Chapter I: A. Coles (46)

Mr. BASSETT spoke several times in the course of the debate. The following is the substance of the whole of his remarks: He said, on rising, that it was with no feigned diffidence that he addressed the House. I shall, said he, have credit with every one in the assertion that I am most anxious that the proposition I have made should succeed. Must I not, then, deplore the feebleness of voice, the want of force, of manner, and promptness of mind and thought, which limit me? But I shall feel compensated if the House will, in heart, join me in regretting that a cause worthy of the first of advocates has fallen into such puny hands. For the _cause_, then, will they hear me, and for their country's good will they improve each hint I may let fall, by their better judgment. It is true, sir, we have little experience--I cannot boast of naval knowledge in our land--but, yet, we are not quite deficient. Let it be remembered, that it is on the first principles that we are to decide; that we are to mark the outlines only, which depend much on general reasoning, and, in doing which, we may resort to the experience of others. I will follow (though with unequal step) the course taken by my predecessor last year, and, on the question to fill this blank, bring the whole subject before the committee. It will be assumed, as then proved, that protection is due to every national right, which cannot be estimated by pecuniary calculation, but must be tested by national ability only to defend and protect them. To the mode of effecting so desirable an object, I shall confine myself. The report has assumed it as a principle almost of instinct to oppose like to like, and so says the history of man, whom we find ever availing himself of the improvements of his assailant for self-defence. Hence has the art of war become to all nations the most interesting science, and no citizen is more estimable than he who can direct the national force with most efficiency. The importance of a naval force is amply attested on record. I will first, sir, point you to the conflicts between the rival Republics of Rome and Carthage, and ask you to remember the agency that their vessels had in them. Had the Romans confined themselves to the land, never had Carthage been destroyed. The history of Europe, from Venice to Great Britain, is too familiar to all who hear me, to require reference to particulars. It is sufficient for me to call attention to the effect of naval power, as it passed from nation to nation. What was the power of Venice and Genoa when they led the van of naval power? How quickly did the sceptre of Portugal rise, as she assumed a station on the ocean! how sink as she lost her naval preponderance! How did a navy once support the United Provinces! and how is it now the salvation of Great Britain! It is then a fact, that a naval armament gives effect to the power of a nation, as do the musket and bayonet, the cannon and the mortar. And how, sir, is it attempted to rebut this fact? By showing a physical disability in the country to avail itself of this force? No. For then would they be rebutted by the extent of our coasts, by the materials for ship-building, (so ample,) and the known habits and genius of our countrymen, as each day is evincing. And here, sir, I wish I could follow up the beautiful figure of my friend, who, on a former occasion, showed you our continent, extending to either ocean, with the finger of Munificence pointing to the goodly heritage.

We have then these facts: that a navy is a powerful means of national operation; that our local situation is fitted for its use; and that we have the necessary materials. To which it is objected that your infant Navy must be opposed to one which has reached the full manhood of power on the ocean. I admit it. But shall we therefore abandon the ocean, yield our birthright, our goodly heritage, without a struggle? Or, shall we not rather, deducing argument from example, like the gallant Captain Hull, avoid their fleets and capture their single ships.

I am aware that habit impels some to be fearful on this subject, and the experience of the past will not convince them. With diffidence, therefore, do I refer to the efficiency of twelve ships-of-the-line and twenty frigates, as demonstrated last session. Let me ask of gentlemen who thus think, who thus feel, to examine the extent of their argument. Does it not go, not only to the abandonment of the ocean, but to the seacoast also? I shall trust to former statements for the magnitude of this sacrifice, with the observation, that abandoning the ocean involves the loss of one million four hundred thousand tons of shipping; and that in giving up the coasts, you lose a valuable portion of your soil, and some of your fairest cities. I will not dwell on the magnitude of this sacrifice, because I cannot believe that Americans will abandon any right which there is a prospect to maintain. I cannot, I admit, answer as conclusively the objection, that much time will be passed before this force can be procured; yet, I believe, that a mind which relied on that objection, might be satisfied that late preparation is better than none. Nor could a mind, so circumstanced, fail to see, that, while making preparation, you come every day nearer your object; in neglecting it, you are every day further from it, and you are, in neglecting it, blending ultimate loss with temporary sacrifice.

Mr. Chairman, is it for an infant nation, or a popular Government, to be deterred by the want of preparation? What is it that the youth has not to prepare, or when was it that a popular Government taxed itself with previous preparation? But why this argument of despair? What were your preparations for the Revolutionary war, and when made? After an army was in your country. Yet were they then made and effectually made. By the bravery of our fathers our soil was secured; on us it rests to secure our rights on the water, common to every independent nation, and as clearly ours as they are essential to our interests. What is this argument of infancy? Had not the Navy of Great Britain a beginning? Yes. There was a time when Britain had no ship. What then? She was invaded, and more, she was conquered. At this day, her wooden walls, as they are proverbially called, are her defence and protection. Is it admitted that the British fleet secures her from attack? If so, would not a fleet secure us from attack also? But we have it not. Is it not then our duty, as guardians of the public interest, to provide this powerful, this necessary means of defence? But some are alarmed at the cost. Permit me to recur to the calculation of the last year. And first, as to the information derived from British experience, whose example may be taken as precedent on maritime subjects; at least they make a powerful argument, where they are rejected as full proof. In recurring to British estimates, it certainly was unexpected to the American eye to see the same sum charged for a soldier as for a sailor, viz: ---- dollars per month; and as unexpected, on investigating the British expenditures for a series of years, to find that the appropriations for the Navy are found less than those for the Army, as will be seen by reference to the _Annual Register_. In corroboration of this is our own history, as appears from the calculations made by my predecessor, of which I will avail myself.

Is it not then demonstrated by foreign and domestic experience, that a naval force is the cheapest the nation can resort to for defence and protection? Is it not also proved, that a force believed to be competent, might be obtained at a sum greatly within the means of the Government--say twelve millions of dollars--or a fourth less than the ordinary amount of revenue for a year in good times? Test this subject in another way. The cost of your Navy, twelve millions; give up the ocean, and you lose, for one item, one million four hundred thousand tons of shipping, which at fifty dollars the ton, would be worth five times the sum. Yet that would unquestionably be the least item in the account, because that would be but one loss, while that of your coasting, and other trade, would swell into a great annual amount, and be as great a sacrifice of convenience as profit. Nor is such a conclusion the less to be deprecated, because it is difficult to foresee all the evils which must result from the abandonment of one essential right of an independent nation. I know it may be said by those who view this subject differently from me, that they do not mean to abandon the ocean. It is, then, for them to show the difference between not abandoning a right, and not defending it; for I cannot believe that any gentleman will contend that the national defence shall be left to privateers. They have most justly been considered an aid to the national arm, but Heaven forbid that they should be relied on as principal. A private arm, with power to shield the nation, is what I could not contemplate without terror. I cannot believe it necessary to pursue this argument.

To return then: The force adequate to the defence of our seas would cost twelve millions. I will not say that this whole expense ought to be incurred in one year; indeed, it ought to be remarked, that of the twenty frigates, nearly eight are ready for service. Let the principle be yielded, and we can then enter on the calculation as to the portion which may be procured each year. The decision, too, would, in my judgment, be the strongest inducement to the enemy to make peace when they saw that you were progressing to a force which they could not meet. If, indeed, the force which has been named was not altogether adequate to the object of defending your own waters, you would find, having that force, that you could make any small addition that was requisite without difficulty. In reference to the opinions of others, in some measure, did the select committee determine on the number of ships, and their force, to be procured this year. Thus if the first blanks are filled with four seventy-six gun ships, they cost, per estimate, $333,000, and will require an appropriation of $1,332,000. If the other blank be filled with six thirty-eight gun ships, which, by estimate, cost $220,000, the requisite appropriation for them will be $1,320,000. For the sloops of war, the last blank I have calculated at $61,200, which would require an appropriation of $367,200; which, with the necessary appropriation for the four frigates ordered to be rebuilt last year, viz: the Philadelphia, New York, General Greene, and Boston, will amount to $3,500,000. This would give you four seventy-sixes and eighteen frigates, mostly of the best size. Compare the efficiency of that force with the interest of three millions and a half, the cost, and you cannot but be gratified with the result. I say, Mr. Chairman, the interest; because, though it was not in the province of the select committee to look out the ways and means, yet was it so interested as to their object, that they could but ask how was the money to be had; and they were satisfied that three millions and a half could, with facility, be loaned for navy purposes. I state this with no view to limit the ways and means, but only that until the subject is given them to provide for, the House might not be embarrassed with the difficulty of money.

With the humble hope that the views of the committee have been shown to be at least most reasonable, if not most correct, I beg leave to say a few words as to the different kinds of vessels proposed. I will not ask that the clerk should read that excellent letter from Captain Stewart, because I presume every gentleman who wishes information has read it more than once. From that and the other documents, the committee thought themselves warranted in recommending four seventy-six gun ships. In addition to the sufficient reasons offered there, that a large ship, with fewer men and a less cost, will be more efficient than small ones, by the table A it is most conclusively evinced, that a seventy-six, at one round, throws on the enemy four pounds fourteen ounces of ball for each man; whereas, the gunboat throws only ten ounces. I only give the extremes, that the argument may be the more readily taken. Here, too, we have the fact, that six hundred and fifty men are sufficient for a seventy-six, while four hundred and twenty are required for a frigate. The annual expense is, for the large ship, $202,110; for the frigate, $110,000. While in action, the larger ship is equal or superior to three frigates. To support this calculation by figures, we have the opinions of Captains Hull, Stewart, and Morris; and Mr. Hamilton says, that all the officers in service concur in the opinion; and I am told that such is the real history of naval conflicts. Mr. Hamilton mentions one, and Captain Stewart mentions another, of four French frigates attacking a British seventy-four, of which one was sunk, two taken, and the other run off.

It is cause of some exultation to me, that our naval men, where the opportunity is afforded them, give the example to prove our theory. As I am told, orders were sent from Washington in September to Captain Chauncey, then at New York, who made his preparation, took his workmen with him to the Lakes, and some days since we had the account that he had built and launched, before November was out, a frigate of twenty-six guns. The gallant Chauncey enables me to present an argument that would, could I do it justice, I am sure, have much weight. Will any gentleman regret that this twenty-six gun ship has been built, though the mastery of the Lakes has been acquired without it? Neither shall we regret the building of the seventy-sixes, though peace, which God send, should come before they are launched. There is yet one other objection too important to be passed over, though it was on a former occasion so ably canvassed. It is the difficulty of getting seamen. That difficulty exists, I do admit. Yet is not the difficulty insurmountable. Here again I avail myself of the illustrations of my friend from South Carolina.

The gentleman has again referred to the difficulty of manning your ships, and deems impressment indispensable. Sir, I admit the weakness of our nation, and lament it too. Yet I cannot believe that the hard hand of tyranny is essential to their well-being; and I regret that in an assembly of freemen, that this, the most if not the only detestable example England has set us as to a navy, should be so much relied on. Look to the fact, that in five years forty-two thousand seamen deserted from the British navy. Look to the fact, that their prisoners require to be committed to return to their own country. It is with no little pride that I call the attention of the gentleman and the committee to our gallery. Did a British gallery ever exhibit such a spectacle? No, a seaman there is a slave, and seldom puts his foot on shore but under the guard of an officer. Let us therefore be cautious in admitting that though Great Britain has been most successful, that she owes it to the hard, to the iron hand of impressment. It would not be difficult to find in her naval institutions other principles to which the mind would delight to attribute her superiority, rather than that from which we cannot but turn in disgust.

Mr. STOW said he should not consider the motion made by the honorable gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. SEYBERT) as going to defeat the main object of the bill, which was a liberal increase of the navy, because he understood his intention to be to move a larger number of frigates if the clause for seventy-fours should be stricken out. The question then he should consider as simply whether it was best at present to build any ships-of-the-line, or to confine our exertions to frigates only? He said his own opinions had leaned pretty strongly to the latter side till, as a member of the Navy Committee, he had been led to a more careful examination of the subject; and he confessed that that examination had fully convinced him of the utility, and he might say necessity, of building some line-of-battle ships. The propriety of building them, as well as a proportion of lighter ships, grew out of the different objects to which they were to be applied. There could be no doubt of the superior advantages of frigates and sloops of war when employed in cruising against our enemy's commerce, but whenever the object is to repel a powerful force, ships-of-the-line ought to be resorted to. They form batteries infinitely more effective in proportion to their expense than frigates. To illustrate this--the cost of a seventy-four is less than one-third more than that of a forty-four gun frigate, yet the force is as three to one, or according to the lowest estimate I have heard, as two to one. This is easily explained when we consider that to make a seventy-four is little more than adding another deck to a large frigate. It would then appear evident, that unless we resorted to this kind of force, we should fight our enemy on the most unequal terms. She could at any time lay a few heavy ships at the mouths of our harbors and in our narrow waters, and thus effectually destroy not only our foreign trade, but what was of infinitely more importance, she could destroy the whole of our coasting trade.

Further, said Mr. S., knowing that we have no powerful ships, she can easily protect by convoy all her valuable fleets; but if we had four ships-of-the-line she would be driven to the enormous expense of convoying every fleet of merchantmen sailing to any part of America by five or six seventy-fours, or they would be exposed to capture by our fleet.

But, said Mr. S., it is objected that they would be blockaded. This objection was equally against frigates; but he was perfectly willing to put it upon that ground, that Great Britain would attempt to blockade them. What then would be the case? She must employ six blockading ships, supported at an enormous expense, at such a distance; and as had been fully shown by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. CHEVES,) last year, six more ships at least must be occupied in preparing and sailing to replace the first six--thus employing twelve ships to four. And after all, the attempt to confine our ships would frequently be rendered abortive by storms. Again, it has been objected that we had no harbors south of Montauk Point, in which, if pursued, our ships could take shelter. If by this was meant barely that we had no harbor properly fortified, he admitted it was true; and it was also equally true as applied to our heavy frigates; but if it was meant that there was no harbor in which ships could enter that was capable of being properly defended, it was entirely erroneous. For many such there were, and where sufficient works could be erected in a few months.

Mr. S. said a strong reason for building seventy-fours, and to which he particularly requested the attention of the committee, grew out of the state of our preparation. We have timber for four seventy-fours, seasoned and ready for use, which could not be applied to frigates, without great loss. And this explained the fact, that we could build seventy-fours sooner than frigates, unless the timber thus provided should be cut up, which, after years of deliberate preparation for seventy-fours, would appear like children's play. He said in a case of this kind, he thought great respect was due to experience. That many years ago all the ships of war belonging to the nations of Europe were small, but that, without one exception, they had resorted to a certain proportion of heavy ships. From this circumstance, as well as from the uniform opinion of our own officers, he inferred that these were the most conclusive reasons in favor of them.

The question was then taken on the motion to strike out the seventy-fours, and negatived. The committee rose and had leave to sit again.

FRIDAY, December 18.

_Increase of the Navy._

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to increase the Navy of the United States.

Mr. CUTTS then moved to strike out the seventy-fours, with a view to increase the number of frigates to be built to ten, and to add a number of sloops of war.

Mr. C. spoke at considerable length in support of his motion, and in favor of frigates and sloops of war in preference to seventy-four gun ships.

The question was then taken on striking out the provision respecting seventy-fours, and was carried--for the amendment 56, against it 53.

Mr. CUTTS moved an amendment authorizing the building of ten ships of war, of forty-four guns, and ten sloops of war.--Motion lost by a great majority.

MONDAY, December 21.

On motion of Mr. BASSETT, the petitions of J. A. Chevallie, attorney of Amelie Eugene de Beaumarchais, presented on the 24th of December, 1805, and 2d of April, 1806, together with all the documents concerning the said claim, were referred to the Committee of Claims.

_Encouragement to Privateering by Public Armed and Private Armed Vessels._

Mr. BASSETT, from the Committee on the Naval Establishment, presented a bill relating to captures; which was read twice, and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Wednesday next. The bill is as follows:

A Bill relating to captures.

_Be it enacted, &c._, That where any ship or vessel in the
service of the United States shall have captured, or may
hereafter capture, a ship or vessel belonging to an enemy,
of equal or inferior force, and it shall become necessary to
destroy such prize to prevent her falling into the hands of
the enemy, or for the security of such ship or vessel so in
the service of the United States, the Secretary of the Navy
is hereby required to issue his commission to one or more
fit person or persons, who, on the best evidence that can be
procured, shall proceed to estimate the value of such ship
or vessel, prize as aforesaid, in the port into which the
capturing vessel shall first enter, and make return on oath of
said estimate or valuation to the Secretary of the Navy.

SEC. 2. _And be it further enacted_, That the Secretary of the
Navy shall thereon proceed to apportion the sum, which shall
be equal to one-half the said valuation or estimate, as prize
money, among the officers and crew making such capture, and
cause the same to be paid to them accordingly.

SEC. 3. _And be it further enacted_, That each commissioned
officer shall receive six dollars per day for each day he shall
be employed in making the aforesaid estimate: _Provided_, His
compensation shall in no case exceed ---- dollars.

SEC. 4. _And be it further enacted_, That every captain or
commanding officer of any vessel in the service of the United
States immediately on his coming into port, after having
captured a ship or vessel of equal or superior force, shall
make report thereof to the Secretary of the Navy, describing
particularly the size and equipment of the ship or vessel so
destroyed, and the nature and extent of the damage done her in
the action, as also the causes and inducements for destroying
his prize, which report, in part, shall be received as evidence
by the commissioners aforesaid.

SEC. 5. _And be it further enacted_, That the Secretary of the
Navy shall cause the account of the money so by him ordered
to be paid, to be settled at the end of one year, and all the
unclaimed dividends he shall cause to be paid over to the Navy
Hospital Fund.

Mr. BASSETT, from the same committee, also presented a bill regulating pensions to persons on board private armed ships; which was read twice, and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Thursday next. The bill is as follows:

A Bill regulating pensions to persons on board private
armed ships.

_Be it enacted, &c._, That the two and a half per centum
reserved in the hands of the collectors and consuls by the
act of June, eighteen hundred and twelve, entitled "An act
concerning letters of marque, prizes, and prize goods," shall
be paid into the Treasury, under the like regulations provided
for other public money, and shall constitute a fund for the
purposes of this act, and such other purposes as Congress may
direct, for the aid and comfort of the seamen of the United
States.

SEC. 2. _And be it further enacted_, That the Secretary of
the Navy be authorized and required to place on the pension
list, under the like regulations and restrictions as are used
in relation to the Navy of the United States, any officer or
seamen who, on board of any private armed ship or vessel,
bearing a commission or letter of marque, shall have been,
in the line of duty, wounded or otherwise disabled; if an
officer, allowing him one-half his monthly pay for the greater
disability, and so in proportion; and if a seaman, or acting
as a marine, the sum of six dollars per month for the greater
disability, and so in proportion; which several pensions shall
be paid, by direction of the Secretary of the Navy, out of the
fund above provided.

SEC. 3. _And be it further enacted_, That the commanding
officer of every vessel having a commission, or letters of
marque and reprisal, shall enter in his journal the name and
rank of any officer, and the name of any seamen who, during
his cruise, shall, in the line of his duty, have been wounded
or disabled, describing the manner and extent, as far as
practicable, of such wound or disability.

SEC. 4. _And be it further enacted_, That every collector shall
transmit quarterly to the Secretary of the Navy a transcript of
such journals as may have been reported to him, so far as they
give a list of the officers and crew, and the description of
wounds and disabilities, the better to enable the Secretary to
decide on claims for pensions.

_Duties on Privateer Prize Goods._

Mr. CHEVES, from the Committee of Ways and Means, to whom was referred the bill from the Senate directing the Secretary of the Treasury to remit certain fines, penalties, and forfeitures, reported the same with amendments, the principal one of which is to strike out the words "and the dependencies thereof," so as to exclude from the operation of the bill, the cases of goods brought in from Canada, &c.--The bill was referred to a Committee of the Whole.

Mr. C. also introduced the following report:

The Committee of Ways and Means, to whom were referred so much
of the petition of the owners and agents of sundry private
armed vessels fitted out of the port of New York, as prays the
reduction of the duties on prize goods, and the petitions of
sundry owners of private armed vessels fitted out of the port
of Boston, and of sundry owners of like vessels fitted out of
the ports of Norfolk and Portsmouth, Virginia, also praying a
reduction of the duties on prize goods, report:

That a letter from John Ferguson and John L. Laurence, agents
for the petitioners from New York, and a letter from the
Secretary of the Treasury, both addressed to the chairman of
the committee, and which accompany this report, contain all
the facts and views which will probably be found material
in the examination and consideration of this subject; and
that this committee, having maturely considered them, are of
opinion, that a reduction of the duties on prize goods, without
embracing, at the same time, all importations made in the
prosecution of the ordinary commerce of the country, cannot,
consistently with sound policy and rational legislation, be
made, and that a general reduction would diminish a revenue,
where it does not distress the consumer, and would not produce
any material increase of gain to the captors. The committee,
therefore, recommend the following resolve:

_Resolved_, That it is inexpedient to grant the prayer of the
petitioners.

_Documents referred to in the above report._

WASHINGTON, _Nov. 23, 1812_.

SIR: We take the liberty of enclosing to you, for the
inspection of the Committee of Ways and Means, sundry papers
connected with the application by the owners of privateers in
New York, for a reduction of duties on prize goods. They are as
follow:

No. 1, exhibits the proceeds of the schooner Venus and cargo,
captured by the privateer Teazer.

No. 2, is a statement of the cost of the privateers General
Armstrong and Governor Tompkins.

No. 3, contains extracts of letters from several privateer
agents.

The Committee of Ways and Means are (including the accompanying
documents) in possession of three statements of prize sales,
where the property was, in each case, of a different character
from the others. The cargo of the New Liverpool consisted
(contrary to our impressions when before the committee)
altogether of wine, amounting to 27,959 gallons, whereon
the duty was 46 cents per gallon, which consumed more than
one-half of the proceeds of vessel and cargo, and, connected
with the other charges, left the owners of the privateer about
one-sixth of the captured property. The Industry was laden
with 152 bbls. salmon; and the benevolent intentions of the
privateersmen to restore to an indigent owner the amount of
her loss, terminated, in consequence of the high duties and
charges, in an inability to present her with more than a paltry
sum, scarcely worth her acceptance. The Venus had a cargo of
rum, sugar, fruit, and preserves, which produced $17,637 68,
and was charged with duties amounting to $8,287 63. The vessel,
being well calculated for a privateer, was bought in by the
captors for that business. But, experience teaching them that
the profits of private naval warfare are by no means equivalent
to the hazard, they have abandoned that intention, and are
now offering the Venus for sale in the public newspapers, but
cannot find a purchaser.

We would respectfully suggest to the Committee of Ways and
Means that great anxiety exists in New York, that Congress
may give the question of a reduction of prize duties a speedy
decision; which, if favorable, will revive the spirit and zeal,
now expiring, with which privateering was undertaken at the
commencement of the war; and, if unfavorable, will prevent
those who have purchased vessels for warlike enterprises, in
which they cannot now dispose of any interest, from incurring
losses accumulated under fruitless expectations.

We have taken the liberty of reminding the committee that
no naval force of any efficiency can be supported by the
Government but at an expense far greater than the amount of
the duties of which we pray the remission; and that there is
probably no other species of naval armament half so destructive
as privateers to the commerce of an enemy.

The employment of a great number of experienced masters of
vessels and seamen necessarily engaged in them, whose services
could not probably be obtained in any other way, and whose
skill and intrepidity produce so much honor to the country,
forms another important consideration.

To these may be added, that, in no other way, can the
mercantile interest be so effectually united in the support
and prosecution of the war, as by offering inducements to
the investments of its otherwise unemployed capital in such
enterprises.

We are, sir, with great respect, your obedient servants,

JOHN FERGUSON,
JOHN L. LAWRENCE.

Hon. L. CHEVES, _Chairman, &c._

TUESDAY, December 22.

_Imprisonment of American Seamen._

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following Message from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

I transmit to the House of Representatives a report of the
Secretary of State, complying with their resolution of the 9th
instant.

JAMES MADISON.

DECEMBER 21, 1812.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, _Dec. 19, 1812_.

The Secretary of State, to whom was referred the resolution of
the House of Representatives of the 9th instant, requesting
information touching the conduct of British officers towards
persons taken in American armed ships, has the honor to lay
before the President the accompanying papers marked A, B, C,
from which it appears, that certain persons, some of whom are
said to be native, and others naturalized citizens of the
United States, being parts of the crews of the United States
armed vessels the "Nautilus" and the "Wasp," and of the private
armed vessel the "Sarah Ann," have been seized, under the
pretext of their being British subjects, by British officers,
for the avowed purpose, as is understood, of having them
brought to trial for their lives, and that others, being part
of the crew of the Nautilus, have been taken into the British
service.

The Secretary of State begs leave also to lay before the
President the papers marked D and E. From these it will
be seen, that whilst the British naval officers arrest as
criminals such persons taken on board American armed vessels
as they may consider British subjects, they claim a right to
retain on board British ships of war American citizens who
may have married in England, or been impressed from on board
British merchant vessels; and that they consider an impressed
American, when he is discharged from one of their ships, as a
prisoner of war. All which is respectfully submitted.

JAMES MONROE.

(A.)

_Sir John Borlase Warren to Mr. Monroe._

HALIFAX, _September 30, 1812_.

SIR: Having received information that a most unauthorized act
has been committed by Commodore Rodgers, in forcibly seizing
twelve British seamen, prisoners of war, late belonging to
the Guerriere, and taking them out of the English cartel brig
Endeavor on her passage down the harbor of Boston, after
they had been regularly embarked on board of her for an
exchange, agreeable to the arrangements settled between the
two countries, and that the said British seamen so seized,
are now detained on board the United States frigate President
as hostages; I feel myself called upon to request, sir, your
most serious attention to a measure so fraught with mischief
and inconvenience, destructive of the good faith of a flag
of truce and the sacred protection of a cartel. I should be
extremely sorry that the imprudent act of any officer should
involve consequences so particularly severe as the present
instance must naturally produce, if repeated; and although it
is very much my wish, during the continuance of the differences
existing between the two countries, to adopt every measure
that might render the effect of war less rigorous, yet, in
another point of view, the conviction of the duty I owe my
country would, in the event of such grievances as I have
already stated being continued, not admit of any hesitation in
retaliatory decisions; but as I am strongly persuaded of the
high liberality of your sentiments, and that the act complained
of has originated entirely with the officer who committed it,
and that it will be as censurable in your consideration as it
deserves, I rely upon your taking such steps as will prevent a
recurrence of conduct so extremely reprehensible in every shape.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir,
your most obedient and most faithful humble servant,

JOHN BORLASE WARREN,

_Admiral of the Blue, Commander-in-Chief, &c._

JAMES MONROE, Esq., _Secretary of State_.

_Mr. Monroe to Sir John Borlase Warren._

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, _Oct. 28, 1812_.

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 30th
September, complaining that Commodore Rodgers, commanding a
squadron of the United States Navy at the port of Boston, had
taken twelve British seamen, lately belonging to His Britannic
Majesty's ship the Guerriere, from a cartel in the harbor of
Boston, and that he had detained them on board the President, a
frigate of the United States, as hostages.

I am instructed to inform you, that inquiry shall be made into
the circumstances attending, and the causes which produced the
act, of which you complain; and that such measures will be
taken, on a knowledge of them, as may comport with the rights
of both nations, and may be proper in the case to which they
relate.

I beg you, sir, to be assured that it is the sincere desire
of the President to see (and to promote, so far as depends on
the United States) that the war which exists between the two
countries be conducted with the utmost regard to humanity. I
have the honor to be, &c.,

JAMES MONROE.

Sir JOHN B. WARREN, _Admiral of the Blue_,
_Commander-in-Chief, &c._

(B.)

WASHINGTON, _Dec. 17, 1812_.

SIR: I have the honor to annex a list of twelve of the crew of
the late United States sloop of war Wasp, detained by Captain
John Beresford, of the British ship Poictiers, under the
pretence of their being British subjects.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, sir, your obedient
servant,

GEORGE S. WISE, _Purser_.

Hon. PAUL HAMILTON, _Sec'ry Navy_.

[Here follow several other documents, not deemed of material importance, except the following:]

(C.)

_Extract of a letter from Major General Pinckney to
the Secretary of War, dated_

HEADQUARTERS, CHARLESTON,
_November 4, 1812_.

"Information having been given upon oath to Lieutenant
Grandison, who at present commands in the Naval Department
here, that six American seamen, who had been taken prisoners on
board of our privateers, had been sent to Jamaica to be tried
as British subjects for treason, he called upon the marshal to
retain double that number of British seamen as hostages. The
marshal, in consequence of instructions from the Department
of State, asked my advice on the subject, and I have given my
opinion that they ought to be detained until the pleasure of
the President shall be known. The testimony of Captain Moon
is herewith. I hope, sir, you will have the goodness to have
this business put in the proper train to have the President's
pleasure on this subject communicated to the marshal."

The Message and documents were, on motion, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

WEDNESDAY, December 23.

Another member, to wit, from Louisiana, THOMAS BOLLING ROBERTSON, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat.

_Increase of the Navy._

The bill from the Senate to increase the Navy of the United States, was read a third time; and the question, being stated, "Shall the bill pass?"

Mr. MCKEE spoke at considerable length against its passage, and concluded by moving to postpone it to Monday, with a view to obtaining further information on the subject of the materials, &c.

The motion to postpone was supported by Mr. ALSTON and Mr. SEYBERT, and opposed by Mr. MILNOR, Mr. BASSETT, and Mr. WIDGERY. The votes were for postponement 51, against it 73.

So the motion was lost.

The question recurring on the passage of the bill,

Mr. POTTER said, as he represented a commercial State, and his constituents at present were very anxious for a navy, he felt it his duty to assign his reasons for the vote he was about to give. He said, when he saw his political friends, with only one exception, in favor of the bill under consideration, and the anxious solicitude of the gentleman on the other side of the House for its fate, he felt himself much embarrassed; but while he was by his feelings at times almost impelled to vote in its favor, his judgment compelled him to vote against it.

Mr. P. said his objections to a navy were that it would cost more than ever it would be worth to the nation; that we could not build, man, and support the ships contemplated, in addition to our present establishment, without resorting to the same means for their support as other maritime nations had done; that it must be supported by impression or oppression; we must either impress our citizens to man our Navy, and compel them to serve against their wills for almost nothing, or oppress the nation with taxes not to be endured, to enable the Government to give such wages as would induce our seamen to enter voluntarily into our service. He said it had been observed by the friends of the bill, and particularly by his friend from Pennsylvania, (Mr. MILNOR,) that the Navy was at this time very popular with all parties, in this House and the nation; that they had done honor to themselves and to their country, while our army had, in almost every instance, been defeated and disgraced. Mr. P. said we had been very unfortunate in the selection of some of our commanding officers, who had, as it would seem, been appointed more because they wanted office, than because they were qualified for it; some of them were too old, and others too young; but he believed we had as good officers in our Army as we had in the Navy, and whenever the time should arrive that would afford them a fair opportunity, that they would equally distinguish themselves.

Mr. P. said there was a kind of popular delusion at this time about a Navy, that he found difficult to oppose. He said it was at least popular with all those who expected to make money out of it, and with many from the most honorable motives. But he believed, when the people, who were to pay all, and receive nothing, come to see that we had spent for them the last year upwards of twenty millions of dollars, and that notwithstanding all the moneys we had received, by double duties, and otherwise, that we had increased the national debt, in that year, ten millions six hundred thousand dollars, and that we want, for the expenses of the present year, agreeably to the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, $31,925,000, exclusive of the expense of the contemplated increase of our Navy, and for losses and war contingencies--that when they should put those sums together, and apportion them to the several States, agreeable to the constitution, and see that but few individuals, and not many States, would have personal property sufficient to pay their proportions--that this delusion as to those who have eventually all this money to pay would at least vanish.

It was likewise said that the spirit of the nation demanded this increase of our Navy. He remembered very well that it was so said on a former occasion, and that the finger of Heaven pointed to war, but it was very soon found that the finger of the people pointed to peace. It was then said, as it is now said, that we were a divided people, and it was necessary to convince foreign nations that we would support our own Government. The then Executive was addressed from all parts of the United States, with pledges of life, fortune, and sacred honor, in support of what he had done, or should do. This was intended to correct the error abroad as to our being a divided people, and for no other purpose. Its object was entirely misunderstood by the then President. He thought they were uneasy and wanted something to steady them. An army was raised, and taxes laid for their benefit;--a navy was provided which did honor to themselves and the nation, that protected our commerce, and caused our flag to be respected in every sea, in consequence of which our revenue continued to increase, notwithstanding all the depredations committed on our commerce, and the nation appeared to be prosperous and happy; but when the people were called upon to test the sincerity of their pledges and promises, by the payment of a tax of only two millions of dollars, they said they had been entirely misunderstood, that those pledges were intended to have an influence abroad, and not for the purpose of trouble at home, and that they would not pay taxes to support a navy or army; and, the first opportunity they had, they changed the Administration. If they would not then pay two millions of dollars, to support that Administration, can they be expected to pay nearly fifty millions for the support of this, for the same purposes?

Mr. P. said this Administration, during the last session of Congress, was addressed from all parts of the Union, and from many of the States in their legislative capacities, promising to support them with their lives, fortunes, and sacred honors, in common form. This perhaps was to have its influence abroad. The Administration, believing them sincere, have been induced to declare war, and are left to carry it on without money. They find that those pledges and promises cost but little, and are worth nothing; and the consequence will be, that when the people are called upon to pay those enormous expenses, the present Administration will share the same fate from them as the former did.

The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. CUTTS) said the expense of this Navy would swamp the present, as it had done a former Administration; that, Mr. P. said, was a business of their own, it was no concern of his; but if with their means they could not manage the affairs of the nation, with their present experience, having seen the rock on which a former Administration split, they would richly deserve it; his only object was to keep his constituents from being mired down with debt and taxes.

Many gentlemen support this bill upon the principle that this settles the question; that we are to become a great naval power, and to have a permanent Naval Establishment; to this Mr. P. said he objected for the reasons he had assigned; he said he had found mankind much the same: give them power, and they would not only use, but abuse it--give them money, and they will spend it, and want to borrow; and, he said, if an Administration like the present, without money, without an army, or navy, would plunge this country so unprepared into a war, and continue it for the present existing cause, and extend their views of conquest to the Floridas, the Canadas, Quebec, Halifax, and Nova Scotia, whenever they should have money, an army, and ships; the next thing they would want colonies, as other nations had done, and that Bermuda and New Providence would be in our way; and we must have Jamaica to get good rum and sugar. And instead of this country enjoying peace, which is above all things the most desirable, we should be involved like other nations in perpetual war.

Mr. RANDOLPH moved to postpone the further consideration of the bill till to-morrow.--Lost.

So the bill was passed.

_Medal to Commodore Preble, &c._

The following Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

I transmit to the House of Representatives a report of the
Secretary of the Navy, complying with their resolution of the
16th instant.

JAMES MADISON.

DECEMBER 23, 1812.

The following is the report referred to in the above Message:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, _Dec. 21, 1812_.

SIR: On the subject of the resolution of the honorable the
House of Representatives, of the 16th instant, I have the honor
to state, that, in pursuance of the resolution of Congress of
the 3d March, 1805, a gold medal, emblematical of the attacks
on the town, batteries and naval force, of Tripoli, by the
squadron under Commodore Preble's command, was presented
to Commodore Preble, in the manner stated in the enclosed
letter, dated May 17, 1806: That one month's pay was allowed,
"exclusive of the common allowance, to all the petty officers,
seamen, and marines, of the squadron, who so gloriously
supported the honor of the American flag, under the orders
of their gallant commander, in the several attacks:" That no
sword has been presented to either of the commissioned officers
or midshipmen, who distinguished themselves in the several
attacks: And that it is not known to this Department that there
ever was made by Congress a specific appropriation of $20,000
for the purpose of carrying into effect the resolution referred
to.

With respect to that part of the resolution which requests
the President to cause a sword to be presented to each of
the commissioned officers and midshipmen who distinguished
themselves, it is presumed that the President saw what to
his mind appeared difficulties of great delicacy, from the
peculiar language of the resolution. By the resolution, he was
requested to present swords to such only as had distinguished
themselves; and all having been represented to him as having
acted gloriously, he could not in justice draw with precision
a line of discrimination. He felt, it is presumed, a repugnance
to the making of a selection, which, by implication, would
necessarily have cast an unmerited reproach upon all not
therein included. A degradation of that kind might have greatly
injured the service, and could not possibly have been grateful
to the honorable feelings of the favored officers.

I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, your
obedient servant,

PAUL HAMILTON.

To the PRESIDENT.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, _May 17, 1812_.

SIR: In pursuance of the resolution of Congress of the 3d
March, 1805, requesting the President of the United States to
cause a gold medal to be struck, emblematical of the attacks
on the town, batteries, and naval force, of Tripoli, by the
squadron under your command, and to present it to you in such
manner as in his opinion would be most honorable to you, the
medal, which will herewith be delivered to you by Lieutenant
Jones, has been struck. You will receive it, sir, as a
testimony of your country's estimation of the important and
honorable services rendered by you; and you will be pleased to
accept an assurance of the great pleasure I have in the honor
of presenting it to you.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most
obedient servant,

R. SMITH.

To Com. EDWARD PREBLE.

From the records of the Navy Department.

PAUL HAMILTON.

After some conversation as to the proper course for this business to take, it was referred to a select committee, to consist of seven members, to consider and report thereon.

Mr. QUINCY, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. ROANE, Mr. LACOCK, Mr. TROUP, Mr. EMOTT, and Mr. DINSMOOR, were appointed the committee.

MONDAY, December 28.

_Public Lands--Cash System and Reduction of
Price._

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the report of the Committee on the Public Lands, made on the second instant, respecting an extension of the time limited by law for the payment of lands purchased of the United States.

The report concludes with the following resolutions, the adoption of which the committee recommend:

"_Resolved_, That such part of the laws for the sale of public
lands as allow a credit on part of the purchase money, be
repealed; and that the price at which lands shall be offered in
future shall be one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre.

"_Resolved_, That in future sales a portion of the public lands
be offered in tracts of eighty acres.

"_Resolved_, That two years be given in addition to the time
allowed by law to the purchasers of public lands, whose time
of payment shall have or may expire on or before the first day
of January, 1814, on condition that all the interest that has
accrued or may accrue on or before the 18th day of March next,
shall be paid at that day, and the interest that may become
due thereafter shall be paid at the day on which the time,
according to existing laws, shall expire for making payment."

Considerable desultory debate took place on these propositions; but the committee rose without coming to any decision thereon, and obtained leave to sit again.

TUESDAY, December 29.

_Additional Military Force._

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill "supplementary to the act for the more perfect organization of the Army of the United States," and on the bill "in addition to the act for raising an additional military force."

The bills having been read through, a motion was made by Mr. DAVID R. WILLIAMS to fill the blanks in the first bill, for the amount of bounty, &c., and the question having been stated--