Chapter I: A. Coles (45)

Mr. MCKIM presented a petition of Commodore Joshua Barney, on behalf of himself and the owners, officers, and crews, of sundry private armed vessels of war, "praying to be considered as claimants to all property proven to be enemy's property, found on board of vessels sailing under the American flag, having on board British manufactured goods, coming from Great Britain to the United States, and under the protection of British licenses, which have been captured by them, or that they may participate as '_informers_' in the seizure and condemnation of the said property under the non-importation."--Referred to the Committee of Ways and Means.

MONDAY, December 7.

Another member, to wit, from Virginia, EDWIN GRAY, appeared, and took his seat.

TUESDAY, December 8.

Another member, viz: from Virginia, WILLIAM A. BURWELL, appeared, and took his seat.

WEDNESDAY, December 9.

_Imprisonment of American Seamen._

Mr. BASSETT offered to the House the following resolution:

Whereas, It is represented, that Great Britain has seized
sundry persons fighting under the American flag, laying claims
to them alike incompatible with justice and the rights of the
United States as an independent nation:

_Resolved_, That the President be requested to lay before this
House the information he has received on that subject, and the
measures taken to redress an evil which violates the rights and
interests, and outrages the feelings of a free and independent
people.

Mr. BASSETT stated that several cases had come to his knowledge in which the British naval commanders had seized persons taken on board of American armed vessels, and confined them, in one instance, in irons, and in another had transported them to England for trial. It was not his intention now to go into an examination of these cases. Such an examination was not necessary to authorize the House to call for the information required. He had given its present form to the motion he had offered, because its adoption would go to show that the councils of the nation were not indifferent to this subject. It would, he trusted, further enable the Executive to show that it never slumbered on any occasion in which the rights of the people were concerned; and he had no doubt the information to be received would show it. When it was received, the House might take what course it pleased; perhaps no legislative act would grow out of it. But it was proper, in any event, that the House should be in possession of information required.

Mr. MILNOR said he had no objection to the call for information, but he excepted to the form of the resolution, for two reasons. It was prefaced by a preamble, which was not usual in such cases, which preamble, moreover, assumed as fact circumstances of which the House had no official or authentic information. His other objection was, that it expressed an opinion on a point on which he was not ready to express one. Mr. M. said he knew not the extent of the evil of which the gentleman complained. If it was merely that Great Britain laid claim to her own subjects fighting our battles against her, he would at least not say that this was an act on the part of Great Britain deserving all those severe epithets which the gentleman had thought proper to attach to it. The resolution stated facts not before the House, and expressed an opinion on an act the degree of enormity of which depended on the circumstances respecting which it was proposed to ask for information. Mr. M. wished that the House should not lightly be compelled into a discussion of this subject, and especially as the gentleman had intimated the probability that no legislative act was to grow out of the information called for.

Mr. SEYBERT said, as his colleague's principal objection to the motion appeared to be a difficulty as to facts, he hoped to procure his vote for its adoption by stating at least one which had come to his knowledge. I, said Mr. S., had the honor to have a nephew on board the ship Wasp. He informed me this morning that after they had been carried into Bermuda, several of their crew were taken and confined in irons; that he saw them in that situation; and that their crime was, having fought the battles of our country. What may be my colleague's feelings on this occasion, I know not--I hope they are honorable to himself and the House--for myself I wish the subject investigated. Mr. S. concluded by expressing his hope that the resolution would pass.

Mr. MACON said he was anxious to obtain information on this subject, but doubted the propriety of the preamble. After the information was received, it would be time enough to express an opinion on the subject. He had no doubt that we must at last come to the determination to protect every man that is on board of a ship of the United States. It is what Great Britain herself does; and in this respect we ought to follow her example. If these people undertake to fight our battles, we ought to protect them. Mr. M. said he was opposed to the preamble, because he did not wish to give reasons to the departments of the Government for any call for information the House thought proper to make; it was enough that the House should ask for it, and the President should give or withhold it. The practice heretofore was against the course now pursued.

Mr. BIGELOW said he had no objection to the call for information, divested of the preamble and the opinion expressed in it, except that it did not go far enough. He proposed to amend it by adding thereto the following words, "accompanied with all the evidence in his possession, which will tend to show whether such persons are American citizens or British subjects."

Mr. BASSETT said he was indifferent as to the form, provided he obtained the substance; he, therefore, should submit to such modification as the gentleman from North Carolina should think proper to make. But, said Mr. B., as it has been said that there is no information before the House, I state that I understand, and it is my belief, that six men of the crew of the United States brig Nautilus were detained and sent to England for trial; and that Commodore Rodgers had detained as hostages for their safety twelve British subjects. I state also to the House that I understand and believe that six seamen of another armed vessel have been detained, and that General Pinckney had detained a like number of British subjects. I state that I have received information that the boatswain of the Wasp had been put in irons after she was taken. These violations of humanity and the law of nations I believe to require retaliation. When I voted against a bill on this subject (Mr. WRIGHT'S) it was not because I was opposed to retaliation. No, sir; retaliation in war is often mercy--it puts an end to those cruelties which would otherwise frequently disgrace parties at war, and is indispensable in the conduct of hostilities.

Mr. B. having withdrawn his motion, it was substituted by the following, offered by Mr. MACON:

"_Resolved_, That the President of the United States be
requested to cause to be laid before this House any information
which may be in his possession touching the conduct of British
officers towards persons taken in American armed ships."

Mr. RANDOLPH said he trusted that the resolution now before the House would meet with no objection; although against the resolution as first proposed, he must have voted for it, notwithstanding all the odium which might have attached to such a vote. He hoped, he said, that rigorous retaliation would take place if our countrymen found in arms had been treated as criminals and not as prisoners of war. He hoped we should have ample atonement for every drop of American blood which should be spilt in such manner. Having taken occasion to pay a handsome compliment to the gallantry of our Navy, which was not heard with sufficient distinctness to be reported, Mr. R. concluded by hoping there would be no objection to the resolution.

Mr. MILNOR said he thought it due to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. BASSETT) to state that, owing to the noise which prevailed in the House, he had not before heard the statement which the gentleman had now been kind enough to make. He had heard of no such case as that alluded to by his colleague; but he trusted he had been sufficiently guarded not to commit himself, even to the most invidious construction, as opposed to a proper investigation of this subject. To the present motion he yielded his perfect acquiescence. Mr. M. said he trusted that in any thing that related to the honor of the country in the contest in which we are now engaged, whatever might have been his opinion of the propriety of entering into it, he should not be found more backward than other gentlemen in sustaining the just rights of the nation.

Mr. SHEFFEY said, if American citizens had been treated in the manner represented, he was clearly of opinion that severe retaliation ought to follow. But did gentlemen pretend that a British subject, running away from a British vessel, and found on board of one of ours, was to be considered as entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war? Could this doctrine be asserted by any gentleman? He presumed not. The resolution, as it now stood, would not elicit the facts material as to this point. He, therefore, moved to amend it, by inserting, after the word "persons," the words "other than British subjects."

Mr. SEYBERT said he was happy to hear the declaration last made by his colleague, (Mr. MILNOR.) He hoped the amendment first offered would be rejected with disdain. [The SPEAKER declared that such language was not proper in debate, the expression being too strong, and such as sometimes led to a personal altercation, always to be avoided.] Mr. S. thanked the Speaker for his caution; he meant no personality; but he thought it did not become this House to debate whether the persons in question were British subjects or not, when they had been put in irons for fighting the battles of the country. Let the proof rest on the aggressor on national law and the violator of the rules of war. He hoped the House would without hesitation reject the amendment. I may go too far, said he, by stating too much; but I will say thus much without risk of contradiction: that the boatswain of the Wasp, a warrant officer of the United States, had been twelve years within the United States and has a wife and children here. These, I hope, are sufficient characteristics to insure him our support: I will give him mine, and have no doubt the House will do the same.

Mr. RANDOLPH said that the proposed amendment brought strongly to view the impropriety of the House, on the rude suggestions of any member, committing itself hastily by a definite determination which to-morrow they might be disposed to retract. He believed this was one of those cases in which there was no necessity for haste. The House would be as competent to-morrow, to decide on the subject of the resolution and the proposed amendment, and in a manner to redound, at least, as much to the credit of the House and the national good, as now. With regard to his own opinions, if they were of any importance with his worthy colleague, he would at once say they were on this subject the opinions of that man, from whom he never did dissent but upon one question, without being wrong--that man who was emphatically called for eight years our Commander-in-chief--the founder of this nation--the author of the constitution--our first President--the man who was made for the office, and the office for him--the man who discharged all its duties so perfectly, as if it had been only to show those who come after him their incompetency. Mr. R. said he would ask his worthy colleague, what he supposed would have been the fate of a certain Benedict Arnold, had he been brought alive to the American camp, after his desertion from it? On that subject there can be but one opinion. On another question, if his opinion was of any value, he would state it. It was not a loose thought, taken upon the impulse of the moment; but the result of meditation and reflection. As long as foreigners, naturalized by our laws, remain on our soil, he was ready to throw over them the mantle of the constitution--he would protect them, as he would protect the native citizen, at the hazard of the last shilling of the public revenue, and the last drop of the blood of our people. But, when they go abroad on the high seas; when they come to this country to acquire a neutrality of character, now indeed no longer to be found here; when they come here only to neutralize goods in the Baltic, at Heligoland, in the Black Sea, the White Sea, and the Red Sea, and the passing to and fro on the highway of nations; if it please God, their old master George the Third, or Napoleon, or Alexander of Russia, should lay his hand on them, they were welcome, Mr. R. said, for him. He would not spend one shilling, one drop of American blood, to redeem such a man; much less would he have retaliation executed on subjects of the nation claiming him, with whom we should happen to come in collision, which might have to be expiated by the native blood of these States. I would not, said Mr. R., have the New England man or old Virginian executed by any despot, limited or unlimited in authority, in order to secure to us the worthless property in the man who is a Christian in Christendom and a Mussulman in Turkey. But, Mr. R. asked, did not this question assume a different shape, when this man was not going to and fro on the high seas in search of plunder, which he calls patriotism, but, when he is found in a public ship of war of the United States? On that subject--for it was a new question--he was not prepared to decide. It was not, Mr. R. said, and the House might rely on it, the sentiment of the people of these States--it might be of some comparatively small, and therefore only insignificant section of the community--that we should enter into a contestation with France and England for property in their subjects.

Mr. R. here drew a comparison between the practice of harboring slaves in some of our Northern cities, Philadelphia for instance, and the countenance given in this country to European emigrants. As to these foreigners, Mr. R. said he owed them nothing. He was sorry they had ever found refuge here--he wished he had driven them from our shores--or have permitted, as we have the merchants, to go out where they pleased, without attempting to protect them.

Mr. QUINCY rose, he said, simply to express his regret, that a debate in this form and manner should have arisen. The question which had been touched, was one which required all the information and light which could be shed on it. The principles connected with it were so numerous and critical, that it required all the reflection of which gentlemen were capable, to enable them to discuss and decide it in a proper manner. He rose also to express his regret that a motion for amendment should be made by a gentleman with whom he frequently coincided in opinion, which went to exclude information of the manner in which officers treated persons other than British subjects. He could not vote against receiving information of any kind--particularly on a subject so interesting. Mr. Q. was proceeding in his remarks, when--

Mr. SHEFFEY withdrew his motion.

Mr. BASSETT explained his ideas of expatriation. He would not protect the man who had left the country with an intention not to return, &c., but he would protect the man who went out to fight the battles of the country.

Mr. RANDOLPH rose for the purpose of moving an amendment. He adverted to the language of the resolution, and drew a distinction between the character of privateers and of our public armed vessels. Was it competent, he asked, to the Government to receive as testimony the statement of the commander or crew of an American corsair? It was well known, too, he remarked, that the high wages which had been paid to the crews of the privateers, was one of the reasons why the American Navy was in some degree unmanned. And, was it not a different question, whether we should interpose our authority between the subject of a foreign nation and his Government, when that subject is fighting your battles, bleeding on the deck of your public ship, at twelve dollars a month, and when he is decoyed into a corsair by the temptation of eighty, fifty, or forty dollars a month? There is a difference, sir, said Mr. R. I trust, said he, if we receive the information we are about to ask, we shall get it from a pure and authorized source, such as no man can question. I mean the commanders of our public ships of war. Mr. R. concluded by moving to strike out "American," and insert "public," so as to read "public armed ships."

Mr. WIDGERY expressed his surprise at the various expedients resorted to, to embarrass this question; and hoped this would have the same fate as the other. He said he could tell the gentleman that many privateers had been manned without a cent of wages. But, suppose they had been manned in other ways, were not privateers as useful in annoying the enemy as public ships? No man that knew any thing about maritime affairs would deny it. Whereever our privateers had come across an armed vessel of the enemy, of any thing like equal force, they had done their duty like American tars. We are at war, Mr. W. said, and ought to check the enemy wherever we come in contact with them. He believed the privateering carried on had been of great advantage to us and injury to our enemy. As to the objection which had been offered to receiving the statement of their commanders, what were gentlemen afraid of? No disparagement to the commanders of the navy, (for he respected them all,) he knew gentlemen commanding privateers whose opinions were entitled to as great respect as that of any other, and whose word could not be questioned. In relation to the cases referred to in the resolve, particularly that of the boatswain, Mr. W. said we were bound by every principle of the law of nations to support him to the last cent of our money, more especially as he had a warrant under the seal of the United States. The conduct of our enemy was the less justifiable, as she manned her own ships with people of all nations.

Mr. RANDOLPH'S proposed amendment was negatived by a large majority; and the resolution was agreed to without further debate or opposition.

FRIDAY, December 11.

_Macedonian and Frolic._

The following Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

_To the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States_:

I transmit to Congress copies of a letter to the Secretary of
the Navy, from Captain Decatur, of the frigate "United States,"
reporting his combat and capture of the British frigate
Macedonian. Too much praise cannot be bestowed on that officer
and his companions on board, for the consummate skill and
conspicuous valor by which this trophy has been added to the
naval arms of the United States.

I transmit, also, a letter from Captain Jones, who commanded
the sloop-of-war Wasp, reporting his capture of the British
sloop-of-war, the Frolic, after a close action, in which other
brilliant titles will be seen to the public admiration and
praise.

A nation feeling what it owes to itself and to its citizens
could never abandon to arbitrary violence on the ocean, a class
of them which gives such examples of capacity and courage, in
defending their rights on that element; examples which ought to
impress on the enemy, however brave and powerful, a preference
of justice and peace, to hostility against a country whose
prosperous career may be accelerated, but cannot be prevented,
by the assaults made on it.

JAMES MADISON.

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1812.

U. S. SHIP UNITED STATES, AT SEA.

October 30, 1812.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that, on the 25th instant,
being in the latitude 29° north, longitude 29° 30' west, we
fell in with, and, after an action of one hour and a half,
captured His Britannic Majesty's ship Macedonian, commanded by
Captain John Carden, and mounting forty-nine carriage guns,
(the odd gun shifting.) She is a frigate of the largest class,
two years old, four months out of the dock, and reputed one
of the best sailers in the British service. The enemy being to
windward, had the advantage of engaging us at his own distance;
which was so great that, for the first half hour, we did not
use our carronades, and at no moment was he within the complete
effect of our musketry or grape. To this circumstance, and a
heavy swell which was on at the time, I ascribe the unusual
length of the action.

The enthusiasm of every officer, seaman, and marine, on board
this ship, on discovering the enemy, their steady conduct
in battle, and the precision of their fire, could not be
surpassed. Where all have met my fullest expectations it
would be unjust in me to discriminate. Permit me, however,
to recommend to your particular notice my first lieutenant,
William H. Allen; he has served with me upwards of five years,
and to his unremitted exertions in disciplining the crew is to
be imputed the obvious superiority of our gunnery exhibited in
the result of this contest.

Subjoined is a list of the killed and wounded on both sides.
Our loss, compared with that of the enemy, will appear small.
Among our wounded you will observe the name of Lieutenant Funk,
who died a few hours after the action; he was an officer of
great gallantry and promise, and the service sustained a severe
loss in his death.

The Macedonian lost her mizzenmast, fore and main-topmasts, and
main-yard, and was much cut up in her hull.

The damage sustained by this ship was not such as to render her
return into port necessary; and had I not deemed it important
that we should see our prize in, should have continued our
cruise.

With the highest consideration and respect, I am, sir, your
obedient humble servant.

STEPHEN DECATUR.

Hon. PAUL HAMILTON.

_List of killed and wounded on board the United States._

Thomas Brown, New York, seaman; Henry Shepherd, Philadelphia,
seaman; William Murray, Boston, boy; Michael O'Donnel, New
York, private marine; John Roberts, private marine--_killed_.

John Mercer Funk, Philadelphia, lieutenant, (since dead;) John
Archibald, New York, carpenter's crew; Christian Clark, ditto,
seaman; George Christopher, ditto, ordinary seaman; George
Mahar, ditto ditto; William James, ditto ditto; John Lawton,
ditto, private marine--_wounded_.

On board the Macedonian there were thirty-six killed, and
sixty-eight wounded; among the former, were the boatswain, one
master's mate, and the schoolmaster; and of the latter were
the first and third lieutenants, one master's mate, and two
midshipmen.

NEW YORK, _November 24, 1812_.

SIR: I here avail myself of the first opportunity of informing
you of occurrences of our cruise, which terminated in the
capture of the Wasp, on the 18th of October, by the Poictiers,
of seventy-four guns, while a wreck from damages received
in the engagement with the British sloop-of-war Frolic, of
twenty-two guns, sixteen of them thirty-two-pound carronades,
four twelve-pounders on the main deck, and two twelve-pound
carronades on the top-gallant forecastle; making her superior
in force to us by four twelve-pounders. The Frolic had struck
to us, and was taken possession of two hours before our
surrendering to the Poictiers.

We had left the Delaware on the 13th; the 16th had a heavy
gale, in which we lost our jib-boom and two men; half-past
eleven on the night of the 17th, in latitude 37 degrees north,
and longitude 65 degrees west, we saw several sail, two of
them appearing very large; we stood for them for some time,
then shortened sail, and steered the remainder of the night
the course we had perceived them on. At daylight, on Sunday
the 18th, we saw them ahead; gave chase, and soon discovered
them to be a convoy of six sail, under the protection of a
sloop-of-war; four of them large ships, mounting from sixteen
to eighteen guns. At thirty-two minutes past eleven A. M., we
engaged the sloop-of-war, having first received her fire at
the distance of fifty or sixty yards, which space we gradually
lessened until we laid her on board, after a well-supported
fire of forty-three minutes; and although so near, while
loading our last broadside, that our rammers were shoved
against the side of the enemy, our men exhibited the same
alacrity which they had done during the whole of the action.
They immediately surrendered upon our gaining their forecastle,
so that no loss was sustained on their side after boarding.

Our maintop-mast was shot away between four and five minutes
from the commencement of the firing, and falling, together
with the maintopsail-yard, across the larboard fore and
fore-topsail braces, rendered our head-yards unmanageable the
remainder of the action. At eight minutes, the gaff and mizzen
topgallant-mast came down, and at twenty minutes from the
beginning of the action every brace and most of the rigging
was shot away. A few minutes after separating from the Frolic
both her masts fell upon deck; the main-mast going close by the
deck, and the foremast going twelve or fifteen feet above it.

The courage and exertions of the officers and crew fully
answered my expectations and wishes. Lieutenant Biddle's
active conduct contributed much to our success, by the exact
attention paid to every department during the engagement, and
the animating example he afforded the crew by his intrepidity.
Lieutenants Rogers, Booth, and Mr. Rapp, showed, by incessant
fire from their divisions, that they were not to be surpassed
in resolution or skill. Mr. Knight, and every other officer,
acted with a courage and promptitude highly honorable, and I
trust have given assurance that they may be relied on whenever
their services may be required.

I could not ascertain the exact loss of the enemy, as many
of the dead lay buried under the masts and spars that had
fallen on deck, which two hours' exertion had not sufficiently
removed. Mr. Biddle, who had charge of the Frolic, states that,
from what he saw, and from information from the officers,
the number killed must have been about thirty, and that of
the wounded about forty or fifty; of the killed, is her
first lieutenant and sailing-master; of the wounded, Captain
Winyates, and the second lieutenant.

We had five killed and five wounded, as per list: the wounded
are recovering. Lieutenant Claxton, who was confined by
sickness, left his bed a little previous to the engagement, and
though too weak to be at his division, remained on deck, and
showed, by his composed manner of noting its incidents, that we
had lost by his illness the services of a brave officer.

I am, respectfully, &c.

JACOB JONES.

Hon. PAUL HAMILTON.

The Message and documents having been read--

On motion of Mr. RANDOLPH, they were referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, with instructions to report a suitable expression of the Legislative approbation of the services detailed.

Mr. R. said he did not wish by this motion to limit the committee to reporting a resolution; or to preclude them from expressing approbation in a more substantial manner.

WEDNESDAY, December 16.

_Navy of the United States._

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill from the Senate, which had been previously twice read in the House.

Mr. SAWYER made a motion to add the word "teen" to "four," so as to make it fourteen 74 gun ships.

Mr. S. thought it a proper occasion to try the question whether we were to have a navy or not. He took the occasion to congratulate the House upon the repeated victories of our little navy over the enemy; and of the grateful prospect of a speedy termination to the despotism of the seas. National piracy is about to be exterminated, and all nations permitted to traverse their great highway in safety. The thing can be done; and if we say so, with the will of God, will be done. The experiment upon which the proof hangs has been made. British arms cannot withstand American upon the sea. The bully has been disgraced by an infant; and fear shall no longer restrain an abject world from vindicating its long violated rights. Give us but a respectable fleet, and it is all we ask. But what can we do with four seventy-fours? They are a mere mockery. If we do mean to make a serious stand upon the ocean, such a force must be out of all character. If we mean merely to annoy her trade, (and he trusted we meant more,) frigates will do; but, to make any serious impression that way, we must have a respectable fleet; at least, in his opinion, fourteen sail-of-the-line. That would give us a preponderance on our own coast, and enable us to bring in our prizes with safety. Who can bear the idea of our being obliged to burn or sink all the ships we may take away from the enemy, for fear of their being recaptured? He thought we should save enough by the protection they would afford to our prizes to support the expense of them. We can easily support such a force. The expense, distributed over our widely-extended population, would be less than a dollar a head; and, where is the American who would grudge such a sum for such an object? The people, I am confident, will cheerfully pay it, because we are now at war, and a navy is found the most efficient weapon in our hands against the enemy. He therefore trusted that if it was the disposition of the House to have a navy, they would establish such a one as would answer some purpose.

Mr. SEYBERT said he did not anticipate that the bill from the Senate would have been called for to-day by the Chairman of the Naval Committee; notwithstanding he had bestowed some attention on the subject, he confessed his remarks would be made in a manner not entirely satisfactory to himself; he would, however, proceed with them.

Mr. Chairman, said he, I wish it was as easy to build, equip, and man the seventy-fours, as it will be to add the word "teen" to "four," as is proposed by the gentleman from North Carolina. So far from adding to the number of these ships, contemplated by the bill, he had intended to move that no seventy-four gun ships should be, at this time, authorized by the Legislature.

On a former occasion, Mr. S. continued, when a naval establishment was the subject under consideration, he stated at length his reasons for opposing the propositions before the House. The opinions which he then advanced concerning an extensively permanent naval establishment for the United States were still believed to be well grounded. He did not hesitate to declare his intention, at this time, and under the pressure of present circumstances, to yield much to general feelings, and the sentiments of the nation; nevertheless, he should guard against being carried too far by the current of popular opinion. It is equally my duty, said he, to keep in view what is conceived to be the permanent and vital national interest. He declared a uniform opposition to that establishment, which could not be brought within the means and resources of the nation to maintain it. We have made war, said he, to guarantee the honor and independence of the nation, as well as for the support of the just rights of our citizens; with these objects in view, he had consented to authorize a regular force of 25,000 men, and advocated one more numerous, though in principle he was opposed to standing armies. If, then, a great portion of my fellow-citizens deem an increase of the Naval Establishment essential to promote the great work, why should it be refused on my part? No opposition would be made by him to the principle or spirit of the bill before the House, though, he confessed, he did not approve the provisions as to the kind of force therein contemplated.

Mr. S. continued.--At this time our principal object should be, to authorize that species of force which can be furnished in the shortest period, and which promises to be the most efficient in the present contest. If the views of the Government were not now confined to the present war, he considered it inexpedient to build public ships. It was necessary that the revenue should be cautiously applied. If it be employed so as to carry on the war with vigor, he would not shrink from any appropriation which could tend to produce that effect; by protracting the contest for the want of means, expense will be accumulated, and we should achieve nothing.

Mr. S. would not assent to an increase of the navy, with a view to reconcile other measures to the opposition--to him that vote promised no such result. Our political opponents, continued he, will tell us, as regards the navy, you are doing right to add to it; thus far we will go with you; we always maintained this to be the proper course; as to your golden dreams in Canada, we will abandon them to yourselves exclusively. Such were his present impressions; it would gratify him to find himself to have been mistaken. He declared his intention to oppose the building of 74's, or double-decked ships, and to advocate a greater number of the largest class frigates. If, however, his statements should not prove satisfactory to the House, he declared the failure would not induce him ultimately to vote against that species of force which a majority might deem expedient.

If, said Mr. S., the great reason for now laying the keels of the double-decked ships, be (as was lately acknowledged elsewhere by high authority) to test the intentions of the legislature as to a permanent naval establishment, he, for one, declared, he would not thus be tested, nor could he be thereby induced to vote in favor of the proposition; he would always be governed by circumstances.

The declaration of the committee, that it was proper to meet "like with like," or, in other words, because the British have seventy-four gun ships, the United States should have them of the same class, would have no effect on him. We might as well say, because there are ships in the British service, which carry one hundred and twenty guns, we should also have such. This reasoning is fallacious. No one has attempted to advocate the latter proposition. Admitting that you had four seventy-four gun ships on your navy list, he maintained, they would answer no good purpose. In the course of the following year, their number will be more than doubled and trebled on the part of the enemy. The consequence would be, that your most expensive ships must either combat under very unpromising circumstances, or they would be blockaded in your harbors, and then be worse than useless; they must be kept at a heavy expense, and their crews would deprive other ships of the men necessary for their equipment. He said, the opinions which he had just advanced were not the result of idle speculations at the fireside; they were supported by intelligent commanders, and rested upon the firm base of experience; they were confirmed by the conversations of some whose splendid achievements adorned the pages of our Revolutionary history, and by others, who rank as heroes of the present war. He asked, why need we resort to other authority, when that of the head of the Naval Department can be brought to bear testimony in favor of the propositions laid down? In the year 1798, the Secretary of the Navy informed the House that twelve seventy-fours, as many frigates, and twenty or thirty smaller vessels, "would probably be found sufficient to insure our future peace with the nations of Europe." In 1811, it was declared that, "twelve sail of seventy-fours and twenty well-constructed frigates, with our smaller vessels," were necessary to annoy the commerce of the enemy, and guard our coasts. To this he added that, in the year 1811, during a state of peace with the United States, the British had seven ships-of-the-line on the American stations, independent of fifties, frigates, and smaller vessels; at the same time, they had thirty-nine ships-of-the-line on the stocks! Tell me, said he, what is to keep a great proportion of them from your coast in 1813?

Mr. MCKEE said, he had not expected this subject would have been taken up to-day, or to say any thing on it when it should be taken up. But, said he, for what purpose, I feel impelled to ask, are you going to build these vessels? Are you to spend four or five millions of dollars, in addition to your present extraordinary expenditures, to protect commerce? Will this old argument, in favor of a navy, now be used, which we have so often heard heretofore? Sir, where is your commerce now to protect? Will you protect that clandestinely destined to Great Britain? No, surely. Will you protect that destined to the coast of France? Let us reflect what commerce you can carry on with France. None worth protection, or of any moment to the great body of the American people. Does France purchase your tobacco or cotton, which heretofore have found a market there? She has never been a purchaser of provisions or breadstuffs. What is the state of trade between us and France? Your cotton, in France, is taxed with enormous duties. No man who is not under the influence of the moon would, at this time, think of making a shipment there. Would you ship your commerce there merely to surrender so much property into the grasp of the Emperor? It would be the extreme of folly. Where, then, will you protect your commerce? To the Baltic, sir? You can carry on in that quarter no commerce at all interesting to the great body of the American people. In what does your export to that region consist? In articles of colonial produce; not in articles the produce of your soil. Will you tax the great agricultural community for the purpose of protecting this extraneous commerce? I ask if the people of the West, of the Atlantic, of the Middle States, or any other portion of the American people, will be content to be taxed to support a navy for the protection of a commerce in foreign produce, by which but few individuals in the nation can be benefited? There is no commerce to protect, unless it be that which exchanges specie for the production of the East Indies, and benefits no part of the community. Having no valuable commerce now to protect, the object of adding vessels to your navy, must be to fight your battles at sea.

If you would propose a navy as a means of carrying on war, bend your resources to that object. We have been told that the trident of Neptune is passing into our hands. But, sir, the sovereignty of the ocean is not to be acquired by four ships-of-the-line and five or six frigates. You can have no legitimate object in building such vessels as proposed, unless it be to carry on the war. If that be your object, make your means commensurate to the end you have in view.

Do you yet contend that the object is to protect commerce? Your commerce is not worth the cost. And who would pay it? The merchants? No, sir. They will pay only their proportion. I recollect, when a boy, to have seen a little book, in which I admired the pictures more than the reading, in which were the representations of a king, a priest, a soldier, and a farmer; a label issuing from the mouth of each contained these words: The king says, "I govern all;" the priest, "I pray for all;" the soldier, "I fight for all;" and the farmer, "I pay for all." This, sir, is perfectly true as regards the American farmers--they pay for all. And what advantage do they derive from it? What advantage are my constituents to derive from the expenditure of this money?

THURSDAY, December 17.

_Increase of the Navy._

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to increase the Navy of the United States.

Mr. SEYBERT moved to amend the first section of the bill by striking out "four seventy-fours and," so as to erase the provision for building vessels of that description.

Mr. GOLD.--The provision in the bill to introduce ships-of-the-line into the Navy, I consider, Mr. Chairman, as fixing the great policy of a navy under this Government. Frigates we have had, but in common with petty nations; for the Barbary Powers have frigates; the provision now offered rises higher and promises something worthy of the constitution, something honorable to the Government. I rejoice, Mr. Chairman, at the favorable circumstances, and hail the auspices under which we now meet this question; we are no longer left to erring speculations, to uncertain reasoning, but have under our eyes the sure and infallible test of experience, of practice in war with a naval force. Within a few weeks our tars have thrice grappled with the enemy, and thrice have they triumphed in combat; the success has swelled the American bosom with joy from Orleans to Maine--all without exception of party, vie in demonstrations of joy and in the bestowment of honors upon the victors.

While such a scene is presented here, gloom and dissatisfaction prevail in the metropolis of Great Britain--those who have been so long accustomed to conquer, receive the capture of the Guerriere with as much astonishment as they would behold a suspension of the laws of nature. A strange event to Britons!

How often, sir, has it been echoed and re-echoed within these walls, that it would be in vain to attempt any thing with a navy against Great Britain, unless we could bring ship to ship and man to man--could equal our enemy on the ocean. How much mistaken have gentlemen been; how vain is human reason! The earliest stage of the first war under the Government has yielded a clear, full, and incontestable refutation of the argument. While the American arms have suffered disgrace upon disgrace on what was deemed the natural and proper theatre for the display of our power; while by land all is gloomy and comfortless, and the heart sickens under the past, our little Navy, a handful of men, has nobly sustained us upon the ocean, and banished that despondency which our disasters by land must have otherwise produced.

If, sir, under such auspices, such overwhelming evidence of the efficiency of a navy, this question is to be put by, I shall despair of a navy; we may rank with Algiers in a force of frigates, but shall do nothing worthy of a community of eight millions of souls, placed by Heaven in a situation most favorable to commerce and naval power.

The objections, sir, to a navy are not a little amusing. Do you move the question in peace, it is objected, that commerce flourishes and you want not protection; at another time it is said not to be worth the expense of a navy, and lastly a navy will draw America into the European vortex and involve us in a war. Now that we are in war, a new book of logic is opened, and it is objected, that you have not time to build a navy, the war will be over before ships can be finished. It is thus, sir, that the arguments against a navy are made to answer and refute themselves; nay, more, the argument in war is a satire and reproach to the objection in peace. "There is not now time to build a navy," reproaches us for not having passed the requisite laws at the last session.

I have always considered the great policy of a navy settled by the constitution; need I spend time to show, that no great specific power was delegated to the General Government unless it was deemed necessary; not necessary for a dormitory, but to be executed for the general protection and welfare. This was the polar star--the test and criterion that governed in the delegation of powers by the States--powers not necessary to be exercised for the general good were retained by the several States. What greatly strengthens the argument is, the power to provide a navy is not only given to the General Government, but taken away or denied to the several States. In adopting the constitution, this question was considered at rest, and a navy was deemed the necessary consequence of this power; in the Virginia Convention, where great talent and ingenuity was displayed in the debate, the point was so considered, and the objection rested on that ground; the consequence of adoption was supposed to be an unequal strengthening of the commercial parts of the Union. So deeply impressed was President WASHINGTON with the importance of a navy, and so true to his duty and just claims of commerce for protection, that he could not consent to quit his high station in the public councils without placing on record his sentiments for the good of his country--this he did in his speech to the fourth Congress (second session) in language that well attests his wisdom and paternal care and solicitude for his country. He recommended and urged the policy of a navy in the strongest terms, and I will not believe that the parting lesson of that great and good man will be lost to his country--there is certainly too much respect for his memory to disregard his solemn advice and counsel on any subject. In this policy Mr. JEFFERSON also concurred at a period most auspicious to fair inquiry and dispassionate judgment; it was before the tempest of party arose, to obscure the great luminary of truth and blacken the political horizon.

Mr. WIDGERY.--Mr. Chairman, it will be recollected that I was last session of Congress opposed to the building of seventy-fours, until we had got more frigates. I have been rather opposed to them in the Committee of Naval Affairs, not because I was opposed to an augmentation of the Navy, but because I thought it more to the advantage of the country to build frigates and sloops of war at present; and if, hereafter, when we have sailors plenty to man the large ships with, it should be thought best to have larger ships, it may be very well to build them; but, at present, our resources are inadequate to build the seventy-fours and the ten frigates, and say eight or ten sloops of war, which are absolutely necessary for the protection of our seacoast, in order to keep off the British gun-brigs or privateers. The ships-of-the-line will not answer this purpose, when they are at sea; they must keep deep water; they cannot, with safety, follow in under the land those small vessels which annoy our coasters, and capture them all along shore. Within a few days, I have accounts of a small privateer, of eight guns, having captured twenty or thirty sail of coasting vessels. Sir, it is a sight to see a public armed ship of the United States anywhere on our shore to the eastward of Boston--a seacoast of 200 miles--when the enemy can take every thing that passes out to sea, and a country in which there are the best of ship-harbors, where they might cruise with safety, always having a harbor handy to run into. I cannot feel willing to build seventy-fours, to the exclusion of the smaller ships, of which we are so much in want at this time. If you had the money in your chest, and all ready for the building four seventy-fours, and all the timber in the yard--which you have not--still I should have doubts on my mind as to the propriety of those heavy ships. Say, if you please, that you had those ships built, could you send them to sea? I presume not, if at war with England, because she would always blockade your harbors wherever they were; and if you sent them out, perhaps you would never have to man them again; not because our ships in single combat are not a match for hers, but, because they have more ships than they know what to do with; they would always outnumber you at sea, and they would be able to come up with and capture your four ships. But, for what purpose are you to send them out? Certainly, not to take merchantmen. They are not calculated for that purpose, unless you had more than four of them. In case you had a number sufficient to intercept their East India fleet, which, generally, are under strong convoys of heavy ships, then it might be an object to send them to sea. If you are to keep them in port, for the purpose of harbor defence, you must always keep them manned; it will be too late to man them after the enemy comes in sight. And there is, in my mind, another difficulty: In the manning these heavy ships, you will have to impress men to go on board of them, or raise the wages up to what is given in a merchant ship; because the sailors will not be willing to go on board large ships, when they have no chance for prize money. On the other hand, they will be very willing to enter on board cruising ships, such as frigates or sloops of war, in hopes of taking prizes; and you have not, at present, a sufficient number of sailors to man what smaller vessels we want. If you build frigates and sloops of war, they can be furnished without your advancing the money; the merchants will build them, and loan them to the Government. The frigates and smaller vessels can be put afloat in six months from the time they are agreed for; and your ships-of-the-line will not be finished in less than two years; and if they do not cost 30 per cent. more than they are calculated at, I will dare pay all I am worth towards them for nothing. I am willing to go for almost any number of frigates, because I know you can have them built without advancing a dollar until they are ready for service, and because I am convinced they are most for our interest. Popular opinion, I know, has great weight at times; let us not be carried off on the wings of enthusiasm; we are at present at very great expense, and we ought to act prudently with our finances, or they will soon become low. At the same time, I cannot agree with the gentleman from Kentucky, who says he is opposed to any augmentation of the Navy, and asks if you are willing to tax the planters for the building a Navy, and the protection of the merchant? Sir, will not the same reasoning apply against the maritime towns being taxed to support the army of 10,000 men in the West? Gentlemen say, stay on shore, and you will be safe. Sir, may we not, in return, say to the gentlemen who are settling the cheap lands of the interior, keep among us; go not into the Indian country; we cannot be taxed to defend you. This reasoning will apply with as much force against the interior as theirs does against the Atlantic towns. Sir, we are all one people, and, in order to remain so, we must be willing to defend at all points.