Chapter XXXVII: Part IV: Diplomatic Papers Relating to the Origin of the War, (3)

On the same day, July 22, 1914, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, notified the foreign French legations of the information in M. Cambon's report of the 21st, and said that the Marquis di San Giuliano, Prime Minister at Rome, was interceding with Austria-Hungary that nothing impracticable be demanded of Serbia; thus, that the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana be required, and not a judicial inquiry into the causes of the crime of Sarajevo. Evidently the Cabinet at Vienna, under pressure of the press and military party, is trying to intimidate Serbia by extreme demands, expecting German support in this policy.

"I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna [M. Dumaine] to use
all his influence with Count Berchtold [the Austrian Minister for
Foreign Affairs] and to represent to him in a friendly
conversation how much Europe would appreciate moderation on the
part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would be
likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Serbia."

On the same day, July 22, 1914, M. Dumaine reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that Count Berchtold was still at Ischl evidently waiting for the decision of Kaiser Francis Joseph on the Serbian question.

"The intention of proceeding against Serbia with the greatest
severity ... of 'treating her like another Poland,' is attributed
to the Government. Eight army corps are said to be ready to start
on the campaign, but M. Tisza [Hungarian Prime Minister], who is
very disturbed about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have
intervened actively in order to exercise a moderating influence.

"In any case it is believed that the _démarche_ will be made at
Belgrade this week. The requirements of the Austro-Hungarian
Government with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to
guarantees of control and police supervision, seem to be
acceptable to the dignity of the Serbians; M. Yovanovitch
[Serbian Minister at Vienna] believes they will be accepted. M.
Pashitch [Serbian Prime Minister] wishes for a peaceful solution,
but says that he is ready for a full resistance. He has
confidence in the strength of the Serbian army, besides, he
counts on the union of all the Slavs in the [Dual] Monarchy to
paralyze the effort directed against his country.

"Unless people are absolutely blinded, it must be recognized here
that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both to the
Austro-Hungarian army and to the cohesion of the nationalities
governed by the emperor, which has already been so much
compromised.

"Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, is showing himself
a supporter of violent measures, while at the same time he is
willing to let it be understood that the Imperial Chancellery
would not be in entire agreement with him on this point. The
Russian Ambassador [M. Schebeko], who left yesterday for the
country in consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has confided to me that his
Government will not raise any objection to steps directed toward
the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the societies
which are notoriously revolutionary, but could not accept
requirements which would humiliate Serbian national feeling."

On the same day, July 22, 1914, M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, had told him that Prince Lichnowsky, had stated that a _démarche_ of Austria-Hungary against Serbia was expected at Berlin, and that the German Government was endeavoring to hold back the Austro-Hungarians, but thus far had been unsuccessful. Sir Edward Grey had answered that he would like to believe that Austria-Hungary, before intervening at Belgrade, were assured that the Serbian Government had been cognizant of the conspiracy resulting in the crime of Sarajevo, and had not done all in their power to prevent the crime.

"For if it could not be proved that the Serbian Government were
responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the intervention
of Austria-Hungary would not be justified and would arouse
against them the opinion of Europe."

The Italian Ambassador and Serbian Minister, M. Boschkovitch, share Sir Edward Grey's apprehensions. M. Boschkovitch fears that demands will be made on the Serbian Government which their dignity and public opinion may not allow them to accept without protest.

"Notwithstanding the sacrifices which Serbia has made for her
recent victories she can still put 400,000 men in the field, and
public opinion, which knows this, is not inclined to put up with
any humiliation.

"Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador [Count Mensdorff], asked him to recommend his
Government not to depart from the prudence and moderation
necessary for avoiding new complications, not to demand from
Serbia any measures to which she could not reasonably submit, and
not to allow themselves to be carried away too far."

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE TO SERBIA

The expected blow now fell on Serbia. On the same day, July 22, 1914, Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent out to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg, and Constantinople, the contents of the note which was to be presented on the morrow to the Serbian Government.

A justification of the demands in it were given. All of the complaints here made against Serbia have already been given, except the charge that

"individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia
had come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist
propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

"The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government, in the face
of the provocative attitude of Serbia, was inspired by the
territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
and the hope that the Serbian Government would end in spite of
everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its
true value. By observing a benevolent attitude toward the
political interests of Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government
hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an
analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular,
Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the
political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the
Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and
ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandizement of
Serbia possible."

This benevolence, however, was repaid by the Serbian Government tolerating the propaganda which ended in the crime of Sarajevo.

"In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal
Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at
Belgrade with a view to inducing the Serbian Government to stop
the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and
integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

"The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking
this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the
sentiments of all civilized nations, who cannot permit regicide
to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in
political strife and the peace of Europe to be continually
disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade."

The ambassadors were instructed each to submit a copy of the note to the Government to which he was accredited, together with a _dossier_

"elucidating the Serbian intrigues and the connection between
these intrigues and the murder of the 28th of June."

On the following day, Thursday, July 23, 1914, Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, that, as Great Britain of all the powers might be most easily led to form an impartial judgment on the action taken, in presenting the copy of the note, he should point out that Serbia might have rendered less acute the serious steps she must expect from Austria-Hungary by spontaneously investigating the conspiracy tending to the crime of Sarajevo, and that on the contrary she had endeavored to wipe out all its traces, for example, in the case of the Serbian civil servant Ciganovic, who was compromised by the independent testimony of both of the assassins, and who was in Belgrade on the day of the crime, yet whom the director of the Serbian press declared to be completely unknown in that city.

"The short time limit attached to our demand must be attributed
to our long experience of the dilatory arts of Serbia.

"The requirements which we demand that Serbia should fulfill, and
which indeed contain nothing which is not a matter of course in
the intercourse between states which are to live in peace and
friendship, cannot be made the subject of negotiations and
compromise; and, having regard to our economic interests, we
cannot take the risk of a method of political action by which it
would be open to Serbia at pleasure to prolong the crisis which
has arisen."

Later in the day Count Mensdorff had an interview with Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the substance of which Sir Edward communicated on the same date to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

Count Mensdorff intimated the general nature of the note. Sir Edward regretted the time limit set as akin to an ultimatum, and so likely to inflame opinion in Russia, and render difficult securing a satisfactory reply from Serbia. If it later developed that proceedings were unduly protracted, a time limit could then be set. By that time Russian opinion would be less excited, and, if the case appeared strong against Serbia, the Russian Government would be in a position to influence Serbia to reply satisfactorily to the demands of the note. A time limit was generally a thing used only as a last resort, when all other means had failed.

Count Mensdorff instanced the bad faith of Serbia in not fulfilling her promise of 1909 to live on neighborly terms with Austria-Hungary, and said that, on the contrary, she had conducted an agitation to disintegrate that country, which made it absolute for Austria to protect herself. On this Sir Edward did not comment. He said that the French Ambassador, M. Cambon, and the Russian, Count Benckendorff, and others were agreed that those who had influence at St. Petersburg should exert it on behalf of patience and moderation.

"I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in
this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian
demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have
discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of
the present situation were terrible. If as many as four great
powers of Europe--let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and
Germany--were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must
involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an
interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or
followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry.
In these days, in great industrial states, this would mean a
state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who
were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept
away.

"Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible
consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would
depend upon Russia.

"I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this,
it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace
as it was to say ordinarily that it took two to make a quarrel. I
hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and
Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them
directly with each other.

"Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but
he was under the impression that the attitude in Petrograd had
not been very favorable recently."

On the same day, July 23, 1914, before the copy of the note had been presented to him, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, notified the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Rome, that it was reported by M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, that the intention of Austria-Hungary was to proceed with the greatest severity against Serbia, while keeping eight army corps ready to start operations.

Nevertheless Baron Macchio, Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had assured M. Dumaine that the tone and demands of the note were such as to allow us to count on a peaceful result.

"In view of the customary procedure of the Imperial Chancellery,
I do not know what confidence ought to be placed in these
assurances....

"The Serbian Minister [M. Vesnitch] holds that as M. Pashitch
[Serbian Prime Minister] wishes to come to an understanding, he
will accept those demands which relate to the punishment of the
outrage and to the guaranties for control and police supervision,
but that he will resist everything which might affect the
sovereignty and dignity of his country.

"In diplomatic circles at Vienna the German Ambassador [Von
Tschirschky] is in favor of violent measures, while at the same
time he confesses that the Imperial Chancellery is perhaps not
entirely in agreement with him on this point; the Russian
Ambassador [Schebeko], trusting to assurances which have been
given him, has left Vienna, and before his departure confided to
M. Dumaine that his Government will not raise any objection to
the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the
revolutionary associations, but that they could not accept
requirements which were humiliating to the national sentiment of
Serbia."

On the same day, July 23, 1914, M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that the Bavarian press were optimistic over a peaceful solution of the Serbian question, but that official circles were pessimistic.

The note was presented at 6 p. m., Thursday, July 23, 1914, by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, to the Serbian Minister of Finance, M. Laza Patchou, in the absence of M. Pashitch, the Prime Minister, who was away electioneering. The time limit for acceptance of its demands was forty-eight hours. Giesl added verbally that, if the demands were not accepted within that period, the Austro-Hungarian Legation would leave Belgrade on the morrow, Friday, at 10 a. m. This information was telegraphed that evening to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Petrograd, M. Sazonof, by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Belgrade, M. Strandtman. Through him M. Patchou solicited the help of Russia, declaring that no Serbian Government could accept the demands of Austria-Hungary. M. Patchou at the same time telegraphed to the foreign Serbian Legations the news of the delivery of the note, and informed them that he was in a position to state that no Serbian Government could accept its demands in their entirety.

TEXT OF THE NOTE

The following are the contents of the note:

"On March 31, 1909, the Royal Serbian Minister to the court of
Vienna made the following statement, by order of his Government:

"'Serbia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the
situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore
adapt herself to the decisions which the powers are going to
arrive at in reference to Article XXV of the Berlin Treaty. By
following the councils of the powers, Serbia binds herself to
cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has
assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she
binds herself further to change the direction of her present
policies toward Austria-Hungary, and in the future to live with
the latter in friendly and neighborly relations.'"

Here follow the charges with which the reader is already familiar: That there is in Serbia a movement to separate certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which, developed under the eyes of the Government of Serbia, has found expression beyond that kingdom in a series of acts of terrorism and assassination.

The Serbian Government has done nothing to suppress the movement, its violent propaganda in public education and the press, or the participation in its intrigues by public officials.

"It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the
criminal authors of the outrage of June 28 that the murder at
Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received
the arms and bombs with which they were equipped from Serbian
officers and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and
that, lastly, the transportation of the criminals and their arms
to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by leading Serbian
frontier officials.

"These results impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the
duty to terminate intrigues which constitute a permanent menace
for the peace of the monarchy.

"In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal
Government is forced to demand official assurance from the
Serbian Government that it condemns the propaganda directed
against Austria-Hungary, i. e., the entirety of the machinations
whose aim it is to separate parts from the monarchy which belong
to it, and that Serbia binds herself to suppress with all means
this criminal and terrorizing propaganda.

"In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the
Royal Serbian Government will publish on the first page of its
official organ of July 26, 1914, the following declaration:

"'The Royal Serbian Government condemns the propaganda directed
against Austria-Hungary, i.e., the entirety of those machinations
whose aim it is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
territories belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the
ghastly consequences of these criminal actions.

"'The Royal Serbian Government regrets that Serbian officers and
officials have participated in the propaganda, cited above, and
have thus threatened the friendly and neighborly relations which
the Royal Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its
declaration of March 31, 1909.

"'The Royal Government, which disapproves and rejects every
thought or every attempt at influencing the destinations of the
inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty
to call most emphatically to the attention of its officers and
officials, and of the entire population of the kingdom, that it
will henceforward proceed with the utmost severity against any
persons guilty of similar actions, to prevent and suppress which
it will make every effort.'

"This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the
cognizance of the royal army through an order of his majesty the
king, and it is to be published in the official organ of the
army.

"The Royal Serbian Government binds itself, in addition, as
follows:

"'1. To suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and
contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and whose general
tendency is directed against the latter's territorial integrity.

"'2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society
Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda,
and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and
associations in Serbia which occupy themselves with the
propaganda against Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will
take the necessary measures, so that the dissolved societies may
not continue their activities under another name or in another
form.

"'Without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in
Serbia, so far as the corps of instructors as well as the means
of instruction are concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to
foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

"'4. To remove from military service and the administration in
general all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda
against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of
the material which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses
against them, the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the
right to communicate to the Royal Government.

"'5. To consent that in Serbia officials of the Imperial and
Royal Government cooperate in the suppression of a movement
directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.

"'6. To commence a judicial investigation against the
participants of the conspiracy of June 28, who are on Serbian
territory. Officials, delegated by the Imperial and Royal
Government, will participate in the examinations.

"'7. To proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja
Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Serbian state officials,
who have been compromised through the result of the
investigation.

"'8. To prevent through effective measures the participation of
the Serbian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives
across the frontier, and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz
and Loznica who assisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo
in crossing the frontier.

"'9. To give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in
regard to the unjustifiable remarks of high Serbian functionaries
in Serbia and abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their
official position, to express themselves in interviews in a
hostile manner against Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June
28.

"'10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the
Royal Government, at the latest by Saturday, 25th inst., at 6 p.
m. A memoir concerning the results of the investigations at
Sarajevo, so far as they concern points 7 and 8, is inclosed with
this note.'"

INCLOSURE

"The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and
accomplices in the court of Sarajevo, on account of the
assassination on June 28, has so far yielded the following
results:

"'1. The plan to murder Archduke Franz Ferdinand during his stay
in Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip,
Nedeljko, Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko
Grabez, with the aid of Major Voja Tankosic.

"'2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by
the criminals were obtained by Milan Ciganowic and Major
Tankosic, and presented to Princip Gabrinowic in Belgrade.

"'3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of
the Serbian army in Kragujevac.

"'4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganowic
instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades and gave
instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip Grabez
in a forest near the target practice field of Topshider (outside
Belgrade).

"'5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia
and Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the
smuggling of their arms, a secret system of transportation was
organized by Ciganowic. The entry of the criminals with their
arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was effected by the frontier
captains of Shabatz (Rade Popowic) and of Loznica, as well as by
the custom-house official Rudivoy Grbic of Loznica with the aid
of several other persons.'"

On the same day that the note was presented to Serbia, July 23, 1914, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, wrote a circular letter to the German Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, embodying and enforcing the Austro-Hungarian arguments justifying the note. These the ambassadors were instructed to present to the Foreign Offices of the countries to which they were accredited. The chancellor commended the self-restraint of Austria-Hungary in thus far avoiding war with Serbia. Now, however, he feared that Serbia would not comply with the just demands of the country she had injured, but would adopt "a provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary."

"Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless
it renounced definitely its position as a great power, but to
press its demands with the Serbian Government, and, if need be,
enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to
which the choice of means must be left with it."

The ambassadors were charged to give special emphasis to the view

"that in this question there is concerned an affair which should
be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the
limitation to which it must be the earnest endeavor of the powers
to insure. We anxiously desire the localization of the conflict
because every intercession of another power on account of the
various treaty alliances would precipitate inconceivable
consequences."

The ambassadors were instructed by the chancellor to send him telegraphic reports of their interviews.

CONTROVERSY OVER THE TIME LIMIT

The diplomatic correspondence of the two following days is occupied chiefly with the attempt of Serbia and the powers not party to the dispute to have the time limit of the Austro-Hungarian note extended. In order to save repetition the correspondence hereafter will be given under the heads of the dates when letters, telegrams, etc., were sent, and the subheads of the countries in whose official reports they are found.

CHRONOLOGICAL ARRANGEMENT OF DATES

FRIDAY, JULY 24, 1914

_Serbia._ M. Strandtman, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Petrograd, that Pashitch, Prime Minister of Serbia, had returned to the capital, and would give an answer to Austria within the prescribed time, showing the points which are acceptable or unacceptable.

"To-day an appeal will be addressed to the powers to defend the
independence of Serbia. Then, added Pashitch, if war is
inevitable, we will make war."

_Great Britain._ Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that M. Pashitch had told him that the Austrian demands were considered unacceptable by the Serbian Government, and that it trusted to Great Britain to induce Austria to moderate them. M. Pashitch was dejected and anxious.

_Russia._ The Crown Prince Alexander, Prince Regent of Serbia, telegraphed to Czar Nicholas II of Russia that the Serbian Government had been willing from the first to open an inquiry in Serbia as to complicity of Serbian subjects in the crime of Sarajevo.

"The demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note are, however,
unnecessarily humiliating for Serbia, and incompatible with her
dignity as an independent state....

"We are prepared to accept those of the Austro-Hungarian
conditions which are compatible with the position of an
independent state, as well as those to which your majesty may
advise us to agree, and all those persons whose complicity in the
crime may be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of
the demands could not be carried out without changes in our
legislation, which would need time.... We may be attacked at the
expiration of the time limit by the Austro-Hungarian army which
is concentrating upon our frontier. We are unable to defend
ourselves, and we beg your majesty to come to our aid as soon as
possible. The much-appreciated good will which your majesty has
so often shown toward us inspires us with the firm belief that
once again our appeal to your noble Slav heart will not pass
unheeded...."

_Russia._ M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg, that the Berlin press in the main warmly welcomed the uncompromising attitude of Austria-Hungary.

"The semiofficial 'Lokal-Anzeiger' is particularly violent; it
describes as fruitless any possible appeals that Serbia may make
to St. Petersburg, Paris, Athens, or Bucharest, and concludes by
saying that the German people will breathe freely when they learn
that the situation in the Balkan Peninsula is to be cleared up at
last."

_Serbia._ Dr. Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to M. Pashitch a report of a chance interview with Count Pourtalès, the German Ambassador. The Count had said that peace with Austria-Hungary depended on Serbia alone, since the matter lay entirely between the two disputants.

"In reply I told Count Pourtalès that he was under a
misapprehension, and that he would see before long that this was
not a question merely between Serbia and Austria, but a European
question."

_Austria-Hungary._ Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, that he had handed a copy of the note to Serbia to Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

"At the fifth heading he asked what it meant; to introduce
officials of our Government in Serbia would be equivalent to the
end of Serbian political independence. I answered that
cooperation of, e.g., police officials, in no way affected the
sovereignty of the state.

"He regretted the time limit, as in this way we should be
deprived of the possibility of quieting the first outbreak of
excitement and bringing pressure to bear upon Belgrade to give us
a satisfactory answer. It was always possible to send an
ultimatum if answer was not satisfactory.

"I developed our point of view at length. (Necessity of defense
against continued revolutionary undertakings which threaten the
territory of the [Dual] Monarchy, protection of our most vital
interests, complete failure of the conciliatory attitude which we
had hitherto often shown to Serbia, who had had more than three
weeks to set on foot of her own accord investigations as to
accomplices in outrage, etc.)

"The Secretary of State repeated his objections to the short time
limit, but recognized that what was said as to complicity in the
crime of Sarajevo, as well as many of our other requirements, was
justified.

"He would be quite ready to look on the affair as one which only
concerned Austria-Hungary and Serbia. He is, however, very
'apprehensive' that several great powers might be involved in a
war. Speaking of Russia, Germany, and France, he observed that
the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance might be more or less to
the same effect as those of the Triple Alliance.

"I fully explained to him our point of view, and repeated with
emphasis that in this case we must stand firm so as to gain for
ourselves some sort of guaranties, as hitherto Serbian promises
have never been kept. I understood that in the first place he
considered the question only as it influences the position of
Europe. He must, however, in order to be fair to our point of
view, put himself in our situation.

"He would not go into any more detailed discussion on this
subject, said he must have time to study the note more carefully.
He was to see the German and the French Ambassadors, as he must
first of all exchange ideas with the powers who are allies of
Austria-Hungary and Russia respectively, but have themselves no
direct interest in Serbia."

Count Szécsen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to Count Berchtold that, on his presentation of the copy of the note to Serbia to M. Bienvenu-Martin, French Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs, point five in the note had seemed to make a special impression on the secretary, since he had asked that it be reread.

"I took the opportunity to impress on him that the question was
one which must be brought to an issue directly between Serbia and
us, but that it was in the general interests of Europe that the
trouble which for years past had been kept up by Serbian
intrigues against us should at last make way for a clear
situation.

"All friends of peace and order, and I placed France in the first
rank of these, should therefore give serious advice to Serbia to
change completely her attitude and to satisfy our just demands.

"The minister said that it was the duty of Serbia to proceed
energetically against any accomplices of the murderers of
Sarajevo, a duty which she could not escape. While laying special
stress on the sympathy of France for Austria-Hungary, and on the
good relations which existed between our two countries, he
expressed the hope that the controversy would be brought to an
end peacefully in a manner corresponding to our wishes.

"The minister avoided every attempt to palliate or to defend in
any way the attitude of Serbia."

In a second telegram Count Szécsen reported that Baron von Schoen, German Ambassador at Paris, had officially informed M. Bienvenu-Martin, French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, that, in the view of the Berlin Cabinet, the Serbian controversy concerned only the two parties to it, and, in case that third states should wish to intervene, Germany would be on the side of her ally. M. Bienvenu-Martin replied that his Government agreed that the controversy concerned Belgrade and Vienna alone, and he hoped for a peaceful solution.

Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to Count Berchtold that, on presenting the copy of the note to Serbia to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the minister had questioned the fact of the outrages complained of arising in Serbia, and declared that the note was a pretext for war on Serbia.

"I said to him that no one among us was attacking the integrity
of Serbia or the dynasty. M. Sazonof expressed himself most
vigorously against the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana, which
Serbia would never undertake. The participation of imperial and
royal officials in the suppression of the revolutionary movements
elicited further protest on the part of the minister. Serbia then
will no longer be master in her own house. 'You will always be
wanting to intervene again, and what a life you will lead
Europe!' I answered that if Serbia shows good will it will be a
quieter life than hitherto.

"The commentary added to the communication of the note was
listened to by the minister with fair composure; at the passage
that our feelings were shared by those of all civilized nations,
he observed that this was a mistake. With all the emphasis I
could command, I pointed out how regrettable it would be if we
could not come to an understanding with Russia on this question,
in which everything which is most sacred to us was at stake, and,
whatever the minister might say, everything which is sacred in
Russia. The minister attempted to minimize the monarchical side
of the question.

"With regard to the _dossier_ which was put at the disposal of
the Governments, M. Sazonof wanted to know why we had given
ourselves this trouble, as we had already delivered the
ultimatum. This was the best proof that we did not really desire
an impartial examination of the matter. I said to him that the
results which had been attained by our own investigations were
quite sufficient for our procedure in this matter, which had to
do with Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that we were only ready
to give the powers further information if it interested them, as
we had nothing to keep secret.

"M. Sazonof said that now that the ultimatum had been issued he
was not in the least curious. He represented the matter as if we
only wanted to make war with Serbia whatever happened. I answered
that we were the most peace-loving power in the world, but what
we wanted was security for our territory from foreign
revolutionary intrigues, and the protection of our dynasty from
bombs....

"In spite of his relative calm, the attitude of the minister was
throughout unaccommodating and hostile."

The Russian "Official Gazette" announced that the Government were closely and anxiously following the Serbian controversy, to which Russia could not remain indifferent.

Count Szápáry telegraphed to Count Berchtold that, after a council of ministers which had lasted five hours, M. Sazonof had received the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalés.

M. Sazonof took the position that the Serbian question was a European affair, the settlement of 1909 having been made under the auspices of all the powers. He pointed out

"that Austria-Hungary had offered a _dossier_ for investigation
when an ultimatum had already been presented. Russia would
require an international investigation of the _dossier_, which
had been put at her disposal. My German colleague at once brought
to M. Sazonof's notice that Austria-Hungary would not accept
interference in her difference with Serbia, and that Germany also
on her side could not accept a suggestion which would be contrary
to the dignity of her ally as a great power.

"In the further course of the conversation the minister explained
that that which Russia could not accept with indifference was the
eventual intention of Austria-Hungary 'to devour Serbia.' Count
Pourtalès answered that he did not accept any such intention on
the part of Austria-Hungary, as this would be contrary to the
most special interest of the monarchy. The only object of
Austria-Hungary was 'to inflict on Serbia justly deserved
chastisement.' M. Sazonof on this expressed his doubts whether
Austria-Hungary would allow herself to be contented with this
even if explanations on this point had been made.

"The interview concluded with an appeal by M. Sazonof that
Germany should work with Russia for the maintenance of peace. The
German Ambassador assured the Russian Minister that Germany
certainly had no wish to bring about a war, but that she
naturally fully represented the interests of her ally."

Count Pourtalès telegraphed his Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg that M. Sazonof was very much agitated.

Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, to explain to Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that the action taken toward Serbia was not a formal ultimatum but "merely a _démarche_ with a time limit," which, if not acceded to, would be followed only by Austria's breaking off diplomatic relations and beginning military preparations.

"If Serbia were to give way only under the pressure of our
military preparations, we should indeed have to demand that she
should make good the expenses which we had incurred; as is well
known, we have already had twice (1908 and 1912) to mobilize
because of Serbia."

Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, a report of his interview with Prince Koudacheff, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna. The prince had stated that St. Petersburg was apprehensive that the _démarche_ might take the form of humiliating Serbia, and this would have an echo in Russia.

"I explained ... the danger, not only to the integrity of the
[Dual] Monarchy, but also to the balance of power and the peace
of Europe, which would be involved in giving further scope to the
great Serbian propaganda, and how all the dynasties, and not
least the Russian, would apparently be threatened if the idea
took root that a movement which made use of murder as a national
weapon could be continued with impunity.

"I pointed out that we did not aim at any increase of territory,
but only at the maintenance of what we possess, a point of view
which could not fail to be understood by the Russian Government."

_Russia._ M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Prince Koudacheff, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, to ask Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the time limit in the note to Serbia be extended, as it left to the powers insufficient time for conciliation.

"Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the
powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and
Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow
them sufficient time to study them.

"In this case, if the powers were convinced that certain of the
Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position
to offer advice to the Serbian Government.

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render
nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to
the powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of
international relations."

M. Sazonof communicated this message to London, Rome, Paris, and Belgrade, with the request that in the three former cases similar instructions be given to their Ambassadors at Vienna.

_Great Britain._ Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, that he had said to Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, that it was a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings.

"The murder of the archduke and some of the circumstances
respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with
Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never
before seen one state address to another independent state a
document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be
hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent
sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that
Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint
officials who would have authority within the frontiers of
Serbia.

"I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should
concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point
of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between
Austria and Serbia were not the concern of his majesty's
Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made
in order to discuss those merits.

"I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an
exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their
views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of
the situation."

Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had sought an interview with him, as the Austrian step clearly meant war. At the interview M. Sazonof had said Austria's demands were provocative and immoral, some being impossible of acceptance. She would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted. He hoped Great Britain would proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France. France would fulfill the treaty obligations with Russia, besides supporting Russia in diplomatic negotiations. Sir George said, that personally he did not expect any declaration of this kind from Great Britain. Direct British interests were nil in Serbia, British public opinion would not permit Great Britain to enter war on her behalf. M. Sazonof replied that the general European question was involved, and Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

Evidently Sazonof wants Great Britain to join in warning Austria that her intervention in Serbia will not be tolerated. But suppose Austria nevertheless wars in Serbia, will Russia forthwith declare war on Austria?

A council of ministers is being held this afternoon on mobilization. At a meeting to-morrow, where the czar will preside, a decision will be come to.

Sir George said the important thing to do was to influence Austria to extend the time limit. M. Paléologue, the French Ambassador, was either set on war or was bluffing, and whichever it was, our only chance for peace was to adopt a firm and united attitude. There was no time to carry out Sir George's suggestion. The British Ambassador then said that his Government might perhaps warn Austria that war would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and so make it hard for Great Britain to keep out of the conflict. M. Sazonof answered that Great Britain would sooner or later be dragged into war; war would be rendered more likely by Great Britain if she did not make common cause with Russia and France. President Poincaré and M. Viviani, President of the Council, being in Russia, it appears as if Austria had taken advantage of their absence from France to present their ultimatum to Serbia. Even though we do not join them it seems that France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.

Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that he was assured by M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, that Russia would not be indifferent to the humiliation of Serbia. Prince Koudacheff, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, had told Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the note to Serbia was unusual and peremptory, and drawn up in a form rendering its acceptance impossible. The count replied that the Austro-Hungarian Minister would leave Belgrade at the time set if Serbia did not yield. The Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake. The step taken by the Government was approved by the country. He did not think objections would be raised by the powers.

Sir Edward Grey informed Sir Francis Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris of a conversation with M. Cambon, the French Ambassador at London, over an intended interview that afternoon of Sir Edward with Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador.

"I would say to the ambassador that, of course, if the
presentation of this ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble
between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about
it; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which
it seemed to me that any power interested in Serbia would take. I
should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the
ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that
I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating
influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and
ourselves, who had not direct interests in Serbia, should act
together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St.
Petersburg.

"M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the
four powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to
join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in
St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken
some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march
into Serbia, for the Serbians could not possibly accept the
Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion
to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and therefore,
once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for
any mediation.

"I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St.
Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble
between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did
move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilized, it would be possible
for the four powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and
Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be
essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany
should participate in it.

"M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once
moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by
mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would
be that Germany should propose it to the other powers.

"I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and
Serbia.

"He replied that it was so."

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed the results of the interview with Prince Lichnowsky to Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin. Sir Edward's statements were those he had decided upon in his interview with M. Cambon. The prince replied that Austria might be expected to move unless Serbia accepted her demands _in toto_. He suggested that Serbia ought in no case to give a negative reply. A partial acceptance if sent at once might afford an excuse to Russia against immediate action. Sir Edward asked Sir Horace to submit his views to the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow.

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to advise the Serbian Government, if it were proved that any Serbian officials, however subordinate, were accomplices in the murder of the archduke, to give Austria the fullest satisfaction in the way of expressing concern with regret. For the rest they must reply as they consider best in Serbian interests. The only chance for Serbia is to reply favorably to as many points in the note as the time limit allows.

"Serbian Minister here has begged that his majesty's Government
will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility
of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say
even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by
French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your
French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are,
as expressed above, to Serbian Government.

"I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not
precipitate military action."

_France._ M. Viviani, French Prime Minister, who had not yet seen the note to Serbia, wrote from Reval, Russia, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, to send on to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, the following information and instructions:

In M. Viviani's conversation with M. Sazonof, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, it was agreed to prevent Austrian intervention in the internal affairs of Serbia of a kind which Serbia might consider as an attack on her sovereignty and independence. This view should be communicated to Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and moderation counseled him, cooperation in this should be secured from the Russian and British Ambassadors in Vienna. The British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, had informed M. Sazonof that his Government might join in a _démarche_ (proceeding) for removing any danger to general peace, and telegraphed his Government to that effect. M. Sazonof has instructed Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to secure such cooperation. M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, should be instructed to back him up. M. Bienvenu-Martin sent to M. Viviani, returning from Russia on _La France_, and to the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Rome, and the French Minister at Belgrade, the contents of the Austrian note to Serbia, and an account of the circumstances of the delivery of the copy to the French Government by Count Szécsen, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. M. Berthelot, French Political Director, in obedience to M. Bienvenu-Martin's instructions, had confined himself to stating to the ambassador that painful feeling would be aroused in French public opinion by the categorical nature of the note, and its short time limit, and its presentation to Serbia at a time when the President and Prime Minister of France were at sea, and could not exert, in cooperation with statesmen of other powers not directly interested, that soothing influence on Serbia and Austria which was so desirable in the interest of general peace.

In a letter to these ambassadors and minister, and to the French Minister at Stockholm (M. Thiébaut), M. Bienvenu-Martin said that M. Berthelot, French Political Director, had advised M. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister at Paris, that Serbia should play for delay by asking that she be allowed time to verify the evidence, presumably one sided, adduced by Austria in support of her note to Serbia, and, above all, that Serbia should declare herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe.

Italy had not been consulted by Austria in regard to the note, nor even informed of it. M. Bienvenu-Martin informed these same representatives at foreign courts (with exception of the Ambassador at Vienna), that M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna had reported that the chief fear of the Austro-Hungarian military party was that Serbia would accede to the demands of Austria-Hungary; and that M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna thought his Government would give way on all points save the order to the army dictated to King Peter, dismissal of officers suspected by Austria, and interference by foreign officials in Serbia. M. Yovanovitch hoped that a discussion on these points might be started which would lead to arbitration by the powers.

The feeling in Germany was warlike. The tone of the press there was intimidating, particularly toward Russia. Italy was exercising moderating influence at Vienna.

M. Bienvenu-Martin notified the French representatives at the above courts and at Vienna of the contents of the circular note of the German Government delivered him that day by Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador. Said the Acting Foreign Secretary:

"I called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that
while it might appear legitimate to demand the punishment of all
those who were implicated in the crime of Sarajevo, on the other
hand it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be
accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia;
the Serbian Government, even if it was willing to submit to them,
would risk being carried away by a revolution.

"I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only took
into account two hypotheses: that of a pure and simple refusal or
that of a provocative attitude on the part of Serbia. The third
hypothesis (which would leave the door open for an arrangement)
should also be taken into consideration; that of Serbia's
acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction
for the punishment of the accomplices and full guaranties for the
suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they were
compatible with her sovereignty and dignity.

"I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by
Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be
examined; if Serbia gave obvious proof of good will it could not
be thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the
conversation.

"Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third powers,
who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take
interest in Serbia, to take an attitude which was in accord with
the wishes of Germany to localize the dispute.

"Herr von Schoen recognized the justice of these considerations
and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked
him if we should give to the Austrian note the character of a
simple _mise en demeure_, which permitted a discussion, or an
ultimatum, he answered that personally he had no views."

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin, that official German opinion supported Austria in not abating her demands on Serbia. There was pessimism in diplomatic circles. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Broniewsky, had bitterly noted the presentation of the note to Serbia during the absence from France of the French President and Prime Minister. He thought that William II, in his desire to support the monarchic principle, was becoming less inclined to show a conciliatory attitude.

In a second letter M. Cambon reported an interview he had just had with Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State. The secretary supported the Austrian note to Serbia. It was that country's domestic affair, and he hoped that the dispute would be localized.

"I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely
ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated
to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my
surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims of whose
limit and scope he was ignorant.