Chapter XXI: Front Matter (21)

But this juror had formed no opinion about the guilt or innocence of the party accused; which depended on four facts wholly distinct from the opinion which he had formed. First, whether the contents of the book were really such as had been represented to him? Secondly, whether they should, on the trial, be proved to be true? Thirdly, whether the party accused was really the author or publisher of this book? And fourthly, whether he wrote or published it “with intent to defame the President, or to bring him into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against him the hatred of the good people of the United States?” On all these questions, the mind of the juror was perfectly at large, notwithstanding the opinion which he had formed. He might, consistently with that opinion, determine them all in the negative; and it was on them that the issue between the United States and James Thompson Callender depended. Consequently, this juror, notwithstanding the opinion which he had thus formed, did stand indifferent as to the matter in issue, in the legal and proper sense, and in the only sense in which such indifference can ever exist; and therefore his having formed that opinion, was not such an excuse as could have justified the Court in discharging him from the jury.

And the said Samuel Chase, for plea to the said second article of impeachment, saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor, as in and by the said second article is alleged against him; and this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to them to require.

The third article of impeachment alleges that this respondent “with intent to oppress and procure the conviction of the prisoner, did not permit the evidence of John Taylor, a material witness in behalf of the said Callender, to be given in, on pretence that the said witness could not prove the truth of the whole of one of the charges contained in the indictment, although the said charge embraced more than one fact.”

In answer to this charge, this respondent begs leave to submit the following facts and observations:

The indictment against James Thompson Callender, which has been already mentioned, and of which a copy is exhibited with this answer, consisted of two distinct and separate counts, each of which contained twenty distinct and independent charges, or sets of words. Each of those sets of words was charged as a libel against John Adams, as President of the United States, and the twelfth charge embraced the following words: “He (meaning President Adams) was a professed aristocrat; he proved faithful and serviceable to the British interest.” The defence set up was confined to this charge, and was rested upon the truth of the words. To the other nineteen charges no defence of any kind was attempted or spoken of, except such as might arise from the supposed unconstitutionality of the sedition law; which, if solid, applied to the twelfth charge as well as to the other nineteen. It was to prove the truth of these words that John Taylor, the person mentioned in the article of impeachment now under consideration, was offered as a witness. It can hardly be necessary to remind this honorable Court, that when an indictment for a libel contains several distinct charges, founded on distinct sets of words, the party accused, who in such cases is called the “traverser,” must be convicted, unless he makes a sufficient defence against every charge. His innocence on one, does not prove him innocent on the others. If the sedition law should be considered as unconstitutional, the whole indictment, including this twelfth charge, must fall to the ground, whether the words in question were proved to be true or not. If the law should be considered as constitutional, then the traverser, whether the words in the twelfth charge were proved to be true or not, must be convicted on the other nineteen charges, against which no defence was offered. This conviction on nineteen charges would put the traverser as completely in the power of the Court, by which the amount of the fine and the term of the imprisonment were to be fixed, as a conviction upon all the twenty charges. The imprisonment could not exceed two years, nor the fine be more than two thousand dollars. If, then, this respondent were desirous of procuring the conviction of the traverser, he was sure of his object without rejecting the testimony of John Taylor. If his temper towards the traverser were so vindictive as to make him feel anxious to obtain an opportunity and excuse for inflicting on him the whole extent of punishment permitted by the law, still a conviction on nineteen charges afforded this opportunity and excuse as fully as a conviction on twenty charges. One slander more or less, in such a publication as the “Prospect before Us,” could surely be of no moment. To attain this object, therefore, it was not necessary to reject the testimony of John Taylor.

That the Court did not feel this vindictive spirit is clearly evinced by the moderation of the punishment, which actually was inflicted on the traverser, after he was convicted of the whole twenty charges. Instead of two thousand dollars, he was fined only two hundred, and was sentenced to only nine months’ imprisonment, instead of two years. And this respondent avers that he never felt or expressed a wish to go further; but that in this decision, as well as in every other given in the course of the trial, he fully and freely concurred with his colleague, Judge Griffin.

In the case under consideration, no proof was offered as to the whole matter contained in the twelfth article. No witness except the above-mentioned John Taylor was produced or mentioned. When a witness is offered to a court and jury, it is the right and duty of the court to require a statement of the matters intended to be proved by him. This is the invariable practice of all our courts, and was done most properly by this respondent and his colleague, on the occasion in question. From the statement given by the traverser’s counsel of what they expected to prove by the said witness, it appeared that his testimony could have no possible application to any part of the indictment, except the twelfth charge above mentioned, and but a very weak and imperfect application even to that part. The Court, therefore, as it was their right and duty, requested that the questions intended to be put to the witness should be reduced to writing, and submitted to their inspection, so as to enable them to judge more accurately, how far those questions were proper and admissible. This being done, the questions were of the following tenor and effect:

1st. “Did you ever hear Mr. Adams express any sentiments favorable to monarchy, or ‘aristocracy,’ and what were they?”

2d. “Did you ever hear Mr. Adams, while Vice President, express his disapprobation of the funding system?”

3d. “Do you know whether Mr. Adams did not, in the year 1794, vote against the sequestration of British debts, and also against the bill for suspending intercourse with Great Britain?”

The second question, it is manifest, had nothing to do with the charge; for Mr. Adams’ approbation or disapprobation of the funding system could not have the most remote tendency to prove that he was an aristocrat, or had proved faithful and serviceable to the British interest. The third question was in reality as far as the second from any connection with the matter in issue, although its irrelevancy is not quite so apparent. Mr. Adams’s having voted against the two measures alluded to in that question, if he did in fact vote against them, could by no means prove that he was “faithful and serviceable to the British interest,” in any sense, much less with those improper and criminal views, with which the publication in question certainly meant to charge him. The fact, if true, was _no_ evidence to support such an inference, therefore the fact was immaterial; and as it is the province and duty of the Court, in such circumstances, to decide on the materiality of facts offered in evidence, it follows clearly that it was the right and duty of the Court, in this instance, to reject the third question; an affirmative answer to which could have proved nothing in support of the defence.

For these reasons this respondent did concur with his colleague, the said Cyrus Griffin, in rejecting the three above-mentioned questions; but not any other testimony that the said John Taylor might have been able to give.

And for plea to the said third article of impeachment, the said Samuel Chase saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor, as in and by the said third article is alleged against him: this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to them to require.

The fourth article of impeachment alleges, that during the whole course of the trial of James Thompson Callender, above mentioned, the conduct of this respondent was marked by “manifest injustice, partiality, and intemperance;” and five particular instances of the “injustice, partiality, and intemperance,” are adduced.

The first consists, “in compelling the prisoner’s counsel to reduce to writing and submit to the inspection of the Court, for their admission or rejection, all questions which the said counsel meant to propound to the above-mentioned John Taylor, the witness.”

This respondent, in answer to this part of the article now under consideration, admits that the Court, consisting of himself and the above-mentioned Cyrus Griffin, did require the counsel for the traverser, on the trial of James Thompson Callender, above mentioned, to reduce to writing the questions which they intended to put to the said witness. But he denies that it is more his act than the act of his colleague, who fully concurred in this measure. The measure, as he apprehends and insists, was legal and proper; his reasons for adopting it, and he presumes those of his colleague, he will submit to this honorable Court, in order to show that if he, in common with his colleague, committed an error, it was an error into which the best and wisest men might have honestly fallen.

The next circumstance stated by the article now under consideration, as an instance and proof of “manifest injustice, partiality, and intemperance” in this respondent, is his refusal to postpone the trial of the said James Thompson Callender, “although an affidavit was regularly filed, stating the absence of material witnesses on behalf of the accused, and although it was manifest that, with the utmost diligence, the attendance of such witnesses could not have been procured at that term.”

This respondent, in answer to this part of the charge, admits that, in the above-mentioned trial, the traverser’s counsel did move the court, while this respondent sat in it alone, for a continuance of the trial until the next term; not merely a postponement of the trial, as the expressions used in this part of the article would seem to import; and did file, as the groundwork of their motion, an affidavit of the traverser, a true and official copy of which (marked exhibit No. 5) this respondent herewith exhibits, and begs leave to make part of this answer; but he denies that any sufficient ground for a continuance until the next term was disclosed by this affidavit, as he trusts will clearly appear from the following facts and observations:

The trial of an indictment at the term when it is found by the grand jury, is a matter of course, which the prosecutor can claim as a right, unless legal cause can be shown for a continuance. The prosecutor may consent to a continuance, but if he withholds his consent, the Court cannot grant a continuance without legal cause. Of the sufficiency and legality of this cause, as of every other question of law, the Court must judge; but it must decide on this, as on every other point, according to the fixed and known rules of law.

One of the legal grounds, and the principal one on which such a continuance may be granted, is the absence of competent and _material_ witnesses, whom the party cannot produce at the present term, but has a _reasonable ground_ for expecting to be able to produce at the next term. Analogous to this, is the inability to procure, at the present term, legal and _material_ written testimony, which the party has a _reasonable expectation_ of being able to procure at the next term.

Public justice will not permit the trial of offenders to be delayed, on light or unfounded pretences. To wait for testimony which the party really wished for, but did not expect to be able to produce within some definite period, would certainly be a very light pretence; and to make him the judge, how far there was reasonable expectation of obtaining the testimony within the proper time, would put it in his power to delay the trial on the most unfounded pretences. Hence the rule, that there must be reasonable ground of expectation, in the judgment of the Court, that the testimony may be obtained within the proper time.

It is therefore a settled and most necessary rule, that every application for a continuance, on the ground of obtaining testimony, must be supported by an affidavit, disclosing sufficient matter to satisfy the Court, that the testimony wanted “is competent and material,” and that there is “reasonable expectation of procuring it within the time prescribed.” From a comparison of the affidavit in question with the indictment, it will soon appear how far the traverser in this case brought himself within this rule.

The absent witnesses, mentioned in the affidavit, are William Gardner, of Portsmouth in New Hampshire; Tench Coxe, of Philadelphia, in Pennsylvania; Judge Bee, of some place in South Carolina; Timothy Pickering, lately of Philadelphia, in Pennsylvania, but of what place at that time the deponent did not know; William B. Giles, of Amelia County, in the State of Virginia; Stevens Thompson Mason, whose place of residence is not mentioned in the affidavit, but was known to be in Loudon County, in the State of Virginia; and General Blackburn, of Bath County, in the said State. The affidavit also states, that the traverser wished to procure, as material to his defence, authentic copies of certain answers made by the President of the United States, Mr. Adams, to addresses from various persons; and also, a book entitled “an Essay on Canon and Feudal Law,” or entitled in words to that purport, which was ascribed to the President, and which the traverser believed to have been written by him; and also, evidence to prove that the President was in fact the author of that book.

It is not stated, that the traverser had any reasonable ground to expect, or did expect, to procure this book or evidence, or these authentic copies, or the attendance of any one of these witnesses, at the next term. Nor does he attempt to show in what manner the book, or the copies of answers to addresses, were material, so as to enable the Court to form a judgment on that point. Here, then, the affidavit was clearly defective. His believing the book and copies to be material, was of no weight, unless he showed to the Court sufficient grounds for entertaining the same opinion. Moreover, he does not state where he supposes that this book, and those authentic copies, may be found; so as to enable the Court to judge, how far a reasonable expectation of obtaining them might be entertained. On the ground of this book and these copies, therefore, there was no pretence for a continuance. As to the witnesses, it is manifest, that from their very distant and dispersed situation, there existed no ground of reasonable expectation that their attendance could be procured at the _next_ term, or at any subsequent time. Indeed, the idea of postponing the trial of an indictment till witnesses could be convened at Richmond, from South Carolina, New Hampshire, and the western extremities of Virginia, is too chimerical to be seriously entertained. Accordingly, the traverser, though in his affidavit he stated them to be material, and declared that he could not procure their attendance at that term, could not venture to declare, on oath, that he expected to procure it at the next, or at any other time; much less that he had any reasonable ground for such an expectation. On this ground, therefore, the affidavit was clearly insufficient; and it was consequently the duty of the Court to reject such application.

But the testimony of these witnesses, as stated in the affidavit, was wholly immaterial; and, therefore, their absence was no ground for a continuance, had there been reasonable ground for expecting their attendance at the next term.

William Gardner and Tench Coxe were to prove that Mr. Adams had turned them out of office, for their political opinions or conduct. This applied to that part of the publication which constituted the matter of the third charge in the indictment, in these words, “the same system of persecution extended all over the continent. Every person holding an office, must either quit it, or think and vote exactly with Mr. Adams.” Judge Bee was to prove, that Mr. Adams had advised and requested him by letter, in the year 1799, to deliver Thomas Nash, otherwise called Jonathan Robbins, to the British Consul, in Charleston. This might have had some application to the matter of the seventh charge; which alleged that “the hands of Mr. Adams were reeking with the blood of the poor, friendless Connecticut sailor.” Timothy Pickering was to prove that Mr. Adams, while President, and Congress was in session, was many weeks in possession of important despatches from the American Minister in France, without communicating them to Congress. This testimony was utterly immaterial; because, admitting the fact to be so, Mr. Adams was not bound, in any respect, to communicate those despatches to Congress, unless, in his discretion, he should think it necessary; and also, because the fact, if true, had no relation to any part of the indictment. There are, indeed, three charges, on which it might at first sight seem to have some slight bearing. These are the eighth, the words furnishing the matter of which are, “every feature in the administration of Mr. Adams forms a distinct and additional evidence that he was determined, at all events, to embroil this country with France;” the fourteenth, the words stated in which allege, that “by sending these Ambassadors to Paris, Mr. Adams and his British faction designed to do nothing but mischief;” and the eighteenth, the matter of which states, “that in the midst of such a scene of profligacy and usury, the President persisted as long as he durst, in making his utmost efforts for provoking a French war.” To no other charge in the indictment had the evidence of Timothy Pickering, as stated in the affidavit, the remotest affinity. And surely, it will not be pretended by any man, who shall compare this evidence with the three charges above mentioned, that the fact intended to be proved by it, furnished any evidence proper to go to a jury, in support of either of those charges; that “every feature of his administration formed a distinct and additional evidence of a determination, at all events, to embroil this country with France,” that “in sending Ambassadors to Paris, he intended nothing but mischief,” that “in the midst of a scene of profligacy and usury, he persisted, as long as he durst, in making his utmost effort for provoking a French war,” are charges, which surely cannot be supported or justified, by the circumstance of his “keeping in his possession, for several weeks, while Congress was in session, despatches from the American Minister in France, without communicating them to Congress,” which he was not bound to do, and which it was his duty not to do, if he supposed that the communication, at an earlier period, would be injurious to the public interest. The testimony of William B. Giles and Stevens Thompson Mason was to prove that Mr. Adams had uttered in their hearing certain sentiments favorable to aristocratic or monarchical principles of Government.

This had no application except to a part of the twelfth charge; which has been already shown to be wholly immaterial if taken separately, and wholly incapable of a separate justification, if considered as part of an entire charge. And, lastly, it was to be proved by General Blackburn, that in his answer to an address, Mr. Adams avowed, “that there was a party in Virginia which deserved to be humbled into dust and ashes, before the indignant frowns of their injured, insulted, and offended country.” There were but two charges in the indictment to which this fact, if true, had the most distant resemblance. These are the fifteenth and sixteenth, the words forming the matter of which, call Mr. Adams “an hoary-headed libeller of the Governor of Virginia, who with all the fury, but without the propriety or sublimity of Homer’s Achilles, bawled out, to arms, then, to arms!” and “who, floating on the bladder of popularity, threatened to make Richmond the centre point of a bonfire.” It would be an abuse of the patience of this honorable Court, to occupy any part of its time in proving that the fact intended to be proved by General Blackburn, could not in the slightest degree support or justify such charges as these.

To the third charge adduced in support of the article now under consideration, the charge of using “unusual, rude, and contemptuous expressions towards the prisoner’s counsel,” and of “falsely insinuating that they wished to excite the public fears and indignation, and to produce that insubordination to law to which the conduct of this respondent did manifestly tend,” he cannot answer otherwise than by a general denial. A charge so vague, admits not of precise or particular refutation. He denies that there was any thing unusual or intentionally rude or contemptuous in his conduct or his expressions towards the prisoner’s counsel; that he made any false insinuation whatever against them, or that his own conduct tended in any manner to produce insubordination to law. On the contrary, it was his wish and intention to treat the counsel with the respect due to their situation and functions, and with the decorum due to his own character. He thought it his duty to restrain such of their attempts as he considered improper, and to overrule motions made by them, which he considered as unfounded in law; but this it was his wish to accomplish in the manner least likely to offend, from which every consideration concurred in dissuading him. He did indeed think at that time, and still remains under the impression, that the conduct of the traverser’s counsel, whether from intention or not he will not undertake to say, was disrespectful, irritating, and highly incorrect. That conduct which he viewed in this light, might have produced some irritation in a temper naturally quick and warm, and that this irritation might, notwithstanding his endeavors to suppress it, have appeared in his manner and in his expressions, he thinks not improbable; for he has had occasions for feeling and lamenting the want of sufficient caution and self-command, in things of this nature. But he confidently affirms, that his conduct in this particular was free from intentional impropriety; and this respondent denies, that any part of his conduct was such as ought to have induced the traverser’s counsel to “abandon the cause of their client,” nor does he believe that any such cause did induce them to take that step. On the contrary, he believes that it was taken by them under the influence of passion, for some motive into which this respondent forbears at this time to inquire. And this respondent admits that the said traverser was convicted, and condemned to fine and imprisonment, but not by reason of the abandonment of his defence by his counsel; but because the charges against him were clearly proved, and no defence was made or attempted against far the greater number of them.

The fourth charge in support of this article attributes to this respondent “repeated and vexatious interruptions of the said counsel, which at length induced them to abandon the cause of their client, who was therefore convicted, and condemned to fine and imprisonment.” To this charge, also, it is impossible to give any other answer but a general denial. He avers that he never interrupted the traverser’s counsel vexatiously, or except when he considered it his duty to do so.

Lastly, this respondent is charged, under this article, with an “indecent solicitude, manifested by him, for the conviction of the accused, unbecoming even a public prosecutor, but highly disgraceful to the character of a judge, as it was subversive of justice.” This is another charge of which it is impossible to give a precise refutation, and to a general denial of which this respondent must therefore confine himself. He denies that he felt any solicitude whatever for the conviction of the traverser; other than the general wish natural to every friend of truth, decorum, and virtue, that persons guilty of such offences as that of which the traverser stood indicted, should be brought to punishment for the sake of example.

And the said respondent for plea to the said fourth article of impeachment, saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime and misdemeanor, as in and by the said fourth article is alleged against him, and this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to require.

The fifth article of impeachment charges this respondent with having awarded “a capias against the body of the said James Thompson Callender, indicted for an offence _not capital_, whereupon the said Callender was arrested and committed to _close_ custody, contrary to law in that case made and provided.”

This charge is rested, 1st, on the act of Congress of September 24, 1789, entitled “An act to establish the judicial courts of the United States,” by which it is enacted “that for any crime or offence against the United States, the offender may be arrested, imprisoned, or bailed, agreeably to the usual mode of process, in the State where such offender may be found.” And, 2dly, on a law of the State of Virginia, which is said to provide “that upon _presentment_ by any grand jury, of an offence _not capital_, the Court shall order the clerk to issue a _summons_ against the person or persons so offending, to appear and answer such presentment at the _next_ court.” It is contended, in support of this charge, that the act of Congress above mentioned made the State law the rule of proceeding, and that the State law was violated by issuing a capias against Callender, instead of a summons.

It will also appear, as this respondent believes, by a reference to the laws and practice of Virginia, into which he has made all the inquiries which circumstances and the shortness of time allowed him for preparing his answer would permit, that all the cases in which a summons is considered as the only proper process, are cases of petty offences, which, on the presentment of a grand jury, are to be tried by the court in a summary way, without the intervention of a petit jury. Therefore these provisions had no application to the case of Callender, which could be no otherwise proceeded on than by indictment, and trial on the indictment by a petit jury.

And the said respondent, for plea to the said fifth article of impeachment, saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime and misdemeanor, as in and by the said fifth article is alleged against him; and this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to them to require.

The sixth article of impeachment alleges that this respondent, “with intent to oppress and procure the conviction of the said James Thompson Callender, did, at the court aforesaid, rule and adjudge the said Callender to trial during the term at which he, the said Callender, was presented and indicted, contrary to the law in that case made and provided.”

This charge also is founded, 1st, on the act of Congress of September 24, 1789, above mentioned, which enacts, section 34, “that the laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise provide, shall be regarded as the rules of decision, in trials at _common law_, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply;” and, 2dly, on a law of the State of Virginia, which is supposed to provide, “that in cases not capital, the offender shall not be held to answer any presentment of a grand jury, until the court next preceding that during which such presentment shall have been made.” This law, it is contended, is made the role of decision by the above-mentioned act of Congress, and was violated by the refusal to continue the case of Callender till the next term.

In answer to this charge this respondent declares, that he was at the time of making the above-mentioned decision wholly ignorant of any such law of Virginia as that in question; that no such law was adduced or mentioned by the counsel of Callender, in support of their motion for a continuance; neither when they first made it, before this respondent sitting alone, nor when they renewed it, after Judge Griffin had taken his seat in court; that no such law was mentioned by Judge Griffin, who concurred in overruling the motion for a continuance and ordering on the trial; which he could not have done had he known that such a law existed, or considered it as applicable to the case; and that this respondent never heard of any such law until the articles of impeachment now under consideration were reported, in the course of the present session of Congress, by a committee of the House of Representatives.

And for plea to the said sixth article of impeachment, the said Samuel Chase saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor, as in and by the said-article is alleged against him; and this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to them to require.

The seventh article of impeachment relates to some conduct of this respondent in his judicial capacity, at a circuit court of the United States held at Newcastle, in the State of Delaware, in June, 1800. The statement of this conduct, made in the article, is altogether erroneous; but if it were true, this respondent denies that it contains any matter for which he is liable to impeachment.

These charges amount in substance to this: that the respondent refused to discharge a grand jury, on their request, which is every day’s practice, and which he was bound to do, if he believed that the due administration of justice required their longer attendance; that he directed the attention of the grand jury to an offence against a statute of the United States, which, he had been informed, was committed in the district; and that he desired the District Attorney to aid the grand jury in their inquiries concerning the existence and nature of this offence. By these three acts, each of which it was his duty to perform, he is alleged “to have degraded his high judicial functions, and tended to impair the public confidence in, and respect for, the tribunals of justice, so essential to the public welfare.”

That this honorable Court may be able to form correctly its judgment concerning the transaction mentioned in this article, this respondent submits the following statement of it, which he avers to be true, and expects to prove:

On the 27th day of June, 1800, this respondent, as one Of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, presided in the circuit court of the United States, then held at Newcastle, in and for the district of Delaware, and was assisted by Gunning Bedford, Esq., then district judge of the United States for that district. At the opening of the court on that day, this respondent, according to his duty and his uniform practice, delivered a charge to the grand jury, in which he gave in charge to them several statutes of the United States, and, among others, an act of Congress, passed July 14th, 1798, entitled “An act in addition to the act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States,” and commonly called the “sedition law.” He directed them to inquire concerning any breaches of those statutes, and especially of that commonly called the sedition law, within the district of Delaware.

On the same day, before the usual hour of adjournment, the grand jury came into court, and informed the Court that they had found no indictment or presentment, and had no business before them, for which reason they wished to be discharged. This respondent replied, that it was earlier than the usual hour of discharging a grand jury; and that business might occur during the sitting of the court. He also asked them if they had no information of publications within the district, that came under the sedition law, and added, that he had been informed that there was a paper called the _Mirror_, published at Wilmington which contained libellous charges against the Government and President of the United States: that he had not seen that paper, but it was their duty to inquire into the subject; and if they had not turned their attention to it, the attorney for the district would be pleased to examine a file of that paper, and if he found any thing that came within the sedition law, would lay it before them. This is the substance of what the respondent said to the grand jury on that occasion, and, he believes, nearly his words; on the morning of the _next day_ they came into court and declared that they had no presentments or indictments to make, on which they were immediately discharged. The whole time, therefore, for which they were detained, was twenty-four hours, far less than is generally required of grand juries.

And for plea to the said seventh article of impeachment, the said Samuel Chase saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor, as in and by the said seventh article is alleged against him, and this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to them to require.

The eighth article of impeachment charges that this respondent, “disregarding the duties and dignity of his official character, did, at a circuit court for the district of Maryland, held at Baltimore, in the month of May, 1803, pervert his official right and duty to address the grand jury then and there assembled, on the matters coming within the province of the said jury, for the purpose of delivering to the said grand jury an intemperate and inflammatory political harangue, with intent to excite the fears and resentment of the said grand jury, and of the good people of Maryland, against their State government and constitution,” and also that this respondent, “under pretence of exercising his judicial right to address the grand jury as aforesaid, did endeavor to excite the odium of the said grand jury, and of the good people of Maryland, against the Government of the United States, by delivering opinions which were, at that time and as delivered by him, highly indecent, extra-judicial, and tending to prostitute the high judicial character with which he was invested to the low purpose of an electioneering partisan.”

In answer to this charge this respondent admits that he did, as one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, preside in a circuit court held at Baltimore in and for the district of Maryland, in May, 1803, and did then deliver a charge to the grand jury, and express in the conclusion of it some opinions as to certain public measures, both of the Government of Maryland and of that of the United States. But he denies that, in thus acting, he disregarded the duties and dignity of his judicial character, perverted his official right and duty to address the grand jury, or had any intention to excite the fears or resentment of any person whatever against the Government and Constitution of the United States or of Maryland. He denies that the sentiments which he thus expressed were “intemperate and inflammatory,” either in themselves or in the manner of delivering; that he did endeavor to excite the odium of any person whatever against the Government of the United States, or did deliver any opinions which were in any respect indecent, or which had any tendency to prostitute his judicial character to any low or improper purpose. He denies that he did any thing that was unusual, improper, or unbecoming in a judge, or expressed any opinions, but such as a friend to his country and a firm supporter of the Governments, both of the State of Maryland and of the United States, might entertain. For the truth of what he here says, he appeals confidently to the charge itself: which was read from a written paper now in his possession ready to be produced. A true copy of all such parts of this paper as relate to the subject matter of this article of impeachment, is contained in the exhibit marked No. 8, which he prays leave to make part of this his answer.

Admitting these opinions to have been incorrect and unfounded, this respondent denies that there was any law which forbids him to express them in a charge to a grand jury, and he contends that there can be no offence without the breach of some law. The very essence of despotism consists in punishing acts which, at the time when they were done, were forbidden by no law. Admitting the expression of political opinions by a judge, in his charge to a grand jury, to be improper and dangerous, there are many improper and very dangerous acts, which not being forbidden by law, cannot be punished. Hence the necessity of new penal laws, which are from time to time enacted for the prevention of acts not before forbidden, but found by experience to be of dangerous tendency. It has been the practice in this country, ever since the beginning of the Revolution which separated us from Great Britain, for the judges to express from the bench, by way of charge to the grand jury, and to enforce to the utmost of their ability such political opinions as they thought correct and useful. There have been instances in which the Legislative bodies of this country have recommended this practice to the judges; and it was adopted by the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States as soon as the present Judicial system was established.

Nor can the incorrectness of the political opinions thus expressed have any influence in deciding on the guilt or innocence of a judge’s conduct in expressing them. For if he should be considered as guilty or innocent, according to the supposed correctness or incorrectness of the opinion thus expressed by him, it would follow that error in political opinion, however honestly entertained, might be a crime; and that a party in power might, under this pretext, destroy any judge who might happen, in a charge to a grand jury, to say something capable of being construed by them into a political opinion adverse to their own system.

And the said Samuel Chase, for plea to the said eighth article of impeachment, saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime and misdemeanor, as in and by the said eighth article is alleged against him, and this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to them to require.

This respondent has now laid before this honorable Court, as well as the time allowed him would permit, all the circumstances of the case, with an humble trust in Providence, and a consciousness that he has discharged all his _official_ duties with justice and impartiality, to the best of his knowledge and abilities; and that intentionally he hath committed no crime or misdemeanor, or any violation of the constitution or laws of his country. Confiding in the impartiality, independence, and integrity of his judges, and that they will patiently hear, and conscientiously determine this case, without being influenced by the spirit of party, by popular prejudice, or political motives, he cheerfully submits himself to their decision.

He is satisfied that every member of this tribunal will observe the principles of humanity and justice, and will presume him innocent until his guilt shall be established by legal and creditable witnesses, and will be governed in his decision by the moral and Christian rule of rendering that justice to this respondent which he would wish to receive.

This respondent now stands not merely before an earthly tribunal, but also before that awful Being whose presence fills all space, and whose all-seeing eye more especially surveys the temples of justice and religion. In a little time, his accusers, his judges, and himself, must appear at the bar of Omnipotence, where the secrets of all hearts shall be disclosed, and every human being shall answer for his deeds done in the body, and shall be compelled to give evidence against himself, in the presence of an assembled universe. To his Omnipotent Judge, at that awful hour, he now appeals for the rectitude and purity of his conduct, as to all the matters of which he is this day accused.

Mr. RANDOLPH, on behalf of the Managers, requested time to consult the House of Representatives, and likewise to be furnished with a copy of the answer of Judge Chase, for the purpose of making a replication to it.

The PRESIDENT said the Senate would take the request into consideration, and make known to the House of Representatives such order as should be taken thereon.

Whereupon the Senate, at the suggestion of the PRESIDENT, retired to their legislative apartment.

On Wednesday, the 6th instant, the House of Representatives received a copy of the foregoing answer, which was referred to the Managers. On the same day, Mr. RANDOLPH reported a replication to the answer, which was immediately taken into consideration. Several motions were made and rejected, after a short debate, to soften the style; when the replication, as reported, was adopted--yeas 77, nays 34. Whereupon, it was resolved that the Managers be instructed to proceed to maintain the said replication at the bar of the Senate, at such time as shall be appointed by the Senate.

THURSDAY, February 7.

The Court was opened about two o’clock.

_Present_: The Managers, and Mr. HOPKINSON, of the counsel for Mr. Chase.

Mr. RANDOLPH, on behalf of the Managers, read the replication of the House of Representatives, to the answer of Samuel Chase, as follows:

Replication by the House of Representatives of the United
States, to the answer of Samuel Chase, one of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, to the
Articles of Impeachment exhibited against him by the said House
of Representatives.

The House of Representatives of the United States have
considered the answer of Samuel Chase, one of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, to the
Articles of Impeachment against him, by them exhibited, in the
name of themselves and of all the people of the United States,
and observe,

That the said Samuel Chase hath endeavored to cover the
high crimes and misdemeanors laid to his charge, by evasive
insinuations and misrepresentation of facts; that the said
answer does give a gloss and coloring utterly false and untrue,
to the various criminal matters contained in the said Articles;
that the said Samuel Chase did, in fact, commit the numerous
acts of oppression, persecution, and injustice, of which he
stands accused; and the House of Representatives, in full
confidence of the truth and justice of their accusation, and
of the necessity of bringing the said Samuel Chase to a speedy
and exemplary punishment, and not doubting that the Senate will
use all becoming diligence to do justice to the proceedings
of the House of Representatives, and to vindicate the honor
of the nation, do aver their charge against the said Samuel
Chase to be true, and that the said Samuel Chase is guilty
in such manner as he stands impeached; and that the House of
Representatives will be ready to prove their charges against
him, at such convenient time and place as shall be appointed
for that purpose.

Signed by order, and in behalf of, the said House.

NATH. MACON, _Speaker_,

Attest:

JOHN BECKLEY, _Clerk_.

Mr. HOPKINSON requested a copy of the replication, which, the PRESIDENT replied, would be furnished by the Secretary.

Mr. BRECKENRIDGE moved a resolution to the following effect:

That the Secretary be directed to inform the House of Representatives that the Senate will, to-morrow, at twelve o’clock, proceed with the trial of Samuel Chase; which was agreed to without one dissenting voice, 34 members voting for it.

Whereupon, the Senate withdrew to their legislative apartment.

FRIDAY, February 8.

The Court opened precisely at twelve o’clock.

_Present_: The Managers, and the House of Representatives, in Committee of the Whole; and Mr. Chase, attended by his counsel, Messrs. MARTIN, HARPER, HOPKINSON, and KEY.

The crier having, agreeably to a prescribed form, notified all those concerned to come forward and make good the charges exhibited against Samuel Chase,

Mr. RANDOLPH, the leading Manager, requested that the witnesses on the part of the prosecution might be called, to ascertain who were present.

They were accordingly called, to the number of twenty-four.

_Present_: Alexander James Dallas, William Lewis, William Rawle, William S. Biddle, Edward Tilghman, George Reed, John Montgomery, John Stephen, John Thompson Mason, Samuel H. Smith, John Taylor, George Hay, William Wirt, and John Heath.

_Absent_: James Lea, John Crow, Risdon Bishop, Aquila Hall, Philip Stewart, Thomas Hall, Philip N. Nicholas, John Harvie, Meriwether Jones, and James Pleasants.

Mr. RANDOLPH observed that various considerations, which it was unnecessary to detail, induced him, on behalf of the Managers, to move a postponement of the trial till to-morrow, when they hoped to be prepared to proceed with it.

Mr. HARPER said that, on behalf of Judge Chase, he would not object to the motion.

The PRESIDENT informed the Managers that the Senate acceded to their request, and added, that the Senate would attend to-morrow at twelve o’clock, for the purpose of proceeding with the trial.

At the request of Mr. HARPER, the witnesses on the part of Judge Chase were called over, to the number of forty.

_Present_: John A. Chevalier, David M. Randolph, John Marshall, John Basset, Samuel P. Moore, William C. Frazier, David Robertson, Edward Tilghman, Wm. Meredith, Jared Ingersoll, Samuel Ewing, James Winchester, Walter Dorsey, James P. Boyd, Nicholas Brice, John Purviance, William M. Mechin, Thomas Chase, William H. Winder, William Gwynn, William Rawle, William J. Govane, Gunning Bedford, Nicholas Vandyke, John Hall, jun., Archibald Hamilton, and Thomas Carpenter.

_Absent_: William Marshall, Edmund Randolph, Robert Gamble, Philip Moore, Cornelius Comegys, John Stewart, and Edward J. Coale.

_Not found_: John Hopkins, Philip Gooch, William Minor, and Samuel Wheeler.

_Sick_: Cyrus Griffin. _Dead_: J. C. Barrett.

Whereupon the Court rose.

SATURDAY, February 9.

The Court was opened precisely at 12 o’clock.

_Present_: The Managers, attended by the House of Representatives in Committee of the Whole; and Judge Chase, attended by his counsel, as mentioned in the proceedings of yesterday.

At a quarter after 12 o’clock, Mr. RANDOLPH, on behalf of the Managers, opened the impeachment, as follows:

Mr. President: It becomes my duty to open this cause on behalf of the prosecution. From this duty, however incompetent I feel myself to its performance at all times, and more especially at this time, as well from the very short period which has been allowed us to consider the long and elaborate plea of the respondent, as from the severe pressure of disease, it does not become me to shrink. The station in which I have been placed calls for the discharge of an important public trust at my hands. It shall be performed to the best of my ability, inadequate as I know that ability to be. When I speak of the short period which has been allowed us, I hope not to be understood as expressing, on our part, any dissatisfaction at the course which has been pursued, or any wish to prolong the time which has been allotted for trial. We are sensible of a disposition in this honorable Court to grant us every indulgence which we ought to ask, and when their attention is called to the precipitate hurry of our preparation, it is only to offer, on behalf of an individual, perhaps a weak apology for the weak defence which he is about to make of the cause confided to his care. A desire for the furtherance of justice and the avoidance of delay, but, above all, an unshaken conviction that we stand on impregnable ground, induce us on this short notice to declare that we are ready to substantiate our accusation, to prove that the respondent is guilty in such manner as he stands impeached.

It is a painful but indispensable task which we are called upon to perform: to establish the guilt of a great officer of Government, of a man, who, if he had made a just use of those faculties which God and nature bestowed upon him, would have been the ornament and benefactor of his country, would have rendered her services as eminent and useful as he has inflicted upon her outrages and wrongs deep and deadly. A character endowed by nature with some of her best attributes, cultivated by education, placed by his country in a conspicuous station, invested with authority whose righteous exercise would have rendered him a terror to the wicked, whilst it endeared him to the wise and good: such a character, presented to the nation in the light in which he now stands, and in which his misdeeds have made it our duty to bring him forward, forms one of the saddest spectacles which can be offered to the public eye. Base is that heart which could triumph over him.