Chapter XIII: Front Matter (13)

Mr. J. RANDOLPH expressed his regret that the attempt which he had made yesterday to reply to the very personal allusions of a gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. GRISWOLD,) whom he was sorry not to see in his place, had, by the adjournment, proved abortive. Such was his regard for the opinions of the House, that he should always, when called upon from a respectable quarter, justify any conduct which he deemed it proper to pursue in its deliberations. He felt it due to the respect in which he held the Chair and those around it, to reply to the remarks of the gentleman from Connecticut, and this consideration alone could have induced him to offer any thing in addition to what he had already advanced in favor of the motion. He should otherwise have left the resolution to its fate. In that fate he did not feel himself personally implicated. If it should be rejected, he would be satisfied in having done his duty, and the House, he supposed, would feel equally satisfied in having discharged theirs. It was asked, where was the mover of this resolution at the time when the alleged misconduct took place? Did it not, said the gentleman, pass under their own eyes? Were not their deliberations held on the very spot? and why had the motion slept until this day? He hoped he should be permitted to say that it did not pass under his eyes; although he knew, at the time of the condemnation in question, he did not become acquainted with the circumstances under which it took place until long after their occurrence. It was true that the deliberations of Congress were then held in Philadelphia, the scene of this alleged iniquity, but, with other members he was employed in discharging his duties to his constituents, not in witnessing, in any court, the triumph of his principles. He could not have been so employed. It would be recollected, that the information given by the gentleman from Pennsylvania formed the groundwork of his proceedings, and he asked whether it was more the duty of the mover of the resolution to have brought it forward than every other member of the House who was a witness of the statement made by that gentleman? This information, of an official nature, given by a member in his place, of a transaction in open court, and which it was the duty of them all to have noticed, had been called a story related on hearsay; a rumor of an affair which had happened in a corner; and the House was asked if they would take such evidence as ground of proceeding, on the _dictum_ of any one member, however great their confidence in him might be? If he really felt that respect for the House which the gentleman from Connecticut had professed, he would not have insulted their understandings by such language. He would not have stood up, as _amicus curiæ_, to prevent their being precipitated into absurdity and injustice by an influential member of their body. That, however, was the station which the gentleman had assumed, and he hoped the duties of it would be discharged with the fidelity which they required. After clothing himself with this character, Mr. R. said he expected to have seen him at his post--he regretted that he did not see him there, and that his duty did not permit him to withhold the observations which he was compelled to make. Whilst, however, the gentleman was engaged in discharging the new and important function with which he stood self-invested, he seemed cautious of replying to the masterly statement of his venerable friend from Pennsylvania, and which he believed had remained unanswered because it was unanswerable. It must, said Mr. R., be a subject of high gratification to us all, and I congratulate this House upon it, that age has not yet dimmed the lustre of those talents which have so long presided in the councils of this country. And if the time shall come when we are to resign our understandings, and place ourselves under the direction of an individual, I hope to be permitted to range myself under the banners of that tried patriot, and not under those of the gentleman from Connecticut. In the same spirit with which he challenged the confidence of the House, as a friend unwilling to see them led into error and absurdity, that gentleman had endeavored to alarm their pride by representing the motion as a demand made upon them. It was so. It was (if he might so express it) a writ of right, not of favor--and as such he demanded it, as such he urged it. But an objection was taken that no act of misconduct had been alleged. With his friend from Maryland he would say, that a fact of the first importance had been adduced, on which he was sorry his friend had not dwelled longer. It could not receive too much attention. On a trial for life and death, the jury, who were the constitutional judges both of the law and fact, were deprived of the right of a discussion of the point of law, “what constitutes treason?” The rights of the jury and of the accused were equally invaded. It was conduct not dissimilar to this, in a case of libel, which drew forth from the English Parliament the famous declaratory bill of Mr. Fox. Lord Mansfield had laid down the doctrine that the jury had a right to decide only upon the bare facts of printing and publishing, and not upon the question of guilt, which was compounded of the law and the fact. This produced the declaratory act which passed a strong censure on the practices of courts--since it did not amend or alter the law, but declared what the law was--and established the point resisted by the court, that the jury was the judge both of the fact and of the law. If, then, on a question of criminal law, where the punishment was only fine and imprisonment, the conduct of a judge was deemed highly reprehensible in encroaching upon the rights of the jury, what shall we say of him who usurps those rights in a case of life and death, in a case of treason? This denial to the prisoner and the jury of the right of having the point of law discussed, seemed to be the first step towards assuming those powers in cases of treason, the exercise of which, in cases of libel, had drawn down upon the English courts the censure of their Parliament. Would the gentleman say this was nothing? Would he affirm that if a man were under trial for murder, the court would be justified in saying to his counsel, You may, if you can, disprove the fact with which the prisoner stands charged, but you shall not endeavor to show that it does not amount to the crime with which he stands charged? If you admit the killing, you shall not argue the point that such killing does not constitute murder. Would the gentleman contend that treason is better defined than murder? What is murder? Killing with malice aforethought; can any definition be clearer? What is burglary? Breaking in during the night. What is treason? The constitution defines it as levying war against the United States; adhering to their enemies; giving them aid and comfort. But what had definitions to do with the case? Because murder was defined, had counsel ever been stopped in an attempt to show that the killing with which their client stood charged was not a killing with prepensive malice, a killing which constituted murder? What was more common than to see the facts admitted, and the crime not only denied, but disproved to the satisfaction of the jury; and upon what principle shall counsel be arrested in the attempt to show that the facts charged in an indictment for treason do not amount to such a levying of war, or an adherence or aid to such enemies as would constitute treason? Mr. R. said that the fact mentioned by the gentleman from Pennsylvania was of a remarkable nature. He had never heard of a similar proceeding, and he rejoiced that another instance of so black a nature could not probably be furnished by any tribunal in this country.

The gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. DENNIS,) however, had entirely abandoned the ground taken by his friend. He agrees that there is a charge of an important nature exhibited, and if it was incorporated into the resolution, and the inquiry confined to that subject only, he would vote for it. The object of the one gentleman was only to confine the inquiry, whilst that of his friend was to deny it altogether. He could not thank the gentleman for his liberality. He would have what he asked or nothing. He would never consent to confine the inquiry; if it could not be full and free, let it be denied.

The gentleman from Maryland had, with very little dexterity, endeavored to confound the resolution of inquiry with the articles of impeachment which may follow from it, and said that if the House would consent to confine the inquiry to any particular charge he would vote for it. It was true that after articles of impeachment should have been exhibited against the accused, the House would not be permitted to prefer any new accusation, or to adduce testimony to prove any guilt other than that which was charged in those articles. In the same manner as when a criminal was indicted, evidence would not be suffered to be brought forward to prove any act of criminality not contained in some one of the counts of the indictment. But would gentlemen persist in confounding things so entirely different, as to confine an incipient inquiry by the same rigid rules which would govern a criminal trial? It was trifling with the judgment of the House. The gentleman was eager for inquiring, but the charge must be incorporated into the resolution, and the inquiry confined to a specific point, before he could be brought to consent to it. Whatever other misdemeanors might come to the knowledge of the committee in the course of the investigation, he would not agree to have them reported to the House. And at the same time he told them of the struggle between his inclination and his sense of duty--his inclination as a friend of the accused to grant the inquiry, his duty as a member of the House and a friend of justice to refuse it. Mr. R. was sorry to find the gentleman in this awkward predicament; he regretted that it was out of his power to gratify him by narrowing the inquiry. This his duty would not suffer him to do. He hoped, however, the strength of the gentleman’s constitution would carry him through the arduous struggle in which he was involved, by his wishes on the one hand, and his principles on the other.

Whilst so much was said on the subject of precedent, he hoped he might offer a few cases to their consideration. He did not come to the House armed with precedents. Neither his health nor leisure permitted him to search for them. Gentlemen of greater industry, and who attached more importance to them than himself, had furnished him with them. For his part he thought precedents had nothing to do with the case, but for the sake of those who thought differently, he would show the course which he advocated was not destitute even of their support. Here Mr. R. referred to Mr. Hatsell’s precedents. “On the 21st of April, 1626, Mr. Glanvylee, from the select committee appointed to consider of the charges against the Duke of Buckingham, reports that they desire the House will resolve whether common fame is a ground for this House to proceed upon?” It is resolved to consider this the next day. After a long debate the House resolve that, “common fame is good ground of proceeding of this House, either to inquire of here, or to transmit the complaint, if the House find cause, to the King or Lords.”

Mr. R. begged to call the attention of the House to the opinion of a gentleman, delivered during the debate, to which he must be permitted to attach more importance than to that of the gentleman from Connecticut. When he mentioned the name of Selden, he believed he should stand justified in the opinion of the gentleman himself, and in that of his warmest admirers. “These cases (said Mr. Selden) are to be ruled by the law of Parliament and not by the common or civil law.” Mr. Littleton says, “this is not a House for definitive judgment, but for information, denunciation, or presentment, for which common fame is sufficient.” Mr. Noy says, “There are two questions--first, Whether a common fame? Second, Whether this fame be true? We will not transmit without the first inquiry: but without the second we may; for peradventure we cannot come by the witnesses; as if the witnesses be in the Lords’ House.”

Again, on the 16th October, 1667, the House being informed “that there have been some innovations of late in the trials of men for their lives and deaths, and in some particular cases restraints have been put upon juries, the matter is referred to a committee.” This case (Mr. R. said) was precisely in point. “On the 18th of November, this committee are empowered ‘to receive information against the Lord Chief Justice Keeling, for any other misdemeanors besides those concerning juries.’” Thus on a particular fact, innovation in trials for life and death, a committee was raised, and yet they were not confined to the examination of that single charge, but empowered to inquire generally into the misconduct of the judge. A stronger or more pointed precedent could not be conceived.

By the constitution, Mr. Randolph said, that House was vested with the sole power of impeachment. How this power was to be exercised must depend on their discretion, and on no other law or principle whatever: for “these cases are not to be ruled by the common or civil law, but by the law of Parliament.” That law of Parliament it remained with them to establish. It could not be matter of surprise that he, one of the leading principles of whose politics it was to support the weight of that branch of the Government, and to be jealous of executive influence--it could not surprise any one, that he should exert himself in behalf of the constitutional rights of that House. When he saw the importance which was attached to precedent, he was more than ever solicitous for that which they were then about to establish. He trusted that they would not consent to abridge the power with which the constitution had invested them--to reduce it below the standard which the English House of Commons had fixed as the measure of their own power in similar cases. A time might come when a wicked President and his flagitious ministers might so conduct themselves in office, as to make every man regret the proceedings of that day, in case they should suffer their power to sleep. The refusing to exercise it, then, would hereafter be adduced as a denial of its existence. Such might be the circumstances of the times, that no private man would dare to step forward with a specific charge against the Executive. If they should deny an inquiry without a specific charge, they would do all in their power to screen such a President and such ministers at a future day. It had been remarked that, in this government, an officer found guilty, on an impeachment, could not be punished capitally. The sentence could only remove him from office, and disqualify him, for ever after, from holding one under the United States. If, in a country where the accused may be brought to the block, free, unfettered inquiry is warranted against any rank however exalted--would it be denied here, where the punishment was comparatively light? Should they hold the other departments of the Government more inviolable than they were considered even in England? Would they afford to a criminal, Executive or Judiciary, a shelter denied by the law of that government? He hoped they would not. He trusted that they would give an example of their readiness to bring every offender to justice, however great might be his station.

Mr. GRIFFIN.--I had hoped that no subject would have been agitated during this session which should have interrupted the tranquillity or disturbed the harmony of this House, so necessary to the faithful and correct discharge of our public duties; but, sir, I perceive, from the turn which the debate upon the resolution now before the House has taken, that sensations have been excited which I fear it will be difficult to allay.

The proposition now before the House, nursed with so much secrecy, and forced on us so suddenly and unexpectedly, comes in such a questionable shape, that I must beg the attention of the House for a few moments while “I speak to it.”

What, sir, does the resolution demand of us? That a committee be appointed to inquire into the official conduct of Samuel Chase and Richard Peters, &c. But how is this inquiry to be conducted? Are there any data by which the committee are to be guided? Is there any specific charge to which their attention or inquiries are to be directed? None. And who, sir, before this enlightened day ever heard of a committee of inquiry being raised, without possession of a single subject to direct or guide the inquiry? What, sir, erect an inquiring committee vested with all the rights of a Star Chamber, and yet assign them no specific objects of their duty! But, sir, the official conduct of these judges has given offence--and are we now, sir, to probe and search the whole judicial lives of these gentlemen, for causes of complaint and censure? Are the records of the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania now to be ransacked, for evidences of their guilt and cause of impeachment? I never have and never shall deny the right of this House to inquire into the conduct of public officers--but, sir, if the honorable mover of the resolution is serious----

[Here Mr. RANDOLPH interrupted, and desired the gentleman to explain his meaning by the word serious.]

Mr. GRIFFIN continued. I will answer the gentleman: my meaning is, that if the gentleman believes there are just grounds for impeachment--if he is in possession of information or facts, let him declare them, and if they appear to my mind to be sufficient whereon to ground an impeachment, let him demand it and I will join with him. Let him specify the instances of malfeasance of which these judges have been guilty, and I will unite with him--let him declare the malconduct of these public functionaries, and I will cordially co-operate with him. If these judges have travelled beyond the line of their duty, if they have wantonly exceeded the limits of their power, I will aid in the infliction of such punishment as they may merit; but, sir, I cannot, I will not, in this indirect manner, wound the feelings or censure the characters of men, holding high responsible offices under your Government. Could I induce myself to believe that the course now proposed to be pursued is correct, I will gladly give it my assent; but for reasons very different from those the advocates of this measure adduce: could I deem it correct, I would support the resolution because I believe the characters implicated therein will safely pass the ordeal preparing for them, and that the inquiry will redound to their honor. I would cheerfully support the resolution, because, by the impeachment which I predict will follow, an opportunity will be offered to remove the load of unmerited calumny under which the Federal Judiciary of the United States have too long labored, and with which our public prints have been long filled. But the course is incorrect--the measure in its present shape appears to me to be fraught with incalculable mischief to our country, and I never will assist in the establishment of a precedent which may at some future day be made an engine of persecution, as “wicked as intolerant.” Mr. Speaker, let me ask of you, sir, to remember the consequences which may flow from the adoption of this resolution--let me conjure this House to reflect upon the dreadful effects which must arise to us, if, upon the bare assertion of a single gentleman, unsupported by any direct allegation, a committee of this nature shall be raised, a precedent of this kind established, what public character will be safe? nay, sir, how soon may not we ourselves feel its baneful influence? Far be it from me, sir, to impute to the honorable mover of the resolution any impurity of motives. I believe his conduct has proceeded from a consciousness of duty, and from a similar consciousness of duty I must oppose the measure. I cannot deny the power of this House to adopt the resolution upon your table, but I beg of you to pause ere you take the fatal step, and do not, because “dressed with a little brief authority, play such fantastic tricks before high heaven as make e’en angels weep.”

Sir, I have endeavored to discharge what I conceived to be my duty upon this occasion, and when experience shall fatally convince us of the dreadful effects of the precedent we are now about to establish, I shall derive consolation from the reflection, that I lent my feeble aid to check the overwhelming torrent.

Mr. EUSTIS said, he did not view this subject in the same light with the gentleman last up; he did not see those awful consequences which he had pointed out. He hoped the time would never come, when an inquiry into the conduct of an officer of the Government should be deemed a subject of alarm in that House. It was the first principle of the constitution, that every man was amenable to the constitution and laws of his country; and however elevated any one might be, that he could not be raised above the reach of inquiry. The observations of the gentleman who had last spoken, and of others who had preceded him, were predicated on a principle that was not correct. If the resolution on the table was to impeach the judge, those observations would be relevant, but they were incorrect on the preliminary motion to inquire.

In making up, said Mr. E., my judgment on this subject, I have endeavored altogether to avoid the inquiry, whether the officer implicated in this resolution, has so conducted himself as to require impeachment by this House. I have not accepted the opinion of the mover of the resolution, and I have excluded all the other information adduced in the debate; because I consider it as alone applicable to the question of impeachment, which is not now before the House. The question before the House is a very different one, and, in my opinion, it is plain and simple. What is it? It is that a committee be raised to inquire into the official conduct of a certain public officer. When a member of this House, under the obligations of honor, and the additional obligations of an oath, rises and takes upon himself the responsibility of moving an inquiry into the official conduct of a public officer, which can only be effected in virtue of the impeaching power of this House, which power it exclusively possesses, I view the request for an inquiry in the nature of an information laid before the House as the grand inquest of the nation.

When this proposition was made, the mind of every gentleman was naturally cast about for the situation of the officers in question. If it shall be the opinion of the House that their conduct is such as to afford grounds for an impeachment, it will be granted that it is an indispensable duty to make the inquiry. If, on the other hand, the House are of opinion that no testimony can be produced which will lead to an impeachment, then it is due to the officers to institute an inquiry. The object of an inquiry is two-fold--arising from the duty to the people, and that due to the officer whose conduct is impeached. If gentlemen are of opinion that, in this case, there are no grounds for impeachment, then it is clear that the conduct and character of the officer ought to be vindicated, and the inquiry instituted to afford him the means. If they are of opinion that there are grounds for an impeachment, then the duty they owe to the people urges them to the inquiry. In the constitution I find no excuse, no justification, on which to ground a refusal to institute an inquiry into the conduct of any public officer charged with misbehavior.

To such an inquiry, what is objected? That the power may be abused. Indeed, the objection is, that it is abused in this instance. How abused? To argue from abuse of the power against the use of it, is no argument at all. If the House believe either alternative I have mentioned, and one or the other you must believe, it is their duty to make the inquiry. But it is said that the committee are to be clothed with power to send for persons and papers. Granted. That power is indispensably necessary. It is said their powers are to be inquisitorial. This is not true. Will not the committee be accessible by every member of the House, and what are their ulterior powers but to collect facts, and to express an opinion whether they afford grounds for an impeachment? That opinion they will eventually submit to the House, and, without its approbation, it will be settled.

It is further said that no specific charge is adduced, and if there were, gentlemen say they would vote for the inquiry. But if a specific charge were made, I ask if any member would be enabled to give a more enlightened vote than on the present resolution? I consider the general power to inquire as most important, and that it is the duty of the House, on such occasions as the present, to enlarge rather than to narrow the field of inquiry.

It is further said that this course of proceeding will discourage respectable men from accepting the offices of Government. But certainly every officer, from the President to the most menial, knows that he holds his office subject to inquiry, to impeachment, and to punishment, in case of criminality.

If the House do not pursue the present course, from what quarter are they to expect the origination of an inquiry? Is it to be supposed that it will come from the citizen, when his life and fortune are probably at the disposal of particular officers charged with misconduct. This line of inquiry ought, in my opinion, to be courted and encouraged; more especially in this instance, after the course which the debate has taken, and after specific charges have been adduced. The debate has given an importance to the inquiry, which its original merits may not, perhaps, have entitled it to.

When this subject was first introduced, it appeared to me novel, and that there were no precedents in point under the Federal Government. It is time that this precedent should be established. It is time that every officer should know that this House is ready at any time to inquire into his official conduct, if charged with misbehavior; and instead of declining the inquiry, in this instance, from a false delicacy to the officer, it becomes the House to embrace the resolution and make the inquiry. If evidence shall be collected, and it appears that there are no grounds for impeachment, the officer will be restored to the public confidence, and will be acquitted. If, on the other hand, it appears that he has been guilty of malfeasance in office, a duty will be imposed upon the House, from which they cannot recede, to bring him to trial.

Mr. THATCHER.--As gentlemen seem to consider the decision of the court in the trial of Fries as unprecedented, I beg leave to refer them to the cases of the United States _versus_ Vigol, and the same _versus_ Mitchell, 2 Dallas’s Reports, 346 to 357. They will find that the decision of the court, in the case of Fries, was exactly conformable to cases adjudged in 1795. Without troubling the House with the whole of those cases, I beg leave to read the decision of the court in the last case. “The charge of the court, says the reporter, was delivered to the jury in substance as follows. Patterson justice. ‘The first question to be considered is, what was the general object of the insurrection? If its object was to suppress the excise offices, and to prevent the execution of an act of Congress, by force and intimidation, the offence, in legal estimation, is high treason: it is a usurpation of the authority of Government; it is high treason by levying of war.’” The decision, sir, is also conformable to the English authorities. The charge then against Judge Chase and Judge Peters, after divesting it of the coloring which imagination has given it, amounts to this--that, in the trial of Fries for treason, the court prevented the counsel from arguing to the jury against a point of law long settled by that and other courts of the United States. I have attended closely to the statement made by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. SMILIE,) and I believe I am correct.

The very point which the counsel of Fries would have argued to the jury, was that which had long before been settled by the courts of the United States. I contend, sir, that this court did no more than they had a right to do--no more than is practised by every well regulated court. They prevented counsel from arguing law in the face of the authorities, and of the opinion of the court. That this is usual, I appeal to gentlemen of the law who are present. This, sir, is the only fact stated to the House upon which the motion is founded.

The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) has said, that he has been informed of facts, which convince him that an inquiry ought to be made. But that gentleman has not stated to the House what those facts are.

It has been contended, that where a member of this House shall state that he is convinced that an inquiry ought to be made, the House ought to institute such an inquiry. Precedents have been adduced to prove that this has been done in the British Parliament. There certainly has been no case cited where an inquiry has been commenced upon the motion without stating his facts or his evidence. But whatever may have been the practice in England I can never consent to vote upon any impressions or convictions but my own.

If the official conduct of the judges upon the trial of Fries was such as to require the interposition of this House why, (as the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. GRISWOLD, has asked,) why was not this inquiry sooner announced? This trial, I am told, was in February, 1800. It took place within the hearing of Congress. It was the subject of universal attention. Why has it slept four years? Upon what ground shall we invest a committee with power to ransack the country for charges against our judges? Shall we, upon the motion of a member--shall we, upon the statement of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. SMILIE,) commence an inquiry, troublesome and expensive--an inquiry, which must attach suspicion to the official conduct of the judges? Sir, I respect the conduct of the gentlemen who attempt to remove obstructions from the stream of justice, but I must be convinced that obstructions now exist, before I can vote for this resolution.

Mr. EARLY.--Like other gentlemen who have gone before me in this discussion, I do not consider myself at liberty to vote against the resolution on the table. Like them, I deem myself bound to vote for an inquiry into the conduct of any public officer, when that inquiry is demanded by a member of this House. After the view taken of the merits of this measure by the gentlemen from Pennsylvania and Virginia, I did expect that all further opposition to it would have ceased. In this expectation I have been disappointed.

I feel constrained to vote in favor of this resolution, because I believe that the inquiry it contemplates is an act of justice due to the people of the United States on one hand, and to the characters of the individuals charged, on the other. A charge of high crimes and misdemeanors has been made on this floor against two individuals, and two members of this House have demanded an inquiry into their official conduct. To this demand may be added the weight of public opinion. I am apprized of the delicacy of this ground, and when I resort to it, it is my wish to be understood as meaning that when charges of a high nature are instituted and reiterated from one end of the Union to the other, so as to create a general belief, so as to destroy confidence in the principle and integrity of those who administer justice, and to beget a suspicion that justice cannot be obtained equally by all men; under such circumstances the public voice demands an inquiry into the truth of the charges. Is this a fact, or is it not, in relation to the officers implicated in this resolution? I presume that it is the fact to a great extent will not be denied. Every gentleman on this floor, in the habit of reading the public prints, must have had so forcible an impression made on his mind on this subject, as not to have lost a recollection of the conduct charged upon one of the judges named in this resolution, in the case of Fries, Cooper, and Callender. I cannot, therefore, refuse my assent to the inquiry, because I believe it due to the public, as well as to the individuals charged with the improper conduct, and who, if they were on the spot, would undoubtedly memorialize us for an inquiry. Indeed one of the officers referred to in the resolution, if conscious of his innocence, ought, in my opinion, long since, to have demanded an inquiry into his official conduct, when he witnessed the strong and numerous charges against him in the public prints from one end of the continent to the other.

It is objected to this resolution that no proof has been adduced to the House of the truth of the allegations preferred. In my mind there is all the difference that can be imagined between an inquiry and an impeachment; and almost all the arguments urged on this occasion apply exclusively to an impeachment. A strong proof of this has been given by the gentleman who has just sat down. That gentleman (Mr. R. GRISWOLD) has taken this remarkable ground, that this House ought not to inquire without proof. I suppose he meant, by proof, the depositions of witnesses; this is, in other words, saying that we, whose constitutional duty it is to inquire, may omit to do it, because they whose duty it is not to inquire, have not done it.

The present resolution is nothing more than this: A certain officer of the Government is charged, in the face of the nation, with malfeasance in office, and a committee appointed to inquire into the truth of the charge. Gentlemen allege that the committee is to be appointed to inquire what accusations can be found, and then for testimony to sustain them. But this is not so. The accusations have been long since made, and they are not of a day, but of a year’s standing.

The analogy between the functions of this House and a grand jury, is correct and forcible. Before a grand jury, it is the right of any individual to apply for and demand an inquiry into the conduct of any person within their cognizance; and it is more especially the right of any member of the jury to make such a demand; and it is their bounden duty, according to their oaths, to make the inquiry when so demanded.

The official conduct of the judges I view as more delicate and important than that of any other description of officers; for, on their impartiality the whole people of the United States depend for obtaining justice in ordinary cases, and individuals depend, in the last resort, for the preservation of their lives. Their official conduct should, therefore, not only be correct, but likewise free from suspicion. Simply to be charged ought to produce an inquiry; and I must confess that a recent case, in which the integrity of a judicial officer was impeached, excited my warmest approbation. I mean the case of a judge (Judge Tucker) in a neighboring State, who, on a suggestion believed by no man, deemed it a duty to himself and his country to demand an inquiry into his conduct.

Another view, by no means unimportant, which may be taken, is, that the reputation of the Government, of which the judges are a component part, demands the inquiry in question. Will any gentleman pretend to say that reputation is not at stake,--that it is not affected at home or abroad by the charges which have been so long and so loudly made? I presume not. Whether those charges are true or not, is not the question; for, whether true or not, so long as they are generally believed, the reputation of the Government is affected; its reputation for impartial justice is affected, and deeply too. To refuse this inquiry would be to give weight to this impression abroad--to add to the suspicion, at home and abroad, that impartial justice is not done to all men. Let us, then, make the inquiry, and restore the reputation of the Government, by inflicting a proper punishment upon these officers, if guilty, and, if innocent, by proving the charges against them calumnies.

Mr. EPPES.--If, in adopting the resolution before us, we were to attach odium to the characters in question, I should feel no surprise at the course pursued by the gentlemen who oppose this inquiry. In this country the official conduct of every man is, and ought to be, subject to examination. It is not the examination, but the result of that examination, which attaches merit or demerit to a public character. In a Government like ours no principle ought to be cherished with greater care than a free inquiry into the conduct of public officers. So friendly am I to this principle in its fullest extent, so necessary do I believe it to be to the preservation of that purity in public officers essential to a republic, that it will always be sufficient for me to vote an inquiry, for a member to declare he considers an inquiry necessary. A proper regard to his own reputation will always, I am certain, prevent any member of this House from calling on us to exercise this important duty on light or trivial grounds. As to the extensive field of inquiry to which this doctrine may lead, I care not; and whenever a member of this House shall rise in his place and declare that he considers an inquiry into the conduct of a public officer or officers necessary, I shall be ready to pass the whole circle in review, to begin with the first and end with the last, to vote an inquiry into the conduct of each, and even to go further, to vote an impeachment if necessary. I shall on every such occasion consider it a duty I owe to the individual accused, and to the community in whose behalf the accusation is made, to vote an inquiry.

Thus much for the general principle which would induce me to vote for this resolution, if no specific charge had been made. In the present case, however, a specific charge of a serious kind has been made by a member from Pennsylvania; and, however gentlemen may have attempted to weaken the force of this charge, it does substantially amount to this: that, by the opinion of a judge, a citizen of the United States was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel, when arraigned for his life. I will not, however, dwell on this charge. It has been placed by a gentleman from Maryland (Mr. NICHOLSON) in a point of view satisfactory to myself, and, I believe, to the House. I consider it, however, my duty on this occasion to mention a trial which took place in the Commonwealth of Virginia, which affords another specific charge against Judge Chase. I was not present at this trial, and am not personally acquainted with the circumstances. I believe, however, that in the Commonwealth of Virginia but one sentiment prevails as to the conduct of Judge Chase on this occasion, viz: that it was indecent and tyrannical. In the course of the trial he refused to allow a witness on the part of the prisoner to be examined, because the witness could prove the truth of a part only, and not the whole of the words laid in the indictment. By a system of conduct peculiar to himself, he deprived the prisoner of the aid of Mr. George Hay, as counsel, a man, who, although not as generally known as some others in our State, is inferior to none in his profession. I do not mention these circumstances as hearsay evidence, but as facts, which I am induced to believe can be established by legal testimony. If, on this statement, there is any gentleman who can refuse an inquiry, I am willing to leave him in the enjoyment of his opinion. For my own part, I shall be always ready, on the demand of any member of this House, to exercise my constitutional right of inquiry, and, without partiality or prejudice, pursue the course pointed out by my duty, whether it shall lead to impeachment or an honorable acquittal.

Mr. NICHOLSON rose for the purpose of calling the attention of the House to precedents. When he yesterday addressed them he had thought it unnecessary to introduce authorities from foreign nations; but as they had been insisted on by the opponents to the resolution, he would refer to two or three; and he was more solicitous to do so at the present moment, as he saw a gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. DANA) about to rise, and he wished to call the gentleman’s attention to them, in order that he might remark on them, and show, if it was to be done, that they did not apply to the case under consideration. If gentlemen would refer to the powers exercised by the Commons of England, for time almost immemorial, and to those exercised by the several State Legislatures, he believed that precedents innumerable would be furnished. The Commons of England were the grand inquest of the nation. As such it was their duty to inquire into the official conduct of all those intrusted with the powers of Government. Every officer in the realm was liable to impeachment by them. The same principle would be found to run through the constitutions of most of the States, and it was wisely introduced into the Constitution of the United States. The power to impeach is admitted to be in the House of Representatives, and the only question is, as to the manner in which this power shall be exercised. The proposed method is called a loose one, and we are asked to show some precedent for it. The House of Commons at the commencement of every session appoint what is there called a committee of grievances and courts of justice. Many of the State Legislatures appoint a similar committee annually, and, in the State from which he came, the House of Delegates always appoint a committee of grievances and courts of justice. It was one of their standing committees, and the appointment was as regular and as usual as the appointment of a committee of claims in this House. What then he inquired was the duty, what the authority of this committee? In England, in Maryland, and in every other State where it exists, it is their duty to inquire into the conduct of every officer of the Government, to call witnesses before them to prove official misconduct, to report offences to the House from which their powers are derived, and recommend the proper measures to be adopted.

This House, like the Commons of England, and the most numerous branch in the State Legislatures, is the grand inquest of the nation; they are to inquire into crimes and bring offenders to justice. It had not, he said, heretofore been customary for this House to appoint a committee of grievances and courts of justice, but he believed no man would deny the power, and when appointed they would not only have the authority proposed to be in this committee, but one infinitely more extensive. They would have the right to inquire into the conduct of all civil officers, and to report such facts as might come to their knowledge. If, then, we could with propriety, and agreeably to precedent, authorize an inquiry into the conduct of several hundred officers, could it be denied that the same precedent would warrant an inquiry into the conduct of two only? In 5th _Comyn’s Digest_, page 204, it would be found that a committee of grievances and justice was one of their standing committees, and in page 205 it was declared that they might “summon any judges and examine them in person upon complaint of any misdemeanor in office.” He presumed it had not been thought necessary heretofore to appoint a general committee of this kind, but at present the necessity was apparent, as a complaint had been made to the House of the official misconduct of two judges. Again, in the same book, page 209, it is said, “The Commons are the general inquisitors of the realm, and therefore if a Lord, spiritual or temporal, commit oppression, bribery, extortion, &c., the Commons shall inquire of it, and if, by the vote of the House, the crime appears to have been committed, they transmit it, with the evidence, to the Lords.” This, he said, would clearly show, what indeed he thought common sense would teach every man, that the inquiry should be made before proof was exhibited upon which an impeachment was to be grounded. In the same page it would be seen that “common fame is a sufficient ground of a proceeding in the House of Commons by inquiry, or by a complaint, if need be, to the King or Lords.” And _Rushworth’s Historical Collection_, page 217, is cited, it is said, by some of the ablest lawyers of that day that “if common fame were not to be admitted as public accusers, great men would be the only safe ones, as no private man would venture to complain of them.” Mr. N. referred to these authorities at that particular stage of the discussion, as he was desirous of giving gentlemen an opportunity of commenting upon them. As he had no wish to prolong the debate, he would not multiply observations upon that point, but could not sit down without noticing what had fallen from a gentleman from Massachusetts, in which he had again attempted to vindicate the conduct of the judges upon the trial of Fries.

The gentleman had referred to a case in _Dallas’s Reports_, respecting the Western Insurrection, in which he says the point of law determined upon the trial of Fries, had been previously settled by one of the federal courts, and from thence infers that Mr. Chase and Mr. Peters were justified in preventing counsel from arguing it a second time. That such conduct might be perhaps excusable in a civil cause he was not prepared to deny; but, in a case of criminal jurisdiction, involving the guilt or innocence of a man whose life was to be the forfeit, he held it totally unjustifiable.

All men, he said, were acquainted with the circumstances of what was generally called the Western Insurrection. Some of the Western counties of Pennsylvania were opposed to the excise law. A considerable majority of the people had resolved to oppose its execution, and took strong measures to prevent individuals from accepting offices under it, and compelled some of them to resign the places to which they had been appointed. While they professed an attachment to the Government of the Union they resolved to resist the execution of one of its laws. Among these was a man by the name of Mitchell, and he was charged with high treason before the circuit of Pennsylvania in which Judge Paterson then presided. A doubt existed whether the resistance to the execution of a law, even by force of arms, was such a levying of war within the meaning of the constitution, as amounted to treason. What was the conduct of the judge on that occasion? He had no disposition to preclude inquiry. He had no wish to keep the jury in ignorance by forbidding fair and open argument. On the contrary, it appeared from a note on page 348 that he called the attention of the prisoner’s counsel to the point, and requested that they would notice it in their observations. This was done before the defence was opened, and he said he should beg leave to read a part of the argument made in favor of the prisoner.

“The counsel for the prisoner (E. Tilghman and Thomas) premised
that they did not conceive it to be their duty to show that the
prisoner was guiltless of any description of crime against the
United States, or the State of Pennsylvania, but they contended
that he had not committed the crime of high treason, and
ought, therefore, to be acquitted on the present indictment.
The adjudications in England upon the various descriptions of
treason, had been worked incautiously, into a system, by the
destruction of which the Government itself would be seriously
affected; but even there, the best judges and the ablest
commentators, while they acquiesce in the decisions that have
already taken place, furnish a strong caution against the too
easy admission of future cases, which seem to have a parity
of reason. Constructive and interpretive treasons must be the
dread and scourge of any nation that allows them--_1 Hale, P.
C._, 132, 259--_4 Black. Com._, 85. Take, then, the distinction
of treason by levying war, as laid down by the attorney of
the district, and it is a constructive or interpretive weapon
which is calculated to annul all distinctions heretofore
wisely established in the grades and punishments of crimes,
and by whose magic power a mob may be easily converted into a
conspiracy, and a riot aggravated into high treason.”

Such, he said, was the opinion of two gentlemen ranking high in their profession, and who would not be charged with having any feeling toward the offence or the offender inconsistent with the rights or interests of the Government. The whole argument was too lengthy to be read to the House, but he considered it well worth the perusal of every American. Able as it was, however, it had not the wished for weight with the court. Judge Paterson gave the following charge to the jury: “The first question is, what was the general object of the insurrection? If its object was to suppress the excise offices, and to prevent the execution of an act of Congress, by force and intimidation, the offence, in legal estimation, is high treason; it is a usurpation of the authority of Government; it is high treason by levying of war.” Sir, said Mr. N., this opinion of the court may have been honest; I mean not to impeach the purity of motive which dictated it, but I mean to show that the offence with which Mitchell was charged, the resistance to the execution of a law, was not considered as treason by the highest existing authority of this country. Mitchell was pardoned by the President of the United States, and Congress, not long after, expressed their opinion on the subject in the most ample manner.