Chapter XLII: Part IV: Diplomatic Papers Relating to the Origin of the War, (8)

"He appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but
said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider
any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to
their communication of to-day [the ultimatum].

"I asked his excellency why they had made their demand even more
difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in
south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia
from saying all her mobilization was directed only against
Austria.

"His excellency said that if the answer from Russia was
satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited
favorable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before
the emperor and chancellor.

"He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the
request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office
had even up till last night been urging Austria to show
willingness to continue discussions--and telegraphic and the
telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising
nature--but Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything."

Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris that he had presented to M. Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Grey's inquiry concerning France respecting Belgian neutrality.

"He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will
be in the circumstances [which may arise from Germany's ultimatum
to Russia.]"

The German Embassy is packing up.

In a supplementary telegram Bertie informed Grey:

"French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of
Belgium, and it would be only in the event of some other power
violating that neutrality that France might find herself under
the necessity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to
act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times.
President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the
Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously
renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs
to-day."

_France._ Raymond Poincaré, President of France, informed George V that Germany was pushing forward military preparations, especially on the French frontier, while France had till now confined herself to indispensable precautionary measures.

"We are, in spite of the moderation of the Government of the
Republic and the calm of public opinion, on the eve of the most
terrible events.

"From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war
would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British
Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France
might be engaged; if on the other hand, Germany were convinced
that the _entente cordiale_ would be affirmed, in case of need,
even to the extent of taking the field side by side, there would
be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken.

"It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave
complete liberty to your majesty's Government, and that, in the
letters exchanged in 1912 between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul
Cambon, Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a
mutual agreement to consult one another in the event of European
tension, and to examine in concert whether common action were
advisable.

"But the character of close friendship which public feeling has
given in both countries to the _entente_ between Great Britain
and France, the confidence with which our two governments have
never ceased to work for the maintenance of peace, and the signs
of sympathy which your majesty has ever shown to France, justify
me in informing you quite frankly of the impressions of all
France.

"It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British
Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful
settlement depend.

"We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have
enjoined upon our ally [Russia] an attitude of moderation from
which they have not swerved. In concert with your majesty's
Government, and in conformity with Sir E. Grey's latest
suggestions, we will continue to act on the same lines.

"But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if
Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great
Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an
agreement between her and Russia will become impossible. I am
profoundly convinced that at the present moment, the more Great
Britain, France and Russia can give a deep impression that they
are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible will it
be to count upon the preservation of peace.

"I beg that your majesty will excuse a step which is inspired
only by the hope of seeing the European balance of power
definitely reaffirmed."

Ambassador Paul Cambon telegraphed from London of Grey's reply to Germany on attitude of Great Britain in event of European war.

"The Cabinet Council took place this morning. After having
examined the situation, the Cabinet thought that for the moment
the British Government were unable to guarantee to us their
intervention; that they intended to take steps to obtain from
Germany and France an understanding to respect Belgian
neutrality; but that before considering intervention it was
necessary to wait for the situation to develop.

"I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British
Government would await the invasion of French territory. I
insisted on the fact that the measures already taken on our
frontier by Germany showed an intention to attack in the near
future, and that, if a renewal of the mistake of Europe in 1870
was to be avoided, Great Britain should consider at once the
circumstances in which she would give France the help on which
she relied.

"Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet on the
situation had been formed only at the moment; that the situation
might be modified; and that in that case a meeting of the Cabinet
would be called at once in order to consider it.

"I am informed that the Cabinet will meet again to-morrow, and
that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will be certain
to renew the discussion.

"The letter which the President of the Republic has addressed to
the King of England should be given to the king this evening.
This step will, I am sure, be taken into serious consideration by
the British Cabinet."

M. Viviani notified the Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, of France's agreement to the proposal of Great Britain to Austria-Hungary not to proceed further against Serbia after occupying Belgrade, and to await mediation by the powers.

"Sir E. Grey made this suggestion in the hope that military
preparations would be suspended on all sides."

Russia had already agreed to stop military preparations if Austria eliminated from her ultimatum to Serbia all points which endanger Serbian sovereignty.

"Sir E. Grey thinks that, if Austria stops her advance after the
occupation of Belgrade, the Russian Government could agree to
change their formula in the following way:

"That the powers would examine how Serbia should give complete
satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereignty or
independence of the kingdom. In case Austria should declare
herself ready, in the interests of Europe, to stop her advance
and to discuss how an arrangement might be arrived at, Russia
could also consent to the discussion and suspend her military
preparations, provided that the other powers acted in the same
way."

M. Viviani telegraphed to the Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople that negotiations had begun again between Austria and Russia, the latter having accepted the formula advised by Great Britain.

"Nevertheless ... Germany ... has not ceased to encourage the
uncompromising attitude of Vienna; the German military
preparations continue; the immediate opposition of Germany to the
Russian formula was declared at Berlin inacceptable for Austria
before that power had even been consulted; in conclusion, all the
impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has
sought to humiliate Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente,
and if these results can not be obtained, to make war."

Ambassador Dumaine telegraphed from Vienna:

"General mobilization for all men from nineteen to forty-two
years of age was declared by the Austro-Hungarian Government this
morning at one o'clock.

"My Russian colleague [M. Schebeko] still thinks that this step
is not entirely in contradiction to the declaration made
yesterday by Count Berchtold [Austro-Hungarian Minister for
Foreign Affairs]."

Ambassador Jules Cambon telegraphed from Berlin that Secretary of State von Jagow had informed him that, in the face of total mobilization by Russia, Germany had declared _Kriegsgefahrzustand_ (imminence of war). German Ambassador Schoen had been instructed to ask France what attitude she intended to adopt.

M. Viviani informed Ambassador Paléologue at St. Petersburg of the Schoen interview and the ultimatum he had delivered, to be replied to on the morrow (Saturday) at 1 p. m.

"I shall confine myself to telling him that France will have
regard to her interests. The Government of the Republic need not
indeed give any account of her intentions except to her ally.

"I ask you to inform M. Sazonof [Minister for Foreign Affairs] of
this immediately. As I have already told you, I have no doubt
that the Imperial Government, in the highest interests of peace,
will do everything on their part to avoid anything that might
render inevitable or precipitate the crisis."

Minister Klobukowski telegraphed from Brussels that _L'Agence Havas_ having announced the proclamation of "imminence of war" in Germany, he had assured M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, that France would respect Belgian neutrality.

"The Russian and British Ministers appeared much pleased that in
the circumstances I gave this assurance, which further, as the
British Minister told me, was in accordance with the declaration
of Sir E. Grey."

_Belgium._ M. Davignon reported the above interview to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London, giving the exact words of the French Minister:

"No incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even
if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your
country. France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far
as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile act.

"I thanked M. Klobukowski, and I felt bound to observe that we
had always had the greatest confidence in the loyal observance by
both our neighboring states of their engagements toward us. We
have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the German
Government will be the same as that of the Government of the
French Republic."

M. Davignon telegraphed to all the Belgian Legations abroad:

"The Minister of War informs me that [Belgian] mobilization has
been ordered, and that Saturday, August 1, will be the first
day."

He telegraphed to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris, that the British Minster had reported Sir Edward Grey's inquiry to France and Germany if they would respect Belgian neutrality, and now formally states that he presumes--

"that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and
that she desires and expects that the other powers will respect
and maintain it.

"I thanked Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the
Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added that
Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independence
could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain
our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other powers,
in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence
which had always existed between us, would respect and maintain
that neutrality.

"I stated that our military forces, which had been considerably
developed in consequence of our recent reorganization, were
sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves energetically in the
event of the violation of our territory.

"In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed to
me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to
mobilize our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands had
come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that,
moreover, the recent date of our new military system, and the
temporary nature of the measures upon which we then had to
decide, made it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough
precautions. Our neighbors and guarantors should see in this
decision our strong desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves.

"Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated
that his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing
negotiations with France and Germany, the result of which would
be communicated to me."

He telegraphed to the same ministers that the German Minister, Herr von Below Saleske, had been informed of Belgium's military measures, and that it was explained to him

"a consequence of our desire to fulfill our international
obligations, and that they in no wise implied an attitude of
distrust toward our neighbors."

The German Minister was reminded of instructions his Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, had given to his predecessor, Herr von Flotow.

"In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a
consequence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of
Flushing, certain newspapers had maintained that in the case of a
Franco-German war Belgian neutrality would be violated by
Germany.

"The [Belgian] Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a
declaration in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign
affairs would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the
mistrust which was so regrettable from the point of view of the
relations between the two countries.

"Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated
the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared
that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality,
but he considered that in making a public declaration Germany
would weaken her military position in regard to France, who,
secured on the northern side, would concentrate all her energies
on the east.

"Since then, in 1913, Herr von Jagow [German Secretary of State]
had made reassuring declarations to the Budget Commission of the
Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian neutrality.

"Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with
Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments
expressed at that time had not changed."

SATURDAY, AUGUST 1, 1914

_Austria._ On the following day Count Szápáry, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs, an interview with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. "I first warned M. Sazonof," said the count, "that in interpreting my instructions to him I must leave out of account the new condition of affairs in Vienna created by the general Russian mobilization. I then said that it was a mistake that Austria had declined further negotiations with Russia.

"Your excellency was not only quite prepared to deal with Russia
on the broadest basis possible, but was also especially inclined
to subject the text of our note to a discussion so far as its
interpretation was concerned.

"I could only hope that the course of events had not already
taken us too far; in any case, I regarded it as my duty in the
present moment of extreme anxiety to prove once again the good
will of the Imperial and Royal Government. M. Sazonof replied
that he took note with satisfaction of this proof of good will,
but he desired to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations
at St. Petersburg for obvious reasons appeared to promise less
prospect of success than negotiations on the neutral _terrain_ of
London. I replied that your excellency, started from the point of
view that direct contact should be maintained at St. Petersburg,
so that I was not in a position to commit myself with regard to
his suggestion as to London, but I would communicate on the
subject with your excellency."

_Germany._ The German White Book states:

"As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the
receipt of a reply to our inquiry, the kaiser ordered the
mobilization of the entire German army and navy on August 1, at 5
p. m.

"The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg [Count Pourtalès] was
instructed that, in the event of the Russian Government not
giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time he should
declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after the
refusal of our demands. [He so declared at 5 p. m.] However,
before a confirmation of the execution of this order had been
received, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August 1,
Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German
territory.

"Thus Russia began the war against us.

"The French Prime Minister [M. Viviani] gave an equivocal and
unsatisfactory reply on August 1 at 1 p. m., which gave no clear
idea of the position of France, as he limited himself to the
explanation that France would do that which her interests
demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p. m., the mobilization of the
entire French army and navy was ordered.

"On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities."

Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed to Ambassador Lichnowsky at London:

"Germany is ready to agree to the English proposal in the event
of England guaranteeing with all her forces the unconditional
neutrality of France in the conflict between Germany and Russia.
Owing to the Russian challenge German mobilization occurred
to-day before the English proposals were received. In consequence
our advance to the French frontier cannot now be altered. We
guarantee, however, that the French frontier will not be crossed
by our troops until Monday, August 3, at 7 p. m., in case
England's assent is received by that time."

Lichnowsky answered that Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had asked him

"whether I thought I could declare that in the event of France
remaining neutral in a German-Russian war we would not attack the
French. I told him that I believed that I could assume
responsibility for this."

At 5.30 p. m. the ambassador telegraphed that Grey had just read to him the following unanimous declaration of the British Cabinet:

"The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality
of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the
neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If
Germany could see her way to give the same positive reply as that
which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to
relieve anxiety and tension here, while, on the other hand, if
there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one
combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely
difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.

"On my question whether, on condition that we would maintain the
neutrality of Belgium, he could give me a definite declaration
with regard to the neutrality of Great Britain, the minister
answered that that was impossible, but that this question would
play a great part in public opinion in this country. If we
violated Belgian neutrality in a war with France there would
certainly be a change in public opinion which would make it
difficult for the Cabinet here to maintain friendly neutrality.
For the time there was not the slightest intention to proceed in
a hostile manner against us. It would be their desire to avoid
this if there was any possibility of doing so. It was, however,
difficult to draw a line up to which we could go without
intervention on this side. He turned again and again to Belgian
neutrality, and was of opinion that this question would also play
a great part.

"He had also thought whether it was not possible that we and
France should, in case of a Russian war, stand armed opposite to
one another without attacking. I asked him if he would be in a
position to arrange that France would assent to an agreement of
this kind. As we wanted neither to destroy France nor to annex
portions of French territory, I could think that we would give
our assent to an arrangement of this kind which would secure for
us the neutrality of Great Britain. The minister said he would
make inquiries; he also recognized the difficulties of holding
back the military on both sides."

At 8.30 p. m. the ambassador telegraphed:

"My communication of this morning is canceled by my communication
of this evening. As there is no positive English proposal before
us, any further step in the sense of the message I sent is
superfluous."

At 7.10 p. m. Ambassador Pourtalès presented at St. Petersburg a note repeating the ultimatum of July 31, and closing:

"Russia having refused to comply with [not having considered it
necessary to answer*] this demand, and having shown by this
refusal [this attitude*] that her action was directed against
Germany, I have the honor, on the instructions of my Government,
to inform your excellency as follows:

"His majesty the emperor, my august sovereign, in the name of the
German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at
war with Russia.

"* The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be
supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and
that, by mistake, they were both inserted in the Note."

_Russia._ A secret telegram was sent to Russian representatives abroad announcing Germany's ultimatum delivered at midnight, and stating the German Ambassador's reply to the inquiry if it meant war: "No, but we are very near it."

Ambassador Benckendorff telegraphed from London that Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, hoped that no great power would open hostilities before the formula for a peaceful settlement of the disputes, accepted by Russia and offered to Germany, had been considered. Later he telegraphed that France had agreed to respect the neutrality of Belgium, but that Germany had stated she could give no definite answer to the question.

Ambassador Isvolsky telegraphed from Paris:

"The Austrian Ambassador [Count Szécsen] yesterday visited
Viviani [Minister for Foreign Affairs] and declared to him that
Austria, far from harboring any designs against the integrity of
Serbia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her
grievances against Serbia with the other powers. The French
Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary
military activity on the French frontier, for they are convinced
that, under the guise of _Kriegszustand_, mobilization is in
reality being carried out."

Later he telegraphed that, hearing from St. Petersburg of the German order of general mobilization, President Poincaré had signed the order for French mobilization.

"The German Ambassador [Baron von Schoen] has just visited
Viviani [Minister for Foreign Affairs] but told him nothing
fresh, alleging the impossibility of deciphering the telegrams he
has received. Viviani informed him of the signature of the order
for mobilization issued in reply to that of Germany, and
expressed to him his amazement that Germany should have taken
such a step at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was
still in progress between Russia, Austria, and the powers. He
added that mobilization did not necessarily entail war, and that
the German Ambassador might stay in Paris as the Russian
Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador in
St. Petersburg."

_Great Britain._ George V sent the following telegram to William II:

"Many thanks for your telegram of last night. I have sent an
urgent telegram to Nicholas, in which I have assured him of my
readiness to do everything in my power to further the resumption
of the negotiations between the powers concerned."

Upon receipt of the telegram from the German Kaiser of August 1, King George replied that there must be a misunderstanding in regard to the suggestion of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, made to the German Ambassador, respecting avoidance of conflict between Germany and France, while the possibility remained of an agreement being arrived at between Austria and Russia.

"Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky early to-morrow
morning in order to ascertain whether there is any
misunderstanding on his side."

King George replied to the letter of President Poincaré of July 31, assuring him of cooperation of their two Governments in the interest of peace.

"I admire the restraint which you and your Government are
exercising in not adopting an attitude which could in any wise be
interpreted as a provocative one."

Grey sent a personal message from King George to Nicholas II in which he appealed to the czar to remove the misunderstanding that had evidently produced the deadlock between Russia and Germany, and offered his assistance in reopening the conversations between Russia and Austria.

The Czar replied to King George that attempts at peace had been that afternoon rendered futile by Germany's declaration of war, which was wholly unexpected by him, since he had given William II "most categorical assurances that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued."

"In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have
done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on
me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and
Russia. God bless and protect you."

Ambassador Bertie, telegraphing from Paris, reported an interview that morning between the French Political Director and German Ambassador Schoen.

"M. Berthelot pointed out that general mobilization in Russia had
not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general
mobilization, and that the Russian Government were ready to
demobilize if all powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the
French Government that in view of this and of the fact that
Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government
should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St.
Petersburg requiring immediate demobilization by Russia. There
were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the
German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French
Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating
that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the
reply were not satisfactory. The French Government considered
that this was an extraordinary proceeding.

"The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign
Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his
passports, but he stated that he had packed up."

Ambassador Bunsen telegraphed from Vienna that a general mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army and fleet had been ordered. Minister Villiers telegraphed from Brussels:

"Belgium expects and desires that other powers will observe and
uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the
utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign
Affairs [Davignon] said that they believed that they were in a
position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations
between Belgium and her neighbors were excellent, and there was
no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well,
nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies."

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin that the Hamburg authorities had detained British merchant ships on unknown grounds, and instructed him to request the German Government to order their release.

"The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this
is done. His majesty's Government, on their side, are most
anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the
German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take
any step which would make the situation between us impossible."

Later Grey telegraphed Goschen that he still believed it possible to secure peace if a little respite could be gained before any great power began war. Russia and Austria had at last agreed to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to objections raised to the original Russian formula.

"Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia
are ready to converse, and I hope the German Government may be
able to make use of the Russian communications referred to, in
order to avoid tension. His majesty's Government are carefully
abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters."

In following telegrams Grey sent Goschen the Russian formula as amended by himself, and the acceptance of the same by Russia.

Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris information received from President Poincaré of German mobilization, etc., and Russia's desire to continue pacific conversations with Germany.

"The French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific,
sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite
despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war."

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Buchanan at St. Petersburg that reliable news had come from Vienna that the Austro-Hungarian Government,

"though the situation has been changed by the mobilization of
Russia, would, in full appreciation of the efforts of England for
the preservation of peace, be ready to consider favorably my
proposal for mediation between Austria and Serbia. The effect of
this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military
action against Serbia would continue for the present, and that
the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop
the mobilization of troops directed against Austria, in which
case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military
countermeasures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria
by Russian mobilization.

"You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs [M. Sazonof] and
say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation
by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears
still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter
should be discussed with German Government also by Russian
Government."

Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris that orders for general mobilization had been given at 3.30 p. m., in answer to the German _Kriegsgefahrzustand_ (imminence of war), which, by calling out troops up to war strength, is tantamount to mobilization.

"The Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that
this act of mobilization is one for purely defensive purposes."

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Bunsen at Vienna an account of interviews with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, in which Count Mensdorff gave him assurances that Austria would not impair the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Serbia, and said that, contrary to report, Austria was willing to continue conversations with Russia.

Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed Grey of an interview that morning with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which M. Sazonof recounted his conversation with Count Szápáry, the Austrian Ambassador, the evening before, in which he proposed the London conference.

Ambassador Bunsen telegraphed Grey from Vienna that the Russian Ambassador, Schebeko, thought that, as mobilization is too expensive to be continued long, Germany will attack Russia at once. Tension now is greater between Russia and Germany than between Russia and Austria. Russia would be satisfied, says Schebeko, with Austria's acceptance of the new formula.

"He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs [Count Berchtold] that most terrific consequences
must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time
Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his
excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from
the first, and that his strong personal bias probably colored his
action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German
Government also desired war from the first.

"It is the intention of the French Ambassador [Dumaine] to speak
earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the
extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to
serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being
considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do.
I fear that nothing can alter the determination of
Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course,
if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany."

Ambassador Goschen telegraphed from Berlin:

"Orders have just been issued for the general mobilization of the
navy and army, the first day of mobilization to be August 2."

Later he telegraphed that Secretary of State von Jagow had expressed annoyance at detention of British ships at Hamburg, and promised to order their immediate release.

_France._ M. Viviani, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, informed the ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome of the two _démarches_ made on the previous evening at Paris and St. Petersburg--"the one rather vague, the other precise and conciliatory."

"Unfortunately these [latter] arrangements which allowed one to
hope for a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been
rendered useless by the attitude of Germany [in presenting her
ultimatum to Russia].

"The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. And she
wishes for it against France. [Here he recounted the interview
with the German Ambassador Schoen at the French Foreign Office.]

"This attitude of breaking off diplomatic relations without any
direct dispute, and although he has not received any definitely
negative answer, is characteristic of the determination of
Germany to make war against France. The want of sincerity in her
peaceful protestations is shown by the rupture which she is
forcing upon Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed
with Russia to begin negotiations."

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador at Berlin, reported Austria's willingness to continue conversations with Russia.

"The ultimatum to Russia can only do away with the last chances
of peace which these conversations still seemed to leave. The
question may be asked whether in such circumstances the
acceptance by Austria was serious, and had not the object of
throwing the responsibility of the conflict on to Russia."

He told of the interviews of the British Ambassador with Secretary of State von Jagow, in which Mr. Goschen vainly pleaded that Germany use her influence with Austria in the cause of peace.

"Germany's ultimatum coming at the very moment when an agreement
seemed about to be established between Vienna and St. Petersburg,
is characteristic of her warlike policy."

It looks as if she desired war on her own account.

M. Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the ambassadors at London and Berlin and the Minister of Brussels of his pledge to respect Belgian neutrality as given to Great Britain.

Ambassador Barrère reported from Rome an interview of the German Ambassador with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which Herr von Flotow had asked the intentions of Italy in the present crisis.

"The Marquis di San Giuliano answered that as the war undertaken
by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely
defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view
of the consequences which might result from it according to the
declaration of the German Ambassador, Italy could not take part
in the war."

M. Viviani reported to the ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, and Constantinople the visit to him at 11 a. m. of German Ambassador Schoen.

"After having recalled all the efforts made by France toward an
honorable settlement of the Austro-Serbian conflict and the
difficulty between Austria and Russia which has resulted from it,
I put him in possession of the facts as to the _pourparlers_
which have been carried on since yesterday [in reference to
Austro-Russian dispute].

"I drew attention to the attitude of Germany who, abandoning all
_pourparlers_, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very
moment when this power had just accepted the British formula
(which implies the cessation of military preparations by all the
countries which have mobilized) and regarded as imminent a
diplomatic rupture with France.

"Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the developments
which had taken place in this matter for the last twenty-four
hours, that there was perhaps in them a 'glimmer of hope' for
some arrangement, that he had not received any fresh
communication from his Government, and that he was going to get
information. He gave renewed protestations of his sincere desire
to unite his efforts to those of France for arriving at a
solution of the conflict. I laid stress on the serious
responsibility which the Imperial Government would assume if, in
circumstances such as these, they took an initiative which was
not justified and of a kind which would irremediably compromise
peace.

"Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate departure and
did not make any fresh request for an answer to his question
concerning the attitude of France in case of an Austro-Russian
conflict. He confined himself to saying of his own accord that
the attitude of France was not doubtful.

"It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may result
from my conversation with the German Ambassador for, on their
side, the Imperial Government continue the most dangerous
preparations on our frontier. However, we must not neglect the
possibilities, and we should not cease to work toward an
agreement. On her side France is taking all military measures
required for protection against too great an advance in German
military preparations. She considers that her attempts at
solution will only have a chance of success so far as it is felt
that she will be ready and resolute if the conflict is forced on
her."

Ambassador Paul Cambon reported from London the situation between Great Britain and Germany, especially in regard to British neutrality and Germany's attitude toward Belgian neutrality.

"Sir Edward Grey will ask the Cabinet to authorize him to state
on Monday in the House of Commons that the British Government
will not permit a violation of Belgian neutrality.

"In the second place, the British fleet is mobilized, and Sir
Edward Grey will propose to his colleagues that he should state
that it will oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover by the
German fleet, or, if the German fleet should pass through, will
oppose any demonstration on the French coasts. These two
questions will be dealt with at the meeting on Monday. I drew the
attention of the Secretary of State to the point that, if during
this intervening period any incident took place, it was necessary
not to allow a surprise, and that it would be desirable to think
of intervening in time."

Minister Mollard presented the request from Dr. Eyschen, Minister of State of Luxemburg, for an assurance that France would respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy. A similar request has been made to Germany.

M. Viviani returned the same assurance that he had given in the case of Belgium.

_Belgium._ M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to the Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg to carry out the instructions [in case of war between France and Germany becoming imminent] of July 24; and to the Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg to carry out instructions [the same] of July 25.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 2, 1914

_Austria-Hungary._ On the following day, Ambassador Szögyény telegraphed from Berlin that no answer had been received from Russia to Germany's demand that she demobilize; that Russian troops had crossed the German frontier at Schwidden (southeast of Bialla); and that Germany therefore regarded herself at war with Russia and had that morning given Ambassador Swerbeiev his passports.

_Germany._ Ambassador Lichnowsky telegraphed from London to Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg that Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had given up as impracticable his suggestions as to the possibility of creating lasting British neutrality, which were made without previous inquiry of France and without knowledge of mobilization.

RUSSIA EXPLAINS HER EFFORTS FOR PEACE

_Russia._ M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, published an announcement respecting recent events in correction of a "garbled version" appearing in the foreign press. This recited the circumstances of the Austrian note of July 23 to Serbia and Serbia's reply of the 25th.

"Russia considered that the humiliation of Serbia, involved in
these demands, and equally the evident intention of
Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony in the Balkans, which
underlay her conditions, were inadmissible. The Russian
Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the most
friendly manner that it would be desirable to re-examine the
points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note. The
Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to agree to a
discussion of the note. The moderating influence of the four
powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful....

"The Austro-Hungarian Government proceeded to mobilize and
declared war officially against Serbia, and the following day
Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accompanied the
declaration of war openly accuses Serbia of having prepared and
carried out the crime of Sarajevo. Such an accusation of a crime
at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State,
aroused, by its evident inanity, widespread sympathy for Serbia
throughout all classes of European society.

"In consequence of this behavior of the Austro-Hungarian
Government, in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not
remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia, the Russian Government
considered it necessary to order mobilization in the military
districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This decision was
rendered necessary by the fact that since the date when the
Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to the Serbian Government,
and since the first steps taken by Russia, five days had elapsed,
and yet the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia
halfway in her efforts towards peace. Indeed, quite the contrary;
for the mobilization of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had
been ordered.

"The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken by
Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these
steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that
they were not in any way aimed at Germany. Simultaneously, the
Russian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue
discussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute,
either in the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or, as
suggested by Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the
four great powers not directly interested, that is to say, Great
Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.

"This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally
unsuccessful. Austria-Hungary declined a further exchange of
views with Russia, and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join
the proposed conference of the powers.

"Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. When
questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which
we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs declared that these conditions were Austria's
recognition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a
European character, and a declaration by her that she agreed not
to insist upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the
sovereign rights of Serbia.

"Germany considered this Russian proposal unacceptable to
Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation of
general mobilization by Austria-Hungary reached St. Petersburg.

"All this time hostilities were continuing on Serbian territory,
and Belgrade was bombarded afresh.

"The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend
the scope of our precautionary military measures.

"The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that
Russia was compelled to begin preparations so as to be ready for
every emergency.

"But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that
account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of
the situation, and she announced that she was ready to accept any
proposed settlement of the problem that might be put forward,
provided it complied with the conditions laid down by her.

"In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German
Government on July 31 demanded of the Russian Government that
they should suspend their military measures by midday on August
1, and threatened, should they fail to comply, to proceed to
general mobilization.

"On the following day, August 1, the German Ambassador, on behalf
of his Government, forwarded a declaration of war to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs."

M. Sazonof telegraphed to the Russian representatives abroad

"that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist upon us the
responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to mobilize by the
immense responsibility which would have fallen upon our shoulders
if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time
when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a
dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was undertaking
general mobilization.

"The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that he
would take no aggressive action as long as the discussions with
Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many
proofs of Russia's desire for peace, Germany neither could, nor
had the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully
accept any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and
independence of Serbia. Any other solution, besides being
entirely incompatible with our own dignity, would assuredly have
upset the European balance of power by securing the hegemony of
Germany. The European--nay, the world-wide--character of this
dispute is infinitely more important than the pretext from which
it springs. By her decision to declare war upon us, at a moment
when negotiations were in progress between the powers, Germany
has assumed a heavy responsibility."

_Great Britain._ Ambassador Goschen sent from Berlin two telegrams to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, one stating that Secretary of State von Jagow had just informed him that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed the frontier, Germany and Russia were in a state of war, and the other that the reason for the detention of British ships on the day preceding was laying of mines and taking other precautions.

Ambassador Villiers telegraphed from Brussels that a German force had entered Luxemburg. This was confirmed by a telegram from the Minister of State for Luxemburg, who gave details, and added:

"These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary
to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty
of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to
address an energetic protest against this aggression to the
representatives of his majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg.
An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin. [Paris was also
informed.]"

Grey telegraphed Ambassador Bertie at Paris:

"After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon [French
Ambassador in London] the following memorandum:

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet
comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake
hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British
fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of his
majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and
must not be taken as binding his majesty's Government to take any
action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet
takes place.

"I pointed out that we had very large questions and most
difficult issues to consider, and that our Government felt that
they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany
necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany
to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose
fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know
how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely
undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this
assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless
the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did not give a
security to France that would enable her to settle the
disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

"M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him
the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord
Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the
violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much
more important matter; we were considering what statement we
should make in Parliament to-morrow--in effect, whether we should
declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a _casus belli_. I
told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this
point."

_France._ Ambassador Paléologue telegraphed from St. Petersburg that the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalés was leaving the Russian capital that day, and that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Szápáry had not yet received instructions from Vienna as to the declaration of war.

M. Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, and Constantinople:

"This morning, French territory was violated by German troops at
Ciry and near Longwy. They are marching on the fort which bears
the latter name. Elsewhere the Custom House at Delle has twice
been fired upon. Finally, German troops have also violated this
morning the neutral territory of Luxemburg.

"You will at once use this information to lay stress on the fact
that the German Government is committing itself to acts of war
against France without provocation on our part, or any previous
declaration of war, whilst we have scrupulously respected the
zone of ten kilometers which we have maintained, even since the
mobilization, between our troops and the frontier."

Ambassador Paul Cambon reported from London Sir Edward Grey's declaration of the British Cabinet as to protection of France by the British fleet.

"Afterwards in speaking to me of the neutrality of Belgium and
that of Luxemburg, the Secretary of State reminded me that the
Convention of 1867, referring to the Grand Duchy, differed from
the Treaty referring to Belgium, in that Great Britain was bound
to require the observance of this latter Convention without the
assistance of the other guaranteeing powers, while with regard to
Luxemburg all the guaranteeing powers were to act in concert.

"The protection of Belgian neutrality is here considered so
important that Great Britain will regard its violation by Germany
as a _casus belli_. It is a specially British interest and there
is no doubt that the British Government, faithful to the
traditions of their policy, will insist upon it, even if the
business world in which German influence is making tenacious
efforts, exercises pressure to prevent the Government committing
itself against Germany."

M. Viviani replied to M. Paul Cambon that the promise of the British Cabinet was "a first assistance which is most valuable to us."

"The help which Great Britain intends to give to France for the
protection of the French coasts or the French merchant marine,
will be used in such a way that our navy will also, in case of a
Franco-German conflict, be supported by the British fleet in the
Atlantic as well as in the North Sea and Channel. I would note
that British ports could not serve as places for revictualling
for the German fleet."

M. Viviani telegraphed to Ambassador Jules Cambon at Berlin to protest to the German Government against the violation of the French frontier by German armed forces, as "unjustified by anything in the present situation."

"The Government of the Republic can only leave to the Imperial
Government the entire responsibility for these acts."

M. Marcellin Pellet, Minister at the Hague, telegraphed to M. Viviani that the German Minister had called on M. Loudon, Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain the necessity for the German violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg.

_Belgium._ M. Davignon, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to the ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, that he had warned the German Minister at Brussels, Herr von Below Saleske, that the French Minister, M. Klobukowski, would publish the formal declaration made by the German Minister on August 1, respecting Belgian neutrality.

"When I next met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention,
and added that up to the present he had not been instructed to
make us an official communication, but that we knew his personal
opinion as to the feelings of security, which we had the right to
entertain toward our eastern neighbors. I at once replied that
all that we knew of their intentions, as indicated in numerous
previous conversations, did not allow us to doubt their perfect
correctness toward Belgium. I added, however, that we should
attach the greatest importance to the possession of a formal
declaration, which the Belgian nation would hear of with joy and
gratitude."

Later, the German Minister presented the following "very confidential" note to Belgium.

GERMAN DECLARATION OF INTENTIONS TOWARD BELGIUM

"Reliable information has been received by the German Government
to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of
the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as
to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory
against Germany.

"The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of
the utmost good will, will be unable, without assistance, to
repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect
of success to afford an adequate guaranty against danger to
Germany. It is essential for the self-defense of Germany that she
should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Government
would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an
act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of
Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to
enter Belgian territory.

"In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the
German Government make the following declaration:

"1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In
the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain
an attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German
Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to
guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom
in full.

"2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to
evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

"3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared,
in cooperation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all
necessaries for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an
indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German
troops.

"4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular
should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a
resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying
railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will,
to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

"In this event Germany can undertake no obligations toward
Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the
two States must be left to the decision of arms.