Chapter XL: Part IV: Diplomatic Papers Relating to the Origin of the War, (6)

"He is convinced that Austria will not withdraw any of her
claims, and will maintain them, even at the risk of bringing
about a general conflagration; he doubts whether Germany is
disposed to lend herself to any pressure on her ally. He asserts,
however, that Germany at this moment attaches great importance to
her relations with London, and he believes that if any power can
determine Berlin in favor of peaceful action, it is England.

"As for Italy she will continue to make every effort in favor of
peace. It is with this end in view that he had adhered without
hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London
of the ambassadors of those powers which are not directly
interested in the Austro-Serbian dispute."

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador at Berlin, reported the interview of Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador, with the German Secretary of State, and said that Herr von Jagow's language confirmed that of Baron von Schoen at Paris.

M. Bienvenu-Martin then notified the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, of his interview with Count Szécsen, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, and the memorandum he had submitted criticizing the Serbian reply to the Austrian note.

_Belgium._ Baron Beyens, Minister at Berlin, reported to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Brussels, the diplomatic situation at the German capital. Germany had not replied to the British proposal. "The decision rests with the emperor."

TUESDAY, JULY 28, 1914

_Serbia._ Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, this day telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister, that Serbia's reply to the Austrian note being unsatisfactory, the Austro-Hungarian Government

"was compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and
interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of
arms. Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward
in a state of war with Serbia."

M. Pashitch telegraphed this news from Nish to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd, gave the information officially to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

"I have the honor to inform your excellency of this regrettable
act, which a great power had the courage to commit against a
small Slav country which only recently emerged from a long series
of heroic but exhausting battles, and I beg leave on this
occasion of deep gravity for my country to express the hope that
this act, which disturbs the peace of Europe and revolts her
conscience, will be condemned by the whole civilized world and
severely punished by Russia, the protector of Serbia.

"I beg your excellency to be so kind as to lay this petition from
the whole Serbian nation before the throne of his majesty."

_Austria-Hungary._ An official communication was given to the press at Vienna summarizing the Government's criticism of the Serbian reply to the Austro-Hungarian note.

"Inasmuch as the Austro-Hungarian demands constitute the minimum
regarded as necessary for the reestablishment of a permanent
peace in the southeast of the [Dual] Monarchy, the Serbian reply
is considered to be insufficient.

"That the Serbian Government is aware of this appears from the
fact that they contemplate the settlement of the dispute by
arbitration, and also from the fact that on the day on which
their reply was due, and before it was in fact submitted, they
gave orders for mobilization."

Count Szögyény, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed to Count Berchtold that Germany had declined to take part in the four power-conference

"on the ground that it is impossible for Germany to bring her
ally before a European court in her settlement with Serbia."

Baron von Müller telegraphed to Count Berchtold from Tokyo, Japan, that the semiofficial Japan "Times" concludes a leading article on the Serbian question with the statement that Japan is on the best of terms with the three great powers concerned, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia, while it is in no way interested in Serbia. He infers that, in case of war, Japan would, as a matter of course, maintain strict neutrality.

Count Berchtold telegraphed Count Szögyény at Berlin the report made by Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, of his interview on the 27th with Sir Edward Grey.

"I believe that I need not specially point out to your excellency
that Grey's proposal for a conference, in so far as it relates to
our conflict with Serbia, appears, in view of the state of war
which has arisen, to have been outstripped by events."

Count Berchtold telegraphed Count Mensdorff in London to explain to Sir Edward Grey in detail the _dossier_ of charges against Serbia accompanying the Austrian note, and

"make clear to him that the offer of Serbia to meet points in our
note was only an apparent one, intended to deceive Europe without
giving any guaranty for the future.

"As the Serbian Government knew that only an unconditional
acceptance of our demands could satisfy us, the Serbian tactics
can easily be seen through: Serbia accepted a number of our
demands, with all sorts of reservations, in order to impress
public opinion in Europe, trusting that she would not be required
to fulfill her promises. In conversing with Sir Edward Grey, your
excellency should lay special emphasis on the circumstance that
the general mobilization of the Serbian army was ordered for the
afternoon of July 25 at three o'clock, while the answer to our
note was delivered just before the expiration of the time
fixed--that is to say, a few minutes before six o'clock. Up to
then we had made no military preparations, but by the Serbian
mobilization we were compelled to do so."

Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szápáry, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, an account of an interview with the Russian Ambassador at Vienna. Count Berchtold had informed M. Schebeko of Austria-Hungary's inability to concur in Russia's proposal to take the Serbian reply to the Austrian note as a starting point for an understanding between the disputants.

"No one in our country could understand, nor could anyone approve
negotiations with reference to the wording used in the answer
which we had designated as unsatisfactory. This was all the more
impossible because, as the ambassador knew, there was a deep
feeling of general excitement which had already mastered public
opinion. Moreover, on our side war had to-day been declared
against Serbia.

"In reply to the explanations of the ambassador, which culminated
in asserting that we should not in any way suppress the admitted
hostile opinion in Serbia by a warlike action, but that, on the
contrary, we should only increase it, I gave him some insight
into our present relations toward Serbia which made it necessary,
quite against our will, and without any selfish secondary object,
for us to show our restless neighbor, with the necessary
emphasis, our firm intention not to permit any longer a movement
which was allowed to exist by the Government, and which was
directed against the existence of the [Dual] Monarchy. The
attitude of Serbia after the receipt of our note had further not
been calculated to make a peaceful solution possible, because
Serbia, even before she transmitted to us her unsatisfactory
reply, had ordered a general mobilization, and in so doing had
already committed a hostile act against us. In spite of this,
however, we had waited for three days. Yesterday hostilities were
opened against us on the Hungarian frontier on the part of
Serbia. By this act we were deprived of the possibility of
maintaining any longer the patience which we had shown toward
Serbia. The establishment of a fundamental but peaceful
amelioration of our relations toward Serbia had now been made
impossible, and we were compelled to meet the Serbian provocation
in the only form which in the given circumstances was consistent
with the dignity of the monarchy."

Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Mensdorff in London of his interview with Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna. Bunsen had explained Sir Edward Grey's position.

Count Berchtold telegraphed Count Szögyény at Berlin to communicate to the German Chancellor or Secretary of State the following information:

"According to mutually consistent reports, received from St.
Petersburg, Kiev, Warsaw, Moscow, and Odessa, Russia is making
extensive military preparations. M. Sazonof has indeed given an
assurance on his word of honor, as has also the Russian Minister
of War, that mobilization has not up to now been ordered; the
latter has, however, told the German Military Attaché that the
military districts which border on Austria-Hungary--Kiev, Odessa,
Moscow, and Kazan--will be mobilized should our troops cross the
Serbian frontier.

"Under these circumstances I would urgently ask the Cabinet at
Berlin to take into immediate consideration the question whether
the attention of Russia should not be drawn, in a friendly
manner, to the fact that the mobilization of the above districts
amounts to a threat against Austria-Hungary, and that, therefore,
should these measures be carried out, they would be answered by
the most extensive military countermeasures, not only by the
[Dual] Monarchy but by our ally, the German Empire.

"In order to make it more easy for Russia to withdraw, it appears
to us appropriate that such a step should, in the first place, be
taken by Germany alone; nevertheless we are ready to take this
step in conjunction with Germany.

"Unambiguous language appears to me at the present moment to be
the most effective method of making Russia fully conscious of all
that is involved in a threatening attitude."

_Russia._ Consul General at Fiume telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg, that a state of siege had been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and at Fiume, and reservists of all classes called out.

M. Broniewsky, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed M. Sazonof that the local papers had not published _in extenso_ the Serbian reply, evidently being well aware of the calming effect it would have on German readers.

M. Schebeko, Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed that the Austro-Hungarian order for general mobilization had been signed.

M. Sazonof telegraphed the ambassadors at London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome:

"In face of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia,
it is necessary that Great Britain should take instant mediatory
action, and that the military measures undertaken by Austria
against Serbia should be immediately suspended. Otherwise
mediation will only serve as an excuse to make the question drag
on, and will meanwhile make it possible for Austria to crush
Serbia completely and to acquire a dominant position in the
Balkans."

_Germany._ The Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, confidentially reported to the Government of Germany that the evidence presented by Austria-Hungary was conclusive of the complicity in the crime of Sarajevo of members of the Serbian Government and army, and the existence of organized Serb propaganda against the Dual Monarchy. Austria-Hungary therefore was justified in her action as well as demands against Serbia.

The Chancellor telegraphed to Count Pourtalès, Ambassador at St. Petersburg:

"We continue in our endeavor to induce Vienna to elucidate in St.
Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Serbia
in a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The
declaration of war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in
this matter."

Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Vienna, telegraphed to the German Chancellor that the British mediation proposal, "owing to the opening of hostilities by Serbia," was "belated." William II at 10. 45 p. m., sent the following message to Nicholas II:

"I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which
is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia. The
unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in
Serbia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz
Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Serbians
murder their own king and his consort still dominates that
country. Doubtless you will agree with me that both of us, you as
well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to
insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible
murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.

"On the other hand, I by no means overlook the difficulty
encountered by you and your Government to stem the tide of public
opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us
both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire
influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and
satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that
you will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties
which may yet arise.

"Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin."

_Great Britain._ Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Ambassador at Vienna, sent to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs at London, the text of the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia. This was followed by the statements:

"Austria-Hungary, who has just addressed to Serbia a formal
declaration, in conformity with Article I of the convention of
October 18, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities,
considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Serbia.

"In bringing the above to notice of his Britannic Majesty's
embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honor to
declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in
conformity with the terms of the conventions of the The Hague of
October 18, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London
of February 28, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted
by Serbia."

The French Embassy informed Sir Edward Grey that France accepted his four-power mediation proposal, and had appointed M. Paul Cambon her representative in the conference.

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, communicated to Grey a telegram from M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which stated that his interviews with the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, confirmed his impression that Germany would support Austria-Hungary's uncompromising attitude.

"The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this
crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their
ally....

"This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.

"It seems to me that Great Britain is in a better position than
any other power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the
German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt
that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin."

Sir Francis Bertie, Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed Grey that M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs, realized the position of Great Britain.

"He quite appreciates the impossibility for his [British]
majesty's Government to declare themselves 'solidaires' with
Russia on a question between Austria and Serbia, which in its
present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees
that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more
Serbian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to
the Russian Government.

"The German Ambassador [Baron von Schoen] has stated that Austria
would respect the integrity of Serbia, but when asked whether her
independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance."

Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed that, after conference with his French and Italian colleagues, he had found that the German Secretary of State von Jagow had, while refusing to take part in the proposed conference, said to all of them that he desired to work with their Governments for the maintenance of general peace.

"We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can
be objecting only to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he
himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find
it possible to work with us."

Maurice de Bunsen, Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed that Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared Austria-Hungary could not delay military proceedings against Serbia, and so declined the mediation proposed.

"Prestige of [Dual] Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now
prevent conflict."

The Ambassador supplemented this in a longer telegram, giving details of his interview with Count Berchtold.

Sir Rennell Rodd, Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed an account of an interview the Marquis di San Giuliano, Prime Minister, had just had with the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires.

If explanations were given of mode in which Austrian agents would intervene under Articles V and VI of the note to Serbia, Serbia might still accept the whole note. This explanation could be imparted, without loss of dignity to Austria, through the powers, who might then advise Serbia to accept the note without conditions.

The Marquis pointed out a passage in the Austrian note which had been misinterpreted by Serbia, and so might be used as a basis for settlement, namely, that regarding cooperation of Austrian agents in Serbia; this was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia, telegraphed from Nish that he was urging greatest moderation on the Serbian Government pending mediatory efforts by the powers.

"Two Serbian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Serbian
merchant vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at
Orsova."

This was supplemented by a telegram that war had been declared by Austria.

Grey telegraphed to Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, explaining the nature of his proposed four-power conference. No suggestion would be put forward that has not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia. A direct exchange of views between these countries is preferable to all other methods. This the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, is reported to have offered. If Austria accepts, the situation will become less critical. Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, reports that his Government has counseled moderation at Vienna. This is very satisfactory.

A supplementary telegram read:

"German Government, having accepted principle of mediation
between Austria and Russia by the four powers, if necessary, I am
ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should
suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I
will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the
conversations between Austria and Russia progress."

Grey telegraphed to Sir George Buchanan, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, his satisfaction over prospect of direct exchange of views between Russia and Austria, and readiness to facilitate this if he knew what Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, proposes that the ministers at Belgrade do.

"Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria
his willingness to cooperate in some such scheme? It might then
take more concrete shape."

Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed report to Grey on the 28th inst. of an interview with the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. The Chancellor was most anxious for Germany and Great Britain to work together for European peace, as they had successfully done in last preceding crisis. He could not accept the four-power proposal, since the conference would look like an "Areopagus" of two groups of two powers, each sitting in judgment on two other powers, but this refusal should not militate against his strong desire for effective cooperation. He was doing his best at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get both powers into friendly direct discussion, but if, as reported, Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the south, this would put it out of his power to continue preaching moderation at Vienna. Austria, who was only partially mobilizing, would have to take similar measures; so, if war results, Russia will be responsible.

Goschen remarked that surely part of the responsibility rested on Austria for refusing to accept the almost wholly compliant reply of Serbia, or to admit it as a basis for discussion. The Chancellor repeated his views about the Serbian question being wholly Austria's affair, with which Russia had nothing to do.

"Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most
unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make
war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here."

Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed from St. Petersburg report of interview with M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who thanked Grey for his language to Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador. Sazonof was pessimistic. Buchanan asked him if he would be satisfied with Austria's assurances to respect Serbia's integrity and independence. He replied: Not if she attacked Serbia; that he would order mobilization on the day that Austria crossed the Serbian frontier.

"I told the German Ambassador [Count Pourtalès], who appealed to
me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and
that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use
his restraining influence. I made it clear to his excellency
that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not
be averted if Serbia were attacked by Austria."

Ambassador de Bunsen at Vienna telegraphed news of Austria's declaration of war against Serbia, and her declination of Russia's suggestion of direct discussion with her. Russian Ambassador Schebeko said that the London conference now offered the only prospect of European peace, and he was sure Russia would agree to it.

"So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact,
all hope need not be abandoned."

_France._ M. Viviani, French Prime Minister, on board _La France_, telegraphed to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, approving his course. Russia was not responsible for present situation, and Germany could not with grace refuse to counsel Austria, provoker of the crisis. He approved Grey's proposition of a four-power conference.

"The action of the four less interested powers cannot ... be
exerted only at Vienna and St. Petersburg. In proposing to exert
it also at Belgrade, which means, in fact, between Vienna and
Belgrade, Sir E. Grey grasps the logic of the situation; and, in
not excluding St. Petersburg, he offers, on the other hand, to
Germany a method of withdrawing with perfect dignity from the
_démarche_ by which the German Government have caused it to be
known at Paris and at London that the affair was looked upon by
them as purely Austro-Serbian and without any general character."

M. Bienvenu-Martin replied to M. Viviani that Germany had taken no sincere action to hold back Austria, and was opposing Grey's plan of mediation, thus dooming it to failure. Austria will take energetic measures to-morrow, the 29th, to compel Serbia to give them the satisfaction demanded, and has begun to mobilize.

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassador at London, reported interviews of Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, with Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, and Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador. The first continued to maintain that the Serbian reply was unacceptable. The second talked like Baron von Schoen at Paris; he desired Great Britain to use moderating influence at St. Petersburg. Grey replied that this would be embarrassing, as Russia had been moderate from the beginning, especially in her pacific advice to Serbia. It was at Vienna that action was necessary, and there Germany's help was indispensable. News had come from St. Petersburg of the first direct conversations between Russia and Austria, that of Prime Minister Sazonof and Ambassador Szápáry. Secretary Grey and Under-Secretary Nicholson were doubtful of its success, since M. Sazonof had not yet secured assent to a revision of the Serbian note by the two cabinets.

"In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious
consequences, it would be very desirable that these direct
negotiations should be carried on in such a way as not to hamper
Sir E. Grey's action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext
for slipping out of the friendly intervention of the four powers.

"The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined effort
to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. Grey's suggestion,
the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was best
to await the result of the conversation which had been begun
between St. Petersburg and Vienna. Sir E. Grey has, in
consequence, directed Sir E. Goschen to suspend his _démarche_
for the moment. In addition, the news that Austria has just
officially declared war against Serbia opens a new phase of the
question."

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador at Berlin, reported an interview of Herr von Jagow with M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires, in which the German Secretary of State was hopeful that Austria-Hungary's willingness to converse with Russia after the expiration of the ultimatum to Serbia might discover an issue from present difficulties. M. Cambon adds that perhaps Austria is seeking time to make her preparations.

Von Jagow told Cambon that he could not accept the kind of conference proposed by Grey, and that success depended on mediation taking another form.

"I laid stress upon the danger of delay, which might bring on
war, and asked him if he wished for war. He protested, and added
that direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were
in progress, and that from now on he expected a favorable
result."

Von Jagow had made the same suggestion to the British and Italian Ambassadors.

"My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of
form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his
Government that they should change the wording of their proposal,
which might take the character of a diplomatic _démarche_ at
Vienna and St. Petersburg.

"In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any
démarche at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma by
asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by
the powers to avoid war could be brought about.

"We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favor of
peace compatible with our engagements toward our ally; but to
place the responsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care
to ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes."

M. Paléologue, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported that M. Sazonof, Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had said "Austria is unwilling to converse."

M. Dumaine, Ambassador to Vienna, reported the declaration of Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British Ambassador Bunsen that discussion of the Serbian reply was useless, war having been declared. M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador, said that his position from the beginning had been that the question was not of localizing the war, but preventing it. The declaration of war made _pourparlers_ by the four powers extremely difficult. The German formula, "Mediation between Austria and Russia," is unsuitable, since it assumes a dispute between the two empires which does not exist.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 1914

_Austria-Hungary._ On the following day, July 29, 1914, Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, telegraphed the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, London, Paris, and Rome, copies of a memorandum which he had handed Herr von Tschirscky that day in answer to the _démarche_ made by the German Ambassador, namely that the Austro-Hungarian Government should accept the Serbian reply either as satisfactory or as a basis for discussion. The memorandum declared that, contrary to the assumption of Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, at whose instance the proceeding was taken, the parts of the Serbian reply which were not accepted by Austria-Hungary are the most vital in it, since they contain the guarantees for Serbia's observance of the demands made on her. So, too, it is an assumption that the action taken against Serbia was directed against Russia and her influence in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary does not charge Russia with instigating the Serbian propaganda against the Dual Monarchy. Our feelings toward her are entirely friendly.

Austria-Hungary cannot adopt the desired attitude toward the Serbian reply since this has already been outstripped by events. Our declaration of war was made after vainly waiting three days for Serbia to abandon her point of view.

"If the British Cabinet is prepared to use its influence on the
Russian Government with a view to the maintenance of peace
between the great powers, and with a view to the localization of
the war which has been forced upon us by many years of Serbian
intrigues, the Imperial and Royal Government could only welcome
this."

Ambassador Szécsen telegraphed from Paris that France was unmistakably making military preparations.

"The German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen is commissioned to
discuss these preparations with M. Viviani [French Prime
Minister] to-day, and to point out that in these circumstances
Germany may be compelled to take similar measures which
necessarily could not be kept secret, and which could not fail to
cause great public excitement when they became known. In this way
the two countries, although they are only striving for peace,
will be compelled to at least a partial mobilization, which would
be dangerous.

"Further, in accordance with these instructions, Baron Schoen
will declare that Germany has a lively desire that the conflict
between us and Serbia should remain localized, and that in this
Germany relies on the support of France."

Ambassador Szögyény telegraphed from Berlin that as early as the 26th inst. the German Government had warned Russia that mobilization by her would cause German mobilization.

"Another telegram has to-day been sent to St. Petersburg, stating
that owing to the further progress of the Russian measures of
mobilization Germany might be brought to mobilize."

Ambassador Szápáry telegraphed from St. Petersburg that M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was greatly excited over the alleged disinclination of Austria-Hungary to continue exchange of ideas with Russia, and over her mobilization, which is supposed to be more extensive than necessary, and therefore directed against Russia.

I visited the minister to explain matters. I agreed that you (Count Berchtold) had declined to discuss the wording of the Serbian reply, but made it clear that we had no intention, if the conflict remained localized, to annex Serbian territory or touch her sovereignty, and would always be ready to keep in touch with St. Petersburg on Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.

M. Sazonof accepted the assurance in regard to territory, but on the point of sovereignty said he must continue to believe that our coercion of Serbia would result in her becoming our vassal, and that this would upset equilibrium in the Balkans, and so involve Russian interests. Russia recognized our legitimate interest there, but its assertion must be acceptable to Serbia.

"I expressed the view that this was not a Russian but a Serbian
interest, whereupon M. Sazonof claimed that Russian interests
were in this case Serbian interests, so that I was obliged to
make an end of the vicious circle by going on to a new topic.

"I mentioned that I had heard that there was a feeling of anxiety
in Russia, because we had mobilized eight corps for action
against Serbia. M. Sazonof assured me that it was not he (who
knew nothing about this) but the Chief of the General Staff who
had expressed this anxiety. I endeavored to convince the minister
that any unprejudiced person could easily be persuaded that our
southern corps could not constitute a menace for Russia.

"I indicated to the minister that it would be well if his
Imperial Master were informed of the true situation, as it was
urgently necessary, if it was desired to maintain peace, that a
speedy end should be put to the military competition which now
threatened to ensue on account of false news.

"The minister further informed me that a ukase would be signed
to-day, which would give orders for a mobilization in a somewhat
extended form. He was able, however, to assure me in the most
official way that these troops were not intended to attack us.
They would only stand to arms in case Russian interests in the
Balkans should be in danger. An explanatory note would make it
clear that this was a measure of precaution, since we, who in any
case have the advantage of quicker mobilization, have now also
already so great a start. In earnest words I drew M. Sazonof's
attention to the impression which such a measure would make in
our country. I went on to express doubt whether the explanatory
note would be calculated to soften the impression, whereupon the
minister again gave expression to assurances regarding the
harmlessness (!) of this measure."

Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szögyény at Berlin that the Russian military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan were being mobilized. The ambassador should notify the German Government of this, and emphasize that if Russian mobilization were not stopped without delay, Austria-Hungary would follow with general mobilization. The representatives of Germany and Austria-Hungary at St. Petersburg, and, if necessary, at Paris, will declare the same to the Government there. We will not be diverted from our course against Serbia.

_Germany._ Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed to Ambassador von Schoen at Paris to protest against the military measures France was reported to be taking, and say that, in answer, Germany would have to proclaim "a threatening state of war."

"While this would not mean a call for the reserves or
mobilization, yet the tension would be aggravated. We continue to
hope for the preservation of peace."

Count Pourtalès, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, had an interview with M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he reported as follows:

"The secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my
Government to participate in a quadruple conference to find means
to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch
upon the sovereignty of Serbia. I could merely promise to report
the conversation and took the position that, after Russia had
decided upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of
ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible.
Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to
Austria-Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed
for with regard to Serbia, _i.e._, an infraction of sovereignty.
Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests
by disclaiming any territorial aspiration--a great concession on
the part of a state engaged in war--should therefore be permitted
to attend to its affairs with Serbia alone. There would be time
at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance
toward the sovereignty of Serbia.

"I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire
Austro-Serbian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general
European conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the
secretary the magnitude of this danger.

"It was impossible to dissuade Sazonof from the idea that Serbia
could not now be deserted by Russia."

THE KAISER AND CZAR EXCHANGE TELEGRAMS

William II received the following telegram from Nicholas II:

"I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I
ask you earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been
declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation
which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall
be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I
shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To
prevent a calamity as a European war would be, I urge you in the
name of our old friendship to do all in your power to restrain
your ally from going too far."

The Kaiser replied at 6.30 p. m.:

"I have received your telegram and I share your desire for the
conservation of peace. However, I cannot--as I told you in my
first telegram--consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an
'ignominious war.' Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the
promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are
entirely unreliable.

"According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be
considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the
promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this
opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian
Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the
expense of Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly
possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian
war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever
seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and
desirable between your Government and Vienna, an understanding
which--as I have already telegraphed you--my Government endeavors
to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures by
Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary,
would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and
would undermine my position as mediator which--upon your appeal
to my friendship and aid--I willingly accepted."

The Czar answered:

"Thanks for your telegram, which is conciliatory and friendly,
whereas the official message presented to-day by your ambassador
to my minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you
to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the
Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Tribunal. I trust in your
wisdom and friendship."

_Russia._ M. Broniewsky, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State, had told him no news had been received from Vienna as to acceptance of private discussions at St. Petersburg--that it was very difficult for him to produce any effect at Vienna, especially openly.

"He even added, in speaking to Cambon, that were pressure brought
to bear too obviously, Austria would hasten to face Germany with
a _fait accompli_."

Von Jagow had heard from St. Petersburg that you were more
inclined than previously to find a compromise acceptable to all
parties. I replied that this had been your position from the
outset, provided the compromise were acceptable not only to
Austria, but equally to Russia. He then said that Russian
mobilization on the frontier, of which he had heard, would render
an understanding with Austria difficult as she was making no
preparations on the Russian frontier. I replied that I had
information in my possession that Austria was mobilizing there,
and that our mobilization was in reply to it. But our measures, I
assured him, were not directed against Germany.

Alexander, Crown Prince of Serbia, telegraphed to Nicholas II his gratitude for the sympathy extended to Serbia by the Czar on the 28th inst.

"It fills our hearts with the belief that the future of Serbia is
secure now that it is the object of your majesty's gracious
solicitude. These painful moments cannot but strengthen the bonds
of deep attachment which bind Serbia to Holy Slav Russia."

M. Sazonof telegraphed Ambassador Isvolsky at Paris that Germany had decided to mobilize if Russia did not cease her military preparations.

"As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no
alternative but to hasten on our own military preparations and to
assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the French
Government of this, and add that we are sincerely grateful to
them for the declaration which the French Ambassador made to me
on their behalf, that we could count fully upon the assistance of
our ally, France. In the existing circumstances that declaration
is especially valuable to us.

"[Communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in Great Britain,
Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany.]"

_Great Britain._ Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, reported to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that Russia would mobilize at Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan. This information had been officially sent by Russia to Berlin on the 28th inst., with assurances that there was no aggressive intention against Germany. The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, was still retained at Vienna. Direct communication between Austria and Russia was, however, at an end, owing to Austria's declaration of war on Serbia. Mediation by London Cabinet to end Austria's military operations was therefore most urgent. If these continued Austria would crush Serbia while the conference was continuing.

Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed to Grey a report of his interview with Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg.

He informed me that Austria-Hungary refused to act on your suggestion to make the Serbian reply the basis of discussion. Von Jagow had written to Vienna that, though Serbia had shown a certain desire to meet the demands made on her, nevertheless he appreciated Austria's requirement of guaranties which were absent in the Serbian reply:

"The Chancellor then went on to say that the hostilities which
were about to be undertaken against Serbia had presumably the
exclusive object of securing such guaranties, seeing that the
Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that
they had no territorial designs.

"He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be
correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such
language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible
misunderstandings.

"As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

"From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving
advice at Vienna, his excellency hoped that you would realize
that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of
European complications."

Goschen reported an interview with the German Secretary of State. Von Jagow was much depressed.

"He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to
be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that
they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to
precipitate matters and present a _fait accompli_. This had, in
fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of
your suggestion that Serbia's reply offered a basis for
discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much
troubled by reports of mobilization in Russia, and of certain
military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in
France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French
colleague [M. Jules Cambon] who informed him that French
Government had done nothing more than the German Government had
done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His excellency denied
German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is
true. My French colleague said to under-Secretary of State [Herr
von Zimmermann] that, when Austria had entered Serbia, and so
satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be
favorable for four disinterested powers to discuss situation and
come forward with suggestions for preventing graver
complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea
worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different
matter from conference proposed by you."

Grey replied to Goschen, stating his appreciation of the Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's language, and assuring the Chancellor that Great Britain would strain every effort for peace.

"If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from
going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all
join in deep gratitude to his excellency for having saved the
peace of Europe."

Ambassador Buchanan at St. Petersburg telegraphed to Grey that partial mobilization had been ordered. This said M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was against Austria-Hungary alone. Direct conversation with St. Petersburg having been refused by Vienna, he would urge Germany that a return be made to your proposal of a four-power conference.

Ambassador Bunsen reported from Vienna that there was no step to be taken at present to stop war with Serbia, to which the Austro-Hungarian Government was fully committed by the declaration of war, and Kaiser Francis Joseph's appeal to his people, published this morning. In the opinion of Duke d'Avarans, the Italian Ambassador, Russia might be quieted by Austria-Hungary making a binding engagement not to destroy Serbian independence nor seize Serbian territory, but this she would refuse to do.

Sir Rennell Rodd, Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed that the Marquis di San Giuliano would urge in Berlin an exchange of views by the powers in London, and suggest that the German Secretary of State propose a formula acceptable to his Government.

"The Secretary for Foreign Affairs remarked that it was difficult
to make Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany,
however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if
she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France
he thought it would have a great effect."

Grey replied to Rodd that the London conference was now impracticable owing to the attitude of Austria-Hungary, and that Italy must now speak at Berlin and Vienna.

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin that the German Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, said he was endeavoring to make Austria satisfactorily explain at St. Petersburg the scope of her proceedings in Serbia, but information comes from Vienna that Austria declines to discuss the Serbian issue. Germany opposes the four-power conference. I asked her to present her plan to prevent war between Russia and Austria, France and Italy joined with my request.

"Let mediation come into operation by any method that Germany
thinks possible if only Germany will 'press the button' in the
interests of peace."

Goschen telegraphed back to Grey that he had had an interview with Bethmann-Hollweg who had just returned from Potsdam. The Chancellor feared Germany's being drawn into war by Russia attacking her ally.

"He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British
neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to
judge the main principle which governed British policy, that
Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed
in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object
at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain
were certain, every assurance would be given to the British
Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial
acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove
victorious in any war that might ensue.

"I questioned his excellency about the French colonies, and he
said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that
respect. As regards Holland, however, his excellency said that,
so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and
neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his
majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It
depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might
be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over,
Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against
Germany.

"His excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been
Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware,
to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that
these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which
he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement
between England and Germany, though it was of course at the
present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of
British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might
possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realization
of his desire.

"In reply to his excellency's inquiry how I thought his request
would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that
at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any
course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire
to retain full liberty."

Grey informed Ambassador Bertie at Paris of a conversation he had had with M. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador.

I told Cambon that I would inform the German Ambassador Prince Lichnowsky, to-day that he must not suppose by my friendly tone that we should stand aside in event of a general war following failure of efforts to maintain peace. However, I warned Cambon that the case of Serbia was not like that of Morocco, in which we had made a special agreement with France, but one in which we did not feel called to take a hand.

"M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly.
He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a
struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel
called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany
and France become involved, so that the question became one of
the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was
necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this
announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

"He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a
demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany
attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not
give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked."

Grey telegraphed Ambassador Goschen at Berlin of his conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, in which he had pointed out

"that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation,
regarded it as a condition that the military operations against
Serbia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only
drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Serbia. It was,
of course, too late for all military operations against Serbia to
be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces
would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Serbian
territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some
mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must
hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction
from Serbia, stated that she would not advance further, pending
an effort of the powers to mediate between her and Russia."

In a following message Grey related to Goschen a second conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, in which he told the German Ambassador that, in event of a general war, the issues might be so great that it would involve all European interests, and he should not think that Great Britain would stand aside.

"He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I
meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

"I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything
that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying
that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be
no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or
even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if
the issue did become such that we thought British interests
required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the
decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of
other powers had to be....

"The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said;
indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already
given in Berlin as his view of the situation."

In still another message Grey informed Goschen that he had said to the German Ambassador, in reference to the suggestion of San Giuliano, the Italian Prime Minister of mediation between Russia and Austria, that it would not be mediation to urge Russia to stand aside and give Austria a free hand to go any length she pleased.

Grey informed Ambassador Bunsen at Vienna that Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Mensdorff, had offered to submit him a long memorandum justifying the action of his government toward Serbia. Grey refused to discuss the Serbian question now that the peace of Europe was imperilled. The greater question settled, the powers might be free to obtain satisfaction for Austria in the lesser.

"In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that
the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the
Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Serbia had always
been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence."

Bunsen reported to Grey that the news of Russian mobilization was not generally known in Vienna.

_France._ M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, and Constantinople, and the Minister to Serbia, that the Austro-German attitude was becoming clearer.

"Austria, uneasy concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized the
opportunity of the crime of Sarajevo in order to punish the
Serbian intrigues, and to obtain in this quarter guaranties
which, according as events are allowed to develop or not, will
either affect only the Serbian Government and army, or become
territorial questions. Germany intervenes between her ally and
the other powers and declares that the question is a local one,
namely, punishment of a political crime committed in the past,
and sure guaranties for the future that the anti-Austrian
intrigues will be put an end to. The German Government thinks
that Russia should be content with the official and formal
assurances given by Austria that she does not seek territorial
aggrandizement and that she will respect the integrity of Serbia;
in these circumstances the danger of war can come only from
Russia, if she seeks to intervene in a question which is well
defined. In these circumstances any action for the maintenance of
peace must take place at St. Petersburg alone.

"The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory. In the
former capital, while protesting that the Germans desire to
safeguard general peace by common action between the four powers,
the idea of a conference is rejected without any other expedient
being suggested, and while they refuse to take any positive
action at Vienna. In the Austrian capital they would like to keep
St. Petersburg in play with the illusion of an _entente_ which
might result from direct conversations, while they are taking
action against Serbia.

"In these circumstances it seems essential that the St.
Petersburg Cabinet, whose desire to unravel this crisis
peacefully is manifest, should immediately give their adherence
to the British proposal. This proposal must be strongly supported
at Berlin in order to decide [Secretary of State] Von Jagow to
take real action at Vienna capable of stopping Austria and
preventing her from supplementing her diplomatic advantage by
military successes. The Austro-Hungarian Government would,
indeed, not be slow to take advantage of it in order to impose on
Serbia, under the elastic expression of 'guaranties' conditions
which, in spite of all assurances that no territorial
aggrandizement was being sought, would in effect modify the
status of eastern Europe, and would run the risk of gravely
compromising the general peace either at once or in the near
future."