Chapter V: Appendix: (lists of Sources) 517 (5)

Four lines of advance now offered themselves to Scott. By taking the cross-road to the right he could have skirted Lake Texcoco, passing the village of that name, and approached the north or the northwest quarter of Mexico. But the route would have been long, deficient in water and fuel, and circuitous; it was defended by Valencia with an ample supply of artillery; a movement in that direction would have made surprise or even sudden attack impossible for him; at a pass near Guadalupe Hidalgo stood fortifications; and a march round these would have involved another long circuit on exposed and unknown ground. This route, therefore, was not seriously considered. On the other hand, after the most thorough investigation, Scott had planned before leaving Puebla to take the cross-road to the left, march along the southern shores of Lakes Chalco and Xochimilco, and reach San Agustín, some ten miles to the south of Mexico; and it was for this reason that he placed Worth, who was to lead the movement while Twiggs was to menace Old Peñón, near Chalco.[25.17]

On reaching the ground, however, unfavorable reports about this road were given by Mexican spies; and the General, partly for that reason and partly to mystify the enemy, reconnoitred the Peñón and also a fourth route, which led to the village of Mexicaltzingo, about five miles from the city. In regard to the Peñón his engineers--who pushed their investigations with the utmost intrepidity, studied every foot of the red ledges dripping with crimson gravel, and even penetrated behind the hill--decided that it could be carried, but only at a severe loss; while the evidence concerning the fourth possibility led to a substantially similar conclusion, supported by the additional objection, that apparently success would place the Americans on difficult and unknown ground. At about the same time Scott obtained further information regarding the Chalco route, which seemed to justify the opinion formed at Puebla. Consequently the orders to attack Mexicaltzingo--issued either because at the time Scott thought he should march that way or because he desired to mislead the cunning Mexican spies, who even gained the confidence of high American officers--were suddenly rescinded in the night of the fourteenth, and the next day, though Twiggs continued to threaten the Peñón until the morning of the sixteenth, all the rest of the army, headed by the cavalry and Worth's division, set out for San Agustín, distant from Chalco some twenty-five miles.[25.17]

For about half this distance the road was little more than a narrow lane, with a lake--or more properly a watery marsh--on the right and bold foothills close on the left. Spaces of firm ground there were. At one time venerable olive trees formed an arch over the road; once the troops camped in a fine grove, and some ledgy, rocky spurs had to be crossed. But for much of the way, although the weather had been remarkably dry for the midst of the rainy season, the story, as Scott had anticipated, was "mud, mud, mud." Now and then a man would slip and sink to his waist in a bog-hole; in places the track was quite overflowed; the chilly, torrential rains of almost every afternoon increased the difficulties; and the labor of getting several miles of wagons and heavy guns along such a route was almost incredible. Besides, the troops had to be ready at all hours for attack--frontal, rear or flank. But early in the afternoon of the seventeenth Harney and Worth's advance reached San Agustín, a delightful place full of handsome gardens and orchards; and the next day the rest of the troops joined them--"ready," as a soldier put it, "for anything except a thrashing."[25.18]

[TO SAN AGUSTÍN]

But again, where were the Mexicans? With so many works to construct, Santa Anna could hardly be censured for leaving unfortified--especially as both an inner and an outer line were made ready against any forces using it--a route that seemed to be quite impracticable for an army train; but he might have placed upon it a few light guns and a body of skirmishers, who could have embarrassed the Americans greatly. This, however, with his usual over-confidence and faulty judgment, he neglected to do. Yet he was not idle. On the fourteenth he knew the Americans were talking of a march to San Agustín; and though he suspected this language might be a blind, he not only sent additional forces to that quarter, but ordered Alvarez to follow Scott, should such a movement occur, and be ready to fall upon him bravely should he attack a fortified position; and when the movement actually began on the following day, though Santa Anna misinterpreted its aim, he promptly took further defensive steps on that line.[25.18]

One result was a slight brush between Alvarez and Twiggs after the latter moved from Chalco on the sixteenth; but Alvarez soon found so many difficulties in the road pursued by the Americans and so little food or pasturage left in their rear, that he once more abandoned his appointed field of operations. Santa Anna would not break up his general plan by sending strong detachments from the southern line; and consequently Scott's march was merely annoyed by a few hundred irregulars, who fired at intervals, rolled great stones down the slopes, and cut ditches in the road, but broke from cover and fled like scared rabbits when C. F. Smith's corps of light infantry ran leaping and shouting across the hillsides. Thus ended the second chapter of Santa Anna's hopes.[25.18]

Meantime a precipitate rearrangement of the Mexican forces took place. The President, after reconnoitring the American advance, hastened to place himself between San Agustín and Mexico. Troops were despatched from the Peñón to various points on the southern front, and Valencia was ordered to proceed by the way of Guadalupe Hidalgo to the same quarter. But the former status could no more be restored than one could put back the smoke of an exploded shell. The strongest fortifications had been turned and rendered useless; and any one could see that on the side now threatened, where a number of causeways approached the city, the defence of it would almost necessarily be weakened by a division of the garrison. After such enthusiasm and such impatience to meet the enemy, retirement unadorned with laurels or with even the stains of combat produced a humiliating reaction in all hearts.[25.19]

At Mexico the returning soldiers found empty streets, untenanted balconies and bolted windows; and the silent, sombre, fearsome aspect of a besieged city enveloped and oppressed them. Doubts as to Santa Anna's competence or loyalty, which had slept but not died amidst the recent glorification and his confident promises of "a splendid triumph," awoke. People recalled that precisely when the enemy were moving against Vera Cruz, the Mexican army had been led off into the northern deserts; and they hotly demanded why the engineers, the laborers, the troops and the cannon had been massed at Old Peñón, where Scott could nullify them all by a turn of the wrist. As if in answer, it was publicly stated that an outpost had found a treasonable communication addressed by the President of Mexico to the American commander; and so ended Chapter III of Santa Anna's hopes.[25.19]

XXVI

CONTRERAS, CHURUBUSCO

August, 1847

While grievously disappointed by the collapse of his efforts at Old Peñón, Santa Anna felt by no means despondent regarding his new line. Toward the south ran the great highway of Acapulco--along which numberless cargoes of silks, teas and spices had approached--guarded at about a mile from the city by the gateway or _garita_ of San Antonio Abad. Three miles and a half beyond that garita the highway crossed a bridge over Churubusco River, here practically a drainage canal running between high embankments planted with maguey, with Mexicaltzingo about a mile and a half distant at the left. On the farther side of the river, a fifth of a mile southwest of the bridge, stood a massive convent and church, skirted by the rambling hamlet of Churubusco. Passing the church at a distance of three hundred and fifty yards the highway veered slightly toward the east, and some two and a quarter miles from the river came to a great feudal hacienda named San Antonio, adorned with trim silver poplars and Peruvian pepper trees along the front of its buildings. A scant mile then brought one to the similar but far less pretentious establishment of Cuapa; and two scant miles more to San Agustín.[26.1] At the Churubusco bridgehead and convent and at San Antonio, where the erection of defences had begun some time before, laborers could now be seen working--particularly at San Antonio--like bees; and with all possible haste guns, as well as troops, were brought over from the Peñón. Here, said the President, he "desired to have the battle fought."[26.4]

To increase his confidence, troops not only occupied Mexicaltzingo on the left, but in even stronger force guarded the opposite flank. About three miles toward the south from San Cosme, the western garita of Mexico, the traveller, passing the fortified hill of Chapultepec on the right, found himself at the genial suburb of Tacubaya. Keeping on in the same general direction for nearly six miles and traversing Mixcoac at about half-way, one came to San Angel, a pretty but narrow town of some importance on the skirt of the foothills. Two miles from here toward the east at Coyoacán, a garden spot loved by Cortez and Alvarado, the fine brigade of Pérez, which consisted of about 3500 infantry, was now placed; and at San Angel itself a high military officer, followed by some 5500 troops[26.2] from Guadalupe, drove up in a coach about noon on Tuesday, the seventeenth of August. The man was of average height but unusually broad, with a bull-neck deep in his shoulders, as if some person had tried to force a good idea into his head with a pile-driver, a hard, cruel, domineering look about his blue eyes, small side-whiskers, and a heavy mustache. It was Valencia, whose imputed schemes and intrigues had of late been keeping every tongue busy.[26.4]

[VALENCIA'S MOVEMENTS]

Valencia's instructions were to block the way from Coyoacán to Tacubaya with men and works; but he mounted at once, rode on south by the turnpike, passed Ansaldo--a farmhouse buried in its orchard, two miles and a half or so from San Angel--and a strong half-mile beyond it paused. On his right, open ground sloped gradually back into a rounded hill, some three or four hundred yards from the road; and below him on the left flowed a small but lively stream at the bottom of a deep, wide ravine, near the opposite side of which stood the adobe buildings of Padierna farm.[26.4]

From this point a mule-path, barely practicable for horses, wriggled off in the direction of San Agustín, here about four miles distant in a straight line; and--covering the whole intermediate plain from San Antonio and San Agustín on the one side to Padierna and San Angel on the other, from Coyoacán on the north to the mountains on the south--extended a _pedregal_ or lava bed, which looked as if a raging sea of molten rock had instantly congealed, had then been filled by the storms of centuries with fissures, caves, jagged points and lurking pitfalls, and finally had been decorated with occasional stunted trees and clumps of bushes. After pursuing the mule-path for some distance, ordering a camp and batteries established on the slope of the rounded hill, and instructing experts to reconnoitre the ground thoroughly, Valencia returned to his post; and in the evening, on learning from the experts that four other paths--one of them available for artillery--led from San Agustín to San Angel, he summarized the reconnaissances in a letter to Santa Anna, complaining that he had neither room to manoeuvre nor time to fortify where he was, asking leave to change his position, and calling for 2000 more men.[26.4]

The next day, Wednesday, the eighteenth, Santa Anna, writing back that Scott intended to attack San Antonio, ordered Valencia to place his troops at Coyoacán, and send his artillery to Churubusco, a mile farther east. Valencia, who by this time had placed a strong outpost on the mule-path and sappers on the rounded hill, replied that Scott, striking both at San Antonio and at San Angel, would push his thrust in whichever direction he should find the easier, and that he could not conscientiously leave the second point unguarded by obeying those orders. Notes worthy of the most finished and effusive pirates were then exchanged; and in the end Santa Anna, who longed to remove his insubordinate general but dared not, authorized him to do as he pleased and assume, of course, the attendant responsibility.[26.3] Accordingly on Thursday morning Valencia advanced with trumpets, drums and flags to the rounded hill, and proceeded to array his forces. A long, low, earthen parapet with an angle at the southern end already faced Padierna, and five guns were in battery; but the summit of the hill was neglected.[26.4]

[SCOTT FEELS HIS WAY]

During this time the Americans were not inactive. Early on Wednesday Scott directed Worth and Engineers Mason and Tower, supported by Garland's brigade of infantry and a body of dragoons, to reconnoitre San Antonio.[26.5] The task was accomplished boldly and thoroughly; and they found the place heavily defended, not only in the vicinity of the white castle which formed the headquarters of the hacienda, but for a long distance eastward--where, moreover, the water-soaked ground almost forbade approach--and saw countless laborers toiling hard upon the works. The presence of at least one 24-pounder was demonstrated, and other heavy cannon were believed to be there. In Worth's opinion, the cost of making a successful assault by the narrow, gun-swept causeway with fascines and ladders would cripple the army.[26.6]

Questioning peons through an interpreter, the officers learned of a path which began at the highway near Cuapa, made a circuit on the left through the pedregal, and apparently returned to the highway some distance inside the works, and this received careful attention; but the conclusion was, that while infantry could filter through it, artillery could not pass; and to advance by such a route in the presence of a strong, unshaken enemy, whose front and other flank could not be attacked or seriously threatened, appeared worse than hazardous. Even Scott felt rather depressed on hearing the reports, especially as fortifications were said to exist north of the hacienda. The men, wagons and guns, all covered with mud, that lay scattered about on the wet ground, seemed little indeed like a conquering army. Except for some cattle, the army had only four days' provisions; the hard bread was already musty, and the horses lacked forage.[26.6]

Later, however, Lee and Beauregard brought somewhat more promising information. To the hacienda of Peña Pobre, a mile and a quarter from San Agustín toward the west, they had found a good road; and then, after proceeding about an equal distance by a mule-path to the top of a sharp ridge, they had seen the path continue to Padierna and the turnpike, which lay in full view nearly a mile and a half away, and they believed it possible to make a road by that line. Their escort had routed a hostile corps of observation, and some men had been seen at work on a rounded hill beyond the turnpike, but no other Mexican forces appeared to be near. Indeed, it seemed probable that much less adequate defences had been provided here than on the great southern highway, and in this direction Scott resolved to strike. "An enemy that halts, vacillates, declines the battle offered him, makes a circuit, hunts for a position and finds none to suit him is an enemy lost," exulted the _Diario_.[26.6]

[THE BATTLE OF CONTRERAS]

The next morning, August 19, therefore--while Quitman unwillingly remained at San Agustín to guard the base,[26.7] and Worth, with his engineers and troops, continued to reconnoitre and threaten on the San Antonio side--Scott ordered a force of engineers to build a road in the other direction. Pillow's division was to furnish working-parties, and Twiggs's to clear away whatever Mexican detachments might undertake to hinder the operations; and the implied instructions were to gain and hold the San Angel turnpike, so that San Antonio could be turned. Scott did not expect or desire a general engagement at this time; but he directed Pillow to take command and employ both divisions, if a battle should be opened, promising that in such an event he would soon appear on the field. Under these instructions the troops advanced cautiously but rapidly the first mile and a quarter, constructed a road to the summit of the ridge, pulled up the guns with drag-ropes, and looked over. As the returning tide makes a sea in the Bay of Fundy, where only bare ground had been visible a few hours earlier, Valencia's army had taken possession. It was now one o'clock, and evidently road-building was over for a while.[26.11]

Pillow, however, knew all about winning victories. From a central hill, Zacatepec, where he stood, he could measure Valencia's forces to a nicety, and he decided to brush them away. By his order the Mounted Rifles, particularly the advanced companies of Roberts and Porter, deployed quickly, drove the Mexican skirmishers in a handsome style from rocks and fissures, and finally occupied Padierna. At the same time and under his instructions Magruder--tall, blonde and intrepid--advanced his field battery nearly a mile without cover over that almost impassable ground, which the enemy had now barred with stone walls, planted it under the slight protection of a transverse ledge, and not long after two o'clock opened a duel with Mexican siege guns, 68-pound howitzers and many lighter pieces, more than twenty in all, at a range of about 900 yards, while brave Callender fought the howitzer battery beside him, dashing little Reno set off rockets, and Smith's and Pierce's brigades, which were presently to attack Valencia's camp, furnished support. And Pillow knew also how to "bag" a defeated enemy. So he ordered Riley's brigade to the extreme right to coöperate with the frontal attack by checking reinforcements and cutting off Valencia's retreat. Then he countermanded this order, but not in season.[26.11]

Zigzagging, scrambling, leaping, and sliding as best they could over about a mile of pedregal, Riley's brigade crossed the stream and the turnpike, formed in the orchard of Ansaldo, routed small bodies of lancers, passed through San Gerónimo--an Indian village lying amid trees and ravines a quarter of a mile west of Ansaldo and about three times as far from Valencia--had a stiff but victorious brush with Torrejón and three regiments of cavalry, defied Valencia's cannon, some of which now faced this way, found cover at length in broken ground between the village and his camp, and waited for the Mexicans to be routed. But the major general commanding failed in the prime essential of his plan, for he did not induce Valencia to retreat. Badly crippled, the American batteries became silent after an hour or so, the brigades that had expected to charge saw clearly they could accomplish nothing, and Riley found himself isolated. So ended wretchedly the first phase of the battle of Contreras,[26.8] Pillow's phase.[26.11]

But by this time a second phase was taking shape. Pillow himself perceived that Riley had been thrown into imminent peril, and sent Cadwalader's brigade, which was followed by the Fifteenth Infantry, to his support. Smith, useless where he was and probably feeling little confidence in Pillow or Twiggs, decided to regard himself as the senior officer present, gathered his men, except those employed in skirmishing, and, with a yell of endorsement from them, proceeded in the direction that Riley had taken--not, however, primarily to intercept Valencia's retreat or reinforcements, but with a direct view to attacking his left flank. At about the same time--probably by half-past three o'clock--Scott himself joined Pillow and other officers on Zacatepec, viewed with his usual battlefield equanimity the desperate state of things, now spread before him like a map on a table, studied Valencia's batteries, the heavy ranks of supporting infantry and the long lines of cavalry in the rear, and soon fixed upon woody San Gerónimo--marked at a line distance of about a mile and three quarters by its white steeple--as the key to the situation, since it both flanked and isolated Valencia, and ordered Shields's brigade also, which had followed him from San Agustín, to that point.[26.11]

Smith, arriving at San Gerónimo about an hour before sunset, found all of the commands, except Shields's, that had been ordered to go there; and he also found that Santa Anna, after hurrying from San Antonio through Coyoacán and San Angel, had placed himself with Pérez's brigade and seven or eight hundred cavalry and artillery on low hills about one half or three quarters of a mile behind San Gerónimo, and--though checked by Cadwalader's brigade--was making ready to attack. Smith at once began preparing to dispose of him, while the Mexicans on the hills, after four or five guns arrived, indulged in vivas, music and a little harmless cannonading; but both commanders finally concluded that the hour was now too late for a battle. Santa Anna also decided that an impassable ravine separated him from the Americans, and that he could not prudently expose his men and arms to the rain then imminent; and therefore, leaving his cavalry and artillery behind, he put the rest of his forces under cover at San Angel.[26.11]

Night and a storm now set in, but behind the curtain of darkness four striking scenes were presented. Scott, the general who seemed to have lost half his army all at once without a battle, sat at headquarters anxious and helpless. Seven times he despatched an officer to his isolated right with orders, and seven times the officer failed to get through. But still he waited--patient, considerate for those about him, hopeful and alert, reflecting no doubt that brave men, skilful officers and the natural strength of San Gerónimo would count. Valencia, on the other hand, feeling that at last he had proved Santa Anna a blunderer, and had forced him into the position of a mere assistant, was jubilant, boastful and literally intoxicated. He reported grandly on his "brilliant day," and scattered promotions as if already head of the state.[26.11]

Santa Anna, devoured by passions and perplexities, now sent José Ramiro to Valencia by a circuitous route with orders to retreat at once. Not long afterwards two of Valencia's aides reached San Angel, bringing news that, instead of being exterminated, thousands of Americans were established in the San Gerónimo woods. Don't talk to me, Santa Anna cried to the aides, who endeavored to excuse the situation; Valencia is an ambitious, insubordinate sot; he deserves to have his brains blown out, and I will not expose my men to the storm for him; let him spike his guns, make the ammunition useless, and retreat. When Ramiro arrived at the camp, Valencia would not listen to his message, and fiercely demanded ammunition and men; but when his aides reported, he saw his doom.[26.9] "Traitor, he has sold us!" he cried, storming like a madman in the midst of his troops. Soldiers heard and echoed the cry. Women shrieked. Frightened horses broke loose and galloped into the night. Americans with lights are creeping in behind us, reported Torrejón. The army understood. Scouts were feeling the way. The price had been paid to Santa Anna. Their blood would soon be claimed.[26.11]

In ignorance of all these outside events the Americans at San Gerónimo, too exhausted to eat, bore the torrents of chilling, beating rain without fires and in darkness as best they could. Some found huts, but most of them lay in the mud or stood up under trees. Smith's and Riley's men occupied the lanes, and Shields's brigade, which stumbled in at about midnight, put up in the road and an orchard. Officers fared like privates. In such a plight, the troops listened for hours to the music and vivas of the enemy, and for their own part could only reflect on the painful and fruitless exertions of the day and on the prospects of the morrow. Without cavalry, without cannon, without reserves of provisions or ammunition, without hope of quarter, they felt that with some 4200 men they might have to face 25,000 exultant Mexicans and any amount of artillery at daybreak. But everybody believed in General Smith.[26.10] "Here he is!" "Now we'll have them!" Riley's soldiers had cried on seeing Smith arrive; and the confidence was not misplaced.[26.11]

During the afternoon a ravine leading toward Valencia's rear had been found. Smith seized upon the hint at once, and proposed to attack by that route before daybreak with bayonets only; a conference of officers agreed to his plan; it was decided to notify Scott, and suggest that a diversion be made on Valencia's front at the proper time; Lee undertook the almost impossible feat of carrying this message across the pedregal; and Officers Tower and Brooks, whose lights--probably occasional matches--Torrejón had reported, were sent off to study the ravine, and prepare to be the guides. As Santa Anna was expected to attack early, Shields accepted the charge of building fires in the morning as if no Americans had left the ground, and holding San Gerónimo.[26.11]

Two hours after midnight the troops were roused, and at three o'clock Riley began to move. But it was tedious work to marshal the scattered corps in the darkness and rain by touch and whisper, and morning broke before the last were out of the village. The ravine branched deceptively; it was full of rocks, too; and the watery clay, a soldier said, slipped like "soft soap." Finally, however, the units closed up at about a mile from San Gerónimo, and, partially hidden in a fog, scrambled up to firm ground behind a low hill. As it was now light, the firearms were put in order; and with quick adaptation to the topography, the present arrangement of the Mexicans and their probable movements, General Smith marshalled and instructed the troops.[26.11]

Riley's brigade, about 1300 strong, was to be the storming party. Cadwalader's in halves formed a wing on each side to keep off cavalry. A part of Smith's, together with the engineer company, was directed to slip along behind elevated ground, and fall upon the flank or rear of a Mexican force posted in advance; and the rest of it, marching by the left, was ordered to strike the camp and a large body of lancers on the flank. Even the possibility of a rear attack from Santa Anna, supposed to be still where he had been seen the evening before, was provided against. Meanwhile the troops that had remained in the pedregal, assembled as well as possible by Twiggs and Lee during the latter part of the night, in accordance with orders from Scott, watched and waited near Padierna under Colonel Ransom of the Ninth Infantry.[26.11]

Finally a slightly round-shouldered man, with blue eyes, a sandy mustache and sandy hair, walked slowly to the front and looked at his watch. It was about six o'clock. "Are you ready?" he asked in a cheery voice. "Ready!" the troops answered with a meaning smile. He gave them a keen glance. "Men, forward!" he then ordered, for it was General Smith. "Forward, forward!" flew the command through the ranks, and ahead they went.[26.11]

Struck on front and rear General Mendoza's advanced corps fired without aiming, turned and bolted; but Ransom's men, darting across the ravine, gave Valencia something else--something he fancied more serious than Smith's approach--to think about. Only a pair of 6-pounders bore on Riley, and they fired high. Soon the Mexicans at the breastwork, exchanging shots wildly with Ransom, found that bullets were coming from behind, leaped over the parapet and fled. Attacked by Smith's men, the lancers gave way and upset the rest of the infantry; and Riley's column, deployed as well as time and the ground would allow, bore down like a flood. All was now confusion in the camp: infantry, horse, artillery, mules, women, laborers in a mob. Some of the gunners remained at their pieces--chained to them, it was said--but, like the infantry, they aimed little; and almost in a moment, like a bag turned upside down, the camp was empty of all the Mexicans who could get away. Again General Smith drew out his watch. "It has taken just seventeen minutes," he remarked.[26.11]

Riley's brigade halted to secure the prisoners and the spoils, among which--to the frantic delight of the soldiers--were the two cannon lost so nobly at Buena Vista; but the rest of the victorious troops pursued the enemy to San Angel; and the Mexicans fleeing by the turnpike toward Ansaldo, cannonaded from their own camp and running the gantlet of Smith, Ransom and even Shields, who had moved down toward the road, fared badly. Others, including Torrejón and a large part of the cavalry, managed by taking rough paths to reach San Gerónimo and the hills. Valencia also escaped; but Salas, who tried to check the flight, was captured. Seven hundred Mexicans fell, it was estimated; over eight hundred were made prisoners; the captured cannon, including the best that Santa Anna had, and the captured ammunition proved invaluable; and the cost, as reported by Scott, was not over sixty Americans killed and wounded.[26.11]

[AFTER THE BATTLE OF CONTRERAS]

Nor were such the only consequences of this lightning-stroke. Santa Anna, having at length decided to rescue Valencia and raised his forces to at least 7000 by drawing Rangel's reserve brigade from the city, had set out at daybreak for his position of the night before; but when in sight of Valencia's camp he learned from flying soldiers that all was over, and that his outer line of defences had failed. Angrily striking at fugitives with his whip he turned back, and waited near San Angel for a while, unable to decide anything. Then he sent Rangel to guard the southwest section of Mexico, despatched orders to evacuate San Antonio and Mexicaltzingo, and marched with the rest of his forces to Churubusco. Here priceless time was spent in raving against Valencia--whom he ordered shot at sight--in a passion that almost crazed him. His dominant idea now, so far as he could think at all, was to make the capital a second Troy; and, probably with that in view, he set Pérez's brigade in motion toward the city.[26.12]

After a time, however, reason gained the better of desperation, and seeing the necessity of protecting the retreat of the San Antonio garrison, he ordered General Rincón, who was ably seconded by Anaya, to hold the Churubusco convent as long as possible, garrisoned the bridgehead with one of Pérez's regiments, extended two others far down behind the embankment of the river eastwardly, used a part of the remaining two as a line from the bridgehead to the convent, and stationed the rest on the highway behind.[26.12]

The convent position included, besides the building proper, a strong church with a parapeted roof, a high stone enclosure provided on the inside with scaffolds for troops, a broad, wet ditch, two outside bastions facing Coyoacán, unfinished but strong breastworks on the west and south, two detached adobe huts pierced with embrasures on their southwest sides, four 8-pounders, three smaller guns, and for garrison some 1500 or 1800 men, consisting of the Mexico battalions named Independencia and Bravos, the San Patricio contingent of American deserters or most of it, and some detachments of other corps; while the bridgehead, a powerful, scientifically constructed work, with four feet of water in the ditch and three heavy cannon, appeared to defy attack. Surveying this excellent position Santa Anna recovered some of his courage, and began work actively to complete the fortifications near the bridge. The untried militia at the convent were almost in despair when they found themselves in the forefront, but he promised to aid them at the critical time.[26.12]

[Illllustration: BATTLE OF CHURUBUSCO]

Scott, for his part, left San Agustín before he knew how Smith's plan had worked out, met the news on the pedregal, kept on to San Angel, and near that place, amid tumultuous cheering, took command of Pillow's and Twiggs's divisions.[26.13] The road to Mexico by way of Tacubaya lay open, but he could not move now in that direction and leave Worth, Quitman, the artillery, the baggage, the stores and the sick to join him as best they could, exposed--as it was believed--to some 25,000 Mexicans. The first needful step was to capture San Antonio and reunite his army. Worth had already been directed, after the rout of Valencia became known, to attack and also turn that position whenever he should learn that Pillow and Twiggs had gained its rear; and as a cross-road led from San Antonio to Coyoacán, Coyoacán was the proper point of concentration. Scott therefore went there with his troops, and sent Lee, strongly escorted by dragoons and Mounted Rifles, to reconnoitre the enemy and give the preconcerted signal for Worth's advance. Further to assist that general, Pillow with Cadwalader's brigade was now ordered down the cross-road.[26.14]

[THE BATTLE OF CHURUBUSCO]

Worth did not, however, wait for assistance. At about eleven o'clock he sent Colonel Clarke's brigade--the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Infantry--and Brevet Colonel C. F. Smith's battalion from Cuapa to turn San Antonio by the path on the left hand and cut off retreat, and placed Garland, accompanied by Duncan's battery, in a somewhat sheltered spot, as near as possible to the fortifications, with orders to advance on hearing the other brigade at work. Clarke's tortuous path seemed to be three miles long, and as it lay for two thirds of the distance in the pedregal, where the troops had to slide and scramble in single file, two hours were occupied in the march. The Mexicans, therefore, warned by seeing this movement--which they vainly attempted to check--as well as ordered by Santa Anna to retire, made the utmost efforts, after spiking some of their guns, to escape with the rest of them. But the garrison of San Antonio and the neighboring fortifications, which consisted of the Hidalgo and Victoria battalions of Mexico and some other militia, were wholly unfitted to execute a difficult retreat in the face of the enemy. Not far from its middle Clarke struck their column; and while the first part, led by General Bravo, kept on toward Churubusco bridge, the second broke up and scattered.[26.15]

By this time Garland, having found by pushing a company forward that San Antonio had been evacuated, hastened on to unite with Clarke. The enemy were quickly driven from fortifications of a minor importance at Sotepingo, and the division then rushed forward after Bravo, while the Mexicans--a mass of cavalry, infantry and artillery, wagons, mules, women, servants, carriages and camp-followers--made all possible speed. Owing to the effects of the rains, two Mexican guns and a number of wagons were mired on the way; and near the Churubusco bridge Pérez's brigade, hard pressed by the Americans from San Angel, crowded in upon the stream of fugitives.[26.15]

So it happened that when Engineer Stevens climbed the church tower of Coyoacán at about noon to reconnoitre, he observed a large body of Mexican troops pouring along the highway from San Antonio. Apparently Santa Anna was drawing all his forces to the city. Dense fields of corn six feet high or more almost hid the works at the convent. Perceiving, however, the nose of a bastion, Stevens concluded there might be one gun at that point, which he thought could be rushed; and a prisoner mentioned only two guns. The entire American army, reacting from the gloom of the previous evening, exultant over Smith's victory, and almost intoxicated by the change from storm to splendid sunshine, was now feeling invincible, eager and over-confident. Stevens merely shared the contagion; his report--precipitate and misleading, as he fully admitted later--signified that without loss of a moment the San Antonio garrison ought by all means to be intercepted; and so Scott did what we know it had not been his intention to do: ordered Twiggs immediately to the convent and highway by the direct road. "Make haste, my sons," he called to the troops, "or they will be gone before you reach them!"[26.16]

At his instance and by way of precaution, engineers were sent on to make investigations; but, as the case appeared simple and urgent, the investigating and the fighting began hastily together. In a haphazard way the Mounted Rifles, or at least a part of them, became engaged; then the First Artillery advanced; and soon the rest of Smith's brigade--the Third Infantry--besides the engineer company and Taylor's battery were thrown in. Rincón, a gray-haired Spanish veteran, deceived our generals, for he desired to save ammunition, and therefore did not open his artillery fire till the Americans had come within musket range. To pause after the conflict began would have chilled the ardor of the troops and encouraged the enemy. Victory or defeat were the only alternatives, and a defeat could not be thought of.[26.16]

Victory did not arrive, however; so now the Second and the Seventh Infantry, led by Riley, attacked the Mexican right. Amidst the corn the American infantry became scattered, yet in the same haphazard way fought on; and Taylor, placed in a very exposed position before the state of things was understood, fired at short musket range with beautiful precision and rapidity. But the Mexicans, inspired by good leaders and by the example of the American deserters, who aimed the cannon, stood their ground. From parapets and bastions poured sheets of unceasing flame, sally followed sally, and guns at the bridgehead coöperated. In an hour and a half Taylor drove the enemy from the walls and from the roof of the church, but he lost twenty-four men and fourteen horses killed and wounded. The battery had to be withdrawn, and victory seemed almost beyond reach.[26.16]

Worth had now been attacking the bridgehead for half an hour or more. Hurrying the troops along, without giving them definite instructions, at a speed limited only by their wind and the obstacles in their way, he had left the Sixth Infantry on the highway, placed the Fifth and the Eighth at the right of it, and sent the rest of his infantry obliquely against the Mexican left; and then, without a reconnaissance of the bridgehead, the Sixth was ordered to charge whatever lay in its front.[26.15]

Probably the army contained no better corps, but it recoiled twice in confusion under a terrific storm of iron and lead. Valor was not lacking, but the men were dumfounded to come "butt-end first," as a soldier put it, upon such a fort so strongly held, when they had supposed they were chasing a parcel of rabbits; and their numbers were unequal to the task. Officers as well as men showed every sign of panic. The regiment could not be kept on the highway; and the troops in the tall corn on the right accomplished no more. The ground was soft there; and it was cut up with dikes and with deep, wide ditches containing about three feet of water. The men fought, but they fought in general disorder. C. F. Smith found himself with not more than twenty of his battalion at hand. Even the artillery, the backbone of the army, failed now, for Duncan's light pieces could not challenge the bridgehead squarely on the highway, and the ground beside it was unsuitable for them; while occasional fire from the convent and the explosion of an ammunition wagon abandoned by the Mexicans added to the difficulties.[26.15]

At the same time, besides these two combats which Scott had not expected, one planned by him was taking place. A few minutes after sending Twiggs toward Churubusco he ordered Pierce--and presently Shields also--to follow a road leading north from Coyoacán, cross Churubusco River, and move toward Santa Anna's rear, so as to protect the American flank and rear, favor the attack on the convent, and cut off the retreat of the Mexicans. The route adopted by the troops after leaving the road took them for a mile and a half through cornfields and marshes, and placed them near the highway, about three quarters of a mile north of the bridgehead, not far from the hacienda of Los Portales. To parry the blow Santa Anna at once moved in that direction with the Fourth Ligero, the Tulancingo regiment and most of the Eleventh Line, his finest corps, extending his men--perhaps 2200 in all--until they almost overlapped the Americans; while some 1500 or 2000 cavalry, probably consisting of the horse that had followed him to San Angel reinforced by that which had escaped from Contreras, menaced--though afraid to attack--Shields's left.[26.17]

Precisely what occurred now cannot be stated, for apparently most of the reporting officers were more anxious to conceal than to disclose facts; but it seems clear that Shields handled the men clumsily, that his own regiments fell into disorder when charging and shrank from the devouring Mexican fire, and that Pierce's brigade, composed of excellent material but officered to a large extent with political favorites, actually skulked. The Mexicans, on the other hand, finding two ditches along the highway to protect them from the dreaded bayonet and an embankment to screen them somewhat from bullets, fought stiffly. Shields was therefore unable, with his six hundred good men and two small howitzers, to make any impression, and after a time his troops huddled wherever they could in the shelter of some buildings.[26.17]

But finally, between three and four o'clock, the spell broke. Worth's men, though astonished and for a time dismayed, had no thought of giving up. "Victory or death" was not a phrase to them, but a conviction. Though dikes, ditches, bad ground, corn higher than their heads, and the Mexican artillery fire broke up their organization, personal courage and personal leadership survived. In smaller or larger groups they fought on. Santa Anna, by taking the Fourth Ligero from Pérez to defend the rear, deducted half the strength of his left wing, and no doubt Shields's operations, very suggestive of the American methods used in previous battles, tended to make the troops at the bridgehead nervous. Gradually a part of the unlucky Sixth and men of C. F. Smith's and Garland's commands, working toward the extreme American right, out-reached the enemy, crossed the river, turned the Mexican line, and moved on toward the highway. This created great alarm. The fate of Valencia was recalled. Many of the officers wilted. Ammunition seems partially to have failed; and at length, under a still galling fire, some of the Eighth Infantry, followed by more of the Fifth, waded the ditch of the bridgehead--twenty feet broad it was--climbed over the parapet or pushed through the embrasures, and settled the question hand to hand.[26.15]

At once Duncan planted two of his guns on the highway near the convent, and for ten or fifteen minutes, aided by a piece or two at the bridgehead, he fired with a judgment, rapidity and accuracy that delighted the on-lookers. By this time two of Rincón's guns at the right of the convent and one of the other pieces had become unserviceable; the ammunition, so lavishly expended, had failed the infantry; and the loss of the bridgehead, which stood on higher and commanding ground, was recognized as a most serious blow. The artillery commandant began to move a cannon from the front side to the right. Only two guns were in play on the front; and our Third Infantry, noting the slackened fire, dashed over the parapet at the left of the convent. Still the American deserters would not permit a white flag to be shown, and the garrison retired sullenly to the interior of the building. But Captain J. M. Smith, seeing that active resistance was over, now put up a white handkerchief himself to prevent further bloodshed. The signal of surrender stopped Duncan's work, too; and the Mexicans, astonished by the consideration shown them, laid down their arms.[26.18]

Pérez and Bravo with a large part of the troops were now on the way to Mexico _via_ Mexicaltzingo and Old Peñón, and others were taking flight along the highway, pursued by Worth's division. Shields perceived what was occurring, and harangued his brigade. "The South Carolinians will follow you to the death," answered the "Tigers," as they were called by Scott. Many, if not all, of the New Yorkers joined them; Pierce's officers mustered pluck enough to guard the left; and once more a charge was made. It proved no easy work, though, even now. First and last more than a third of Shields's brigade were killed or wounded. Brave, handsome Butler, commanding the Tigers, and his lieutenant colonel went down, and Colonel Burnett of the New Yorkers fell. But at last Shields carried the day, captured nearly four hundred Mexicans, and met Worth's cheering van on the highway.[26.17]

All joined then in the pursuit, supported with a captured 6-pounder and a howitzer, and took liberal toll as they went, until, after charging nearly two miles, they were halted by Worth. Orders from the commander-in-chief to the same effect soon arrived. Four companies of dragoons under Harney were permitted, however, to keep on, and when the sight of a battery led him to pull up, Captain Kearny of the First resolved to charge the guns, and galloped ahead.[26.19]

"Oh, what a glorious sight it was to see Phil Kearny riding into them!" wrote a soldier. His own troop were picked men; they rode picked horses--all iron-gray--that now seemed endowed with supernatural strength; and his other troop were fit comrades. Standing quite upright in the stirrups they looked like centaurs. Little by little the rear fours, hearing the trumpet sound the recall, dropped off; but the leader and about a dozen others kept on like a swift vessel, dashing the billows of humanity right and left. The battery, which stood at the garita, fired upon friend and foe alike. Still the little group arrived there, leaped from their horses to carry it, and found--that they were alone. The panic of the enemy, however, saved them. Tearing loose and springing into the saddle, they got away. But a grape-shot was faster than Kearny; and so, losing an arm but winning a brevet, he finished valiantly the battle of Churubusco.[26.19]

[AFTER THE BATTLE OF CHURUBUSCO]

Santa Anna's total loss for the day--the killed, the wounded and especially the missing--may be roughly estimated as 10,000. He admitted that he lost more than a third of his men. After he was able to find where he stood (August 30) the Army of the East contained 11,381 privates. Alvarez had 2447 privates (August 26); and, besides remnants of Valencia's troops, there were doubtless many small bodies of militia. Scott estimated the Mexicans killed and wounded as 4297, and 2637 prisoners, including eight generals, were reported; while the American ordnance was more than trebled, and the scanty stock of ammunition enormously increased. Out of 8497 engaged in the two battles, we lost fourteen officers and 119 privates killed, sixty and 805 respectively wounded, and some forty of the rank and file missing, who probably lost their lives.[26.20]

The high moral qualities displayed by our troops made the day glorious, as Hitchcock said, "in the highest degree"; and the army, naturally overestimating the numbers of the enemy, felt exceedingly proud. Scott, riding about the field, gray and massive, was hailed by the troops as the very genius of power and command.

"Never did mightier man or horse
Stem a tempestuous torrent's course,"

they felt; and when he addressed them with the eloquence of a soldier's heart, it seemed as if the cheers that followed must have shaken the "Halls." Nature, however, appeared to view the situation differently. The mountains above Padierna wrinkled their foreheads with still deeper furrows, or knit them with still darker scowls. Dense black clouds, preceded by gleaming heralds, rushed suddenly across the sky. Lightning flashed in sheets. Thunders rolled until the earth seemed to tremble. Torrents of rain deluged the ground; and in a little while, almost like something heavy and solid, night swiftly and prematurely descended.[26.21]

XXVII

NEGOTIATIONS

May, 1846-September, 1847

After fighting ceased, the Americans found temporary quarters wherever they could. Most of Shields's command occupied Los Portales "in a most deplorable condition," and Worth's division remained at the same point or in Churubusco. Some of Pillow's men retired to San Antonio, and there passed the night without rations, blankets, fires or lights, while others moved across to Mixcoac. A part of Twiggs's lay in a muddy field without shelter, while the rest made their way to Coyoacán or San Angel. Some of the troops, covered with sticky mud, slept in a barn on straw, and acquired an extremely curious appearance. For all it was a hard night, and perhaps hardest for the officer on guard. The hours crawled. Thoughts of the battle, the morrow and the distant home barely stirred his leaden brain. Every instant, drowsiness threatened to become stupor. Now and then a sentry's challenge, the snort of a horse, the blast of a bugle roused him with a start. At last came a streak in the east. He called the drummer, and ordered him to "beat off." Instantly the sharp roll was taken up by others. The bustle of men awoke; and the troops were alive again. Joy and pride welled up in their hearts, but the sadness of bereavement also and a sense of disappointment. They seemed to have won the race but lost the prize. Why had they not slept in the city?[27.1]

There were adequate military reasons for this. It was believed that Santa Anna still had some 20,000 men, and what fortifications defended the interior of Mexico no one pretended to say. Three surprises had met the Americans during the past forty-eight hours. They had sick and wounded, prisoners, wagons and captured material to look after. They were scattered, unmunitioned, spent. Not a few had become ill. In spite of Scott's precise orders to carry rations a large number had gone hungry for about a day, and many had fasted longer. The stock of provisions had practically been exhausted. If repulsed, the troops would have faced starvation; if successful, they would have been a disorganized mass of ravenous, infuriated soldiers in a hostile city. Almost all, even officers, were eager for a revel in the "Halls"; they would largely have scattered for something to eat and something to drink; many would soon have been intoxicated; and fearful scenes, costly alike to them and the inhabitants, would have disgraced the victory and imperilled the army.[27.1]

[AMERICAN EFFORTS TO MAKE PEACE]

Besides, the aim of the United States was peace; it appeared certain that in view of the battle just won the Mexicans would be disposed to offer acceptable terms; and resident Americans as well as neutrals had assured Scott that by taking the city, breaking up the government, dispersing the sensible and substantial men who desired a settlement, and perhaps rousing the people to desperation, he would be defeating his own government. On the other hand, as the General had reckoned before leaving Puebla, the presence of a victorious American army waiting at the gate seemed likely to excite intense fears of slaughter and sack, and prove a most effective argument for negotiation. Consequently, though sure he could break his way in, Scott deliberately sacrificed military glory, and halted. The wish to end hostilities was the dominant consideration; and, fully to understand this, we must now place ourselves at Washington, and then return to our present point by a singularly winding route.[27.1]

Both in his war Message of May 11, 1846, and later, Polk announced that he would be ready to negotiate whenever Mexico would make or even hear propositions; and he sought a listening ear with a persistence due to several causes: a real desire to end the war, a naïve ignorance of Mexican psychology, the exigencies of home politics and foreign relations, a natural predilection on his own part and on Buchanan's for schemes and tactics, and behind all a sincere wish, in accordance with our long-standing sentiment and policy, for the prosperity and friendship of the sister republic. Taylor was therefore instructed to place himself on confidential terms, if possible, at the Mexican headquarters with a view to bringing about negotiations; and in line with this policy Worth, while at Saltillo, offered pleasant sentiments to Santa Anna on the subject of peace.[27.2]

The battles on the Rio Grande and the unwelcome effects of the blockade tended to sober Mexico, as did the aloofness of Great Britain; and Marcy counted not a little on the settlement of the Oregon question. Intimations were received from Consul Black in June and July, 1846, that not only all thoughtful citizens but Paredes himself desired to reach an agreement. Bravo and his Cabinet, who temporarily assumed the reins of government, felt more strongly in the same way, and were more free to act; other signs also pointed in that direction; and it was hoped that Santa Anna, should he regain power, would favor peace. The American administration, on the other hand, felt much embarrassed by the unexpected seriousness of the problems involved in the conflict. So on the twenty-seventh of July Buchanan addressed the Mexican minister of relations, waiving as undesirable all discussion upon the causes of the war, and inviting negotiations in the most conciliatory manner.[27.4]