Chapter VII: Appendix: (lists of Sources) 517 (7)

However, the great problem before them soon occupied the minds of all. Mexico, lying on a very slight elevation or swell, could be entered on its western side by the garita of San Cosme and at the southwest by the garita of Belén, to each of which led a causeway from the fortified hill of Chapultepec, about a mile and a half southwest of Belén. From this garita a second causeway ran south about an equal distance to the picturesque chapel of La Piedad, where it was crossed by one extending eastwardly from Tacubaya to the San Antonio or Acapulco highway, which--it will be recalled--led south to Churubusco and San Agustín. Not far north of the latter junction and about a mile from the city proper stood the garita of San Antonio; while, intermediate between the San Antonio and the Piedad routes, the Niño Perdido causeway, coming from San Angel, connected with Niño Perdido garita, which stood at the edge of the city. Finally, a road leading nearly east from San Antonio gateway conducted one to La Viga garita and La Viga canal, a deep and broad waterway, which, since it could not well be bridged in the face of the enemy, practically bounded Scott's field of operations. There were thus four garitas--Belén, Niño Perdido, San Antonio and La Viga in this order from west to east--each guarding an approach to the capital from the south.[28.7]

Scott's expectation was to break the south front, and after the armistice ended, his engineers, assisted to some extent by himself and a Mexican officer in his pay, reconnoitred it actively and boldly except on the forenoon of the eighth. Had it been feasible to strike immediately on the resumption of hostilities, the enemy's lines would have been found poorly fortified and armed. But this could not well be done with Santa Anna's principal forces menacing our flank; the American army was not yet in position; and Scott desired first of all to destroy El Molino. After the battle of the eighth half of his troops imperatively required a breathing space. The wounded had to be given attention. The army still needed to be placed. It was necessary to protect hospitals, baggage and stores--especially since Governor Olaguíbel and about 700 militia, supposed by Americans to be Alvarez with his two divisions, were approaching the rear, and according to reports Valencia had 8000 men in that vicinity. Moreover Scott's information was not complete. The eighth of September, following the twentieth of August, had proved the danger of rashness; and the fresh losses made extreme caution absolutely necessary. Finally, Scott felt a suspicion that the Mexicans expected and wished him to attack their apparently unfinished works covering the south front.[28.8]

On the morning of the eleventh he inspected these once more, and then had a conference of generals and engineers at La Piedad. It was a solemn gathering. Before them lay the fortified capital of Mexico, a hopeful army of perhaps 15,000, a good equipment of artillery, nearly 700 trained gunners, and a large population, somewhat disillusioned, but excited and vengeful; and in view of the American situation it was essential, as the commander-in-chief clearly indicated, to strike a vital blow at once.[28.9]

But where? Point by point Scott fully and fairly stated the case: at the southwest the mighty porphyritic hill of Chapultepec to carry, but a clear problem, hard ground, excellent places for batteries, Huger's opinion that in one day the fortified college on the top of the hill could be demolished, in the event of success a position from which to operate freely, and at least a possibility that, after losing what was commonly deemed its key, Mexico would listen to terms; on the southern front marshes, inundations, large ditches full of water everywhere, causeways already cut by the enemy, bridges destroyed, a topography that made rear and flank attacks impossible, an extensive series of well-planned and well-armed fortifications crossing their fires and commanding one another, and an enemy apparently eager to have the attack made here. Scott, while disclaiming any wish to influence the judgment of others, pronounced frankly for Chapultepec.[28.9]

Then one of the engineers--a tall, handsome young man, with a positive chin, a strong nose, a dark, closely trimmed mustache, dark hair clustering above his ears, and a fresh, clear color in his face--stood up and reported crisply on the work of reconnoitring. His name was Robert E. Lee, and he recommended approaching by the southern front. Three other engineers concurred with him. Four generals, doubtless influenced by these experts, took the same view. Twiggs and Riley inclined the other way. The fifth engineer present was then called upon, and he--Beauregard--in a long, technical statement argued for the Chapultepec route. Pierce changed his opinion. A silence followed; and then Scott, drawing up his magnificent figure to its full height, announced in his grand way: "Gentlemen, we will attack by the western gates. The general officers present here will remain for further orders--the meeting is dissolved." And so the die was cast.[28.10]

[CHAPULTEPEC]

The preparation of Chapultepec for defence had begun in May, and Santa Anna had insisted upon it as of the "highest importance"; but want of money hindered and at times checked operations. During the armistice a little progress was made, and September 9, under the direction of a competent engineer and of the President himself, the work began in earnest. But alterations in plan, a lack of implements, a shortage of materials, the general confusion and the want of time naturally made thoroughness impossible. Chapultepec was therefore a fort but not really a fortress. It stood alone, too, without the supporting positions that a fortress must have; and shot and shell could penetrate the defences of the college on the summit of the hill almost everywhere. Even the parapets were not ready; and instead of the 2000 men required for an adequate garrison of the buildings and works, only a few hundreds occupied them. Their elevation merely hindered approach--not assault--and artillery could largely offset that advantage. To hold the grove was essential, for without it the garrison above could not obtain supplies or even water; and here the want of adequate defences had a still worse effect, since large forces could not be protected against artillery.[28.11]

Yet for 7180 available Americans including those required to make a feint against the southern front--an "army" that had to contemplate still harder work beyond, and could not afford severe losses here--Chapultepec meant a great deal. In general the position formed an approximate rectangle about three fourths of a mile in length by one fourth of a mile in width, bounded at its western end by El Molino and on the other sides with high stone walls. In the south wall, at about its middle point, there was an opening covered on the outside by a sand-bag redan (B), unarmed. From the main gateway in the eastern end the causeway of Belén struck off toward the city, another road--guarded here by a cut and by two batteries--ran toward Tacubaya, and a third, after running westwardly into the rectangle and a little way up the slope until it arrived at a 4-pounder in a circular redoubt (C), flanked with an infantry entrenchment (D), turned sharply toward the northeast, and finally climbed to the summit.[28.12]

Here on a rectangular level space or terre-plein, supported at the eastern end by an almost vertical precipice and on the other sides by high, parapeted walls, rose the masonry buildings of the military college, skilfully though incompletely reinforced with sand-bags and screens of timber (blindage), supplemented with parapeted azoteas, and surrounded with ten effective guns, heavy and light. A deep, broad fosse at the base of the western wall, mines below that, and finally, half-way down the slope, a redan (E) strengthened this end, where the incline was gentlest. In swamps at the western foot of the hill stood a large grove of huge cypresses--extending also toward the main gateway--through which ran an east and west road commanded by this redan (E) and also by the wall of the fort. Beyond the grove came a north-and-south ditch, intended for drainage, with a redan-breastwork (A)--looking westward--at its northern end; and finally, after traversing level and open fields for about a quarter of a mile toward the west, one arrived at El Molino. Placed so conspicuously in view, 150 or 200 feet in height, Chapultepec seemed to deserve its popular reputation of impregnability, and the American soldiers gazed at the white walls on the summit, transfigured in the sunlight, with dread if not with consternation.[28.12]

Late in the afternoon, September 11, Quitman's division ostentatiously presented itself at La Piedad, but after dark both his and Pillow's moved to Tacubaya, leaving Twiggs with Brevet Colonel Riley's brigade and Steptoe's and Taylor's field pieces behind. During the night two 16's and an eight-inch howitzer under Drum were placed behind bushes on the road from Tacubaya to Mexico, about 1000 yards from Chapultepec, and a similar howitzer with a 24-pounder, masked in the same way, south of El Molino under Hagner; and these batteries (Nos. 1 and 2) opened fire the next morning (September 12). Later in the day a 16-pound siege gun and an eight-inch howitzer (Battery No. 3) and a ten-inch mortar (No. 4), planted nearer the mill, joined in the work. Chapultepec replied; and, as usual, the Mexican artillerymen--of whom there was a full complement--did well, occasionally knocking sand-bags from the American parapets, while our own gunners, warned by the burst of smoke, took shelter at each discharge. Meantime Steptoe, in the hope of deceiving the Mexicans as to Scott's purpose, made as much noise as possible opposite the San Antonio garita.[28.13]

During these preparations the Mexicans passed their days in a state of fever. Reports that our army had only half-rations cheered them, and Scott's deceptive manoeuvres were attributed by many to indecision or timidity. On the eleventh a review and a valiant proclamation from the President recalled his "victory" of 1829 over the Spaniards. But a sense of weakness and confusion, the loss of friends, the continual alarms, the marchings and countermarchings, and the ominous clang of the bells kept them sad and anxious. Santa Anna, for his part, displayed as usual a remarkable activity and a remarkable want of judgment and method. During the night of September 9 he set perhaps 2000 men at work--one hour each--on the southern fortifications, and the parapets rose as if by enchantment. Not knowing where Scott would strike, he broke his army into a number of detachments, and shifted troops and guns frequently according to his notion of the probabilities, while always maintaining a reserve. But he lost himself in a maze of details; and on the eleventh, deceived by the rather weak American feint, he unwisely drew men and cannon from Chapultepec and Belén.[28.14]

[SEPTEMBER 12]

Early the next morning, however, the reports of spies and the roar of Scott's heavy guns enlightened him. Troops were hurried to the real point of danger. With all speed he went there himself, ordered his best engineers to work on the fortifications near the main gateway of the Chapultepec enclosure, and posted troops close by. But there was little he could do. More and more accurately the American batteries fired and kept on firing. Two of the best cannon in the fort were disabled. The buildings of the college suffered, the garrison suffered more, and their morale suffered most of all, for except the engineers and gunners the men felt utterly helpless. When Santa Anna entered the rectangle unattended to reconnoitre, a shell burst near him and covered his red pony with dirt. Toward evening General Bravo, the commander of the position, came down, reported to him that the garrison were cowed, and demanded fresh troops; but Santa Anna could see no use of sending them forward to be destroyed on the way or else demoralized after arriving. They should be provided, he said, at the critical moment.[28.15]

Scott saw, however, as the day waned, that Huger's expectations would not be realized--that an assault would be necessary. For this last resort preparations had in fact been made. The troops and the ladders were now ready. Fearing the Mexicans would repair the damages under cover of night he thought at first of delivering the blow at once; but he concluded that it was now too late in the day, that his guns could soon dispose of repairs and reinforcements, and that a morning attack would give many hours for pursuing the advantages gained. Engineers proceeded to mend and improve our own batteries, and the generals met for a conference. Here the plans were finally decided upon. Quitman's division and a forlorn hope of about 265 selected officers and men from Twiggs's division, under Captain Casey of the Second Infantry, were to advance by the Tacubaya road; and Pillow's, preceded by a similar party from Worth's division, led by Captain McKenzie of the Second Artillery, was to attack by way of El Molino and the grove. Then every one betook himself to his post. But Pillow felt discontented. "We shall be defeated," said Worth privately; and even Scott admitted to Hitchcock, "I have my misgivings."[28.16]

[BATTLE OF CHAPULTEPEC]

At daybreak--about half-past five--the next morning a signal gun broke the stillness, and then our batteries opened. For two hours or so they hurled shot and shells at the fort, and then for some thirty minutes grape, canister and shells were poured into the grove. At about eight o'clock, as if by common consent, they stopped--but only to burst forth again with new fury.[28.17]

That one momentary pause was the command to attack. Colonel Trousdale, with the Eleventh and Fourteenth Infantry and a section of Magruder's field battery under the "Stonewall" Jackson of our civil war, moved some distance eastward from near El Molino by the Anzures causeway along the northern side of the rectangle, to prevent reinforcement and embarrass escape in that quarter. Lieutenant Colonel Johnston with four companies of the gray Voltigeurs advanced outside the south wall, drove the Mexicans from the redan (B) and from the wall, behind which they had been standing on platforms, passed through the opening, captured the circular redoubt (C) and the breastwork near it (D), and opened fire on the southern parapet of the fort. Reno's howitzers, taken from El Molino eastward into the fields, poured shells upon the grove and the Mexican entrenchments (A and E). Four other Voltigeur companies under Colonel Andrews, after crossing those open fields, rushed with loud cheers into the swamp; and the Ninth and the Fifteenth Infantry, deploying into line, followed them closely. Decorated with long, hanging moss, the venerable cypresses, dear alike to Cortez and to Montezuma, seemed like the fit guardians of some mystical and melancholy religion; but now hurrahs and sharp flashes and the terrible crash of cannon-balls amidst the branches broke their shadowy silence, and the Americans, wallowing through the mire, drove the Mexican skirmishers from tree to tree, from the grove, and at last from the battle.[28.17]

Clearly it was time for Santa Anna to support the garrison. Attempts had been made to repair the fort during the night, but no adequate materials could be found there. A cannon had burst. The dead and wounded lay about. There were no surgeons, no medical supplies. The expected reinforcements did not appear. Most of the students, gallant lads in gray uniforms and gaily tasselled blue caps, withdrew by command. Bravo--thickset and erect, with deep eyes and a powerful chin--though he was cold and unenterprising, had flawless courage, and he stood with folded arms or marched calmly from post to post. But the infantry of the garrison--hungry, exhausted, stunned, hopeless--cowered behind the parapets. Many had to be driven to their places, and some had to be fired on. Even the engineers and gunners felt despondent.[28.17]

But Santa Anna could not see what to do. No doubt the hill was to be attacked from the grove, but the enemy seemed likely to assault by the Tacubaya causeway also, and Trousdale, he fancied, might come round by a road that skirted the eastern end of the rectangle to strike his rear. Besides, the officers and men showed no desire to challenge the American artillery by marching up the hill, and he understood well enough himself how few of them could probably reach the fort. At length, however, he strengthened the forces on the Tacubaya road, and sent most of the San Blas Activo battalion to Bravo. At the circular redoubt this corps met the Americans, and not many of them lived to go farther.[28.17]

East of the grove, Andrews with his Voltigeurs and Reno with his howitzers turned a little to the right and united with Johnston. This left the Ninth a clear front. Colonel Ransom had promised, the day before, that he and his men would go into the fort or die. Proudly erect, sword in hand, the beau-ideal of a soldier, he strode in front up the steepest part of the slope, while the Fifteenth marched on his left. The breastwork (E) was captured; and then, coming in view of the fort--its buildings almost hidden in smoke, its parapets a sheet of flame, the air filled with the hiss and shriek and roar of missiles--he waved his sword, shouted, "Forward, the Ninth!" and fell dead with a bullet in his forehead. A terrible cry rose from his men: "Ransom has fallen--the Colonel is shot!" Wild for revenge they all charged on, and a part of them reached the fosse.[28.17]

But there had been some mistake. The ladders had been entrusted to raw men, it was said; perhaps they had not been started off in time; apparently some of the bearers had left their places and hurried on; some had been killed and others frightened. Anyhow the ladders did not arrive. Like the Voltigeurs on their right, the Ninth and the Fifteenth sought shelter behind rocks and stumps and fired at the parapet; and the tardy storming party, which was to have passed through them, feeling no desire to get between the two lines of fire and really unable to do anything without ladders, halted.[28.17]

The men were fairly safe. Their muskets taught most of the enemy to keep down behind the parapet. The rest of the Mexicans fired very badly, and the Americans near the wall could not be reached by the cannon. But the attack was making no progress. Time passed--five, ten, fifteen dreadful minutes, and still no ladders could even be seen. The American batteries, which had been firing over the heads of our troops, could no longer do it safely. The ardor of battle was cooling. Low mounds that looked like graves, but in reality were the mines, lay under our men, and a Mexican lieutenant of engineers had orders to fire them at the right moment. Santa Anna with perhaps 4000 or even 5000 reserves so near--might he not come round the hill? Scott's whole gazing army, back even to Lieutenant Mayne Reid at Battery No. 2, was seized with a horrible fear. Pillow, lying at the foot of the hill painfully hurt in the ankle, sent for the whole of Worth's division, which was supporting him as a reserve, and begged Worth to make "great haste" or it would be "too late."[28.17]

There was, however, a nearer source of help. When the signal for attack was given, Quitman's division--preceded by forty pioneers under Captain Reynolds of the Marines, Casey's forlorn hope, and 120 stormers from the volunteer division led by Major Twiggs of the Marines--advanced on the Tacubaya causeway until about 200 yards from the gateway batteries. To support it, repel a body of Mexicans on its right, ward off any force that might approach from the city, perhaps turn those batteries, and if possible gain the Mexican rear, General Smith struck off into the meadows and pushed on despite the ditches; and Captain Drum and Lieutenant Benjamin, each with a single gun, and Lieutenant Hunt with two of Duncan's pieces advanced by the road, firing on those batteries or at the hill and fort as opportunities offered.[28.17]

On each side of the causeway ran a ditch that was almost a canal and cramped the troops not a little; and a terrible fire of artillery and musketry from the meadows, the front, the wall of the rectangle and the fort on the hill-top greeted them. Quitman had reconnoitred here the day before, and thought he understood the problem; but the Mexicans had made further preparations afterwards, and when he ordered a charge, it was checked, and Twiggs and Casey fell. Ahead of him, partly enfilading the road, blazed at least five guns, and some of the best soldiers in the Mexican army--commanded by General Rangel--occupied the stone buildings near them, while others fired from behind the wall near the gateway. Under this concentrated and awful storm the Americans recoiled, and sheltered themselves near a bend in the road by lying down, getting into the ditches or occupying some houses. Here, too, the offensive was blocked; the attack failed.[28.17]

But "the issue of battle lies in the hearts of men," and the will of every American heart was Victory. Lieutenant Reid, hurrying over from the battery with two companies, dropped on the slope, but his men went forward. By Quitman's order the New York and the Second Pennsylvania regiments left the Tacubaya causeway, under a heavy fire waded the ditches on the left and rear to the redan (B), and charged through the opening, while the Palmettoes, finding a break in the same wall, made a little farther east by an American cannon, enlarged it with their bayonets and squeezed through. Shields and the commanders of the New York and Pennsylvania regiments were wounded, but the troops kept on. Clarke's brigade, sent forward by Worth, hastened up the western slope, and when Lieutenant Longstreet of the Eighth fell, Lieutenant Pickett seized the colors. For some reason the mines failed to explode; and at last the ladders came up.[28.17]

Shouting and yelling, the Voltigeurs, the Ninth and Fifteenth, some of McKenzie's and the foremost of Quitman's men, all closely intermingled, and brilliant with flags and the sparkle of arms, crowded to the fosse. The first ladders, with all the bold fellows upon them, were thrown down, but in a moment so many more were placed, side by side, that fifty could go up abreast. The blue Voltigeur flag, now full of holes, was planted on the parapet. A tide of brave Americans overflowed the fort. Resistance was vain. A little before half-past nine Bravo gave up his diamond-hilted sword, and the tricolor, that had been waving placidly amidst the uproar, came down with a jerk.[28.17]

Fire was opened then upon the Mexicans at the gateway below, and fearless Captain Roberts of Casey's storming party, at the head of all the troops on the causeway and supported by General Smith's brigade, carried the gateway batteries. Many from Quitman's and Smith's commands rushed to the summit, dealing with flying enemies as they went. Scott himself came up--the hero of Chippewa and Lundy's Lane. The men pressed round him. He told them how glad he was, and how proud of them; and how proud their country, their wives, their sisters and their sweethearts would be; and it seemed as if such cheering had never been heard, anywhere in the world, before.[28.17]

Exultant but weary, the soldiers now looked about them as they took breath. From this eyrie the whole wonderful Valley of Mexico could be surveyed. All round the west the great wall of rugged mountains closed it in, and two vast, snowy peaks guarded its portal on the east. As if reluctantly the mountains gradually subsided into verdant hills and a wide plain, enamelled in a thousand soft hues. The broad, smooth lakes gleamed like molten silver. The gold of ripening grain, penciled lines of pale-green maguey, cottages radiant in the sun like the sails of distant ships, country-houses and villas half hiding in foliage, and many straight, converging avenues, lined with trees, delighted the eye. In the midst, clear-cut as a medallion, lay the city of Mexico, the capital, its roofs and towers black with people; and there, just yonder, stood the Halls of the Montezumas, the Jerusalem of these ardent young crusaders. Unfortunately breastworks, redoubts, cannon and a Mexican army were still to be reckoned with. Santa Anna had probably lost not more than 1800 killed, wounded and missing this day, and apparently Scott's loss had been about one fourth as great.[28.18]

[QUITMAN'S OPERATIONS]

But the Americans quickly prepared to advance--first of all, Quitman. Naturally a certain discretion had been given to the commanding generals, and he intended to make the most of it. Looking from the hill along the Belén causeway, he saw a wide avenue divided through the middle by a stone aqueduct some eight feet wide and fifteen feet high, resting on heavy arches and pillars of masonry. Owing to fine weather the road was unusually firm. A small number of troops, fleeing in the utmost confusion, could be seen upon it, but at only one point fortifications. Borrowing all of Pillow's troops except the Fifteenth Infantry, which remained to hold Chapultepec and guard the prisoners, he quietly gave orders that his men should assemble near the main gateway. At once the inspiring words began to circulate, "Quitman's division to the city!" and as soon as possible the Rifles, in their crimson sashes, were leading the march forward. About a mile on, a two-gun battery, with a field redan at its right on the marsh, blocked the way. For an hour or so Drum used a small gun upon it. Then the Rifles, after creeping along the aqueduct from arch to arch, took it by assault, and the march continued toward the fortifications at the garita.[28.19]

As at the other garitas, no gates existed here, but a ditch and a parapet blocked one half of the causeway and a zigzag redoubt the other. Just at the north was the stone house intended for guards and customs officials, beyond which lay the wide _Paseo_ (Promenade). South, on the Piedad road, were artillery and infantry that could fire through the arches. Inside the garita, buildings extending toward the east offered shelter, and in open ground a little more toward the north and about 300 yards distant, the extensive edifice called the citadel, protected with a wall and a wet ditch, constituted a serious obstacle.[28.19]

Santa Anna, after acting like a madman when Chapultepec fell, came to this garita. General Terrés, a brave old Spaniard, commanded here with about 180 infantry and some artillerymen. Santa Anna gave him three guns of medium power, and stationed General Ramírez in the Paseo, Brevet General Argüelles on the opposite side, and General Perdigón Garay and Colonel Barrios in the rear with substantial reserves.[28.19]

On approaching this formidable position, Quitman encountered a withering storm of bullets, grape and solid shot from both sides and the front, and suffered rather severely. But Drum and Benjamin, iron men, bringing up as soon as possible a long 18-pounder and a 24-pound howitzer on the opposite sides of the aqueduct, dampened the ardor of the Mexicans not a little, and splinters from the masonry did havoc among the sheltered artillerymen at the garita. Some troops already beaten at Chapultepec and at the intermediate battery soon became demoralized. At about one o'clock rumors crept in that Americans from the southern front were turning the position. Ramírez, Garay, Argüelles and Barrios retired without the formality of saying good-by; and Terrés, whose cannon ammunition had failed, withdrew prudently to the citadel with two of the guns and about seventy panicky men, the remnant of his garrison. The Rifles now dashed over the parapet; and at exactly twenty minutes past one a tall, slender man with short, bristling, grayish hair stood on it, smoking a cigar and waving a red handkerchief tied to a rifle. It was Quitman, self-possessed but exultant; and in a few moments the Palmetto colors and the green banner of the Rifles, with its blazing gold eagle, were flying at the portal of the city.[28.19]

The advance then continued for some little distance, and, as the ammunition of our two heavy guns had been exhausted, the captured Mexican 8-pounder was made to do good service. But Santa Anna, who had thought the position safe and gone on to San Cosme, soon arrived with ordnance and troops. The citadel was reinforced, and infantry and cannon were placed at other points. Quitman's last artillery cartridges were used, and under the enemy's fire no more could be brought up. Solid shot cut down both Drum and Benjamin. Our infantry had to retire to the vicinity of the garita. Attempts were then made to strengthen the position; but they did not accomplish very much. Ammunition gave out entirely, and firing ceased. The enemy grew bolder. Again and again they charged, and though repulsed they did not appear to be discouraged. By this time every member of Quitman's staff, Beauregard, his engineer officer, and all his artillery officers had been killed or wounded, and he longed anxiously for night.[28.19]

Meanwhile, events had occurred on Scott's other wing. Trousdale's command, supplemented with Jackson's guns, pushed along the road and aqueduct on the north side of the rectangle, and the latter distinguished himself by fearlessly attacking a one-gun redoubt, which, supported by infantry and by fire from the summit of the hill, barred the way. To check Mexican reinforcements and threaten the enemy--particularly the troops in Quitman's front--Scott now had Worth, Garland's brigade, C. F. Smith's battalion, Duncan's battery, the rest of Magruder's battery and Sumner's dragoons pursue the same route. The one-gun redoubt was flanked and occupied; and Worth's forces arrived at the northeast corner of the rectangle in time to annoy the retreat of Rangel and other departing Mexicans.[28.20]

[THE SAN COSME APPROACH]

Here began the broad, straight Verónica causeway--closely similar to that of Belén--which extended almost north for nearly two miles (3530 yards) to the English cemetery, and there joined the San Cosme highway at approximately a right angle. Understanding the difficulties of the Belén approach, Scott intended to make only a feint in that quarter, and let his left wing break into the city. He therefore sent the brigades of Clarke and Cadwalader and also Huger with siege guns to Worth. To organize the attacking column, replenish the ammunition, make other needed preparations, and sweep away the resistance encountered at several minor fortifications, especially near the cemetery, required time; but at about four o'clock Worth found himself on the straight highway about half a mile from the San Cosme garita.[28.20]

This entrance to the city had been included in the general scheme of defence, but on account of its remoteness from pressing danger few workmen had been employed here; and when Chapultepec fell, it lay entirely open except for a small parapet without a ditch extending partly across the highway some 250 yards to the west. General Peña, however, coming this way from Chapultepec, stopped at the parapet, and Rangel placed at the garita such troops as he could assemble. Santa Anna, who displayed on this occasion reckless valor and an almost fiendish activity, sent three available cannon and brought additional troops. The roofs of buildings in the vicinity were occupied. A redoubt with embrasures was hastily erected at the garita, the near arches of the aqueduct were stopped up with sand-bags, and some guns in the Paseo were prepared to coöperate.[28.20]

On attempting to advance, therefore, Worth found the highway swept with bullets, canister, grape and shells. Garland, however, was ordered to creep forward under the protection of the arches, and endeavor to reach the south flank of the garita, and Clarke to burrow through the continuous line of buildings on the other side, and strike the northern flank. Lieutenant U. S. Grant, who was reported as acquitting himself at this time "most nobly," waded some ditches with a party of men and a mountain howitzer, and planted the gun on the roof of a church at the right; and Lieutenant Raphael Semmes of the navy performed a similar exploit on the left. Artillery fire compelled Peña, who--reinforced by Santa Anna with two companies of the Eleventh Infantry--was fighting gallantly, to leave the parapet; and Hunt, of Duncan's battery, though he lost more than half his men in dashing 150 yards at full speed, landed a gun at that point, where he could load in safety and then fire from the one embrasure.[28.20]

By five o'clock these preparations were complete. On the other hand Rangel had been severely wounded, and his principal gun, a 24-pound howitzer, had become unserviceable. Suddenly, to his utter astonishment, Americans appeared on the top of a three-story house that commanded the interior of his redoubt, and with a single volley disposed of almost every gunner and artillery mule. Then some of them hurried down to the front door of the house, burst it open, and rushed into the redoubt, where they met Americans just arrived by a flanking movement from the other side of the highway. In a panic the Mexicans fled, literally sweeping away Santa Anna and a body of troops, who had come at all speed from Belén to support the position. Many of them scattered, but with no little difficulty others were conducted to the citadel. By six o'clock Worth entered Mexico. Near the garita his forces were safely housed, and by way of "good-night" and good advice, Huger dropped a few shells in the vicinity of the palace.[28.20]

The end, however, was not yet in view. Santa Anna had some 5000 infantry and fifteen cannon at the citadel, with probably about 7000 more troops not far away, and the Americans, besides having lost many in the day's fighting, were now fearfully divided. Not only Worth but Quitman, who planted three heavy guns in battery during the night, intended to advance in the morning, and apparently a day of carnage was to ensue.[28.20]

But Santa Anna probably began to feel the reaction that always followed his great efforts. Funds and provisions were scanty. The army was demoralized, and the mass of the people felt disheartened. Within the town there were no fortifications, and it looked as if another battle under these conditions might scatter the troops, and involve the loss of nearly all the war material. Besides, leading persons in the city had always been strenuously anxious to prevent bombardment and assault; and the President was urged now, as four months previously, to spare it. Early in the evening, therefore, he briefly discussed the situation with Olaguíbel, the minister of war and three generals. The Governor was for acting deliberately; but Santa Anna, declaring that honor had been satisfied and the city could not be defended successfully, ordered immediate evacuation; and by one o'clock the troops retired in a somewhat orderly fashion to Guadalupe Hidalgo. About three hours later a commission of the city council (_ayuntamiento_) offered terms of capitulation at the American headquarters in Tacubaya. These were of course rejected, for the town lay at our mercy; but Scott gave informally the usual assurances of good treatment.[28.21]

[THE AMERICANS CAPTURE MEXICO]

So when the first thin streak of dawn glimmered forth behind the gray volcanoes, and our cannon at Belén garita were on the point of opening fire, a white flag and an invitation to enter the capital reached Quitman. First making sure there was no deception, he advanced; and after stopping about half an hour at the citadel he moved forward under a splendid sun to the grand plaza, which fronted the palace and the cathedral, with Smith's brigade, the Marines, the New York volunteers and Steptoe's battery. As a triumphal procession the command looked rather strange. Quitman and Smith marched at its head on foot--the former with only one shoe; and behind them came troops decorated with mud, the red stains of battle and rough bandages, carrying arms at quite haphazard angles. Not less astonishing looked the city, for sidewalks, windows, balconies and housetops were crowded with people. Except for the silence, the countless white handkerchiefs and the foreign flags, it might have been thought a holiday. Before the palace, which filled the east side of the plaza, the troops formed in line of battle. Officers took their places at the front, and when Captain Roberts hoisted a battle-scarred American flag on the staff of the palace at seven o'clock, arms were presented and the officers saluted.[28.22]

Soon loud cheering was heard. A few squares away the commander-in-chief, escorted by cavalry with drawn swords, had reached Worth's command, which had stopped at six o'clock by orders opposite the high ash trees of the Alameda. A clatter of galloping hoofs followed; and in another moment, amidst the involuntary applause of the Mexicans, General Scott, dressed in full uniform and mounted on a tall, heavy bay charger, dashed with his staff and Harney's dragoons into the grand plaza--his noble figure, gold epaulets and snowy plumes, resplendent under the brilliant sun, fitly typifying the invisible glory of his unkempt and limping army. Uncovering, he rode slowly along the line of battle to the music of our national airs; the troops, presenting arms again, cheered and hurrahed till it seemed as if the earthquake-proof cathedral must be shaking, and the cavalry escort waved high their flashing blades.[28.22]

In stentorian tones the commander-in-chief appointed Quitman governor of the city; and then, dismounting in the courtyard, he clanked up the broad stairway of the palace, to indite congratulations on the "many glorious victories" of his army. Presently cross-belted American Marines were calmly patrolling the Halls of the Montezumas as if they owned them, while the rest of the troops gazed with profound exultation at the long pinkish façade and the endless balconies of the upper story, and the people gazed silently at the troops. "They are all and each of them heroes," commented a foreigner present, and others in the world thought the same.

"Light up your homes, O fathers,
For those young hero bands,
Whose march is still through vanquished towns
And over conquered lands,
Whose valor, wild, impetuous
In all its fiery glow,
Pours onward like a lava-tide,
And sweeps away the foe!"[28.22]

XXIX

FINAL MILITARY OPERATIONS

January, 1847-April, 1848

At the north, after the Buena Vista campaign and the embarrassments growing out of it came to an end, Taylor probably wished, in what an officer called "his easy dog-trot fashion," to advance as far as San Luis Potosí, and retained troops urgently needed by Scott; but by the middle of June, 1847, he doubtless realized that effective operations on so long a line, especially through hostile and much of the way through barren territory, were impracticable, and advised that Scott's column alone should act on the offensive. A month later orders of a corresponding tenor were issued at Washington, and then some 3000 surplus troops of the northern army proceeded toward the capital, though too late, of course, to assist in the decisive struggle.[29.1]

Valencia, during his brief stay at San Luis Potosí in the early summer of 1847, not only requested permission to move against Saltillo, but planned that General Filisola, aided by a brigade under Avalos, then lying at Matehuala, by Reyes, the comandante general of Zacatecas, and by Urrea--who still commanded the "brigade of observation," and could easily pass across the Sierra Madre from Tula--should threaten, if not attack, Saltillo and Monterey, and at least keep the Americans on the defensive. Some disquieting movements of these troops resulted; but Valencia was soon called to Mexico, and various difficulties, chiefly a lack of means resulting from the American occupation, proved fatal to this ambitious enterprise, besides hindering the Mexican preparations to receive Taylor at San Luis Potosí.[29.1]

During the winter of 1846-47 and to some extent later, the garrison of Tampico was menaced by plans for an uprising, to be assisted by outside forces, and sometimes it was feared that a move to capture the city would be launched from Tula in the hope of embarrassing Scott's communications; but the Americans, though not strong in numbers there, were vigilant and well protected by fortifications. Besides, the authorities of Tamaulipas, now living on fairly good terms with the invaders, had little wish to take part in active hostilities. They quarrelled bitterly with Urrea, who naturally attempted to draw supplies and money from the region, and in November, 1847, with a view to bringing about harmony, that officer was removed. Scott's victories and especially the fall of Mexico had no little effect in this quarter; the prospect of serious operations entirely disappeared; and early in November, 1847, General Taylor, who had reached the conclusion some time before that his country wanted him for President, and had laid aside his old brown coat in favor of checked shirt sleeves, set out for home on a leave of absence, which actually continued until the close of the war. Wool took his place; but nothing occurred in this region except guerilla affairs, of which a due account will be given presently.[29.1]

In the northwest, meantime, Price, who commanded in New Mexico and was disturbed by rumors of danger from the south, decided on his own responsibility, ignoring instructions to do otherwise, that he must assume the aggressive. Early in March, 1848, the city of Chihuahua was therefore reoccupied; and on the sixteenth of that month, after a little brisk fighting, the town of Rosales, about sixty miles to the southeast, which Angel Trias held with some 800 men, chiefly National Guards, was captured by assault with a trifling loss. But this campaign had no general effect on the war--indeed, the treaty of peace had already been signed--and Price was ordered by Marcy to retire.[29.1]

[FIGHTING IN THE CAPITAL]

In Scott's department the final military operations began very promptly. Immediately after the Americans took possession of the grand plaza at Mexico on the morning of September 14, a multitude of blanketed léperos crowded closely upon them. Already these miscreants had tasted the disorder they loved, for the palace had been left unguarded, and they had sacked it; and now they showed signs of turbulence. The plaza was cleared, however, and no further trouble seemed likely. But when our troops began to march away to their quarters, a shot was heard. A bullet probably intended for Worth struck Garland, and almost instantly firing from street corners, windows and the tops of houses became general, though not systematic. Thousands of convicts from the jail supported the populace, and in one way or another not a few of the better class coöperated. By Tornel's order paving stones had been taken to many of the azoteas with a view to resisting the invader step by step, and these, like every other sort of weapon, were now used.[29.2]

Though surprised, the Americans promptly accepted the challenge. Skirmishers drove back the mobs. Grape and canister swept the streets. As a rule, every house from which a shot flew became a target for our heavy cannon, which seemed to shake the very foundations of the city, and when breached was immediately sacked; and sharpshooters worked effectively on towers and roofs. Scott threatened even sterner measures; and the city authorities not only put up notices, embodying his threats and imploring the people to desist from a vain and imprudent contest, but interceded personally with them in the streets. By about noon the Americans held all the points of vantage, and as evening approached, the firing died away. A fearful night ensued. It was dark and cold. No lights relieved the gloom. Wild mobs ran shouting through the streets, and the hoof-beats of American patrols resounded from square to square.[29.2]

Santa Anna, finding it impossible on the morning of the fourteenth to subsist his army at Guadalupe, had ordered the infantry and heavy guns to Querétaro under General Herrera, and proceeded with four small pieces and the cavalry to San Cristóbal, a point about fourteen miles northeast of the capital. After seeing the people of Mexico view with indifference his efforts of the previous day, he expected nothing of them; but on learning of the outbreak he marched back to Guadalupe, and at a late hour sent into Mexico a small force of cavalry and infantry to investigate and assist. This met Duncan's battery and retreated; but Santa Anna, assured that on the next day there would be a rising _en masse_, erected a breastwork at the Peralvillo garita on the north side of the town, and waited.[29.2]

As soon as day broke, gloomy and wet, the shooting was in fact resumed, at least in the northern quarters. But he soon perceived that no general movement was taking place, and again marched away. This disheartened the people still more; the efforts of the authorities influenced them greatly; and by the end of the afternoon, realizing that much was to be suffered and nothing gained, they generally abandoned hope. During the next day or two scattering shots could be heard, but real fighting was over. Extravagant hopes of destroying the small American army were still entertained by lightheaded men. "You will soon behold the banner of the haughty invader trailing in the dust," wrote one of these, and attempts were made by military officers to organize a real conspiracy; but lack of courage, means, confidence and mutual trust--as well as the watchfulness of the Americans--made success impossible. Scott repeatedly warned his troops to be vigilant and orderly, to keep together, and to refrain from drinking. As the danger grew less menacing, however, they became less careful, and for probably a month assassinations were frequent. From first to last several hundred Americans perished in the hostilities, and no doubt far more of the enemy. But by the middle of October the city was tranquil.[29.2]

The concluding field operations in Scott's department resembled for the most part the fighting just described, for they had to do chiefly with guerillas. That style of warfare suited the national character. It had figured prominently in the Spanish struggle against Napoleon and in the Mexican war of independence; and when the public began to see clearly that battles could not stop the Americans, it was invoked--even though by universal military practice in Europe those who robbed and fought at will, while pretending to be inoffensive, were considered brigands and assassins--as the one hope.[29.3]

Thoughtful persons like J. F. Ramírez and General Mora pointed out serious dangers: the impossibility of discipline, the relaxation of morale, the destruction of all standards, and the certainty that a spirit of violence and rapine would grow by what it fed upon; and they recognized the improbability that such methods could prevail against the strength, equipment, compactness and skill of the Americans. But the obvious advantages of the guerilla system, which it required far less intelligence to perceive and appreciate, counted powerfully on the other side. How much the Spanish themselves had suffered from their irregulars during the hostilities against Napoleon was not understood, and patriotic pride in the war of independence had tended to draw a veil over its horrors.[29.3]

The dagger, said the official newspaper, was the favorite weapon of the people. Unarmed men could burn wagons and intercept communications, it was pointed out. Even women and children could help. A thorough knowledge of the country, its mountains and its by-paths, would evidently constitute an enormous advantage. Light corps of the abstemious rancheros, embarrassed with no baggage, could travel quickly day and night, concentrate in large numbers against an American detachment, strike, vanish, and then, when least expected, reappear, making the most of all neglects, all mistakes, nullifying superior strength by avoiding it, and nullifying discipline by fighting in a style that had no need of discipline. Situated even more favorably than Spain for such warfare, the Mexicans were to outdo her example.[29.3]

This is what will save us, proclaimed in effect the legislature of México state. "Let the echo of our mountains repeat the cry of War and Liberty," exclaimed the congress of Vera Cruz. Santa Anna endorsed the plan. Salas organized the "Guerillas of Vengeance," which were to make "war without pity" "in every manner imaginable"; and in April, 1847, the government, pinning its faith to the system, set it on foot in earnest. Scott, the "cowardly tiger," was to be routed after all.[29.3]

[THE GUERILLAS OF THE NORTHEAST]

In the north February, 1847, was the golden month of the irregulars, for the approach of the Mexican army under Santa Anna encouraged the rancheros to lay aside the habits of peace. Canales boasted of 161 Americans killed that month, and Urrea with his combined force of regulars and guerillas, besides engaging in other operations, captured a train of wagons at Agua Negra, and horribly slaughtered a large number of guards and teamsters. To avenge this butchery a party of Rangers, teamsters and other civilians murdered twenty-four men in a village not far distant. Upon this Canales declared what he called martial law, announcing that every American, armed and unarmed, and every Mexican living peaceably would be shot; and many were led by fear or a lust for plunder to take up arms.[29.4]

The American trains in particular seemed likely to be easy prey. As they commonly stretched out for some two miles and were guarded only--for so the character of the road usually dictated--at the ends, the Mexicans, trained to charge at full speed through an ordinary thicket, could readily attack them from ambush at about the middle point, create a stampede, and do a great deal of mischief. Infantry could not pursue the guerillas with success, and the number of our mounted men was always comparatively small, for every Mexican ranchero had at least one smart pony. In September, 1847, a band even attacked Mier. Governor Aguirre of Coahuila exerted himself particularly to organize forces of this character, and not only alcaldes but priests aided the cause.[29.4]

The American leaders, however, pursuing a course that was now conciliatory, now severe, and in many instances technically unjust, succeeded in coping with a system that was itself unjust. Taylor levied on the people of Nuevo Léon a tax of $96,000, the estimated value of the goods destroyed at Agua Negra, but suspended it indefinitely, when representative authorities proved the substantial innocence of the population and begged for mercy. Cavalry patrols and detachments pursuing culprits fairly wore out their horses. Villages, if even suspected of harboring the "banditti," were burned. Contributions were imposed wherever connivance appeared probable. By April, 1847, Canales was in despair.[29.5]

Then Wool determined to stamp out the evil, and announced in July that any guerillas caught by him would be executed. In December, 1847, he issued his famous Order 11, which not only made the Mexican authorities and their towns responsible for all damages done, but required them to hunt down the "brigands." Aguirre attempted to retaliate, but in vain. The Americans had power enough to carry out threats, whereas he had not; and he admitted his failure. Besides, the mass of the population were indolent in mind as well as body, and looked upon submission as preferable to danger. In February, 1848, finding the guilty rancheros were anxious to give up the business, Wool enabled them to resume peaceful occupations by declaring an amnesty, and in the following May he stated that the country had never before been so free from highway robbery.[29.5]

[GUERILLAS IN VERA CRUZ STATE]

In the south, Vera Cruz, a state of mountains, gorges, thickets and forests threaded with blind paths, was the chief home of the guerilla, and it looked as if Scott's line of communication might be virtually destroyed. Not only many hardy, hot-blooded and unscrupulous natives, but a great many desperadoes hailing from Cuba were ready to enlist. After the fall of Vera Cruz, and still more after the battle of Cerro Gordo, a large number of regular officers, to say nothing of privates, could scarcely find bread, and some men, like the ex-divinity student, ex-Carlist, Jarauta--whose small, close beard, fierce black eyes, braided jacket, graceful cloak and gold-laced sombrero gave him a romantic air--had acquired in Spain a taste for this adventurous, reckless life; but a vastly greater number were prosaic felons, liberated from prison under a pledge to rob and murder. Nominally J. C. Rebolledo, a fine looking man of rather humane instincts, was the chief in this district, but the 800 or so persons belonging to many small bands, while occasionally acting more or less in concert, were mainly independent. The decree under which all goods coming from points occupied by the Americans were lawful booty opened possibilities of large gains, and Rebolledo's capture of ten loaded wagons in April, 1847, set the people aflame with cupidity.[29.6]