Chapter XI: Front Matter (11)

But, have gentlemen reflected that, if all the evils were drawn from Pandora's box, to vex Great Britain, you could have hit on none so well calculated to call out all her resistance, and all her obstinacy, as this same expedient, the embargo! If she yields to us, under the pressure of such a system, she discloses to us the secret of her independence! Sir, the embargo is war; it was intended as such against Great Britain. And she understands its meaning and its character too well for us to disguise it, under a pretence of its being a mere precautionary municipal measure. Its efficacy as a coercive measure has been too often and too loudly boasted of in this House, to make its real object a secret to her. Nay, in so far as the great and prominent feature of war is coercion; in so far as war is always intended to make the adversary yield that which he will not yield voluntarily; in so far, are the embargo and the non-importation act WAR. Each was intended to coerce Great Britain to yield to us points which it had been ascertained she would not yield voluntarily. It was a system of coercion, a new-fangled sort of philosophical experimental war; novel, to be sure, in its character, but, to all substantial purposes, war. Instead of bloodshed, there was to be ink shed--instead of bayonets, pens--instead of the bloody arena, huge sheets of paper! Whenever Great Britain shall yield to the coercion of the non-importation, embargo, or non-intercourse system, she virtually tells the people of the United States, "we are in your power whenever you choose to make a claim upon us, whether just or unjust; threaten us with an embargo and a non-intercourse, and you bring us to your feet." Does any gentlemen believe, even allowing the pressure of the embargo to be great upon her, that she can yield, that she can afford to yield? That she can admit that we have her always perfectly in our power? Sooner would she give up in battle--sooner would she see her soldiers retreating before our bayonets; sooner would she see her armies perish under our valor, than acknowledge herself the slave of this magic wand. Her children might grow to be men, and she might try the fortune of another day; the hair of Samson might grow on again, and his strength be renewed; but in yielding to the chance of the embargo, she places her existence in our hands, and becomes dependent upon our will for the existence of her sovereignty. Sir, the King of England cannot, he dare not, yield to our embargo.

But, sir, he has not told us that he considers our embargo hostile to him; nor has our Government ever told him that it was; such a declaration has never been put to paper. No, sir; when you look into the correspondence, it would seem that the embargo was never intended as a coercive measure, nor even understood so by Great Britain. Every thing on both sides is conceived in a sincere spirit of "friendship." Our non-importation act, our proclamation, our embargo, are all acts of friendship and kindness toward Great Britain, for aught we find there. And Great Britain issues her Orders in Council in a reciprocating spirit of amity toward us. She is not offended with our non-importation act, nor our embargo. Not at all. Her orders are not intended to harm us. She means nothing in the world, but simply to retaliate upon France--and she is sorry that almost the whole force of the blow falls upon us, but it is unavoidable. She, by the laws of nations, has as perfect a right to retaliate upon France as we have to make our innocent municipal regulations--and she is full as sorry that her retaliation system should wound us, as we are that our municipal regulations should incommode her. Sir, this diplomatic hypocrisy (begun, I acknowledge, by us) is intolerable. Sir, there is not one word of truth in the whole of it, from beginning to end. The plain state of the case is this: Anterior to the non-importation act, the British Treaty had expired--there were points of dispute, particularly concerning the impressment of seamen, which could not be adjusted to the satisfaction of our Government. In this state of things, either we ought to have gone to war, or we ought not. If we had intended to do so, stronger measures should have been resorted to than a non-importation act. If we had not intended to do so, the act should never have been passed. Those who passed it could have but one of two objects in view; either to coerce Great Britain to the terms we demanded--or, by vexing and irritating her, to raise up in due time an unnecessary fictitious quarrel, which (as this country is known to be extremely sensitive of British aggression) might ultimately end in a real old-fashioned war. No men could have been so weak as to calculate upon the first result. As to the other, the wisdom of the calculation is pretty strongly proved by the situation in which we now find ourselves. Sir, this is the whole mystery--and it must be explored--it must be exposed. We must understand the real character of our controversy with Great Britain--the real character, intent, and aim, of the different measures adopted by us and by her, before we can hope to heal the wounds our peace has received, or to restore the prosperity we have been unnecessarily made to abandon. I know, sir, how difficult it is to overcome matured opinions or inveterate prejudices; and I know, too, that, at this time, the individual who shall venture to lay open "the bare and rotten policy" of the time, makes himself the butt of party rancor, and strips himself to the unsparing "lacerations of the press." But these are considerations too feeble to deter me from my duty.

[Mr. G. appearing much exhausted, and Mr. QUINCY having intimated to the House that Mr. G. suffered under a pain in the side, moved for an adjournment. The SPEAKER inquired whether Mr. G. yielded the floor? Mr. G. replied, he had himself little inclination to continue his remarks, but the House appeared so eager to hear him, (a laugh,) he hardly knew what answer to make. However, he said, he would give the floor. The House then adjourned.]

The object, sir, of our present deliberations is, or ought to be, to relieve our country from the distresses under which it groans; to do this, we should be prepared to legislate with a single eye to the welfare and happiness of the nation. It is of the first necessity that we should deliberate with calmness, if we mean to apply an effectual remedy to the diseases of the State. In the remarks which I had the honor to make yesterday, I was constrained to draw a contrast between the measures and prosperity of former times and those of the present times. Under circumstances of the same character, we were formerly able to overcome our misfortunes. Now we are not. And I did this for the purpose of impressing upon the House an opinion, that if the Administration had practised upon the principles of their predecessors, all had been well; or, that if retracing their steps, or relinquishing the path of error and misfortune, they would still be the learners of wisdom and experience, it would not even now be too late to retrieve the affairs of the country. If I know my own heart, I did not make the comparison from any invidious purposes; but merely to turn the minds of gentlemen back to former times; that they might reflect upon the perils and calamities of those times, and the means by which an end was put to them; but in doing this, I could not avoid paying the tribute of deserved praise and of sincere gratitude to the men under whose agency we prospered abundantly. In contrasting the conduct of the present with that of the former Administration, I meant to subserve no purposes of party. Nay, sir, I could have much desired to have been spared the necessity of presenting that contrast before the nation. I could have wished to have avoided these references, lest I might excite party feeling in others; lest I might appear to be governed by them myself. But truth could not be attained by any other course, and I have been compelled to take it.

The first resolution, contained in the following words, was divided, so as to take the question first on the part in italic:

"Resolved, _That the United States cannot, without a sacrifice
of their rights, honor, and independence, submit to the late
edicts of Great Britain_--and France."

The question was then taken on the first clause of this resolution, and carried--yeas 136, nays 2.

The question being about to be put on the remaining part of the resolution, viz: on the words "and France"--

The question then recurred on the second member of the first resolution; and the same being taken, it was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 113, nays 2.

The main question was then taken that the House do agree to the said first resolution as reported to the Committee of the Whole, in the words following, to wit:

"_Resolved_, That the United States cannot, without a sacrifice
of their rights, honor, and independence, submit to the edicts
of Great Britain and France:"

And resolved in the affirmative--yeas 118, nays, 2.

SATURDAY, December 17.

A division of the question on the resolution depending before the House was then called for by Mr. DAVID R. WILLIAMS: Whereupon, so much of the said resolution was read, as is contained in the words following, to wit:

"_Resolved_, That it is expedient to prohibit, by law, the
admission into the ports of the United States of all public or
private armed or unarmed ships or vessels belonging to Great
Britain or France, or to any other of the belligerent powers
having in force orders or decrees violating the lawful commerce
and neutral rights of the United States."

The question then recurring on the first member of the original resolution, as proposed to be divided on a motion of Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS, and hereinbefore recited, a division of the question on the first said member of the resolution was called for by Mr. GARDENIER, from the commencement of the same to the words "Great Britain," as contained in the words following, to wit:

"_Resolved_, That it is expedient to prohibit, by law, the
admission into the ports of the United States of all public or
private armed or unarmed ships or vessels belonging to Great
Britain."

The question being taken that the House do agree to the same, it was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 92, nays 29.

A farther division of the question was moved by Mr. ELLIOT, on the said first member of the resolution, on the words "or France," immediately following the words "Great Britain," hereinbefore recited: And the question being put thereupon, it was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 97, nays. 24.

And on the question that the House do agree to the second member of the said second resolution, contained in the words following, to wit:

"Or to any other of the belligerent powers having in force
orders or decrees violating the lawful commerce and neutral
rights of the United States:"

It was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 96, nays 26.

The question then being on the residue of the said resolution contained in the following words:

"And, also, the importation of any goods, wares, or
merchandise, the growth, produce, or manufacture, of the
dominions of any of the said powers, or imported from any place
in the possession of either:"

The question was taken, and resolved in the affirmative--yeas 82, nays 36.

The main question was then taken that the House do agree to the said second resolution, as reported from the Committee of the whole House, and resolved in the affirmative--yeas 84, nays 30, as follows:

YEAS.--Lemuel J. Alston, Willis Alston, jun., Ezekiel Bacon,
David Bard, Joseph Barker, Burwell Bassett, William W. Bibb,
William Blackledge, John Blake, jun., Thomas Blount, Adam
Boyd, John Boyle, Robert Brown, William A. Burwell, William
Butler, Joseph Calhoun, George W. Campbell, Matthew Clay,
Joseph Clopton, Richard Cutts, John Dawson, Joseph Desha,
Daniel M. Durell, John W. Eppes, William Findlay, Jas. Fisk,
Meshack Franklin, Francis Gardner, Thomas Gholson, jun.,
Peterson Goodwyn, Edwin Gray, Isaiah L. Green, John Heister,
William Helms, James Holland, David Holmes, Benjamin Howard,
Reuben Humphreys, Daniel Ilsley, John G. Jackson, Richard M.
Johnson, Walter Jones, Thomas Kenan, William Kirkpatrick, John
Lambert, John Love, Nathaniel Macon, Robert Marion, William
McCreery, John Montgomery, Nicholas R. Moore, Thos. Moore,
Jeremiah Morrow, John Morrow, Roger Nelson, Thos. Newbold,
Thomas Newton, Wilson C. Nicholas, John Porter, John Rea of
Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Matthias
Richards, Benjamin Say, Ebenezer Seaver, Samuel Shaw, Dennis
Smelt, John Smilie, Jedediah K. Smith, John Smith, Henry
Southard, Richard Stanford, Clement Storer, John Taylor, George
M. Troup, James I. Van Allen, Archibald Van Horne, Daniel C.
Verplanck, Jesse Wharton, Robert Whitehill, Isaac Wilbour,
David R. Williams, Alexander Wilson, and Richard Wynn.

NAYS.--Evan Alexander, John Campbell, Epaphroditus Champion,
Martin Chittenden, John Culpeper, Samuel W. Dana, John
Davenport, jun., Jas. Elliot, William Ely, Barent Gardenier,
John Harris, Richard Jackson, Robert Jenkins, James Kelly,
Philip B. Key, Joseph Lewis, jun., Matthew Lyon, Josiah
Masters, William Milnor, Jonathan O. Mosely, Timothy Pitkin,
jun., Josiah Quincy, John Russell, James Sloan, L. B. Sturges,
Samuel Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge, Jabez Upham, Philip Van
Cortlandt, and Killian K. Van Rensselaer.

And on the question that the House do concur with the Committee of the Whole in their agreement to the third resolution, in the words following, to wit:

_Resolved_, That measures ought to be immediately taken for
placing the country in a more complete state of defence:

It was unanimously resolved in the affirmative.

On motion of Mr. GEORGE W. CAMPBELL,

_Ordered_, That the second resolution be referred to the committee appointed on so much of the Message from the President of the United States, at the commencement of the present session, as respects our relations with foreign powers, with leave to report thereon by way of bill or bills.

On motion of Mr. GEORGE W. CAMPBELL,

_Ordered_, That the third resolution be referred to the committee appointed, on the 8th ultimo, on so much of the said Message from the President of the United States as relates to the Military and Naval Establishments, with leave to report thereon by bill, or bills.

MONDAY, December 19.

_Miranda's Expedition._

Mr. LOVE called for the order of the day on the report of the committee on the subject of the thirty-six persons confined in Carthagena, South America. The following is the resolution reported by the committee:

_Resolved_, That the President of the United States be
_requested to adopt the most immediate and efficacious means
in his power to obtain_ from the Viceroy of Grenada, in
South America, or other proper authority, the liberation
of thirty-six American citizens, condemned on a charge of
piracy, and now held in slavery in the vaults of St. Clara, in
Carthagena, and that the sum of ---- dollars be appropriated to
that purpose.

Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS moved to postpone the consideration of the subject indefinitely. Negatived--50 to 36.

The House then went into a Committee of the Whole on the subject--39 to 33.

Mr. LOVE moved to amend the resolution by striking out the words in italics, and inserting "authorized to request."--Carried, ayes 54.

Those gentlemen who supported this resolution in the debate were Messrs. LOVE, LYON, BACON, NELSON, SLOAN, and WILBOUR. Those who opposed it were Messrs. D. R. WILLIAMS, TAYLOR, SMILIE, MACON, and SOUTHARD.

The gentlemen who opposed the resolution, among other objections, contended that an agreement to the resolution would but involve the Government in difficulty without answering any good purpose; that it would in fact be aiding the attempt of a certain party to prove that the General Government had some connection with this expedition originally, which it certainly had not; that the facts set forth in the petition were wholly unsupported by evidence; that these persons had engaged themselves in a foreign service; that they had become weary of the privileges of freemen, and had entered into a hostile expedition against a foreign country, and, in so doing, had been taken, condemned for piracy, and immured as a punishment for that offence; that the British Government, having been at the bottom of this business, was the proper power to release these persons, and indeed had applied to the Spanish commander for the purpose; that even were the United States bound by the laws of justice or humanity to intercede for these persons, they knew not to whom to make application, and would probably meet with a refusal, perhaps a rude one, if any judgment could be formed from the present situation of our affairs with Spain; that if gentlemen wished for objects on which to exercise their humanity, they might find them in the lacerated backs of our impressed seamen, without extending it to criminals. In reply to an observation of Mr. LYON, that if we did not get these men Great Britain would do so, and employ them to extend her naval force, Mr. MACON replied, if she did, she was welcome to keep them; but she was in the habit of supplying her navy with seamen from our vessels, without the trouble which the acquisition of these men might occasion her.

In reply to these objections, and in support of the resolution, the humanity of the House was strongly appealed to. It was urged that the Government could in nowise be involved by an appeal to the generosity of the provincial government; that these men had not wilfully committed piracy, but had been deluded under various pretences to join the expedition; that they had joined it under a belief that they were entering into the service of the United States; that, even admitting them to have been indiscreetly led to join the enterprise, knowing it to be destined for a foreign service, yet, that they had been sufficiently punished by the penalty they had already undergone; that it was wholly immaterial what inference any persons might draw from the conduct of the United States in this respect, as to their concern with the original expedition; that such considerations should have no weight with the House; that if these poor fellows were guilty, they had repented of it; and Mr. NELSON quoted on this point the Scriptures, to show that there should be more joy over one sinner that repenteth, than over ninety and nine who have no need of repentance. In reply to an intimation that it was not even ascertained that they were American citizens, Mr. BACON observed that one of them had been born in the same town in which he was, and was of a reputable family.

The resolution was negatived by the committee--49 to 31.

The committee rose and reported the resolution, which report the House agreed now to consider--ayes 57.

The question of concurrence with the committee in their disagreement to the resolution, was decided by yeas and nays, 50 to 34.

On motion, the House adjourned.

TUESDAY, December 20.

A new member, to wit, JOSEPH STORY, returned to serve in this House, as a member for the State of Massachusetts, in the room of Jacob Crowninshield, deceased, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

WEDNESDAY, December 21.

_Captain Pike's Expedition._

On motion of Mr. J. MONTGOMERY, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill making compensation to Z. M. Pike and his companions.

[The first section of this bill grants to Captain Pike and his companions a certain quantity of land. The second section allows them double pay during the time they were engaged in exploring the western country.]

Mr. STANFORD moved to strike out the first section of the bill; which was negatived--53 to 38.

The second section was stricken out--42 to 35.

A considerable debate took place on this bill, in which Messrs. MONTGOMERY, LYON and ALEXANDER supported the bill, and Messrs. MACON, DURELL, STANFORD and TALLMADGE opposed it.

The bill being gone through, was reported to the House.

SATURDAY, December 31.

_Division of the Indiana Territory._

Mr. THOMAS, from the committee appointed on the thirteenth instant, to inquire into the expediency of dividing the Indiana Territory, made a report thereon; which was read, and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Monday next. The report is as follows:

That, by the fifth article of the ordinance of Congress for
the government of the Territory of the United States Northwest
of the river Ohio, it is stipulated that there shall be formed
in the said Territory no less than three, nor more than five
States; and the boundaries of the States, as soon as Virginia
shall alter her act of cession, and consent to the same, shall
become fixed and established, as follows:

The Western State shall be bounded by the Mississippi, the
Ohio, and Wabash rivers; a direct line drawn from the Wabash
and Post Vincennes, due north, to the Territorial line between
the United States and Canada, and by the said Territorial line
to the Lake of the Woods and Mississippi.

The middle State shall be bounded by the said direct line, the
Wabash, from Post Vincennes to the Ohio; by the Ohio, by a
direct line drawn due north from the mouth of the Great Miami,
to the said Territorial line, and by the said Territorial line.

The Eastern State shall be bounded by the last-mentioned direct
line, the Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the said Territorial line:
_Provided, however_, and it is further understood and declared,
that the boundaries of these three States shall be subject so
far to be altered, that if Congress shall hereafter find it
expedient, they shall have authority to form one or two States
in that part of the said Territory which lies north of an east
and west line drawn through the southerly bend or extreme of
Lake Michigan. And whenever any of the said States shall have
sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, such State shall be
admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United
States on an equal footing with the original States, in all
respects whatever, and shall be at liberty to form a permanent
constitution and State Government: _Provided_, the constitution
and government so to be formed shall be republican, and in
conformity to the principles contained in these articles;
and, so far as it can be consistent with the general interest
of the Confederacy, such admission shall be allowed at an
earlier period, and when there shall be a less number of free
inhabitants in the State than sixty thousand.

By the aforesaid article, it appears to your committee that the
line fixed as the boundary of the States to be formed in the
Indiana Territory is unalterable, unless by common consent;
that the line of demarcation, which the Wabash affords between
the eastern and western portion of said Territory, added to
the wide extent of wilderness country which separates the
population in each, constitute reasons in favor of a division,
founded on the soundest policy, and conformable with the
natural situation of the country. The vast distance from the
settlements of the Wabash to the present seat of Territorial
government, renders the administration of justice burdensome
and expensive to them in the highest degree. The superior
courts of the Territory are, by law, established at Vincennes;
at which place suitors, residing in every part of the
Territory, are compelled to attend with their witnesses, which,
to those who reside west of the Wabash, amounts almost to a
total denial of justice. The great difficulty of travelling
through an extensive and loathsome wilderness, the want of food
and other necessary accommodations on the road, often presents
an insurmountable barrier to the attendance of witnesses;
and, even when their attendance is obtained, the accumulated
expense of prosecuting suits where the evidence is at so remote
a distance, is a cause of much embarrassment to a due and
impartial distribution of justice, and a proper execution of
the laws for the redress of private wrongs.

In addition to the above considerations, your committee
conceive that the scattered situation of the settlements over
this extensive Territory cannot fail to enervate the powers of
the Executive, and render it almost impossible to keep that
part of the Government in order.

It further appears to your committee, that a division of
the said Territory will become a matter of right under the
aforesaid article of the ordinance, whenever the General
Government shall establish therein a State Government; and
the numerous inconveniences which would be removed by an
immediate separation, would have a direct tendency to encourage
and accelerate migration to each district, and thereby give
additional strength and security to those outposts of the
United States, exposed to the inroads of a savage neighbor,
on whose friendly dispositions no permanent reliance can be
placed.

Your committee have no certain data on which to ascertain the
number of inhabitants in each section of the Territory; but,
from the most accurate information they are enabled to collect,
it appears that west of the Wabash there are about the number
of eleven thousand, and east of said river about the number of
seventeen thousand, and that the population of each section is
in a state of rapid increase.

Your committee, after maturely considering this subject,
are of opinion that there exists but one objection to the
establishment of a separate Territorial Government west of the
river Wabash, and that objection is based on the additional
expense which would, in consequence thereof, be incurred by
the Government of the United States. But, it is also worthy of
observation, that the increased value of the public lands in
each district, arising from the public institutions which would
be permanently fixed in each, to comport with the convenience
of the inhabitants, and the augmentation of emigrants, all of
whom must become immediate purchasers of these lands, would far
exceed the amount of expenditure produced by the contemplated
temporary government.

And your committee, being convinced that it is the wish of
a large majority of the citizens of the said Territory that
a separation thereof should take place, deem it always just
and wise policy to grant to every portion of the people of
the Union that form of government which is the object of
their wishes, when not incompatible with the constitution of
the United States, nor subversive of their allegiance to the
national sovereignty.

Your committee, therefore, respectfully submit the following
resolution:

_Resolved_, That it is expedient to divide the Indiana
Territory, and to establish a separate Territorial Government
west of the river Wabash, agreeably to the ordinance for the
government of the Territory of the United States northwest of
the river Ohio, passed on the 13th day of July, 1787.

Mr. THOMAS, from the same committee, presented a bill for dividing the Indiana Territory into two separate governments; which was read twice and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Monday next.

A motion was made by Mr. WYNN, that when this House adjourns, it will adjourn until Tuesday morning, eleven o'clock: And the question being taken thereupon, it was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 60, nays 45.

MONDAY, January 9, 1809.

Another member, to wit, JOHN ROWAN, from Kentucky, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

_Naval Establishment._

The amendments of the Senate to the bill sent from the House for employing an additional number of seamen and marines, were taken up. [The amendments propose the immediate arming, manning, &c., all the armed vessels of the United States.]

Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL expressed a hope that the House would disagree to the amendments. The President was already authorized by law to fit out these vessels, whenever, in his opinion, the public service should require it; and the expense which would attend them was a sufficient argument against it, if no urgent occasion existed for their service, which he believed did not.

Mr. STORY entertained a very different opinion from that of the gentleman from Tennessee. In case of war there must be some ships of war of one kind or other; and it would take six months at least to prepare all our ships for service. At present they were rotting in the docks. If it were never intended to use them, it would be better to burn them at once than to suffer them to remain in their present situation. He believed if out at sea they might be useful and would be well employed. Why keep them up at this place, whence they could not get out of the river perhaps in three weeks or a month? He believed that a naval force would form the most effectual protection to our seaports that could be devised. Part of our little navy was suffered to rot in the docks, and the other part was scarcely able to keep the ocean. Could not a single foreign frigate enter almost any of our harbors now and batter down our towns? Could not even a single gunboat sweep some of them? Mr. S. said he could not conceive why gentlemen should wish to paralyze the strength of the nation by keeping back our naval force, and now in particular, when many of our native seamen (and he was sorry to say that from his own knowledge he spoke it) were starving in our ports. Mr. S. enumerated some of the advantages which this country possessed in relation to naval force. For every ship which we employed on our coasts, he said, any foreign nation must incur a double expense to be able to cope with us. The truth was, that gentlemen well versed in the subject, had calculated that it would require, for a fleet competent to resist such a naval force as the United States might without difficulty provide, four or five hundred transport ships to supply them with provisions, the expense of which alone would be formidable as a coercive argument to Great Britain. He wished it to be shown, however small our naval force, that we do not undervalue it, or underrate the courage and ability of our seamen.

Mr. COOK followed Mr. STORY on the same side of the question. He compared the nation to a fortress on which an attack was made, and the garrison of which, instead of guarding the portal, ran upon the battlements to secure every small aperture. He thought their attention should first be directed to the gates, and that a naval force would be the most efficient defence for our ports.

Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS called for the yeas and nays on the amendments.

Mr. SMILIE said that raising a naval force for the purpose of resisting Great Britain, would be attacking her on her strong ground. If we were to have a war with her on the ocean, it could only be carried on by distressing her trade. Neither did he believe that these vessels of war would be of any effect as a defence. They did not constitute the defence on which he would rely. If we had a navy, it would form the strongest temptation for attack upon our ports and harbors. If Denmark had possessed no navy, Copenhagen would never have been attacked. The only way in which we could carry on a war on the ocean to advantage, Mr. S. said, would be by our enterprising citizens giving them sufficient encouragement. Were we to employ a naval force in case of war, it would but furnish our enemy with an addition to her navy. He hoped the House would disagree to the amendments of the Senate and appoint a committee of conference.

Mr. DANA said that the amendments sent from the Senate presented a question of no small importance to the nation. Without expressing any opinion on the question, it appeared to him to be at least of sufficient importance to be discussed in Committee of the Whole. Coming from the other branch of the Legislature, and being so interesting to the nation, he wished that it might be discussed fairly and fully; and, therefore, moved a reference to a Committee of the Whole.

Messrs. DANA, TALLMADGE, and STORY, urged a reference to a Committee of the Whole on account of the great importance of the subject, on which a full discussion would be proper; and Messrs. MACON, G. W. CAMPBELL, and HOLLAND opposed it, because the seamen proposed by the original bill were now wanted, and the subject of the amendment was already referred to a Committee of the Whole in a distinct bill. Motion lost, 58 to 55.

Mr. MACON observed, that the immediate expense of this arrangement, if agreed to, would be at least five or six millions of dollars, and but four hundred thousand were appropriated by the bill. When he compared this bill with the report of a select committee made to the House of Representatives, he said he was astonished. A part of that report was a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, in which the very number (two thousand) contained in the bill as it went from this House, was desired. Mr. M. adverted to the observation of Mr. STORY, that it would cost Great Britain as much to keep one frigate as it would cost us to keep two. He thought the expense would be about equal. The expense of the transportation of provisions would be counterbalanced by the difference of expense between the pay of the British and American seamen, the latter being double of the former generally. He objected to this bill from the Senate because no estimate accompanied it. He thought they would go far enough if they gave the departments all that they asked. This House had indeed as much right to judge of the force requisite, as any other department; but he did not wish to be called upon to supply a deficit in the appropriation, which never failed to occur even in the ordinary appropriations for the Navy Department. Give the four hundred thousand dollars asked for, and the deficit in the appropriation will be at least ten times the amount of the sum appropriated.

Mr. COOK contended strenuously in favor of a naval force. He detailed the advantages which would accrue to the nation from a few fast sailing frigates. He said they were essentially necessary to defence. He expatiated on the difficulty with which any foreign power could maintain a force on our coast.

Mr. HOLLAND did not profess to have much knowledge on this subject, but he said it did not require much to overthrow the arguments of gentlemen on the subject. What defence a few frigates would be to the extensive coast of this country, he could not understand. There certainly never had been a time when this country should rely on a maritime force as a sufficient protection. Indeed, he said, if we had fifteen or twenty or more sail-of-the-line, he should hesitate much before he would go to war with Great Britain, because these would undoubtedly be lost. Our power of coercion was not on the ocean. Great Britain had possessions on this continent which were valuable to her; they were in the power of the United States, and the way to coerce her to respect our rights on water, would be attacking them on land. He said he certainly did not undervalue the disposition and prowess of our seamen; and it was because he valued them, that he did not wish them to go into an unequal contest, in which they must certainly yield. Gentlemen might understand naval matters; but it was no reason that they should therefore understand the efficiency of a naval force. There was sufficient evidence in history to warn the United States against it.

Mr. TROUP said he rose but for the purpose of stating facts which struck him as being applicable to the subject before the House. He referred chiefly to an extract of a letter written to himself and published in the paper of to-day. [Mr. T. then read the extract which appeared in the National Intelligencer on the 9th instant.] In addition to these facts, letters had been received, in the course of this morning, containing further particulars, which he begged leave to state to the House. After the officer (commander of a British armed vessel) had been forced on board his vessel, and while lying in our waters and within our jurisdiction, he had fired several shots at pilot-boats, passing and repassing, had been very abusive, and threatened the town with what he called vengeance; and, in addition to these facts, letters had reached Savannah from Liverpool, giving satisfactory information that vessels of fifteen or twenty guns had been fitted out for the purpose of forcing a cotton trade with South Carolina and Georgia. This information, Mr. T. said, came from unquestionable authority. And it was because he was unwilling that the people of this country should longer submit to the abuse of British naval officers; because he was unwilling that they should be exposed to the insolence of every British commissioned puppy who chose to insult us; because he was unwilling that armed vessels should force a cotton trade, when every man knew that nine-tenths of the people of Georgia would treat as traitors the violators of the embargo; it was for this reason that he was disposed to vote for the amendments from the Senate. The great objection which had been taken to them was the expense which they would produce. Economy, Mr. T. said, was a good thing in time of peace; but if this contracted spirit of economy predominated in our war councils, if we were forced into a war, so help him God, he would rather at once tamely submit our honor and independence than maintain them in this economical way. If we went to war, we ought not to adopt little measures for the purpose of executing them with little means; neither should we refuse to adopt great measures, because they could not be executed but with great means. It was very true that, in war as well as in peace, calculation to a certain extent was necessary; but, if they once resolved on an object, it must be executed at whatever expense. He was no advocate for standing armies or navies, generally speaking; but, in discharging his duties here, he must be governed by the circumstances of every case which presented itself for his decision, and then ask himself, Is it wise, politic, and prudent, to do this or omit that? He said he would never go back to yesterday to discover what he had then said or done, in order to ascertain what he should now do or say. Political conduct must depend on circumstances. What was right yesterday might be wrong to-day. Nay, what was right at the moment he rose to address the House, might, ere this, be palpably wrong. Conduct depended on events, which depended on the folly or caprice of men; and, as they changed, events would change. It might have been a good doctrine long ago that this country ought to have a navy competent to cope with a detachment of the British navy; it might have been good doctrine then, but was shocking doctrine now.

At that time England had to contend with the navies of Russia, Denmark, France, Holland, Spain, &c. Now England was sole mistress of the ocean. To fight her ship to ship and man to man, and it was impossible that gentlemen could think of fighting her otherwise, if they fought her at all, we must build up a huge navy at an immense expense. We must determine to become less agricultural and more commercial; to incur a debt of five hundred or a thousand million of dollars, and all the loans and taxes attendant on such a system, and all the corruption attendant on them. He should as soon think of embarking an hundred thousand men for the purpose of attacking France at her threshold, as of building so many ships to oppose the British navy. It was out of the question; no rational man could think of it. But that was not now the question. It was, whether we would call into actual service the little navy we possessed. It was not even a question whether we would have a navy at all or not. If that were the question, he would not hesitate to say that even our present political condition required a navy to a certain extent, to protect our commerce against the Barbary Powers in peace, and in time of war for convoys to our merchantmen. He only meant a few fast-sailing frigates, such a navy as we have at present, for the purpose of harassing the commerce of our enemies also. He therefore thought our present naval force ought to be put in service. As far as the appropriation ($400,000) would go, it would be employed; but if Congress should hereafter see cause to countermand or delay the preparation, they would have it in their power to do so by refusing a further appropriation.

Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS said it was his misfortune to differ with gentlemen upon all points on the subject of the navy. He was opposed to it from stem to stern; and gentlemen who attempted to argue in favor of it as a matter of necessity, involved themselves in absurdities they were not aware of. When money had been appropriated for fortifications, there had been no intimation that it would be necessary to prop them up with a naval force. If our towns could not be defended by fortifications, he asked, would ten frigates defend them? The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. STORY) had even gone so far as to say that a single gunboat could sweep one-half of our harbors. If a single gunboat could now sweep most of our harbors, Mr. W. said he should like to know what eleven hundred and thirty vessels of war could do, even when opposed by our whole force of ten frigates! The gentleman from Massachusetts had said it would be cheaper to keep these vessels in actual service than in their present situation. Mr. W. said he supposed that the gentlemen meant that they would rot faster in their present situation than if they were at sea. He said he was for keeping them where they were, and would rather contribute to place them in a situation where they would rot faster. Mr. W. combated the arguments that employing the navy would afford relief to our seamen, and that the maintaining a navy on our coast would be more expensive to an European power than the support of a larger naval force by us. And he said we should never be able to man any considerable fleet except the constitution were amended to permit impressments, following the example of Great Britain.

The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. STORY) had said that except we begun with this bill, and got his fast-sailing frigates, we should never regain our rights. If that were really the case, Mr. W. said he was ready to abandon them. He considered that the sort of maintenance of our rights adverted to by the gentleman from Massachusetts, would be destructive to those rights. Gentlemen must have forgotten that when Hamburg was in the greatest state of prosperity, she did not possess even a single gunboat. Why! there was not wealth enough in this whole nation, if every one were to carry his all, thus to maintain our rights against the navy of Great Britain. If we were carried into a war, and every thing really seemed to be tending that way, we must rely upon the enterprise of our citizens; and that, when set at liberty, would be found more desperate than the navy of any country. When we arrived at the end of the Revolutionary war we had but one frigate, and the best thing we ever did was to give that one away. The State of South Carolina had not yet got clear of the curse. She embarked one frigate in the general struggle, and she had not rid herself of the debts incurred by it yet. Private enterprise must be depended upon. The people from the Eastward had shown in the last war what they would do. When vessels were loaded with sugar they would fight like bull-dogs for it. He recollected a story, he said, of one of our privateers being beat off by a Jamaica man, whom they attacked. The captain not liking to lose the prize, and finding his crew disheartened, told them she was full of sugar. "Is she?" said they, "by G--d; let us at them again." They scarcely ever failed in their enterprises.

In allusion to the case at Savannah, Mr. W. regretted that an insult should be offered to the people of the country. The insult at Savannah had by this time been redressed, he had no doubt. He had no information to induce him to believe so, but the knowledge that the sloop-of-war Hornet was stationed off Charleston, and of course cruised near the place. The Hornet was perfectly adequate to drive any vessel of twenty guns out of our waters. She was one of the best vessels of the United States, and as well officered as any. [Mr. TROUP observed that the Hornet was off Charleston. Now, he wanted a frigate at Savannah.] Mr. W. said that Savannah was the very place where gunboats would be perfectly effectual. He meant to make no reflection against the proposer of the gunboat system, but he did against those who had only given one-half of the system, and omitted the other--the marine militia. And now, when an attack was menaced at Savannah, gentlemen wanted a frigate! If nine-tenths of the people were opposed to the evasions of the embargo law, Mr. W. said it would not be evaded. The evaders would be considered as traitors--as the worst of traitors. As to preparing a force for the protection of navigation, the gentleman from Georgia must well know that the whole revenue of the United States would not be competent to maintain a sufficient number of vessels to convoy our merchantmen.

Mr. W. concluded by saying, that he wished the nation to be protected, and its wrongs to be redressed; but when he reflected that at Castine the soil had been most abominably violated, he could not view the insults in our waters as being equal to it; for, said he, touch the soil and you touch the life-blood of every man in it.

Mr. DURELL considered the present subject as one of the most important which had been introduced at this session. It would indeed be difficult to reason gentlemen into a modification of a principle to which they were opposed throughout; but he trusted that this House was not generally so disposed. He believed that a large majority of the House were at the present moment in favor of embargo or war, because the House had been so distinctly told by a committee on our foreign relations, that there was no alternative but submission; and almost every gentleman who had the honor of a seat within these walls, had committed himself on the subject, either to persevere in the embargo or resort to war. What would be the object of a war? Not the right of the soil, not our territorial limits, but the right of navigating the ocean. Were we to redress those wrongs, those commercial injuries, on the land? Not altogether, he conceived. Would it be good policy, he asked, to let our means of carrying on war on the ocean rot in our docks, and not make use of them? These vessels would also be useful as a defence. Why then should they not be manned and put in readiness for service? It was said that we could not cope with the British navy. Mr. D. said this argument proved too much, if it proved any thing. If he did not feel perfectly comfortable in a cold day, should he therefore divest himself of all clothing? Why send out the sloop of war Hornet, alluded to by the gentleman last up--why rely upon it for redressing the insult at Savannah, if naval force was useless? It was no reason, because Great Britain had more vessels than we, that we should not use what we had. Indeed, those gentlemen who objected to naval force, appeared to be mostly from the interior, and of course could not properly estimate its value.

Mr. SAWYER was wholly opposed to the amendments from the Senate. The objection to this particular increase of naval force on the score of expense, was not to be disregarded. He called the attention of gentlemen to the state of the Treasury. The expense of this system would be three millions; and when this sum was added to other sums which would be requisite if measures now pending were adopted, it would render it necessary for Congress now to borrow money on the credit of posterity. The expedient of direct taxation would not be resorted to. It had already been the death-blow to the political existence of one Administration. This Government, he said, was founded on public opinion, and whenever the approbation of the people was withdrawn, from whatever cause, the whole superstructure must fall.

Mr. S. dwelt at some length on the disadvantage of loans. He said, if this nation was destined to raise a navy for the protection of commerce, it should have begun earlier, in the year 1793, when such outrageous violations had been committed on our commerce. The expense of such an establishment would have far exceeded the amount in value of captures made since that period. He concluded, from a number of observations which he made on this subject, that, on the score of the protection of trade, it would not be proper to fit out a navy. This proposition, he said, was the mere entering-wedge. The system was either unnecessary, or would be wholly futile in practice. Our seamen would cost us at least double of what is the expense of her seamen to Great Britain; and it required her utmost exertions to pay the interest of the enormous debt with which her unwieldy navy had saddled her. He therefore certainly thought that an attempt to justify it on the score of profit would not succeed. He deprecated the extension of Executive patronage, which would result from an increase of the Naval Establishment. Need he go back, he asked, to the time when the black cockade was necessary, in some parts of the country, to secure a man from insult from the officers of the navy? He wished to limit the Executive patronage; to adhere closely to the maxims of our forefathers. By sending out a navy, too, he said, we should volunteer to support the ascendency of the British navy, become the mere jackals of the British lion. Mr. S. went at some length into an examination of the former Administration in relation to a navy. There was nothing, he observed, in the nature of our Government, or of our foreign relations, to require a navy. If we could not carry on foreign commerce without a navy, he wished to have less of it and more of internal commerce, of that commerce which the natural advantages of the country would support between different parts of it. If we were to build a navy for the protection of foreign commerce, we should throw away our natural advantages for the sake of artificial ones. He was in favor of the embargo at present. There was more virtue in our barrels of flour as to coercion than in all the guns of our navy; and we had lately given our adversaries a supplementary broadside, which he hoped would tell well. Mr. S. stated the origin and progress of navies at some length, commencing with the Republic of Genoa. Our chief reliance as to defence must be on our militia. So little did Great Britain now rely on her navy for defence of her soil, that she had called upon every man in the country to be at his post, if danger came. Other nations might be justified in supporting a naval force, because they had colonies separated from them by the sea, with whom they were obliged to have means of intercourse, but we had not that apology for a navy. Mr. S. concluded his observations, after speaking near an hour, not, he said, that he had gone through the subject; but, as it was late in the day, he yielded the floor to some other gentleman.