Chapter XXXVI: Part IV: Diplomatic Papers Relating to the Origin of the War, (2)

"Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as
follows: The country squires, represented in the Reichstag by the
Conservative party, want at all costs to escape the death duties,
which are bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting
of the session which has just closed the Reichstag agreed to
these duties in principle. It is a serious attack on the
interests and privileges of the landed gentry. On the other hand,
this aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive
to compare the Army List with the Year Book of the nobility. War
alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest.
During the discussions on the Army Bill a Conservative speaker
put forward the need for promotion among officers as an argument
in its favor. Finally this social class, which forms a hierarchy
with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realizes with dread
the democratization of Germany and the increasing power of the
Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only
does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection
threaten its material interests, but in addition the number of
its political representatives decreases with each legislative
period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162
belonged to the aristocracy; in 1898, 83; in 1912, 57. Out of
this number 27 alone belong to the Right, 14 to the Center, 7 to
the Left, and 1 sits among the Socialists.

"The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal
party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same
reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions,
however, they are bellicose. They have their reasons, social in
character.

"The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy
at the democratization of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members
in the Reichstag; in 1874, 55; in 1887, 99; in 1912, 45. They do
not forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the
leading rôle in Parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes
against the country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between
Conservative instincts and Liberal ideas they look to war to
settle problems which their parliamentary representatives are
painfully incapable of solving. In addition, doctrinaire
manufacturers declare that the difficulties between themselves
and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary
ideas of freedom--without France industrial unrest would be
unknown.

"Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armor plate, big
merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating
on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity--all
these regard war as good business.

"Among the 'Bismarckians' must be reckoned officials of all
kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free
Conservatives or Imperial party. This is the party of the
'pensioned,' whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the
'Post.' They find disciples and political sympathizers in the
various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and
formed in the public schools and universities.

"The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits,
develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by
statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire
commensurate with the industrial output of the empire. There are
sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so
they say, is a crushing burden on the nations; it checks
improvement in the lot of the masses and assists the growth of
Socialism. France, by clinging obstinately to her desire for
revenge, opposes disarmament. Once for all she must be reduced
for a century to a state of impotence; that is the best and
speediest way of solving the social problem.

"Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers, and other
apologists of German _Kultur_ wish to impose upon the world a way
of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest
from France that intellectual supremacy which, according to the
clearest thinkers, is still her possession. From this source is
derived the phraseology of the Pan-Germans and the ideas and
adherents of the _Kriegsvereine_ [war leagues], _Wehrvereine_,
and other similar associations too well known to need particular
description. It is enough to note that the dissatisfaction caused
by the treaty of November 4 has considerably swelled the
membership of colonial societies.

"We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is
inspired by rancor and resentment. These are the most dangerous.
They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German
diplomatists are now in very bad odor in public opinion. The most
bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the
negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping
together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one
day they will present their accounts in the war press....

"During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these warlike
diplomatists exclaimed: 'Germany will not be able to have any
serious conversation with France until she has every sound man
under arms.'

"In what terms will this conversation be couched? The opinion is
fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany
will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances
and the tendencies of the emperor. But when the moment comes she
will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack
her. Offense will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian
tradition.

"Must war, then, be considered as inevitable?

"It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk if France
can make it clear to the world that the _Entente Cordiale_ and
the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but
realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The British
fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however,
that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land
alone can a decisive issue be obtained.

"As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in
political and military circles than was the case three or four
years ago, it is not believed that her cooperation will be
sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective.

"People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as
a duel between France and Germany."

On November 22, 1913, M. Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, an account of a recent conversation between the Kaiser and the King of the Belgians in the presence of General von Moltke, Chief of the General German Staff, which gravely impressed King Albert. It showed that German enmity against France was increasing, and that the Kaiser had ceased to be the friend of peace. The Kaiser had come to believe that war with France was inevitable; and, when it did come, that German success was certain. General von Moltke strengthened his sovereign in these opinions:

"This time the matter must be settled, and your majesty can have
no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole
German people will be carried away when that day comes.

"The king of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the
intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that
sense, and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the
French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits
or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators.

"The emperor and his chief of the General Staff nevertheless
persisted in their point of view.

"During the course of this conversation the emperor seemed
overstrained and irritable. As William II advances in years,
family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and
especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater
empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of
the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of
the Pan-Germans and who does not regard the position occupied by
the empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps
the reply of France to the last increase of the Germany army, the
object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of
Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness,
for, whatever may be said, it is realized that Germany cannot go
much further.

"One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation.
The emperor and his chief of the General Staff may have wished to
impress the king of the Belgians and induce him not to make any
opposition in the event of a conflict between us....

"The Emperor William is less master of his impatience than is
usually supposed. I have known him more than once to allow his
real thoughts escape him....

"If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion I would submit that it
would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that
the emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were
formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase
which he likes to use, 'we must keep our powder dry.'"

[See also letter of M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, of July 10, 1914, in pages following.]

The next evidence presented before the court of the world is that by Serbia and her witnesses, the nations thus far, to all appearances, interested solely in maintaining the peace of Europe, as to Serbia's non-responsibility for the assassination of the hereditary Archduke of Austria at Sarajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, and as to her sincere desire to do all she could, short of impairing her sovereignty and suffering national humiliation; and that by Austria-Hungary and the same witnesses that were brought forward by Serbia as to Serbia's complicity in the assassination, and to Austria-Hungary's right to fix this, and to exact guaranties that Serbia should not in the future prosecute her evil designs against Austria-Hungary.

THE ASSASSINATION OF THE AUSTRIAN ARCHDUKE

On June 28, 1914, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. René Viviani, President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, the assassination that day of the hereditary Archduke of Austria and his wife at Sarajevo, Bosnia.

On June 29, 1914, Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, telegraphed to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, that the Vienna press asserted that magisterial inquiry had already shown that the Sarajevo outrage was prepared at Belgrade; that the whole conspiracy in its wider issues was organized there among youths inspired with the great Serbian idea; and that the Belgrade press was exciting public opinion by articles about the intolerable conditions in Bosnia, papers containing which were being smuggled in large quantities into Bosnia.

On the same day, June 29, 1914, Ritter von Storck, Secretary of the German Legation at Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen being absent from his post on leave, reported to Count Berchtold, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Vienna, the following facts:

"Yesterday the anniversary of the battle of the Amselfeld was
celebrated with greater ceremony than usual, and there were
celebrations in honor of the Serbian patriot, Milos Obilic, who
in 1389 with two companions treacherously stabbed the victorious
Murad.

"Among all Serbians, Obilic is regarded as the national hero. In
place of the Turks, however, we are now looked on as the
hereditary enemy, thanks to the propaganda which has been
nourished under the aegis of the royal Government and the
agitation which for many years has been carried on in the press.

"A repetition of the drama on the field of Kossovo seems,
therefore, to have hovered before the minds of the three young
criminals of Sarajevo, Princip, Cabrinovic, and the third person
still unknown, who also threw a bomb. They also shot down an
innocent woman and may, therefore, think that they have surpassed
their model.

"For many years hatred against the [Dual] Monarchy has been sown
in Serbia. The crop has sprung up and the harvest is murder.

"The news arrived at about five o'clock; the Serbian Government
at about ten o'clock caused the Obilic festivities to be
officially stopped. They continued, however, unofficially for a
considerable time after it was dark. The accounts of
eye-witnesses say that people fell into one another's arms in
delight, and remarks were heard such as: 'It serves them right;
we have been expecting this for a long time,' or 'This is revenge
for the annexation [of Bosnia].'"

On the following day (June 30, 1914), M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, warned M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, by telegraph, that the tendency in Vienna was becoming more and more apparent to represent, in the eyes of Europe, the assassination as the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia.

The idea was to use this as a political weapon against Serbia. Great attention should therefore be paid to the tone of the Serbian press.

On the same day (June 30, 1914), Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, in two telegrams informed M. Pashitch that the Berlin press was misleading German public opinion on the outrage; that German hostility toward Serbia was growing, being fostered by false reports from Vienna and Budapest, which were diligently spread in spite of contradictions by some newspapers and news agencies.

On the same day (June 30, 1914), M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, a conversation he had held, in the absence of Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with Baron Macchia, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Department. In this the Serbian Minister adopted the following line of argument:

"The Royal Serbian Government condemn most energetically the
Sarajevo outrage and on their part will certainly most loyally do
everything to prove that they will not tolerate within their
territory the fostering of any agitation or illegal proceedings
calculated to disturb our already delicate relations with
Austria-Hungary. I am of opinion that the Government are prepared
also to submit to trial any persons implicated in the plot in the
event of its being proved that there are any in Serbia. The Royal
Serbian Government, notwithstanding all the obstacles hitherto
placed in their way by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy (creation of an
independent Albania, opposition to Serbian access to the
Adriatic, demand for revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, the
September ultimatum, etc.) remained loyal in their desire to
establish a sound basis for our good neighborly relations. You
know that in this direction something has been done and achieved.
Serbia intends to continue to work for this object, convinced
that it is practicable and ought to be continued. The Sarajevo
outrage ought not to and cannot stultify this work."

M. Yovanovitch said that he had communicated the substance of this conversation to the French and Russian Ambassadors.

On the same day (June 30, 1914), the Serbian Prime Minister received from M. Georgevitch, Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, the information that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador there had told him that, in recent conversations, Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister and Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had expressed himself as satisfied with the attitude of the Serbian Government, and desired friendly relations with it.

On the same day (June 30, 1914), Herr von Storck, Secretary of the German Legation at Belgrade, telegraphed to Count Berchtold that he had asked Herr Gruic, General Secretary of the Serbian Foreign Office, what measures the Royal Serbian police had taken, or proposed to take, to follow up clues to the crime which notoriously were partly to be found in Serbia, and that the reply was that the matter had not yet engaged the attention of the police.

On July 1, 1914, M. Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister was informed by telegraph from the Serbian Minister in London, M. S. Boschkovitch, that, basing their conclusion on Austrian reports, the English press attributed the Sarajevo outrages to Serbian revolutionaries. He was informed by telegraph on the same day, by M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, of popular hostile demonstrations in front of the Serbian Legation, which were quelled by the police. A Serbian flag was said to have been burned.

"Hatred against Serbians and Serbia is being spread among the
people, especially by the lower Catholic circles, the Vienna
press, and military circles. Please do what is possible to
prevent demonstrations taking place in Serbia, and to induce the
Belgrade press to be as moderate as possible in tone.... It is
expected that decision as to the attitude to be adopted toward
Serbia and the Serbians will be taken after the funeral [of the
archduke]."

Thereupon, on the same day (July 1, 1914), M. Pashitch warned all the Serbian legations at foreign courts of the evident purpose of the Austrian and Hungarian press to take political advantage of the act of a "young and ill-balanced fanatic." All ranks of Serbian society, official and unofficial, he said, condemned the act, recognizing that it would be most prejudicial not only to good relations with Austria-Hungary, but to their coreligionists in that country.

"At a moment when Serbia is doing everything in her power to
improve her relations with the neighboring monarchy it is absurd
to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired
acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest
interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage.
Unfortunately this did not lie within Serbia's power, as both
assassins are Austrian subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been careful
to suppress anarchic elements, and after recent events she will
redouble her vigilance, and in the event of such elements
existing within her borders will take the severest measures
against them. Moreover, Serbia will do everything in her power
and use all the means at her disposal in order to restrain the
feelings of ill-balanced people within her frontiers. But Serbia
can on no account permit the Vienna and Hungarian press to
mislead European public opinion and lay the heavy responsibility
for a crime committed by an Austrian subject at the door of the
whole Serbian nation and on Serbia, who can suffer only harm from
such acts....

"Please ... use all available channels in order to put an end as
soon as possible to the anti-Serbian campaign in the European
press."

On the same day (July 1, 1914), Herr Jehlitschka, Austrian Consul General to Turkey, wrote from Uskub, in European Turkey, to Count Berchtold, Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna, of the actions at Prestina on the 525th anniversary of the battle of the Amselfeld (1389), for the first time officially celebrated as the "Festival of the Liberation" of the Serbian nation, and carefully prepared to make it an especially solemn and magnificent demonstration of Serbian nationality.

"The propaganda connected with this at the same time extended to
Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia, but especially to Hungary; those
who took part in it received free passes on the Serbian state
railways; food and lodging at low prices, maintenance by public
bodies, etc., were promised....

"The various speeches ... dealt ... with the well-known theme of
the union of all Serbia and the 'liberation of our brethren in
bondage' beyond the Danube and the Save, even as far as Bosnia
and Dalmatia.

"When, during the course of the evening, the news of the horrible
crime of which Sarajevo had been the scene was circulated, the
feeling which animated the fanatical crowd was, to judge by the
numerous expressions of applause reported to me by authorities in
whom I have absolute confidence, one that I can only characterize
as inhuman.

"In view of this attitude of the population, which was also
displayed at Uskub, all attempts of the Serbian press to divest
Serbia of the moral responsibility for a deed which was received
by a representative gathering with such unvarnished satisfaction
collapse miserably."

On July 2, 1914, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. Viviani, Prime Minister in Paris, the resentment against Serbia in Austrian military circles and by those persons opposed to Serbia's maintenance of the position she had acquired in the Balkans. If the Serbian Government refused as intolerable to its dignity the demand of Austria-Hungary that the Serbian Government investigate into the origin of the archduke's assassination, he feared that this would furnish Austria-Hungary a ground for resort to military measures.

On the same day (July 2, 1914), Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister at Paris, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the French Government advised Serbia to remain calm, in official circles as well as in public opinion.

On July 3, 1914, M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, sent two reports to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, the first containing an account of a mob which gathered before the Serbian Legation on July 2, on account of his having hoisted the national flag at half-mast as a sign of mourning; the bodies of the victims of the Sarajevo tragedy having been brought that day to the Austrian capital. The police dispersed the mob. The papers of July 3, under the heading of "Provocation by the Serbian Minister," falsely described the incident. The minister mentioned by name leading instigators of attacks in the Austrian and German press on Serbia as haranguing the crowd. In the second letter he reported a conversation he had had with Baron Macchio, Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in which the Baron severely censured the Belgrade press for its antimonarchical propaganda, and, implicitly, the Serbian Government for not controlling the press. The Serbian Minister had replied that the press was free, and that there was no means of curbing it except by going to law; and, in rejoinder, he censured the Austro-Hungarian Government, which could control the press of its empire, for permitting it shamefully to attack Serbia by accusing the whole nation of being an accomplice in the Sarajevo crime. Baron Macchio had replied: "We accuse only those who encourage the Great Serbian scheme, and work for the realization of its object." Yovanovitch had rejoined that, till the assassination, Bosnia Serbs had been uniformly called "Bosniaks," yet the assassin was now described as "a Serb," and no mention was made that he was a Bosnian and an Austrian subject. This was evidently to cast odium upon Serbia.

On July 4, 1914, Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister at Paris, reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, a recent conversation with M. Viviani, the new French Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the Sarajevo incident.

"I described to him briefly the causes which had led to the
outrage and which were to be found, in the first place, in the
irksome system of Government in force in the annexed provinces,
and especially in the attitude of the officials, as well as in
the whole policy of the monarchy toward anything orthodox. He
understood the situation, but at the same time expressed the hope
that we should preserve an attitude of calm and dignity in order
to avoid giving cause for fresh accusations in Vienna.

"After the first moment of excitement public opinion here has
quieted down to such an extent that the minister-president
himself considered it advisable in the Palais de Bourbon to
soften the expressions used in the statement which he had made
earlier on the subject in the Senate."

On the same day (July 4, 1914), Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd,[1] telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, had expressed his opinion that the outrages upon the Serbs in Bosnia would increase the sympathy of Europe for Serbia; that the accusations made in Vienna would not obtain credence and that therefore Serbia should remain calm.

[Footnote 1: Although the name St. Petersburg was not changed
officially to Petrograd until after the outbreak of the war, the
latter name is used uniformly in the Serbian Blue Book and
Russian Orange Book.]

On the same day (July 4, 1914), Count Szécsen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, that, in officially thanking M. Poincaré for his sympathy over the Sarajevo tragedy, the President had excused the hostile demonstrations against Serbia by citing those against all Italians in France after the assassination of President Carnot.

"I drew his attention to the fact that that crime had no
connection with any anti-French agitation in Italy, while in the
present case it must be admitted that for years past there has
been an agitation in Serbia against the [Dual] Monarchy fomented
by every means, legitimate and illegitimate.

"In conclusion, M. Poincaré expressed his conviction that the
Serbian Government would meet us with the greatest willingness in
the judicial investigation and the prosecution of the
accomplices. No state could divest itself of this duty."

On the same day (July 4, 1914), M. de Manneville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, reported to M. Viviani, President of the Council in Paris, a conversation with Herr von Zimmermann, German Under-Secretary of State, in which von Zimmermann had expressed the hope that Serbia would satisfy Austria's demands with regard to the investigation and prosecution of the accomplices in the crime of Sarajevo. Otherwise she would be condemned by the whole civilized world.

"The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety
which is shown by a part of the German press as to possible
tension in the relations between the Governments of Vienna and
Belgrade, or at least they do not wish to seem to do so."

Two days later (July 6, 1914), M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported to M. Viviani, Prime Minister at Paris, a recent interview which M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had had with Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires at the request of the latter. The Count intimated that the Austro-Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search for the instigators of the crime of Sarajevo on Serbian soil. M. Sazonof interjected:

"No country has had to suffer more than Russia from crimes
prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in
any country whatsoever the procedure with which your papers
threaten Serbia? Do not embark on such a course."

On the same day (July 6, 1914), M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the excitement in military and government circles against Serbia was growing, owing to the tone of the press, which was diligently exploited by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade. On the same date he informed the Prime Minister in detail of the press agitation against Serbia. By headlines the people were led to infer, on the date of the crime of Sarajevo, that the two perpetrators were Serbs from Serbia proper. In later reports there was a marked tendency to connect the crime with Serbia. Belgrade was indicated as the place of its origin by the visit to that capital of the assassins, and by the bombs originating there, which facts had been elucidated at the trial of the assassins in Sarajevo. The Hungarian press claimed that there was evidence to show:

"1. That the perpetrators while in Belgrade associated with the
_comitadji_ [revolutionist] Mihaylo Ciganovitch; and (2) that the
organizer and instigator of the outrage was Major
Pribitchevitch....

"Further ... the latest announcement which the Hungarian
_Korrespondenzbureau_ made to the newspapers stated:

"'The inquiries made up to the present prove conclusively that
this outrage is the work of a conspiracy. Besides the two
perpetrators, a large number of persons have been arrested,
mostly young men, who are also, like the perpetrators, proved to
have been employed by the Belgrade Narodna Odbrana in order to
commit the outrage, and who were supplied in Belgrade with bombs
and revolvers.' [This item was later recalled.]

"At the same time the Vienna _Korrespondenzbureau_ published the
following official statement:

"'We learn from authoritative quarters that the inquiries
relating to the outrage are being kept absolutely secret. All the
details, therefore, which have appeared in the public press
should be accepted with reserve.'

"Nevertheless the Budapest newspapers continued to publish
alleged reports on the inquiry. In the last 'report' of the
Budapest newspaper 'A Nap,' which was reprinted in yesterday's
Vienna papers, the tendency to lay the responsibility for the
outrage on the Narodna Odbrana is still further emphasized.
According to this report the accused Gabrinovitch had stated that
General Yankovitch is the chief instigator of the outrage."

On the same day Herr Hoflehner, Austro-Hungarian Consular Agent at Nish, Serbia, wrote to Count Berchtold, Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna, of the satisfaction and even joy expressed, especially in the leading circles, over the crime at Sarajevo.

On the next day (July 7, 1914), M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, wrote to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that, though Emperor Francis Joseph had appealed to the Prime Ministers of Austria (Count Berchtold) and of Hungary (Count Tisza), and to the Minister of Finance (Herr Bilinski) for calmness, it was impossible to tell what attitude toward Serbia the Government would take.

"For them one thing is obvious; whether it is proved or not that
the outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they must
sooner or later solve the question of the so-called Great Serbian
agitation within the Hapsburg Monarchy. In what manner they will
do this and what means they will employ to that end has not as
yet been decided; this is being discussed especially in high
Catholic and military circles. The ultimate decision will be
taken only after it has been definitely ascertained what the
inquiry at Sarajevo has brought to light....

"Austria-Hungary has to choose one of the following courses:
either to regard the Sarajevo outrage as a national misfortune
and a crime which ought to be dealt with in accordance with the
evidence obtained, in which case Serbia's cooperation ... will be
requested in order to prevent the perpetrators escaping the
extreme penalty; or, to treat the Sarajevo outrage as a
Pan-Serbian, South-Slav, and Pan-Slav conspiracy with every
manifestation of the hatred, hitherto repressed, against Slavdom.
There are many indications that influential circles are being
urged to adopt the latter course: it is, therefore, advisable to
be ready for defense. Should the former and wiser course be
adopted, we should do all we can to meet Austrian wishes in this
respect."

On July 9, 1914, M. Pashitch telegraphed to all the foreign Serbian Legations that the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince Alexander was receiving daily threatening letters from Austro-Hungarians, and that they should make use of this information with other foreign ministers and journalists.

On July 10, 1914, M. Allizé, French Minister In Munich, wrote to M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, that the Bavarians were asking the object of the new German armaments.

"Recognizing that no one threatens Germany, they consider that
German diplomacy had already at its disposal forces sufficiently
large and alliances sufficiently powerful to protect German
interests with success."

Nevertheless, public opinion will support the Imperial Government in any enterprise in which they might energetically embark, even at the risk of conflict.

"The state of war to which all the events in the East have
accustomed people's minds for the last two years appears no
longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the
political and economic difficulties which will continue to
increase."

On July 11, 1914, M. d'Apchier-le-Maugin, French Consul General at Budapest, reported to M. Vivian, Prime Minister at Paris, that Count Tisza, Hungarian Prime Minister, had refused to make to the Hungarian Chamber any disclosures on the Sarajevo incident until the judicial inquiry was closed. The chamber approved.

"He did not give any indication whether the project of a
_démarche_ [proceeding] at Belgrade, with which all the papers of
both hemispheres are full, would be followed up."

The virulence of the Hungarian press has diminished, and the papers are unanimous in advising against this step, which might be dangerous.

"The semiofficial press especially would desire that for the word
'_démarche_,' with its appearance of a threat, there should be
substituted the expression '_pourparlers_' [conversations],
which appears to them more friendly.

"The general public, however, fears war. It is said that every
day cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities
toward the frontier.... The Government, whether it is sincerely
desirous of peace, or whether it is _preparing a coup_, is now
doing all that it can to allay these anxieties.... Their optimism
to order is, in fact, without an echo; the nervousness of the
Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof of
this; without exception, stocks have fallen to an unaccountably
low level."

On July 14, 1914, Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State, had told him that Austria-Hungary, as a great power, could not tolerate the provocative attitude of the Serbian press.

On the same day M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, wrote M. Pashitch that the Literary Bureau of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, which supplied the press with material and set its tone, was exciting opinion against Serbia. Official German circles in Vienna were especially ill disposed toward Serbia. The "Neue Freie Presse," under instructions from the Vienna Press Bureau, summarized the feeling:

"We have to settle matters with Serbia by war; it is evident that
peaceable means are of no avail. And if it must come to war
sooner or later, then it is better to see the matter through now.

"The Bourse is very depressed. There has not been such a fall in
prices In Vienna for a long time."

On the same day, July 14, 1914, M. Pashitch sent two letters to all the foreign Serbian Legations.

In the first letter he gave specific illustrations of misinformation by the Austro-Hungarian press such as that Austro-Hungarian subjects were maltreated in Belgrade, and were now panic-stricken, and that there had been a demonstration against the Austrian Minister at the funeral of Dr. Hartwig, the Russian Minister. There was no foundation whatever for these statements.

In the second letter he notified the Legations that the Austro-Hungarian news bureaus, the channel of Serbian news to the world, misrepresented, through garbling extracts, the tone of the Belgrade press, and that all Serbian papers were forbidden entry into Austria-Hungary.

"With us the press is absolutely free. Newspapers can be
confiscated only for _lèse-majesté_ or for revolutionary
propaganda; in all other cases confiscation is illegal. There is
no censorship of newspapers."

Accordingly the Serbian foreign ministers were instructed to give out information that the Serbian Government lacked the power to control the newspapers, and further to spread knowledge of the fact that it was Austro-Hungarian papers which originated all the controversies, while the Serbian ones only replied. There was no desire in Serbia to provoke Austria-Hungary.

On July 15, 1914, M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the Ministers of the Dual Monarchy had been consulting about the Sarajevo incident, and that it appeared nothing was decided. Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had gone to Ischl, where Emperor Francis Joseph was recovering from the shock of the assassination, to report to him. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, had replied evasively to interpellations made in the Hungarian Parliament by the Opposition. Owing to the absence on leave from his post of the War Minister and his chief of staff, the Bourse had recovered.

"One thing is certain: Austria-Hungary will take diplomatic steps
at Belgrade as soon as the magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo is
completed and the matter submitted to the court."

In a second letter of the same date M. Yovanovitch reported to M. Pashitch that it was thought that the inquiry had not produced sufficient evidence to justify officially accusing Serbia more than for tolerating in her borders certain revolutionary elements. Austro-Hungarian methods were criticized in diplomatic circles and the Serbian attitude was commended as in accord with the dignity of a nation.

"In spite of the fact that it appears that the German Foreign
Office does not approve of the anti-Serbian policy of Vienna, the
German Embassy here is at this very moment encouraging such a
policy."

In a third letter of the same date M. Yovanovitch informed the Prime Minister that it appeared that Austria-Hungary would not invite the Serbian Government to assist her in discovering and punishing the culprits of the Sarajevo crime, but would make it a case against Serbia and the Serbians, or even against the Jugo-Slavs (on her own border), looking in this for the approval of Europe, which would prepare the way for the sharp reactionary measures she contemplated to take internally to suppress the great Serbian propaganda and the Jugo-Slav idea. The Government must take some action for the sake of its prestige at home as well as abroad....

The accusation against Serbia will extend from April, 1909, to the present. Austria-Hungary will claim to the powers that the facts developed therein give her the right to take diplomatic steps at Belgrade, and demand that Serbia in future act as a loyal neighbor. Austria-Hungary will ask Serbia to accept unconditionally her demands.

On the same day, July 15, 1914, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. Viviani, Prime Minister at Paris, that certain press organs in Vienna, specifically the "Militärische Rundschau," represented France and Russia as incapable of holding their own in European affairs, and that Austria-Hungary, with the support of Germany, could therefore subject Serbia to any treatment she pleased. The "Rundschau" argued that now was the most propitious time for the war in which Austria-Hungary would have to engage in two or three years at the latest.

"At this moment the initiative rests with us: Russia is not
ready, moral factors and right are on our side, as well as might.
Since we shall have to accept the contest some day, let us
provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a great power,
our honor, are in question; and yet more, for it would seem that
our very existence is concerned....

"Surpassing itself, the 'Neue Freie Presse' of to-day reproaches
Count Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he
said: 'Our relations with Serbia require, however, to be made
clear.' These words rouse its indignation. For it tranquillity
and security can result only from a _war to the knife_ against
Pan-Serbism, and it is in the name of humanity that it demands
the extermination of the cursed Serbian race."

On July 16, 1914, Dr. Yovanovitch, Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that Secretary of State Von Jagow had informed him that reports of the German Minister at Belgrade pointed to the existence of a great Serbian propaganda, which should be energetically suppressed by the Serbian Government in the interest of good relations with Austria-Hungary.

On July 17 M. Boschkovitch, Serbian Minister at London, telegraphed to M. Pashitch that the Austrian Embassy there was endeavoring to favor the idea that Austria must give a good lesson to Serbia. Despite peaceable official statements by Austria-Hungary the way was preparing for diplomatic pressure upon Serbia which might develop into an armed attack.

On the same day, July 17, M. Ljub Michailovitch, Serbian Minister at Rome, telegraphed to M. Pashitch that the Marquis di San Giuliano, Prime Minister of Italy, had stated to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador:

"Any step undertaken by Austria against Serbia which failed to
take into account international considerations would meet with
the disapproval of public opinion in Italy, and that the Italian
Government desire to see the complete independence of Serbia
maintained."

On July 19, 1914, M. Pashitch telegraphed a long notice to the foreign Serbian legations, telling of the accusation of the Austrian press from the time of the Sarajevo outrage that the crime was the direct result of the great Serbian idea, propagated by various associations such as the Narodna Odbrana, which were tolerated by the Serbian Government. The notice detailed the attitude of the Serbian Government toward the Serbian press, presented in the preceding correspondence. In regard to its attitude toward Austria-Hungary it said:

"The Serbian Government at once expressed their readiness to hand
over to justice any of their subjects who might be proved to have
played a part in the Sarajevo outrage. The Serbian Government
further stated that they had prepared a more drastic law against
the misuse of explosives. The draft of a new law in that sense
had already been laid before the State Council, but could not be
submitted to the Skupshtina [Serbian Parliament], as the latter
was not sitting at the time. Finally, the Serbian Government
stated that they were ready, as heretofore, to observe all those
good neighborly obligations to which Serbia was bound by her
position as a European state.

"From the date of the perpetration of the outrage until to-day
not once did the Austro-Hungarian Government apply to the Serbian
Government for their assistance in the matter. They did not
demand that any of the accomplices should be subjected to an
inquiry, or that they should be handed over to trial. In one
instance only did the Austrian Government ask for information;
this was as to the whereabouts of certain students who had been
expelled from the Pakratz Teachers' Seminary and had crossed over
to Serbia to continue their studies. All available information on
this point was supplied."

The notice related the anti-Serbian propaganda conducted by the Austro-Hungarian press, the interpellations in the Hungarian Parliament, etc., and the probable intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to demand a categorical reply from Serbia, which, if not satisfactory, would be followed by war.

That Austria-Hungary was picking a quarrel had been evidenced by her use of an exploded rumor of a contemplated attack on the Austrian Legation in Belgrade to prove how excited public opinion was in Serbia, and to what lengths she was ready to go.

"There is reason for apprehension that some step is being
prepared against us [in the evident intention] that the inquiry
which is being made is not to be limited to the perpetrators and
their possible accomplices in the crime, but is most probably to
be extended to Serbia and the Great Serbian idea....

"On the other hand the Serbian Government have given their
particular attention to the improvement and strengthening of
their relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which had
lately become strained as a result of the Balkan wars and of the
questions which arose therefrom. With that object in view the
Serbian Government proceeded to settle the question of the
Oriental Railway, the new railway connections, and the transit
through Serbia of Austro-Hungarian goods for Constantinople,
Sofia, Saloniki, and Athens.

"The Serbian Government consider that their vital interests
require that peace and tranquillity in the Balkans should be
firmly and lastingly established. And for this very reason they
fear lest the excited state of public opinion in Austria-Hungary
may induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to make a _démarche_
which may humiliate the dignity of Serbia as a state, and to put
forward demands which could not be accepted.

"I have the honor, therefore, to request you to impress upon the
Government to which you are accredited our desire to maintain
friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, and to suppress every
attempt directed against the peace and public safety of the
neighboring monarchy. We will likewise meet the wishes of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire in the event of our being requested to
subject to trial in our independent courts any accomplices in the
outrage who are in Serbia--should such, of course, exist.

"But we can never comply with demands which may be directed
against the dignity of Serbia, and which would be inacceptable to
any country which respects and maintains its independence.

"Actuated by the desire that good neighborly relations may be
firmly established and maintained, we beg the friendly
Governments to take note of these declarations and to act in a
conciliatory sense should occasion or necessity arise."

ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION

With Serbia's case now fully before the courts of Europe, there began a movement among the powers desiring to keep the peace of the continent for mediation between the disputants. This was begun by Germany and Great Britain.

On July 20, 1914, Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, recounting a conversation with the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky. The prince said that Austria was certainly going to take some step in the Serbian matter; that the situation was uncomfortable, and that it would be desirable if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Russia. Sir Edward Grey presumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Serbia, founded upon what they had discovered at the trial of the Sarajevo assassins. This would make it easier for other powers, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. The more reasonable the demands of Austria, the easier it would be to smooth things over.

"I hated the idea of a war between any of the great powers, and
that any of them should be dragged into a war by Serbia would be
detestable.

"The ambassador agreed whole-heartedly in this sentiment."

On the same day, July 20, 1914, M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the word had been passed round in Vienna to maintain absolute secrecy about what was being done in the Serbian matter. There was no room for the optimism reported to exist in Belgrade. It was highly probable Austria-Hungary was preparing for war against Serbia.

"The general conviction that prevails here is that it would be
nothing short of suicide for Austria-Hungary once more to fail to
take advantage of the opportunity to act against Serbia. It is
believed that the two opportunities previously missed--the
annexation of Bosnia and the Balkan War--have been extremely
injurious to Austria-Hungary. In addition, the conviction is
steadily growing that Serbia, after her two wars, is completely
exhausted, and that a war against Serbia would, in fact, merely
mean a military expedition to be concluded by a speedy
occupation. It is also believed that such a war could be brought
to an end before Europe could intervene.

"The seriousness of Austrian intentions is further emphasized by
the military preparations which are being made, especially in the
vicinity of the Serbian frontier."

On the same day, July 20, 1914, a French consular report was made from Vienna to the Government at Paris, which referred to the diplomatic situation.

"Much will be demanded of Serbia; she will be required to
dissolve several propagandist societies, she will be summoned to
repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in cooperation with
Austrian officials, to keep strict control over anti-Austrian
tendencies in the schools; and it is a very difficult matter for
a government to consent to become in this way a policeman for a
foreign government. They foresee the subterfuges by which Serbia
will doubtless wish to avoid giving a clear and direct reply;
that is why a short interval will perhaps be fixed for her to
declare whether she accepts or not. The tenor of the note and its
imperious tone almost certainly insure that Belgrade will refuse.
Then military operations will begin.

"There is here, and equally in Berlin, a party which accepts the
idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions; in other words, a
conflagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be
necessary to start before Russia has completed the great
improvements of her army and railways, and before France has
brought her military organization to perfection. But on this
point there is no unanimity in high circles; Count Berchtold and
the diplomatists desire at the most localized operations against
Serbia. But everything must be regarded as possible."

The report commented on the departure from usage by the Austro-Hungarian press in prominently reporting the remarks of the most obscure Serbian newspapers,

"which, just on account of their obscurity, employ language
freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often insulting. This work of
the official agency has obviously for its aim the excitement of
public feeling and the creation of opinion favorable to war. The
fact is significant."

On July 21 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, that M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister to Germany, had declared to the German Government that Serbia was willing to entertain Austria's requirements arising out of the Sarajevo outrage, provided that she asked only for

"judicial cooperation in the punishment and prevention of
political crimes, but that he was charged to warn the German
Government that it would be dangerous to attempt, through that
investigation, to lower the prestige of Serbia.

"M. Browniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, mentioned
this subject to Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State. Von
Jagow said that he supposed the German Government now had full
knowledge of the note prepared by Austria, and were therefore
willing to give the assurance that the Austro-Serbian
difficulties would be localized. The Secretary of State protested
that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note,
and expressed himself in the same way to me. I could not help
showing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little
with what circumstances lead one to expect.

"I have also been assured that from now on the preliminary
notices for mobilization, the object of which is to place Germany
in a kind of 'attention' attitude in times of tension, have been
sent out here to those classes which would receive them in
similar circumstances. That is a measure to which the Germans,
constituted as they are, can have recourse without indiscretion
and without exciting the people. It is not a sensational measure,
and is not necessarily followed by full mobilization, as we have
already seen, but it is none the less significant."

On the same day, July 21, 1914, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, notified the French Legations at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Rome that the Berlin Bourse was extremely weak on the 20th, probably on account of anxiety over the Serbian question, and that M. Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, had grave reason that Germany would support Austria-Hungary in her contemplated _démarche_ at Belgrade without seeking to play the part of mediator.

On the same day, July 21, 1914, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, wrote a long letter to Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, reviewing the situation. Most of his statements have been given in more moderate language in the preceding correspondence. He describes how the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary have been "poisoned" by Serbian national aspirations, due to the great Serbian propaganda (carried on in Austria-Hungary as well as in Serbia), and to Serbian success in the Balkan wars. This chauvinism has increased to a paroxysm, bordering on insanity. The policy is to separate from Austria-Hungary the southern Slav provinces, and so abolish the Dual Monarchy as a great power. Bosnia and Herzegovina are expected to revolt, and the Slav regiments in the Austro-Hungarian army to mutiny. Out of the ruins will be builded the great Serbian Empire, and that in the immediate future.

Serbian newspapers without fear of reprimand discuss the decrepitude of the Dual Monarchy and insult her officials, and even "the exalted person of our ruler." The press is the educator of the Serbian people; it promoted the great Serbian propaganda, from which sprang the crime of Sarajevo. Political parties and governmental policy are wholly subservient to it. Its accusations that the sudden death of the Russian Minister, Dr. Hartwig, was due to poison are on the verge of insanity--the London "Times" called them ravings. The people, in gratitude for the past, and in anxiety for the future, outbid one another in servility to Russia. They despise Austria-Hungary as powerless, for internal and external reasons. The serious words of our statesmen are regarded as "bluff."

"This picture leads up to the conclusion that a reckoning with
Serbia, a war for the position of the [Dual] Monarchy as a great
power, even for its existence as such, cannot be permanently
avoided.

"If we delay in clearing up our relations with Serbia we shall
share the responsibility for the difficulties and the unfavorable
situation in any future war which must, however, sooner or later
be carried through....

"Should we therefore ... put forward far-reaching requirements
joined to effective control--for this alone could clear the
Augean stable of great Serbian intrigues--then all possible
consequences must be considered, and from the beginning there
must be a strong and firm determination to carry through the
matter to the end.

"Half measures, the presentation of demands, followed by long
discussions and ending only in an unsound compromise, would be
the hardest blow which could be directed against
Austria-Hungary's reputation in Serbia and her position in
Europe."

On July 22, 1914, Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of Foreign Affairs at London, that he had had an interview with the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, who insisted that the question at issue between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was for these alone to settle, without interference from outside, and said that it was inadvisable for the German Government to approach the Austro-Hungarian Government on the matter. The German Secretary had frequently emphasized to the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, M. Yovanovitch, that Austro-Serbian relations should be put on a proper footing. He thought that Austria had acted toward Serbia with great forbearance.