Chapter XVII: Front Matter (17)

Sir, if the Spanish nation has any feeling for its sovereignty, it would spurn your request. Only suppose that nation to possess the same feelings which actuate every breast in this House; which actuate the American people. Suppose the claim of Mr. Burr to citizenship in Britain, on the ground of once a subject always a subject, had been recognized by the British Government. Suppose that he was suffering in chains in some of your prisons, and because they had heard that Mr. Burr might have been innocent, the British Government had asked his release, would not the people of America have spurned the request as an indignity to the nation? And may we not suppose that these proud Spaniards, as they are called, may have feelings of a like nature? I believe, sir, that the course proposed would only add rigor to their sufferings, weight to their chains.

Mr. LIVERMORE asked if the committee which made this report had not before it evidence that certain British subjects concerned in Miranda's expedition had been liberated on the application of some officers of that nation? If they had it would be a fair answer to the eloquent speech of the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RANDOLPH said he did not think that the information asked for by the gentleman was at all material to this case. It was a matter of no consequence at all, as respected the statement made by the gentleman from South Carolina on (he had no doubt) very good grounds. What, said Mr. R., has been the situation of Great Britain in relation to Spain? Great Britain, at the time the expedition was undertaken, was an enemy of Spain--was at actual war with Spain--and therefore in a subject of Great Britain it might have been highly meritorious to annoy Spain, either at home or in her colonies to the utmost extent in his power, without any direct authority from his Government. Subsequently to that time, however, Great Britain has become the ally of Spain in consequence of the revolution; and at that time Great Britain obtained from persons exercising the authority of government in Spain the release of these prisoners, which it is perfectly natural Spain should then have granted. But suppose, instead of that change having taken place in the relations between Great Britain and Spain, Bonaparte had quietly succeeded in putting King Joseph on the throne of Spain and the Indies, and applications had then been made; or suppose that the application had been deferred until now, and the power of the House of Bonaparte was as complete over the colonies in South America as we have every reason to believe it is over the European possessions of the mother country, would the British subjects in that case have been released? It is an unfortunate circumstance that no question can be agitated in this House and tried upon its own merits; that every thing which is, has been, or may be, is to be lugged in on the question before us, to the total exclusion of the merits of the case, and in this way, instead of a session of three and six months for doing the business of the nation, if every question is to be tried in the manner in which it appears to me this has been, we may sit to all eternity and never get through it.

I lay no claim to greater precision than other men; but really I cannot perceive what kind of relation, what kind of connection exists between most of what I have heard on this subject, and the true merits of the case. Gentlemen get up and abuse the Spanish Government and people, and what then? Why, it appears all this is preliminary to our making an humble request of this Government and people that they shall grant us a particular boon. To be sure, sir, all this time we do plaster ourselves unmercifully--we lay it on with a trowel--and gentlemen seem to think that if we sufficiently plaster ourselves, our President, and people, and be-devil every other Government and people, it is sufficient to illuminate every question. And this is the style in which we speak to Governments perfectly independent of us!--A very wise mean, to be sure, of inducing them to grant the pardon of these people as a favor to us. Sir, it would be a strange spectacle, to be sure, when this Minister that is to be, this sort of anomalous messenger whom you are going to send, I know not exactly to whom; whether to the Junta, or persons exercising the power of government in the provinces, or to the Government in Europe; when this Minister goes to Carthagena or elsewhere, if he should carry to the Viceroy along with his credentials a file of papers containing the debates on this question. Why, sir, like Sir Francis Wronghead, we appear all to have turned round. My honorable friend, the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. TAYLOR,) spoke of the crimes of these men. Gentlemen on the other side, who wish them to be pardoned, tell you of nothing but of their innocence, and the injustice of those who condemn them and now have them under punishment. Two more such advocates as have appeared in favor of this proposition would damn the best cause ever brought before any House or any court in Christendom. The gentleman from New York, (Mr. EMOTT,) who spoke yesterday, certainly very pertinently, and very handsomely, tells the House that in this case no other money than that of the United States, will be received; that with a sort of Castilian fastidiousness, those persons acting for the Government of Spain will not touch any money which shall not be offered in the quality of public money. I believe no such thing; and moreover, I wish it to be distinctly understood that the question of money is not the question with me; and that to suppose it necessary for the Government of the United States to interfere for the purpose of raising so pitiful a sum as $3,500 for the relief of these unfortunate men, whose situation I most seriously deplore, is a libel upon the charity of this country. I believe, notwithstanding the public impression on this subject against the petitioners, that the money could be raised in half an hour in any town in the United States. I believe it might be raised in that time in the city of Washington. It is not a question of the amount of money wanted; it is, whether the Government of the United States shall lend its countenance to persons situated as these unfortunate people are? Sir, had we at that time been at war with Spain, as Great Britain, something might be said in favor of these persons. But we were not at war with Spain, and these men knew it; and I believe they knew at least as well as I know, that when a man is recruited for _public service_, as they say they thought to be their case, he is immediately taken before a justice of the peace and sworn. This part of the ceremony, however, is not stated to have taken place. To be sure, sir, the gentleman from New York (Mr. EMOTT) said, I believe, every thing that could be said in favor of those unfortunate people, and really almost convinced me that we ought to make this interference; but unfortunately for him and for his cause, other advocates rose up in its favor and placed the subject in a situation not only as respects the majority of this House, but as respects that Government with whom intercession is to be made, which will completely foreclose any attempt at relieving the sufferers. It is not possible that the majority of this House, or that the Spanish Government, can be affected in any other manner than with disgust and indignation at such stuff. The gentleman from New York told us that these were ardent young men, who were anxious to go to Caraccas for the purpose, I think, of correcting the despotism which existed in that country; or otherwise, political Quixotes. This, I take it, will operate little in their favor with the Spanish Government, however it may in ours. I confess I feel very little sympathy for those who, overlooking their own country, and the abuses in their own Government, go in search of political adversaries abroad--go a tilting against political despotisms for the relief, I suppose, of distressed damsels compelled to live under them.

The question was now taken, and the votes being affirmative 62, negative 61, the SPEAKER voted in the negative--the votes then being equal, the question was lost.

MONDAY, June 19.

_The Batture at New Orleans._

The House proceeded to consider the resolution submitted by Mr. MACON, on the sixteenth instant, in the words following, to wit:

"_Resolved_, That so much of the message of the President of
the United States of the seventh of March, one thousand eight
hundred and eight, as relates to the batture in the suburbs
of St. Mary's, adjoining New Orleans, and the documents
accompanying it, together with the petitions of Edward
Livingston, and the petitions of the citizens of New Orleans
on the same subject, and the documents which accompanied the
same, be referred to the Attorney-General of the United States,
and that he be instructed to receive and collect such other
testimony as may be necessary to ascertain the title of the
United States to the before-mentioned batture, and that he
be directed to report to this House, at the next session of
Congress, his opinion as to the validity of the claim of the
United States to the said batture."

Mr. BURWELL thought that this was not the proper course to pursue; but that the course recommended at the last session was the one, viz: to give the petitioners the right of appeal from the decision of the Orleans court to the Supreme Court, or to give the United States the same right, should the decision be against them. He could see no advantage in the procrastination now proposed, nor any injury to the United States or the city of New Orleans, in the course which he advocated. He doubted, although the letter of the law of 1807 might cover this case, whether it was ever intended that that law should operate as this had done. My intention, said he, in voting for it, was that it should apply exclusively to the Western lands, commonly called the Yazoo lands, and such other lands as were occupied by hundreds who might be formidable from their numbers. To undertake jurisdiction on questions of property is taking upon ourselves the functions of another department of the Judiciary. The case involves important points of law--and let me ask, whether the gentlemen in this House are so well read in law as to be able to decide such an important point as this? It does appear to me that on all the questions of private property arising in the United States, where the question of right is not to be brought before this House, we ought to consult the convenience of the parties by promoting dispatch. On the question whether this property belong to the United States or to the petitioners I am completely ignorant. Nor would I have it inferred that I believe the petitioner to have a right to the property; I take it that the claim of the United States must be good, or the inhabitants of Orleans would not be so zealous in the support of it.

Mr. POYDRAS asked for the reading of a letter which he had received from the Governor of Orleans Territory, which was accordingly read. The letter states, that if it were possible that the committee to whom Mr. Livingston's claim was referred could now visit New Orleans, they would be convinced that the batture, now covered with water, was in fact the bed of the river, and, therefore, could not be private property. Mr. P. stated the history of this piece of alluvion at some length, and the circumstances under which it had always been deemed public property.

Mr. SHEFFEY said that before passing this resolution, gentlemen ought to ascertain what the Attorney-General could do in this case. He could not compel the attendance of witnesses, or collect testimony of circumstances which occurred a hundred years ago; and unless he could do this, it was impossible he could examine the title, for testimony as to facts was essential to enable him to form a correct opinion. What influence could the opinion of the Attorney-General have? Was the right of the citizen to fall prostrate before such an _ex parte_ opinion or statement as that might be? If it was not to have influence, why thus evade a decision on the prayer of the petitioner? If it was to have any influence, it must be a pernicious one, because founded on _ex parte_ testimony. Would the House go into the merits of the case on this opinion, when obtained without affording an opportunity to the party interested to prove that the law was not correctly expounded nor the facts correctly stated? Surely not. If they did not, if they heard opinions on both sides, they converted this House into a judiciary tribunal. Was this body calculated for that branch of Government? No; this, Mr. S. said, is a Government of departments, each of which ought to be kept separate. What, sir! is this a question of right between the United States and an individual, and we are about to take it into our own hands, to wrest it from the constitutional authority, and decide it ourselves? I hope we shall not; and, therefore, I am against this proposition. What does the Attorney-General state in his report? Aware of the impropriety of his deciding, he tells you--what? That the usual course, where the rights of the United States have been involved, has been to appoint commissioners to hear and decide. Here the Attorney-General tells you it is not proper for him to decide. And I should never wish to see the case in which the Attorney-General's opinion is to give authority for dispossessing an individual of his property; for if it can be done in one case it may be in every case. Any individual may be driven from his property by military force, and then his title be decided by an ill-shapen, one-sided statement and opinion of the Attorney-General. Against such a decision I do protest. Is it because you have power on your side, sir, that you will not submit to a judicial decision of this question? If there be a controversy about a right, there ought to be a judicial decision.

I, sir, have been unable to see how an individual having property, in which he was put in possession in 1804 or '5 by a judicial decision, could be disposed of it by the act of 1807, the operation of which was limited to acts done hereafter, that is, after the passing of that act in 1807. That law too speaks of "lands ceded to the United States." Was the batture ceded to the United States? I say not, because it was private property before the United States possessed the sovereignty of the country. By the treaty of 1803 with the Government of the United States, the rights and property of the inhabitants of Louisiana was secured to them. What then is the inference from this state of the case? That the United States got possession illegally, in defiance of judicial authority. I am sorry to see that the judicial authority has been set at defiance, and the Presidential mandate carried into effect at the point of the bayonet, right or wrong. This was the case. Those who were put in possession were ousted by military force. Let me not be understood as throwing odium on the Executive; far from it. I believe the Executive acted conscientiously, but upon an _ex parte_ statement. The President was never told that the case had been judicially investigated. Those facts were taken for granted, on the other hand, which did not exist, and those which formed the foundation of the true merits of the case, were withheld.

Mr. POYDRAS spoke at some length in reply to Mr. SHEFFEY, and in defence of the title of the United States. The batture had many years ago been considered as public property, and no one who examined the circumstances of the case could for a moment doubt it. He said that it had never been claimed as private property until after it came into the possession of the United States. He hoped the rights of the public and of the people of New Orleans would not be trampled upon to grant the petitioner his prayer.

Mr. MACON said that he was himself in favor of giving the right of the United States to the property to the people or corporation of New Orleans, and letting them and the individual contest it. There was nothing new, however, in the reference of a subject to the Head of a Department, whose opinion would have no more weight than reason, and so far only ought it to have weight. Mr. M. said he had no more desire to interfere with the judiciary than either of the gentlemen who had spoken. If provision was made for trying this case, must it not be extended to all others? In order to do justice, it must be done to all. Had not a special court been refused in relation to a property of much greater value than this? Before Congress made a special court for a certain case, they ought to look at the consequences. It was departing from the general system of the nation to appoint a court for a special case. Perhaps there was something in this case which differed from other cases: but he doubted whether it would warrant the appointment of a special court. Mr. M. said he saw no other way of treating this subject but by letting it go before the courts already organized. If the right was in the petitioner, be the consequences what it might, the city of New Orleans had no right to take it away from him.

Mr. TROUP observed that this case was probably one which would fall under the old maxim, _nullum tempus occurrit regi_ or _reipublicæ_. It appeared to him that there was a constitutional difficulty in this case, which did not appear to have suggested itself to the mind of any gentleman. First, has the United States a claim, either real or disputed, to this territory? Whether disputed or otherwise, provided the claim be asserted on its part, the question is, has the Congress of the United States a power to decide the validity of that claim? And if it has, is it proper so to decide it? What is the subject-matter in dispute? Public property; and what species? Landed. Then the question results, has Congress a right, in order to determine its title, to refer it to any tribunal whatever? I contend not; the right to public property was originally in the people of this country; they could never be divested of their great public right to the landed property of the nation, but by their express consent. They did give that right to the Congress of the United States, in declaring that it should have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations concerning public territory. Would it have had that power, if this right had not been expressly delegated? I know that, under the old Articles of Confederation, Congress did undertake to legislate as to property; but it was always questionable whether they had a right to do so--and this was not the only point on which Congress did exercise powers which were brought into question. The right to determine claims to public property is not only guarantied exclusively to Congress by the constitution, but the practice has been invariably pursuant to it; it was so in 1807. The Government not only asserted its right in the first instance, but asserted its power to enforce the right at the point of the bayonet. If the public have always been in possession of a certain property, the man who enters on it without their consent is a trespasser on that property. Upon this view of the subject, there is a constitutional difficulty on which the House should decide, before it entertains a motion for delegating a power to decide this question to any tribunal or commission whatever.

Mr. BOYD said, admitting all the gentleman had said to be true, his observations did not apply to this case. He had spoken of the right to public property. The question now was, whether this was public property or not; if it were certainly public property, on which ground the gentleman rested his argument, there could be no question on the subject. It was asked only before they decided between the individual and the United States on the right to land, not confessedly public property, but claimed as such, that fair investigation should be had. Mr. B. disclaimed the power of deciding judicially upon the subject; it was a right which he had never thought of this House claiming. A delay of justice was a denial of it. The individual petitioning had been in possession of the property; it had been taken from him by force, and he now asked a trial of his title before a competent court--and this opportunity, Mr. B. said, he ought to have as speedily as possible.

Mr. RANDOLPH said he should vote against that report. He said it was no part of his intention to deliver any opinion on the merits of the claim, although he had devoted not a little of his time to the study of that question, for two reasons: first, that it would be a prejudicated opinion, inasmuch as that was not the question which the House were called upon to decide, even if it were competent to decide it. I am extremely sorry, said he that the law of 1807 has been brought into view of this House by my friends from North Carolina and Georgia, and for this reason: that that law has no bearing at all on the present question. Its object was wholly different from that to which it has been misapplied. What, sir, was the object of that law? To defend against a conspiracy, I may properly term it--against the lawless violence of confederated associations, a vast property. How has it been applied? Not to a great public property, but to a speck of land, to which, as I understand it, a single individual, or at most three or four, put in a claim. Such an application as that of the law in question was never intended by the Legislature; and, if applied to such a property as the batture, and to the case of a single individual, may be applied to the property of every man in society. What is the doctrine of my friend from Georgia? That the public are always supposed to be in possession of the national domain. True, sir, and it is also true that those who enter upon it and endeavor to appropriate it to themselves, are trespassers, and as such, may be resisted by force. But that is not the case in the present question--very far from it--for the public never had been in possession of the property in question.

Without attempting to enter into the merits of the real title to the land in question, let us take it on the ground of the right of the citizen. A citizen comes before this House, and complains that he is dispossessed of his common right by arbitrary power. If, after a cause has been heard by a court, and a citizen put in possession of a property, by a decree of that court, he is dispossessed of it by military violence, where, if not before this House, is he to prefer his claim for redress? There is no court before which he can go, because the court which is the last resort in this case has already unavailingly given its decision. There is no court of appeal, no superior tribunal, and if there were, and a decree of the Supreme Court obtained in his favor on the appeal, what is any decree to avail against armed men--against muskets and bayonets? But this is not the only reason why I am sorry that the act of 1807 has been brought in to apply to this case. It is because, if this House can be once prevailed upon to consider this case as analogous to the Yazoo case, many most injurious consequences must follow therefrom. The first is, that that odious and supremely infamous claim will be put upon a ground which it is by no means entitled to occupy; and I entreat my friend from Georgia, and those whose minds are unalterably made up on the Yazoo question, not to give their enemies such a prize as they must have on us, if we agree to confound the Yazoo claim with that before the House. There is no sort of analogy between them. On the other hand, sir, supposing the right to be in the United States, I beg gentlemen not to create so forcible an interest against the rights of the United States as will infallibly be embodied against it if we confound the two. I have no idea of giving the Yazoo men such a handle. Again, let us suppose, if we can suppose it, that the right is in the petitioner; may it not, supposing a great majority of the House to be against the Yazoo claim--we do not know how they are disposed--may it not create an unjust bias against the petitioner? So that in whatever aspect we view it, it is not only impolitic, but, what is worse, extremely unjust to attempt to identify the two cases. And, sir, it is a matter of curious speculation, that while the act of 1807 has been brought into operation in the case of a solitary individual and a little speck of property to which it was not intended to apply, even supposing the case in question to to have arisen subsequently to the passage of that act; that, although it has been misapplied in this case, it has not been applied to the case to which it was intended to apply, and for which it was enacted; for, if I understood my friend from Georgia a few days ago, some hundreds or thousands of intruders have set themselves down on the public lands, and the public force has never been employed against them. On the contrary, the artillery of Government has been brought into play against a single individual. It was, indeed, said that these intruders had agreed to remain as tenants at will; but, let them remain till they are sufficiently strong, and they will give you another chapter in the history of Wyoming; for, after they are sufficiently strong to hold territory, although the arm of Government has been applied successfully to oust a single individual put in possession by a decree of a court, you will find it nerveless to expel these men.

With regard to the doctrine _nullum tempus occurrit reipublicæ_, it is a dangerous doctrine, if carried to the extent to which I apprehend my friend from Georgia would carry it. I venture to say that the abuse of that doctrine in the celebrated case of Sir John Lowther and the Duke of Portland, which created one general sentiment of indignation in the British nation--an attempt under that maxim to deprive a subject, hostile to the Court, of property of which he had been long in possession, for the purpose of transferring it to a minion of the Court--that case, with all its aggravated enormities, does not come up to the case before the House; and I speak without reference to the question whether the petitioner has a right or not to the property in this case. The question of right is not before the House, and that question, decide which way you will, can have no sort of weight in the vote which the House ought to give. The question is this: Having been long in possession of a piece of land, the title deeds destroyed, records burnt, and possession the only title you have to show, an attempt is made to dispossess you of the property; a decree of court confirms your right; if the individual, under these circumstances, can be turned out of possession by main force and strength, and that, too, military force, there is an end in the right to property of every man in the country. Sir, I have been astonished, and grieved and mortified, to see so little sensation created in this nation by the procedure in question. It strikes at the root of every thing dear to freemen. There is an end of their rights.

What, then, is this case? An individual comes before us, and says, that after having been put in possession of a piece of land, (I speak not of the validity of his title; it is not concerned in this question,) he was dispossessed by military force of this property. These two facts I do not understand any member of this House to deny. And what does he claim? He claims of you, as the guardians of the rights of every man in society, _justice_. And where do you send him? To the Attorney-General. I will suppose that in the Lowther and Portland case, the Duke of Portland had been referred to the Attorney-General. Would the English nation have endured it? No, sir. Much less would they have endured, military as the nation is becoming by the introduction of large standing armies, that he should have been dispossessed of his property by an armed military force, at the fiat of the Crown. The question is, what should be done? Sir, what should not be done is perfectly clear. It ought not to be done that the petitioner should be sent to the Attorney-General, who has already given an opinion on his claim, though that is very immaterial, which opinion it seems we cannot find. If I understand any thing of this Government, however, it ought to be on record, and this return of _non est inventus_ ought not to have been received. All that we have to do, it appears to me, is to make a provision, in the nature of a declaratory law, not amending the act of 1807, but, declaring what the law is; and we ought to quiet the rights, and the mind too, of every man in society, by declaring that, by the act of 1807, it was not intended to authorize the President of the United States to interpose the bayonet between the courts of justice and the individual. This power never has been given, never was intended to be given.

Mr. GOLD said that this was one of the most important subjects that had ever been brought before the House. He did not mean to enter into the merits of the case. The gentleman from Virginia had very clearly expressed all those sentiments which every man must feel on hearing the history of this case; and as regarded the ground taken, of _nullum tempus occurrit_, the gentleman had repelled it very properly--and indeed in that country whence the maxim had been derived, whenever it was attempted to be put in force against ancient possessions, it had been executed with great difficulty. It is in the very teeth of _Magna Charta_, which says that a freeman shall not be dispossessed of his freehold without a better right is ascertained. There are a variety of forms by which the right is guarded. If I, said Mr. G., understood the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. TROUP,) he considers it a sacrifice of the rights of the United States to permit a decision on its property to pass into the hands of third persons. Even in England the prerogative is not carried so far. The Crown has frequently consented that the right of Government should pass into the hands of third persons, viz: of commissioners, for the purpose of investigation.

I will not trouble the House with lengthy remarks on this subject. I can hardly advert to it without feeling all that has been much more eloquently expressed by the gentleman from Virginia than it is in my power to express it. Let gentlemen look around and see if they can find a precedent for this transaction. And when we consider it, every man's feelings must be operated upon too strongly to permit him to argue. The course suggested by the gentleman from Virginia must prevail, or we no longer live under a Government of laws, and those principles on which it is founded are destroyed. The man ousted must be put in possession, must be restored to the possession of the property which the hand of violence has wrested from him; and I hope that a proposition to this effect in a proper shape will be presented.

Mr. GHOLSON said he thought it would better become the character of this assembly to discuss every subject with calmness and deliberation, and on its own merits, than to endeavor to influence the decision by an appeal to the passions. It was important that such a course should be pursued, whether with reference to a great political principle or to the interest of the individual whose rights were said to have been wantonly prostrated at the Executive will. I (said Mr. G.) have been early taught, and the doctrine has grown with my years, that the right of property is not one of the least consideration in a free constitution. It is of a nature so sacredly inviolable that, when clearly ascertained, I would never encroach upon it by any means but through the regular constituted authority. It would have been under this impression that, had I been a member of the Legislature when the law of 1807 was introduced into the statute book, I should have been opposed to it. But receiving all the sanctions of a law, and as such containing a rule of conduct in certain specified cases, what was the Executive to do? Was he to set at defiance the law of the land? A doctrine like this can never be contended for. It seems, however, that to satisfy gentlemen the President should have refused to carry this law into execution, which I acknowledge does usurp judicial authority.--[Mr. RANDOLPH said that his ground was that the President had not executed the law. If a law were ever so unconstitutional, the President having signed it, it would become his duty to carry it into effect. But he denied that he had carried it into effect.] Upon that point, continued Mr. G., my colleague and I are at issue. I rise not to discuss the merits of the claim, which I have no disposition to do. I rise to defend the late President of the United States, to endeavor, to the extent of my feeble powers, to place this question in a proper point of view. If the President of the United States has gone beyond the letter of the law, which itself tends to encroach on the rights of the citizen, I would be the last person to justify him in thus trespassing on the dearest rights of a freeman. But it is very easy to show that he has not exceeded the express provisions of the law in question.

The act of 1807 contains two clauses having a bearing on the subject; the first ascertaining the character of the persons to be ousted, and the second providing the means of ousting them. The President is authorized to exercise this power, either where property was previously in possession, in which case he is to give notice, or where it was subsequently entered on, in which case he is not required to give notice. It is easy to show that this is one of the cases contemplated by that act. It is well known that the feudal law did exist in Louisiana, previous to its acquisition by the United States, and that by that law alluvion does accrue to the Crown. Now, if the feudal law did exist, and by that law alluvion did accrue to the Crown of France, does it not follow that the same right did accrue to the United States by the deed of cession from France, who owned the territory? If the claimant was in possession when this act passed, it became the duty of the President of the United States to give him three months' notice previous to his removal; if not, no such notice was necessary. On this point I need only refer to the fact that it was not so early as the passage of the act, indeed not till the 23d of May, that the claimants came into possession. They were quieted in possession, so far as the rights of the United States were not concerned, on the 23d of May, 1807.

The decision of the corporation court of New Orleans is relied on as giving a title to the petitioner. That that decision did at all affect, in the remotest possible degree, the right of the United States, is a position which no man acquainted with the principles of law will contend for. The decision cannot affect the right of the United States, because it was not contested or defended before that court.

It is said that the feudal law does not exist in France. From time immemorial it has existed all over Europe. That it exists at this time in this country there can be no doubt. The right to lands is allodial, but is inherent in the Government. Is it denied that the Government can take property from an individual, making him compensation therefor? If the right to land be indefeasible, could the Government run a road through it? It certainly could not. I wish it to be distinctly understood that I do not attempt to say where the real right to the property in question does reside. But I do say, that, according to the treaty of cession, it did become the Government of the United States to exercise the power which the President under the law of 1807 did make use of.

If there has been any violation of right, it was in the passage of the law under which the President acted. It was such a one as, under present persuasion, I could not have voted for, even to remove a Yazoo purchaser. I would even give to such a one his right to a fair trial. I would not have agreed to pass it, for a reason given a day or two ago, that the right to trial by jury is inalienable; it is a right which descends to us with our other birth-rights; it is one without which liberty is but a name. It was an unfortunate circumstance that such a law did pass. But if the Legislature thought proper to enact such a law, let them not, in the name of the great God, throw the blame on their instrument, on the President, who was innocent of fault, and bound to carry the statute into effect. There is undoubted proof that the President only acted in pursuance of the statute. The retroactive part of the statute is the most horrible feature in it.

But it is said that this is an extreme case, that this small spot was selected as the object of Executive vengeance. I am informed that in almost every instance of intrusion on the public lands, settlement was made by individual claimants. I would rather give up fifty times the value of land of the United States than to encroach against law on that of any individual. It was not the execution of the law which encroached on the rights of the citizen, but the law itself. I would ask, how can it be contended to the contrary? Who was in possession of the land when the law passed? It had been used as public property, and had every requisite to that character; and as such, when any one took possession of it, the President would not have done his duty under the act of 1807, had he not caused them to be removed.

MONDAY, June 26.

_Non-Intercourse._

On motion of Mr. SMILIE, the House resumed the consideration of the report of the Committee of the Whole, on the bill from the Senate, to revive and amend certain parts of the act interdicting commercial intercourse.

Mr. DANA said the amendment moved to the amendment of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. SHEFFEY) went to give a construction to the bill which would operate as a complete exclusion of the vessels of both powers until a satisfactory adjustment of all existing differences shall have taken place. What, said Mr. D., is the situation in which we are now placed? On what principle is it that British ships were first excluded and on which their exclusion was confirmed by the non-intercourse law? They were originally excluded by the proclamation of the President of the United States in consequence of the attack on the Chesapeake. The President of the United States now in office has declared his acceptance of the proffered terms of satisfaction for that outrage. And, after that, is it proposed that we shall continue the measure of hostility when the cause alone which led to it is completely done away? I should suppose that in the very act of adjustment, which took place between the British Minister and the American Secretary, it is implied that we should do nothing further on this subject. The President of the United States has accepted the satisfaction offered; he has declared those terms, when performed, to be satisfactory. And are gentlemen considering the restoration of the seamen taken from the Chesapeake as a reason why we should continue the interdict? If we examine this subject fairly, the great principle of reparation was disavowed of the claim to search our armed vessels, and a homage to our rights. That matter must be deemed to be settled, if the President of the United States had authority to settle it. If the President had not power to settle it, this furnishes strong evidence that the vote of approbation of his conduct was a proper proposition.

As to the interdiction by the non-intercourse act, I apprehend that was founded on the violation of our neutral rights by the belligerent powers, the President of the United States being authorized to renew trade whenever the edicts violating our lawful commerce should be revoked. Whether or not the President has done right in accepting the assurance instead of the fact, gentlemen have considered it unnecessary for them to express any opinion upon it. If there be no edict affecting our lawful commerce in force by one belligerent, the interdict is at an end in point of fact in relation to that one. The question of the affair of the Chesapeake is settled, if the President had power to settle it; and as to the other cause of interdiction, the President has declared that the British orders will have been revoked on the 10th of June. Has the President acted correctly or not? If he has acted correctly in taking the assurance for the fact, the very principle of the non-intercourse is at an end as respects one of the belligerents, and there can be no ground for the exclusion of British armed vessels.

Mr. TAYLOR said he thought the gentleman from Connecticut used the word hostility in relation to this measure of including British armed vessels from the United States. Now, I believe, sir, said Mr. T., that if we go to the opinions entertained, not by the President of the United States, but entertained and expressed in the very foundation of the arrangement which was made, it will be found that the very hostility intended to be produced by the President's proclamation ceased at the moment when we passed the non-intercourse act in which we excluded the vessels of both the belligerents. The hostility was in the admission of the armed vessels of one, and excluding those of the other. It ceased by the non-intercourse law, and so satisfactory was this law of the last session, that it was the very foundation on which the overture was made which ended so much to the satisfaction of this nation. So that, in fact, when we perpetuate the order of things produced by that act, we do not perpetuate the state of things produced by the interdictory proclamation of the late President. It was matter of satisfaction to the British Government, as expressed by their Minister here, that the quality of hostility in the exclusion of her vessels was taken away by the non-intercourse law. Have we promised, in the negotiation which has taken place, that we will commit an act of hostility against France for the boon which we have received from the hand of Great Britain? No, sir; and yet, if we take the definition of Mr. Canning, as to excluding the vessels of one belligerent and receiving those of the other, according to the mode proposed by the amendment, without the sentence moved to be admitted to it, it will in fact be agreeing to go to war with France. According to the opinion of Britain, promulgated not only to this Government but to the world according to the demonstration made by the British Government, you will undertake a measure of active hostility against France; for what? For any great boon that this Government has received from the hands of Great Britain? No, sir. If all the promises were fulfilled to their full extent, we should then receive but justice at her hands. It was acknowledged, too, in the discussion which took place, that any nation, particularly a neutral nation, has a right to exclude the armed vessels of both belligerents; but that, on the contrary, the state now proposed to be produced, the exclusion of one and admission of the other, is an act of hostility of the party excluded. As I would not be compelled by the utmost ill usage by either belligerent to take part with the other against that one, neither will I take a consent or refusal from one or the other to do us justice as a motive for alliance, or a war which shall compromit our neutrality. I now speak of both, for both have used us as ill as was in their power. As kicks and cuffs have not compelled us to take part with them, neither shall caresses or fawning, for we will mete out an equal measure of justice to both. I consider the state of things produced by the non-intercourse as totally distinct from that produced by the proclamation of our late illustrious President.

Mr. FISK.--It was my intention not to have troubled the House with any remarks on the bill now under consideration. I could readily have reconciled it to my feelings to have given a silent vote in favor of the bill, had not so many and various objections been made against it. But as it seems to be objectionable, and susceptible of so many amendments, in the opinion of so many gentlemen, the House will indulge me, while I offer the reasons which will govern my vote.

This bill for which we were convened, has, during the time we have been here, received as yet but a small portion of our attention; and it is so important that upon its passage, and the principles it shall embrace, may depend the destinies of our country. It deserves our immediate and most serious attention. I hope it may be coolly and dispassionately examined, and treated according to its real importance. Its principles have been carefully and scrupulously investigated by the committee who reported it, or a bill similar in its provisions, of which committee I had the honor to be a member.

The language is plain; public ships are not interdicted. There is but one question to be decided in disposing of this bill, and that is respecting public ships; for I believe all will agree to renew the non-intercourse act as respects France. The question is, what regulation shall we make respecting public ships, and one of three courses is to be pursued? Shall we exclude both, admit both, or discriminate?

There are many who would be willing to exclude the armed ships of every foreign power from our harbors and waters. And considering what we have suffered by admitting them, it may be well questioned whether it would not be the best policy of this nation to interdict them by a permanent law. Yet many gentlemen object to this, as being inexpedient at this period. It is said, and it is the principal argument urged against it, that it might embarrass our impending negotiations with Great Britain to interdict her public ships by this act. As I feel as much disposed for an amicable adjustment of our differences with that nation as any member of this House, and would be as unwilling to embarrass the negotiation, I would not insist on this interdiction.

It is also said that England has made reparation, or agreed to make reparation, for the aggression which caused the interdiction of her public ships, and that as the cause no longer exists the interdiction should cease. _Be it so_; and may we never have fresh cause to renew it!

But, say gentlemen, we must not now recede from the ground we have taken with respect to France, we must discriminate. Let us for a moment view the ground we have taken--not only as relates to France, but England also.

We are not at war with either of the belligerents. Our Ministers at their respective Courts are endeavoring to negotiate, and by negotiation to obtain redress for the injuries of which we complain, and whatever precautionary measures we might adopt would not be deemed a violation of our neutral character, so long as those measures were equally applicable to both the belligerents. We could not be deemed to have taken part with either to the prejudice of the other, while no other was benefited by our measures. While British public ships were interdicted, and our embargo existed, an offer was made to both the belligerents to resume our trade--the same equal terms were tendered to both. The nation refusing is left without a cause of complaint against us, for resuming our trade with the nation accepting the offer.

Before either nation does accept, America changes her position. The embargo is abandoned, and a general interdiction of the public ships of England and France, and a non-intercourse with these nations and their dependencies, is substituted. By this non-intercourse act, the particular interdiction is merged in a general regulation. This was to exist until the end of the next session of Congress only. This was virtually saying, that the proclamation interdicting British public vessels from our waters for a particular aggression shall be revoked; and a general municipal regulation, over which the President shall have no control, shall be substituted in its stead. It was then, in order to preserve our neutral character, necessary that this rule should embrace both the belligerents. It may be said, and has indeed been frequently said, that the reason of extending this restriction to France, was her having burnt our vessels and imprisoned our seamen. But never, at least in the history of diplomacy, have cause and effect been more distant and unconnected. France, on the high seas, burns our vessels, and in her own territories imprisons our seamen. We, at the distance of three thousand miles, interdict our ports and waters to her public ships, which do not or dare not come within five hundred leagues of the line of our interdicted territory, and this is to retaliate for the aggression. Can this interdiction be defended on this ground? It cannot. There must have existed some other reason. It was to preserve our relations with the belligerents in that state that should be consistent with our professions of neutrality.