Chapter XVII: Front Matter (17)

Mr. L. said he was fully of opinion with the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. EUSTIS) in the sentiments he had expressed. The United States had it eminently in their power to make these people happy without an extension to them of all our privileges. They will not be gratified from knowing that the theory of liberty is extended to them, but from its practical effects. The people of Louisiana know but little of political theories, but they will feel the just operation of equal laws; and if they can obtain practical justice, though it may not arise from an extension of our elementary political principles, they will not find fault with it.

Mr. L. said he was not among those who considered the bill, in all its provisions, perfect. He considered it susceptible of much amendment; though not in the principle now under review. In this provision, by declaring that the inhabitants of the Territory shall compose the Legislative Council, a great point is gained by the people. For it cannot be supposed that the inhabitants, thus called upon to discharge high duties to society, will so far lose sight of their own permanent interests as to sacrifice them, together with the good of the country, to whim or corruption.

Their election by the President is another important security. Suppose the Governor shall wish to render the Council his puppets. The President will not feel an interest in gratifying his improper views. It is, however, said that his information will be derived from the Governor. But the fact is, he will receive it in part from the Governor, and in part from others; and he will be sagacious enough to judge, not from a part, but from the whole that reaches him.

A valuable effect will flow from composing the Council of the inhabitants of the country; its members will thereby be initiated in the theory of our Government and laws, and this knowledge will hereafter qualify them for higher political trusts; they will acquire much political knowledge; they will return home, and their conversation with their friends will naturally turn on political topics, and on the laws they have passed; thus will a spirit of inquiry and of political discussion spring up in the country. When this effect shall be produced, it will be time, and only then, to give them a government as liberal and free as that contemplated by the amendment.

Mr. MACON (Speaker) observed that he coincided in opinion with the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. VARNUM,) whose object would, he thought, be better tried by a motion to strike out the section. This motion would bring the principle before the House. If the section should be stricken out, the bill would be recommitted for new modification to a select committee. Mr. M. accordingly moved to strike out the fourth section.

This motion having been stated from the Chair,

Mr. MACON again rose. I will endeavor, said he, to compress my ideas on this point in a few words. My first objection to the principle contained in the section is, that it establishes a species of government unknown to the laws of the United States. We have three descriptions of Government; that of the Union, that of the States, and Territorial governments. I believe the Territorial government, as established by the ordinance of the Old Congress, the best adapted to the circumstances of the people of Louisiana; and that it may be so modified as best to promote their convenience. The people residing in the Mississippi Territory, are now under this kind of government.[8] Is it not likely that the people of Louisiana will expect the same form of government and laws with their neighbors; and is it not desirable for the general peace and happiness that there should be a correspondence between them? If they are as ignorant as some gentlemen represent them, (and of this I know nothing,) will they not expect the same grade of government with the inhabitants of the Mississippi Territory, with whom they will have a constant intercourse? Although they lived previously under the Spanish Government, and although their number did not entitle them, when formed into a Territory, to the second grade of government, no inconvenience resulted. It is said, in reply to this observation, that a large number of inhabitants of that Territory were Americans. It is true that many of them were native Americans, but some also were Spanish.

The simple question is, what kind of government is most fitted to this people? It is extremely difficult to legislate for a people with whose habits and customs we are unacquainted. I, for one, declare myself unacquainted with them; nor would I in fixing the government, unless for the safety of the Union, do an act capable of disgusting the people for whom it is adopted. It will be a wise policy to avoid whatever is calculated to disgust them. My opinion is that they will be better satisfied with an old-established form of government, than with a new one. Why? Because they have seen it established in the adjacent Territory of Mississippi, and know the manner in which it operates. If there are bad men in Louisiana, will any thing be more easy than to disgust the people against the General Government by showing that they have given one kind of government to the people of the Mississippi Territory, and a different kind to them? In my mind, it is sound policy to give them no cause of complaint. We ought to show them that we consider them one people.

I will not pretend to say that the people of Louisiana are prepared for a State government, which differs most materially from a Territorial government. The best way to prepare them for such a government, is to take the system already known to our laws; one grade or the other of the Territorial government. For myself, I would prefer the adoption of the second grade, but I would prefer the first to any new system. For these reasons, I hope the section will be struck out, and the bill referred to a select committee.

WEDNESDAY, February 29.

_Government of Louisiana._

The House went again into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for the government of Louisiana.

The fourth section of the bill being under consideration--

Mr. JACKSON said: As this section is the corner stone on which the whole superstructure rests, and involves the most important principle of the bill, I will ask the indulgence of the committee to make a few remarks upon it. It presents two important questions; first, whether it is proper on the broad principle of political justice to adopt it? And secondly, whether it is consistent with our treaty with France? Two questions arise out of the first proposition; first, Is the system consonant to the habits of a free people? And, secondly, if not, is it the best calculated to advance the happiness of those who have never tasted the blessings of liberty? The first question requires no discussion; it will be answered in the negative by every section of this Union. Every section has been engaged in forming a constitution, and both the State and Federal constitutions have decided this point in the negative, because neither partake of the aristocratical or monarchical features contained in this section.

It is urged by gentlemen, that we ought to give to this people liberty by degrees. I believe, however, there is no danger of giving them too much of it; and I am unwilling to tarnish the national character by sanctioning the detestable calumny that man is not fitted for freedom. What will the world say if we sanction this principle? They will say we possess the principle of despotism under the garb of Republicans; and that we are insincere, with whatever solemnity we may declare it, in pronouncing all men equal. They will tell us that we have emphatically declared to the American people and to the world, in our first act evincive of emancipation from the tyranny of England, that all men are equal; and that all governments derive their rightful power from the consent of the governed; and that notwithstanding, when the occasion offers, we exercise despotic power, under the pretext that the people are unable to govern themselves.

Mr. HOLLAND.--As my ideas are very different from those of the gentleman who has preceded me, and as I do not believe that either policy or moral obligation recommends the adoption of a system such as he has avowed to be proper, I will, in a few words, state the sentiments I entertain.

Can gentlemen conceive the people of Louisiana, who have just thrown off their chains, qualified to make laws? Under the late system the people had no concern in the government, and it was even criminal for them to concern themselves with it; they were set at a distance from the government, and all required from their hands was, to be passive and obedient. Can it be supposed such a people made the subject of government their study, or can it be presumed they know any thing about the principles of the Constitution of the United States? Would persons thus elected be of any service to the Government? So far from being an assistance, they would be an encumbrance. Why then impose this burden upon them? The object of this bill is to extend the laws of the United States over Louisiana, not to enable the people of Louisiana to make laws. This extension, so far from being an act of despotism, will be an important privilege. If the laws of the United States were founded in injustice they might have some right to complain, but we only apply to them laws by which we ourselves consent to be governed.

The provisions of this section are said to be worse than those of the first grade of Territorial governments; but this is incorrect. This plan is not equal to the second grade, but it is certainly superior to the first grade. The first grade gives the Governor and judges all the powers granted by this section; and this section, in addition to the Governor and judges, contemplates the appointment of thirteen councillors. Is not this preferable to giving the whole power to the Governor and judges?

Mr. BOYLE said he should not have risen on this occasion but for the impression that some arguments of weight had been omitted, or had not been sufficiently dwelt on. In the few remarks he purposed to make, he should endeavor to avoid a repetition of ideas already expressed. It was not so much to the novelty, as to the nature of the plan of government contained in the fourth section, that he was opposed. He did not consider the Territorial government proposed to be substituted as perfect, but he believed it infinitely preferable to that contemplated in the bill. Preferring, therefore, either grade to this, said Mr. B., I shall concur in supporting the substitution of the second grade as most fitted to the circumstances of the people of Louisiana. I feel peculiarly hostile to the mode of appointing the Legislative Council. The power of appointing them is unnecessarily vested in the President. Waiving all objection arising from the distance of the President from the men to be appointed; from the necessity of his relying on the representations of others as to their qualifications, and his liability to be deceived by misrepresentations; still one objection remains, which, to my mind, is most important. I am, said Mr. B., unwilling to extend executive patronage beyond the line of irresistible necessity. For, I believe, if ever this country is to follow the destiny of other nations, this destiny will be accelerated by the overwhelming torrent of executive patronage. I feel as high a veneration for the present Chief Magistrate as any man on this floor. Early attached to him, I have retained the full force of my regard for him. But, were he an angel, instead of a man, I would not clothe him with this power; because, in my estimation, the investiture of such high powers is unnecessary. My opinion is, that they will be more properly exercised by the people. To give them to the President is to furnish a dangerous precedent for extending executive power and patronage; and as he has himself said, one precedent in favor of power is stronger than a hundred against it. I am in favor of giving to the people all that portion of self-government and independence which is compatible with the constitution.

WEDNESDAY, March 7.

_Georgia Claims._

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill providing for the settlement of sundry claims to public lands lying south of the State of Tennessee; to which Committee of the Whole were also referred, on the twentieth ultimo, a motion containing sundry resolutions “respecting claimants to the said lands under an act of the Legislature of the State of Georgia, passed in the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five.”

Mr. J. RANDOLPH called for the reading of sundry resolutions lately offered by him on this subject. The resolutions having been read, Mr. R. said, when he had submitted them, it was with the view of trying the question then before the committee as he thought fairly. It was no part of his intention to embarrass the operations of the friends of the bill, further than to take the sense of the committee and of the House on each specific proposition embraced by the resolutions. His wish, therefore, was, that the sense of the committee, in the first instance, should be taken on the resolutions. If they should be rejected, the vote of rejection would be a virtual admission of the claims of 1795; and gentlemen might then modify the bill in such manner as might best please them to do.

Mr. MITCHILL.--These resolutions tend to involve Congress in the proceedings of the State of Georgia. I consider myself as one of those who, by assenting to certain acts heretofore passed by Congress, have consented to a hearing and compromise with the grantees. If this construction be correct, the Committee are precluded from adopting these resolutions; nor is it proper, in my opinion, for Congress to go into a view of the proceedings of Georgia on this occasion. That State is sovereign to a certain extent, and this Government possesses no right to interfere with her sovereignty. Attached to this sovereignty is the right of granting land belonging to her. But it is alleged that Georgia was, in the year 1795, in a disorderly state, and that a certain Legislature in that year did a certain act which a subsequent Legislature declared to be totally unauthorized. This may be so. It is certain the second Legislature declared the act of the first null, under circumstances of a very extraordinary nature. I do not, however, see that it is our duty to give an opinion whether the Legislature of Georgia acted wickedly or uprightly. Whichever course they may have pursued, I do not believe this body to be a constitutional board of censors. We find frequent occasions enough on which, without going out of our way, our duty calls upon us to give our opinions. Believing this to be an occasion on which no opinion is required from us, and one which it is most prudent to pass by without giving such opinion, I wish not to vote for or against the resolutions. I am, therefore, for the committee’s rising and reporting the bill.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH.--I had hoped that when these resolutions were sent from the House to the committee, they would have received the respectful attention to which every such reference is entitled; and that the committee would at least have deemed them worthy of some expression of opinion on them; that they would have deigned to say whether the reasoning or facts contained in them are or are not erroneous and unfounded. The gentleman from New York tells the committee that, by an act passed at a previous session of Congress, a pledge has been given to a certain description of claimants under the act of 1795, to do something in relation to their claims. If so, is this a reason for not acting on the resolutions? No; it is a reason for taking them up and rejecting them. One of those resolutions says, and I am prepared to prove it true, and I call on gentlemen to show its falsehood, “that the claims of persons derived under the act of January first, 1795, are recognized neither by any compact between the United States and the State of Georgia, nor by any act of the Federal Government.” I deny that they are so recognized. If they are, what can be easier than for the learned gentleman to refer to the compact under which they are recognized? This he cannot show, and hence his unwillingness to express an opinion. At an antecedent session we passed a law on this subject. The gentleman may have given his vote for this law under the impression he states, but it does not follow that the Legislature acted under the same impression; on the contrary, I know several gentlemen who voted for it, though hostile to the claims under the act of 1795, because it contained a general provision for claims, and did not particularly recognize those arising under the act of 1795; and now, because Congress have passed an act of a general nature, when it was notorious there are a variety of claims besides those under the act of 1795, and none of which are mentioned either in the compact or treaty with the State of Georgia, it is said we have given a pledge, and we are called upon to fulfil it. And this language is held by gentlemen who, in the same breath, have expressed a disposition to reject another description of claims. Could absurdity speak in stronger language? A general appropriation has been made by Congress for claims; the claims preferred are of two classes--those under the acts of 1789 and 1795. There might have been claims of a hundred other descriptions--for all these Congress have made a general appropriation--and yet we are told by gentlemen hostile to the claims of 1789 that we are pledged to provide for those of 1795. If we are pledged to satisfy one description, are we not equally pledged to the other? But the truth is, we have given no pledge. If we have, nothing is so easy as to refer to the statute book, and to point it out. No such pledge is recognized by our compact with Georgia. While I am up, permit me to say, if the compact with Georgia be construed according to its letter, the appropriation of $5,000,000 ought to be considered as not embracing claims under the act of 1795, for the best reason in the world: the statute book of Georgia shows the reason. But, say gentlemen, we possess the power to satisfy these claims, though such satisfaction may not have been contemplated by our compact with Georgia. There must, say they, have been an understanding between the Commissioners of Georgia and our Commissioners in favor of compromising them, and therefore it is inferred that we ought to be governed more by the _quo animo_ with which the compact was formed than by its strict letter; it is accordingly attempted to be proved, that there was an understanding between our Commissioners and those of Georgia, that relief should be extended to claimants under the act of 1795. I am authorized by the Commissioners to say that this was not the case. Whether, therefore, we are governed by the strict letter of the contract, or by the _quo animo_, we cannot discover the grounds for this opinion. I have been told, in a way which removes all doubts, by the Commissioners on both sides, at least by a Commissioner of the United States having a great participation in the business, and by the Georgia Commissioners, that the stipulation in the compact was not inserted at the instance of Georgia, but reluctantly inserted by them at the instance of the Commissioners of the United States.

Mr. MACON (Speaker) remarked that this question, like many others which presented themselves, had taken up a long time in discussing the preliminary point that might have been required on the resolutions. To rise and report the bill, without acting on the resolutions, would be a virtual rejection of them; especially as the House had determined to rise on the 19th. For one, Mr. M. said, he was ready to vote on the resolutions. If it were wrong to vote on them, it was certainly proper to vote against their reference. But why not vote on them? We may not all agree; but have we not a right to think for ourselves? Let us then meet them, and vote as we see best. Mr. M. said he was more desirous of meeting the question, as he differed from those with whom he generally coincided in opinion. It may be said the resolutions embrace an abstract question. If so, gentlemen ought not to have allowed their reference. In the present stage of the business, no question could be taken unless in the committee, or on a motion to discharge the committee from their further consideration. Mr. M. said, he thought it the right of every member of a deliberative body to express his sentiments and record his opinion on any subject before it. This had always been the practice. He trusted, therefore, the committee would not rise, but proceed to the discussion of the resolutions.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH.--I little expected to stand on this floor, in the list of persons hostile to State rights--to be charged, as the gentleman before me has expressed himself, with having brought forward propositions subversive of the rights of the States. The sovereignty of the States has ever been the cardinal principle of my political opinions, and in the outset, I enlisted under the banner of State rights in opposition to federal usurpation. The doctrine of exalting the General Government on the ruin of the authority of the States, is at length exploded, and those who have heretofore been most conspicuous in encroaching upon the rights of the States, generally, and upon those of Georgia in particular, are now foremost in displaying their zeal for both. I cannot but rejoice at the acquisition which this cause has made. But to those of its friends who are too new to it to understand its interests as yet, I would recommend, that they would take the conduct of the Georgia delegation as an evidence of the rights and interests of that State. They surely are not so destitute of information or fidelity, as to misunderstand or abandon the rights of the people whom they represent.--So long, however, as I have the honor of concurring with them in opinion, I shall be very easy under any clamor which the new friends of Georgia and of the rights of States may endeavor to excite. If, however, gentlemen are unwilling to rely on the opinions of so few, however respectable men, I refer them to the act of the Legislature of Georgia herself, generally called the rescinding act, passed under circumstances of unparalleled unanimity, and confirmed by the general voice of the people, who subsequently recognized it in, and ingrafted it upon their constitution. If still they remain dissatisfied, I would ask them if the recognition of the claims against Georgia, in the bill which they are so eager to pass, be not equally a violation of the rights of that State, with the rejection of those claims. Does not the bill before you, in pronouncing upon the validity of the act of Georgia, equally involve the principle against which gentlemen protest so loudly, with the resolutions themselves? They have their choice either to pronounce the corrupt act of 1795, or the rescinding act of 1796, invalid. Are not the rights of Georgia as much affected by the one as by the other? and even more, by annulling the act of 1796, since she alone recognizes that to be her own.

Here Mr. R. read the first and second resolutions:

“_Resolved_, That the State of Georgia was at no time invested
with the power of alienating the right of soil possessed by the
good people of that State in and to the vacant territory of the
same, but in a rightful manner and for the general good.”

Who will deny it? If Georgia has made a valid contract we must execute it. If invalid, there is no obligation on us to perform it.

“That when the governors of any people shall have betrayed
the confidence reposed in them, and shall have exercised that
authority with which they have been invested for the general
welfare, to promote their own private ends, under the basest
motives, and to the public detriment, it is the inalienable
right of a people, thus circumstanced, to revoke the authority
thus abused, to resume the rights thus attempted to be
bartered, and to abrogate the act thus endeavoring to betray
them.”

I am afraid if we deny this position we have no title to show for our own existence as a nation.

Mr. R. here read the third resolution:

“That it is in evidence to this House that the act of the
Legislature of Georgia passed on the 7th of January, 1795,
entitled an act &c., was passed by persons under the influence
of gross and palpable corruption, practised by the grantees
of the lands attempted to be alienated by the aforesaid
act, tending to enrich and aggrandize, to a degree almost
incalculable, a few individuals, and ruinous to the public
interest.”

If there be any objection in my mind to this resolution, it is that it does not sufficiently detail what it contains in substance; that the vendors of this iniquitous bargain being at the same time the vendees, the contract was therefore void. On a former occasion, when this position was advanced, we were told that, on the same principle, the sale of our western lands might be set aside, since members of the Legislature speculated in them to a vast amount. However indecorous and reprehensible this may have been in persons in their situation; there was a wide and material difference between the sales made by the United States and a pretended sale like this--not of a few acres, but of millions; not of sections and half sections, but of thousands of square miles; not measured by chains and perches, but by circles of latitude and longitude; not made in the face of day, on public notice, for a reasonable equivalent, and with the general participation of the citizens, but bartered away in the dark by wholesale for the emolument of the partners in the job, for a pretended consideration too paltry to give an air of validity to the contract; and even this sum, pitiful as it was, had since been drawn from the treasury of Georgia by those who had paid it, or others claiming under them by an act yet more infamous and disgraceful if possible than that by which it was deposited there. But it is not my intention at this time to enter into the particulars of this transaction. In the former stages of this bill I have endeavored to give a faithful history of it. Weak and vain, however, must be every effort to do justice to this enormous and atrocious procedure. Some gentlemen indeed will tell you that we have no proof of these facts. The depositions are _ex parte_, say they, and therefore in strictness of law cannot be considered as evidence. But when was it known that men could not legislate on less than legal evidence? Have we not the same evidence of the fraud that we have of the existence of the claims? Are not the evidences of both in the same report? the same proof of the corruption as of the claims? They both hang together. Do not gentlemen themselves admit the existence of the corruption? On what other principle could they justify their proposition to withhold from these harpies the whole of their glorious booty, and put them off with a comparative pittance? Set aside the evidence of the corruption, and it cannot be denied, that instead of five, they are entitled to fifty millions of acres. I repeat they are entitled to all or nothing. We at least are consistent, we deny their title to anything, and we propose to give them nothing. Gentlemen on the other side can support the claim to the five millions, which they propose to give, only by arguments which justify a claim to ten times that amount.

Mr. R. here read the fourth resolution:

“That the good people of Georgia, impressed with general
indignation at the act of atrocious perfidy and unparalleled
corruption, with a promptitude of decision highly honorable
to them, did, by the act of a subsequent Legislature, passed
on the 13th day of February, 1796, under circumstances of
peculiar solemnity, and finally sanctioned by the people, who
have subsequently ingrafted it on their constitution, declare
the preceding act and the grants made under it, in themselves
null and void; that the said act should be expunged from the
records of the State and publicly burnt--which was accordingly
done--provision at the same time being made for restoring
the pretended purchase money to the grantees, by whom, or by
persons claiming under them, the greater part of the said
purchase money has been withdrawn from the treasury of Georgia.”

This is another of the resolutions not even substantially embraced in the proffered amendment, which has been rejected by the committee. The evidence of the facts contained in the former part of it is to be found in the act of Georgia, which I hold in my hand, commonly called the rescinding act. The report of our Commissioners furnishes the proof of the withdrawal of the money, with a detailed statement of that nefarious business, which in the former stages of this bill has been amply explained. In the rescinding act the Legislature of Georgia take other objections to the usurpation of 1795, besides those founded on its corruption. They deny the constitutional right of their predecessors to have made such an alienation of the public domain, even with honorable views and for a fair equivalent. They declare that their constitution prescribes a certain mode whereby vacant lands shall be sold and granted, and that the pretended act of 1795 is void, not only from its corruption, but from its contravening those provisions. This is a weighty and vital objection. The slow yet equitable method known to the Constitution of Georgia of laying off new counties, granting out the lands, when they were appropriated and settled, laying off and settling others, was ill-suited to the gigantic rapacity of the Assembly of 1795, and their ravenous accomplices, who grasped at every acre within the nominal limits of the State, whether covered by Indian titles, or whether those claims were extinguished.

I must beg leave, in answer to the objection of some gentlemen here, to repeat what was advanced by me in a former discussion of the subject. Georgia ceded this territory to us subject to certain specified claims, arising under Great Britain, under Spain, and under her Bourbon act, as it is commonly called, which has no relation to any of the Yazoo acts, as they are termed. For these claims we have stipulated to provide, moreover paying her a certain sum out of the first proceeds of the lands, as a consideration for the grant. Besides the above-mentioned claims there were others not recognized by, or provided for, in our compact. In relation to these, Georgia gives a reluctant assent, (which is to be inferred as well from the expressions which are used in the treaty, as from the declaration of the Commissioners on both sides,) that we may apply, not exceeding five millions of acres to quiet other claims, generally, without specifying what they are--the appropriation not to exceed the amount above, and to be made within six months from the ratification of the compact, or to revert back to Georgia. Among the claims of this vague description may be ranked those of the Virginia and South Carolina Yazoo Companies (under the act of Georgia of 1789, and those arising under the corrupt act of 1795.) We are at liberty, therefore, to give these reserved five millions of acres to either, or to both, of those descriptions of conflicting claimants, but we are certainly not bound to bestow an acre on one of them, either by compact with Georgia or by our own act of appropriation. When that act passed it was at the close of our session; there was not time to investigate any of these claims. It was then understood that some of them were equitable, and not founded in corruption. If we had not then made the appropriation, the term within which we were permitted to make it, would have elapsed before the next session of Congress. We therefore made the appropriation in the same general terms of our compact with Georgia, pledging ourselves to none, while we thereby reserved the right of examining and recompensing all, in case they should thereafter be found to deserve it. The day of investigation having arrived, you are invited to decline it altogether, and hold that the reservation of the right to give, is converted by some political magic into a duty, and that too by those who propose to give nothing to the companies of 1789, although their claim is embraced by the general provision of our compact with Georgia, and by the terms of our act of appropriation as much as the claims of the companies of 1795.

FRIDAY, March 9.

_Government of Louisiana._

The House went into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for the government of Louisiana. The fifth section being read, as follows:

“SEC. 5. The judicial power shall be vested in a superior
court, and in such inferior courts, and justices of the peace,
as the Legislature of the Territory may, from time to time,
establish. The judges of the superior court, and the justices
of the peace, shall hold their offices for the term of four
years. The superior court shall consist of three judges,
any one of whom shall constitute a court. They shall have
jurisdiction in all criminal cases, and exclusive jurisdiction
in all those which are capital, and original and appellate
jurisdiction in all civil cases of the value of one hundred
dollars. Its sessions shall commence on the first Monday of
every month, and continue till all the business depending
before them shall be disposed of. They shall appoint their own
clerk. In all criminal prosecutions which are capital, the
trial shall be by a jury of twelve good and lawful men of the
vicinage; and in all cases, criminal and civil, in the superior
court, the trial shall be by a jury, if either of the parties
require it. The inhabitants of the said Territory shall be
entitled to the benefits of the writ of _habeas corpus_; they
shall be bailable, unless for capital offences, where the proof
shall be evident, or the presumption great; and no cruel and
unusual punishment shall be inflicted:”

Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL moved to strike out “which are capital, the trial shall be by a jury of twelve good and lawful men of the vicinage; and in all cases, criminal and civil, in the superior court, the trial shall be by a jury, if either of the parties require it,” and to insert “the trial shall be by jury, and in all civil cases above the value of twenty dollars.”

Mr. C. said he conceived that in legislating for the people of Louisiana, they were bound by the Constitution of the United States, and that they had not a right to establish courts in that Territory on any other terms than they could in any of the States. Wherever courts were established in a Territory, they must be considered as courts of the United States, and of consequence cannot be otherwise constituted than as courts in the States. The constitution expressly declares that, in criminal cases the trial shall be by jury, and in all civil cases where the sum in controversy exceeds the value of twenty dollars, the trial shall be likewise by jury. In the ninth article of the amendments to the constitution, we find the following words: “In suits at common law where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” The eighth article says: “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.”

I will observe that the right of trial given by this section, to wit: “if either of the parties require it,” is a dangerous mode of proceeding, and may tend unwarily to entrap them. The person brought before the court for a misdemeanor, asked if he requires a jury trial, may be ignorant of the evidence, and may not know the benefits of a trial by jury; he must at all events show a want of confidence in the court, or waive a jury trial. If he does the first, he may sour the minds of the court. The party is thus put in a situation which may be worse than if he was deprived altogether of the right of a trial, by the necessity of making a choice which may operate more against him. The bill therefore does not secure the right of a jury trial, as contemplated by the constitution.

Mr. SLOAN said a few words in support of the motion, which was lost--yeas 20.

[At this stage of the business we attended the trial of impeachment in the Senate, and cannot with perfect correctness state the further proceedings of the House on the bill. We understand, however, that the new section, sometime since offered by Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL, providing for the election of a Legislature by the people of Louisiana, instead of their being governed according to the bill from the Senate by a council appointed by the President, was disagreed to--yeas 37, nays 43.--_Reporter._][9]

SATURDAY, March 10.

_Georgia Claims._

Mr. J. RANDOLPH moved the taking up for consideration the resolution offered by him on the claims under the act of Georgia of 1795.

Mr. ELLIOT moved the order of the day on the bill for the compromise of those and other claims.

Mr. GREGG moved to postpone the further consideration of the resolutions till the first day of December next. He was, he said, perfectly prepared to act on the bill for the settlement of the claims, and to give it his decided negative; and should have no objections, but for the lateness of the session, and the great mass of important business that demanded attention.

The SPEAKER said, the motion to consider the resolutions, being first made, must be first put.

It accordingly was put, and carried--yeas 58.

Mr. JACKSON then moved a postponement of the resolutions until the 1st Monday in December.

Mr. STANFORD inquired whether the motion of postponement was not susceptible of a division, so as to apply to each resolution separately.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH hoped the question would be so taken.

Mr. RODNEY expressed the same wish, and that the yeas and nays might be taken on each division of the question. He was opposed to a postponement. He should not have risen at this late period but for the warm opposition the resolutions had received from various quarters, and but for his desire to avail himself of the opportunity to state his reasons for giving them a firm support.

It is objected to these resolutions that they are abstract propositions. By abstract principles, I understand axioms unapplied. But when they are applied to facts, they cease to be considered in the abstract. In geometry there are certain elementary principles which are the basis of all reasoning on any proposition in that department of science. So in law there are principles in the abstract while they remain unapplied, and which bear in every case where facts admit of their application. So in politics certain principles are held sacred, either in the view of right, or in relation to the constitution of a State. But when these principles are applied to a given state of things, they cease to be abstract. In the Declaration of Independence there are several abstract principles, such as “that all men are free,” &c. But when applied to a certain state of things, they are no longer abstract. I apprehend, therefore, that my worthy friend from Pennsylvania will, on more mature reflection, perceive that the principles contained in the resolutions bearing on facts cease to be abstract; on facts which it is necessary for us to decide, and against examining the consequences of which no reason can be urged. But, says another gentleman, we have no jurisdiction in the case; we have nothing to do with the act of Georgia of 1795; we have no authority over it. I confess myself really surprised to be assured, over and over again, that the act of 1795 which gives the House all this trouble, is the corner stone of the present claims, and without which there would not be a shadow of claim, is not to be considered as blended with our proceedings. What! when we are called upon to compromise claims, are we not to go to the cause, to the fountain source, and decide whether they have, or have not, a foundation in justice? Put the act of 1795 out of the way, and would we have ever heard of this compromise? Remove it, and would we have a single claimant before us soliciting a compromise? I consider the act, to Georgia, as involving the all-important point; as intimately and indissolubly blended with the question before us. That question is whether we will consent to give five millions to effect a compromise of claims, directly emanating from the act of 1795; and then, as an incidental question, we are obliged to look at the act of 1795. If the House have authority over the main question, _ex vi termini_, they have authority over every question incidental to it; and common sense teaches us that it is absolutely necessary to determine on the validity of the act of 1795, in order to decide the justice or policy of compromising claims arising out of it.

Having settled, as I conceive, these preliminary points, I will call the attention of the House to the great point on which their decision must turn. Either the act of 1795 or of 1796 is in force. If that of 1795 is in force the claimants have a legal title to unascertained millions. If that act is not binding, they have no claim at all. If that act is of no authority, there is an end of their title. The tree is cut up by the roots, and all its branches fall. They have either then a title to fifty millions, or they have no title at all. Their case cannot be compared to a common saying, which declares half a loaf better than no bread.

Now let us compare these facts and reasonings with the resolutions. When I rose I intended to have taken them up in order, but as I have been diverted by the course of the argument, I shall pursue the track I have taken. One of the resolutions states “that a subsequent legislature of an individual State has an undoubted right to repeal any act of a preceding legislature, provided such repeal be not forbidden by the constitution of such State, or of the United States.”

This is, I think, a plain and clear axiom. Both legislatures flow from the same source, and are armed with equal powers. What one legislature can do, another may undo, if the interest of the public prescribes it. I know an ingenious distinction is taken, as to the power of a legislative body, between municipal acts and those constituting contracts. The distinction holds to a certain degree as to expediency, but not as to power. When a legislative body forms a contract, it is a solemn thing, and it ought not to be touched, except when the private evil arising from its being annulled should rather be endured than the public calamity arising from its continuance. But still the position of the resolution is perfectly tenable. What one legislature has done another may undo; what one has enacted, a subsequent one may repeal.

Let us examine whether there is any thing in the rescinding act of Georgia at variance with the constitution of that State, or the Constitution of the United States. The whole course of the business shows the previous act to have been a violation of the Constitution of Georgia. The Constitution of the United States declares that no State “shall pass any _ex post facto_ law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.” That no contract has been impaired, is evident from attending to the sense of the word. I know of no contract formed, either in a legal or equitable sense. Did the Constitution of Georgia authorize her Representatives to rob the people of their property? Or did it authorize them only to dispose of it for their welfare? If they had a right to dispose of it in a wrongful manner, it knocks up the argument at once. If they were vested with a right to rob and plunder their constituents, I give up the point. But until this is shown I shall remain of opinion that they only had the right of disposing of it for the general good. I am not about to travel through the fruitful wilderness of inquiry disclosed in the progress of this affair. But gentlemen say that we have no evidence of corruption. What do they want more than we possess? The whole business has been referred to a set of Commissioners, whose comprehensive powers embraced an investigation of every claim. They have fully examined the claims under the act of 1795, and they have reported that--

“A comparison of the schedule annexed to the articles, and
which is declared to be a part of the agreement, with the yeas
and nays on the passage of the act authorizing the sale, (E.)
shows that all the members, both in the Senate and House, who
voted in favor of the law, were, with one single exception,
(Robert Watkins, whose name does not appear,) interested in,
and parties to, the purchase.

“The articles of agreement, and list of associates of the
Tennessee company, which have been voluntarily furnished by
one of the trustees, show that a number of the members of the
Legislature were also interested in that company.”

This stubborn fact appears on the face of a report made by persons duly authorized to investigate the whole transaction. The fact is indisputable, and ought to satisfy the most reluctant and unwilling mind of the enormity of the corruption attending this business. It is fully satisfactory to my mind. But it is said that this statement is founded on _ex parte_ depositions, and that no opportunity has been allowed to cross-examine the witnesses. But where were they taken? In Georgia; in probably the same House that witnessed the scene of disgrace; by a tribunal competent to take them and to inquire into facts.

Upon the whole, it appears to me most evident, on referring to the acts of Georgia, the articles of cession, and the laws of Congress, that the claims under the acts of Georgia have no validity. If, therefore, we give any thing, it must be from compassion, and not from the obligations of justice. Let the House, ere it do this, reflect whether there are not objects in the country equally worthy of their compassion. Let them visit the straw shed of the war-worn soldier who bled in the defence of our rights; the comfortless hut of the widow who lost her husband in battle. With but little search we shall find a mountain of claims that overhangs the justice of the country. If, after this view, we shall consider any unfortunate victims of injustice in this transaction entitled to compassion, I will agree to go as far as any man in affording them relief. But were we as rich as Crœsus, I would first administer relief to the Belisariuses of our country. Let us be just to these before we are generous to other descriptions of claimants.

Mr. T. M. RANDOLPH.--Mr. Speaker: I hope the House will not consent to postpone these resolutions. I hope it will, on the contrary, immediately proceed to consider them, and conclude by adopting them, for, taken generally, they meet my warm approbation as to the principles they lay down, and I am anxious to see the last one, which is the fair corollary of the other, incorporated into the bill now before us.

My opinion is, that it will cast a broad stain on the American character, as it must be exhibited in future history, for this body which represents it to grant compensation for their pretended losses, under whatever form ingenuity may invent to disguise it, to any of those adventurers who made the spurious contract with Georgia in the year 1795, for the purchase of her western territory, upon the ground that the fictitious bargain gave the least shadow of title to any part of that territory. This opinion is a conviction irresistibly given to my mind by an impartial investigation, that what were at that time called companies of land adventurers, were, with the exception of one or two misled individuals, whose delusion and consequent implication I lament, no other, in their conduct on this occasion, than shameless bands of sharpers; what was impudently called a contract, was, in reality, a fraud of unprecedented enormity, and what has since been declared an unjust interposition of the primary sovereign authority of the State, to cancel a fair bargain, was no more than the regular and proper application of the only sufficient means which could be used to redress a cheat upon the people of Georgia of unparalleled audacity and magnitude. I am sorry, by entertaining this opinion, to differ with so many on this floor, with whom it is my pride to think; but I am not much surprised at that difference. Very rarely, indeed, have I heard of important questions which did not divide opinions; never have I been at a criminal trial where numbers did not doubt the reality of the crime. Such is the difference in the impression made by the same testimony upon different minds. Were it not for this extraordinary circumstance in our nature, which almost precludes unanimity, and which completely defies explanation upon any general principles of the moral structure of man, there would be but one sentiment in this House upon the question now before it. The information which has satisfied my mind, I have derived from the declarations of the counties of Georgia, in their petitions and remonstrances presented to the convention of that State, which assembled in the month of May, 1795; from the acknowledgment made by that convention of the dignity of those applications, and the respect due to them, in the resolve which referred the matter they contained to the consideration of the succeeding Legislature; from the proceedings of the General Assembly of 1796, upon that matter, and the evidence it collected and recorded relative thereto; and, lastly, from certain declarations and provisions confirming those proceedings, and thereby establishing that evidence, which were made by the convention of 1798, and which exist now in the body of the present Constitution of Georgia. The same means of information are within the reach of all; I ought to say, should be possessed by all; I might say, should be satisfactory to all; since the witnesses are the great body of the people of one of our respectable States, and the testimony is authenticated, confirmed, and preserved, as well by the constitutional as the ordinary code of that State.