Chapter M: CAMPBELL then rose and spoke as follows (45)

With respect to the propriety of building gunboats, he would observe that they were not a mere experiment; they were sanctioned by the practice of Europe, and were very beneficial for the defence of ports against sudden attack. The French, Spanish, Dutch, and other nations, in the vicinage of the British Navy, had combined their boats with land batteries, for the purpose of defence against the assaults of that formidable Navy. These boats were also a part of a system heretofore practised in other countries, and proposed to be further pursued here.

Mr. CROWNINSHIELD said that there was some inconsistency in the observations of the gentleman from Pennsylvania; he had said gunboats would be useful with the aid of large vessels, and at the same time said they were entirely useless in the mouths of rivers or deep waters. [Mr. MILNOR explained that he had meant they would be useless when acting alone.] Mr. C. said he had formed a very different opinion, indeed, from that expressed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania with respect to gunboats. It was well known that no longer ago than the year before last, this Government had employed eight or ten gunboats to assist in the attack on Tripoli; they all crossed the Atlantic in safety, except one boat. Although they did not come into the attack on Tripoli, because a peace was prematurely concluded, yet he himself had heard the late Commodore Preble say that, without them the squadron would not have been competent to have made an effectual assault on the city. These boats then kept the sea in very tempestuous weather, a fact which the despatches from the commanding officer had announced. He believed that they could not at this time adopt a better mode of defence than that proposed by the bill. He should be sorry to see the proposed number reduced, because he believed they would render important services, if at any time our ports or harbors should be attacked. These gunboats were not boats that would sink the moment they got into rough water; they were boats of 60 or 70 tons burden, which might navigate the globe with safety. He spoke from experimental knowledge. The gentleman surely did not mean to say they could not swim. In Mr. C.’s opinion, there could be no better system of defence in aid of fortifications than that proposed by the bill.

Mr. BLOUNT presumed the gentleman would admit, as a certainty, that it was the duty of the House to provide effectual protection. The select committee having determined, in their own mind, that the best system of defence would be composed by fortifications and gunboats, had inquired what number, would be of use. The answer to this inquiry was already before the House; it was stated that the United States had already 69 gunboats--that 257 were the whole number which might be usefully employed; consequently that 188 were wanting. If it were the object of gentlemen to afford a certain protection to the country, he hoped they would not hesitate to pass this bill. If the gentleman from Pennsylvania should be able, when the subject was properly before them, to prove to Mr. B. that frigates or ships of war would add to the protection which might be afforded by fortifications and gunboats, he would vote with him for their construction. It would be time to discuss this when the subject was before them. He hoped the idea of the utility of a naval force would not induce gentlemen to withhold from the Executive that force which they had signified as necessary for the protection of our ports and harbors. If any doubt were entertained by gentlemen who were not members of the last Congress, there was a report, which he held in his hand, made at a former session, containing the opinions of naval officers on the expediency or utility of these boats. The report was lengthy, and he should not call for the reading of it, except gentlemen wished it. There was, however, no necessity to demonstrate their utility, as no gentleman had attempted to show that they were not eminently and essentially useful as one species of defence.

The gentleman last up has stated that I wished this mode of defence because it was the wish of the Executive. I stated expressly, and the gentleman must so have understood me, that the committee had selected this number of gunboats because they were informed that this number would be necessary. I referred to the document where this statement is expressed and where it may be found. I meant to express the opinion, that if we built a less number than necessary, it would be a waste of public money; and that protection would not be obtained by a less force than that which is proposed.

Mr. B. also said that the 88 gunboats would cost $440,000; that sum, when applied to the building of a large frigate, would not complete her; and when built, she would carry but 44 guns, one-half the number of guns which would be carried by 88 gunboats; besides which, the expense of rigging and making her fit for service would be enormous. Thus, by building one frigate only at the same expense as would complete 88 gunboats, they lost 44 guns, besides the additional expense of fitting out and manning the frigate. He had, however, only risen at this time to explain that he had been misrepresented when it was stated that he had said he should vote for this number of gunboats because the Executive had recommended it.

Mr. SMILIE said the question was, whether they would appropriate a certain sum of money for the defence of their ports and harbors. He had not heard it said, and he hoped it never would be said, that they ought to defend themselves beyond their own shores. He confessed that he was now called upon to give his vote on a question to the decision of which he was not competent; but it being his duty to decide, he should, on this as on other subjects with which he was not well acquainted, depend upon the opinions of those who were. He believed many gentlemen in the House were in the same situation with himself, not being acquainted with naval affairs. It was the duty of the Executive to communicate information in answer to any inquiries which it was necessary to make. They had performed that duty, and the answers were in favor of gunboats. Should he then pursue any opinion of his own in contradiction to this, when he had no evidence on which to ground that opinion? Certainly not; he should depend upon those who possessed better information on the subject than himself, except there was something so absurd in their opinions that he could not swallow it.

Mr. CHANDLER said, when they had information from actual examination, that the contemplated number of gunboats would be necessary, he did believe that the proposed sum should be appropriated to that object. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, who had moved this amendment, professed himself as willing to protect our ports and harbors as any gentleman, but wished to strike out part of the number of gunboats, in order to adopt another mode of defence. Admitting that a frigate could be built for the sum which would complete eighty-eight gunboats; could he demonstrate that the force of forty-four guns would be equal to eighty-eight of heavier metal? Another thing he would mention; when the gunboats were constructed, a part of them might be removed, and they could increase or diminish the force at any particular place, as occasion might require; if they had one frigate in place of them, they could not divide her strength, and it could be retained at one point only.

Mr. NEWTON said it was not his intention to take up the time of the committee in a disquisition on the subject of gunboats; though, were he to attempt it, he had no doubt but he might be equally qualified with some gentlemen who had displayed their eloquence on this occasion. He thought they should now take into consideration the situation of the country in relation to Great Britain. Why were they now talking of defence, of fortifications, and of gunboats? Because they had arrived at a perilous crisis; the nation had been attacked; the blood of its citizens had been spilled; and they must have war, if reparation were not made. They heard by the papers that a Minister was to be sent to negotiate on the subject; but when that Minister arrived here, would any gentleman say that they would receive that reparation which he was prepared to offer? He believed not. When our affairs were thus situated, and as the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. MACON) said a few days ago, when they were actually in a state of war, ought they not to make a better use of their time and the public money, than in debating on the details of a bill? If a treaty with Great Britain were laid upon their table at this moment, should they for that reason desist from preparations for defence? No; that nation had trampled on every moral principle; there was no faith in her; paper and parchment were no security for her good conduct. If they wished to be respected by that power, they must place themselves in a situation to return injury for injury; to retaliate on her for the violations of their rights. When they did this, they might expect something like decency of conduct, or respect for their rights from that power; until they put themselves in a situation to command her respect, they would in vain expect to receive it.

Mr. GARDENIER said that although he was not one of those who entertained a great passion for gunboats, yet he could see certain situations in which they would be useful in aid of fortifications; but they should be restricted to a certain number. The mode of fortification which was proposed, was by gunboats and batteries; and the proportionate expenditure for these two objects, how much for one, and how much for the other, was a subject which would engage the attention of the House when it came properly before them. He should feel no objection to vote for the whole number of gunboats, were he certain at the same time that enough would be appropriated for land-batteries and other objects.

Mr. MASTERS said, if the amendment of the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. BLOUNT) had for its object to authorize the President to dam up the Hudson River by sinking blocks, he trusted the good sense of the committee would reject such a preposterous proposition. The injurious consequences of such an experimental measure to the city of New York, and the State at large, would be beyond calculation. It would, in all human probability, inundate, in high freshets, a considerable part of the town; and in low water, in the summer season, so prevent the influx of water as to cause the tide to recede more than thirty miles, and ruin a number of most flourishing towns one hundred and seventy miles up the river. The effects would be ruinous to one of the finest rivers in the world. It was a well-known fact that sinking the piers of Westminster bridge, in the river Thames, caused the tide to recede in that river upwards of seven miles; take the same data for calculation, and the tide in Hudson River would recede more than fifty miles. This, said Mr. M., is a visionary scheme to evade the real object of defence, and to introduce false notions of economy. Whenever we attempt to make appropriations for permanent forts and batteries, expense and economy are brought forward as an objection. The objects of necessary defence, and a prudent, well-regulated economy, can be easily reconciled; but your plausible and popular sound of economy, which is always the sweeping argument when this and similar measures are under consideration, is like a fine net, which is intended to catch every thing, both great and small. It may serve for a fine fancy to fill up a speech with, but will not answer for fortifications. It will endanger the nation by keeping us defenceless and weak, tempt aggressions, and invite the destruction of our seaport towns. Where, then, will be your economy?

Mr. QUINCY said he would only ask the gentleman from North Carolina, as to his precise meaning in inserting the word “works.” This word was, perhaps, in common life, confined to constructions other than fortifications; he believed, however, it might include fortifications also. When he had asked the question as to the species of works contemplated to be erected, he had no conception that it was possible, under an expression of this kind, to comprehend the sinking of blocks to choke up the harbor of New York; for he had thought the erection of works was putting up, whilst sinking blocks was putting down. He had, however, a different object in rising. He had understood it to be the intention of this bill not only to authorize the repair of old fortifications, but the erection of new ones; and the bill as it stood antecedent to the gentleman’s amendment, might have been competent to that end. Now, as the gentleman had amended it, it would imply works different from fortifications as he understood. If indeed it were the real object of the gentleman to repair old fortifications only, and not to erect new ones, the bill would now answer his purpose fully. If it were otherwise, he conceived the language was not correct.

Mr. BLOUNT said he felt very little solicitude as to the fate of his motion. His intention was to give a greater latitude to the discretion of the President. He would not, however, undertake to dispute with the gentleman from Massachusetts on the precise meaning of words; for he had not spent his early life within the walls of a college, as that gentleman had, but in the field, fighting for the liberties of his country. Under the belief that the word _works_ did include fortifications, he had made his motion for amendment. It was the intention of the committee both to erect new works and to repair old ones. If the gentlemen from New York and Massachusetts were determined to restrain the President from giving that protection to the port of New York which the people of that State should think proper, he was content. He did not wish to waste the time of the House unnecessarily, especially on a subject which required so much expedition.

Mr. COOK said he lived in a port in which there was sufficient depth of water for any British man of war, and he thought he should feel as indignant at any proposition for destroying the harbor as the gentleman from New York. He hoped the feelings of other gentlemen in the House would be in unison with his. If they were arrived at such a point of degradation, that, in case of attack, they must retreat to or beyond the mountains, and if instead of defending they must abandon the coast to its fate, they had better adopt this measure, and block up their ports altogether. After such a proposition as this, he should not be surprised at any one which could be made; it appeared to him that the spirit of our forefathers was departing the country. He was alarmed when he heard such a proposition as this, and he hoped there would be sufficient magnanimity in the House to give the amendment a decided negative.

WEDNESDAY, December 9.

Another member, to wit, EDWARD ST. LOE LIVERMORE, from Massachusetts, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

_Fortifications and Gunboats._

The House proceeded to consider the amendments reported yesterday by the Committee of the Whole to the bill, sent from the Senate, entitled “An act to appropriate money for the construction of an additional number of gunboats.”

Mr. DURELL said, as there appeared to be a considerable diversity of opinion on this gunboat business, and as a number of gentlemen from, the North did not readily fall into the scheme of the Southern gentlemen, and as he was from the North, he would state some reasons why this bill should not pass. He thought, as every gentleman appeared to think, that this was a crisis which called for union and great exertion; the great object was, to arm the nation to meet an event which they would be called to meet ere long. The question was now on one species of this arming, on which there were different opinions.

It appeared that, in addition to fortifications, the precise number of one hundred and eighty-eight gunboats was called for. A question had been asked, why that number was exactly calculated as being necessary; the chairman of the committee, who reported the bill, states that this number was thought necessary by the Executive Department. It was not to the system of gunboats that he had an objection, for he believed that, to a certain extent, they might be useful; but he did not believe that gunboats in connection with fortifications, would attain the end for which they were acknowledged to be proposed. In casting his eye over the documents before him, he perceived that gunboats were assigned to certain situations in the North, where he was confident they could never be of use. He was positive of this fact. Four gunboats were assigned to the port of Portsmouth, New Hampshire. He would appeal to gentlemen in the House, acquainted with the situation of that port, whether they seriously believed that four gunboats, or that twenty, would be of any service there? It was impossible that they should; the situation of the port, the strength and rapidity of the tide, were such that they could not be used. The same observation would apply to a number of ports east of that; it was generally conceded that gunboats were not calculated for deep and turbulent waters; the Northern shores were not sand banks, and gentlemen seemed to think these were necessary to allow gunboats to defend even themselves.

He saw that for the ports of Norfolk and New York, there were assigned a large number of gunboats. He was inclined to believe that a number of frigates, to the amount of the expense of these gunboats, would be more consonant with the wishes of the people in the mouth of the Hudson, than so many gunboats.

One hundred and twenty-eight gunboats to Norfolk and New York! The expense of sixty-four, one half of this number, would be fully equal to the expense of four forty-four gun frigates; and he was of opinion that these, at one-half the expense, would be considered by the gentlemen from Norfolk and New York, and by the House, as better calculated than gunboats to defend those ports. Mr. D. could see no reason why they should not have their choice in this respect. He, therefore, concluded with moving to strike out “one hundred and eighty-eight gunboats,” and insert “one hundred and twenty-four gunboats, and four forty-four gun frigates.”

Mr. BLOUNT called for a division of the question, wishing the first question taken on striking out.

Mr. GARDNER felt very conscious of the importance of fortifying the various ports and harbors of the United States, and should give the bill his support on its passage; but he had been in hopes yesterday that the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, would have prevailed. He wished to see the system of gunboats put into operation, and to see the efficiency of that mode of defence properly tested. There appeared to be many different opinions on the subject; and he perceived the House would not be satisfied till the experiment was tried, and their utility known. He was willing that as many gunboats should be employed as was sufficient for defence in those waters where they might be useful; but he did not think they would be efficient in the Northern and Eastern ports of the United States. He should be obliged to gentlemen if they would strike out a part of this number of gunboats, and appropriate the sum applicable to them to another mode of defence. There appeared to be a large majority in favor of the bill, but if they would be so condescending as to fortify the Northern ports in a way most agreeable to the people interested in their defence, he should feel gratified at it. He was in favor of the amendment, though he would rather a large number should be stricken out; and hoped the question on striking out would be carried, whether ships of war were inserted or not. It had been yesterday said, by a gentleman from Virginia, that if a less number were built than that proposed, they would be useless. This argument could have no weight with those who did not think they would afford defence at all; but, for his own part, he should vote for any thing in the shape of defence, till it should be found insufficient by experiment.

Mr. BACON observed, that some gentleman had undertaken in themselves, to represent the whole Northern part of the Union, and had expressed their wishes that the House would condescend to listen to the united prayers of the representatives from those States. He only rose to say, that he, for one, protested against being considered as joining in that request. He was of opinion that the mode embraced by the bill would better accord with the sentiments of the people of the Northern States, than that which those gentlemen had proposed. He had no intention of making any calculation on the subject, because he did not consider himself qualified to do it; but would barely observe that, were the question fairly tried in the Northern interest, those gentlemen would be found in the negative.

Mr. CROWNINSHIELD said he considered the present proposition as much the same with that which was yesterday offered in Committee of the Whole, and to which the committee was decidedly opposed. He trusted the decision of the House to-day would be the same as that of the committee yesterday. He thought his friend from New Hampshire was extremely mistaken in his calculations of the comparative expense of gunboats, and frigates of forty-four guns. It would be seen by the report of the Secretary of the Navy, that the estimates for gunboats would amount to about $5,000; and he thought it would not go beyond it. Taking this for granted, the gentleman’s calculations of expense must fall to the ground. Mr. C. then stated the expense of frigates which had been built, from which it appeared that the expense of building one frigate was fully as much as that of sixty-four gunboats. If they proposed to strike out this number of gunboats in order to build frigates, they must add a sum of one million of dollars to the appropriation.

Mr. SAWYER said it was not his intention to trouble the House often with his observations; for, being but a young member, he sat there more for the purpose of acquiring information than of giving it; nor should he have risen at this time, had not his duty compelled him to reply to some remarks, and to oppose the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Hampshire, (Mr. DURELL.) The gentleman wished the United States to have a fleet; to have four forty-four gun frigates to assist in the defence of New York. For his own part, Mr. S. wished the United States were in such a situation as to enable them to usher into existence a fleet capable of annihilating at one blow the whole naval power of England, which had so long proved a scourge to all nations, and to this nation in particular. Such a consummation was devoutly to be wished; but the attainment of such an object by the United States, was utterly impossible: they had not means wherewith to do it, and an attempt which should fall short of the end, would do the nation more injury than good, by tending to swell the already overgrown naval power of Great Britain. At present, he must say, he was entirely opposed to a Naval Establishment, and differed entirely with the gentleman from Massachusetts, upon the propriety of any such establishment in the present situation of affairs; he wished to have nothing to do with any establishment unconnected with a system of land defence. There was a time when a Naval Establishment might have been consistent with national policy; when a naval armament, such as could then have been constructed, might have been instrumental, by proper management, in maintaining the balance of naval power in Europe; that time was, when the combined fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, were nearly a match for the British naval force; but that time was now elapsed; that opportunity, which might have been so advantageously seized, was, through an unfortunate prejudice in favor of one nation and against another, suffered to escape unheeded. They now saw the effects of that policy; the fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, were swept from the ocean; the British Navy retained the undisputed possession of every sea, and it would be an extravagant undertaking in the United States to attempt the creation of a naval force calculated to make a serious impression upon Great Britain; they would become the mere shipwrights of Great Britain, who would be ready to receive their ships as fast as they could be launched. Could they erect a navy equal to that which Denmark had possessed? Could they build and equip twenty-four sail of the line at once? If they could do this, experience had fatally shown, that so far from aiding in the defence of this nation, that force would soon be turned against it; England, with a superior force, would soon convert them into a means of offence against this nation. But it would not be in the power of the United States, encumbered as they were by a great national debt, and cramped in their resources by interruptions of their trade, to provide a navy as respectable as that of Denmark was; and surely any smaller force could not be contemplated. Let us then, said he, apply our limited means to a mode of defence on which more reliance may be placed; let us in the first place put our ports and harbors in such a state of defence as will, in a great degree, prevent our feeling the want of a navy. To effect this object, he said, they must have recourse to gunboats. He did not conceive this means of defence to be so trivial as the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. DURELL) seemed to think them; not that they could be relied on as an efficient system of defence by themselves; not that they were to expel the British squadron from our shores, (though it was thought they could effect that object;) but because, in conjunction with land batteries and fortifications, they would ensure some safety of person and property in our seaport towns. By judicious management, by disposition in shoal waters, so as to aid the batteries on shore, they might be the means of preventing our cities from being plundered and burned, and our banks and stores from being rifled of their wealth. In this point of view, he considered them as part of a land defence, totally unconnected with a navy; they were not to go into deep water; the ocean was not their element; they were to remain in stations from which they might afford the greatest assistance to our forts and batteries, and when hard pressed or overpowered by force they could take shelter under them. This, said Mr. S., is the great advantage they have over heavy ships, there being no danger of their capture while we can maintain possession of our forts.

The British have not dared to attack a single French port since, though they had full possession of the channel and every means of attack which their unopposed naval superiority could afford. Though they saw preparing in those ports materials for their destruction, though they saw rising up in them means of offence so much dreaded as to require the utmost vigor of national exertion to provide against them, still did they stand aloof. Had Copenhagen been defended by gunboats distributed so as to act with the batteries, she would not have fallen so easy a prey; in fact, the few gunboats they had did all the execution that was done to the British shipping; for the fleet which remained in the port for its defence had no retreat from the superior force of the enemy, but where they could be pursued by vessels of equal size, while the gunboats ran under the forts and continued to annoy the British ships until those forts were taken by land. And if all the vessels which were captured had been gunboats, how much better would it have been for the Danes; how much less heavy would the loss of a few boats have been than that of so many large ships, so long building and accumulating, and at such an immense expense! But in order to show the inutility of gunboats, as well as fortifications, this House was told the British could succeed against our towns by landing a sufficient number of men below our forts and attacking them by land. This is exactly, Mr. S. said, what he wished to hear; for it was conceding at once that our gunboat and fortification defence would be too much for them to pass, that they would be compelled to give up the idea of carrying the place by water, and thus lose all the great advantages which their boasted irresistible naval power could afford them.

Mr. COOK said he could have wished that the different modes of defence should have been united, and decided upon together; but from the disposition of gentlemen who were in favor of the gunboat system, the House appeared to be compelled now to decide on this alone. It was well known that he was not averse to the proposition for constructing a number of gunboats; that he had last session given his vote in favor of them, and was now in favor of increasing the number, believing that in some situations they might be eminently useful; but when he found that so large a sum had been appropriated, almost to the exclusion of any other mode of defence, he deemed it his duty to give his vote in favor of a proposition tending more equally to apportion the modes of defence.

It had been moved to strike out of the bill a certain number of gunboats, and insert a certain number of ships of war. That a navy was necessary for the protection of our commerce was the opinion of President Washington, expressed at a time when our commerce was comparatively small. [Mr. C. here read an extract from an address to Congress from President Washington.] Mr. C. acknowledged that he had not experimental knowledge on this subject; but he appealed to the candor of those gentlemen who advocated this mode of defence, to accord to him that liberality which he would exercise towards them. He meant to impeach the motives of no man. He conceived that every gentleman would act according to the dictates of his conscience, and he claimed their indulgence to do the same.

Were the navy now to be increased to repel aggression from any foreign power, it would be regarded as a proper measure. He was not in favor of a large increase of our Navy; but he conceived it necessary to have a few large ships to drive from their ports scattering ships of an enemy. He thought himself not out of order, since the opinion of the President of the United States on the subject of gunboats had been read, verbally to quote his opinion on this subject. The President was in favor of large ships; he thought it was improper that any single ship should be able to block up a port or harbor of the United States; and that a remedy should be provided. Mr. C. thought that no danger could arise to the liberties of the people from an increase of the Navy; he called upon gentlemen who supported that doctrine to quote a single instance where any nation had lost its liberties from a navy. He did not himself consider an increase of our Navy necessary at the present moment, but it might be necessary at a future time; it would not, therefore, be improper now to provide materials, that they might have them in readiness when wanted. At present their attention should be directed solely to the defence of their cities on the seacoast; but at any future time, when it should be made satisfactorily to appear to this Government that the nations of Europe were disposed to coalesce for the purpose of asserting those rights which were dear to every maritime power, he hoped the United States would be ready and willing to join them in maintaining the freedom of navigation. It has been said, by some people, observed Mr. C., that we ought to lie by on our arms and avert the event of the European contest; let them alone, say they, let Buonaparte fight it out with them. Now this was a doctrine to which Mr. C. could not subscribe. If there was one great power disposed to control and domineer over the ocean, and the United States had great property at stake, why not pay their proportion, their footing as it were? He considered an opposite conduct pusillanimous and unjust. They had more tons of shipping afloat, and were more largely concerned in the freedom of the seas, than any nation on earth, one only excepted; and should they say that they would lie by unconcerned, while the dearest rights of nations were destroyed by any one nation! It must be clear to every one that they should not, and yet instead of increasing their defensive powers where they were assailable and most vulnerable, he was hurt to hear gentlemen propose means of defence for points perfectly unconnected with existing evils, which consisted in the harassing their navigation, and inflicting injuries on their floating commerce.

Mr. C. did not want ships for protection of our cities; he had no fear of their being burnt; he considered them as sufficiently protected by the proposed fortifications and gunboats, but all the money in the Treasury should not be applied to these subjects. The merchants of the United States were more concerned for the defence of their property which they had sent beyond seas than for the burning or sacking of our cities. Some cities, it was true, had been burnt during the Revolutionary War; but it should be recollected that the enemy then carried on a war of extermination, and even invited the savages to burn our towns. The war which was now feared was not a war of the same stamp; it would be merely a war for the right of trade, and not carried on in so sanguinary a manner.

Mr. FISK said the gentleman from Massachusetts was opposed to this measure because it would take all the money out of the Treasury. He should show: _First_, That it was beyond their means; and _Second_, That it was not a measure of exigency. Would he be willing to leave our ports and harbors unprotected, and go abroad to protect our commerce? Mr. F. did not think that the merchants of the United States would support that doctrine. If they did, he wished they were out of the United States. The gentleman had told the House that his feelings had been wounded at the deference shown to the statements of the Secretary of War, and a few minutes after, read an extract from an English newspaper, giving an account of a transaction which had taken place between gunboats and English vessels. Mr. F. confessed he was not a little surprised at his preferring the authority of English newspapers to that of the Head of a Department in our own country. A gentleman who did this, might be allowed to indulge in the spirit of prophecy. He had said, if they adopted this measure, they would soon feel the effects of it. Mr. F. wished the gentleman would show how. The gentleman had said, because a few towns were burnt last war, the House seemed to think that the war which was expected would be a war of extermination; but that this was to be a harmless war, a mere war of trade. He would ask that gentleman what was the conduct of Great Britain towards Denmark? Had they spared the town of Copenhagen? He believed not. Would they spare the towns of New York or Norfolk, if it were in their power to destroy them? He thought not. Mr. F. thought the great question now was, What was the most efficient force--what would afford the most complete protection to our ports and harbors? The gentleman had said that they had now no force which could contend with an eighty or ninety gun ship. If that were the case, Mr. F. said, his argument completely recoiled upon himself. They had now eight or ten frigates, and if these could not contend with one eighty or ninety gun ship, they had better stop where they were, and not erect more of such inefficient force. Let us consider the subject for a few moments, said Mr. F. This is not an untried force; it was tried before that gentleman had existence. The instance mentioned by the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. SAWYER,) might have shown that this force would be sufficient. It was the opinion of a most experienced naval commander, and whose standing and information entitled him to more than ordinary credit, that he would rather have four gunboats than a forty-four-gun frigate. A frigate could not carry the same metal as a gunboat. If a frigate was dismasted, becalmed, or any accident whatever happened to her, she could not get out of the way. These reasons should have weight on the minds of any gentleman, particularly of one who did not pretend to experimental knowledge on this subject. If the Treasury was as low as it was said to be, they should surely pursue the cheapest means of defence. By adopting the mode of defence by gunboats, in preference to defence by frigates, they would have, at the same expense, a third more in number of guns, besides double the weight of metal. With gunboats there was no loss of time in putting about. Not so with a frigate. She must first discharge one side, and then go about, before she could fire the other. But, gentlemen who were steeled against conviction, and determined, at all events, to have a Navy, would not be influenced by argument or reason. Had not Denmark a Navy? What became of it? It fell into the hands of a superior naval power, and that will be the fate of our Navy if we erect one.

Mr. THOMAS said that the gentleman on his right, his colleague, (Mr. GARDENIER,) had told the House that he should vote to build the whole number of gunboats, not because he thought them an efficient defence, but because he considered them feeble machines. This reasoning might be conclusive in the mind of that gentleman, and he did not care what influenced him, since it appeared they should have his vote for the bill.

However, Mr. T. said he merely rose to reply to one remark of that gentleman. He knew that it had been rung through the country, by electioneering gentry, for these number of years, that the formidable navy, so carefully raised by the former Administration, had been sold off by the present one, and the nation left without defence; and that gentleman (Mr. G.) had repeated the same story, that the formidable navy which had been raised with so much care had been sold off, to the eternal disgrace of the nation. Hearing this assertion, Mr. T. thought it his duty, on that floor, to declare that not a single national ship had been ordered to be sold since the present Administration came into power; that not a single vessel had been sold except from orders issued previous to the time that the administration of this Government was taken out of the hands of those coinciding with that gentleman in political sentiment.

The amendment offered by Mr. DURELL was then negatived--ayes 19.

The bill being about to be read a third time this day, its decision was, on motion of Mr. ELLIOT, postponed till to-morrow.

THURSDAY, December 10.

_Fortifications and Gunboats._

The bill sent from the Senate, entitled “An act to appropriate money for the construction of an additional number of gunboats,” together with the amendment agreed to yesterday, was read the third time.

Mr. ELLIOT.--When an humble and uninfluential individual, voluntarily isolating himself from the several great parties that divide, distract, and ruin our devoted and degraded country--our devoted and degraded country--(I repeat the expression, sir, for I know it to be as consonant to the rules of order as I shall prove it to be incontestably true;) when such an individual rises to deliver his sentiments upon an important subject of national concern, it would seem that the singularity of his situation might attract attention, however deficient he may be in the solid powers of argument, or the brilliant tones of eloquence. But these are inauspicious times. These are not the _mollia tempora fundi_--the soft reasons of persuasion--the calm hours of peace. They are times of alarm and denunciation. For myself, peculiar and almost irresistible reasons would impel me to continue silent, not only this day, but for the short remainder of my political existence. But there are periods when silence is almost equivalent to an abandonment of duty. Private afflictions, as inconceivable by others as they are indescribable by myself, were I disposed to describe them, indispose me for political exertion. There are times, however, when even the most refined feelings of the human heart should give place to the sublime energies of the human mind. When imperious duty calls, the latter should be exerted, even if it be only that the former, when the great effort is over, should resume their empire with more exquisite sensibility.

The present is one of those great crises that rarely occur in the annals of nations--it is, indeed, a crisis of most awful moment. Our political day of hope and joy and peace is suddenly overcast with thick and dark clouds. In the language of sacred oriental poetry, it is a day of darkness and gloominess--a day of clouds and thick darkness--as the morning spread upon the mountains.

In casting my eye over the various documents upon the table, my attention is for the moment attracted by one which has been placed upon it this morning--a report from the Committee on Revisal and Unfinished Business, upon matters undetermined at the last session. In this I find mention made of several propositions upon the subject of the defence of the nation, which I had the honor then to propose, and which it was not the pleasure of the House then to act upon. Propositions of a similar character, so far as respects the fortification of the ports and harbors, the organization and arming of the militia, and the equipment of the frigates, it is now hinted, will be carried into effect in the course of the present session. I am happy that my doctrines are becoming popular, and that there is some prospect of their adoption. But it is because I fear, and indeed believe, that the present bill is pressed upon us for the purpose of superseding every measure of national defence which would comport with the true interest and the honor of the nation, that I am so decidedly opposed to it, and that I consider the Republic degraded by the substitution of a weak and miserable policy for measures of a manly and magnanimous character, at a crisis which peculiarly requires them.

The principal argument, although this does not seem to be openly avowed, in favor of the present measure, is the supposed predilection of the Executive for this system of defence. Indeed, this is but a new edition, or rather a new volume, of the celebrated proclamation and gunboat system, which, instead of elevating us in the scale of nations, has greatly sunk the national character. The objects in view are to protect the commerce of the Union to a certain extent, and to protect our coasts and seaports. Of course this measure is to constitute a material, if not the principal part of a general system of national defence and protection. The object is proper and patriotic, and it is a subject of deep regret that the means are inefficient. But history and human experience have settled the true character of these machines, and as we have nothing else to hope for, we can expect nothing like an energetic and effectual system.

The President _shall_ recommend. The voice of the constitution is imperative. It makes it the duty of the Chief Executive Magistrate to take upon himself the responsibility of explicitly recommending to the Legislature such measures as he deems the public welfare to require. In making the inquiry, in what manner has this great and solemn duty been performed at the present moment? the transition is easy to the Message of the President at the commencement of this session. These messages, as public documents, and addressed exclusively to the Legislature, are certainly fair subjects of criticism; and whoever shall be impelled by duty to speak unpleasantly of the present system of administration, will have an abundant source of rich consolation in the reflection, that, when gunboats are the subject of discussion, it is impossible to be out of order. The present system begins and ends with gunboats. In the Message to which allusion has been made, which should have been as a polar star to guide us at this dark season, not a single measure is explicitly and unequivocally recommended. I will read that part of it which relates to the Naval Establishment:

“The gunboats already provided have been chiefly assigned to
New York, New Orleans, and the Chesapeake. Whether our movable
force on the water, so material in aid of the defensive works
on the land, should be augmented in this or any other form,
is left to the wisdom of the Legislature. For the purpose of
manning these vessels, in sudden attacks on our harbors, it is
a matter for consideration whether the seamen of the United
States may not justly be formed into a special militia, to be
called on for tours of duty, in defence of the harbors where
they shall happen to be; the ordinary militia of the place
furnishing that portion which may consist of landsmen.”

Here the Executive submits certain matters for consideration, without assuming to himself the responsibility of expressly recommending them. In relation to the Naval Establishment, he only talks of a movable force on the water; and if we should build our flotilla of two hundred and fifty-seven gunboats, at an expense which will be shown to be enormous, and, in the event of a war with Great Britain, two or three British ships of the line, and as many frigates, should come upon our coast, and blow them all to atoms, as would infallibly be the case if they were to come in contact with them, we shall no doubt be told that a wise and prudent Executive never recommended such an ill-judged, degrading, and disastrous measure. But for what purpose are gunboats to be built? To protect commerce and the coast. Every one knows that we cannot protect our commerce in every clime and on every sea against the naval power of Great Britain. It would be unwise, therefore, at present, to exhaust our resources by building a navy of ships of the line. It does not follow, however, that nothing can be done; that we cannot support our own jurisdiction. Nothing effectual, it is certain, can be done by gunboats. They have never been of use but as auxiliaries to more extensive and substantial establishments; and they have always been of so little comparative use, as to render it impossible to ascertain the amount of the service they have rendered. We may safely challenge their advocates to produce a single instance in which, alone and unconnected with works of more consequence, they have been of any essential use at all, for purposes either of offence or defence. In my researches into their history I have met with no instance of the kind. Here I shall advert to a document, the reading of which has been called for by the honorable chairman of the committee on that part of the President’s Message relative to aggressions committed within our waters, and with which I should not otherwise have troubled the House. I do it at this time, because I find my voice failing so fast that I shall be unable to go so fully into the subject as I originally contemplated. This I shall not regret myself, and still less will the House regret it. In the message of February 10, 1807, communicating the information requested by the House of Representatives in relation to the utility and efficacy of gunboats, we find, indeed, that gunboats apparently constitute but a subordinate species of defence, and yet they are spoken of as competent to almost all the purposes of national protection. A flotilla of no less than two hundred is contemplated.

Annexed to the Message are the opinions of several military and naval officers, some of them celebrated and some of them obscure. General Gates, whose memory we all venerate, has been mentioned. He merely gives his opinion, and furnishes no particular information upon the subject. He is followed by General Wilkinson, the hero of the Sabine and New Orleans, the man who violates your constitution at the point of the bayonet in order to preserve it inviolate; the idol of popular delusion for the moment, but the object of a very different homage from the wise and good. Unfortunately, the letter of this great character conveys no information. Commodore Barron says: “Ten or twelve of these boats will probably be sufficient to compel to remove from her position a frigate, and so on in proportion to the size and number of the enemy’s ships. To do more than annoy would be difficult. With those vessels a great number and a long time would be necessary to capture a ship of war; but few commanders would feel secure while open to the attack of an enemy, which, however inferior, he could not destroy.” This is all very candid and very strong reasoning against the cause it is produced to support. It is matter of regret, however, if it ever has been ascertained that gunboats have been able to remove a ship of war from her position, that we have not been put in possession of that information. The following remarks are taken from the communication of Captain Tingey: “The efficacy of gunboats in the defence of coasts, ports, and harbors, must be obvious to every person capable of reflection; when it is considered with what celerity they can generally change their position and mode of attack, extending it widely to as many different directions as their number consists of, or concentrating nearly to one line of direction. Such, indeed, is believed to be the great utility of gunboats for defence, that, notwithstanding the gigantic power of the British Navy, in its present state, a judicious writer in the British Naval Chronicle, after advising a plan for raising a fleet of 150 or 200 gunboats to assist in repelling the threatened invasion of that country, says, ‘a gunboat has this advantage over a battery on shore, that it can be removed at pleasure from place to place, as occasion may require, and a few such vessels, carrying heavy guns, would make prodigious havoc among the enemy’s flat-bottomed boats crowded with soldiers.’” Surely we do not expect the British will come to invade us in flat-bottomed boats. If they should do so, we may array this miserable machinery against them, and shall probably be victorious.

But it is a popular system--the people are in favor of it--and this is an overwhelming answer to every argument that can be urged against it.