Chapter XX: Front Matter (20)

_Resolved_, That the Secretary be directed to issue a
summons to Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court of the United States, to answer certain
articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the House
of Representatives on Friday last: That the said summons be
returnable the 2d day of January, and he served at least
fifteen days before the return day thereof.

On the 24th and 31st of December, the Senate adopted the following rules of proceeding, to be observed in cases of impeachment.

1. Whensoever the Senate shall receive notice from the House of
Representatives, that managers are appointed on their part, to
conduct an impeachment against any person, and are directed to
carry such articles to the Senate, the Secretary of the Senate
shall immediately inform the House of Representatives, that
the Senate is ready to receive the managers for the purpose of
exhibiting such articles of impeachment, agreeably to the said
notice.

2. When the managers of an impeachment shall be introduced to
the bar of the Senate, and shall have signified that they are
ready to exhibit articles of impeachment against any person,
the President of the Senate shall direct the Sergeant-at-Arms
to make proclamation; who shall, after making proclamation,
repeat the following words: “All persons are commanded to keep
silence, on pain of imprisonment, while the grand inquest of
the nation is exhibiting to the Senate of the United States,
articles of impeachment against ---- ----;” after which the
articles shall be exhibited, and then the President of the
Senate shall inform the managers, that the Senate will take
proper order on the subject of the impeachment, of which due
notice shall be given to the House of Representatives.

3. A summons shall issue, directed to the person impeached, in
the form following:

_The United States of America, ss._

The Senate of the United States, to ----, greeting:

Whereas, the House of Representatives of the United States of
America, did, on the ---- day of ----, exhibit to the Senate
articles of impeachment against you, the said ----, in the
words following, viz: [here recite the articles] and did demand
that you the said ---- should be put to answer the accusations
as set forth in said articles; and that such proceedings,
examinations, trials, and judgments, might be thereupon had,
as are agreeable to law and justice: You, the said ----, are
therefore hereby summoned, to be, and appear before the Senate
of the United States of America, at their Chamber in the City
of Washington, on the ---- day of ----, then and there to
answer to the said articles of impeachment, and then and there
to abide by, obey, and perform such orders and judgments as
the Senate of the United States shall make in the premises,
according to the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Hereof you are not to fail.

Witness, ----, Vice President of the United States of America,
and President of the Senate thereof, at the City of Washington,
this ---- day of ----, in the year of our Lord ----, and of the
Independence of the United States, the ----.

Which summons shall be signed by the Secretary of the Senate, and sealed with their seal, and served by the Sergeant-at-Arms to the Senate, or by such other person as the Senate shall specially appoint for that purpose; who shall serve the same, pursuant to the directions given in the form next following:

4. A precept shall be endorsed on said writ of summons, in the form following, viz:

_United States of America, ss._

The Senate of the United States, to ----, greeting:

You are hereby commanded to deliver to, and leave with ----,
if to be found, a true and attested copy of the within writ of
summons, together with a like copy of this precept, showing
him both; or in case he cannot with convenience be found, you
are to leave true and attested copies of the said summons and
precept, at his usual place of residence, and in whichsoever
way you perform the service, let it be done at least ---- days
before the appearance day mentioned in said writ of summons.
Fail not, and make return of this writ of summons and precept,
with your proceedings thereon endorsed, on or before the
appearance day mentioned in said writ of summons.

Witness, ----, Vice President of the United States of America,
and President of the Senate thereof, at the City of Washington,
this ---- day of ----, in the year of our Lord ----, and of the
Independence of the United States, the ----.

Which precept shall be signed by the Secretary of the Senate, and sealed with their seal.

5. Subpœnas shall be issued by the Secretary of the Senate, upon the application of the managers of the impeachment, or of the party impeached, or his counsel, in the following form, to wit:

To ----, greeting:

You, and each of you, are hereby commanded to appear before the
Senate of the United States, on the ---- day of ----, at the
Senate Chamber, in the City of Washington, then and there to
testify your knowledge in the cause which is before the Senate,
in which the House of Representatives have impeached ----. Fail
not.

Witness, ----, Vice President of the United States of America,
and President of the Senate thereof, at the City of Washington,
this ---- day of ----, in the year of our Lord ----, and of the
Independence of the United States, the ----.

Which shall be signed by the Secretary of the Senate, and sealed with their seal.

Which subpœnas shall be directed, in every case, to the Marshal of the district, where such witnesses respectively reside, to serve and return.

6. The form of direction to the Marshal, for the service of the subpœna, shall be as follows:

The Senate of the United States of America, to the Marshal of
the district of ----:

You are hereby commanded to serve and return the within
subpœna, according to law.

Dated at Washington, this ---- day of ----, in the year of our
Lord ----, and of the Independence of the United States, the
----.

_Secretary of the Senate._

7. The President of the Senate shall direct all necessary preparations in the Senate Chamber, and all the forms of proceeding, while the Senate are sitting for the purpose of trying an impeachment, and all forms during the trial, not otherwise specially provided for by the Senate.

8. He shall also be authorized to direct the employment of the Marshal of the District of Columbia, or any other person or persons, during the trial, to discharge such duties as may be prescribed by him.

9. At twelve o’clock of the day appointed for the return of the summons against the person impeached, the legislative and executive business of the Senate shall be suspended and the Secretary of the Senate shall administer an oath to the returning officer, in the form following, viz: “I, ----, do solemnly swear, that the return made and subscribed by me, upon the process issued on the ---- day of ----, by the Senate of the United States, against ----, is truly made, and that I have performed said services as therein described. So help me God.” Which oath shall be entered at large on the records.

10. The person impeached shall then be called to appear, and answer the articles of impeachment exhibited against him. If he appears, or any person for him, the appearance shall be recorded, stating particularly, if by himself, or if by agent or attorney; naming the person appearing, and the capacity in which he appears. If he does not appear, either personally, or by agent or attorney, the same shall be recorded.

11. At twelve o’clock of the day appointed for the trial of an impeachment, the Legislative and Executive business of the Senate shall be postponed. The Secretary shall then administer the following oath or affirmation to the President:

“You solemnly swear, or affirm, that in all things appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of ----, you will do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

12. And the President shall administer the said oath or affirmation to each Senator present.

The Secretary shall then give notice to the House of Representatives, that the Senate is ready to proceed upon the impeachment of ----, in the Senate Chamber, which Chamber is prepared with accommodations for the reception of the House of Representatives.

13. Counsel for the parties shall be admitted to appear, and be heard upon an impeachment.

14. All motions made by the parties, or their counsel, shall be addressed to the President of the Senate, and if he shall require it, shall be committed to writing, and read at the Secretary’s table; and all decisions shall be had by yeas and nays, and without debate, which shall be entered on the records.

15. Witnesses shall be sworn in the following form, to wit: “You ---- do swear, (or affirm, as the case may be,) that the evidence you shall give in the case now depending between the United States and ----, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. So help you God.” Which oath shall be administered by the Secretary.

16. Witnesses shall be examined by the party producing them, and then cross-examined in the usual form.

17. If a Senator is called as a witness, he shall be sworn, and give his testimony standing in his place.

18. If a Senator wishes a question to be put to a witness, it shall be reduced to writing and put by the President.

19. At all times, whilst the Senate is sitting upon the trial of an impeachment, the doors of the Senate Chamber shall be kept open.

HIGH COURT OF IMPEACHMENTS.

WEDNESDAY, January 2, 1805.

The Court having been opened by proclamation,

The return made by the Sergeant-at-Arms was read, as follows:

“I, James Mathers, Sergeant-at-Arms to the Senate of the United
States, in obedience to the within summons to me directed, did
proceed to the residence of the within named Samuel Chase, on
the 12th day of December, 1804, and did then and there leave a
true copy of the said writ of summons, together with a true
copy of the articles of impeachment annexed, with him the said
Samuel Chase.

“JAMES MATHERS.”

After which the Secretary administered to him the oath as follows:

“You, James Mathers, Sergeant-at-Arms to the Senate of the
United States, do solemnly swear, that the return made and
subscribed by you, upon the process issued on the 10th day of
December last, by the Senate of the United States, against
Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, is truly made, and that you have performed said services
as therein described. So help you God.”

SAMUEL CHASE, having been solemnly called, appeared.

The PRESIDENT of the Senate (Mr. BURR) informed Mr. CHASE, that having been summoned to answer to the articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the House of Representatives, the Senate were ready to receive any answer he had to make to them.

Mr. CHASE requested the indulgence of a chair,[19] which was immediately furnished.

After being seated for a short time, Mr. CHASE rose, and commenced the following address to the Senate, which he read from a paper that he held in his hand:

“Mr. President: I appear, in obedience to a summons from this honorable Court, to answer articles of impeachment exhibited against me, by the honorable the House of Representatives of the United States.

“To these articles, a copy of which was delivered to me with the summons, I say that I have committed no crime or misdemeanor whatsoever, for which I am subject to impeachment according to the Constitution of the United States. I deny, with a few exceptions, the acts with which I am charged; I shall contend, that all acts admitted to have been done by me were _legal_; and I deny, in every instance, the _improper_ intentions with which the acts charged are alleged to have been done, and in which their supposed criminality altogether consists.”

The PRESIDENT reminded Mr. CHASE that this was the day appointed to receive any answer he might make to the articles of impeachment.

Mr. CHASE said his purpose was to request the allowance of further time to put in his answer.

The PRESIDENT desired him to proceed.

Mr. CHASE proceeded in his address; and having finished it, was desired by the PRESIDENT, if he had any motion to make, to reduce it to writing, and hand it to the Secretary.

Whereupon, Mr. CHASE submitted the following motion:

“I solicit this honorable Court to allow me until the first day
of the next session, to put in my answer, and to prepare for my
trial.”

The PRESIDENT informed Mr. Chase, that, the Court would take time to consider his motion.[20]

The Senate withdrew to a private apartment, where debate arose on the question, whether it was not incumbent on the Senators to take the oath required by the constitution, before they took into consideration the motion of Mr. Chase, which issued in the adoption of the following resolution:

_Resolved_, That, on the meeting of the Senate, to-morrow,
before they proceed to any business on the articles of
impeachment before them, and before any decision of any
question, the oath prescribed by the rules, shall be
administered to the President and members of the Senate.

On the ensuing day, previously to the entrance of the Senate into the public room, considerable debate took place on the motion of Mr. Chase, without any decision being made.

THURSDAY, January 3.

The Court was opened by proclamation about two o’clock.

The oath prescribed was administered to the President by the Secretary.

The PRESIDENT administered the oath prescribed to the following members:

Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Condit, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Giles, Hillhouse, Howland, Jackson, Mitchill, Moore, Olcott, Pickering, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Smith of Ohio, Smith of Vermont, Sumter, Tracy, White, Worthington, and Wright.

And the affirmation was administered to Messrs. Logan, Maclay, and Plumer.

The PRESIDENT stated that he had received a letter from the defendant, enclosing an affidavit that further time was necessary for him to prepare for trial; which affidavit was read, as follows:

_City of Washington, ss_:

Samuel Chase made oath on the Holy Evangels of Almighty God,
that it is not in his power to obtain information respecting
the facts alleged in the articles of impeachment to have
taken place in the city of Philadelphia in the trial of John
Fries; or of the facts alleged to have taken place in the city
of Richmond, in the trial of James T. Callender, in time to
prepare and put in his answer, and to proceed to trial, with
any probability that the same could be finished on or before
the fifth day of March next. And further, that it is not in his
power to procure information of the names of the witnesses,
whom he thinks it may be proper and necessary for him to
summon, in time to obtain their attendance, if his answer could
be prepared in time sufficient for the finishing of the said
trial, before the said fifth day of March next; and the said
Samuel Chase further made oath, that he believes it will not be
in his power to obtain the advice of counsel, to prepare his
answer, and to give him their assistance on the trial, which he
thinks necessary, if the said trial should take place during
the present session of Congress; and that he verily believes,
if he had, at this time full information of facts, and of the
witnesses proper for him to summon, and if he had also the
assistance of counsel, that he could not prepare the answer he
thinks he ought to put in, and be ready for his trial, within
the space of four or five weeks from this time. And further,
that his application to the honorable the Senate, for time
to obtain the information of facts, in order to prepare his
answer, and for time to procure the attendance of necessary
witnesses, and to prepare for his defence in the trial, and to
obtain the advice and assistance of counsel, is not made for
the purpose of delay, but only for the purpose of obtaining a
full hearing of the articles of impeachment against him, in
their real merits.

SAMUEL CHASE.

Sworn to, this third day of January, 1805, before

SAMUEL HAMILTON.

Whereupon the following motion was made by Mr. BRADLEY:

“_Ordered_, That Samuel Chase file his answer, with the
Secretary of the Senate, to the several articles of impeachment
exhibited against him, by the House of Representatives, on or
before the ---- day of ----.”

On motion, by Mr. BRECKENRIDGE, to fill the blank with the words “the fourth day of February next,” the yeas and nays being taken, it passed in the affirmative--yeas 22, nays 8, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Baldwin, Breckenridge, Brown,
Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Giles, Howland, Jackson, Logan,
Maclay, Mitchill, Moore, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York,
Smith of Ohio, Smith of Vermont, Sumter, Worthington, and
Wright.

NAYS.--Messrs. Bradley, Dayton, Hillhouse, Olcott, Pickering,
Plumer, Tracy, and White.

_Ordered_, That the Secretary notify the House of Representatives, and Samuel Chase, thereof.

[Between this day, and that assigned for receiving the answer of Mr. Chase, the Senate Chamber was fitted up in a style of appropriate elegance. Benches, covered with crimson, on each side, and in a line with the chair of the President, were assigned to the members of the Senate. On the right and in front of the chair, a box was assigned to the Managers, and on the left a similar box to Mr. Chase and his counsel, and chairs allotted to such friends as he might introduce. The residue of the floor was occupied with chairs for the accommodation of the members of the House of Representatives; and with boxes for the reception of the foreign Ministers, and civil and military officers of the United States. On the right and left of the chair, at the termination of the benches of the members of the Court, boxes were assigned to stenographers. The permanent gallery was allotted to the indiscriminate admission of spectators. Below this gallery, and above the floor of the House, a new gallery was raised, and fitted up with peculiar elegance, intended primarily for the exclusive accommodation of ladies. But this feature of the arrangement, made by the Vice President, was at an early period of the trial abandoned, it having been found impracticable to separate the sexes! At the termination of this gallery, on each side, boxes were specially assigned to ladies attached to the families of public characters. The preservation of order was devolved on the Marshal of the District of Columbia, who was assisted by a number of deputies.]

TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE.

MONDAY, February 4, 1805.

About a quarter before ten o’clock the Court was opened by proclamation, all the members of the Senate, thirty-four, attending.

The Chamber of the Senate, which is very extensive, was soon filled with spectators, a large portion of whom consisted of ladies, who continued, with little intermission, to attend during the whole course of the trial.

The oath prescribed was administered to Mr. BAYARD, Mr. COCKE, Mr. GAILLARD, and Mr. STONE, members of the Court, who were not present when it was before administered.

_Ordered_, That the Secretary give notice to the House of Representatives that the Senate are in their public chamber, and are ready to proceed on the trial of Samuel Chase; and that seats are provided for the accommodation of the members.

In a few minutes the Managers, viz: Messrs. J. RANDOLPH, RODNEY, NICHOLSON, BOYLE, G. W. CAMPBELL, EARLY, and CLARK, accompanied by the House of Representatives in Committee of the Whole, entered and took their seats.

SAMUEL CHASE being called to make answer to the articles of impeachment, exhibited against him by the House of Representatives, appeared, attended by Messrs. HARPER, MARTIN, and HOPKINSON, his counsel; to whom seats were assigned.

The PRESIDENT, after stating to Mr. CHASE the indulgence of time which had been allowed, inquired if he was prepared to give in his answer?

Mr. CHASE said he had prepared it, as well as circumstances would permit; and submitted the following motion:

“Samuel Chase moves for permission to read his answer, by
himself and his counsel, at the bar of this honorable Court.”

The PRESIDENT asked him if it was the answer on which he meant to rely? to which he replied in the affirmative.

The motion being agreed to by a vote of the Senate, Mr. CHASE commenced the reading of his answer, (in which he was assisted by Messrs. HARPER and HOPKINSON,) as follows:[21]

This respondent, in his proper person, comes into the said Court, and protesting that there is no high crime or misdemeanor particularly alleged in the said articles of impeachment, to which he is, or can be bound by law to make answer; and saving to himself now, and at all times hereafter, all benefit of exception to the insufficiency of the said articles, and each of them, and to the defects therein appearing in point of law, or otherwise; and protesting also, that he ought not to be injured in any manner, by any words, or by any want of form in this his answer; he submits the following facts and observations by way of answer to the said articles.

The first article relates to his supposed misconduct in the trial of John Fries, for treason, before the circuit court of the United States at Philadelphia, in April and May, 1800; and alleges that he presided at that trial, and that, “unmindful of the solemn duties of his office, and contrary to the sacred obligation by which he stood bound to discharge them faithfully and impartially, and without respect to persons,” he did then, “in his judicial capacity, conduct himself in a manner highly arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust.”

This general accusation, too vague in itself for reply, is supported by three specific charges of misconduct:

1st. “In delivering an opinion, in writing, on the question of law, on the construction of which the defence of the accused materially depended:” which opinion, it is alleged, tended to prejudice the minds of the jury against the case of the said John Fries, the prisoner, before counsel had been heard in his favor.

2d. “In restricting the counsel for the said John Fries, from recurring to such English authorities as they believed apposite; or from citing certain statutes of the United States which they deemed illustrative of the positions, upon which they intended to rest the defence of their client.”

3d. “In debarring the prisoner from his constitutional privilege of addressing the jury (through his counsel) on the law, as well as on the fact, which was to determine his guilt or innocence, and at the same time endeavoring to wrest from the jury their indisputable right to hear argument, and determine upon the question of law, as well as the question of fact, involved in the verdict which they were required to give.”

This first article then concludes, that in consequence of this irregular conduct of this respondent, “the said John Fries was deprived of the right secured to him by the eighth article amendatory of the constitution, and was condemned to death, without having been heard by counsel, in his defence.”

In the year 1794, an insurrection took place in four of the western counties of Pennsylvania, with a view of resisting, and preventing by force the execution of these two statutes; and a circuit court of the United States, held at Philadelphia, for the district of Pennsylvania, in the month of April, in the year 1795, by William Patterson, Esq., then one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the above-mentioned Richard Peters, then district judge of the United States, for the district of Pennsylvania, two persons, who had been concerned in the above-named insurrection, namely, Philip Vigol and John Mitchell, were indicted for treason, of levying war against the United States, by resisting and preventing by force the execution of the two last-mentioned acts of Congress; and were, after a full and very solemn trial, convicted of the indictments and sentenced to death. They were afterwards pardoned by George Washington, then President of the United States.

In the first of these trials, that of Vigol, the defence of the prisoner was conducted by very able counsel, one of whom, William Lewis, Esq., is the same person who appeared as counsel for John Fries, in the trial now under consideration. Neither that learned gentleman, nor his able colleague, then thought proper to raise the question of law, “whether resisting and preventing by armed force the execution of a particular law of the United States, be a ‘levying of war against the United States,’” according to the true meaning of the constitution? although a decision of this question in the negative must have acquitted the prisoner. But in the next trial, that of Mitchell, this question was asked on the part of the prisoner, and was very fully and ably discussed by his counsel; and it was solemnly determined by the Court, both the judges concurring, “that to resist, or prevent by armed force, the execution of a particular law of the United States, is a levying of war against the United States, and consequently is treason, within the true meaning of the constitution.” The decision, according to the best established principles of our jurisprudence, became a precedent for all courts of equal or inferior jurisdiction; a precedent which, although not absolutely obligatory, ought to be viewed with very great respect, especially by the court in which it was made, and ought never to be departed from, but on the fullest and clearest conviction of its incorrectness.

On the 9th of July, an act of Congress was passed, providing for a valuation of lands and dwelling-houses, and an enumeration of slaves throughout the United States; and directing the appointment of commissioners and assessors for carrying it into execution; and on the 4th day of July, in the same year, a direct tax was laid by another act of Congress of that date, on the lands, dwelling-houses, and slaves, so to be valued and enumerated.

In the months of February and March, A. D. 1799, an insurrection took place in the counties of Bucks and Northampton, in the State of Pennsylvania, for the purpose of resisting and preventing by force the execution of the two last-mentioned acts of Congress, and particularly that for the valuation of lands and dwelling-houses. John Fries, the person mentioned in the article of impeachment now under consideration, was apprehended and committed to prison, as one of the ringleaders of this insurrection; and at a circuit court of the United States, held at Philadelphia, in and for the district of Pennsylvania, in the month of April, A. D. 1799, he was brought to trial for this offence, on an indictment for treason, by levying war against the United States, before James Iredell, Esq., then one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, who presided in the said court, according to law, and the above-mentioned Richard Peters, then district judge of the United States, for the district of Pennsylvania, who sat in the said circuit court as assistant judge.

In this trial, which was conducted with great solemnity, and occupied nine days, the prisoner was assisted by William Lewis and Alexander James Dallas, Esqs., two very able and eminent counsellors; the former of whom, William Lewis, is the person who assisted, as above mentioned, in conducting the defence of Vigol, on a similar indictment. These gentlemen, finding that the facts alleged were fully and undeniably proved, by a very minute and elaborate examination of witnesses, thought proper to rest the case of the prisoner on the question of law which had been determined in the cases of Vigol and Mitchell, above mentioned, and had then been acquiesced in, but which they thought proper again to raise. They contended, “that to resist by force of arms a particular law of the United States, does not amount to levying war against the United States, within the true meaning of the constitution, and therefore is not treason, but a riot only.” This question they argued at great length, and with all the force of their learning and genius; and after a full discussion at the bar, and the most mature deliberation by the Court, the learned and excellent judge who then presided, and who was no less distinguished by his humanity and tenderness towards persons tried before him, than by his extensive knowledge and great talents as a lawyer, pronounced the opinion of himself and his colleague, “that to resist, or prevent by force, the execution of a particular law of the United States, does amount to levying war against them, within the true meaning of the constitution, and does, therefore, constitute the crime of treason:” thereby adding the weight of another and more solemn decision to the precedent which had been established in the above-mentioned cases of Vigol and Mitchell.

Under this opinion of the Court on the question of law, the jury, having no doubt as to the facts, found the said John Fries guilty of treason on the above-mentioned indictment. But a new trial was granted by the Court, not by reason of any doubt as to the correctness of the decision on the question of law, but solely on the ground, as this respondent hath understood and believes, that one of the jurors of the petit jury, after he was summoned, but before he was sworn on the trial, had made some declaration unfavorable to the prisoner.

On the 11th day of April, 1800, and from that day until the 2d day of May in the same year, a circuit court of the United States was held at Philadelphia, in and for the district of Pennsylvania, before this respondent, then one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the above-mentioned Richard Peters, then district judge of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania. At this court the indictment on which the said John Fries had been convicted as above mentioned, was quashed _ex officio_ by William Rawle, Esq., then attorney of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania, and a new indictment was by him preferred against the said John Fries, for treason of levying war against the United States, by resisting and preventing by force in the manner above set forth, the execution of the above-mentioned acts of Congress, for the valuation of lands and dwelling-houses, and the enumeration of slaves, and for levying and collecting a direct tax. This indictment, of which a true copy, marked No. 1, is herewith exhibited by this respondent, who prays that it may be taken as part of this his answer, being found by the grand jury on the 16th day of April, 1800, the said John Fries was on the same day arraigned thereon, and plead not guilty. William Lewis, and Alexander James Dallas, Esqs., the same persons who had conducted his defence at his former trial, were again at his request assigned by the Court as his counsel; and his trial was appointed to be had on Tuesday the 22d day of the last-mentioned month of April.

After this indictment was found by the grand jury, this respondent considered it with great care and deliberation, and finding from the three overt acts of treason which it charged, that the question of law arising upon it was the same question which had already been decided twice in the same court, on solemn argument and deliberation, and once in that very case, he considered the law as settled by those decisions, with the correctness of which, on full consideration, he was entirely satisfied; and by the authority of which he should have deemed himself bound, even had he regarded the question as doubtful in itself. They are moreover in perfect conformity with the uniform tenor of decisions in the courts of England and Great Britain, from the Revolution in 1688 to the present time, which, in his opinion, added greatly to their weight and authority.

It was for these reasons that on the 22d day of April, 1800, when the said John Fries was brought into court, and placed in the prisoners’ box for trial, but before the petit jury were impanelled to try him, this respondent informed the above-mentioned William Lewis, one of his counsel, the aforesaid Alexander James Dallas not being then in court, “that the Court had deliberately considered the indictment against John Fries for treason, and the three several overt acts of treason stated, therein: that the crime of treason was defined by the Constitution of the United States. That as the Federal Legislature had the power to make, alter, or repeal laws, so the judiciary only had the power, and it was their duty, to declare, expound and interpret the Constitution and laws of the United States. That it was the duty of the Court, in all criminal cases, to state to the petit jury their opinion of the law arising on the facts; but the petit jury, in all criminal cases, were to decide both the law and the facts, on a consideration of the whole case. That there must be some constructive exposition of the terms used in the constitution, “levying war against the United States.” That the question, what acts amounted to levying war against the United States, or the Government thereof, was a question of law, and had been decided by Judges Patterson and Peters, in the cases of Vigol and Mitchell, and by Judges Iredell and Peters, in the case of John Fries, prisoner at the bar, in April 1799. That Judge Peters remained of the same opinion, which he had twice before delivered, and he, this respondent, on long and great consideration, concurred in the opinion of Judges Patterson, Iredell, and Peters. That to prevent unnecessary delay, and to save time on the trial of John Fries, and to prevent a delay of justice, in the great number of civil causes depending for trial at that term, the Court had drawn up in writing their opinion of the law, arising on the overt acts stated in the indictment against John Fries; and had directed David Caldwell, their clerk, to make out three copies of their opinion, one to be delivered to the attorney of the district, one to the counsel for the prisoner, and one to the petit jury, after they shall have been impanelled and heard the indictment read to them by the clerk, and after the district attorney should have stated to them the law on the overt acts alleged in the indictment, as it appeared to him.”

After these observations, this respondent delivered one of the above-mentioned copies to, the aforesaid William Lewis, then attending as one of the prisoner’s counsel; who read part of it, and then laid it down on the table before him. Some observations were then made on the subject, by him and the above-mentioned Alexander James Dallas, who had then come into court; but this respondent doth not now recollect those observations, and cannot undertake to state them accurately.

As to the second specific charge adduced in support of the first article of impeachment, which accuses this respondent “of restricting the counsel for the said Fries from recurring to such English authorities as they believed apposite, or from citing certain statutes of the United States, which they deemed illustrative of the positions upon which they intended to rest the defence of their client,” this respondent admits that he did, on the above-mentioned trial, express it as his opinion to the aforesaid counsel for the prisoner, “that the decisions in England, in cases of indictments for treason at common law, against the person of the King, ought not to be read to the jury, on trials for treason under the Constitution and statutes of the United States; because such decisions could not inform, but might mislead and deceive the jury: that any decisions on cases of treason, in the courts of England, before the Revolution of 1688, ought to have very little influence in the courts of the United States; that he would permit decisions in the courts of England or of Great Britain, since the said Revolution, to be read to the court or jury, for the purpose of showing what acts have been considered by those courts, as a constructive levying of war against the King of that country, in his legal capacity, but not against his person; because levying war against _his Government_ was of the same nature as levying war against _the Government of the United States_: but that such decisions, nevertheless, were not to be considered as authorities binding on the courts and juries of this country, but merely in the light of opinions entitled to great respect, as having been delivered, after full consideration, by men of great legal learning and ability.”

It is only, then, for the correctness of his motives in delivering these opinions, that he can now be called to answer; and this correctness ought to be presumed, unless the contrary appear by some direct proof, or some violent presumption, arising from his general conduct on the trial, or from the glaring impropriety of the opinion itself. For he admits that cases may be supposed, of an opinion delivered by a judge, so palpably erroneous, unjust, and oppressive, as to preclude the possibility of its having proceeded from ignorance or mistake.

With respect to the statutes of the United States, which he is charged with having prevented the prisoner’s counsel from citing on the aforesaid trial, he denies that he prevented any act of Congress from being cited either to the Court or jury on the said trial, or declared at any time that he would not permit the prisoner’s counsel to read to the jury or to the Court any act of Congress whatever. Nor does he remember or believe that he expressed on the said trial any disapprobation of the conduct of the circuit court, before whom the said case was first tried, in permitting the act of Congress relating to crimes less than treason, commonly called the _Sedition Act_, to be read to the jury. He admits indeed that he was then and still is of opinion that the said act of Congress was wholly irrelevant to the issue, in the trial of John Fries, and therefore ought not to have been read to the jury, or regarded by them.

And this respondent further answering saith, that after the above-mentioned proceedings had taken place in the said trial, it was postponed until the next day, (Wednesday, April 23, 1800,) when, at the meeting of the Court, this respondent told both the above-mentioned counsel for the prisoner, that, “to prevent any misunderstanding of any thing that had passed the day before, he would inform them, that, although the Court retained the same opinion of the law, arising on the overt acts charged in the indictment against Fries, yet the counsel would be permitted to offer arguments to the Court, for the purpose of showing them that they were mistaken in the law; and that the Court, if satisfied that they had erred in opinion, would correct it; and also that the counsel would be permitted to argue before the petit jury that the Court were mistaken in the law.” And this respondent added, that the Court had given no opinion as to the facts in the case, about which both the counsel had declared that there would be no controversy.

After some observations by the said William Lewis and Alexander James Dallas, they both declared to the Court, “that they did not any longer consider themselves as the counsel for John Fries, the prisoner.” This respondent then asked the said John Fries, whether he wished the Court to appoint other counsel for his defence? He refused to have other counsel assigned; in which he acted, as this respondent believes and charges, by the advice of the said William Lewis and Alexander James Dallas: whereupon, the Court ordered the trial to be had on the next day, Thursday, the 24th of April, 1800.

On that day the trial was proceeded in; and before the jurors were sworn, they were, by the direction of the Court, severally asked on oath, whether they were in any way related to the prisoner, and whether they had ever formed or delivered any opinion as to his guilt or innocence, or that he ought to be punished? Three of them answering in the affirmative, were withdrawn from the panel. The said John Fries was then informed by the Court, that he had a right to challenge thirty-five of the jury, without showing any cause of challenge against them, and as many more as he could show cause of challenge against. He did accordingly challenge peremptorily thirty-four of the jury, and the trial proceeded. In the evening, the Court adjourned till the next day, Friday, the 25th of April; when, after the district attorney had stated the principal facts proved by the witnesses, and had applied the law to those facts, this respondent, with the concurrence of his colleague, the said Richard Peters, delivered to the jury the charge contained and expressed in exhibit marked No. 3, and herewith filed, which he prays may be taken as part of this his answer.

Immediately after the petit jury had delivered their verdict, this respondent informed the said Fries, from the bench, that if he, or any person for him, could show any legal ground, or sufficient cause to arrest the judgment, ample time would be allowed him for that purpose. But no cause being shown, sentence of death was passed on the said Fries, on Tuesday, the 2d day of May, 1800, the last day of the term; and he was afterwards pardoned by John Adams, then President of the United States.

And this respondent further answering saith, that if the two instances of misconduct, first stated in support of the general charge, contained in the first article of impeachment, were true as alleged, yet the inference drawn from them, viz: “that the said Fries was thereby deprived of the benefit of counsel for his defence,” is not true. He insists that the said Fries was deprived of the benefit of counsel, not by any misconduct of this respondent, but by the conduct and advice of the above-mentioned William Lewis and Alexander James Dallas, who having been, with their own consent, assigned by the Court as counsel for the prisoner, withdrew from his defence, and advised him to refuse other counsel when offered to him by the Court, under pretence that the law had been prejudged, and their liberty of conducting the defence, according to their own judgment, improperly restricted by this respondent; but in reality, because they knew the law and the facts to be against them, and the case to be desperate, and supposed that their withdrawing themselves under this pretence, might excite odium against the Court; might give rise to an opinion that the prisoner had not been fairly tried; and in the event of a conviction, which from their knowledge of the law and the facts they knew to be almost certain, might aid the prisoner in an application to the President for a pardon. That such was the real motive of the said prisoner’s counsel for depriving their client of legal assistance on his trial, this respondent is fully persuaded, and expects to make appear, not only from the circumstances of the case, but from their own frequent and public declarations.

Finally, this respondent, having thus laid before this honorable Court a true state of his case, so far as respects the first article of impeachment, declares, upon the strictest review of his conduct during the whole trial of John Fries for treason, that he was not on that occasion unmindful of the solemn duties of his office as judge; that he faithfully and impartially, and according to the best of his ability and understanding, discharged those duties towards the said John Fries; and that he did not in any manner, during the said trial, conduct himself arbitrarily, unjustly, or oppressively, as he is accused by the honorable the House of Representatives.

And the said Samuel Chase, for the plea to the said first article of impeachment, saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor, as in and by the said first article is alleged; and this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to them to require.

The second article of impeachment charges, that this respondent, at the trial of James Thompson Callender for a libel, in May 1800, did, “with intent to oppress and procure the conviction of the said Callender, overrule the objection of John Basset, one of the jury, who wished to be excused from serving on the said trial, because he had made up his mind as to the publication from which the words, charged to be libellous in the indictment, were extracted.”

In answer to this article, this respondent admits that he did, as one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, hold the circuit court of the United States, for the district of Virginia, at Richmond, on Thursday, the 22d day of May, in the year 1800, and from that day, till the 30th of the same month; when Cyrus Griffin, then district judge of the United States for the district of Virginia, took his seat in the said court; and that during the residue of that session of the said court, which continued till the ---- day of June, in the same year, this respondent and the said Cyrus Griffin held the said court together. But how far any of the other matters charged in this article, are founded in truth or law, appear from the following statement, which he submits to this honorable Court, by way of answer to this part of the accusation.

By an act of Congress passed on the 4th day of May, A. D. 1798, it is among other things enacted, “That if any person shall write, print, utter, or publish, or shall knowingly and wittingly assist and aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing, any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the President of the United States, with intent to defame or to bring him into contempt or disrepute, such person, being thereof convicted, shall be punished by fine, not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment, not exceeding two years;” and “that if any person shall be prosecuted under this act, it shall be lawful for him to give in evidence in his defence, the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel; and the jury shall have a right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of the Court, as in other cases,” as in and by the said act, commonly called the _sedition law_, to which this respondent begs leave to refer this honorable Court, will more fully appear.

At the meeting of the last above-mentioned circuit court, this respondent, as required by the duties of his office, delivered a charge to the grand jury, in which, according to his constant practice, and to his duty as a judge, he gave in charge to them several acts of Congress for the punishment of offences, and among them, the above-mentioned act, called the sedition law; and directed the jury to make particular inquiry concerning any breaches of these statutes or any of them, within the district of Virginia. On the 24th day of May, 1800, the said jury found an indictment against one James Thompson Callender, for printing and publishing, against the form of the said act of Congress, a false, scandalous, and malicious libel, called “The Prospect before Us,” against John Adams, then President of the United States, in his official conduct as President; as appears by an official copy of the said indictment, marked exhibit No. 4, which this respondent begs leave to make part of this his answer.

On Wednesday, the 28th day of the same month, May 1800, Philip Norbonne Nicholas, Esq., now attorney-general of the State of Virginia, and George Hay, Esq., now district attorney of the United States, for the district of Virginia, appeared in the said circuit court as counsel for the said Callender; and on Thursday the 3d of June following, his trial commenced, before this respondent, and the said Cyrus Griffin, who then sat as assistant judge. The petit jurors being called over, eight of them appeared, namely, Robert Gamble, Bernard Mackham, John Barrell, William Austin, William Richardson, Thomas Tinsley, Matthew Harvey, and John Basset, who, as they came to the book to be sworn, were severally asked on oath, by direction of the Court, “whether they had ever formed or delivered any opinion respecting the subject-matter then to be tried, or concerning the charges contained in the indictment?” They all answered in the negative, and were sworn in chief to try the issue. The counsel for the said Callender declaring that it was unnecessary to put this question to the other four jurymen, William Mayo, James Hayes, Henry S. Shore, and John Prior, they also were immediately sworn in chief. No challenge was made by the said Callender or his counsel, to any of these jurors; but the said counsel declared, that they would rely on the answer that would be given by the said jurors to the question thus put by order of the Court.

After the above-mentioned John Basset, whom this respondent supposes and admits to be the person mentioned in the article of impeachment now under consideration, had thus answered in the negative to the question put to him by order of the Court, as above mentioned, which this respondent states to be the legal and proper question to be put to jurors on such occasions, he expressed to the Court his wish to be excused from serving on the said trial, because he had made up his mind, or had formed his opinion, “that the publication, called ‘The Prospect before Us,’ from which the words charged in the indictment as libellous were said to be extracted, but which he had never seen, was, according to the representation of it, which he had received, within the Sedition law.” But the Court did not consider this declaration by the said John Basset as a sufficient reason for withdrawing him from the jury, and accordingly directed him to be sworn in chief.

In this opinion and decision, as in all the others delivered during the trial in question, this respondent concurred with his colleague, the afore-mentioned Cyrus Griffin, in whom none of these opinions have been considered as criminal. He contends that the opinion itself was legal and correct; and he denies that he concurred in it, under the influence of any “spirit of persecution and injustice,” or with any “intent to oppress and procure the conviction of the prisoner,” as is most untruly alleged by the second article of impeachment. His reasons were correct and legal. He will submit them with confidence to this honorable Court; which, although it cannot condemn him for an incorrect opinion, proceeding from an honest error in judgment, and ought not to take on itself the power of inquiring into the correctness of his decisions, but merely that of examining the purity of his motives; will, nevertheless, weigh his reasons, for the purpose of judging how far they are of sufficient force to justify a belief that they might have appeared satisfactory to him. If they might have so appeared, if the opinion which he founded on them be not so palpably and glaringly wrong, as to carry with it internal evidence of corrupt motives, he cannot in delivering it have committed an offence.

The juror in the present case had expressed no opinion. He had formed no opinion as to the facts. He had never seen the “Prospect before Us,” and, therefore, could have no fixed or certain opinion about its nature or contents. They had been reported to him, and he had formed an opinion that if they were such as reported, the book was within the scope and operation of a law for the punishment of “false, scandalous and malicious libels, against the President in his official capacity, written or published with intent to defame him.” And who is there, that having either seen the book or heard of it, had not necessarily formed the same opinion?