Chapter I: A. Coles (35)

In contributing to the good of the United States by an
exposition which cannot (I think) fail to solve and melt all
division and disunion among its citizens, I flatter myself
with the fond expectation that when it is made public in
England it will add one great motive to the many that already
exist, to induce that nation to withdraw its confidence from
men whose political career is a fruitful source of injury and
embarrassment in America; of injustice and misery in Ireland;
of distress and apprehension in England; and contempt every
where. In making this communication to you, sir, I deem
it incumbent on me distinctly and unequivocally to state
that I adopt no party views; that I have not changed any of
my political opinions; that I neither seek nor desire the
patronage nor countenance of any Government nor of any party;
and that, in addition to the motives already expressed, I am
influenced by a just resentment of the perfidy and dishonor of
those who first violated the conditions upon which I received
their confidence; who have injured me and disappointed the
expectations of my friends, and left me no choice but between a
degrading acquiescence in injustice, and a retaliation which is
necessary to secure to me my own respect.

This wound will be felt where it is merited; and if Sir James
Craig still live, his share of the pain will excite no sympathy
among those who are at all in the secret of our connection.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant, &c.

J. HENRY.

To Hon. JAMES MONROE.
_Secretary of State, &c._

No. 1.

Mr. Ryland, Secretary to Sir James Craig, late Governor General
of the British Provinces in North America, to Mr. Henry.

_Application to undertake the Mission to the United
States._

[Most secret and confidential.]

QUEBEC, _January_ 26, 1809.

MY DEAR SIR: The extraordinary state of things at this time in
the neighboring States has suggested to the Governor-in-Chief
the idea of employing you on a secret and confidential mission
to Boston, provided an arrangement can be made to meet the
important end in view, without throwing an absolute obstacle
in the way of your professional pursuits. The information and
political observations heretofore received from you were
transmitted by his Excellency to the Secretary of State, who
has expressed his particular approbation of them; and there is
no doubt that your able execution of such a mission as I have
suggested, would give you a claim, not only on the Governor
General, but on His Majesty's Ministers, which might eventually
contribute to your advantage. You will have the goodness,
therefore, to acquaint me, for his Excellency's information,
whether you could make it convenient to engage in a mission of
this nature, and what pecuniary assistance would be requisite
to enable you to undertake it, without injury to yourself.

At present, it is only necessary for me to add, that the
Governor will furnish you with a cipher for carrying on your
correspondence; and that, in case the leading party in any of
the States wished to open a communication with this Government,
their views might be communicated through you.

I am, with great truth and regard, my dear sir, your most
faithful, humble servant,

HERMAN W. RYLAND.

JOHN HENRY, Esq.

No. 2.

General Instructions from Sir J. H. Craig to Mr.
Henry, respecting his Secret Mission.

_His Excellency the Governor-in-Chief's Instructions to
Mr. Henry, of February, 1809._

[Most secret and confidential.]

QUEBEC, _February 6, 1809_.

SIR: As you have so readily undertaken the service which I have
suggested to you, as being likely to be attended with much
benefit to the public interests, I am to request, that, with
your earliest convenience, you will proceed to Boston.

The principal object that I recommend to your attention, is,
the endeavor to obtain the most accurate information of the
true state of affairs in that part of the Union, which, from
its wealth, the number of its inhabitants, and the known
intelligence and ability of several of its leading men, must
naturally possess a very considerable influence over, and will
indeed probably lead the other Eastern States of America in the
part that they may take at this important crisis.

I shall not pretend to point out to you the mode by which you
will be most likely to obtain this important information; your
own judgment, and the connections which you may have in the
town, must be your guide. I think it, however, necessary to
put you on your guard against the sanguineness of an aspiring
party. The Federalists, as I understand, have at all times
discovered a leaning to this disposition; and their being under
its particular influence, at this moment, is the more to be
expected, from their having no ill-founded ground for their
hopes of being nearer the attainment of their object than they
have been for some years past.

In the general terms which I have made use of in describing
the object which I recommend to your attention, it is scarcely
necessary that I should observe, I include the state of the
public opinion, both with regard to their internal politics,
and to the probability of a war with England; the comparative
strength of the two great parties into which the country is
divided, and the views and designs of that which may ultimately
prevail.

It has been supposed, that, if the Federalists of the Eastern
States should be successful in obtaining that decided influence
which may enable them to direct the public opinion, it is not
improbable that, rather than submit to a continuance of the
difficulties and distress to which they are now subject, they
will exert that influence to bring about a separation from the
general Union. The earliest information on this subject may be
of great consequence to our Government, as it may also be, that
it should be informed how far, in such an event, they would
look up to England for assistance, or be disposed to enter into
a connection with us.

Although it would be highly inexpedient that you should in
any manner appear as an avowed agent, yet, if you could
contrive to obtain an intimacy with any of the leading party,
it may not be improper that you should insinuate, (though
with great caution,) that, if they should wish to enter into
any communication with our Government, through me, you are
authorized to receive any such, and will safely transmit
it to me. And as it may not be impossible that they should
require some document, by which they may be assured that you
are really in the situation in which you represent yourself,
I enclose a credential to be produced in that view. But, I
most particularly enjoin and direct that you do not make any
use of this paper, unless a desire to that purpose should be
expressed, and unless you see good ground for expecting that
the doing so may lead to a more confidential communication than
you can otherwise look for.

In passing through the State of Vermont, you will of course
exert your endeavors to procure all the information that the
short stay you will probably make there will admit of. You
will use your own discretion as to delaying your journey with
this view, more or less, in proportion to your prospects of
obtaining any information of consequence.

I request to hear from you as frequently as possible; and as
letters directed to me might excite suspicion, it may be as
well that you put them under cover to Mr. ----; and as even
the addressing letters always to the same person might attract
notice, I recommend your sometimes addressing your packet to
the Chief Justice here, or occasionally, though seldom, to Mr.
Ryland, but never with the addition of his official description.

I am, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

J. H. CRAIG.

JOHN HENRY, Esq.

_Copy of the "Credential" given by Sir James Craig to Mr. Henry._

The bearer, Mr. John Henry, is employed by me, and full
confidence may be placed in him for any communication which any
person may wish to make to me in the business committed to him.
In faith of which I have given him this under my hand and seal
at Quebec, the 6th day of February, 1809.

[Copies of the letters from Mr. Henry to Sir James Craig, relative to his mission to the United States, in the year 1809.]

No. 1.

_Answer to the letter of Mr. Secretary Ryland, proposing
the mission, &c._

MONTREAL, _Jan. 31, 1809_.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the favor of your letter of the
26th instant, written by the desire of his Excellency, the
Governor-in-Chief, and hasten to express, through you, to his
Excellency, my readiness to comply with his wishes.

I need not add how very flattering it is to receive from His
Excellency the assurance of the approbation of His Majesty's
Secretary of State, for the very humble services that I may
have rendered.

If the nature of the service in which I am to be engaged will
require no other disbursements than for my individual expenses,
I do not apprehend that these can exceed my private resources.

I shall be ready to take my departure before my instructions
can be made out.

I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,

J. H.

H. W. RYLAND, Esq., _Secretary, &c._

No. 2.

_To His Excellency the Governor General, &c., in answer
to his letter of instructions, &c._

MONTREAL, _Feb._ 10, 1809.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
Excellency's letter of instructions, the letter of credence,
and the cipher for carrying on my correspondence. I have
bestowed much pains upon the cipher, and am, notwithstanding
this, deficient in some points which might enable me to
understand it clearly. I have compared the example with my
own exemplification of the cipher, and find a difference in
the results; and as the present moment seems favorable to
the interference of His Majesty's Government in the measures
pursued by the Federal party in the Northern States, and more
especially as the Assembly of Massachusetts is now in session,
I think it better to set forward immediately, than wait for
any further explanation of the means of carrying on a secret
correspondence, which the frequency of safe private conveyances
to Canada will render almost wholly unnecessary. Should it,
however, be necessary at any time, I take leave to suggest
that the index alone furnishes a very safe and simple mode.
In it there is a number for every letter in the alphabet, and
particular numbers for particular phrases; so that when I do
not find in the index the particular word I want, I can spell
it with the figures which stand opposite to the letters. For
example, if I want to say that "troops are at Albany," I find
under the letter T, that No. 16 stands for "troops," and number
125 for "Albany;" the intervening words "are at" I supply by
figures corresponding with the letters in these words.

It will be necessary to provide against accident by addressing
the letters to Mr. ----, of Montreal, with a small mark on
the corner of the envelope, which he will understand. When
he receives it he will then address the enclosure to your
Excellency, and send it from Montreal by mail. I will be
careful not to address your Excellency in the body of the
letter, nor sign my name to any of them. They will be merely
designated by the initials A. B.

If this mode should, in any respect, appear exceptionable, your
Excellency will have the goodness to order a more particular
explanation of the card. It would reach me in safety enclosed
to ----, Boston.

I have the honor to be, with profound respect, your
Excellency's most obedient servant, &c.

J. H.

No. 3.

BURLINGTON, (Vt.,) _Feb._ 14, 1809.

SIR: I have remained here two days in order fully to ascertain
the progress of the arrangements heretofore made for organizing
an efficient opposition to the General Government, as well as
to become acquainted with the opinions of the leading people
relative to the measures of that party which has the ascendant
in the National Councils.

On the subject of the embargo laws there seems to be but
one opinion; namely, that they are unnecessary, oppressive,
and unconstitutional. It must also be observed, that the
execution of them is so invidious as to attract toward the
officers of Government the enmity of the people, which is of
course transferable to the Government itself; so that, in case
the State of Massachusetts should take any bold step toward
resisting the execution of these laws, it is highly probable
that it may calculate upon the hearty co-operation of the
people of Vermont.

I learn that the Governor of this State is now visiting the
towns in the northern section of it, and makes no secret of his
determination, as Commander-in-Chief of the militia, to refuse
obedience to any command from the General Government which can
tend to interrupt the good understanding that prevails between
the citizens of Vermont and His Majesty's subjects in Canada.
It is further intimated that, in case of a war, he will use
his influence to preserve this State neutral, and resist, with
all the force he can command, any attempt to make it a party.
I need not add that, if these resolutions are carried into
effect, the State of Vermont may be considered as an ally of
Great Britain.

To what extent the sentiments which prevail in this quarter
exist in the neighboring States, or even in the eastern section
of this State, I am not able to conjecture. I only say with
certainty, that the leading men of the Federal party act in
concert; and therefore infer that a common sentiment pervades
the whole body throughout New England.

I have seen a letter from a gentleman now in Washington to his
correspondent in this place; and, as its contents may serve to
throw some light on passing events there, I shall send either
the original, or a copy, with this despatch. The writer of
the letter is a man of character and veracity; and, whether
competent or not to form correct opinions himself, is probably
within the reach of all the knowledge that can be obtained by
the party to which he belongs.

It appears by his statement that there is a very formidable
majority in Congress on the side of the Administration;
notwithstanding which, there is every reason to hope, that
the Northern States, in their distinct capacity, will unite,
and resist, by force, a war with Great Britain. In what mode
this resistance will first show itself is probably not yet
determined upon; and may, in some measure, depend upon the
reliance that the leading men may place upon assurances of
support from His Majesty's representatives in Canada; and as I
shall be on the spot to tender this whenever the moment arrives
that it can be done with effect, there is no doubt that all
their measures may be made subordinate to the intentions of
His Majesty's Government. Great pains are taken by the men of
talents and intelligence to confirm the fears of the common
people, as to the concurrence of the Southern Democrats in
the projects of France; and every thing tends to encourage
the belief, that the dissolution of the Confederacy will be
accelerated by the spirit which now actuates both political
parties. I am, &c.

A. B.

No. 4.

WINDSOR, (Vt.,) _Feb._ 19, 1809.

SIR: My last (No. 3) was written at Burlington, the principal
town in the northern part of the State of Vermont. I am now at
the principal town in the eastern section.

The fallacy of men's opinions, when they act under the
influence of sensibility, and are strongly excited by those
hopes which always animate a rising party, led me to doubt the
correctness of the opinions which I received in the northern
section of this State; which from its contiguity to Canada and
necessary intercourse with Montreal, has a stronger interest in
promoting a good understanding with His Majesty's Government.
Therefore, since my departure from Burlington, I have sought
every favorable occasion of conversing with the Democrats
on the probable result of the policy adopted by the General
Government. The difference of opinion is thus expressed.
The Federal party declare that, in the event of a war, the
State of Vermont will treat separately for itself with Great
Britain; and support to the utmost the stipulations into which
it may enter, without any regard to the policy of the General
Government. The Democrats, on the other hand, assert, that in
such a case as that contemplated, the people would be nearly
divided into equal numbers; one of which would support the
Government, if it could be done without involving the people
in a civil war, but, at all events, would risk every thing in
preference to a coalition with Great Britain. This difference
of opinion is not to be wholly ascribed to the prejudices
of party. The people in the eastern section of Vermont are
not operated upon by the same hopes and fears as those on
the borders of the British colony. They are not dependent
on Montreal for the sale of their produce nor the supply of
foreign commodities. They are not apprehensive of any serious
dangers or inconvenience from a state of war; and although they
admit that the Governor, Council, and three-fourths of the
representation in Congress are of the Federal party, yet they
do not believe that the State would stand alone and resist the
National Government. They do not, however, deny that, should
the State of Vermont continue to be represented as it is at
present, it would in all probability unite with the neighboring
States in any serious plan of resistance to a war which it
might seem expedient to adopt. This, I think, is the safer
opinion for you to rely on; if, indeed, reliance ought to be
placed on any measure depending upon the will of the rabble,
which is ever changing, and must ever be marked with ignorance,
caprice, and inconsistency. As the crisis approaches, the
difficulty of deciding upon a hazardous alternative will
increase; and, unfortunately, there is not in Vermont any man
of commanding talents capable of attracting general confidence,
of infusing into the people his own spirit; and, amidst the
confusion of conflicting opinions, dangers, and commotion,
competent to lead in the path of duty or safety. The Governor
is an industrious, prudent man, and has more personal influence
than any other; but his abilities are not suited to the
situation in which a civil war would place him. I am, &c.

A. B.

No. 5.

AMHERST, (N. H.,) _Feb._ 23, 1809.

SIR: A gentleman going direct to Canada affords a safe and
favorable opportunity of giving you some further account of my
progress.

I will not make use of the post offices when I can avoid it,
because private occasions supersede the necessity of writing
in cipher; and the contempt of decency and principles, which
forms part of the morals of the subaltern officers of a
democracy, would incline them to break a seal with the same
indifference that they break their words, when either curiosity
or interest is to be indulged.

I have not had sufficient time nor evidence to enable me to
form any opinion for myself, of the lengths to which the
Federal party will carry their opposition to the National
Government in the event of a war; which may be inferred from
the result of the election of Governors which, within two
months, will be made in the States of Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Rhode Island. From all I know, and all I can
learn of the General Government, I am not apprehensive of
an immediate war. The embargo is the favorite measure; and
it is probable that other means will be employed to excite
England to commit some act of hostility, for the sole purpose
of placing the responsibility of war on that country. This I
most particularly recommend to the consideration of ministers.
The dread of opposition, and of the loss of popularity, will
certainly keep the ruling party at Washington inactive. They
will risk any thing but the loss of power; and they are well
aware, that their power would pass away with the first calamity
which their measures might bring upon the common people,
from whom that power emanates, unless, indeed, they could
find a sufficient excuse in the conduct of Great Britain.
This impression cannot be too deeply felt by His Majesty's
Ministers; nor too widely spread throughout the British nation.
It will furnish a sure guide in every policy that may be
adopted toward the United States.

I have the honor to be, &c.

A. B.

No. 6.

BOSTON, _March 5, 1809_.

SIR: I am favored with another opportunity of writing to you by
a private conveyance; and think it probable, at this season,
that the frequency of these will render it unnecessary to write
to you in cipher.

It does not yet appear necessary that I should discover to
any person the purpose of my visit to Boston; nor is it
probable that I shall be compelled, for the sake of gaining
more knowledge of the arrangements of the Federal party in
these States, to avow myself as a regular authorized agent of
the British Government, even to those individuals who would
feel equally bound with myself to preserve, with the utmost
inscrutability, so important a secret from the public eye. I
have sufficient means of information to enable me to judge
of the proper period for offering the co-operation of Great
Britain, and opening a correspondence between the Governor
General of British America, and those individuals who, from the
part they take in the opposition to the National Government, or
the influence they may possess in any new order of things that
may grow out of the present differences, should be qualified
to act on behalf of the Northern States. An apprehension of
any such state of things as is pre-supposed by these remarks,
begins to subside, since it has appeared, by the conduct of
the General Government, that it is seriously alarmed at the
menacing attitude of the Northern States. But, although it is
believed that there is no probability of an immediate war,
yet no doubts are entertained that Mr. Madison will fall upon
some new expedients to bring about hostilities. What these may
be, can only be deduced from what appears to be practicable.
A _non-intercourse_ with England and France will probably
supersede the embargo; which, by opening with the rest of
Europe a partial, legitimate commerce, and offering strong
temptations to that which is illegal, will expose the vessels
to capture, detention, and embarrassment; will justify the
present policy, and produce such a degree of irritation and
resentment as will enable the Government of this country to
throw the whole blame and responsibility of war from its own
shoulders upon those of the British Ministry. If, in this, the
party attached to France should calculate with correctness,
and the commerce of New England should greatly suffer, the
merchants, being injured and discouraged, would not only
acquiesce in the restrictive system, but even submit to war.
On the other hand, should the small traffic, permitted by a
non-intercourse law, be lucrative and uninterrupted, the people
would be clamorous for more, and soon compel the Government to
restore the friendly relations between the two countries.

While I offer my opinion upon this subject, I cannot but
express a strong hope that, if any terms should be proposed
by either Government, to which the other might think proper
to accede, that a principal motive to the adjustment of
differences should be understood to arise from the amicable
disposition of the Eastern States, particularly of the State
of Massachusetts. This, as it would increase the popularity of
the friends of Great Britain, could not fail to promote her
interests. If it could not be done formally and officially,
nor in a correspondence between Ministers, still, perhaps, the
administration in the Parliament of Great Britain might take
that ground, and the suggestion would find its way into the
papers both in England and America.

It cannot be too frequently repeated, that this country can
only be governed and directed by the influence of opinion, as
there is nothing permanent in its political institutions; nor
are the populace, under any circumstances, to be relied on,
when measures become inconvenient and burdensome. I will soon
write again, and am yours, &c.

A. B.

(In cipher.) No. 7.

BOSTON, _March 7, 1809_.

SIR: I have now ascertained, with as much accuracy as
possible, the course intended to be pursued by the party in
Massachusetts that is opposed to the measures and politics of
the Administration of the General Government.

I have already given a decided opinion that a declaration of
war is not to be expected; but, contrary to all reasonable
calculation, should the Congress possess spirit and
independence enough to place their popularity in jeopardy by
so strong a measure, the Legislature of Massachusetts will
give the tone to the neighboring States, will declare itself
permanent until a new election of members, invite a Congress,
to be composed of delegates from the Federal States, and erect
a separate government for their common defence and common
interest. This Congress would probably begin by abrogating
the offensive laws, and adopting a plan for the maintenance
of the power and authority thus assumed. They would, by such
an act, be in a condition to make or receive proposals from
Great Britain; and I should seize the first moment to open
a correspondence with your Excellency. Scarcely any other
aid would be necessary, and perhaps none required, than a
few vessels of war from the Halifax station, to protect the
maritime towns from the little navy which is at the disposal
of the National Government. What permanent connection between
Great Britain and this section of the Republic would grow out
of a civil commotion, such as might be expected, no person is
prepared to describe; but it seems that a strict alliance must
result of necessity. At present the opposition party confine
their calculations merely to resistance; and I can assure you
that, at this moment, they do not freely entertain the project
of withdrawing the Eastern States from the Union, finding it a
very unpopular topic; although a course of events, such as I
have already mentioned, would inevitably produce an incurable
alienation of the New England from the Southern States.

The truth is, the common people have so long regarded the
Constitution of the United States with complacency, that they
are now only disposed in this quarter to treat it like a truant
mistress, whom they would, for a time, put away on a separate
maintenance, but, without further and greater provocation,
would not absolutely repudiate.

It will soon be known in what situation public affairs are to
remain until the meeting of the New Congress in May, at which
time, also, this Legislature will again assemble. The two
months that intervene will be a period of much anxiety.

In all I have written I have been careful not to make any
impression analogous to the enthusiastic confidence entertained
by the opposition, nor to the hopes and expectations that
animate the friends of an alliance between the Northern States
and Great Britain.

I have abstracted myself from all the sympathies these are
calculated to inspire; because, notwithstanding that I feel the
utmost confidence in the integrity of intention of the leading
characters in this political drama, I cannot forget that
they derive their power from a giddy, inconstant multitude;
who, unless in the instance under consideration they form
an exception to all general rules and experience, will act
inconsistently and absurdly. I am yours, &c.

A. B.

No. 8.

BOSTON, _March_ 9, 1809.

SIR: In my letter No. 6, I took the liberty to express my
opinion of the probable effect of the non-intercourse law,
intended to be enacted; and of the mode by which Great Britain
may defeat the real intention of the American Government in
passing it. But as this sort of impunity recommended might,
in its application to every species of commerce that would be
carried on, be deemed by Great Britain a greater evil than war
itself, a middle course might easily be adopted, which would
deprive France of the benefits resulting from an intercourse
with America, without, in any great degree, irritating the
maritime States.

The high price of all American produce in France furnishes a
temptation which mercantile avarice will be unable to resist.
The consequence is obvious. But if, instead of condemning the
vessels and cargoes which may be arrested in pursuing this
prohibited commerce, they should be compelled to go into a
British port, and there permitted to sell them, I think the
friends of England in these States would not utter a complaint.
Indeed, I have no doubt that if, in the prosecution of a lawful
voyage, the British cruisers should treat the American ships
in this manner, their owners would, in the present state of
the European markets, think themselves very fortunate, as it
would save them the trouble and expense of landing them in a
neutral port, and from thence reshipping them to England, now
the best market in Europe for the produce of this country. The
Government of the United States would probably complain, and
Bonaparte become peremptory; but even that would only tend to
render the opposition in the Northern States more resolute, and
accelerate the dissolution of the confederacy. The generosity
and justice of Great Britain would be extolled; and the
commercial States exult in the success of individuals over a
Government inimical to commerce, and to whose measures they can
no longer submit with patient acquiescence. The elections are
begun; and I presume no vigilance or industry will be remitted
to insure the success of the Federal party. I am, &c.

A. B.

P. S. Intelligence has reached Boston that a non-intercourse
law has actually passed, and that Martinique has surrendered to
British forces.

No. 9.

BOSTON, _March_ 13, 1809.

SIR: You will perceive, from the accounts that will reach you
in the public papers, both from Washington and Massachusetts,
that the Federalists of the Northern States have succeeded
in making the Congress believe that, with such an opposition
as they would make to the General Government, a war must be
confined to their own territory, and might be even too much for
that Government to sustain. The consequence is, that, after
all the parade and menaces with which the session commenced,
it has been suffered to end without carrying into effect any
of the plans of the Administration, except the interdiction of
commercial intercourse with England and France, an event that
was anticipated in my former letters.

Under what new circumstances the Congress will meet in May,
will depend on the State elections and the changes that may
in the mean time take place in Europe. With regard to Great
Britain, she can scarcely mistake her true policy in relation
to America. If peace be the first object, every act which can
irritate the maritime States ought to be avoided, because the
prevailing disposition of these will generally be sufficient
to keep the Government from hazarding any hostile measures.
If a war between America and France be the grand desideratum,
something more must be done; an indulgent and conciliatory
policy must be adopted, which will leave the Democrats without
a pretext for hostilities; and Bonaparte, whose passions are
too hot for delay, will probably compel this Government to
decide which of the two great belligerents is to be its enemy.
To bring about a separation of the States, under distinct and
independent governments, is an affair of more uncertainty,
and, however desirable, cannot be effected but by a series
of acts and a long-continued policy tending to irritate the
Southern and conciliate the Northern people. The former are
agricultural, the latter a commercial people. The mode of
cherishing and depressing either is too obvious to require
illustration. This, I am aware, is an object of much interest
in Great Britain, as it would forever secure the integrity of
His Majesty's possessions on this continent, and make the two
Governments, or whatever number the present confederacy might
form into, as useful and as much subject to the influence of
Great Britain as her Colonies can be rendered. But it is an
object only to be attained by slow and circumspect progression,
and requires, for its consummation, more attention to the
affairs which agitate and excite parties in this country than
Great Britain has yet bestowed upon it.

An unpopular war, that is, a war produced by the hatred and
prejudice of one party, but against the consent of the other
party, can alone produce a sudden separation of any section of
this country from the common head.

At all events, it cannot be necessary to the preservation of
peace that Great Britain should make any great concession at
the present moment, more especially, as the more important
changes that occur in Europe might render it inconvenient for
her to adhere to any stipulations in favor of neutral maritime
nations.

Although the non-intercourse law affords but a very partial
relief to the people of this country from the evils of that
entire suspension of commerce to which they have reluctantly
submitted for some time past, I lament the repeal of the
embargo, because it was calculated to accelerate the progress
of these States towards a revolution that would have put an end
to the only Republic that remains to prove that a Government
founded on political equality can exist in a season of trial
and difficulty, or is calculated to insure either security or
happiness to a people. I am, &c.

A. B.

No. 10.

BOSTON, _March_ 29, 1809.

SIR: Since my letter of the 13th, nothing has occurred which I
thought worthy of a communication.

The last weeks of this month, and the first of April, will
be occupied in the election of Governors and other executive
officers in the New England States.

The Federal candidate in New Hampshire is already elected by
a majority of about one thousand votes. His competitor was a
man of large fortune, extensive connections, and inoffensive
manners. These account for the smallness of the majority.

In Connecticut no change is necessary, and none is to be
apprehended.

In Rhode Island it is of no consequence of what party the
Governor is a member, as he has neither civil nor military
power, being merely President of the Council.

In Massachusetts it is certain that the Federal candidate will
succeed.

A few weeks will be sufficient in order to determine the
relative strength of parties, and convince Mr. Madison that
a war with Great Britain is not a measure upon which he dare
venture. Since the plan of an organized opposition to the
projects of Mr. Jefferson was put into operation, the whole of
the New England States have transferred their political power
to his political enemies; and the reason that he has still so
many adherents is, that those who consider the only true policy
of America to consist in the cultivation of peace, have still
great confidence that nothing can force him (or his successor,
who acts up to his system, or rather is governed by it) to
consent to war. They consider all the menaces and "dreadful
note of preparation" to be a mere finesse, intended only to
obtain concessions from England on cheap terms. From every
sort of evidence, I confess I am myself of the same opinion,
and am fully persuaded that this farce, which has been acting
at Washington, will terminate in a full proof of imbecility
and spiritless temper of the actors. A war attempted without
the concurrence of both parties, and the general consent of
the Northern States, which constitute the bone and muscle of
the country, must commence without hope, and end in disgrace.
It should, therefore, be the peculiar care of Great Britain
to foster divisions between the North and South, and, by
succeeding in this, she may carry into effect her own projects
in Europe, with a total disregard of the resentments of the
Democrats of this country. I am, &c.

A. B.

No. 11.

BOSTON, _April_ 13, 1809.

SIR: I send to Mr. R---- a pamphlet entitled "Suppressed
Documents." The notes and comments were written by the
gentleman who has written the analysis which I sent by a former
conveyance. These works have greatly contributed to excite
the fears of the men of talents and property, who now prefer
the chance of maintaining their party by open resistance and
a final separation, to an alliance with France and a war with
England; so that, should the Government unexpectedly, and
contrary to all reasonable calculation, attempt to involve
the country in a measure of that nature, I am convinced (now
that the elections have all terminated favorably) that none of
the New England States would be a party in it. But, as I have
repeatedly written, the General Government does not seriously
entertain any such desire or intention. Had the majority in the
New England States continued to approve of the public measures,
it is extremely probable that Great Britain would now have to
choose between war and concession. But the aspect of things in
this respect is changed, and a war would produce an incurable
alienation of the Eastern States, and bring the whole country
in subordination to the interests of England, whose navy would
prescribe and enforce the terms upon which the commercial
States should carry, and the agricultural States export, their
surplus produce. All this is as well known to the Democrats
as to the other party; therefore, they will avoid a war, at
least until the whole nation is unanimous for it. Still, when
we consider of what materials the Government is formed, it is
impossible to speak with any certainty of their measures. The
past Administration, in every transaction, presents to the mind
only a muddy commixture of folly, weakness, and duplicity. The
spell by which the nations of Europe have been rendered inert
and inefficient, when they attempted to shake it off, has
stretched its shadows across the Atlantic, and made a majority
of the people of these States alike blind to duty and to their
true interests. I am, &c.

A. B.

No. 12.

BOSTON, _April_ 26, 1809.

SIR: Since my letter No. 11, I have had but little to
communicate.

I have not yet been able to ascertain, with sufficient
accuracy, the relative strength of the two parties in the
legislative bodies in New England.

In all these States, however, Governors have been elected out
of the Federal party, and even the Southern papers indicate an
unexpected augmentation of Federal members in the next Congress.

The correspondence between Mr. Erskine and the Secretary of
State at Washington you will have seen before this can reach
you. It has given much satisfaction to the Federal party here,
because it promises an exemption from the evil most feared, (a
war with England,) and justifies their partiality towards Great
Britain, which they maintain was founded upon a full conviction
of her justice, and sincere disposition to preserve peace. Even
the Democrats affect to be satisfied with it; because, as they
insist, it proves the efficacy of the restrictive system of Mr.
Jefferson.

But the great benefit that will probably result from it will
be, that Bonaparte may be induced to force this country from
her neutral position. Baffled in his attempts to exclude from
the continent the manufactures of Great Britain, he will most
likely confiscate all American property in his dominions and
dependencies, and declare war. Nothing could more than this
contribute to give influence and stability to the British
party. The invidious occurrences of the rebellion would be
forgotten in the resentment of the people against France, and
they would soon be weaned from that attachment to her which
is founded on the aid that was rendered to separate from the
mother country. While Great Britain waits for this natural, I
might say necessary, result of the negotiation, would it not be
extremely inexpedient to conclude a treaty with the American
Government? Every sort of evidence and experience prove that
the Democrats consider their political ascendency in a great
measure dependent on the hostile spirit that they can keep
alive towards Great Britain, and recent events demonstrate
that their conduct will be predicated upon that conviction; it
is, therefore, not to be expected that they will meet, with
corresponding feelings, a sincere disposition on the part of
England to adjust all matters in dispute. They are at heart
mortified and disappointed to find that Great Britain has been
in advance of the French Government, in taking advantage of
the provisional clauses of the non-intercourse law; and if
they show any spirit at the next session of Congress towards
France, it will be only because they will find Bonaparte deaf
to entreaty and insensible of past favors; or that they may
think it safer to float with the tide of public feeling, which
will set strongly against him unless he keep _pari passu_ with
England in a conciliatory policy. I am, &c.

A. B.

No. 13.

BOSTON, _May_ 5, 1809.

SIR: Although the recent changes that have occurred quiet all
apprehension of war, and, consequently, lessen all hope of a
separation of the States, I think it necessary to transmit by
the mail of each week a sketch of passing events.

On local politics I have nothing to add; and as the parade
that is made in the National Intelligencer of the sincere
disposition of Mr. Madison to preserve amicable relations with
Great Britain is, in my opinion, calculated to awaken vigilance
and distrust, rather than inspire confidence, I shall (having
nothing more important to write about) take leave to examine
his motives.

I am not surprised at his conditional removal of the
non-intercourse law, with respect to Great Britain, because
it was made incumbent on him by the act of Congress; but the
observations made on his friendly disposition towards Great
Britain is a matter of no little astonishment. The whole tenor
of his political life directly and unequivocally contradicts
them. His speech on the British Treaty in 1796; his attempt to
pass a law for the confiscation of "British debts" and British
property; his commercial resolutions, grounded apparently
on an idea of making America useful as a colony to France;
his conduct while Secretary of State; all form an assemblage
of probabilities tending to convince me, at least, that he
does not seriously desire a treaty in which the rights and
pretensions of Great Britain would be fairly recognized. It
seems impossible that he should at once divest himself of
his habitual animosity, and that pride of opinion which his
present situation enables him to indulge; but, above all, that
he should deprive his friends and supporters of the benefit
of those prejudices which have been carefully fostered in the
minds of the common people towards England, and which have so
materially contributed to invigorate and augment the Democratic
party. Whatever his real motives may be, it is, in this stage
of the affair, harmless enough to inquire into the cause of
the apparent change. He probably acts under a conviction that,
in the present temper of the Eastern States, a war could not
fail to produce a dissolution of the Union; or he may have
profited by the mistakes of his predecessor, and is inclined
to seize the present opportunity to prove to the world that he
is determined to be the President of a nation, rather than the
head of a faction; or he has probably gone thus far to remove
the impression on the minds of many that he was under the
influence of France, in order that he may, with a better grace,
and on more tenable grounds, quarrel with Great Britain in the
progress of negotiating a treaty. Whatever his motives may be,
I am very certain his party will not support him in any manly
and generous policy. Weak men are sure to temporize when great
events call upon them for decision, and are sluggish and inert
at the moment when the worst of evils is in action. This is the
character of the Democrats in the Northern States. Of those of
the South I know but little. I am, &c.

A. B.

No. 14.

BOSTON, _May_ 25, 1809.

SIR: My last was under date of the 5th instant. The unexpected
change that has taken place in the feelings of political men in
this country, in consequence of Mr. Madison's prompt acceptance
of the friendly proposals of Great Britain, has caused a
temporary suspension of the conflict of parties; and they both
regard him with equal wonder and distrust. They all ascribe
his conduct to various motives, but none believe him to be in
earnest.

The State of New York has returned to the Assembly a majority
of Federal members. All this proves that an anti-commercial
faction cannot rule the Northern States. Two months ago the
State of New York was not ranked among the States that would
adopt the policy of that of Massachusetts; and any favorable
change was extremely problematical.

I beg leave to suggest that, in the present state of things in
this country, my presence can contribute very little to the
interests of Great Britain. If Mr. Erskine be sanctioned in all
he has conceded, by His Majesty's ministers, it is unnecessary
for me, as indeed it would be unavailing, to make any attempt
to carry into effect the original purposes of my mission. While
I think it to be my duty to give this intimation to you, I beg
it may be understood that I consider myself entirely at the
disposal of His Majesty's Government. I am, &c.

A. B.

No. 15.

MONTREAL, _June_ 12, 1809.

SIR: I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I
received, through Mr. Secretary Ryland, your Excellency's
commands to return to Canada; and after the delay incident to
this season of the year, in a journey from Boston, arrived here
yesterday.

Your Excellency will have seen, by the papers of the latest
dates from the United States, that a formidable opposition
is already organized in Congress to the late measures of Mr.
Madison; and it is very evident that if he be sincere in his
professions of attachment to Great Britain, his party will
abandon him. Sixty-one members have already voted against a
resolution to approve of what he has done; and I have no doubt
the rest of the Democratic party will follow the example as
soon as they recover from the astonishment into which his
apparent defection has thrown them.

The present hopes of the Federalists are founded on the
probability of a war with France; but, at all events, this
party is strong and well organized enough to prevent a war with
England.

It would be now superfluous to trouble your Excellency with
an account of the nature and extent of the arrangements made
by the Federal party to resist any attempt of the Government
unfavorable to Great Britain. They were such as do great credit
to their ability and principles; and, while a judicious policy
is observed by Great Britain, secure her interests in America
from decay. My fear of inducing a false security on the part
of His Majesty's Government in their efficiency and eventual
success, may have inclined me to refrain from doing them that
justice in my former letters which I willingly take the present
occasion to express.

I trust your Excellency will ascribe the style and manner of
my communications, and the frequent ambiguities introduced in
them, as arising from the secrecy necessary to be observed, and
my consciousness that you understand my meaning, on the most
delicate points, without risking a particular explanation.

I lament that no occasion commensurate to my wishes has
permitted me to prove how much I value the confidence of your
Excellency, and the approbation already expressed by His
Majesty's Minister. I have the honor to be, &c.

J. H.

I certify that the foregoing letters are the same referred to in the letter of H. W. Ryland, Esq., dated May 1, 1809, relating to the mission in which I was employed by Sir James Craig, by his letter of instructions, bearing date February 6, 1809.

JOHN HENRY.

_Mr. Ryland to Mr. Henry._

QUEBEC, _May_ 1, 1809.

MY DEAR SIR: The news we have received this day from the States
will, I imagine, soon bring you back to us; and if you arrive
at Montreal by the middle of June, I shall probably have the
pleasure of meeting you there, as I am going up with Sir James
and a large suite. The last letters received from you are
to the 13th April. The whole are now transcribing, for the
purpose of being sent home, where they cannot fail of doing you
great credit, and I most certainly hope they may eventually
contribute to your permanent advantage. It is not necessary to
repeat the assurance that no effort within the compass of my
power shall be wanting to this end.

I am cruelly out of spirits at the idea of old England
truckling to such a debased and accursed Government as that of
the United States.

I am greatly obliged to you for the trouble you have taken in
procuring the books, though, if Spain fails, I shall scarcely
have heart to look into them. I can add no more, but that I am,
most heartily and affectionately, yours,

H. W. R.

J. HENRY, Esq., Boston.

_Mr. Ryland to Mr. Henry._

MAY 4, 1809.

MY DEAR SIR: You must consider the short letter I wrote to
you by the last post as altogether unofficial; but I am now
to intimate to you, in a more formal manner, our hope of your
speedy return, as the object of your journey seems, for the
present at least, to be at an end.

We have London news, by the way of the river, up to the 6th of
March, which tallies to a day with what we have received by the
way of the States.

Heartily wishing you a safe and speedy journey back to us, I
am, my dear sir, most sincerely, yours,

H. W. R.

Have the goodness to bring my books with you, though I shall
have little spirit to look into them, unless you bring good
news from Spain.

JOHN HENRY, Esq.

_Mr. Henry to Mr. Peel._

JUNE 13, 1811.

SIR: I take the liberty to enclose to you a memorial addressed
to the Earl of Liverpool, and beg you will have the goodness
either to examine the documents in your office, or those in my
own possession, touching the extent and legitimacy of my claim.

Mr. Ryland, the Secretary of Sir J. Craig, is now in London,
and, from his official knowledge of the transactions and facts
alluded to in the memorial, can give any information required
on that subject. I have the honor to be, &c.

J. H.

_Memorial of Mr. Henry to Lord Liverpool._

The undersigned most respectfully submits the following
statement and memorial to the Earl of Liverpool:

Long before and during the administration of your Lordship's
predecessor, the undersigned bestowed much personal attention
to the state of parties, and to the political measures in the
United States of America.

* * * * *

Soon after the affair of the Chesapeake frigate, when His
Majesty's Governor General of British America had reason to
believe that the two countries would be involved in a war,
and had submitted to His Majesty's Ministers the arrangements
of the English party in the United States for an efficient
resistance to the General Government, which would probably
terminate in a separation of the Northern States from the
General Confederacy, he applied to the undersigned to
undertake a mission to Boston, where the whole concerns of
the opposition were managed. The object of the mission was
to promote and encourage the Federal party to resist the
measures of the General Government, to offer assurances of aid
and support from His Majesty's Government of Canada, and to
open a communication between the leading men engaged in that
opposition and the Governor General, upon such a footing as
circumstances might suggest; and, finally, to render the plans
then in contemplation subservient to the views of His Majesty's
Government.

The undersigned undertook the mission, which lasted from the
month of January to the month of June, inclusive, during which
period those public acts and legislative resolutions of the
Assemblies of Massachusetts and Connecticut were passed which
kept the General Government of the United States in check,
and deterred it from carrying into execution the measures of
hostility with which Great Britain was menaced.