Chapter I: A. Coles (48)

Thus, sir, had the treaty of 1806 been ratified and a good understanding been produced between the two countries, Congress were warned, even in that event, that it was their duty to lend their aid in rendering effectual and perpetual any arrangement which might be made on this subject of impressment. As to the late communications from the Executive department, made to the British Government, since the declaration of war, it is not my intention at this time to enter into a particular examination of their merit or demerit. I will barely remark, that to me they present a novelty in the history of war and diplomacy. Propositions, alleged to be of a pacific nature, made in six days after the declaration of war! Such a procedure (much as I desire peace and much as I was opposed to the war) is to my mind, to say the least, extremely extraordinary, and its policy incomprehensible. It is the more so from the circumstance of a British Minister being on the spot at the moment of declaring the war and keeping up a continued correspondence with the Secretary of State to the last moment of the existence of peace. Under such circumstances I should conceive each nation ought to have known the _ultimatum_ of the other and not waited for the form of a declaration of war, to resume the negotiation and give a new shape to their proposition. I confess that I am not surprised at the result of this war negotiation--every thing was demanded to be yielded by our enemy, for which the war was declared, even as a preliminary in the first instance to an armistice, and in the second instance as preliminary to a negotiation. The equivalent offered on our part was of a nature which it was not within the province of the Executive to confirm, and, of course, depended on what Congress might or might not do on the subject. In addition to this, our agent in London, through whom those propositions were made, did not possess regular and competent powers, and was considered by the British Government as incompetent to act with them on such a subject on equal terms of obligation and responsibility. Whatever, therefore, may be my opinion in relation to those late propositions, and however illy calculated they may have been to produce any desirable result, I am far from considering them unworthy the particular attention of this House. I allude particularly to the equivalent proposed as an inducement for the discontinuance of the practice of impressment. Here, for the first time in the whole history of the long-protracted discussion on this subject, it is intimated that something effectual will be done on our part to prevent the cause of the abuse of which we complain--a promise is given, in the event of obtaining the concessions demanded, that a law would be passed by Congress to prohibit the employment of British seamen in the public or commercial service of the United States. This, then, is what I ask you now to do--pass a law effectually to exclude all British subjects from the public and private maritime service of the United States; let the law be well guarded against the possibility of violation or evasion; and let us be determined rigidly to enforce it; place this law in the hands of your Executive; let him immediately appoint one or more honest, able, independent commissioners; men who neither have nor expect an office; men in whom the nation, without regard to party, would be willing to confide; give them ample powers to form a treaty or arrange the sole question which is now the pivot on which this war depends. Do all this; do it faithfully, and I venture to predict you will obtain a peace, and secure your just rights more speedily, more effectually, and more satisfactorily to the people of this country, than by all the military operations in the compass of your power.

MONDAY, January 4.

EDWARD HEMPSTEAD, returned to serve as the Delegate in this House from the Territory of Missouri, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat.

_Additional Military Force._

The House resumed the consideration of the bill for raising for one year an additional military force of twenty thousand men.

The question was stated on the engrossment of the bill for a third reading.

Mr. BRIGHAM.--Mr. Speaker, the bill under consideration, if passed into a law, will deeply affect my constituents and the public in general. It provides for prosecuting this war on a more extensive scale--it is a kind of second declaration of war. The objects of conquest are multiplied; the field of operation is enlarged; the Army must be increased with the addition of 20,000 regular troops; and enlistments encouraged by additional bounty and wages. Sir, this is the system of arrangement to prosecute the scheme of foreign invasion. One error frequently prepares the way for another; we are now unhappily involved in the calamities of war, and the question is, how we shall prosecute and support it.

Mr. B. said he had been uniformly, and in principle, opposed to this war, and of course opposed to all the measures connected with it; that, in his opinion, this war was both politically and morally wrong; that it was declared without suitable preparation, without necessity, without an army, without adequate resources, and without unanimity; it has been prosecuted without success; we have also gained nothing but loss, defeat, and disgrace; the people are alarmed at the loss of their peace, distressed with the fruits of the war, and have serious apprehensions of what may be the future measures of Congress on this subject.

Sir, continued Mr. B., this war is of an offensive character; it is a war of conquest, totally inconsistent with the spirit and genius of our constitution, and, if prosecuted in the present divided state of the country, I fear it may be fatal to our most valuable institutions. Republics, sir, ought never to be engaged in a foreign, offensive war; they are calculated only for defensive war.

Sir, there is something unaccountable, that the disposition to prosecute this war should increase, as the causes of the war decrease, and the means and ability to carry it on lessen. The war which we now have on hand is predicated principally on the Orders in Council. The impressment of seamen, during the last session of Congress, was considered of minor importance and as a proper subject of negotiation between the two nations, and was so considered in the days of General Washington, in those of Mr. Jefferson, and why not now by Mr. Madison?

Sir, the Orders in Council which interfered with our neutral rights are revoked. The President, in his Message at the commencement of this session, declared the fact, and the war now rests solely on the subject of impressment. I do not believe that the prosecuting of this war will have a tendency to bring about an amicable and satisfactory adjustment on this subject, and at the end of the war, if it ever ceases, this question of impressment must be settled by treaty.

Sir, at this time, and under these circumstances, we are called on to augment our standing army to the number of 55,000 regular troops, to prosecute the war with vigor, and, as some say, for glory.

Sir, if this system of warfare is carried into effect, we shall unavoidably create an annual expense of forty millions of dollars; and where is your money to defray this expense? Why, you must take it from the pockets of our constituents, and from those who are opposed to this war; and if you fail of obtaining the necessary loans, you must stop payment; the nation will become bankrupt, and future generations will be loaded with an enormous debt.

Sir, can this be for the honor and interest of the American people; can it be for the satisfaction of our constituents; are they in love with this war? Are they prepared to barter away their property and their peace for the hazards and fatigue of a foreign war, which promises nothing but poverty and distress? It is impossible. Sir, it is said that we are now about to make one sublime military effort, which shall do honor to this nation; that with these troops we are to take, not only the Canadas, but Halifax and Nova Scotia, and, for aught I know, East Florida, follow up the Tippecanoe expedition, and exterminate the Indians. Mr. B. said that he never had known the incipient cause nor by what authority General Harrison made his incursion into the wilderness, beyond where the United States had extinguished the Indian titles, and destroyed the Prophet's town, but said that he hoped the time would come when he should know the merits of that enterprise.

Mr. B. said if the friends of this bill and of the war could accomplish their darling object, subdue and take possession of the Canadas, and all the other British provinces in North America, in his opinion it would be a great public misfortune--fatal to the civil liberties of the country, and change the character of our Government.

Sir, said Mr. B., with these impressions I deprecate the taking of the Canadas, or the other British provinces, as I do the loss of liberty and the ruin of this country. This war cannot be perpetuated and prosecuted without violating the laws of humanity and justice, the laws of religion and morality--and these laws are to be respected as well by nations as by individuals; and we have not only reason to believe, but do believe, that the God of Armies, who superintends the concerns of men, will give success to our arms, or blast our enterprise, according to its moral character. If the Canadas are subdued and conquered, it must be done by force of arms; and what have the inhabitants of those provinces been guilty of, which warrant this Government in putting them to the sword?

Sir, they are now inoffensive, and quietly pursuing their own business; they are content under their own Administration; they are protected by their own Government, and are not panting for the liberties of this country, as was vainly supposed the last season, nor do they ask us to relieve them from the oppression of their own Government, which General Hull, in his tender mercy, promised them in his pompous proclamation, on the condition that they would revolt from their rightful Sovereign, and put themselves under _his_ gracious protection; nor were they terrified by the threat of extermination, if found fighting in their own defence by the side of an Indian; nor were they to be seduced from their allegiance by promises which could not be performed. No, sir, nor do they ask any favor but that you cease from troubling. Sir, they will not submit, and they have told you, by their actual resistance, that they will defend themselves, their councils, their firesides, their wives, and their children, their rights and their property; and they are not to be subdued but at the price of blood. And where is your authority, where is your right to go home, invade, and break into a foreign territory, and there establish a slaughter-house for the brave sons of America; there spill your blood, and expend your treasure, destroy cities, and demolish houses, plunder the inhabitants, and waste the substance of the industrious and the innocent? Sir, there is no right but a Napoleon right, and that right is power, and not that which reason approves.

Mr. B. said that the war was becoming more and more unpopular in the Eastern States, especially in the State which he had the honor to represent; and they had, in their late elections, come forth and declared it in a voice and language which cannot be misunderstood. And whether there will be a majority in the next Congress in favor of this war was uncertain--he hoped not.

Mr. RIDGELY said he claimed the patience of the House while he assigned the reasons that would influence him to vote against the bill now under consideration. He considered the force contemplated to be raised by the bill as unnecessary. The present Military Establishment of the United States consisted of various descriptions of troops; they were the regular army, the rangers, the volunteers, and the militia. The regular army was made up of the Peace Establishment, authorized by the acts of the 16th of March, 1802, and the 12th of April, 1808, containing about 10,000 men, including officers, and of the "additional military force," which was directed to be raised by the act of the 11th January, 1812; these different establishments were incorporated by an act passed on the 26th of June last; and the present regular army of the United States, as authorized by law, consisted of twenty-five regiments of infantry, three regiments of artillery, two of light dragoons, one of riflemen, and one of light artillery, containing in all about thirty-six thousand men, including company officers and privates; of these the President might have not exceeding fifteen thousand enlisted for eighteen months, and the residue enlisted for five years, unless sooner discharged. Of the rangers, there were seven companies by the acts of 27th January, and 1st July, 1812, and about four or five hundred men. By the act of the 6th February last, the President was authorized to accept of any company or companies of volunteers, either of artillery, cavalry, or infantry, who might offer their services to the number of fifty thousand men; their commissioned officers were to be appointed in the manner prescribed by law in the several States and Territories to which they might respectively belong, and they could only, according to the fair construction of this act, be considered as militia, liable to be called on to do military duty at any time within two years after they were accepted by the President, and bound to continue in service one year after arriving at the place of rendezvous. By the law of the 6th of July last, the President was empowered to appoint and commission the officers of the volunteers who had or should offer their services, and to form them into battalions, squadrons, &c., and they were thus converted from militia into a species of regular force. By the act of the 10th of April last, the President was authorized to call on the several States and Territories for their respective proportions of a detachment of one hundred thousand militia; and the call has been made, I believe, on every State and Territory. The present military force, then, of the United States, as authorized by existing laws, consists of upward of one hundred and eighty-six thousand men, all of whom, when in service, are subject to the rules and articles of war. Of these, the militia can only be used in the prosecution of this war for defensive purposes; the regulars and the volunteers may be ordered to act offensively against the enemy. They may amount, as we have seen, to eighty-six thousand men; and if Canada be as weak and badly defended as gentlemen seem to suppose, and the Administration should persist in their determination to conquer it, they should, I think, be satisfied with such a force to obtain an object so easily attainable. But, sir, said Mr. R., our present Military Establishment is certainly sufficient for all purposes of defence; and I wish to see no land forces raised for any other purpose. I have no hesitation in declaring that I should lament to see Canada or any of the British provinces on this continent in our possession, or forming a part of the American Republic. They will never be worth, to this nation, in any point of view, the blood and treasure that their acquisition will cost us. It has been said by the honorable chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, that there are now in Canada twelve thousand regular troops, and that the militia amount to six thousand. To any thing that gentleman should say, as matter of fact within his own knowledge, I should give the most implicit credit. But his estimate of the militia of Canada must be too low. His sources of information on this point must have been incorrect. The population of Canada (and when I speak of Canada, I mean both Upper and Lower Canada) has been variously stated, from three to five hundred thousand souls; according to no account, I believe, can it be less than three hundred thousand; and, I presume, no gentleman on this floor will say that estimate is too high. Take, then, the population of Canada to be 300,000 souls; what number of militia should this population furnish? We will take the State of New Jersey as a guide for our calculation; according to the census of 1810, the population of that State is 245,255, and its militia, by the return for the same year, 33,740, and the militia bears about the same proportion to the population in the States, generally, as it does in this State. If, then, the militia of Jersey, with its population, amounts to near thirty-four thousand, we may, I think, without danger of contradiction, estimate the militia of Canada (with a larger population) at between thirty and forty thousand; to these add the twelve thousand regular troops, and, in all probability, before we can act offensively against them in the Spring, the number of these troops will be greatly increased, and they may have an efficient force of about fifty thousand men to oppose an invading army. It ought to be recollected, also, that a generous people, contending in their own defence, are actuated by far different and more worthy motives than an army of soldiers can be who attempt their subjugation. The Canadians will contend for their homes, their wives, their children; for every thing that can or that ought to be dear to the human heart. They will be excited in such a cause to the boldest deeds. Instead of traitors, we shall find them true to their country and themselves, and able and ready to exert all their energies in their own defence. If we conquer them, it must be by great exertions, and with immense loss. To subdue a people acting under the impulse of such considerations as will operate on them, will require a force at least double to that which they can oppose to us. But can any man imagine that, if we invade the British colonies, the war will be there? Will the pride of Britain, powerful as she is at sea, and ready at any moment to meet every emergency, permit her tamely to look on and see her provinces wrested from her, without exerting herself with all her energies for their security? Will she make no diversions in their favor? Will she suffer us to carry the war into her territories, and not retort upon us? Does an unprotected seacoast of two thousand miles afford her no opportunities of attacking us? Do our rich and flourishing cities, exposed without defence on the seaboard, to the cannon of her ships of war, furnish her with no objects worthy her attention? Will the city of New York, laid in ashes, atone for the invasion of Canada; or, will the acquisition of Canada compensate to us for the loss of New York? Sir, said Mr. R., ten Canadas, ten times told, would not be worth to this nation that single city.

But of what value would these provinces be to us, if they could be easily acquired? Shall we, by their conquest, obtain the objects for which this war is waged? Shall we thereby secure our commercial rights? Not at all, sir. On the other hand, if the British Government would offer them to us, it would be our true policy to refuse to accept them. It is known to everybody that the population of several of the Eastern States is now full, and that great numbers of their citizens are constantly emigrating. The direction this emigration takes, it is also well known, is South and West. This surplus of population of the Eastern States settles on the banks of the Ohio and Mississippi, and carries with it its Eastern habits, and, if you please, its Eastern prejudices. They become connected and united with the people of the South and West. This union and intercourse will tend to render as the brothers of one family the citizens of this extended Empire. The prejudices of the South against the North, and the North against the South, are weakened daily and will be destroyed. The course this emigration takes is just as it should be. The currents flow from the extremities into the centre of the country. The operation is most beneficial to the nation, and tends constantly to strengthen and cement the union of the States. But if the British provinces should be conquered and become incorporated into the Republic, the direction of the emigration from the Northern and Eastern States will be at once changed. It will take a North instead of a South course. It will go just where it ought not to go. The strength of the nation, already too much scattered, will be still more weakened by a further expansion of its territory and population. The Northern and Eastern States, at present possessing more than their proper proportion of wealth, population, and strength, and having different habits, pursuits, and interests, from the Middle and Southern States, will, by the addition of these provinces, and the settlement of their surplus of population in them, acquire a weight and influence that this Union cannot control. It will exist only at their pleasure, and, in a few years, the destruction of this Government and a separation of the States will be the inevitable consequence.

Mr. PITKIN rose and said:--Before, Mr. Speaker, we give our sanction to this bill; before we agree to add so large a force to our present army, making the whole number fifty-five thousand men, is it not a duty we owe to ourselves and to our constituents, seriously to inquire into the policy, into the necessity of the measure, as well as into the present state of our relations with that nation against which we have declared war? Almost at the very instant when Congress declared war against Great Britain, the Orders in Council, and the blockade of May, 1806, the most prominent causes of the war, were removed. I have always, sir, considered the Orders in Council as the greatest obstacle to the restoration of harmony and free intercourse between the two countries. Had this obstacle been removed before the declaration of war, no one can believe that the Executive would have recommended, or that a majority in either House of Congress would have adopted a measure always fraught with evils in all governments, and which, in a Government like ours, ought never to be resorted to but in the last extremity. I cannot believe that the President, in that case, would have recommended it, when, on the 26th of July, 1811, through the Secretary of State, he informed the British Minister that, on the revocation of the Orders in Council, the non-importation law would be removed, and, of consequence, commercial intercourse would be restored between the two nations. It would be strange, indeed, if the President should, in one moment, restore a free intercourse between the two countries, and, in the next, recommend to Congress a declaration of war, solely on account of another topic remaining in dispute. And, in case such recommendation had been made, if any confidence is to be placed in the declared opinions of gentlemen, many who voted for the war would not, under such circumstances, have given it their support. Unfortunately for the country, the President did not embrace the opportunity, presented by the repeal of the Orders in Council, to remove the non-importation law, and thereby smooth the way for a complete restoration of harmony between Great Britain and the United States. Sir, this would have been done, and the remaining subject of dispute been left in the same situation as before the declaration of war, to be adjusted by amicable arrangements. But, sir, as this was not done, it remains for us, it remains for the people of the United States, to determine whether they will encounter all the evils, all the calamities of war; whether they will sacrifice the fairest prospects, and the best interests of this rising country, on the point now in dispute with Great Britain.

In the few remarks I shall submit to you, sir, and to the House, it is not my intention to go into the consideration of all the original avowed causes of the war; but to confine myself to the new aspect of affairs, presented to us since the declaration of war by the removal of the Orders in Council and blockades.

On the subject of impressments, for which alone the war is now to be continued, what, let me ask, is the principle for which our Government contends? It is this, sir: that the flag of the merchant vessel shall cover all who sail under it; or, in other words, that our flag shall protect all the foreigners our merchants may think proper to employ in their service, whether naturalized or not. Before we raise immense armies, before we sacrifice any more of the lives of American citizens, let us inquire--

1st. Whether the principle, if yielded to us to-morrow, would benefit our native seamen, or would promote the real permanent interests of their country.

2d. Whether there is a probability of obtaining a recognition of this principle by a continuance of the war.

The foreigners employed in our service are those who have not been naturalized, and those who have taken the benefit of our naturalization laws. The former constitute nearly the whole: the latter class is very inconsiderable. The foreigners of the first description, of course, were in competition with our native seamen, and either exclude them from employment, or lessen the rate of their wages. In this way, then, the employment of foreign seamen is an injury to our native seamen; and, in a national point of view, it may well be questioned, whether their employment subserves the permanent and solid interest of the country.

Is it not, sir, of the first importance to us, as a commercial and maritime nation, especially when it may be engaged in a war with a great naval power, to be able to have a sufficient number of native seamen employed in our service? Seamen, who shall be attached by every tie to this country, and on whom we can depend for its defence in time of danger?

This, sir, it is presumed, cannot be denied. If so, is it not the dictate of wisdom and of sound policy for us to give encouragement to our native seamen in preference to those of any foreign country?

The situation in which we now are proves the correctness, as well as the importance, of the position. We are now at war with Great Britain. And, at the very time when this war was declared, thousands of British seamen who had not been naturalized in this country, were, and they still continue in our employment. These seamen (I am speaking, sir, of those not naturalized) are now claimed as British subjects, and, indeed, by our own laws, are now considered as alien enemies. Will gentlemen suffer me to turn their attention to this last fact?

By a law passed the 6th of July, 1798, it is enacted, that "whenever there shall be a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or Government, &c., all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects, of the hostile nation or Government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States, _and not actually naturalized_, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed, _as alien enemies_." Ought we, sir, to depend upon these men to man our fleets, or to defend our ports and harbors? So far as foreigners of this description are concerned, I do not hesitate to say that it is not for the interest of this country that our flag should protect them, and that I will never consent to continue this war for the maintenance of this principle on their account. It is well known, sir, that not only Great Britain, but that France, and all the nations of Europe, claim a right to the services of all their subjects in time of war. In the exercise of this right, the history of Europe shows that, at the commencement of almost all wars, proclamations have been issued by the belligerent powers, recalling their subjects to aid in the defence of their respective countries. During the present war in Europe, this has been done by Great Britain, by France, and the other belligerent powers. With respect to this claim of allegiance, it is not my intention to enter into the discussion whether, in the abstract, it is well or ill founded. This would lead me too far, and would tend to no practical good. I will, however, observe, that it is a right, a claim, which has been long exercised in Europe, and has been sanctioned and acknowledged by the most able and distinguished European writers on public law.

With respect to foreigners, who have been naturalized under our laws, the question is of a more distinct nature, and presents greater difficulties. We ought, undoubtedly, to fulfill all our obligations towards them. What these obligations are, and how far they extend, are questions about which a diversity of sentiment may prevail.--While they remain within our territories, and within our exclusive jurisdiction, they are shielded by the general principle, that all within our dominion and exclusive jurisdiction, are, of course, protected against all claims whatever, and never to be molested in any way without our consent. But, sir, when they go without our territories, and beyond our exclusive jurisdiction, and come within the sphere of the claim of their former Government, the opinion of the best writers on public law seems to be, that the obligation of the country, under whose laws they have been naturalized, does not extend to guaranty them against such claims, unless their allegiance was changed with the consent of their former Government. But, sir, whatever speculative opinions may be entertained on this subject, the number of naturalized seamen is so small, that few, if any, can be of opinion that we ought to have declared war, or that we ought to continue it on their account alone. The whole number of seamen naturalized from 1796 to 1810, as appears by the returns made to the Department of State, is 1,332. This includes those of all nations. What proportion of these were British, or how many of them are now in our service, it is impossible to determine. I presume, however, the number of naturalized British seamen now in our employ does not exceed two or three hundred. Shall we, sir, continue the war for these men?

I am aware, sir, that with respect to impressment from our merchant vessels, abuses have happened, that although the right of taking American citizens is not claimed, the British commanders have not been scrupulous whether they took British subjects or American citizens. Sir, these abuses I never can, and I never will justify. I am satisfied, however, that they have been exaggerated.

But, sir, let me ask, if we have not really intended to protect foreign seamen under our flag, if we have not been guilty of gross negligence, to say the least of it, towards our native seamen? whether, by our laws, and the practice under them, we have afforded them all that protection and security to which they are entitled?

In 1796, Congress passed an act for the relief and protection of American seamen. By this act, the collectors of the several ports were directed, on application, to enter the names of seamen, being citizens of the United States, to grant them certificates, in a form given in the act. In this certificate, the collector is to describe the person of the applicant: also, to declare that, on proof produced to him agreeable to the act, the seaman is a citizen of the United States of America.

It is not a little singular that, although the proof of citizenship to be produced to the collector must be agreeable to the directions of the act, the act itself nowhere directs what that proof must be. Every collector, therefore, has, under this act, used his own discretion, or has pursued such directions as he may have received from the Government as to the kind of proof. What, sir, has been the practice under this law? Have those certificates, or protections, as they are commonly called, been confined to _bona fide_ American citizens? No, sir; we cannot, we ought not, to shut our eyes against facts too notorious to be concealed or denied. Under this act, made expressly for the protection of American seamen, every foreign seaman, almost, at the moment of setting his feet on our shores, has obtained a certificate from some collector, that he is a citizen of the United States; and, with this certificate in his pocket, although perhaps a deserter from his own Government, he enters a public or private vessel, as an American seaman. The mode of obtaining proof of citizenship is well understood. Among other modes, some of which are too disgraceful to be mentioned in this place, those foreign seamen will go before a magistrate, and, although hardly able to speak the English language intelligibly, will swear, for each other, that they were born within the United States, and are American citizens. On such proof, a proof of this sort, the collector issues his certificate.

It will be recollected, sir, that this subject was brought before this House during the last session, in a case from Philadelphia, when a certificate of this kind was obtained by the most flagrant and avowed act of perjury on the part of a foreigner who had just arrived in this country. It was found, on inquiry, that there was no law, either of Pennsylvania or of the United States, to punish the man for this act of false swearing. Not only have these protections been thus obtained by fraud and perjury, but they have also, long since, been an object of barter; they have been bought and sold, and transferred from one to another, not only in this country, but in foreign countries.

To show the extent of this traffic in seamen's protections, permit me to state some facts, of which I have no doubt, knowing the source from whence I have derived them. An American captain having a ship in Bristol, in England, without a crew, he applied to a man who kept a boarding-house for sailors, to procure a crew of American sailors in port; he showed him a great number of American protections, which he agreed to sell him for two guineas each, and with the aid of these to procure him a crew. By high wages, and by suiting these protections to the description of British sailors, he procured this captain his ship's crew; not only so, but when the ship was about to sail, and it was doubtful whether those who had engaged for the voyage would actually go on board, this man actually procured some of a press gang to take them as American sailors, who had deserted from their ships, and put them on board. When we ourselves place no confidence in these certificates, when we know that they are thus obtained by fraud and perjury, can we expect that foreign nations will give credit to them? Instead of being a shield and protection to the real American sailor, they have become a dangerous weapon of offence.

If, sir, it is not for the permanent interest of the United States to employ so many transient foreign seamen, we ought long since, not only to have refused these false protections, but to have passed laws for the encouragement of our native seamen, similar to those which have been adopted in commercial countries, and are commonly called navigation acts. This would, in some measure, have relieved us from the evils which we now experience, in consequence of the employment of so many foreign seamen.

TUESDAY, January 5.

_Additional Military Force._

The House resumed the order of the day on the bill for raising an additional military force of 20,000 men for one year, the question being on the passage of the bill to a third reading.

Mr. BOYD.--Mr. Speaker: It is with great diffidence that I address the Chair. When the bill now before the House was under discussion on Saturday last; that is, the then proposed amendment to insert eighteen months, instead of one year, I was offering my reasons why I thought that that amendment ought to prevail; when, unfortunately for me, I was considered as taking too great a latitude, and prevented from connecting my remarks. As there is little difference, in point of principle, as the bill then was and now is, I embrace this opportunity to make up that deficiency, and will now take care to stick as close as possible to the text.

Sir, I am opposed to passing the bill to a third reading, because I believe it to be altogether inadequate to the purpose intended to be accomplished by it. Sir, when I last addressed the Chair, I then took a retrospective view of our past expectations, plans, and propositions, from which we expected to derive great advantages. Such were the expectations of that time, that I did not accord with them. Those expectations have not been realized; but, instead thereof, we have met with disappointments and misfortunes. I thought that viewing the errors of the past was the most certain way to avoid the future; and I am not at this time sensible of that being erroneous.

Mr. Speaker, I am an old man, and not in the habit of public speaking; and if I have not the faculty of composing my arguments in so connected a form as a lawyer's special pleadings, I hope the House will excuse me, and grant me their indulgence to do it in such form as my capacity will admit of.

[The SPEAKER observed that it was unpleasant to the Chair that the gentleman should indulge in such remarks; he had certainly no wish not to give full latitude to debate. Mr. B. said he stood corrected, and was allowed to proceed.]

Then, Mr. Speaker, I object, because, in my opinion, it is not calculated to produce the desired effect, or that which is intended by it: that is, to raise a force competent to the conquest of the Canadas in the given time. I will ask how many regiments you have in your present establishment? Say thirty-five, and you add twenty, making together fifty-five: what use is there in multiplying regiments without men? The Chairman did state that from prudential motives, he had thought it inexpedient to give the number now actually in service, or enlisted by the present establishment. Sir, it is not my wish to go into a strict inquiry; the regard I have for the honor of my country forbids me; but I will suppose seventeen thousand, and, I believe, that is large; then there is left officers for eighteen thousand men. Are these not sufficient for the recruiting service? to engage every man who is willing to serve his country? to place a recruiting officer in almost every town and village in the United States? They are; and, therefore, you ought not to create an unnecessary addition. If the present establishment is not full, what is the reason? Either that the pay and bounty are not sufficient inducements, or there is a dislike to the service; your creating more regiments will not remove that difficulty. I am against the bill, because the term of service is too short to answer any valuable purpose. Suppose them intended to operate as a force against Canada. Let us see how that will answer the purpose: You send out your warrants to commence the enlistment of the proposed troops at this time; how long a time, is it contemplated, will be necessary for their enlistment? My opinion is, that you will not have them half full in four months; it is then time to take the field, and they are then raw troops. The honorable Chairman (Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS) states to you the number of troops necessary for defensive operations, according to his calculation, to be ten thousand; deducting that number from the present establishment, supposing it to be full. It is not for me to say how far the present establishment is short of the whole number, or will be at that time; but we know that it is far short; we do not know that it can be filled, and if it cannot, then those calculations are fictitious. He also states to you that the regular force in the Canadas is not to be estimated at less than twelve thousand, and three thousand in Halifax, besides their militia. According to this, and my views, you cannot enter Canada the next campaign with man for man; and surely that is not sufficient for conquest in an enemy's country. But I will suppose that you conquer a part of the country; that part must be garrisoned if you will keep it. In a year from the time of enlistment their term expires, and what becomes of your conquest, without force to keep it, supposing it to be made? Say that the officers will be called into service in four months, and there is some of the men enlisted six or eight months hence; the officers must serve until the expiration of the term of the last man engaged, or a derangement must take place--always a disagreeable occurrence in an army.

Sir, if you have not numbers sufficient to bear down all opposition, invade it not: act on the defensive until you have engaged your men, and for a term of time sufficient to answer your purpose; then may you count upon success and honor. I do not say that I believe land conquests will produce an acknowledgment of our rights on the ocean. I believe it will not; but unless you act with great regularity, system, and economy, you cannot avoid it; you must meet with nothing but disappointments and disgrace.

Mr. LAW said as he was originally opposed to the war, and the preparatory steps which led to it, he could not admit the principle, _that because war was declared_ he was bound to acquiesce, and lend his aid to promote every plan for prosecuting the war which might be proposed, however wild and extravagant the same might appear. He said he felt it a duty, and he claimed it as a right, (although he was not ambitious very often to exercise the right,) to offer objections to any measures which might be introduced, if he supposed they were not calculated to produce the effect intended, although he might not be in favor of the object itself; or if he believed the measure proposed would be productive of real evil. Now, sir, on this important occasion it would be wise for a moment to look back, and if we can bear the pain of retrospection, consider what this nation once was, what it might be, and what it in fact is. Time was, and that within the recollection of us all, when industry, commerce, prosperity, and peace, gladdened the hearts of this once happy people, and the use of arms was known only as a pacific pastime. The nation, like some individuals, could not bear the intoxicating influence of prosperity. It might have preserved its enviable condition, but it labored and groaned under the weight of national blessings; it submitted to regard the sinister views and malign influence of foreign powers; it listened--fatally listened--to a serpent more fell than the serpent of old. And now how sad is the reverse, let a dejected and impoverished nation answer; in the past, we see departed comforts; before us, we behold ruin and distress. The unhappy crisis to which we have arrived has been progressive. Had the transition been sudden, the nation would have been driven to desperation. We have been often admonished by those who foresaw the present evils; and had we been wise, might have avoided the calamities in which the country is now involved, and from which there is at present no prospect of speedy relief.

Sir, we will no longer dwell on times past; we will now briefly notice the causes which were alleged in the manifestoes which immediately preceded the declaration of war, and what was said to be the object, and attempt to show that the bill now under consideration is unnecessary for the attainment of the original object; that it will be injurious to the militia, and may endanger the liberties of the country.

As to the causes of the war, without admitting or denying their justice on national principles to justify the act at the time it was declared, he might say that some of the pretended causes have never been seriously relied on by our own Government. The principal one has been wholly removed; and but one of the ingenious catalogue now remains, and that might easily be adjusted to the mutual satisfaction of both nations. And, sir, it ought not to be forgotten, that the act declaring war was carried with great labor and much reluctance; and such was the majority in each branch of Congress that it might well have justified a doubt as to the expediency when it did pass. Besides, a large proportion of the United States were then, and even since have been opposed to the act. And this opposition was not confined to those who have been slanderously reported to be in the interest of Great Britain. The disgust and abhorrence was felt by some of the best patriots and purest bosoms in the country. Experience has also proved that the public sentiment was against the war; witness the feeble ranks of your volunteers, the slow and reluctant march of the militia, and the tardy progress in the recruiting service. Sir, the disgrace and disasters which have hitherto attended the army, have resulted more from a want of confidence in the justice and propriety of the war, than from the lack of talents in those who have conducted the battles, incompetent as they have been represented to command. A nation like this cannot be driven to war. They must feel the justice and necessity of it, and the justice must be so strong as to pierce every heart. This would be felt in a necessary and defensive war; then, indeed, the nation would smite with one arm. Before such a people, roused in such a cause, the veteran legions of Napoleon would be compelled to bite the dust. Such, alas! is not our case. We have a war, without the spirit or unanimity which springs from these causes, and without the pecuniary means of supporting it. Such a war must be disastrous! On what, sir, is the honor of this nation now suspended? On the Navy! that little navy which was despised, neglected, and forgotten, until it fought itself into notice, and rescued the sinking honor of the country.

What, sir, was the avowed object of this war? It has ever been said that conquest, with a view of extending our territory, and enlarging our dominion, was not the wish of this Government. The idea of this Republic following the footsteps of foreign ambitious nations, was so repugnant to the genius of the American people, and the constitution under which we live, that few, if any, of the warmest advocates of the war dare avow it.

The pretence was to take, or rather to receive Canada; for it was vainly supposed the inhabitants of that province would readily join our standard, on the first invitation. But we must go through the form of conquest to protect them from the charge of treason to their own Government. We were to hold Canada until peace should return, and then it was to be delivered up in exchange for maritime rights. And this it was supposed would be a powerful weapon in our hands in the negotiation. With this view the bills augmenting the Army, raising the volunteers, and transferring the militia, passed. By the present bill, and the project connected with it, the original plan is abandoned with the volunteers and militia, and we are now presented with a compound system of conquest, extermination, and defence. It would seem with the force of fifty-five thousand regular troops, we are to conquer all the residue of North America; exterminate every tawny infidel this side of the Isthmus of Darien, and defend a seacoast many hundred miles in extent from the incursions of the enemy! This is truly a gigantic project. He said he could not give it his aid; and he thought some honorable gentlemen who voted for the war would, when they reflected on the magnitude of the scheme now presented, seize this occasion to retire, unwilling to entail on themselves and posterity the expense and ruin which would flow from the project, if carried into execution.

Mr. QUINCY.--Mr. Speaker, I fear that the state of my health may prevent my doing justice to my sentiments concerning this bill. I will, however, make the attempt though I should fail in it.

The bill proposes that 20,000 men should be added to the existing Military Establishment. This, at present, consists of 35,000 men. So that the effect of this bill is to place, at the disposal of the Executive, an army of 55,000. It is not pretended that this addition is wanted either for defence or for the relief of the Indian frontier. On the contrary, it is expressly acknowledged that the present establishment is sufficient for both of those objects. But the purpose for which these 20,000 men are demanded is, the invasion of Canada. This is unequivocally avowed by the chairman of the Committee of Military Affairs, (Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS,) the organ, as is admitted, of the will and the wishes of the American Cabinet.

The bill, therefore, brings, necessarily, into deliberation, the conquest of Canada, either as an object, in itself desirable, or consequentially advantageous, by its effect, in producing an early and honorable peace.[31]

Before I enter upon the discussion of those topics, which naturally arise from this state of the subject, I will ask your indulgence, for one moment, while I make a few remarks upon this intention of the American Cabinet thus unequivocally avowed. I am induced to this from the knowledge, which I have, that this design is not deemed to be serious by some men of both political parties; as well within this House as out of it. I know that some of the friends of the present Administration do consider the proposition as a mere feint, made for the purpose of putting a good face upon things, and of strengthening the hope of a successful negotiation, by exciting the apprehensions of the British Cabinet for the fate of their colonies. I know, also, that some of those who are opposed in political sentiment to the men who are now at the head of affairs, laugh at these schemes of invasion; and deem them hardly worth controversy, on account of their opinion of the imbecility of the American Cabinet, and the embarrassment of its resources.