Chapter LXXI: Book XXXVII: , 32; Anquetil, I, 213 (2)

[1065] The Pope’s nuncio had pointed out to Philip II what a splendid achievement the overcoming of Geneva would be for Christendom. The scheme was an old one. See a letter of Pius IV to Francis II, June 14, 1560, in Raynaldus, XXXIV, 64, col. 2. The King, after some weeks of consideration, declared that he could not think of it; that even the duke of Savoy was against the project. (See Gachard, _Corresp. de Philippe II_, II, 552, and his _Les bibliothèques de Madrid et de l’Escurial_, 100.) On the political ambition of the duke of Savoy see _Rel. vén._, I, 453. He had made a treaty with Bern in 1565 (Collection Godefroy, XCIV, fol. 21). There are three excellent German monographs on Switzerland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: Planta, _Die Geschichte von Graubunden in ihren Hauptzügen_, Bern, 1892; _idem_, _Chronik der Familie von Planta_, Zurich, 1892; Salis-Soglio, _Die Familie von Salis_, Lincau-im-B., 1891. For a review of the last two see _English Historical Review_, VIII, 588.

[1066] See _Revue d’histoire diplomatique_, XIV (1900), 45-47.

[1067] “Mais le faisant, c’estoit remectre le feu et le glaive dans la France plus et plus cruel qu’ilz n’y ont esté.”—_Dépêches de M. Fourquevaux_ (March 15, 1567), I, 189.

[1068] I have given the figures of Mendoza, which probably is the strength of the forces when they arrived. The official roster is in the _Correspondencia_, No. CXXII.

[1069] “The front of every company by a new invention was flanked with fifteen supernumeraries, armed with musketoones, and rests wherein they laid the barrow that could not be managed by the hands. For before his time, such huge muskets as unmanageable were drawn upon carriages and only used at sieges, from whence being transmitted into the field, and those that carry them mixed with the lesser musketeers, they have been found extraordinarily serviceable in battle.”—Stapylton’s transl. of Strada, Book VI, 31.

Brantôme’s statement is more graphic: “Il fut luy le premier qui leur donna en main les gros mousquetz, et que l’on veid les premiers en guerre et parmy les compagnies; et n’en avions point veu encores parmy leurs bandes, lors que nous allasmes pour le secours de Malte; dont despuis nous en avons pris l’usage parmy nos bandes, mais avec de grandes difficultéz à y accoustumer nos soldats comme j’en parle au livre des couronnelz. Et ces mousquetz estonnzarent fort les Flamans, quand ilz les sentirent sonner à leurs oreilles; car ilz n’en avoient veu non plus que nous: et ceux qui les portoient les nommoit-on Mousquetaires; très bien appoinctéz et respectéz, jusques à avoir de grands et forts gojatz qui les leur portoient, et avoient quatre ducats de paye; et ne leur portoient qu’en cheminant par pays: mais quand ce venoit en une faction, ou marchans en battaille, ou entrans en garde ou en quelque ville, les prenoient. Et eussiez dict que c’estoient des princes, tant ils estoient rogues et marchoient arrogamment et de belle grace: et lors de quelque combat ou escarmouche, vous eussiez ouy crier ces mots par grand respect: _Salgan, salgan los mosqueteros! Afuera, afuera, adelante los mosqueteros!_ Soudain on leur faisoit place; et estoient respectéz, voire plus que capitaines pour lors, à cause de la nouveauté, ainsy que toute nouveauté plaist.”—Brantôme, _Vies des Grands Capitaines_: “Le Grand Duc d’Albe.”

[1070] Mendoza, _Comentarios_, II, chaps. i-iii. There is a French translation of this work by Loumier (Soc. de l’histoire de Belge), 2 vols., 1860.

[1071] “The duke arrived in the Low Countries offending none in his passage nor being himself offended by any one, though the French appeared in arms upon the marches of Burgundy and Colonel Tavannes by command from the French king with 4,000 foot and some troops were defence of course of the borders, ‘costed’ the Spanish army. Indeed I do not think that ever army marched so far and kept stricter rules of discipline, so that from Italy even to the Low Countries, not only no towns but not any cottage was forced or injured.”—Strada, VI, 31.

The only instance of plundering seems to have been in the case of the property of the prince of Orange in Burgundy (_C. S. P. For._, 1562, August 7, 1567). This discipline is all the more remarkable, considering the fact that there were fifteen hundred women with the army. “Lon a sceu le passaige du duc d’Albe et de sa trouppe; quon dict estre de six mille espaignolz et quinze cens femmes.”—Guyon to M. de Gordes, July 11, 1567. Cited by the duc d’Aumale, _Histoire des princes de Condé_, I, Appendix XVI.

[1072] Poulet, II, 183, December 25, 1566.

[1073] Morillon to Granvella, April 7, 1566: “Pas ce boult veult l’on gaigner le magistrat des villes et le peuple: que ne sera si facille comme l’on pense.”—Poulet, I, 203. The following is explicit: “Et dict encores plus que, s’il se fust joinct à la première lighe des seigneurs, la religion fust bien avant venue, car de là, dict-il, ‘tanquam ex fonte emanasse has undas,’ et que le Roy le doibt entendri ainse et y pourveoir avant toutte euvre, puisque de celle là est née la seconde de la religion.”—Poulet, II, 75. Cf. 118: “la première lighe et la secunde engendrée d’icelle.”—Granvella to Viglius, November 23, 1566. As late as May 9, 1567, it is called “la gentille ligue” (Poulet, II, 434). Granvella, in a letter to Philip in 1563, attributed the formation of the association to Count Hoorne (_Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 12). Noircarmes, who was better informed, makes Brederode the moving spirit of it (Poulet, II, 613, 614).

The Gueux even had a branch organization, though one historically different in origin, in Franche Comté, in the Confrérie de Ste. Barbe. The seigneurs of the house of Rye enjoyed high civil and ecclesiastical station in both Burgundies in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Marc and Claude François of Rye, father and son, were rivals and political enemies of the Perrenots—the family of Granvella and Chantonnay—and regarded them as upstarts. The Confrérie de Ste. Barbe was organized by them in Franche Comté on lines similar to the Gueux and had dealings with the latter—the members even wearing their emblem. Cardinal Granvella accused the seigneurs of Rye of aiming to establish Protestantism, in Franche Comté from Flanders. This probably was true but in a less degree. Protestant agitation was a means to an end, not an end in itself, it seems to me. If otherwise, such a _catholic_ title for the association is very singular. On the Confrérie de Ste. Barbe consult Poulet, I, 29; II, 44, 141. I am somewhat inclined to think that Tavanne’s Confraternity of the Holy Spirit in ducal Burgundy may not impossibly have been influenced by the Confrérie de Ste. Barbe in the adjoining county of Burgundy, for Tavannes had a long political conflict with the Parlement of Dôle in Franche-Comté (see Collection Godefroy, CCLVII, Nos. 22, 23), and was familiar with things there.

[1074] Poulet, I, 223.

[1075] _Ibid._, II, 269. This revised form of the Gueux in which Calvinism is interjected is often alluded to as the “second league” in the letters which pass between Granvella and the provost Morillon, e. g., _ibid._, 280, 437, 600.

[1076] Poulet, II, 42.

[1077] For some examples see _ibid._, 183.

[1078] This organization seems to have been perfected by February, 1567. Poulet, II, 244, has a brief note on this matter. For an extended article see _Bulletin historique et littéraire de la société de l’hist. du protestantisme Français_, March, 1879. Cf. Gachard, _Corresp. de Guill. le Taciturne_, II, cx, cxi, and notes. Marnix was treasurer-general of the confederation (Poulet, II, 262, n. 1).

[1079] Poulet, II, 335, 336, 396. “Sine qua factum nihil,” wrote the provost, whose conception of government was Draconian in simplicity, to his confidential friend (_ibid._, 353).

[1080] _Ibid._, 469 and 508.

[1081] _Ibid._, 396, 438.

[1082] See Gachard, _Corresp. de Philippe II_, 461, 471, 473; Poulet, I, 461, 521; II, 102, 106, 139, 143, 187, 394, 440, 451, 659, 675.

[1083] Morillon to Granvella, August 31, 1567, in Poulet, II, 605: “La première chose que l’on doibt faire sera de munir et asseurer les frontières et renvoier chascun à son gouvernement, d’aultant que les François semblent voulloir esmouvoir, du moingz les Hugonaux.” The cardinal had advised the duke of Alva to do this in the May preceding, when he was at Genoa on his way northward (Poulet, II, 448, 454).

Montluc’s repeated warnings to Philip II, in the course of their secret correspondence, of the succor French Calvinists were giving to his Flemish rebels (K. 1,506, Nos. 46-48) led the King to enlarge the system of espionage which he maintained in France. The movements of the admiral, the prince of Condé, and other leaders, were carefully reported (_Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, V, 75, note). On the whole practice see Forneron, I, chap. xi.

[1084] Mundt to Cecil from Strasburg, July 8, 1567 (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,418).

[1085] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, III, Introd., v.

[1086] Fourquevaux (July 17, 1567), I, 237. St. Sulpice had held similar language in 1564: “Le meilleur moyen pour le prince d’avoir la paix est d’être toujours en état de repousser ses voisins.”—_L’Ambassade de. St. Sulpice_, 269.

[1087] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,402, July 6, 1567. Sir Henry Norris writes to Cecil on March 25, 1567: “A better time than this could not be found to demand Calais, they being in such distrust of their own force, wherefore it might be understood that some preparation of arms was making in England.”—_Ibid._, No. 1,048. A year earlier than this Cecil had been advised to make common cause with the Emperor, the one to recover the Three Bishoprics, the other Calais (_ibid._, No. 326, April 29, 1566; cf. _ibid._, _Ven._, 394, July 3, 1567). There is a brief account of the negotiations in _Bulletins de la Comm. royale d’histoire_, séries IV, Vol. V, 386 ff. Cf. _C. S. P. For._ (1587), Nos. 1039, 1044, 1046, 1083.

[1088] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, III, Introd., iii; _C. S. P. Ven._, Nos. 389, May 16, 1567.

[1089] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, III, Introd., iv.

[1090] “The prince of Condé wrote to the queen mother against the king’s revoking the edict of pacification, who assured him on the faith of a princess that as long as she might prevail, she should never break it, and if he came to court, he would be as welcome as his heart could devise, and as for the _Swiss_ they were _to defend the frontiers_ in case the Spanish forces should attempt to surprise any peace.”—Norris to Queen Elizabeth, August 29, 1567, _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,644. Catherine de Medici ordered the dispersal of the Huguenot bands on the Picard border in 1567 (_R. Q. H._, January, 1899, p. 21).

[1091] The words are from a letter of Sir Henry Norris to the earl of Leicester in _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,537, July 21, 1567, and sound like a paraphrase of the admiral’s language. The implication is that Coligny’s withdrawal had some connection with the purported stealing of Alava’s cipher in the May before. See _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,230, May 24, 1567. But according to Fourquevaux, I, 227, the Spanish ambassador accused Catherine de Medici of the stealing, _not_ Coligny. If this be true, then Coligny must have wanted to find a pretext for leaving the court without arousing the suspicion or animosity of the King, as might have been the case if he had done so openly out of sympathy for the prince of Condé. Claude Haton, I, 406, says that Coligny was piqued because Strozzi was given the command of the new forces instead of himself. The prince of Condé retired to Valéry, Coligny to Châtillon. D’Andelot soon afterward followed suit, resigning his post as colonel-general of infantry on the ground that the marshal Cossé refused to obey his orders, and retired to Tanlay near Tonnerre. The fine château is still standing.

Thenceforward it was of interest to the prince to stir up doubt and distrust among the Huguenots by misrepresenting the true reasons for the crown’s military preparation (_Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, III, Introd., vi; _C. S. P. For._, _anno_ 1567, p. 305).

[1092] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,629, August 23, 1567.

[1093] Claude Haton, I, 405.

[1094] _C. S. P. Ven._, July 12, 1567.

[1095] La Popelinière, XI, 36, 37.

[1096] See Rosseeuw-Saint-Hilaire, “Le duc d’Albe en Flandre. Procès des comtes d’Egmont et de Hornes (1567-1568),” _Séances et travaux de l’Acad. des sc. moral et polit._, 4^[e] sér., XVI (LXVI^[e] de la collect.), 1863, p. 480.

[1097] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,155, May 1, 1567.

[1098] D’Aubigné, I, Book IV, chap. vii.

[1099] This château was a gift to the prince of Condé by the widow of marshal St. André, who was infatuated with him. After the prince’s second marriage she wedded Geoffrey de Caumont (Claude Haton, I, 363). See also Clément-Simon, _La Maréchale de Saint-André et ses filles_, Paris, 1896.

[1100] The rendezvous was at Rosay-en-Brie (La Popelinière, Book XII, 37; D’Aubigné, IV, chap, vii; Claude Haton, I, 424, 425).

[1101] The Venetian ambassador Correro, in his relation of the conspiracy, expresses astonishment that the secret of the Huguenot leaders did not leak out, and attributes the fact to the perfection of the Protestant organization (quoted by La Ferrière in _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, III, ix). It seems to me that this feature was less due to perfect organization than to the promptitude with which Condé and Coligny endeavored to carry out the project. The lesson of the conspiracy of Amboise seven years before could not have been lost upon them. Moreover, the queen mother did have some intimation, notwithstanding her surprise when the shock came. For on September 10, while the court was staying at Monceaux, some armed bands of horsemen were seen hovering around, which caused the King’s hasty removal to Meaux (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,683, September 13, 1567, Norris to Leicester). From that hour Catherine was on the alert, though she refused to attach alarmist importance to the signs she had seen until her eyes were opened.

[1102] Claude Haton, I, 434.

[1103] Zurlauben, _Hist. milit. des Suisses_, IV, 351; Laugel, “Les régimens suisses au service de France pendant les guerres, de religion,” _Revue des deux mondes_, November 15, 1880, pp. 332 ff. Pfiffer had served in France during the first civil war and was made a colonel after the battle of Dreux. There is a life of him in German by Segesser, _Ludwig Pfyffer und seine Zeit_, Bern, 1880. Other versions of this incident are in D’Aubigné, II, 230-32; Claude Haton, I, 428, 429; Castelnau, VI, chap. iv; De Thou, Book XLII; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 530. La Popelinière, XII, 38, 39, gives a good account of the behavior of the Swiss. The duke of Bouillon, an eye-witness of these incidents, has left a striking account in his _Mémoires_, ed. Petitot, 75.

[1104] For Charles IX’s own version of the affair of Meaux see a letter of the King to the baron de Gordes, begun at Meaux and finished at Paris, September 28, 1567, in Duc d’Aumale, _Histoire des princes de Condé_, I, Appendix XXII. His letter to Montluc of the same date is in _Archives de la Gironde_, X, 437.

[1105] _Rel. vén._, II, 187.

[1106] The Guises made capital out of the event of Meaux and sedulously exploited the King’s animosity. Martin, _Histoire de France_, IX, 216, suggests that Charles IX’s conduct on St. Bartholomew’s Day may have been influenced by this episode.

[1107] _Rel. vén._, II, 112, 113.

[1108] “Discipline of the Reformed Churches in France Received and Enacted by Their First National Synod at Paris in 1559,” chap. vii, canon 1, published in Quick, _Synodicon in Gallia_, 2 vols., London, 1692.

The first consistorial regulation which we possess has been published by the Protestant pastor, Eugene Arnaud, from a manuscript at Grenoble. It bears the title “Articles Polytiques par l’Eglise Réformée selon le S. Evangile, fait à Poitiers 1557.” See _Synode général de Poitiers 1557_, _Synodes provinciaux de Lyon, Die, Peyraud, Montelimar et Nîmes en 1561 et 1562_, _assemblée des Etats du Dauphiné en 1563_, _etc._, par E. Arnaud. Grenoble, ed. Allier, 1872, 91 pages.

At the synod of Lyons (1563) the canons of the three preceding national synods held at Paris, Poitiers, and Orleans, were reduced to a single series of articles. The deliberations of most of the provincial synods still remain in manuscript or are lost (Frossard, _Etude historique et bibliographique sur la discipline ecclésiastique des églises réformées de France_, 18).

[1109] Chap. vi, canon 1.

[1110] Chap. viii, canon 2. Chap. v, canon 1, provides that “a consistory shall be made up of those who govern it (the individual churches), to-wit, of its pastors and elders.” In some cases deacons discharged the elder’s office (chap. v, canon 2).

[1111] Chap. viii, canon 8. Elders were elected by the joint suffrage of pastor and people, upon oral nomination (chap. iii, canon 1).

[1112] Chap. viii, canon 9.

[1113] Chap. viii, canon 14.

[1114] Chap. viii, canon 15.

[1115] The synod of Nîmes in 1572 also divided Normandy into two provinces (_Synodicon in Gallia_, I, 111, 112). At the same time Metz was annexed to Champagne.

[1116] _Rel. vén._, II, 115, and n. B; _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, II, Book V, 338; L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 107; _Mémoires de Philippi_, 360, col. 1 (ed. Buchon); Collection Godefroy, CCLVII, No. 46; Claude Haton, I, 425.

[1117] The democratic revolutionary character of the Huguenot movement in Guyenne probably owes some of its intensity to the memory of the revolt of 1548 and the merciless suppression thereof (observation of M. Henri Hauser, _Rev. hist._, XCVII (March-April, 1908), 341, n. 6, a review of Courteault _Blaise de Montluc_).

[1118] “Temevano prima i cattolici, non perchè fossero inferiori di numero (che ... del popolo minuto non vi è la trigesima parte ugonotta; la nobilita è più infetta; e s’io dicessi di un terzo, forse non fallirei); ma perchè questi; sebben pochi, erano però uniti, concordi, e vigilantissimi nelle loro cose.”—_Rel. vén._, II, 120.

The Huguenots fired guns instead of ringing bells as a signal of alarm (_ibid._, 107). The _tocsin_, even before St. Bartholomew, was the Catholic signal.

[1119] _Rel. vén._, II, 115.

[1120] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, I, 552; Ranke, _Civil Wars and Monarchy in France_, 287; Forneron, _Les ducs de Guise_, II, 221; Anquetil, _Histoire des assemblées politiques des réformes de France_, I, 18.

[1121] Forneron, II, 164 ff.; _Hist. de Languedoc_, V, 543, 544; Armstrong, “The Political Theories of the Huguenots,” _English Historical Review_, IV, 13; Merriam, _History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau_, 13-15; Beaudrillart, _Jean Bodin et son temps_.

[1122] “Si le roy tenoit sa loy, le royaulme en seroit mieulx régy et gouverné, les antiens, qui ont tenu les concilles, ont bien regardé à cella quant ilz ont uny nostre foy avec la continuation de la monarchie des princes, car ilz ont bien poysé que le peuple, qui est gouverné sous ung monarque, est beaucoup plus assuré et tenu en la craincté de Dieu et à l’obéyssance qu’il doibt porter à son roy, que non celluy qui est soubz une républicque, en laquelle sa loy admene tout le monde et destruict les monarchies. Qui me voldra nyer que le roy prent ceste loy qu’il ne faille que sa personne mesmes et son royaulme soit régy et gouverné par les gens qui auront esté esleuz par les estatz, qui sera son conseil sans lequel le roy ne pourra faire chose aucune. Et s’il veult une chose et le conseil une aultre, le pays ne fera sinon ce que le conseil ordonnera, parce qu’il aura esté (esleu) par les estatz; et si le roy mesmes veult quelque chose pour luy ou pour aultre, fauldra que, le bonnet à la main, il le viegne demander à son conseil et les prier, là où en nostre loy il commende au conseil et à tous, tant que nous sommes. Que l’on regarde dès ceste genre ce que se faict en Angleterre et en Escosse, et si ce n’est plustost manière d’aristocracie ou de démocracie que non de monarchie. Et quand le roy sera grand, il voldra demander sa liberté, laquelle ne luy sera concédée et s’il faict semblant de la voloir avoir par force, son conseil mesmes luy couppera la guorge et feront un aultre roy à leur plaisir.”—_Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, IV, 297, 298 (December 1563). The baron de Ruble, in a note remarks: “Nulle part peut-être, pas même dans les écrits de François Hotman et de Bodin, les réformes politiques que promettait le calvinisme ne sont exposées avec autant de clarté que dans ce mémoire de Monluc.”

[1123] Paulet to Cecil, October 13, 1567; _C. S. P. Dom._, Add.

[1124] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 549. On September 29, 1567, permission was given the populace of Paris to arm themselves.—Lettres patentes du Roy Charles IX pour l’establissement des capitaines de la ville de Paris et permission aux citizens d’icelle de prendre les armes. Felibien, _Histoire de Paris_, III, 703, 704.

[1125] La Popelinière, XII, 39; Claude Haton, I, 439; La Noue, chap. xiv; _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,427, September 30, 1567. Norris gives the names of the towns taken by the prince of Condé’s forces.—_State Papers, Foreign_, Elizabeth, Vol. XCIV No. 1,338. See Appendix XI. According to Baschet, _La diplomatie vénitienne_, 543 and note, the prince of Condé planned to burn Paris.

[1126] La Popelinière, Book XII, 51, 51 _bis_. The slaughter at the bridge was terrible. The King’s captain and the color-bearer, who managed to escape to Paris, were hanged by Charles IX.—_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,804, November 2, 1567.

[1127] _Ibid._, No. 1,763, October 14, 1567.

[1128] Claude Haton, I, 444-46.

[1129] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 407, October 18, 1567.

[1130] Claude Haton, I, 439-45, and La Noue, chap. xvi, give some graphic details.

[1131] Claude Haton, I, 444, 445.

[1132] “Ordonnance du Roy, portant permission à toutes personnes, d’apporter, et faire apporter, conduire et amener à Paris, tant par eau que par terre, toutes espèces de vivres, bleds, vins et autres; sans payer pour iceux aucunes daces, subsides, ou imposition quelconques.”—Paris, R. Estienne, 1567.

[1133] “Lettre addressée aux échevins de Rouen par un de leurs délégués,” _Bulletin de la Société de l’histoire de Normandie_, 1875-80, p. 279. The whole letter is of interest.

[1134] Alva’s reply October 24, 1567, is in _Correspondance de Philippe II_, II, 594. Cf. Gachard, _La Bibliothèque Nationale à Paris_, I, 395; II, 459; and _Histoire des troubles des Pays-Bas_, ed. Piot, I, 293 (chap. xlvi).

[1135] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,789, October 27, 1567.

[1136] These demands were presented in writing to the queen’s emissaries. De Thou, Book XLII; Claude Haton, I, 447; D’Aubigné, II, 232-34, have summarized them. La Popelinière, Book XII, 41-43 gives the text. There is a monograph by Baguenault de Puchesse: _Jean de Morvillier, évêque d’Orléans: Etude sur la politique française au XVI^[e] siècle, d’après des documents inédits_, Didier, Paris, 1870.

[1137] La Popelinière, Book XII, 50 _bis_; _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,856, October 10, 1567.

[1138] Davila, I, 195.

[1139] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,777, October 22, 1567.

[1140] A list of officers and the number of horsemen commanded by each who were sent to the king of France by the duke of Savoy.—_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,735, September, 1567.

[1141] He wrote to Philip II, to Emanuel Philibert of Savoy, and the Venetian government urging them to succor Charles IX “against the rebels and heretics” within his kingdom, and to the duke of Lorraine to stop the reiters.—Potter, _Lettres de St. Pie V sur les affaires religieuses de son temps en France_, Paris, 1828. To Philip II, October 13, 1567—Potter, p. 1 (ed. Gouban, Book I, No. 22, p. 50); to the duke of Savoy, October 18, 1567—Potter, p. 8 (ed. Gouban, Book I, No. 25, p. 54); to Priuli, Venetian ambassador in France, October 18—Potter, p. 6 (ed. Gouban, Book I, No. 24, p. 53). At the same time the Pope wrote to the duke of Nevers in terms of rejoicing that Charles IX had escaped at Meaux.—Potter, p. 3 (ed. Gouban, Book I, No. 23, p. 51), October 16, 1567. Within a month the Pope’s word began to be made good, for 10,000 pieces of gold were en route to France in the middle of November.—Potter, p. 10 (ed. Gouban, Book I, No. 26, p. 56), letter to the duke of Savoy of November 16, 1567. In it the Pope says he has written the duke of Lorraine to stop the reiters about to enter France.

[1142] The question of payment of the Swiss still remained to be settled and Charles IX was at his wits’ end and actually offered a mortgage of his frontier towns, save Lyons and the frontier of Burgundy, paying 5 per cent. interest in order to quiet the importunate demands of the cantons.—_Revue d’histoire diplomatique_, XIV (1900), 49, 50.

[1143] Request of Charles IX to the bishop of Mainz to permit the reiters to pass, December 9, 1567.—Coll. Godefroy, CCLVI, No. 4. John Casimir, second son of the elector palatine, Frederick III, levied troops for the Protestants. When protest was made against this action, he gave an evasive reply. See Languet, _Epist. secr._, I, 27; _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, II, 163, 164; La Noue, ed. 1596, p. 897.

On the other hand the landgrave was hostile to the prince of Condé and was fearful also of compromising himself with the Emperor and Spain.—_Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 128, 164; Languet, _Epist. secr._, I, 35.

[1144] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,864, December 15, 1567.

[1145] This is shown by a passage in which the elector of Saxony makes mention of an alliance which the French nobles had offered (_Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 131, 134). Although the prince of Condé in December declared that he had not entered into a treaty with the Flemish Calvinists (_ibid._, 143), it is probable that these proposals were accepted some months later. There is in existence the minute of a treaty with Condé and Coligny dated August, 1568 (_ibid._, III, No. 321, p. 285).

[1146] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,756, October 10, 1567.

[1147] La Popelinière, XII, 52 _bis_; D’Aubigné II, 236. La Noue himself, with characteristic modesty, scarcely mentions this feat.

[1148] “Journal de Lépaulart relig. du monastère de Saint-Crepin-le-Grand de Soissons, sur la prise de cette ville par les Huguenots en 1567,” _Bull. d. Soc. arch._, XIV (Soissons, 1860).

[1149] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,804, November 2, 1567. Metz was captured late in October by the Huguenots, but not the citadel.

[1150] _Ibid._, No. 1,822, November 16, 1567.

[1151] La Popelinière, XII, 52.

[1152] On the identity and career of Robert Stuart, see Claude Haton, I, 458, n. 2.

[1153] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 410, November 11, 1567. Montmorency lingered two days and died on November 12.

[1154] There are accounts of the battle of St. Denis in La Noue, _Mémoires_, chap. xiv; _Mém. du duc de Bouillon_, 379; D’Aubigné, Book IV, chap. ix; Claude Haton, I, 457; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 551 ff. The editor has subjoined a note (2) giving the literature of the subject.

[1155] Claude Haton, I, 495; _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, III, Introd., xv.

The duke of Guise was criticized for not having pursued the Huguenots more hotly and cut the road by Charenton, or Corbeil, or at the ford of Lagny, which might have been done, for their army was in great disorder and depressed on account of the losses which it had suffered. The reason of the delay is probably to be found in the fact that the breach between the Guises and the Montmorencys was wider than ever at this moment. For the duke of Montpensier and the duke of Montmorency each claimed command of the vanguard. The King finally decided in favor of the former, whereupon Montmorency laid down his command. See Claude Haton, I, 461, 462 and note; _Bulletin de la Societé d’histoire de Normandie_, 1875-80, p. 279; _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,833, November 24; No. 1,837, November 29, 1567; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 557.

[1156] Claude Haton, I, 495 and note.

[1157] The admiral sent Teligny to the King on November 13 for this purpose.—_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,822, November 16, 1567; cf. No. 1,836. We know, from a letter of Charles IX to his brother, what the King’s terms would have been: (1) in the case of nobles, authorization of Protestant worship to those possessed of high justice or possessors of “pleins fiefs de haubert” i. e., fiefs that were noble, yet did not confer title, provided it were conducted within their own dwellings in the presence of their families and not more than fifty outside persons, and without arms; (2) absolute limitation of other worship to the places specifically granted in the edict of Amboise; (3) surrender of places and property seized by the Huguenots; (4) suppression of the Protestant cult within the walls of Lyons, but permission to worship at two leagues’ distance from the city; (5) interdiction of levies of money or men in the future and the discontinuance of Protestant associations and synods.—_Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd., xiv. It is a very remarkable fact that these precise terms had been recommended to Charles IX as a basis of settlement by Montluc in a memoir sent to the King in February 1565. See _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, V, 3-9. Montluc made the further recommendation that the governments be divided by _sénéchaussées_ instead of by rivers, on the ground that rivers sometimes divided towns into two jurisdictions. His friction with Damville (cf. _ibid._, 103-6) probably accounts for the proposed change. Montluc also advised abolition of the _vice-sénéchaux_ (_ibid._, 8).

[1158] See the proclamation of Charles IX commanding the provost Paris to search out all gentlemen who have retired to their homes since the battle of St. Denis; and ordering them to return to the army under pain of forfeiture of their fiefs and property. Printed in Appendix XII. In the second part of _Coll. de St. Pétersbourg_, Vol. XXI, is a group of letters from Charles IX to the duke of Anjou running from December 2, 1567. In every page the question of the military operations of the second civil war comes up. It is evident that the gentlemen of the _maison du roi_ complained loudly of the service required of them, especially because they were so ill lodged.—La Ferrière, _Deux ans de mission à St. Pétersbourg_, 24.

[1159] During the occupation of the army all Protestant children who had been baptized in the Reformed religion by preachers were rebaptized according to the rites of the Roman religion, and godfathers and godmothers were given them and new names which were approved by the church.—Claude Haton, I, 512 and note.

[1160] Claude Haton, I, 504-12.

[1161] On December 6 he published a declaration in favor of the Huguenots.—_Bulletin de la Société du prot. franç._ XVI, 118. See also _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,920, the elector to Charles IX, January 4, 1568.

[1162] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,911, from the camp at Dessay, January 3, 1568.

[1163] _Ibid._, No. 1,806, November 3, 1567; No. 1,864 § 2, December 15, 1567. His resolution to assist the Huguenots led to the dismissal of his ambassador at the French court on December 17th.—_Ibid._, No. 1,889. In _ibid._, No. 1,956 there is an abstract of a long letter of the elector palatine written to Charles IX in remonstrance of the action of the King, and in justification of his own course.

[1164] A meeting of the electors was called for January 6, 1568, at Fulda, ostensibly for the purpose of preventing German enrolments for the war in France, but in reality that the Emperor might broach the possibility of recovering the Three Bishoprics.—Mundt to Cecil, January 6, 1568 in _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,927. I cannot understand how Hubert Languet could have fallen into the error of thinking that the queen mother made no opposition to the enlistment of troops in Germany for the Huguenot cause, as he says in _Epp. Arc._, I, 43. The statement puzzled Ranke (p. 233) who left it unsolved. The dispatch of Norris in _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,864, December 15, 1567, to the effect that Lignerolles was sent to Germany by the queen for this purpose clears up the matter. Catherine’s correspondence fails us on this head. But it is well known that many of her letters are scattered in private collections and were not procurable by La Ferrière.

[1165] Alva had no flattering opinion of the cardinal of Lorraine. In 1572 he wrote to Philip II: “Quand en faveur il est insolent et ne se souvient de personne, tandis que, quand il est en disgrace, il n’est bon à rien.”—Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, II, 267.

[1166] Gachard, _ibid._, I, 593, 594, Alva to Philip, November 1, 1567. On the margin of this dispatch Philip wrote this piece of casuistry with his own hand: “Me parece muy bien que hiziese lo que aqui dice, y tanto mas que aquello no hera romper la paz, pues yo no la hizé, ni la tengo, sino con el rey de Francia, y no con sus vasallos ereges, como seria, si esto se hiziese no estando él libre, como aqui se dice.”

[1167] “En caso de muerte del rey y de sus hermanos, tomarse ya la voz que el cardinal dize de rey de Francia para V. M., por el derecho de la reyna nuestra señora; que la ley salica, que dizen, es baya, y las armas la allanarian” (_ibid._, 594).

[1168] “Esto es el punto en que me parece que ay mas que mirar, porqué esto se podria mal hazer sin romper; y por otra parte, parece que seria duro dexar de abrazar á quien por tal causa se pone en mys manos; y pues creo que por este caso avra tiempo, qu’él me avise de su parecer sobre ello, segun allá estubienen las cosas.”—Gachard, _loc. cit._

[1169] Philip II approved this.—Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe II_, I, 598: to Alva, November 12, 1567.

[1170] Gachard, I, 606-7, from Paris, December 4, 1567; _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, Letter CLII; _Correspondance de Philippe II_, I, 605-7. The queen mother seems to have been frightened after the battle of St. Denis for she disclaims blame in advance, “before God and all the Christian princes,” if, in default of help, she be forced to make peace with the prince of Condé. At about the same time, she also wrote to Philip II in the same strain (quoted in part by Forneron, I, 348 from K. 1,507, No. 29). I do not find that this letter has been printed.

[1171] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, 62.

[1172] Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, I, 608.

[1173] “Porqué seria mala burla yr á meter fuego en casa agena, començandose á arder la propria.”—_Ibid._, 597: Alva to Philip II, November 6, 1567.

[1174] It was à propos of Catherine de Medici’s weakness at this time that the marshal Vieilleville bluntly said to Charles IX.: “Ce n’est point Votre Majesté qui a gagné la bataille [of St. Denis]; encore moins le prince de Condé. C’est le roi d’Espagne.”—Weiss, _L’Espagne sous Philippe II_, I, 119.

[1175] On the military state of Sens at this time see Charles IX’s postscript to his mother’s letter to Fourquevaux of December 7 in _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, III, 89, note.

[1176] Norris, writing to Queen Elizabeth on December 15, in one place says, “the reiters are 4,000 with 4,000 lansquenets” (§2); later in the course of the same letter, which is a long one and probably the information of several days running, he says, “6,800 with 6,000 lansquenets” (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,864, December 15, 1567). This seems to be confirmed by another report from France, December 26, which says “the reiters who have arrived amount to 6,500 men” (_ibid._, No. 1,882).

[1177] _Ibid._, No. 1,864 §2, No. 1,882, December 15-26, 1567. The reiters came “with certain pieces of artillery and 700 or 800 empty wagons, trusting to be no greater losers by this dissension than by the last” (_ibid._, No. 1,864, §3. Norris to Elizabeth).

[1178] _Ibid._, No. 1,889, December 28, 1567; No. 1,911, January 3, 1568. In _ibid._, Nos. 1,976 and 2,011, the following is given as the strength of the two armies: “Army of the King, 20,600 horsemen and 10,000 Swiss footmen; the numbers of the other footmen are not set down. Condé’s army, footmen 13,000; horsemen 11,900 where of reiters 6,200”—January, 1568. List of the troops of the prince of Condé with their commanders, amounting in all to 15,000 or 16,000 foot, and 14,000 horse, exclusive of those in garrison or serving in other parts of France—February 15, 1568. Norris wrote in February, 1568: “The prince has crossed the Seine, and is at present nothing inferior in number to the King’s army in infantry, but they are not esteemed so good for battle by reason of the Switzers. He has 3,000 more cavalry than the king has.”—_Ibid._, No. 1,981.

[1179] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,864, §4, December 15, 1567. Names of the different noblemen commanding in the army of the King of France (_ibid._, No. 1,918, January 4, 1568). Letters-patent of Charles IX, dated December 16, 1567, ordered the exodus of all of the “pretended Reformed religion” from Paris and enjoined the seizure of all their benefices and lands, which were to be annexed to the crown property, and the sale of all the goods of such subjects (_ibid._, Nos. 1,877, 1,878, December 21-24, 1567). In January a supplementary order commanded the sale of all goods and movables of those with the prince of Condé, and the annexation of all their lands and hereditaments to the crown (_ibid._, 1,914, January 3, 1568)—decrees which “were not left unexecuted in any point to the utmost” (Norris to Cecil, _ibid._, No. 1,889, December 28, 1567, §1). Cf. Charles IX’s letters-patent of February 21, 1568, bidding that the houses and real property held by base tenure belonging to rebels shall be sold in the same manner as personal property (_ibid._, No. 2,200, February 21, 1568). The same sort of measures were practiced elsewhere. For instance, in Agen, Protestant merchants suffered confiscation of grain and wine to the amount of 1,014 livres, 7 sous (_Arch. Commun._, Agen, Reg. CC, 302).

[1180] The original letter of Charles IX, written from Paris, December 17, 1567 to the duke of Anjou, reciting the terms of peace to be presented to the prince of Condé was sold in Paris in 1845. The duke’s instructions were to renew hostilities if the terms were not accepted. In Coll. Godefroy, XCVI, No. 8, is the safe-conduct given to the cardinal Châtillon by the duke of Anjou. It is dated December 25, 1567.

[1181] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,890, January 4, 1568.

[1182] _Ibid._, No. 1,919, January 4, 1568.

[1183] Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, II, 7, to Alva, January 22, 1568.

[1184] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 430, September 11, 1568; “A Florentine merchant greatly esteemed by these majesties and very useful to them in money matters called upon me today and gave me information concerning the king’s inability from want of money to continue the war.” Account of the sums of money paid to the troops, native and foreign, in the French king’s service during the month of January 1568, amounting to 987,052 livres, or 116,646£ 9_s._ sterling. The amounts reduced from French to English money by Cecil (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,978, January 1568).

[1185] _Ibid._, No. 1,914, January 3, 1568. For an amusing instance see No. 1,670.

[1186] _Ibid._, No. 2,024, February 12, 1568.

[1187] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,024, §1, February 24, 1568.

[1188] “The King’s army, finding what disorder the want of a good head has bred hitherto, are now content to accept any, be it not a marshal of France. It is now said that Mons. de Tavannes shall be M. d’Anjou’s lieutenant” (_ibid._, No. 2,024, February 24, 1568).

[1189] Some of them were captured by the King’s forces in a skirmish near Châtillon between the duke of Nevers and Montgomery, and broken upon the wheel. The poor wretches under the torture compromised twenty-five others of the Guard, who on March 6 were also horribly put to death (_ibid._, No. 2,062, March 12, 1568). After the peace of Longjumeau the Scotch captains who had joined the prince of Condé were deprived of their commissions, although the action was contrary to the edict. In fact a reorganization of the whole _maison du roi_ was made (_ibid._, No. 2,135, April 18, No. 2,178, May 12, 1568). The vacancies were filled by Swiss instead (_ibid._, Nos. 1,981, 1,987, February 1 and 6, 1568), so that the famous Scotch Guard in the end became the King’s Swiss Guard, which lasted down to the Revolution.

[1190] _Ibid._, No. 1,981, February 1, 1568.

[1191] He was accused of having “pretermitted many fair occasions to have fought with the prince.”

[1192] _Ibid._, No. 2,024, §2, February 24, 1568.

[1193] Claude Haton, I, 498 and note; _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,833, November 24, 1567.

[1194] Claude Haton, I, 524.

[1195] These high prices were partly owing to the fact that speculators had bought up much of the grain, which rose in April to between 60 and 70 livres per muid. But in May, with the promise of a good harvest, the price dropped over one-half, from 15 sous tournois per bichet to 7 sous 6 deniers, to the great regret of the merchants who had counted upon a scarcity. On the other hand, the price of oats went higher, being sold at from 10 to 12 sous per bichet, or boisseau, for there was very little to be had after the passage of the troops; and because it ripened earlier, almost all of it was taken (Claude Haton, II, 523).

[1196] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,024, February 24, 1568.

[1197] So ominous was the temper of the Parisians that even the minor gates of the Louvre were equipped with drawbridges (_ibid._, No. 2,040, §4, March 1, 1568). Part of the indignation of Paris was due to the outrages of some reiters in the King’s army from Luxembourg and Lorraine, who robbed priests and despoiled churches, notwithstanding that they were in Catholic service, so much so that “the Parisians had rather had the prince of Condé’s people should approach Paris as they” (_ibid._, Nos. 2,040, 2,041, March 1, 1568).

[1198] _Rel. vén._, II, 145.

[1199] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,040, §3, March 1, 1568.

[1200] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, III, 136. La Rochelle was already the Huguenots’ most important point and already large supplies of gunpowder and ammunition, chiefly from England, were being brought in there (cf. the captain of La Rochelle to Queen Elizabeth, _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,057, March 10, 1568). La Popelinière, XII, 68-70, has a dissertation upon the history and institutions of La Rochelle.

The peace of Longjumeau put an end to Montluc’s plan for the seizure of La Rochelle, for which he had received the King’s sanction in February. See the documents in F. Fr. 15,544, fol. 187; 15,548, foll. 163 ff.

[1201] In the controversy between the count palatine and the King the former had asked that the word “perpetual” be inserted in the edict, so that the edict might not be revoked at will (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,968, 1567-68).

[1202] The balance was to be paid in two instalments at Frankfurt (_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,135, April 18, 1568). All gifts and pensions were revoked until the debt was paid (_ibid._, No. 2,248, June 4, 1568). In Coll. Godefroy, CCLVII, Nos. 35, 41-43 are a number of documents dealing with the pay of the reiters at this time. The whole sum required for the reiters was 1,440,000 livres, and the government at once set to work to collect it. The first collection seems to have been a sort of _don patriotique_ made by a house-to-house visitation, showing how pressing was the necessity. The government tried to borrow the money which John Casimir had raised for the Protestants, but which was not used on account of the peace, and offered to pay 16 per cent. interest for it (_C. S. P. For._, March 28, 1568). On March 23 the King issued letters patent forbidding all notaries and others receiving any contract for annuities or mortgages before the sum of 1,400,000 livres _tournois_ had been raised (_ibid._, No. 2,085). The duke of Alva was in a state of great anxiety for fear lest the reiters would come into the Netherlands and thought he discovered a plot to throw St. Omer into their hands (_ibid._, No. 2,230, April 25, 1568).

All the records abound with allusions to the rapacity of the reiters: “La nazione tedesca, nazione avara” (_Rel. vén._, II, 125 and notes).

“Les reîtres trouvaient beaucoup meilleur l’argent qu’on leur promettait d’Angleterre que les cidres de Normandie.”—La Noue.

“L’importunità dei Tedeschi che mai cessavano de domandare donazioni o paghe.”—Davila, I, 137.

“Ils consommeraient un gouffre d’argent—Facheux, avares, importuns.”—Brantôme, III, 196, 310.

[1203] But restricted as they were, the terms yet mightily offended the Guises, especially the cardinal of Lorraine who “did marvellously storm that the king would condescend to any peace with his subjects, whereat the king said he would agree thereto ‘maugre luy.’” (On the entire negotiations see _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,025, Feb. 24; Nos. 2,040-41, March 1-4; No. 2,054, March 9; Nos. 2,057, 2,058, March 10-11; No. 2,092, March 27, 1568). The final draft was completed on March 23; the edict was signed by Charles IX on March 26. It was published at Paris on the next day (_ibid._, Nos. 2,092-93).

[1204] _Ibid._, No. 2,058, March 11, 1568. Granvella expressed fear of universal famine in France, followed by the plague (Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe II_, II, 17).

[1205] The preachers and the doctors in Paris in their sermons decried the King and his Council (Claude Haton, II, 527 and note; cf. _ibid._, 531; _Rel. vén._, II, 121).

[1206] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,273, June 17, 1568; _Hist. du Languedoc_, V, 482 ff.; _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, V, 18, 88, 142, 156; D’Aubigné, Book IV, chaps. xii-xiv.

[1207] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 2,115, 2,135, April 8-10, 1568.

[1208] _Hist. du Languedoc_, V, 441.

[1209] For details see _ibid._, 443-64.

[1210] Montluc even ascribed the ravages of the plague to Damville in order to create popular prejudice against him! (_Hist. du Languedoc_, V, 449). His own words are: “Pour se montrer au peuple, qui avoit une marvelleuse envie de le voir, n’y pouvant arrêter à cause de la grande peste qui y est.” (Cf. his letters to Damville, December 31, 1567, and August 26, 1569, in _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, V, 103 and 159.) Montluc was doubly incensed at this moment because the peace of Longjumeau canceled orders which he had received in February to attempt to take La Rochelle by sea (_ibid._, VII, 148 ff.; V, 107 note, 109 note, 184 note).

[1211] _Bulletin de la Soc. acad. du Var_, 1876.

[1212] Claude Haton, II, 525. He repeats at different times the current play upon words which designated these free-booting nobles as “gens-pille-hommes” (gentilhommes). In general, in his estimation, the nobility had much degenerated. See Vol. I, Introd., p. lxii.

[1213] Volunteer bands of searchers visited Huguenot houses, to inquire into their faith (_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,191, May 17, 1568). At the court, certain of the nobles promised Charles to assure for all members of their retinue to be good Catholics (_ibid._, Nos. 2,191, 2,235, 2,236, 2,243, 2,248, May 17 to June 4, 1568).

[1214] “D’Anjou has marvellously stomached these dealings, and has kept his chamber, having uttered most despiteful words against them of the religion, saying that he hoped to march upon their bellies” (_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,177, May 12, 1568).

[1215] _Ibid._, No. 2,115, §1, April 8, 1568.

[1216] See the revelations of Norris to Cecil in _ibid._, No. 2,100, March 30, 1568. As earnest of the royal purpose the marshal Montmorency set at once about disarming the people of Paris.

[1217] _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, V, 22, 23.

[1218] Probably neither the cardinal nor Montluc knew that the other had been in secret correspondence with Philip II. Knowing Philip’s methods, it is likely that he kept them in ignorance of it. This was his way (cf. Forneron, I, 327).

[1219] Ruble, _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, IV, 328, 329, letter of March 5, 1564.

[1220] _Ibid._, V, 76, 77 and notes.

[1221] _Ibid._, V, 145.

[1222] Cited by Forneron, _Histoire de Philippe II_, I, 327.

[1223] The ordinance of Moulins specifically alluded to the growing popular nature of these confraternities: “Qu’on abolisse entièrement les confréries établies sous prétexte de religion parmi le _petit_ peuple, les festins, les répas, les bâtons (bâtons de Confrérie, qui servent à porter aux confréries l’Image de quelque saint, ou la représentation de quelque mystère) et autres choses semblables, qui donnent lieu à la superstition, aux troubles, à la débauche, aux querelles, et aux monopoles” (De Thou, V, Book XXXIX, p. 183, in the article prohibiting them). But it was as impossible then as now to enforce a law in the face of a public opinion which did not sympathize with the provision. Public opinion not merely favored their formation; the very officers of the crown promoted their organization. La Popelinière, XI, 12, makes this point.

[1224] “Discorso sopra gli umori di Francia di M^[r]. Nazaret, 1570,” Barberini Library 3,269, fol. 63. See Appendix XIII.

[1225] D’Aubigné, III, 2.

[1226] _Mémoires de Tavannes_, ed. Michaud and Poujoulat, séries I, VIII, 288, 289; Pasquier, Book IV, letter 23; Collection Trémont, Nos. 1,367, 1,382; cf. La Popelinière, XI, 7-12; Pingaud, _Les Saulx-Tavannes_, p. 61.

[1227] _State Papers, Foreign_, Elizabeth, XCVII, No. 1,711. A printed pamphlet. See Appendix XIV.

[1228] Raynal, _Histoire du Berry_, IV, 79-83. The text of the act is found in Thauvessière’s _Histoire du Berry_, 189.

[1229] The text is given in Claude Haton, II, 1152. Cf. Vicomte de Meaux, _Luttes religieuses en France_, 177, 178; Capefigue, _La réforme et la ligue_, 360.

[1230] Feret, _Clermont-en-Beauvaisis pendant les troubles de la ligue_, Clermont, 1853.

[1231] _State Papers, Foreign_, Elizabeth, C, No. 1,863. See Appendix XV.

[1232] _Hist. du Languedoc_, XI, 509-10 and XII; _Preuves_, No. 300, p. cxiii; _Cabinet historique_, II, 217. This league was much more formal in its organization than any of the others. In addition to securing the authorization of the Parlement, the leaders had secured the sanction of Pius V in the March _preceding_. The bull was granted March 15.

[1233] _Cabinet historique_, II, 219.

[1234] Bordenave, _Hist. de Béarn et de Navarre_, 139-45. I venture to suggest the cardinal of Lorraine as a possible instigator, from Bordenave’s words: “quelques autres ... sollicitez par quelques uns des _principaux du conseil_ de France.” Philip II threw new troops into Spanish Navarre at this time, either in consequence of Jeanne d’Albret’s energetic action or to co-operate with the league, if it were successful. Fourquevaux ascertained the fact, but was in the dark as to the reason for it (_Dépêches de Fourquevaux_, II, 25, November, 1568).

[1235] A letter of Coligny, July 29, 1568, shows that the Huguenot leader was aware of the formation of these provincial leagues. After complaining of the assassination of one of D’Andelot’s lieutenants, he protests against the general violence: “Ce que faict croire que ce sont des fruictz et offices des confraires du Saint-Esprit et sainctes ligues qu’ils appellent; mais si on voit que infiniz meurtres et massacres qui se sont faictz avec une effrénée licence en tous les endroictz de ce royaume depuys la paciffication il n’en ayt esté faict aucune justice ou chastiment, quelque déclaration que Vostre Majesté ayt faicte de sa volonté et intention, je n’en espère pas davantage de cestuy-cy, estant bien facile à cognoistre que ce sont choses projectées et délibérées avec les gouverneurs des provinces, et que cela ne se faict poinct sans adveu ou pour le moins sans un tacite consentement.”—_Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, III, 163, note.

[1236] Montmorency continually threw his influence in favor of peace and moderation, slapping the Guises, however, in his utterances. “The Duke Montmorency said there was nothing more necessary for the maintenance of the king’s estate than the sincere observance of the edict of pacification, and such as labour to the contrary are neither friends to the king nor his crown; and for his own part if the king did not foresee in time with due execution of justice this growing mischief, he was resolved with his leave to depart the court with his friends and allies, and so to withdraw himself from such as under the pretext of maintenance of their religion, continually nourished this division, and in the end put out the glory and renown of the French empire.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,177, §1, May 12, 1568.

On June 17 Norris wrote to Cecil: “Montmorency has come to the court. The process between him and the duke of Guise for the county of Dammartin will in the end break into open enmity.”—_Ibid._, No. 2,273.

[1237] “The four marshals agree all in one against the Cardinal.”—_Ibid._, No. 2,235, May 31, 1568.