Chapter XXXVIII: Part IV: Diplomatic Papers Relating to the Origin of the War, (4)

"Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said: 'It is only because we
are having a personal conversation that I allow you to say that
to me.'

"'Certainly,' I replied, 'but if Peter I humiliates himself,
domestic trouble will probably break out in Serbia; that will
open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where you
will be led by Vienna?' I added that the language of the German
newspapers was not the language of persons who were indifferent
to, and unacquainted with, the question, but betokened an active
support. Finally I remarked that the shortness of the time limit
given to Serbia for submission would make an unpleasant
impression in Europe.

"Herr von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little
excitement (_un peu d'émotion_) on the part of Serbia's friends,
but that he was counting on their giving her wise advice.

"'I have no doubt,' I then said to him, 'that Russia would
endeavor to persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make acceptable
concessions; but why not ask from one what is being asked from
the other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given
at Belgrade, is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being
given at Vienna from another quarter?'

"The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that depended
on circumstances; but immediately checked himself; he repeated
that the difficulty must be localized. He asked me if I really
thought the situation serious. 'Certainly,' I answered, 'because
if what is happening is the result of due reflection, I do not
understand why all means of retreat have been cut off.'

"All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support
Austria's attitude with unusual energy. The weakness which her
Austro-Hungarian ally has shown for some years past has weakened
the confidence that was placed in her here. She was found heavy
to drag along. Mischievous legal proceedings, such as the Agram
and the Friedjung affairs, brought odium on her police and
covered them with ridicule. All that was asked of the police was
that they should be strong; the conviction is that they were
violent.

"An article which appeared in the 'Lokal Anzeiger' this evening
shows also that at the German Chancellery there exists a state of
mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay
sufficient attention, I mean the feeling that monarchies must
stand together. I am convinced that great weight must be attached
to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the
Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have been
affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been
a few days previously.

"It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von
Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to
everyone that they were ignorant of the scope of the note sent by
Austria to Serbia."

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin as follows:

"The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his ministers could
not be more pacific, a fact of which the President of the
[French] Republic and the president of the council have been
able to satisfy themselves directly; but the ultimatum which the
Austro-Hungarian Government has just delivered to the Cabinet at
Belgrade introduces a new and disquieting element into the
situation.

"Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer
violence to Serbia. The shortness of the time limit fixed by the
ultimatum renders still more difficult the moderating influence
that the powers of the Triple Entente might exercise at Vienna.

"On the other hand, M. Sazonof [Russian Prime Minister] assumes
that Germany will desire to support her ally and I am afraid that
this impression is correct. Nothing but the assurance of the
solidarity of the Triple Entente can prevent the German powers
from emphasizing their provocative attitude."

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin an interview with Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Cambon and Grey were agreed that everything must be done to avert the crisis, and that the British Cabinet should take the initiative in offering mediation by the four powers not directly interested, Great Britain, France, Russia and Germany. If Germany assented, time would be gained, and this was the essential point.

"Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with Prince
Lichnowsky the proposal. I mentioned the matter to my Russian
colleague [Count Benckendorff] who is afraid of a surprise from
Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have dispatched
her ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.

"Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he
returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held
pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg
and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter
capital by the rumors of a naval entente between Russia and Great
Britain, by the czar's visit to Bucharest, and by the
strengthening of the Russian army. Count Benckendorff had
concluded from this that a war with Russia would be looked upon
without disfavor in Germany.

"The Under-Secretary of State [Sir Arthur Nicholson] has been
struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince
Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if
Germany had wished to do so she could have stopped the dispatch
of the ultimatum.

"The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see
no way of arresting the course of events.

"However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the
démarche upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey."

In a second letter M. Cambon reported receipt of the details of the Austrian ultimatum.

"In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it
extremely difficult for his Government not to support Serbia, we
have been asking ourselves what intervention could avert the
conflict.

"Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I propose
to suggest that he should ask for the semiofficial intervention
of the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack."

M. Bienvenu-Martin informed the French Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna and Rome, and the Ministers at Stockholm and Belgrade of M. Cambon's report, and his (Bienvenu-Martin's) willingness to cooperate in the proposed conciliatory action at Vienna.

_Belgium._ M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg

"that the Government had under consideration an address to the
powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neutrality assuring
them of Belgium's determination to fulfill the international
obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war
breaking out on her frontiers.

"The Government have come to the conclusion that such a
communication would be premature at present, but that events
might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward
suitable instructions at the desired moment to the Belgian
representatives abroad.

"In these circumstances I have proposed to the King [Albert] and
to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you
now exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the
prospect of a Franco-German war became more threatening.

"I inclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you
should read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you
should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a
communication necessary.

"I shall inform you by telegram when you are to act on these
instructions.

"This telegram will be dispatched when the order is given for the
mobilization of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope
and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our
information leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution."

The note inclosed said that Belgium had "most scrupulously" observed the obligations of neutrality imposed on her by the treaties of April 19, 1839, and would "strive unflinchingly" to fulfill them whatever the new circumstances might be.

"The friendly feelings of the powers toward her have been so
often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her
territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities
break out upon her frontiers.

"All necessary steps to insure respect of Belgian neutrality have
nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has
been mobilized and is taking up such strategic positions as have
been chosen to secure the defense of the country and the respect
of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have
been put in a state of defense....

"These measures are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfill
her international obligations; and it is obvious that they
neither have been nor can have been undertaken with any intention
of taking part in an armed struggle between the powers or from
any feeling of distrust of any of those powers."

On the following day this notification was also sent to the Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.

SATURDAY, JULY 25, 1914

_Austria-Hungary._ Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed from Lembach to his Under-Secretary, Baron von Macchio, that Russia through Prince Koudacheff, its Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, was pressing for an extension of the time limit in the note to Serbia, and that he should tell the prince this would not be granted, but that, even after the severance of diplomatic relations, Serbia could have peace by complying unconditionally with Austria-Hungary's demands--in which case, however, she must pay the cost of Austro-Hungarian military measures.

Later, Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Prince Koudacheff had based his request on the powers being taken by surprise in the demands on Serbia, and therefore that Russia should have time to consider the evidence in the case as presented in Austria-Hungary's _dossier_. These grounds, said Count Berchtold, rested on a mistaken hypothesis.

"Our note to the powers was in no way intended to invite them to
make known their own views on the subject, but merely bore the
character of a statement for information, the communication of
which we regarded as a duty laid on us by international
courtesy.... We regarded our action as concerning us and Serbia
alone."

Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, telegraphed Count Berchtold that the Serbian Cabinet on the evening of the 24th and morning of the 25th had been preparing its reply to the note, and would deliver it before the time limit expired; preparations were being made by the Serbian Government and army for removal into the interior; foreign legations expected to have to follow; the Russian Legation was already packing up; the Austro-Hungarian Legation were ready to leave Belgrade by the 6.30 p. m. train.

Count Berchtold notified Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg, on the same day, that, in case of Russia reconsidering her position, and refusing to be swept away by the bellicose elements, he, with the support of his German colleague, Count Pourtalès, a close understanding with whom was presumed, should impress upon M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Austria-Hungary, in event of war with Russia, would not stand alone.

"That we had striven up till now, so far as in us lay, to
preserve the peace which we considered to be the most precious
possession of nations, was shown by the course of events during
the last forty years, and by the historical fact that our
gracious emperor has won for himself the glorious title of
'Protector of the Peace.'

"We should, therefore, most sincerely deplore the disturbance of
the European peace, because we also were of the opinion that the
strengthening of the Balkan States in a position of political and
national independence would prove to the advantage of our
relations with Russia, and would also remove all possibility of
antagonism between us and Russia; also because we have always
been ready, in the shaping of our own policy, to take into
consideration the dominant political interests of Russia.

"Any further toleration of Serbian intrigues would undermine our
existence as a state and our position as a great power, thus also
threatening the balance of power in Europe. We are, however,
convinced that it is to Russia's own interests, as her peaceful
leaders will clearly see, that the existing European balance of
power which is of such importance for the peace of the world,
should be maintained. Our action against Serbia, whatever form it
takes, is conservative from first to last, and its object is the
necessary preservation of our position in Europe."

In a supplementary telegram Count Berchtold instructed Count Szápáry to explain that point five in the note to Serbia was interpolated merely out of practical considerations, and not to infringe on the sovereignty of Serbia.

"By 'collaboration' in point five, we are thinking of the
establishment of a private 'Bureau de Sûreté' at Belgrade, which
would operate in the same way as the analogous Russian
establishments in Paris and in cooperation with the Serbian
police and administration."

Other ambassadors were similarly instructed.

_Russia._ M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to M. Sazonof reporting that he and the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, had urged the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, to advise Vienna to extend the time limit in the ultimatum to Serbia. Von Jagow had telegraphed the request to Vienna, but, owing to the absence of Count Berchtold from the capital, feared that it would have no result.

"Moreover, he has doubts as to the wisdom of Austria yielding at
the last moment, and he is inclined to think that such a step on
her part might increase the assurance of Serbia. I replied that a
great power such as Austria could give way without impairing her
prestige, and I adduced every other similar argument, but failed,
nevertheless, to obtain any more definite promise. Even when I
gave him to understand that action must be taken at Vienna if the
possibility of terrible consequences was to be avoided, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs answered each time in the negative."

M. Sevastipoulo, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, telegraphed M. Sazonof that, at his instance, the French representative at Vienna had been instructed to request extension of the time limit in the note to Serbia.

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, telegraphed that the British representative at Vienna had been instructed to do the same, and also to discuss the prevention of hostilities should the request be refused.

M. Sazonof replied by telegraph that in event of hostilities, Russia counted on Great Britain siding at once and definitely with France and Russia in order to maintain the European balance of power for which Great Britain had constantly intervened in the past and which would certainly be compromised by the triumph of Austria.

Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, handed a note _verbale_ to M. Sazonof, denying the press report that the action of Austria-Hungary was instigated by the German Government, and declaring that this government "had no knowledge of the text" of the note to Serbia before it was presented, and had "exercised no influence upon its contents."

"Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims
made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers
justified.

"Above all Germany wishes, as she has already declared from the
very beginning of the Austro-Serbian dispute, that this conflict
should be localized."

The same statement was made to the French Government by Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador, and to the British Government by Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador. The count asked Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that the British Government bring conciliatory pressure on Austria.

"Grey replied that this was quite impossible. He added that, as
long as complications existed between Austria and Serbia alone,
British interests were only indirectly affected; but he had to
look ahead to the fact that Austrian mobilization would lead to
Russian mobilization, and that from that moment a situation would
exist in which the interests of all the powers would be involved.
In that event Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of
action."

_Great Britain._ Sir Francis Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that M. Bienvenu-Martin, French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, hoped that Serbia's reply to Austra-Hungary's demands would be sufficiently conciliatory to obviate extreme measures, but said that there would be revolution in Serbia if she were to accept the demands in their entirety.

Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, said that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador, Count Szápáry, did not quite correspond with information received from German quarters, which information came too late to affect negotiations at Vienna.

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Serbia was quite
ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be
guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept
the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister
for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had
with the Serbian Minister [Dr. Spalaikovitch] yesterday, that, in
the event of the Austrians attacking Serbia, the Serbian
Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into
the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the
powers to help them. His excellency was in favor of their making
this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an
international footing, as the obligations taken by Serbia in
1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were
given not to Austria, but to the powers.

"If Serbia should appeal to the powers, Russia would be quite
ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of
England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his
opinion, that Serbia might propose to submit the question to
arbitration.

"On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not
precipitate war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your
influence in favor of peace, his excellency assured me that
Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action
until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality
directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present
_status quo_ in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony
there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her
attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with
France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now,
rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged
into war.

"I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin
and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of
moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an
ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once.
His excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that
she could count upon our neutrality.

"I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilized, Germany
would not be content with mere mobilization, or give Russia time
to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His
excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush
Serbia and become the predominant power in the Balkans, and, if
she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the
risks of war."

Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State, had instructed the German Ambassador at Vienna, Herr von Tschirscky, to present to Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Grey's suggestion of an extension of the time limit for Serbia's reply, but that, owing to Berchtold's absence from the capital, the extension would probably not be granted. Von Jagow did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but admitted that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Serbia "could not swallow" certain of Austria-Hungary's demands.

"I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military
action against Serbia, Austria would dangerously excite public
opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion
that crisis could be localized. I said that telegrams from Russia
in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he
maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said
that he had given the Russian Government to understand that the
last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all
in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between
Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall
in with your suggestion as to the four powers working in favor of
moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

"Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note
left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated
very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all
about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such
knowledge."

Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that the Italian Secretary General was of opinion that Austria will only be restrained by Serbia's unconditional surrender, and that there was reliable information she intended to seize the Saloniki Railway.

Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that the language of the Vienna press left the impression that the surrender of Serbia was neither expected nor desired, and that Minister for Foreign Affairs Berchtold would go to Ischl to communicate Serbia's reply as soon as it was presented.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey a forecast of the Serbian reply, and said that the Serbian Government considered it would be fully satisfactory unless Austria-Hungary was determined on war at any cost. In a supplementary telegram he said that in view of his French and Russian colleagues not having received instructions from their governments and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Serbian reply, he had not offered advice to the Serbian Government. It was highly probable the Russian Government had urged the utmost moderation on Serbia.

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that he could not promise to Russia more than he had done.

"I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to
sanction our going to war over a Serbian quarrel. If, however,
war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us
into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

"The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian
_démarche_ makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time
both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other.
In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for
the other four powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian
Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the
four powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and
arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly
that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no
doubt gladly cooperate.

"No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by
either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and
included the allies or friends of both. The cooperation of
Germany would, therefore, be essential."

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to the same effect, and also that Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, was personally favorable to the suggestion of mediation between Austria and Russia, which he thought Austria might be able with dignity to accept.

"I impressed upon the ambassador that, in the event of Russian
and Austrian mobilization, the participation of Germany would be
essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do
nothing. The French Government were traveling at the moment, and
I had had no time to consult them, and could not therefore be
sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government
agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I
thought it the right thing to act upon it."

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, the text of the Russian telegram sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna asking the Austro-Hungarian Government for extension of the time limit for the Serbian reply, and protesting that a refusal would be "against international ethics." Grey asked Bunsen to support the Russian position.

"I trust that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too
late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time
in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking
any irretrievable steps."

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, an account of an interview of M. Boschkovitch, Serbian Minister at London, with Sir Arthur Nicholson, British Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

"He mentioned that both the assassins of the archduke were
Austrian subjects--Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Serbia,
and that the Serbian authorities, considering him suspect and
dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the
Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and
said that he was an innocent and harmless individual."

_France._--M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, an interview with Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin.

"The Belgian Minister appears very anxious.... He is of opinion
that Austria and Germany have desired to take advantage of the
fact that, owing to a combination of circumstances at the present
moment, Russia and England appear to them to be threatened by
domestic troubles, while in France the state of the army is under
discussion. Moreover, he does not believe in the pretended
ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's
_démarche_.

"He thinks that, if the form of it has not been submitted to the
Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its dispatch has been cleverly
chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise
the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganization.

"He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just interrupted his
holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy would be
surprised, to put it no higher, at having been kept out of the
whole affair by her two Allies."

M. Bienvenu-Martin notified the French Legations at London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Stockholm of a visit made him by Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador, to protest against an article in the _Écho de Paris_ calling his _démarche_ of yesterday a "German threat." M. Berthelot, French Political Director, assured him that no private information had been given out by the Foreign office of the _démarche_, and that the article merely showed that the proceeding was known elsewhere than at the Quai d'Orsay. The German Ambassador did not take up the allusion.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that M. Sazonof, Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had been unfavorably impressed by the evasive replies and recriminations of Count de Pourtalès, the German Ambassador, over the note to Serbia.

"The ministers will hold a council to-morrow with the czar
presiding. M. Sazonof preserves complete moderation. 'We must
avoid,' he said to me, 'everything which might precipitate the
crisis. I am of opinion that, even if the Austro-Hungarian
Government come to blows with Serbia, we ought not to break off
negotiations.'"

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin the interview with Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State, by Sir Horace Rumbold.

"The British Chargé d'Affaires inquired of Herr von Jagow, as I
had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the
Austrian note before it was dispatched, and he received so clear
a reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter
further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at
the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria.

"Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter was a
domestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had become
essentially an international one."

Later in the day M. Cambon reported the interview between Herr von Jagow and M. Broniewski, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

"M. Broniewski, like myself, has heard the rumor that Austria,
while declaring that she did not desire an annexation of
territory, would occupy parts of Serbia until she had received
complete satisfaction. 'One knows,' he said to me, 'what this
word "satisfaction" means.' M. Broniewski's impressions of
Germany's ultimate intentions are very pessimistic."

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that Prince Koudacheff, Russian Chargé d'Affaires, had sent his Government's request of an extension of the time limit for the Serbian reply to Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in two telegrams, one addressed to him on his journey, and the other to Ischl, his destination. The prince does not expect any result. Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, had received "with icy coldness" the prince's expostulation that the submission by Austria-Hungary of grievances against Serbia without permitting time for their examination was not consonant with international courtesy. The baron replied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being courteous.

"The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humiliation on
Serbia: it will accept no intervention from any power until the
blow has been delivered and received full in the face by Serbia."

M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that the request by the Russian Government for Italy's cooperation in securing from Austria-Hungary an extension of the time limit for the Serbian reply, came too late for action thereon, owing to the absence from Rome of the Prime Minister, the Marquis di San Giuliano.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, notified M. Bienvenu-Martin that report had come from Vienna of rupture between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

"Large crowds consisting of several hundred persons are
collecting here before the newspaper offices and a demonstration
of numbers of young people has just passed through the
Pariser-platz shouting cries of 'Hurrah' for Germany, and singing
patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the _Siegessaül_
[column of victory], the Austrian and then the Italian Embassy.
It is a significant outburst of chauvinism....

"In financial circles measures are already being taken to meet
every eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis is seen,
in view of the determined support which Germany is giving to
Austria.

"I, for my part, see in Great Britain the only power which might
be listened to at Berlin.

"Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburg, and London will not
succeed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they show a firm
and absolutely united front."

At the hour of expiration of the ultimatum to Serbia, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that Prince Koudacheff, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, had presented alone his request for an extension of the time limit, it seeming to the representatives of the other powers useless to support him when there was no time to do so.

"At the last moment we are assured that the Austrian Minister has
just left Belgrade hurriedly; he must have thought the Serbian
Government's acceptance of the conditions imposed by his
Government inadequate."

SERBIA'S REPLY TO THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE

A few minutes before 6 p. m., July 25, 1914, the Serbian Government made its reply to the Austrian note.

This declared that no attempts had been made, or declarations uttered, by responsible representatives of Serbia, tending to subvert Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina, since March 31, 1909, when protests against the annexation of these countries made in the Skupshtina (Serbian Parliament) were cut short by declarations of the Serbian Government. It drew attention to the fact that Austria-Hungary had since then made no complaint in this connection save in regard to a school book, concerning which it had received an entirely satisfactory explanation.

"Serbia has several times given proofs of her pacific and
moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to
Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive
interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved.
The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for
manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the
press and the peaceable work of societies--manifestations which
take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of
events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control.
The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the
fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions
which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of
a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the
majority of these questions to the advantage of the two
neighboring countries.

"For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and
surprised at the statements, according to which members of the
Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the
preparations for the crime committed at Sarajevo; the Royal
Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an
investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were
ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their
attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom
representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with
the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are
prepared to hand over for trial any Serbian subject, without
regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime
of Sarajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they
undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the
'Journal officiel,' on the date of July 26, the following
declaration":

[Here follows the declaration required by Austria-Hungary, with alterations intended to lessen the humiliation, which changes will be noted in a following criticism by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office.]

"This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal
army in an order of the day, in the name of his majesty the king,
by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be
published in the next official army bulletin.

"The Royal Government further undertake:

"1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the
Skupshtina a provision into the press law providing for the most
severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any
publication the general tendency of which is directed against
the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government
engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause
an amendment to be introduced into Article XXII of the
Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be
confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the
categorical terms of Article XXII of the Constitution.

"2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the
Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the
'Narodna Odbrana' and other similar societies have committed up
to the present any criminal act of this nature through the
proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal
Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal
Government, and will dissolve the 'Narodna Odbrana" Society and
every other society which may be directing its efforts against
Austria-Hungary.

"3. The Royal Serbian Government undertake to remove without
delay from their public educational establishments in Serbia all
that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against
Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government
furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

"4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military
service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved
to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the
territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the
Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later
date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for
the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against
them.

"5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly
grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial
and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the
collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government
upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such
collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law,
with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations.

"6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it
their duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or
eventually may be, implicated in the plot of June 28, and who
happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the
participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or
authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal
Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an
arrangement, as it would be a violation of the constitution and
of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases
communications as to the results of the investigations in
question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

"7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the
delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch.
As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to June 28 was employed (on
probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been
possible to arrest him.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as
to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the
presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of
guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the inquiry
at Sarajevo for the purposes of the later inquiry.

"8. The Serbian Government will reinforce and extend the measures
which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms
and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that
they will immediately order an inquiry and will severely punish
the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have
failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of
Sarajevo to pass.

"9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the
remarks made by their officials whether in Serbia or abroad, in
interviews after the crime which according to the statement of
the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile toward the [Dual]
Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have
communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks,
and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually
made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will
itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

"10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal
Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the
above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the
present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and
carried out.

"If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this
reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it is not to the
common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are
ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by
referring this question to the decision of the International
Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in
the drawing up of the declaration made by the Serbian Government
on March 31, 1909."

The Austro-Hungarian Minister to Belgrade, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, to whom the reply was delivered, on comparing it with his instructions, declared it unsatisfactory, and informed M. Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister that he and his legation would leave Belgrade that evening, turning over his Government's interests in Serbia to the German Legation. Rupture in diplomatic relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, he said, was a _fait accompli_. These events M. Pashitch reported on the same day to all the Serbian Legations abroad, and further announced:

"The Royal Serbian Government have summoned the Skupshtina to
meet on July 27 at Nish, whither all the ministries with their
staffs are proceeding this evening. The crown prince has issued,
in the name of the king, an order for the mobilization of the
army, while to-morrow or the day after a proclamation will be
made in which it will be announced that civilians who are not
liable to military service should remain peaceably at home, while
soldiers should proceed to their appointed posts and defend the
country to the best of their ability, in the event of Serbia
being attacked."

The Austrian Minister left Belgrade at 6.30 p. m. for Vienna. On the same day the Serbian Minister at Vienna, M. Yov. Yovanovitch, received his passports. On the same day the Serbian reply was presented at Vienna, where it received the following commentaries by the Foreign Office:

"The Royal Serbian Government limits itself to establishing that
since the declaration of March 31, 1909, there has been no
attempt on the part of the Serbian Government to alter the
position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

"With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our note, as
we have not insisted that she and her officials have undertaken
anything official in this direction. Our gravamen is that in
spite of the obligation assumed in the cited note, she has
omitted to suppress the movement directed against the territorial
integrity of the monarchy.

"Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the entire
direction of her policies, and in entering into friendly and
neighborly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and not
to interfere with the possession of Bosnia.

"The assertion of the Royal Serbian Government that the
expressions of the press and the activity of Serbian associations
possess a private character and thus escape governmental control,
stands in full contrast with the institutions of modern states
and even the most liberal of press and society laws, which nearly
everywhere subject the press and the societies to a certain
control of the state. This is also provided for by the Serbian
institutions. The rebuke against the Serbian Government consists
in the fact that it has totally omitted to supervise its press
and its societies, in so far as it knew their direction to be
hostile to the [Dual] Monarchy.

"The assertion [that the Serbian Government was ready to proceed
against all persons in regard to whom it would receive
information] is incorrect. The Serbian Government was accurately
informed about the suspicion resting upon quite definite
personalities and not only in the position, but also obliged by
its own laws to institute investigations spontaneously. The
Serbian Government has done nothing in this direction."

The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office objected to the alterations made by Serbia in the declaration published in the official organ. This, in the Serbian reply, began:

"The Royal Serbian Government condemns every propaganda which
should be directed against Austria-Hungary.

"The Austrian demand reads: 'The Royal Serbian Government
condemns the propaganda against Austria-Hungary....' The
alteration of the declaration as demanded by us, which has been
made by the Royal Serbian Government, is meant to imply that a
propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist, and
that it is not aware of such. This formula is insincere, and the
Serbian Government reserves itself the subterfuge for later
occasions that it had not disavowed by this declaration the
existing propaganda, nor recognized the same as hostile to the
[Dual] Monarchy, whence it could deduce further that it is not
obliged to suppress in the future a propaganda similar to the
present one."

Objection was similarly made to the alteration in the Serbian apology for acts of Serbian officers. This apology began:

"The Royal Government regrets that according to a communication
of the Imperial and Royal Government certain Serbian officers and
functionaries have participated in the propaganda.

"The formula as demanded by Austria reads: The Royal Government
regrets that Serbian officers and functionaries ... have
participated.... Also with this formula and the further addition
'according to the declaration of the Imperial and Royal
Government,' the Serbian Government pursues the object, already
indicated above, to preserve a free hand for the future.

"Austria had demanded:

"1. To suppress every publication which incites to hatred and
contempt for the [Dual] Monarchy, and whose tendency is directed
against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.

"We wanted to bring about the obligation for Serbia to take care
that such attacks of the press would cease in the future.

"Instead Serbia offers to pass certain laws which are meant as
means toward this end, viz:

"(_a_) A law according to which the expressions of the press
hostile to the [Dual] Monarchy can be individually punished, a
matter which is immaterial to us, all the more so, as the
individual prosecution of press intrigues is very rarely possible
and as, with a lax enforcement of such laws, the few cases of
this nature would not be punished. The proposition, therefore,
does not meet our demand in any way, and it offers not the least
guaranty for the desired success.

"(_b_) An amendment to article 22 of the constitution, which
would permit confiscation, a proposal which does not satisfy us,
as the existence of such a law in Serbia is of no use to us. For
we want the _obligation_ of the Government to _enforce_ it and
that has not been promised us.

"These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and
evasive as we are not told within what time these laws will be
passed, and as in the event of the not passing of these laws by
the Skupshtina everything would remain as it is, except in the
event of a possible resignation of the Government.

"2. The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated
societies hostile to the [Dual] Monarchy fills the entire public
life of Serbia; it is therefore an entirely inacceptable reserve
if the Serbian Government asserts that it knows nothing about it.
Aside from this, our demand is not completely fulfilled, as we
have asked besides:

"To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies to
prevent the reformation of the dissolved societies under another
name and in another form.

"In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly
silent, so that through this semiconcession there is offered us
no guaranty for putting an end to the agitation of the
associations hostile to the monarchy, especially the Narodna
Odbrana.

"3. The Serbian Government first demands proofs for a propaganda
hostile to the monarchy in the public instruction of Serbia while
it must know that the textbooks introduced in the Serbian schools
contain objectionable matter in this direction and that a large
portion of the teachers are in the camp of the Narodna Odbrana
and affiliated societies.

"Furthermore the Serbian Government has not fulfilled a part of
our demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its text the
addition desired by us: 'as far as the body of instructors is
concerned, as well as the means of instruction'--a sentence which
shows clearly where the propaganda hostile to the monarchy is to
be found in the Serbian schools.

"4. By promising the dismissal from the military and civil
services of those officers and officials who are found guilty by
judicial procedure, the Serbian Government limits its assent to
those cases, in which these persons have been charged with a
crime according to the statutory code. As, however, we demand the
removal of such officers and officials as indulge in a propaganda
hostile to the monarchy, which is generally not punishable in
Serbia, our demands have not been fulfilled in this point."

5. The Serbian reply declared that Serbia was willing to permit that cooperation of officials of the [Dual] Monarchy on Serbian territory which does not run counter to international law and criminal law.

"The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing
to do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of
state police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement.
The reserved attitude of Serbia is therefore incomprehensible and
on account of its vague general form it would lead to
unbridgeable difficulties.

"6. The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable:

"1. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants in
the outrage.

"2. Participation by Imperial and Royal Government officials in
the examinations ('recherche' in contrast with 'enquête
judiciaire').

"3. It did not occur to us to let Imperial and Royal Government
officials participate in the Serbian court procedure; they were
to cooperate only in the police researches which had to furnish
and fix the material for the investigation.

"If the Serbian Government misunderstands us here, this is done
deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between
'enquête judiciaire' and simple police researches. As it desired
to escape from every control of the investigation which would
yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for
it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner
the cooperation of our officials (precedents for such police
intervention exist in great numbers) it tries to justify its
refusal by showing up our demands as impossible.

"(In reference to arrest of conspirators).

"7. This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation,
Ciganowic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three
days after the outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that
Ciganowic had participated in the outrage. In the first place, it
is therefore incorrect that Ciganowic left the Serbian service on
June 28. In the second place, we add that the prefect of police
at Belgrade, who had himself caused the departure of this
Ciganowic and who knew his whereabout, declared in an interview
that a man by the name of Milan Ciganowic did not exist in
Belgrade.

"9. (In reference to expressions made against Austria-Hungary by
Serbian officials in interviews.)

"The Royal Serbian Government must be aware of the interviews in
question. If it demands of the Imperial and Royal Government that
it should furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews
and if it reserves for itself the right of a formal
investigation, it shows that it is not its intention seriously to
fulfill the demand.

"10. (In reference to referring the dispute to arbitration of the
powers.)

"The Serbian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time."

BEGINNING OF MOBILIZATION

The diplomatic issue now became that over mobilization by Russia: whether it was a threat of war against Austria-Hungary alone, or against Germany as well.

On the day of Serbia's reply to the Austro-Hungarian note, July 25, 1914, General von Chelius, German honorary aide to the Czar, sent a telegram to Kaiser William II through the German Foreign Office, which stated:

"The maneuvers of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly
interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at
once. The maneuvers have been cancelled. The military pupils were
raised to-day to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At
headquarters there obtains great excitement over the procedure of
Austria. I have the impression that complete preparations for
mobilization against Austria are being made."

On the same day Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, telegraphed M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"Grey has told the German Ambassador [Prince Lichnowsky] that in
his opinion Austrian mobilization must lead to Russian
mobilization, that grave danger of a general war will thereupon
arise, and that he sees only one means of reaching a peaceful
settlement, namely, that, in view of the Austrian and Russian
mobilizations, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain should
abstain from immediate mobilization, and should at once offer
their good offices. Grey told me that the first essential of this
plan was the consent of Germany and her promise not to mobilize.
He has therefore, as a first step, made an inquiry on this point
at Berlin."

On the same day the German Chancellor, Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg, telegraphed to Prince Lichnowsky:

"The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an
Austro-Serbian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly
correct. We do not wish to interpose in the former any more than
England, and as heretofore we take the position that this
question must be localized by virtue of all powers refraining
from intervention. It is therefore our hope that Russia will
refrain from any action in view of her responsibility and the
seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, in the event of an
Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as
Allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the
other powers."

SUNDAY, JULY 26, 1914

_Austria-Hungary._ The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Szápáry, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Vienna, that Count Pourtalès the German Ambassador, upon hearing reports of measures for Russian mobilization, had called the attention of M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the fact that nowadays mobilization was a highly dangerous form of diplomatic pressure.

"For, in that event, the purely military consideration of the
question by the general staffs would find expression, and if that
button were once touched in Germany, the situation would get out
of control.

"M. Sazonof assured the German Ambassador on his word of honor
that the reports on the subject were incorrect; that up to that
time not a single horse and not a single reservist had been
called up, and that all the measures that were being taken were
merely measures of preparation in the military districts of Kiev,
Odessa, and perhaps Kazan and Moscow."