Chapter XXXIX: Part IV: Diplomatic Papers Relating to the Origin of the War, (5)

M. Suchomlinoff, Russian Minister for War, had immediately after this, summoned Major von Eggeling, German Military Attaché and confirmed M. Sazonof's assurance in detail. As reported by the major, he said:

"For the present merely preparatory measures would be taken, not
a horse would be taken, not a reservist called up. If Austria
crossed the Serbian frontier, the military districts of Kiev,
Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, which face Austria, would be
mobilized. In no circumstances will mobilization take place on
the German front, Warsaw, Vilna, and St. Petersburg. Peace with
Germany is earnestly desired.... I gave the Minister for War to
understand that his friendly intentions would be appreciated by
us, but that we should also consider mobilization against Austria
to be in itself extremely threatening."

_Russia._ M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed the Ambassador at Rome to persuade the Italian Government to act in the interests of peace by bringing influence to bear on her ally, Austria-Hungary, and by opposing the view that the dispute with Serbia could be localized. Russia cannot possibly avoid coming to the help of Serbia. M. Kasansky, Acting Consul at Prague, telegraphed that Austro-Hungarian mobilization had been ordered. M. Sazonof reported to M. Schebeko, Ambassador at Vienna, an interview just held with Count Szápáry, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador.

"After discussing the ten demands addressed to Serbia, I drew his
attention to the fact that, quite apart from the clumsy form in
which they were presented, some of them were quite impracticable,
even if the Serbian Government agreed to accept them. Thus, for
example, points one and two could not be carried out without
recasting the Serbian press law and associations law, and to that
it might be difficult to obtain the consent of the Skupshtina. As
for enforcing points four and five, this might lead to most
dangerous consequences, and even to the risk of acts of terrorism
directed against the Royal Family and against Pashitch, which
clearly could not be the intention of Austria. With regard to the
other points it seemed to me that, with certain changes of
detail, it would not be difficult to find a basis of mutual
agreement, if the accusations contained in them were confirmed by
sufficient proof.

"In the interest of the maintenance of peace, which, according to
the statements of Szápáry, is as much desired by Austria as by
all the powers, it was necessary to end the tension of the
present moment as soon as possible. With this object in view it
seemed to me most desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador
should be authorized to enter into a private exchange of views in
order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of July 23
in consultation with me. This method of procedure would perhaps
enable us to find a formula which would prove acceptable to
Serbia, while giving satisfaction to Austria in respect of the
chief of her demands. Please convey the substance of this
telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a judicious and
friendly manner."

Communicated to Russian Ambassadors in Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy. The Ambassador at Berlin was requested to communicate the contents of the telegram to Secretary of State von Jagow, and express to him the hope that he would advise Vienna to meet Russia's proposal in a friendly spirit.

M. Sevastopoulo, Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, telegraphed M. Sazonof that, when M. Berthelot, French Political Director, informed Count Szécen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, of the Serbian reply to the ultimatum, the count did not conceal his surprise that it was not accepted.

In a supplementary telegram he said M. Berthelot was convinced that Germany's aim, in her negotiations at Paris, was to intimidate France to mediate with Russia.

M. Broniewsky, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, reported noisy demonstrations there by a crowd largely composed of Austrians on news of Austrian mobilization, and anti-Russian shouting by the crowd before the Russian Embassy. No precautions were taken by the police.

_Germany._ Major von Eggeling telegraphed to the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, that it was certain mobilization had been ordered for Kiev and Odessa; it was doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow, and improbable elsewhere in Russia.

The Chancellor telegraphed to Baron von Schoen, German Ambassador at Paris, after Austria-Hungary's official declaration to Russia, that she had no intention to annex the territory of Serbia or to impair her sovereignty, the responsibility for a European war rested on Russia.

"We depend upon France, with which we are at one in the desire
for the preservation of the peace of Europe, that it will
exercise its influence at St. Petersburg in favor of peace."

This telegram, without the final sentence, the Chancellor sent also to Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, adding in the latter case that a call was expected for the several classes of Russian reserves, which would be equivalent to mobilization, and, in this case, Germany would be forced to mobilize, much against her wish.

"We ask [Great Britain] to act on this understanding at St.
Petersburg with all possible emphasis."

Count Pourtalès was directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government:

"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to
countermeasures which must consist in mobilizing the army.

"But mobilization means war.

"As we know the obligations of France toward Russia, this
mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We
cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war.
Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Serbian
Kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume
an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of
Russia to protect the integrity of Serbia as Austria-Hungary does
not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further
development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding."

_Great Britain._ Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs at London, that it was the belief of the German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirscky, that Russia would keep quiet during the chastisement of Serbia. Everything, said Von Tschirscky, depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily the pressure of a few newspapers; pan-Slav agitation in Russia was over; intervention in behalf of Serbia would open up Swedish, Polish, Ruthenian, Rumanian, and Persian questions; France, too, was not in a condition for war. Von Tschirscky doubted that Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Serbia, would assert it by action; Germany knew what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary; the Serbian concessions were all a sham, as proved by the Government previously ordering mobilization and preparing to retire from Belgrade.

Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that Kaiser William was returning suddenly that night (from a sea trip to Norway) on his own initiative, and that the Foreign Office regretted it, owing to the speculation and excitement which it would cause. Herr von Zimmermann, German Under-Secretary of State, had inferred from Russia's statement that she would intervene in case of annexation of Serbian territory; that she would not do so if no territory were taken.

In a supplementary telegram Sir Horace informed Sir Edward that Von Zimmermann considered that the communication by Germany to Austria-Hungary of his (Grey's) hope for a favorable view of the Serbian reply implied that the German Government associated itself to a certain extent with Grey's hope. It did not, however, go beyond this.

Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that Austria-Hungary had informed the Italian Government that the Austro-Hungarian Minister to Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply a declaration of war.

Sir Edward telegraphed to Sir Rennell Rodd, Sir Francis Bertie, Ambassador at Paris, and Sir Horace Rumbold, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to ask if the ministers of foreign affairs at their courts would instruct their ambassadors at London to meet with him in conference "to discover an issue which would prevent complications," and to suggest that the ministers should instruct their representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg to request a suspension of military operations pending results of the conference.

Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that the Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, just returned from leave of absence, thinks Austria-Hungary determined on war, and that it will be impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He and the French Ambassador, M. Dumaine, doubt whether the principle of Grey's suggestion that Russia, being an interested party, is entitled to have a say in a purely Austro-Serbian dispute, would be accepted by either Austria-Hungary or Germany.

_France._ M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified M. Viviani, Prime Minister on board _La France_, and the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, of the events at Belgrade on Saturday, July 25, ending with the order for mobilization given by the Serbian Government, which had retired to Kragoujewatz, whither it was followed by the French and Russian Ministers. At Vienna people "soothe themselves with the illusion that Russia 'will not hold firm.'"

"It must not be forgotten that Italy is bound by the engagements
of the Triple Alliance only if she has been consulted beforehand.

"From St. Petersburg we learn that M. Sazonof [Minister for
Foreign Affairs] has advised Serbia to ask for British mediation.
At the Council of Ministers on the 25th, which was held in
presence of the emperor, the mobilization of thirteen army corps
intended eventually to operate against Austria was considered;
this mobilization, however, would only be made effective if
Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Serbia, and not
till after notice had been given by the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty
being left to him to go on with negotiations even if Belgrade
should be occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both
politically and morally impossible for Russia to allow Serbia to
be crushed.

"In London the German _démarche_ was made on the 25th, in the
same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at Paris. Sir Edward
Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if the war were to
break out no power in Europe could take up a detached attitude.
He did not express himself more definitely and used very reserved
language to the Serbian Minister [M. Boschkovitch]. The
communication made on the evening of the 25th by the Austrian
Ambassador makes Sir Edward Grey more optimistic; since the
diplomatic rupture does not necessarily involve immediate
military operations, the Secretary of State is still willing to
hope that the powers will have time to intervene.

"At Berlin the language used by the Secretary of State [Von
Jagow] to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires [Broniewsky] is
unsatisfactory and dilatory; when the latter asked him to
associate himself with a _démarche_ at Vienna for an extension of
the time limit, he replied that he had already taken action in
this sense but that it was too late; to the request for an
extension of the time limit before active measures were taken, he
replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and not with
a war but with local operations. Herr von Jagow pretends not to
believe that the Austrian action could lead to general
consequences.

"A real explosion of chauvinism has taken place at Berlin. The
German Emperor returns direct to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon thinks
that, at the first military steps taken by Russia, Germany would
immediately reply, and probably would not wait for a pretext
before attacking us.

"At Vienna, the French Ambassador [Dumaine] has not had time to
join in the _démarche_ of his Russian colleague [Schebeko] for
obtaining an extension of the time limit fixed for Serbia; he
does not regret it, this _démarche_ having been categorically
rejected, and England not having had time to give instructions to
her representative about it.

"A note from the British Embassy has been delivered to me: it
gives an account of the conversation between the British
Ambassador at St. Petersburg [Buchanan] and M. Sazonof and M.
Paléologue. Sir Edward Grey thinks that the four powers who are
not directly interested ought to press both on Russia and Austria
that their armies should not cross the frontier, and that they
should give time to England, France, Germany, and Italy to bring
their mediation into play. If Germany accepts, the British
Government has reason to think that Italy also would be glad to
be associated in the joint action of England and France; the
adherence of Germany is essential, for neither Austria nor Russia
would tolerate any intervention except that of impartial friends
or Allies."

M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, informed M. Bienvenu-Martin that a telegram from Vienna stated that diplomatic rupture between Austria and Serbia had taken place, and Austria was proceeding to military measures. Marquis di San Giuliano, the Prime Minister, would return in two days to Rome. The president of the council had given Barrère the impression that Italy would be neutral in case of war, maintaining "an attitude of observation." M. Salandra [afterward Prime Minister] had said that:

"'We shall make the greatest efforts to prevent peace being
broken; our situation is somewhat analogous to that of England.
Perhaps we could do something in a pacific sense together with
the English.' M. Salandra stated definitely to me that the
Austrian note had been communicated to Rome at the last moment."

M. Barrère, in a second telegram, said that the greater part of Italian public opinion was hostile to Austria "in this serious business."

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed that M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, had advised Serbia to ask for British mediation. M. Bienvenu-Martin thereupon telegraphed M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires, London, that France desired British mediation. M. Paléologue reported at greater length M. Sazonof's determination to secure a peaceful solution to the Serbian question.

"'Up to the last moment,' he declared to me, 'I shall show myself
ready to negotiate.'

"It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szápáry to
come to a 'frank and loyal explanation.' M. Sazonof commented in
his presence on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by
article, making clear the insulting character of the principal
clauses. 'The intention which inspired this document,' he said,
'is legitimate if you pursued no aim other than the protection of
your territory against the intrigues of Serbian anarchists; but
the procedure to which you have had recourse is not defensible.'
He concluded: 'Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I
will guarantee you the result.'

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved by this
language; however, while awaiting instructions, he reserves the
opinion of his Government. Without being discouraged M. Sazonof
has decided to propose this evening to Count Berchtold the
opening of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg
on the changes to be introduced into the ultimatum.

"This friendly and semiofficial interposition of Russia between
Austria and Serbia has the advantage of being expeditious. I
therefore believe it to be preferable to any other procedure and
likely to succeed."

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador, had returned in haste from Russia, whither he had gone on the assurance of Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the demands on Serbia would be acceptable. Other Austrian officials had taken the same attitude, which is quite usual in Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, and this procedure has greatly increased the irritation of the Russian Government.

M. Schebeko, seizing advantage of the delay of mobilization, will make a proposal calculated to test the value of the pacific declarations of Germany. This is for a conference of the British, French, Italian, and German Ambassadors, to refuse concurrence in which the German Ambassador, M. Tschirsky, will almost certainly have to plead the principle of "localizing the conflict."

"My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Government, although
surprised and perhaps regretting the vigor with which they have
been inspired, will believe themselves obliged to commence
military action."

M. Bienvenu-Martin reported to M. Viviani on _La France_ and to the ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome the rupture of diplomatic relations with Serbia made by Austria-Hungary.

"According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon [at Berlin], the
British Ambassador [Sir Edward Goschen] thinks that there is a
slight yielding; when he observed to Herr von Jagow that Sir
Edward Grey did not ask him to intervene between Austria and
Serbia, but, as this question ceased to be localized, to
intervene with England, France, and Italy at Vienna and St.
Petersburg, the Secretary of State declared that he would do his
best to maintain peace."

M. Bienvenu-Martin also reported that Italy, not having been consulted about the note to Serbia, felt herself relieved from all responsibility in the grave step taken by her ally. He also told of his answer to the German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen, who sought France's influence to keep Russia from war, that Germany ought, on her side, to influence Austria-Hungary to avoid military operations leading to the occupation of Serbia, and the consequent intervention of Russia.

"The ambassador having observed to me that this could not be
reconciled with the position taken up by Germany 'that the
question concerned only Austria and Serbia,' I told him that
mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburg would be the act of the
four other powers less interested in the question.

"Herr von Schoen then intrenched himself behind his lack of
instructions in this respect, and I told him that in these
conditions I did not feel myself in a position to take any action
at St. Petersburg alone."

After his visit to M. Bienvenu-Martin at 5 p. m. Baron von Schoen went to see M. Berthelot, the Political Director, to have an account of the interview officially published in the press. The article he proposed indicated the most amicable cooperation between France and Germany in the furtherance of European peace.

"The Political Director replied at once, 'Then, in your opinion,
every thing is settled, and you bring us the assurance that
Austria accepts the Serbian note or will enter into conversations
with the powers on this matter?' The ambassador having ...
vigorously denied the suggestion, it was explained to him that if
there was no modification in Germany's negative attitude, the
terms of the suggested 'note to the press' were exaggerated, and
of a nature to give a false security to French opinion by
creating illusion on the real situation, the dangers of which
were only too evident.

"To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador as to the
optimistic impressions which he had formed, the Acting Political
Director replied by asking if he might speak to him in a manner
quite personal and private, as man to man, quite freely and
without regard to their respective functions. Baron von Schoen
asked him to do so.

"M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's
attitude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war; a purely
objective analysis of the facts and the psychology of the
Austro-German relations led logically to this conclusion. In the
face of the repeated statement that Germany was ignorant of the
contents of the Austrian note, it was no longer permissible to
raise any doubt on that point; but was it probable that Germany
would have arrayed herself on the side of Austria in such an
adventure with her eyes closed? Did the psychology of all the
past relations of Vienna and Berlin allow one to admit that
Austria could have taken up a position without any possible
retreat, before having weighed with her ally all the consequences
of her uncompromising attitude? How surprising appeared the
refusal by Germany to exercise mediating influence at Vienna now
that she knew the extraordinary text of the Austrian note! What
responsibility was the German Government assuming and what
suspicions would rest upon them if they persisted in interposing
between Austria and the powers, after what might be called the
absolute submission of Serbia, and when the slightest advice
given by them to Vienna would put an end to the nightmare which
weighed on Europe!

"The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats
of war, and the mobilization which she was undertaking make
peculiarly urgent pacific action on the part of Germany, for from
the day when Austrian troops crossed the Serbian frontier, one
would be faced by an act which without doubt would oblige the St.
Petersburg Cabinet to intervene, and would risk the unloosing of
a war which Germany declares that she wishes to avoid.

"Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that
Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note, and
had approved it only after its delivery; she thought, however,
that Serbia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be
able to forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an
end to a situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a
great power. He declared besides that he did not know the text of
the Serbian reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had
not satisfied Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which
are often ill informed, represented it to be.

"He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and gave his
impressions as to the effect that might arise from good advice
given, for instance, at Vienna, by England in a friendly tone.
According to him Austria was not uncompromising; what she rejects
is the idea of a formal mediation, the 'spectre' of a conference:
a peaceful word coming from St. Petersburg, good words said in a
conciliatory tone by the powers of the Triple Entente, would have
a chance of being well received. He added, finally, that he did
not say that Germany on her side would not give some advice at
Vienna.

"In these conditions the Political Director announced that he
would ask the minister if it appeared to him opportune to
communicate to the press a short note in a moderate tone."

M. Chevalley, French Minister at Christiania, telegraphed to M. Bienvenu-Martin that the whole German fleet in Norway was returning to Germany. M. d'Annoville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Luxemburg, telegraphed that the last four classes of [German] reservists set at liberty had been forbidden to leave their places of residence, and were ordered to hold themselves at the disposition of the _Kommandutur_ at any moment.

MONDAY, JULY 27, 1914

_Austria-Hungary._ On the following day Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, of a conversation he had just had with M. Sazonof.

Mistaken impressions, he told the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, were abroad in Russia as to Austria-Hungary's intentions.

"We were credited with wishing to push forward into Balkan
territory, and to begin a march to Salonica or even to
Constantinople. Others, again, went so far as to describe our
action merely as the starting point of a preventive war against
Russia. I said that all this was erroneous, and that parts of it
were absolutely unreasonable. The goal of our action was
self-preservation and self-defense against hostile propaganda by
word, in writing, and in action, which threatened our integrity.
It would occur to no one in Austria-Hungary to threaten Russian
interests, or indeed to pick a quarrel with Russia. And yet we
were absolutely determined to reach the goal which we had set
before us, and the path which we had chosen seemed to us the most
suitable. As, however, the action under discussion was action in
self-defense, I could not conceal from him that we could not
allow ourselves to be diverted from it by any consequences, of
whatever kind they might be.

"M. Sazonof agreed with me. Our goal, as I had described it to
him, was an entirely legitimate one, but he considered that the
path which we were pursuing with a view to attaining it was not
the surest. He said that the note which we had delivered was not
happy in its form. He had since been studying it, and if I had
time, he would like to look it through once more with me. I
remarked that I was at his service, but was not authorized either
to discuss the text of the note with him or to interpret it. Of
course, however, his remarks were of interest. The minister then
took all the points of the note in order, and on this occasion
found seven of the ten points admissible without very great
difficulty; only the two points dealing with the collaboration of
the Imperial and Royal officials in Serbia and the point dealing
with the removal of officers and civil servants to be designated
by us, seemed to him to be unacceptable in their present form.
With regard, to the first two points, I was in a position to give
an authentic interpretation in the sense of your excellency's
telegram of the 25th instant; with regard to the third, I
expressed the opinion that it was a necessary demand. Moreover,
matters had already been set in motion. The Serbians had
mobilized on the previous day, and I did not know what had
happened since then."

Count Berchtold instructed Count Szápáry by telegraph to declare to M. Sazonof that, so long as the war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia remained localized, the [Dual] Monarchy did not aim in any way at territorial acquisitions of any sort.

Count Szögyény, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed to Count Berchtold that M. Sazonof had explained to Count Pourtalès, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that he could not guarantee that Russia had not begun mobilization, and confessed that certain necessary military measures were being taken.

"Major von Eggeling, German Military Attaché at St. Petersburg,
reports that the Russian Minister for War, M. Suchomlinof, has
given him his word of honor that not a man or a horse has been
mobilized; however, naturally, certain military precautions have
been taken; precautions which, as the German military attaché
adds ... 'are to be sure pretty far-reaching.'"

Count Berchtold informed the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors at Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg of the annotations of his Government to the Serbian reply.

_Germany._ The Austro-Hungarian Consulate at Kovno, Russia, telegraphed to the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, that Kovno had been declared to be in a state of war.

The German Minister at Berne, Switzerland, telegraphed to the Chancellor that the French Fourteenth Corps had discontinued maneuvers.

Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to the Chancellor at Berlin:

"The Secretary of War [Suchomlinof] has given me his word of
honor that no order to mobilize has as yet been issued. Though
general preparations are being made, no reserves were called and
no horses mustered. If Austria crossed the Serbian frontier, such
military districts as are directed toward Austria, viz Kiev,
Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilized. Under no
circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilni, St.
Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my
inquiry into the object of mobilization against Austria he
shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the
secretary that we appreciated the friendly intentions, but
considered mobilization even against Austria as very menacing."

The Chancellor telegraphed Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London:

"We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to
hold a quadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to
place our ally in his dispute with Serbia before a European
tribunal. Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an
Austro-Russian conflict."

This was supplemented by a telegram:

"We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the
sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated besides
to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sazonof for a direct parley
with Vienna."

_Russia._ Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg, to know if his views on direct discussions with the Vienna Cabinet harmonized with Grey's scheme for mediation by the four powers, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany.

"Having heard from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that
you would be prepared to accept such a combination, Grey decided
to turn it into an official proposal, which he communicated
yesterday to Berlin, Paris, and Rome."

M. Sazonof replied by telegraph that the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, had asked him if the Russian Government thought it desirable for Great Britain to take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the four powers.

"I replied that I have begun conversations with the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hope, may
be favorable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to
the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two
Cabinets.

"If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove
impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any
other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favorable
solution of the conflict.

"I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a
misunderstanding which might arise from the answer given by the
French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador, regarding
counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial [Russian]
Cabinet."

This telegram Benckendorff communicated to Grey on the following day.

M. Sazonof telegraphed to the Russian Ambassadors at Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome that the Serbian reply exceeded expectations in its moderation and desire to afford the fullest satisfaction.

"We do not see what further demands could be made by Austria,
unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war with
Serbia."

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to M. Sazonof that the German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen, had confirmed his declaration of yesterday in writing, i.e.:

"1. That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no
territorial acquisitions and that she harbors no designs against
the integrity of Serbia. Her sole object is to secure her own
peace and quiet.

"2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war.

"3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their ardent
desire to preserve peace, should exercise their moderating
influence upon Russia.

"Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expression of
solidarity of Germany and France. The Minister of Justice is
convinced that these steps on the part of Germany are taken with
the evident object of alienating Russia and France, of inducing
the French Government to make representations at St. Petersburg,
and of thus compromising our ally in our eyes; and finally, in
the event of war, of throwing the responsibility not on Germany,
who is ostensibly making every effort to maintain peace, but on
Russia and France."

In a supplementary telegram M. Isvolsky stated that the telegram from Belgrade to Paris, giving the Serbian reply to the Austrian note was delayed twenty hours, and that the telegram from the French Foreign Office containing instructions to support Russia's representations, which had been sent at the special urgent rate at 11 a. m., July 25, 1914, only reached its destination at 6 p. m.

"There is no doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed
by the Austrian telegraph office."

M. Isvolsky telegraphed to M. Sazonof:

"The Austrian Ambassador [Count Szécsen] has informed the Acting
Minister for Foreign Affairs [M. Bienvenu-Martin] that to-morrow,
Tuesday, Austria will proceed to take 'energetic action' with the
object of forcing Serbia to give the necessary guaranties. The
minister having asked what form such action would take, the
ambassador replied that he had no exact information on the
subject, but it might mean either the crossing of the Serbian
frontier, or an ultimatum, or even a declaration of war."

M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed M. Sazonof:

"I begged the Minister for Foreign Affairs [Von Jagow] to support
your proposal in Vienna that Szápáry [Austro-Hungarian Ambassador
at St. Petersburg] should be authorized to draw up, by means of a
private exchange of views with you, a wording of the
Austro-Hungarian demands which would be acceptable to both
parties. Jagow answered that he was aware of this proposal and
that he agreed with Pourtalès [German Ambassador at St.
Petersburg] that, as Szápáry had begun this conversation, he
might as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to
the German Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna
with greater insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow
answered that he could not advise Austria to give way."

In a second telegram M. Broniewsky gave an account of an interview just held between Von Jagow and the French Ambassador, M. Jules Cambon:

"Cambon endeavored to induce Von Jagow to accept the British
proposal for action in favor of peace to be taken simultaneously
at St. Petersburg and at Vienna by Great Britain, Germany, Italy,
and France. Cambon suggested that these powers should give their
advice to Vienna in the following terms: 'To abstain from all
action which might aggravate the existing situation.' By adopting
this vague formula, all mention of the necessity of refraining
from invading Serbia might be avoided. Jagow refused point blank
to accept this suggestion in spite of the entreaties of the
ambassador, who emphasized, as a good feature of the suggestion,
the mixed grouping of the powers, thanks to which the opposition
between the Alliance and the Entente--a matter of which Jagow
himself had often complained--was avoided."

Nicholas II telegraphed his reply to the appeal for Russian aid made by Prince Alexander of Serbia on July 25, 1914. It assured the prince of the Czar's cordial sympathy with the Serbian people.

"The existing situation is engaging my most serious attention,
and my government are using their utmost endeavor to smooth away
the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your highness and
the Royal Serbian Government wish to render that task easy by
neglecting no step which might lead to a settlement, and thus
both prevent the horrors of a new war and safeguard the dignity
of Serbia.

"So long as the slightest hope exists of avoiding bloodshed, all
our efforts must be directed to that end; but if in spite of our
earnest wish we are not successful, your highness may rest
assured that Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the
fate of Serbia."

M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to M. Sazonof of a conversation he had had in the absence of Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs, with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary.

"I drew his attention to the unfavorable impression produced in
Russia by the presentation of demands by Austria to Serbia, which
it was quite impossible for any independent state, however small,
to accept. I added that this method of procedure might lead to
the most undesirable complications, and that it had aroused
profound surprise and general condemnation in Russia. We can only
suppose that Austria, influenced by the assurances given by the
German representative at Vienna, who has egged her on throughout
this crisis, has counted on the probable localization of the
dispute with Serbia, and on the possibility of inflicting with
impunity a serious blow upon that country. The declaration by the
Russian Government that Russia could not possibly remain
indifferent in the face of such conduct has caused a great
sensation here."

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, telegraphed to M. Sazonof:

"Grey has just informed the German Ambassador, who came to
question him as to the possibility of taking action at St.
Petersburg, that such action ought rather to be taken at Vienna,
and that the Berlin Cabinet were the best qualified to do so.
Grey also pointed out that the Serbian reply to the Austrian note
had exceeded anything that could have been expected in moderation
and in its spirit of conciliation. Grey added that he had
therefore come to the conclusion that Russia must have advised
Belgrade to return a moderate reply, and that he thought the
Serbian reply could form the basis of a peaceful and acceptable
solution of the question.

"In these circumstances, continued Grey, if Austria were to begin
hostilities in spite of that reply, she would prove her intention
of crushing Serbia. Looked at in this light, the question might
give rise to a situation which might lead to a war in which all
the powers would be involved.

"Grey finally declared that the British Government were sincerely
anxious to act with the German Government as long as the
preservation of peace was in question; but, in the contrary
event, Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action."

_Great Britain._ Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs at London, that he had consulted with his colleagues about the mediation of the four powers, and the impression was that the note to Serbia was intentionally drawn to make war inevitable, and, until Serbia had been punished, no proposals for mediation would be listened to.

"This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with
Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a
great disappointment.

"I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send
me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the
hope of his majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to
avoid war, and to ask his excellency whether he cannot suggest a
way out even now."

Sir Francis Bertie, Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to Grey that France had accepted his proposal for the four-power mediation, and sent the necessary instructions to her representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.

"Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin
to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of
their speaking jointly to the German Government. Until it is
known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success,
it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be
dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do
so."

Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed to Grey:

"Secretary of State [Von Jagow] says that conference you suggest
would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not,
in his opinion, be called together except at the request of
Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your
suggestion, desirous though he was to cooperate for the
maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had
nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of
the four nations not directly interested should discuss and
suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained,
however, that such a conference as you proposed was not
practicable. He added that news he had just received from St.
Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M.
de Sazonof [Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] to exchange
views with Count Berchtold [Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign
Affairs]. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to
a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing
anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between
the Austrian and Russian Governments.

"In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said
that as yet Austria was only partially mobilizing, but that if
Russia mobilized against Germany latter would have to follow
suit. I asked him what he meant by 'mobilizing against Germany.'
He said that if Russia only mobilized in south, Germany would not
mobilize, but if she mobilized in north, Germany would have to do
so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so complicated
that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization.
Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken
by surprise.

"Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg
had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general
situation."

Sir George Buchanan, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed Grey an account of the interview between M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Count Szápáry, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, in which Sazonof had pointed out that Austria's demands entailed entire revision of existing Serbian laws, and were moreover incompatible with Serbia's dignity as an independent state; and that it would be useless for Russia, being an object of suspicion in Austria, to offer her good offices.

"In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he
thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate
with Austria."

Sir George told M. Sazonof that Grey could do nothing more than he had promised on the 24th inst., and that the Russian Minister was mistaken if he believed that peace would be promoted by Great Britain telling Germany it would have to deal with her as well as with Russia and France if it supported Austria by force of arms.

"Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and
we could only induce Germany to use her influence at Vienna to
avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was
anxious to preserve peace. His excellency must not, if our
efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a
conflict. I trusted that the Russian Government would defer
mobilization ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would
not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that, until the issue
of the imperial ukase, no effective steps toward mobilization
could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit
by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it
were deferred too long."

In a supplementary telegram Buchanan reported that M. Sazonof had proposed

"that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands
should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and
St. Petersburg."

Grey telegraphed to Sir Eward Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, that Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador at London, had informed him that Germany accepted in principle the four-power mediation, reserving its right as ally to help Austria if attacked.

"He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in
St. Petersburg to localize the war and to keep up the peace of
Europe.

"I have replied that the Serbian reply went further than could
have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary
of State [Von Jagow] has himself said that there were some things
in the Austrian note that Serbia could hardly be expected to
accept. I assumed that Serbian reply could not have gone as far
as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at
Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence
was now required. If Austria put the Serbian reply aside as being
worth nothing and marched into Serbia, it meant that she was
determined to crush Serbia at all costs, being reckless of the
consequences that might be involved. Serbian reply should at
least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said
German Government should urge this at Vienna.

"I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of
the situation if the war could not be localized, and observed
that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be
because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute,
Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other
issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between
Austria and Serbia, and would bring other powers in, and the war
would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would
work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated
that after the Serbian reply it was at Vienna that some
moderation must be urged."

Grey telegraphed Buchanan at St. Petersburg, referring him to the above, and informing him that the Russian Ambassador at London, Count Benckendorff had told him [Grey] that the impression prevailed in German and Austrian circles that Great Britain would stand aside in event of war. This the Ambassador deplored for its adverse effect on peace.

Grey informed Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, of his interview just held with Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London.

"Mensdorff said that the Austrian Government, very reluctantly
and against their wish, were compelled to take more severe
measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of
enmity pursued up to now by Serbia.... We would understand that
the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived
to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guaranties for the
definite suppression of the Serbian aspirations and for the
security of peace and order on the southeastern frontier of
Austria.

"As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the
Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. Their action,
which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be
represented otherwise than as self-defense. Also they thought
that they would serve a European interest if they prevented
Serbia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as
she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of
the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the
Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was
theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose
hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly
as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally,
the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations
with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight
that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localizing the
fight, if necessary.

"Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Serbia
was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe
measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free
development of the Balkan States. Now that Serbia had doubled her
territory and population without any Austrian interference, the
repression of Serbian subversive aims was a matter of
self-defense and self-preservation on Austria's part. He
reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Serbian
territory or aggressive designs against Serbian territory.

"I said that I could not understand the construction put by the
Austrian Government upon the Serbian reply, and I told Count
Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with
the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.

"Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Serbian reply might
seem to be satisfactory; but the Serbians had refused the one
thing--the cooperation of Austrian officials and police--which
would be a real guaranty that in practice the Serbians would not
carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

"I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government
believed that, even after the Serbian reply, they could make war
upon Serbia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the
dispute. If they could make war on Serbia and at the same time
satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences
would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this
phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government.
I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburg that the
Serbian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia
found that there was increased tension, the situation would
become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one
of anxiety. I pointed out [as an instance of this] that our fleet
was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it
disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this
moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our
fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration,
it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment.
It seemed to me that the Serbian reply already involved the
greatest humiliation to Serbia that I had ever seen a country
undergo, and it was disappointing to me that the reply was
treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as
unsatisfactory as a blank negative."

Grey informed Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, that the Italian Ambassador at London had stated to Sir Arthur Nicholson, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that Italy agreed to the four-power conference, and that the Marquis di San Giuliano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, would recommend to Germany the suggestion that Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Serbia should suspend military operations pending result of the conference, and would inquire what procedure Germany proposed to be followed at Vienna.

Sir Francis Bertie, Ambassador at Paris, sent Grey a memorandum of M. Bienvenu-Martin's, French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, as to steps to be taken to prevent hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, has been requested to act in concert with the British Ambassador there in Grey's plan. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassador at London, has been appointed France's representative in the four-power conference. France is ready to instruct her representatives at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade to induce these governments to abstain from hostilities pending the results of the conference.

But M. Bienvenu-Martin considers success of the conference depends on the action Berlin is willing to take at Vienna beforehand.

Sir George Buchanan, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to Grey an account of an interview just had with M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sazonof was conciliatory and optimistic.

"Sazonof said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the powers
accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you
would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of
its taking place."

_France._ M. Farges, Consul General at Basle, Switzerland, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, that German officers on leave in this district had been ordered to return to Germany, and that owners of motor cars in Baden had been ordered to be ready to place them at the disposal of the Government, and secrecy enjoined as to the order under penalty of fine. People at Basle are uneasy, and banking facilities restricted.

M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that the German and Austrian Ambassadors there were letting it appear that they were sure Great Britain would preserve neutrality in case of war. Sir Arthur Nicholson, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had, however, assured Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, that Great Britain was free to intervene if she judged it expedient. To make this understood in Germany, nevertheless, that Government should be made to know for certain that they will find Great Britain by the side of France and Russia.

M. Paléologue, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed that M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was using conciliatory language to the ambassadors, and was restraining the press, particularly in recommending great moderation toward Germany.

M. Bompard, Ambassador at Constantinople, telegraphed from Therapia that the Turks were delighted at the misfortunes of Serbia, and thought that Russia will not intervene in her favor under circumstances which would extend the war beyond Serbia and Austria.

"The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that
Austria, with the support of Germany, will attain her objects,
and that she will make Serbia follow Bulgaria and enter into the
orbit of the Triple Alliance."

M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London, reported the interview between Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador.

"The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement
of the demobilization of the fleet. The First Lord of the
Admiralty [Winston Churchill] took this measure quietly on Friday
on his own initiative; to-night Sir Edward Grey and his
colleagues decided to make it public. This result is due to the
conciliatory attitude of Serbia and Russia."

M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London, reported news from St. Petersburg of the willingness of Russia to stand aside if Serbia appealed to the powers. Accordingly Sir Edward Grey will proceed with his plan of a conference, on the understanding that, pending its results, Russia, Austria, and Serbia abstain from active military operations. To this the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky is favorably disposed. Later M. de Fleuriau reported that the Serbian Minister at London, M. Boschkovitch, had not yet received instructions to ask for British mediation. Possibly telegrams to that effect had been stopped on the way.

M. Bienvenu-Martin having received Sir Edward Grey's proposal for the four-power conference, authorized M. de Fleuriau to represent France in it. He repeated his conviction of failure of the conference unless Germany's influence were first exercised pacifically at Vienna.

"I have also noted, during Baron von Schoen's observations, that
the Austro-Hungarian Government was particularly susceptible when
the words 'mediation,' 'intervention,' 'conference' were used,
and was more willing to admit 'friendly advice' and
'conversations.'"

De Fleuriau reported that Italy had accepted intervention by the powers to prevent military operations. Germany had not yet replied to Italy's request for information as to procedure to be followed with regard to Austria-Hungary.

M. Barrère, Ambassador at Rome, reported his interview with the Marquis di San Giuliano, in which that Minister for Foreign Affairs had repudiated his reported approval of the action of Austria-Hungary.