Chapter IV: Front Matter (4)

This amendment affects the relative interest and importance of the smaller States. The constitution requires the Electors of each State to vote for two men, one of whom to be President of the United States. This affords a degree of security to the small States against the views and ambition of the large States. It gives them weight and influence in the choice. By destroying this complex mode of choice, and introducing the simple principle of designation, the large States can with more ease elect their candidate. This amendment will enable the Electors from four States and a half to choose a President, against the will of the remaining twelve States and a half. Can such a change tend to conciliate and strengthen the Union?

This amendment has a tendency to render the Vice President less respectable. He will be voted for not as President of the United States, but as President of the Senate, elected to preside over forms in this House. In electing a subordinate officer the Electors will not require those qualifications requisite for supreme command. The office of Vice President will be a sinecure. It will be brought to market and exposed to sale to procure votes for the President. Will the ambitious, aspiring candidate for the Presidency, will his friends and favorites promote the election of a man of talents, probity, and popularity for Vice President, and who may prove his rival? No! They will seek a man of moderate talents, whose ambition is bounded by that office, and whose influence will aid them in electing the President. This mode of election is calculated to increase corruption, promote intrigue, and aid inordinate ambition. The Vice President will be selected from some of the large States; he will have a casting vote in this House; and feeble indeed must his talents be, if his influence will not be equal to that of a member. This will, in fact, be giving to that State a third Senator.

In the Southern States the blacks are considered as property, and the States in which they live are thereby entitled to eighteen additional Electors and Representatives--a number equal to all the Electors and Representatives that four States and a half are entitled to elect. Will you, by this amendment, lessen the weight and influence of the Eastern States in the election of your first officers, and still retain this unequal article in your constitution? Shall property in one part of the Union give an increase of Electors, and be wholly excluded in other States? Can this be right? Will it strengthen the Union?

Mr. TRACY.--I shall attempt to prove, sir, that the resolution before us contains principles which have a manifest tendency to deprive the small States of an important right, secured to them by a solemn and constitutional compact, and to vest an overwhelming power in the great States. And, further, I shall attempt to show that, in many other points, the resolution is objectionable, and, for a variety of causes, ought not to be adopted.

As I shall be obliged, in delineating the main features of this resolution, to mention the great States in the Union as objects of jealousy, I wish it to be understood that no special stigma is intended. “Man is man,” was the maxim expressed in an early part of this debate, by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. BUTLER,) and in application to the subject of government, the maxim is worthy to be written in letters of gold. Yes, sir, “man is man,” and the melancholy truth that he is always imperfect and frequently wicked, induces us to fear his power, and guard against his rapacity, by the establishment and preservation of laws, and well-regulated constitutions of government. Man, when connected with very many of his fellow-men, in a great State, derives power from the circumstance of this numerous combination; and from every circumstance which clothes him with additional power, he will generally derive some additional force to his passions.

Having premised this, I shall not deem it requisite to make any apology, when I attempt to excite the attention, the vigilance, and even the jealousy of the small, in reference to the conduct of the great States. The caution is meant to apply against the imperfections and passions of man, generally, and not against any State, or description of men, particularly.

It may be proper, in this place, to explain my meaning, when I make use of the words “small” and “great,” as applicable to States.

Massachusetts has been usually called a great State; but, in respect to all the operations of this resolution, she must, I think, be ranked among the small States. The district of Maine is increasing rapidly, and must, in the nature of things, soon become a State. To which event, its location, being divided from what was the ancient Colony of Massachusetts, by the intervention of New Hampshire, will very much contribute. I believe there is a legislative provision of some years’ standing, authorizing a division at the option of Maine. When this event shall occur, Massachusetts, although, in comparison with Connecticut and Rhode Island, she will not be a small State, yet, in comparison with many others, must be so considered. I think myself justifiable, then, for my present purposes, in calling Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Vermont, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina, small States. They are limited in point of territory, and cannot reasonably expect any great increase of population for many years, not, indeed, until the other States shall become so populous as to discourage emigration, with agricultural views; which may retain the population of the small States as seamen or manufacturers. This event, if it ever arrives, must be distant. A possible exception only may exist in favor of Maine; but, when we consider its climate, and a variety of other circumstances, it is believed to form no solid exception to this statement.

By the same rule of deciding, the residue of the States must be called great; for although Georgia and several others are not sufficiently populous, at this time, to be considered relatively great States, yet their prospect of increase, with other circumstances, fairly bring them within the description, in respect to the operation of the measure now under consideration.

It will be recollected that, in the various turns which the debate has taken, gentlemen have repeatedly said that the constitution was formed for the people; that the good of the whole was its object; that nothing was discernible in it like a contest of States, nothing like jealousy of small States against the great; and although such distinctions and jealousies might have existed under the first confederation, yet they could have no existence under the last. And one gentleman (Mr. SMITH, of Maryland) has said that he has been a member of this Government ten years, and has heard nothing of great and small States, as in the least affecting the operations of Government, or the feelings of those who administer it.

Propriety, therefore, requires that we attentively examine the constitution itself, not only to obtain correct ideas upon these observations, so repeatedly urged, but to place in the proper light the operations and effects of the resolution in debate. If we attend to the constitution, we shall immediately find evident marks of concession and compromise, and that the parties to these concessions were the great and small States. And the members of the convention who formed the instrument have, in private information and public communications, united in the declaration, that the constitution was the result of concession and compromise between the great and small States. In this examination of the constitution it will be impossible to keep out of view our political relations under the first confederation. We primarily united upon the footing of complete State equality--each State had one, and no State had more than one vote in the Federal Council or Congress. With such a confederation we successfully waged war, and became an independent nation. When we were relieved from the pressure of war, that confederation, both in structure and power, was found inadequate to the purposes for which it was established. Under these circumstances, the States, by their convention, entered into a new agreement, upon principles better adapted to promote their mutual security and happiness. But this last agreement, or constitution, under which we are now united, was manifestly carved out of the first confederation. The small States adhered tenaciously to the principles of State equality; and gave up only a part of that federative principle, complete State equality, and that with evident caution and reluctance. To this federative principle they were attached by habit; and their attachment was sanctioned and corroborated by the example of most if not all the ancient and the modern confederacies. And when the great States claimed a weight in the councils of the nation proportionate to their numbers and wealth, the novelty of the claim, as well as its obvious tendency to reduce the sovereignty of the small States, must have produced serious obstacles to its admission. Hence it is, that we find in the constitution but one entire departure from the federal principle. The House of Representatives is established upon the popular principle, and given to numbers and wealth, or to the great States, which, in this view of the subject, are synonymous. It was thought, by the convention, that a consolidation of the States into one simple Republic would be improper. And the local feelings and jealousies of all, but more especially of the small States, rendered a consolidation impracticable.

The Senate, who have the power of a legislative check upon the House of Representatives, and many other extensive and important powers, is preserved as an entire federative feature of Government as it was enjoyed by the small States, under the first confederacy.

In the article which obliges the Electors of President to vote for one person not an inhabitant of the same State with themselves, is discovered State jealousy. In the majorities required for many purposes by the constitution, although there were other motives for the regulations, yet the jealousy of the small States is clearly discernible. Indeed, sir, if we peruse the constitution with attention, we shall find the small States are perpetually guarding the federative principle, that is, State equality. And this, in every part of it, except in the choice of the House of Representatives, and in their ordinary legislative proceedings. They go so far as to prohibit any amendment which may affect the equality of States in the Senate.

This is guarding against almost an impossibility, because the Senators of small States must be criminally remiss in their attendance, and the Legislatures extremely off their guard, if they permit such alterations, which aim at their own existence. But lest some accident, some unaccountable blindness or perfidy should put in jeopardy the federative principle in the Senate, they totally and for ever prohibit all attempts at such a measure. In the choice of President, the mutual caution and concession of the great and small States is, if possible, more conspicuous than in any other part of the constitution.

He is to be chosen by Electors appointed as the State Legislatures shall direct, not according to numbers entirely, but adding two Electors in each State as representatives of State sovereignty. Thus Delaware obtains three votes for President, whereas she could have but one in right of numbers. Yet, mixed as this mode of choice is, with both popular and federative principles, we see the small States watching its motions and circumscribing it to one attempt only, and, on failure of an Electoral choice, they instantly seize upon the right of a federal election, and select from the candidates a President by States and not by numbers. In confirmation of my assertion, that this part of the constitution was peculiarly the effect of compromise between the great and small States, permit me to quote an authority which will certainly have great weight, not only in the Senate, but through the Union, I mean that of the present Secretary of State, (Mr. Madison,) who was a leading member of the Federal Convention who formed, and of the Virginia Convention who adopted the constitution.

In the Debates of the Virginia Convention, volume 3, page 77, Mr. Madison says, speaking of the mode of electing the President:

“As to the eventual voting by States, it has my approbation.
The lesser States and some larger States will be generally
pleased by that mode. The Deputies from the small States
argued, and there is some force in their reasoning, that, when
the people voted, the large States evidently had the advantage
over the rest, and, without varying the mode, the interests of
the little States might be neglected or sacrificed. Here is a
compromise. For in the eventual election, the small States will
have the advantage.”

After this view of the constitution, let us inquire, what is the direct object of the proposed alteration in the choice of President?

To render more practicable and certain the choice by Electors--and for this reason: that the people at large, or in other words, that the great States, ought to have more weight and influence in the choice. That it should be brought nearer to the popular and carried further from the federative principle. This claim we find was made at the formation of the constitution. The great States naturally wished for a popular choice of First Magistrate. This mode was sanctioned by the example of many of the States in the choice of Governor. The small States claimed a choice on the federative principle, by the Legislatures, and to vote by States; analogies and examples were not wanting to sanction this mode of election. A consideration of the weight and influence of a President of this Union, must have multiplied the difficulties of agreeing upon the mode of choice. But as I have before said, by mutual concession, they agreed upon the present mode, combining both principles and dividing between the two parties, thus mutually jealous, as they could, this important privilege of electing a Chief Magistrate.

This mode then became established, and the right of the small States to elect upon the federative principle, or by States, in case of the contingency of electoral failure of choice, cannot with reason and fairness be taken from them, without their consent, and on a full understanding of its operation; since it was meant to be secured to them by the constitution, and was one of the terms upon which they became members of the present confederacy; and for which privilege they gave an equivalent to the great States in sacrificing so much of the federative principle, or State equality.

The constitution is nicely balanced, with the federative and popular principles; the Senate are the guardians of the former, and the House of Representatives of the latter; and any attempts to destroy this balance, under whatever specious names or pretences they may be presented, should be watched with a jealous eye. Perhaps a fair definition of the constitutional powers of amending is, that you may upon experiment so modify the constitution in its practice and operation, as to give it, upon its own principles, a more complete effect. But this is an attack upon a fundamental principle established after a long deliberation, and by mutual concession, a principle of essential importance to the instrument itself, and an attempt to wrest from the small States a vested right, and by it, to increase the power and influence of the large States. I shall not pretend, sir, that the parties to this constitutional compact cannot alter its original essential principles, and that such alterations may not be effected under the name of amendment; but, let a proposal of that kind come forward in its own proper and undisguised shape; let it be fairly stated to Congress, to the State Legislatures, to the people at large, that the intention is to change an important federative feature in the constitution, which change in itself and all its consequences, will tend to a consolidation of this Union into a simple republic; let it be fairly stated, that the small States have too much agency in the important article of electing a Chief Magistrate, and that the great States claim the choice; and we shall then have a fair decision. If the Senators of the small States, and if their State Legislatures, will then quietly part with the right they have, no person can reasonably complain.

Nothing can be more obvious, than the intention of the plan adopted by our constitution for choosing a President. The Electors are to nominate two persons, of whom they cannot know which will be President; this circumstance not only induces them to select both from the best men; but gives a direct advantage into the hands of the small States even in the electoral choice. For they can always select from the two candidates set up by the Electors of large States, by throwing their votes upon their favorite, and of course giving him a majority; or, if the Electors of the large States should, to prevent this effect, scatter their votes for one candidate, then the Electors of the small States would have it in their power to elect a Vice President. So that, in any event, the small States will have a considerable agency in the election. But if the discriminating or designating principle is carried, as contained in this resolution, the whole, or nearly the whole right and agency of the small States, in the electoral choice of Chief Magistrate, is destroyed, and their chance of obtaining a federative choice by States, if not destroyed, is very much diminished.

The whole power of election is now vested in the two parties; numbers and States, or, great and small States; and it is demonstration itself, if you increase the power of the one, in just such proportion you diminish that of the other. Do the gentlemen suppose that the public will, when constitutionally expressed by a majority of States, in pursuance of the federative principle of our Government, is of less validity, or less binding upon the community at large, than the public will expressed by a popular majority? The framers of your constitution, the people who adopted it, meant, that the public will, in the choice of a President, should be expressed by Electors, if they could agree, and if not, the public will should be expressed by a majority of the States, acting in their federative capacity, and that in both cases the expression of the public will should be equally binding.

It is pretended that the public will can never properly or constitutionally be expressed by a majority of numbers of the people, or of the House of Representatives. This may be a pleasing doctrine enough to great States; but it is certainly incorrect. Our constitution has given the expression of the public will, in a variety of instances, other than that of the choice of President, into very different hands from either House of Representatives or the people at large. The President and Senate, and in many cases the President alone, can express the public will, in appointments of high trust and responsibility, and it cannot be forgotten that the President sometimes expresses the public will by removals. Treaties, highly important expressions of the public will, are made by the President and Senate; and they are the supreme law of the land. In the several States, many great offices are filled, and even the Chief Magistracy, by various modes of election. The public will is sometimes expressed by pluralities instead of majorities, sometimes by both branches of the Legislatures, and sometimes by one, and in certain contingencies, elections are settled by lot. The people have adopted constitutions containing such regulations, and experience has proved that they are well calculated to preserve their liberties and promote their happiness. From what good or even pardonable motive, then, can it be urged that the present mode of electing our President has a tendency to counteract the public will? Do gentlemen intend to destroy every federal feature in this constitution? And is this resolution a precursor to a complete consolidation of the Union, and to the establishment of a simple republic?--Or will it suffice to break down every federative feature which secures to one portion of the Union, to the small States, their rights?

Mr. TAYLOR.--The opposition to this discriminating amendment to the constitution is condensed into a single stratagem, namely: an effort to excite the passion of jealousy in various forms. Endeavors have been made to excite geographical jealousies--a jealousy of the smaller against the larger States--a jealousy in the people against the idea of amending the constitution; and even a jealousy against individual members of this House. Sir, is this passion a good medium through which to discern truth, or is it a mirror calculated to reflect error? Will it enlighten or deceive? Is it planted in good or in evil--in moral or in vicious principles? Wherefore, then, do gentlemen endeavor to blow it up? Is it because they distrust the strength of their arguments, that they resort to this furious and erring passion? Is it because they know that

----“Trifles light as air,
Are, to the jealous, confirmations strong
As proofs of holy writ!”

So far as these efforts have been directed towards a geographical demarcation of the interests of the Union into North and South, in order to excite a jealousy of one division against another; and, so far as they have been used to create suspicions of individuals, they have been either so feeble, inapplicable, or frivolous, as to bear but lightly upon the question, and to merit but little attention. But the attempts to array States against States because they differ in size, and to prejudice the people against the idea of amending their constitution, bear a more formidable aspect, and ought to be repelled, because they are founded on principles the most mischievous and inimical to the constitution, and, could they be successful, are replete with great mischiefs.

Towards exciting this jealousy of smaller States against larger States, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. TRACY) had labored to prove that the federal principle of the constitution of the United States was founded in the idea of minority invested with operative power. That, in pursuance of this principle, it was contemplated and intended that the election of a President should frequently come into the House of Representatives, and to divert it from thence by this amendment would trench upon the federal principle of our constitution, and diminish the rights of the smaller States, bestowed by this principle upon them. This was the scope of his argument to excite their jealousy, and is the amount also of several other arguments delivered by gentlemen on the same side of the question. He did not question the words, but the ideas of gentlemen. Words, selected from their comrades, are easily asserted to misrepresent opinions, as he had himself experienced during the discussion on the subject.

This idea of federalism ought to be well discussed by the smaller States, before they will suffer it to produce the intended effect--that of exciting their jealousy against the larger. To him it appeared to be evidently incorrect. Two principles sustain our constitution: one a majority of the people, the other a majority of the States; the first was necessary to preserve the liberty or sovereignty of the people; the last, to preserve the liberty or sovereignty of the States. But both are founded in the principle of majority; and the effort of the constitution is to preserve this principle in relation both to the people and the States, so that neither species of sovereignty or independence should be able to destroy the other. Many illustrations might be adduced. That of amending the constitution will suffice. Three-fourths of the States must concur in this object, because a less number or a majority of States might not contain a majority of people; therefore, the constitution is not amendable by a majority of States, lest a species of State sovereignty might, under color of amending the constitution, infringe the right of the people. On the other hand, a majority of the people residing in the large States cannot amend the constitution, lest they should diminish or destroy the sovereignty of the small States, the federal Union, or federalism itself. Hence a concurrence of the States to amend the constitution became necessary, not because federalism was founded in the idea of minority, but for a reason the very reverse of that idea--that is, to cover the will both of a majority of the people and a majority of States, so as to preserve the great element of self-government, as it regarded State sovereignty, and also as it regarded the sovereignty of the people.

For this great purpose certain political functions are assigned to be performed, under the auspices of the State or federal principle, and certain others under the popular principle. It was the intention of the constitution that these functions should be performed in conformity to its principle. If that principle is in fact a government of a minority, then these functions ought to be performed by a minority. When the federal principle is performing a function, according to this idea, a majority of the States ought to decide. And, by the same mode of reasoning, when the popular principle is performing a function, then a minority of the people ought to decide. This brings us precisely to the question of the amendment. It is the intention of the constitution that the popular principle shall operate in the election of a President and Vice President. It is also the intention of the constitution that the popular principle, in discharging the functions committed to it by the constitution, should operate by a majority and not by a minority. That the majority of the people should be driven, by an unforeseen state of parties, to the necessity of relinquishing their will in the election of one or the other of these officers, or that the principle of majority, in a function confided to the popular will, should be deprived of half its rights, and be laid under a necessity of violating its duty to preserve the other half, is not the intention of the constitution.

But the gentleman from Connecticut has leaped over all this ground, and gotten into the House of Representatives, without considering the principles of the constitution, as applicable to the election of President and Vice President by Electors, and distinguishing them from an election by the House of Representatives. And by mingling and interweaving the two modes of electing together, a considerable degree of complexity has been produced. If, however, it is admitted that in an election of a President and Vice President by Electors, the will of the electing majority ought fairly to operate, and that an election by the will of a minority would be an abuse or corruption of the principles of the constitution, then it follows that an amendment, to avoid this abuse, accords with, and is necessary to save these principles. In like manner, had an abuse crept into the same election, whenever it was to be made under the federal principle by the House of Representatives, enabling a minority of States to carry the election, it would not have violated the intention of the constitution to have corrected this abuse, also, by an amendment. For, sir, I must suppose it to have been the intention of the constitution that both the federal principle and the popular principle should operate in those functions respectively assigned to them, perfectly and not imperfectly--that is, the former by a majority of States, and the latter by a majority of the people.

Under this view of the subject, the amendment ought to be considered. Then the question will be, whether it is calculated or not to cause the popular principle, applied by the constitution in the first instance, to operate perfectly, and to prevent the abuse of an election by a minority? If it is, it corresponds with the intention, diminishes nothing of the rights of the smaller States, and, of course, affords them no cause of jealousy.

Sir, it could never have been the intention of the constitution to produce a state of things by which a majority of the popular principle should be under the necessity of voting against its judgment to secure a President, and by which a minor faction should acquire a power capable of defeating the majority in the election of President, or of electing a Vice President contrary to the will of the electing principle. To permit this abuse would be a fraudulent mode of defeating the operation of the popular principle in this election, in order to transfer it to the federal principle--to disinherit the people for the sake of endowing the House of Representatives; whereas it was an accidental and not an artificial disappointment in the election of a President, against which the constitution intended to provide. A fair and not an unfair attempt to elect was previously to be made by the popular principle, before the election was to go into the House of Representatives. And if the people of all the States, both large and small, should, by an abuse of the real design of the constitution, be bubbled out of the election of executive power, by leaving to them the nominal right of an abortive effort, and transferring to the House of Representatives the substantial right of a real election, nothing will remain but to corrupt the election in that House by some of those abuses of which elections by diets are susceptible, to bestow upon executive power an aspect both formidable and inconsistent with the principles by which the constitution intended to mould it.

The great check imposed upon executive power was a popular mode of election; and the true object of jealousy, which ought to attract the attention of the people of every State, is any circumstance tending to diminish or destroy that check. It was also a primary intention of the constitution to keep executive power independent of legislative; and although a provision was made for its election by the House of Representatives in a possible case, that possible case never was intended to be converted into the active rule, so as to destroy in a degree the line of separation and independency between the executive and legislative power. The controversy is not therefore between larger and smaller States, but between the people of every State and the House of Representatives. Is it better that the people--a fair majority of the popular principle--should elect executive power; or, that a minor faction should be enabled to embarrass and defeat the judgment and will of this majority, and throw the election into the House of Representatives? This is the question. If this amendment should enable the popular principle to elect executive power, and thus keep it separate and distinct from legislation, the intention of the constitution, the interest of the people, and the principles of our policy, will be preserved; and if so, it is as I have often endeavored to prove in this debate, the interest of the smaller States themselves, that the amendment should prevail. For, sir, is an exposure of their Representatives to bribery and corruption (a thing which may possibly happen at some future day, when men lose that public virtue which now governs them) an acquisition more desirable than all those great objects best (if not exclusively) attainable by the election of executive power by the popular principle of the Federal Government, as the constitution itself meditates and prefers?

So far, then, the amendment strictly coincides with the constitution and with the interests of the people of every State in the Union. But suppose by some rare accident the election should still be sent into the House of Representatives, does not the amendment then afford cause of jealousy to the smaller States? Sir, each State has but one vote, whether it is large or small; and the President and Vice President are still to be chosen out of five persons. Such is the constitution in both respects now. To have enlarged the number of nominees, would have increased the occurrence of an election by the House of Representatives; and if, as I have endeavored to prove, it is for the interest of every State, that the election should be made by the popular principle of Government and not by that House, then it follows, that whatever would have a tendency to draw the election into that House, is against the interest of every State in the Union; and that every State in the Union is interested to avoid an enlargement of the nominees, if it would have such a tendency.

To illustrate this argument, I will repeat a position which I lately advanced, namely, that the substance of a constitution may be effectually destroyed, and yet its form may remain unaltered. England illustrates it. The Government of that country took its present form in the thirteenth century; but its aspect in substance has been extremely different at different periods, under the same form. Without taking time to mark the changes in substance which have taken place under the form of Kings, Lords, and Commons, it will suffice to cast our eyes upon the present state of that Government. What are now its chief and substantial energies? Armies, debt, executive patronage, penal laws, and corporations. These are the modern energies or substance of the English monarchy; to the ancient English monarchy they were unknown. Of the ancient, they were substantial abuses; for, whether these modern energies are good or bad, they overturned the ancient monarchy substantially, without altering its form. Under every change of Administration these abuses proceeded. The _outs_ were clamorous for preserving the constitution, as they called it; for, though divorced from its administration, the hope of getting in again caused them to maintain abuses, by which their avarice or ambition might be gratified upon the next turn of the wheel; just as in Prussia, where divorces are common, nothing is more usual than for late husbands to affect a violent passion for a former wife, if she carried off from him a good estate! And the _ins_, fearing the national jealousy, and the prepossession against amending the form of Government, and meeting new abuses by new remedies, brought no relief to the nation. So that under every change of men abuses proceeded.

The solution of this effect exists in the species of political craft similar to priestcraft. Mankind were anciently deprived of their religious liberty by a dissemination of a fanatical zeal for some idol; in times of ignorance, this idol was of physical structure; and when that fraud was detected, a metaphysical idol in the shape of a tenet or dogma was substituted for it, infinitely more pernicious in its effects, because infinitely more difficult of detection. The same system has been pursued by political craft. It has ever labored to excite the same species of idolatry and superstition for the same reason, namely, to conceal its own frauds and vices. Sometimes it sets up a physical, at others a metaphysical idol, as the object of vulgar superstition. Of one, the former “Grand Monarch of France;” of the other, the present “Church and State” tenet of England is an evidence. And if our constitution is to be made like the “Church and State” tenet of England, a metaphysical political idol, which it will be sacrilege to amend, even for the sake of saving both that and the national liberty; and if, like that tenet, it is to be exposed to all the means which centuries may suggest to vicious men for its substantial destruction, it is not hard to imagine that it also may become a monument of the inefficacy of unalterable forms of political law to correct avarice and ambition in the new and multifarious shapes they are for ever assuming.

It has been urged, sir, by the gentlemen in opposition, in a mode, as if they supposed we wished to conceal or deny it, that one object of this amendment is to bestow upon the majority a power to elect a Vice President. Sir, I avow it to be so. This is one object of the amendment; and the other, as to which I have heretofore expressed my sentiments, is to enable the Electors, by perfecting the election of a President, to keep it out of the House of Representatives. Are not both objects correct, if, as I have endeavored to prove, the constitution, in all cases where it refers elections to the popular principle, intended that principle to act by majorities? Did the constitution intend that any minor faction should elect a Vice President? If not, then an amendment to prevent it accords with, and is representative of, the constitution. Permit me here again to illustrate by an historical case. England, in the time of Charles the Second, was divided into two parties--Protestants and Papists--and the heir to the throne was a Papist. The Protestants, constituting the majority of the nation, passed an exclusion bill, but it was defeated, and the minor Papist faction, in the person of the Duke of York, got possession of executive power. The consequences were, domestic oppressions and rebellions, foreign wars occasionally for almost a century, and the foundation of a national debt, under which the nation has been ever since groaning, and under which the Government will finally expire.

Had the majority carried and executed the proposed exclusion of James II. from executive power, the English would have escaped all these calamities. Such precisely may be our case. I beg again that it may be understood that, in this application, I speak prospectively and not retrospectively.

But it is far from being improbable, that in place of these religious parties, political parties may arise of equal zeal and animosity. We may at some future day see our country divided into a republican party and a monarchical party. Is it wise, or according to the intention of the constitution, that a minor monarchical faction should, by any means, acquire the power of electing a Vice President, the possible successor to executive power? Ought a republican majority to stake the national liberty upon the frail life of one man? Will not a monarchical Executive overturn the system of a republican Executive? And ought the United States to shut their eyes upon this possible danger until the case shall happen, when it may be too late to open them?

Sir, let us contemplate the dreadful evils which the English nation have suffered from the cause of investing executive power in a man hostile to the national opinion, and avoid them. They suffered, because their exclusion bill was abortive. Election is our exclusion bill. Its efficacy depends upon its being exercised by a majority. It is only a minority which can render election insufficient to exclude monarchical principles from executive power. It is against minority that election is intended to operate, because minority is the author of monarchy and aristocracy.

Shall we, sir, be so injudicious as to make election destroy the principle of election by adhering to a mode of exercising it, now seen to be capable of bestowing upon a minority the choice of a Vice President? Shall we make election, invented to exclude monarchy, a handmaid for its introduction? Or shall we, if we do not see monarchy at this day assailing our republican system, conclude that it never will; although we know that this system has but two foes, of whom monarchy is one? No, sir, let us rather draw instruction from the prophetic observations of a member of the English House of Commons, whilst the bill for excluding James II. was depending, who said:

“I hear a lion in the lobby roar,
Say, Mr. Speaker, shall we shut the door,
And keep him there! Or shall we let him in,
To try if we can get him out again!”

Instead of shutting the door, the English left it open; tyranny got in; and the evils produced by its expulsion, to that nation, may possibly have been equal to those which submission would have produced.

The question was called for loudly at half-past nine, and put--the yeas and nays being taken, were:

YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley,
Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson,
Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith,
Samuel Smith, Stone, Taylor, Worthington, and Wright--22.

NAYS.--Messrs. Adams, Butler, Dayton, Hillhouse, Olcott,
Pickering, Plumer, Tracy, Wells, and White--10.

Upon the PRESIDENT declaring the question carried by two-thirds--

Mr. TRACY said he denied that the question was fairly decided. He took it to be the intention of the constitution, that there should be two-thirds of the whole number of Senators elected, which would make the number necessary to its passage 23.

It was moved to adjourn to Monday.

Mr. TAYLOR said that since it was proposed to adjourn to Monday, when he should be disqualified to sit in that House, he hoped the Senate would not rise without deciding the question definitively on the gentleman’s objections.

Mr. TRACY said he certainly would avail himself of the principle to oppose its passage through the State Legislatures.

The PRESIDENT declared the question had passed the Senate by the majority required, and conformable to the constitution and former usage.

The amendment, as adopted, is as follows:

_Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, two-thirds of
both Houses concurring_, That, in lieu of the third paragraph
of the first section of the second article of the Constitution
of the United States, the following be proposed as an amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified
by three-fourths of the Legislatures of the several States,
shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the
said Constitution, to wit:

The Electors shall meet in their respective States and vote
by ballot for President and Vice President, one of whom, at
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted
for as President, and, in distinct ballots, the person voted
for as Vice President; and they shall make distinct lists of
all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted
for as Vice President, and of the number of votes for each,
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to
the seat of Government of the United States, directed to the
President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall,
in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives,
open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be
counted. The person having the greatest number of votes for
the President, shall be the President, if such number be a
majority of the whole number of electors appointed: and if
no person have such majority, then, from the persons having
the highest numbers, not exceeding three, on the list of
those voted for as President, the House of Representatives
shall choose, immediately, by ballot, the President. But, in
choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States,
the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum
for this purpose shall consist of a member or members,
from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the
States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of
Representatives shall not choose a President, whenever the
right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day
of March next following, then the Vice President shall act as
President, as in the case of death or any other constitutional
disability of the President.

The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice
President, shall be the Vice President, if such number be a
majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no
person have a majority, then, from the two highest numbers
on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice President; a
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the
whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number
shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally
ineligible to the office of President, shall be eligible to
that of Vice President of the United States.

_Ordered_, That the Secretary request the concurrence of the House of Representatives in this resolution.

MONDAY, December 5.

_Impressment of Seamen._

The following messages were received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

_To the Senate of the United States_:

In compliance with the desire of the Senate, expressed in
their resolution of the 22d of November, on the impressment of
seamen in the service of the United States, by the agents of
foreign nations; I now lay before the Senate a letter from the
Secretary of State, with a specification of the cases of which
information has been received.

TH. JEFFERSON.

DEC. 5, 1803.

* * * * *

_Tripolitan Aggression._

_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States_:

I have the satisfaction to inform you, that the act of
hostility mentioned, in my message of the 4th of November, to
have been committed by a cruiser of the Emperor of Morocco,
on a vessel of the United States, has been disavowed by the
Emperor. All differences in consequence thereof have been
amicably adjusted, and the Treaty of 1796, between this country
and that, has been recognized and confirmed by the Emperor,
each party restoring to the other what had been detained or
taken. I enclose the Emperor’s orders given on this occasion.

The conduct of our officers generally, who have had a part in
these transactions, has merited entire approbation.

The temperate and correct course pursued by our Consul, Mr.
Simpson, the promptitude and energy of Commodore Preble,
the efficacious co-operation of Captains Rodgers and
Campbell, of the returning squadron, the proper decision of
Captain Bainbridge, that a vessel which had committed an
open hostility, was of right to be detained for inquiry and
consideration, and the general zeal of the other officers and
men, are honorable facts, which I make known with pleasure. And
to these I add, what was indeed transacted in another quarter,
the gallant enterprise of Captain Rodgers, in destroying, on
the coast of Tripoli, a corvette of that power, of 22 guns.

I recommend to the consideration of Congress, a just
indemnification for the interest acquired by the captors of
the Mishouda and Mirboha, yielded by them for the public
accommodation.

TH. JEFFERSON.

DEC. 5, 1803.

The Messages and papers therein respectively referred to, were read.

_Ordered_, That they severally lie for consideration.

WEDNESDAY, December 7.

AARON BURR, Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate, attended.

JOHN ARMSTRONG, appointed a Senator by the Executive of the State of New York, in the room of De Witt Clinton, resigned, attended.

THURSDAY, December 8.

The credentials of Mr. ARMSTRONG were read, and the oath was administered to him by the Vice President as the law provides.

MONDAY, December 12.

_Amendment of the Constitution._

The Senate resumed the consideration of the last resolution reported by the committee appointed on the 22d of October last, to consider the motion for an amendment to the constitution in the mode of electing the President and Vice President of the United States; which is as follows:

“_Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, two-thirds
of both Houses concurring_, That the following amendment be
proposed to the Legislatures of the several States as an
amendment to the constitution of the United States, which,
when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislature, shall
be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the said
Constitution, to wit;

“That no person who has been twice successively elected
President of the United States shall be eligible as President
until four years shall have elapsed: but any citizen who
has been President of the United States may, after such
intervention, be eligible to the office of President for four
years and no longer.”

On the question to agree to this resolution, it passed in the negative--yeas 4, nays 25, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Butler, Dayton, and Jackson.

NAYS.--Messrs. Adams, Armstrong, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley,
Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Ellery, Franklin,
Hillhouse, Logan, Maclay, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Potter,
Israel Smith, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Tracy, White,
Worthington, and Wright.

TUESDAY, December 13.

ABRAHAM B. VENABLE, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Virginia on the 7th instant, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the Senate.

_Repeal of Bankrupt Act._

The bill, entitled, “An act to repeal an act, entitled ‘An act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States,’” was read the third time; and, on motion, that the further consideration of this bill be postponed to the second Monday in December next, it passed in the negative--yeas 13, nays, 17, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Adams, Armstrong, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Brown, Condit, Jackson, Israel Smith, Samuel Smith, Tracy, White, and Wright.

NAYS.--Messrs. Anderson, Breckenridge, Butler, Cocke, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Hillhouse, Logan, Maclay, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Potter, John Smith, Venable, and Worthington.

On the question, “Shall this bill pass?” it was determined in the affirmative--yeas 17, nays 12, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Breckenridge, Butler, Cocke, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Hillhouse, Logan, Maclay, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Potter, John Smith, Venable, and Worthington.

NAYS.--Messrs. Adams, Armstrong, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Brown, Condit, Israel Smith, Samuel Smith, Tracy, White, and Wright.

So it was _Resolved_, That this bill do pass.[5]

THURSDAY, December 15.

_Classification of Senators._

On motion, the Senate proceeded to ascertain the classes in which the Senators of the State of Ohio should be inserted, as the constitution and rule heretofore adopted prescribe; and it was ordered, that two lots, No. 2 and a blank, be by the Secretary rolled up and put in the ballot box; and it was understood that the Senator who should draw the lot No. 2 should be inserted in the class of Senators whose terms of service respectively expire in four years from and after the third day of March, 1803, in order to equalize the classes.

Accordingly, Mr. WORTHINGTON drew lot No. 2, and Mr. JOHN SMITH drew the blank.

It was then agreed that two lots, Nos. 1 and 3, should be by the Secretary rolled up and put into the ballot-box, and one of these be drawn by Mr. JOHN SMITH, the Senator from the State of Ohio, not classed; and it was understood that, if he should draw lot No. 1, he should be inserted in the class of Senators whose terms of service will respectively expire in two years from and after the third day of March, 1803; but, if he should draw lot No. 3, it was understood that he should be inserted in the class of Senators whose terms respectively expire in six years from and after the third day of March, 1803. Mr. JOHN SMITH drew lot No. 3, and is classed accordingly.

FRIDAY, December 16.

_Importation of Slaves._

The Senate took into consideration the motion made yesterday, that a committee be appointed to inquire whether any, and, if any, what amendments ought to be made in the act, entitled “An act to prevent the importation of certain persons into certain States, by the laws whereof their admission is prohibited,” and that the committee have leave to report by bill or otherwise; and the motion was adopted; and

_Ordered_, That Messrs. FRANKLIN, VENABLE, and I. SMITH, be this committee.

MONDAY, December 19.

_Admissions on the Floor._

The Senate took into consideration the motion made on the 16th instant, that no person be admitted on the floor of the Senate Chamber except members of the House of Representatives, foreign ministers, and the Heads of Departments, unless introduced by a member of the Senate.

On motion, it was agreed to strike out the words “unless introduced by a member of the Senate;” and on motion, it was agreed to subjoin, after the word “Departments,” “and Judges of the Supreme and District Courts of the United States.”

On motion to insert after the word “States,” “and the ladies,” it passed in the negative--yeas 12, nays 16, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Breckenridge, Brown, Dayton, Jackson,
Maclay, Potter, I. Smith, S. Smith, Tracy, White, and Wright.

NAYS.--Messrs. Adams, Armstrong, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley,
Cocke, Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Hillhouse, Olcott, Pickering,
Plumer, J. Smith, Venable, and Worthington.

On motion to insert after the word “States,” “the Governors and Councillors of the respective States, and the Representatives of the State Legislatures,” it passed in the negative--yeas 13, nays 15, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Bailey, Breckenridge,
Dayton, Maclay, Potter, I. Smith, S. Smith, Tracy, Venable,
Worthington, and Wright.

NAYS.--Messrs. Armstrong, Baldwin, Bradley, Brown, Cocke,
Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Hillhouse, Jackson, Olcott,
Pickering, Plumer, J. Smith, and White.

On motion to agree to the resolution amended as follows:

_Resolved_, That no person be admitted on the floor of the
Senate Chamber, except members of the House of Representatives,
foreign ministers, and Heads of Departments, and Judges of the
Supreme and District Courts of the United States:

It was determined in the negative--yeas 7, nays 21, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Adams, Bailey, Condit, Dayton, Franklin,
Jackson, and Wright.

NAYS.--Messrs. Anderson, Armstrong, Baldwin, Bradley,
Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Ellery, Hillhouse, Maclay, Olcott,
Pickering, Plumer, Potter, I. Smith, S. Smith, Tracy, Venable,
White, and Worthington.

FRIDAY, December 30.

_Erection of Louisiana into two Territories._