Chapter I: A. Coles (55)

These propositions went completely to secure to Great Britain the services of all her seafaring subjects, except such as were naturalized under our laws, which amounted to but few, indeed; thirteen hundred British seamen only having been naturalized since the commencement of our Government, and, in all probability, an equal number of our seamen have been naturalized by Great Britain during the same period. Yet, to my astonishment, have I heard it stated, during this debate, that our Government had made no serious propositions to secure to Great Britain the services of her seamen.

But equitable as these propositions were, they were rejected. Notwithstanding, sir, our Government, anxious in their pursuit after peace, have gone still further; they have, through our late Chargé d'Affaires in London, (Mr. Russell,) proposed to Great Britain to exclude from our naval service, as well public as private, all her seamen, including those which may hereafter be naturalized; and notwithstanding the liberality and justice of this proposal, it, like all others, has been made without producing the desired effect. And what more, sir, could have been asked of us, required, or granted, than is contained in these offers? Nothing more, unless, indeed, they had asked for our independence, and, yielding to the requisition, we had granted it. When an American vessel is at sea, it is amenable to no laws but those of its own country and the laws of nations; and where, in either of these, will the advocates for impressment find their justification? Sir, had not the practice of impressment been treated as a casual, a trivial circumstance, during this debate, I should not have presumed to trouble the House with my desultory remarks; and my principal object in addressing the House, was to ask their attention to a document which appears to have been overlooked, and which, if necessary, will place the abomination of that practice in colors too strong to be mistaken.

Here Mr. K. read the following extract of a letter from the Secretary of State to Mr. Monroe, dated January 4th, 1804--

"The whole number of applications made by impressed seamen
to our Consul in London, between the month of June, 1797,
and September, 1804, were two thousand and fifty-nine. Of
this number, one hundred and two seamen only were detained as
British subjects, which is less than one-twentieth of the whole
number impressed. Eleven hundred and forty-two were discharged,
or ordered to be so, and eight hundred and five were detained
for further proof, with the strongest presumption that the
greater part, if not the whole, were Americans, or other
aliens, whose proof of citizenship had been lost or destroyed."

It is, then, evident, from this document, that, for every British seamen obtained by this violent proceeding, a number of Americans, or other aliens, with whom Great Britain has no right to meddle, not less than twenty for one have been the victims to it. Sir, have we become so lost to the real independence and sovereignty of the country, that we are prepared to yield to this degrading, debasing, and humiliating badge of vassalage?

The Romans, of old, had a practice of making the governors of those countries they conquered pass annually beneath their yoke, as a mark of submission; but we, doomed to humiliation far greater, are made to pass daily, nay, hourly, beneath one much more galling. Some gentlemen object to the propositions made by Mr. Russell, and assert that he was not authorized. They should recollect that Mr. Russell's letter, containing this final offer to the British Government, was communicated to this House by the President, and, had it not met with his concurrence, it is presumable he would, in his communication, have expressed his disapprobation towards it. Nay, a similar offer has been made by the Secretary of State to Admiral Warren.

I know not whether the feelings of shame or indignation predominate in my breast, when I see gentlemen constantly laboring to place their own Government in the wrong; and, in contradiction to the official records of this House, insist that we are contending for the employment of foreigners.

The language of our Government upon that subject, is this, sir: that, if the oppressed and unfortunate inhabitants of Europe, escaping from their tyranny and panting after their long-lost liberty, seek a refuge in our happy country, upon their compliance with our naturalization laws, we are willing to extend to them those blessings we enjoy; but should they become dissatisfied with the advantages which the interior of the country affords them, and they think proper to depart from our shores, we say to them, we will not risk our peace for their protection beyond our territorial limits. So far from our contest with Great Britain being for the employment of her subjects, it is a contest for shielding a large and valuable portion of our fellow-citizens from British thraldom, under the lash of which they have too long labored; and who will dare discriminate in that protection which is equally due to all, that is due to the meanest individual in the community, and withhold it from a class of men who have done honor to the American character, and covered themselves with glory?

Mr. RANDOLPH rose, apparently laboring under the effects of a serious indisposition, and addressed the Chair.

I rise (said he) with a heart saddened by the disgrace of our common country, and sickened by the way in which the business of the State has been managed.

Of the temper and virulence which have manifested themselves in this debate, I shall not have any occasion to divest myself in the course of the very few remarks which I fear I shall be enabled to make, because towards them I have no purpose. Indeed, when I look around me, I am exceedingly sad; and I know not now if it will be in my power to go on.

I had intended, if time and health permitted, to address to this Assembly some few observations, confined principally to the change which has taken place in the relations of our country since the declaration of war, not only respecting that belligerent with whom we are engaged in hostilities, but her adversary also. But the course that this debate has taken imposes upon me a painful duty, which I trust God will give me strength to discharge: the duty of reviewing past transactions in the Government, which, from my heart, I would, instead of bringing them up on the present occasion, gladly discharge from my memory. But self-defence is the first law of nature. The merest reptile, the worm itself, will turn when trod upon. Nor is the force of the blow lessened by its being dealt, as in the present case, by the hand--I will not say under the garb and circumstances--of Friendship.

It was my lot, sir, and I may assuredly say my misfortune, to take some little share in those transactions which brought about a civil revolution in the Government of this country. I hope that I am understood. I feel I shall be understood, when I speak of this, by all wise and good men; and it is with them only that I wish to hold intercourse--to commune. It is of their good opinion alone that I am ambitious, if indeed ambition dwell any where in my heart.

Let me endeavor to recall to recollection the state of things about the period when I had the unhappiness to dedicate myself to political life.

Through the opposition, bold but just, which was made by myself, and those associated with me, to the measures of that Administration, an entire change was effected in the control of the Government. One Administration was ejected from power, and another took its place. Is it necessary for me to descant upon the topics of difference which then separated the two great parties in the Government? Is it necessary for me at this time of day to make a declaration of the principles of the Republican party? Is it possible that such a declaration could be deemed orthodox when proceeding from lips so unholy as those of an excommunicant from that church? It is not necessary. Those principles are on record; they are engraved upon it indelibly by the press, and will live as long as the art of printing is suffered to exist. It is not for any man at this day to undertake to change them. It is not for any man who then professed them, by any guise or circumlocution, to conceal apostacy from them, for they are there--there in the book. What are they? They have been delivered to you by my honorable colleague--what are they? Love of peace, hatred of offensive war; jealousy of the State Governments towards the General Government, and of the influence of the Executive Government over the co-ordinate branches of that Government; a dread of standing armies; a loathing of public debt, taxes, and excises; tenderness for the liberty of the citizen; jealousy, Argus-eyed jealousy, of the patronage of the President. From these principles what desertions have we not witnessed? Will you have a list of them? I shall not undertake it.

Principle does not consist in names. Federalism is a real thing--not a spectre, a shadow, a phantom. It is a living addition to the power of the General Government, in preference to the power of the States; partiality for the Executive power, in distinction to that of the co-ordinate Departments of the Government; the support of great military and naval force, and of an "energetic" administration of the Government. That is what is called Federalism. Yes, an energetic Administration, not in its real, but technical sense; for it has a sense as technical as any in our laws. _That_ is Federalism. And, when I am opposing the course which looks toward the rearing up of great Military and Naval Establishments, of an extent not only incommensurate with the necessity but the ability of my country, I care not with whom I vote; I will be true to my principles. Let any man lay his finger upon a vote in which, since I have had the honor (if, indeed, it be an honor) of a seat in this House, I have departed from those principles, and I will consent that, _quoad hoc_, I am a Federalist. But it will be in vain to search for such a vote.

So strenuous, sir, had been the contest--so hot the spirit of rivalship between the two contending parties--that, after the Revolution of 1801, a curious spectacle was presented to this nation and to the world--a spectacle which, I am bold to say, never did before make its appearance in any Government, and never will appear again. It was this: that, as if the character that each party had borne when in collision with one another was indelible, the two parties, after power was transferred from one to the other, did actually maintain the same character which they had derived from impressions received during their late conflict: and the admiring world saw with astonishment the case of an opposition minority attempting to force upon a reluctant Administration patronage and power, which that Administration put by, and sternly refused to accept. Yes, sir; for a time so completely had the Republicans been imbued with the principles which they professed whilst in a minority, that, after becoming the majority, the Federalists pressed on their old adversaries power and patronage, to which they absolutely opposed themselves, repelling, for a season, every project of the kind. Is it necessary for me to allude to the reduction of the Army--to say by whom it was made? Sir, the proposition for it was originally made by the personage now addressing you; it came from what was then considered the Governmental side of the House. And by whom was it opposed? By gentlemen who had so long fought under the banners of a Government of "energy," that they were not content to submit to the diminution of its patronage or its power, even in the hands of their political opponents. I speak of facts. Such a case will never occur again. Nay, indeed, in a little time, the sweets of power had their effect on one side of the House, as the frowns of adversity had upon the other; and after awhile, the court and country parties as easily changed sides as right and left do when a man turns upon his heel.

Yes, sir, the tone of this House was soon changed. We succeeded, however, in the reduction of the Army; but I will trust to the recollection of gentlemen, upon all sides of the House, by what instrumentality this change was effected. The Commander of that Army was retained in his position. I have not leisure, health, or strength, to go into the details; gentlemen will remember them. Meanwhile, peace with this country was negotiated in France by the commissioners sent by Mr. Adams, and was followed up very soon afterwards by the short respite that the truce of Amiens gave to European combatants, wearied rather than satiated with slaughter. These events placed this country in the happiest condition. Of the proceeds of the direct and internal taxes voted by the predecessors of the administration of Mr. Jefferson, one moiety at least came into the Treasury after their dismissal from office. But these proceeds were not necessary to give an overflow of money into the Treasury, which we never ceased to have until we departed from those principles of government and that policy which brought us into power. We sailed on for some time in the full tide of successful experiment, unobstructed by squalls or adverse gales, if we except only the Yazoo breeze. That question was, if I forget not, the first cause of a breach between those persons who had a direct lead in the Government of the country. There were men who did not hesitate, in opposition to all the heads of your Departments, to throw themselves into the breach at that time attempted in the constitution of the country, to defend it, and to defend it with success. It appears, from some documents that have lately been laid upon our table, that errors of that day have been perceived, and that tender consciences which at that time revolted, are now entirely reconciled to the compromise which was then stamped with the reprobation of almost every honest man from Georgia to Virginia. There were considerations of personal feeling which gave to other parts of the Union, and to certain individuals therein, a bias on that subject; and I should be extremely sorry to be considered as passing any thing like general censure upon the advocates of that measure in or out of this House. I refer only, of course, to those who were not parties concerned in the fraud.

At that time, sir, all was prosperity and joy. At that time were accumulated in the Treasury those surpluses which, in one year, nearly equalled the sum for which, in the present year, the revenue is deficient, notwithstanding the loan of last year, and to make up which deficiency the head of the Treasury has been able to devise no other means than a resort to new loans. Yes, sir, there were then those surpluses in the Treasury, the ghosts of which lingered along its vaults for a time after their corporeal bodies departed, and were then heard of no more.

But to proceed. The expenditures of the Government, during the first four years of the Jefferson Administration, exclusive of payments on account of the public debt, averaged only eight millions of dollars a year. In the four last years of the Jefferson Administration, those expenditures were very greatly increased, amounting in the year 1808, (the last of the four,) without any increase of Army and Navy expenditures, to upwards of sixteen millions of dollars--rivalling the expenditures of any one year of Mr. Adams's war, and amounting to one-half as much as was expended by the Father of his Country in his eight years of the Presidency, during which he was called upon to establish public credit, to maintain a bloody Indian war, and to lay the foundation of that character of integrity which the Government has so long sustained abroad, notwithstanding the misconduct of its rulers. Yes, sir, it is a curious but notorious fact, that in 1808 and 1809--and I speak of 1809, for, although the present incumbent came into office on the 3d of March of that year, expenses were incurred and voted in his predecessor's time--the expenditures of the Government outraged all belief when compared with the objects on which they were lavished. And here, Mr. Chairman, let me put to you, and to the gentleman on my right, if it be within the compass of any man's powers to detract more from the merit of an administration of the Government of the United States in managing at least one branch of the revenue than has been done by that honorable gentleman? What has he said? I will not repeat his words; to do so would be odious, invidious; but I well know if what he did say had come from the other side of the House, it would have been set down to the rancor of party spirit; to personal spleen; or to want of respect for the White house, or the Red house, or some other house. What has become of that vast amount of money? No man knows; and to the best of my knowledge and belief, so help me God, no man will ever know.

I find, as I anticipated, a difficulty in dragging along my miserable body, and my feeble mind, in this discussion; a difficulty not less, perhaps, than that of dragging along with me the attention of members of this House. I ask its patience, its pardon, and its pity.

But to continue. In this prosperous state of our country, the war in Europe was renewed, or about to be renewed. The Government of the United States would naturally, from the situation of affairs in that quarter of the world, experience a temporary diminution in its revenue, which it need not feel or regard, because it had been enabled to make that noble provision for a sinking fund, for lessening the national debt, for paying off the mortgages on the estate of every man in the country and of those who are unborn. It had made that noble provision, which was attempted to be diverted to the necessities created by the policy of the last four years of Jefferson's Administration, and the actual diversion of which, I believe, was the first act of this Administration. It had made that appropriation of eight millions of dollars for a sinking fund, not to be touched for any other purpose, and which, at the time of the appropriation, no man dared to believe would be gambled away.

The war in Europe brought to this country, among other birds of passage, a ravenous flock of neutralized carriers, which interposed the flag of neutrality, not only between the property, but even between the persons of the two belligerent powers; and it was their clamor principally, aided by the representations of those of our merchants who saw and wished to participate in the gains of such a commerce, that the first step was taken in that policy of restriction, which it was then foreseen would lead to the disastrous condition in which we now find ourselves. Yes, it was then foreseen and foretold. What was then prophesied is now history. It is so. "You," said the prophet, "are prospering beyond all human example. You, favorites of Almighty God, while all the rest of the world are scourged, and ravaged, and desolated by war, are about to enter into a policy called _preventive_ of war; a policy which comes into this House in the garb of peace, but which must end in war." And in war it _has_ ended. Yes, sir, we have been tortured, fretted, goaded, until at last, like some poor man driven from his family by discord at home, who says to himself, "any thing, even exile, is better than this," we have said that we will take war; we will take _any thing_ for a change. And when war came, what said the people? _They_ said, "any thing for a change!"

At that time circumstances occurred, and I hope the House will pardon me for alluding to them. It is absolutely necessary that I should do so. They have been spoken of by others before me; they were at the time, and have been since, detailed in the most solemn manner on the floor of this body. A denial of them has been challenged and never received. At that time, I repeat, circumstances occurred which made it my duty to oppose the projects of the Executive Government of this country in its relations with foreign powers.

At that time nothing that the _Spanish_ Government could do, not even the invasion of our own territory, not even the capture and carrying off, not from our decks, but our soil, a portion of our citizens, could rouse this House to a spirit which would, in my judgment, have comported not only with its honor, but was absolutely indispensable to its dignity. We were wanting in the assertion of the rights of our own country over its soil and jurisdiction, by which assertion, then, we might have averted the calamities which have since befallen us; but a project for that purpose, recommended by the committee to whom that subject was referred, did not meet the approbation of the House. And from that day and date, the black cloud has thickened over us; has become more and more dense. From that day and date, have we departed from those counsels--in my humble judgment, at least--from those principles, adherence to which had induced the people of the United States to clothe us with their power and confidence.

What have we done since? From that day, with a short interruption, the policy of this Government has actually subserved, as far as it could, the purposes of _France_. I speak of facts; of facts susceptible of proof, which may be felt, seen, touched, heard, and understood by all except those too indolent to examine them, or too ignorant for the light of truth to have any effect upon their understandings. I say, sir, that the policy of this Government has, from that time, subserved the purposes of France. And how do I prove it? Why, sir, by way of meeting the French decrees, which prohibit to us all intercourse with Great Britain, we cut off the intercourse between us and the whole world. We virtually held out to our great commercial cities--to Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston--the same language as Bonaparte had held to his own cities: "I know that you are suffering, and unhappy; that the grass is growing in your streets; that the ships at your wharves are rotting, until they are fit only for fuel; that your trade is dwindling only to nothing; but what is all that to my continental system? What are a few seaport towns--enterprising, wealthy, and prosperous, as indeed they are--what are they, compared to my continental system?" And, sir, what was our "restrictive" system? Similar in point of effect--certainly cotemporaneous in point of time--to Bonaparte's "continental system." Sir, it is a matter susceptible of demonstration, if I possessed the physical power to go through with it, that the system recommended by the then President of the United States, of laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in our ports, for the purpose of "keeping in safety these essential resources," took place in consequence of a communication from our Minister in Paris to this Government, transmitting certain correspondence of his with the French Government. And although in the message to both Houses of Congress, recommending the measure, the President does use the term "belligerent powers," I do attest the fact, and I call upon other gentlemen, who know it, to attest it also, that, while the message purposely referred to both "belligerents," not one scrip of manuscript relating to the other "belligerent" accompanied that message; nor was there any thing contained in that message relating to that "belligerent," but a scrap from an English paper, about the size of a square of its columns, containing some speculations of a London editor; and I say that there did not exist in this House, nor in this nation--if there did, let the evidence be produced--any knowledge of the existence of the orders in council, which have been put forward as justifying the embargo. If their existence had been known at the time, would the President in his message recommending an embargo have failed to notice the fact? Would he not have used it as one of the strongest inducements to the adoption of this system? Would those "orders" not have been published in the National Intelligencer, which is considered--and certainly not without cause, in view of certain things which we have lately seen in it--to be the Court paper? Produce the National Intelligencer of that date; there is not one syllable to be found in it concerning the Orders in Council. No, sir, in his message on the occasion referred to, the President did not produce any _acts_ of the "belligerents" referred to, but only the correspondence between General Armstrong, our Minister at Paris, and that Government, on the subject of the construction of one of its first decrees. It was in consequence of the more recent decrees of France, and not of the British Orders in Council, that the embargo was recommended and laid. And yet, in the discussion which came off on that measure, it was represented as a weapon against England, which would be more efficient than any war, and must bring her to our feet: it would give effect to the object which Bonaparte had in view, of destroying her by consumption, by cutting her off from the commerce of the world. Although I state these facts, I know that it may be proven--and I am sorry that it can--by reference to the journals of this House, and by a report, too, of an honorable and respectable committee of this House, that the embargo was designed to obviate the effects of the Orders in Council.

But, sir, it is indisputably true, that there was no mention in the embargo message of those Orders in Council--no allusion to them in debate upon it--no knowledge of them at the time that the embargo law was passed, that can be proven by any document whatsoever entitled to the least respect; and I will even go so far as to allow as evidence the authority of any newspaper. The members of that committee had heard so much of the Orders in Council, and the effect that it was pretended that the embargo would have upon them, that in their report, speaking of them, they absolutely transposed cause and effect. It is unfortunate that it should be so; but it is nevertheless true. Events subsequent to the period to which I have now brought myself have been detailed in this debate in a manner so clear, so lucid, so convincing, by two honorable gentlemen from New York, that there is no need of my repeating the narrative: but I must be permitted to say that the statement made yesterday by a gentleman from New York, (Mr. EMOTT,) will be refuted when Euclid shall come to be considered a shallow sophist, and not before. My honorable friend from the same State, who spoke a few days ago, called upon gentlemen to handle that part of the subject--the revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees, and the inveiglement thereby of this country into a war with England--in a manner more able than, he was pleased to say, he himself had done it. The attempt to do this would, indeed, be to gild refined gold, to paint the lily, to add to the perfume of the violet--in all cases a most ridiculous and wasteful excess. And yet, sir, the situation in which I unhappily stand, and in which it was my lot to stand at the conclusion of the last session of Congress, compels me to say a word on this subject. You will remember, sir, that it was my misfortune, during the first session of this Congress, to oppose the attempt to impress upon this House and the nation certain most preposterous, absurd, and false propositions; for the temerity of which effort I came under the censure--implied, at least, if not to say direct--of this honorable body. The contrary propositions, which I undertook to maintain, were, first, that the Berlin and Milan decrees were not repealed on the first of November, 1810, and that the only evidence of any such repeal, up to that date, was _the President's Proclamation_ of the second of that month; and secondly, that the British Orders in Council did, in point of fact, establish no serious insurmountable obstacle to negotiation between that Government and the United States. Why, sir, I shall not here go into any argument on this point; if I had the ability, I have not the will; and, if I had the will, I have not the ability. Nor can it be necessary, when the Emperor of France himself comes into court, and cannot reject his own authority, as borne in his own laws. Yes, sir, he did come forth, and, in his antedated decree of the 28th of April, 1811--though it unquestionably ought to bear date full twelve months later--does, in the most offensive of all possible ways, establish the fact, not only that the Berlin and Milan decrees were not repealed (as all the world knew except the President of the United States) on the first of November, 1810, but that they were in his mind when he issued his decree, dated 28th April, 1811. They were repealed, finally, in consequence--of what? Of your doing that which for years he had been attempting, by menace and blandishment, to induce you to do--that is to say, embark in war with England, taking sides with France, "causing," as the phrase was, "our flag to be respected:" And this, too, after your having posted up in the ledger of this House that war with one of the "belligerents" was equivalent to submission to the other!

My other proposition was, that the Orders in Council constituted no insurmountable obstacle to negotiation between this country and Great Britain. And what was the fact in regard to them? Why, that almost at the time that this position was taken on this floor--a few weeks only thereafter--the Orders in Council were repealed.

I put it to you, sir, and to the great mass of the people of this country--to the honest, laborious, unsuspecting, kind-hearted, confiding, generous, and just people--had the fact been known that the French decrees were _not_ repealed, and that the Orders in Council _were_ repealed, whether any man, in any station, would have had the confidence to propose a declaration of war against England, taking part against her, and siding with France in the conflict in which those nations are engaged?

And, whilst I am upon this subject, permit me to say, suppose the proposition which was repeatedly made--in more than one instance by the person who is now addressing you, and supported with the greatest ability by gentlemen on the other side of the House--to postpone our declaration of war against Great Britain until the autumn, when we might be in some state of preparation and readiness for it--had succeeded, what would have been the consequence? At this time we should have been at peace; we should have been lying secure in that snug safe haven of neutrality, in which the good sense of the greatest and best men of this country have always attempted to moor the public ship. _Now_, where are we? And shall this war be called a popular war; a war of the people; a war called for by the public voice, into which this country has been plunged, not more by the agency of the friends of Government than of its enemies, in the hope of the latter that this Administration would sink and founder in it, and they rise to power thereupon? Is it possible that that can be deemed a war of the people, a popular war, which has enabled a gentleman known to be of the most respectable connections, and possessed, I believe, of considerable talent--but who, put in competition with the veteran politician now at the helm of Government, is but a boy in politics--a person whose pretensions are so extremely inferior, to rival the present Chief Magistrate in the confidence of the people, and for a time, as you know, make him tremble for his re-election? It is, however, some consolation to reflect that, in all free Governments, the public voice will sooner or later be heard upon all their measures, and in condemnation of those which the opinion of that public detests and execrates. This is a great law of politics; it is to the political what gravitation is to the physical world; it cannot be counteracted. Statesmen know it, feel it; they do not reason to it, but from it; they never lose sight of it, but are guided by it in all their measures. And those of us who live to see the next Congress, will live to see the effects of that law in this House.

Sir, we have passed so many laws, we have had so many objects for enticing the belligerents on the one hand and coercing them on the other, and enticing and coercing them together, that I feel some little difficulty, in the present state of my brain, in referring to them by title or date; but it is the law passed on this subject, in consequence of which the celebrated letter of the 1st of August of the Duc de Cadore was written, to which I desire most particularly to refer. If, after the proclamation of the President of the United States of the 1st of November thereafter, issued in consequence of that letter, revoking so much of our non-intercourse law as related to France, an unbroken warfare being kept up by France on our commerce--a fact as notorious as the existence of any fact in nature--was it not good cause for reinstating the law in relation to France, and putting her on her ancient ground? Then I would be glad to know, for one, whether our continuing at war with England was any better cause for keeping up the interdiction in relation to her, after she had revoked her Orders in Council? In other words, it being admitted by gentlemen on one side, as it has been contended by gentlemen on the other, that the revocation of the Orders in Council by Great Britain was such a one as did satisfy the terms of the non-intercourse act, what was the reason that the proclamation required by our law in such case did not issue? Why, sir, the state of war between the United States and Great Britain being offensive on our part--being of our own making--was held to be a cause why we cannot execute our law as relates to her. Now, whilst the continued war upon us by France, by seizures of our merchant vessels and their cargoes, is not considered an obstacle to its execution in regard to her, is it not as clear as the noon-day sun, that if the making of war by France on the United States did not constitute any good cause for withholding the revocation as to her, when she professed to have repealed her Berlin and Milan decrees, there was no reason why it should not have been extended to Great Britain also, when she actually repealed her Orders in Council?

I am extremely at a loss to say whether my judgment, my memory, my imagination, or my command of words, fit me for the expression of the few scattered ideas I have on this subject; I fear that they may fail me. But I believe it will be conceded, on all hands, that if, after the revocation of the British Orders in Council, the President of the United States had, as he honorably might have done, made that repeal the basis of negotiation with Great Britain, there is not a man in this country--certainly there is none among his admirers and adherents--who would not have hailed him as the restorer of the peace and prosperity of the country, which had been so idly (I had almost said so wickedly) disturbed. But, regardless of every consequence, we went into war with England as an inconsiderate couple go into matrimony, without considering whether they have the means of sustaining their own existence, much less that of any unfortunate progeny that should happen to be born of them. The sacrifice was made. The blood of Christians enjoying the privileges of jury trial, of the writ of _habeas corpus_, of the freedom of conscience, of the blessings of civil liberty, citizens of the last Republic that ambition has left upon the face of a desolate earth--the blood of such a people was poured out as an atonement to the Moloch of France. The Juggernaut of India is said to smile when it sees the blood flow from the human sacrifice which its worship exacts; the Emperor of France might now smile upon us. But no, sir, our miserable offering is spurned. The French monarch turns his nose and his eyes another way. He snuffs on the plains of Moscow a thousand hecatombs, waiting to be sacrificed on the shrine of his ambition; and the city of the Czars, the largest in the world, is to be at once the altar and the fire of sacrifice to his miserable ambition. And what injury has the Emperor of Russia done to him? For what was he contending? For national existence; for a bare existence; for himself and the people who are subject to his sway. And what, sir, are you doing? Virtually fighting the battles of his foes; surrendering yourself to the views of his adversary, without a plea--without any thing to justify your becoming the victims of his blasting ambition.

Yes, sir, after having for years attempted to drive us by menace into war with England, when he has seen us fairly embarked in it, and the champions of human rights bleeding in his cause, the Ruler of France has turned with contempt from your reclamations; he has left your Minister, who was charged with those reclamations, to follow him in his Russian campaign, to whip up his jaded Pegasus, and, travelling at his heels, to overtake him if he can.[34]

For these injuries and insults what atonement has been made? What satisfaction has been received for your plundered property? And what is the relation in which you stand to France? At this moment, when it is well known that it would not require one additional man in the army or navy to make good, in the eye of nations, your character as an independent and high-spirited people, you are prostrate at the feet of your's and the world's undoer. Is there any thing yet wanting to fill up the full measure of injustice you have sustained? Gentlemen on all sides are obliged to admit that the provocation which we have received from France is ample; that the cup of it is overflowing. And yet, what is our situation in relation to that destroyer of mankind--him who, devising death to all that live, sits like a cormorant on the tree of life; who cannot be glutted, nor tired, with human carnage; the impersonation of death; himself an incarnate death?

All this, I say, does prove--and if it does not I call on gentlemen to disprove the fact--that there is a difference in the standard by which we measure French aggressions and the aggressions of any other people under the sun. When Spain was the ally of France she was--what? She was secure from our indignation. There was not a murderer, a barbarian, in all our Western wilderness that was not safe under the Spanish cloak. For why? Because the King of Spain, such as he was--for he wore only the semblance of a crown--was in alliance with France; and he must not be touched.

But what has _Revolutionary_ Spain done? What offence has she committed against France? That she is not only helpless, destitute of resources, unable to return a blow, but, above all, is coveted by France, are considerations which cannot justify, on the part of France, conduct towards her more infamous than that of the English at Copenhagen--conduct cowardly as it is unprincipled. But, sir, I forewarn gentlemen of the Southern country--I do beseech them, with a sincerity which no man can have a right to question--to beware how they transfer the theatre of war from the rocks and snows of Canada to the sandhills, the rice-fields, the tobacco plantations of the Southern States. For them to think of voluntarily consenting to make that region the theatre of the war, would compel me to believe that they are on the verge of that madness which precedes the destruction of all doomed by Heaven to perish.

Sir, I have just touched, with trembling and faltering hand, some of the preliminary observations which I had intended, at some time or other, to make, into which I have now been prematurely forced to enter, not more unexpectedly than unavoidably, by the strange turn which this debate has taken.

There are two other points--for, in respect to the Orders of Council, I shall not say a word about them--upon which I am very anxious to offer myself to your attention: the one the celebrated point of impressment, which, though it has been very ably handled, is not yet exhausted: the other the Indian war on our Western border. And I also wish to say something on the subject of negotiation. In the midst of a war with one of the greatest powers of Europe, why should the gleam of the tomahawk and the scalping-knife, the cries of massacred women and children reaching our ears--why should these fright us from our propriety? Why, we are told the Indians of the West have been stirred up to war with us by British agents. But what is the fact? That we have no Indian war, but a war of our own seeking, as I have already, in the course of this session, read to you certain proofs; and I will now give you another. It is this: It is agreed on all hands--no man has attempted to dispute it--that, in the affair of the battle of Tippecanoe, the commander and the officers distinguished themselves by the greatest gallantry. How has it happened, then, that while we have been freely voting medals to those gallant officers of our navy who have distinguished themselves on the ocean--and I hope we shall vote them something more substantial--not a whisper has been heard in relation to those who have been engaged in this expedition against the Indians? The subject has not been even inquired into.

Do we know, at this moment, as a Legislature, the causes of that disastrous business--I call it so from its consequences--or by whose authority this war was made? Or, is it come to this: that Governors of our Territories are to consider themselves as so many Hastings and Wellesleys of our country, and that, while they do not involve us in war with Christians like themselves, they may go to any extent in exterminating the Red Barbarians here as in the East Indies Governors and Proconsuls of the British Government do there in regard to uncivilized powers of that quarter of the globe? Is it discovered that our Territorial Governors may at pleasure invade the territory of other nations--for, inconsiderable and contemptible though they be, the Indian tribes _are_ nations--in like manner that the British authorities make war upon those nations of the East? Yes, sir, not only is this a war of our own seeking--not only we had it in our power to keep the peace--but in the country which was the scene of the battle, and in the adjacent country, it was the most popular war ever waged. The frontier people of this country have been in the habit of driving the heathen before them; and to them the chase of the deer, the elk, and the antelope, is not so grateful as that of the red men they hunt. I believe that it is the cause of serious regret to many of the people of the West that there is now no longer any motive to drive them from their lands. As to the Red Men, the Big-Knives have, without any foreign prompting or instigation, driven them off from a country more extensive than that over which the Emperor of France wields his sceptre. So I put aside this item of Indian war altogether as a matter of account in the list of our grievances against the British Government. There is not a shadow of foundation for believing that these Indians were or could have been instigated to take up the hatchet against us until hostile arms had been taken up against them. When driven to the wall they must fight or die--the last alternative left to them--for which nobody can blame them.

It was, sir, a saying of one of the best men who ever wrote, in correspondence with a friend, that he had no time to write a shorter letter; and I can truly say that I have not _time_ to deliver a shorter speech. I know that this question will be taken to-day, for I have been so admonished; and my own very severe and sudden indisposition, which I am almost ashamed to name, will compel me to detain your attention much longer than under other circumstances would have been the case.

A word, now, on the subject of impressment. Our foreign trade had grown beyond the capacity of either our tonnage or seamen to manage. Our mercantile marine was an infant Hercules; but it was overloaded beyond its strength: the crop was too abundant to be gathered by our hands alone. The consequence was, and a natural one too, that not only the capitalists flocked into our country from abroad to share in our growing commerce, but the policy also of our Government was adapted to it, and a law was passed to enable us to avail ourselves of the services of British seamen and seamen of other countries. And, in doing this, we availed ourselves of the pretext--which, as long as the countries to which they belonged winked at it, was fair for us to use--of taking these British seamen for Americans. It was in 1796 that commenced the act, to which reference has been made, and that system of "protections," as they were called, the very mention of which, at this day, causes a burst of honest indignation in the breast of citizens whose situation enables them to ascertain their true character. If these "protections," so termed, have not been forged all over Europe, it is only for the reason that the notes of a certain bank of which I have heard have not been forged, viz: that, the bank being broke, its notes were so worthless that people would not even steal them. The "protections" are attainable by everybody; by men of all ages, countries, and descriptions. They are a mere farce. The issuing of them has gone far to disgrace the character of the country, and has brought into question and jeopardy the rights of real American citizens. This question of impressment, delicate as it has been said to be--difficult as in one view it certainly is--is, of all others, in my judgment, the most compact. With the gentleman from New York, I will say that the tide of emigration has brought to the shores of our country many most valuable characters; some of them persons with whom I have the honor of being in habits, not only of intimacy, but friendship. I believe there does not exist one man of this description, who comes _bona fide_ to this country to settle himself and children here, that would require you to go to war on his account. And, sir, I believe that the belligerent position itself in which you now find yourself will relieve you in a great degree of this evil, for many seamen who have so long, by virtue of these "protections," passed themselves off for American, will find it to be very convenient to be Portuguese or Swedish seamen, or seamen of some other State than the United States--some State that is not at war with England. Sir, there is a wide difference between the character of American seamen and seamen of every other country on earth. The American seaman has a home on the land, a domicil, a wife and children, to whom he is attached, to whom he is in the habit of returning after his voyages; with whom he spends, sometimes, a long vacation from the toils of maritime life. It is not so with the seamen of other countries. For the protection of men of the first description, I am disposed, if necessary, to use the force of the country, but for no other. I know, indeed, that some gentlemen who have spoken much on the subject of the principle of impressment, will tell you that the right to take from a neutral vessel one seaman, if carried to its extent, involves a right to take any, or all seamen. Why, sir, in like manner, it might be argued that the taking illegally of one vessel at sea involves the right to take every vessel. And yet, sir, who ever heard of two nations _going to war_ about a single case of capture, though admitted not to be justified by the laws? Such a case never did and never will occur.

Of one thing we are certain: it rests upon no doubtful ground: that Great Britain, rather than surrender the right of impressing her own seamen, will nail her colors to the mast, and go down with them. And she is right, because, when she does surrender it, she is Samson shorn of his strength: the sinews of her power are cut. I say this openly in the House of Representatives; and I am not communicating to the enemy a secret of any value, because she has herself told us that she can never surrender it. She has told us so, not when she stood in the relation of an enemy toward us, but in the friendly intercourse of the British Ministry with our late Commissioners at London. Turn to the book: I wish the honorable gentleman, if he has it, would for a moment let me have the use of it. You are told in that book that every effort was made by the American Commissioners to effect a relaxation of this right; that the British Ministry evinced the sincerest desire to give satisfaction to them on this point: _but_ what? The Admiralty was consulted; they waked up out of their slumbers the Civilians at Doctors' Commons to deliberate upon it; and they came to the conclusion that the Government of Great Britain could not give up that right. Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, the Commissioners of the United States to negotiate a treaty with the Government of Great Britain, in their correspondence with their own Government, give this fact to excuse themselves for failing to accomplish their object, and to prove that every thing had been done that could be on their part, and every thing conceded on the other side that the most friendly disposition could warrant--and here I do not speak of masked friendship, but of real friendship. Although every thing possible had been done, this right of impressment of her own seamen was a _sine qua non_ on the part of Great Britain--one which would not, could not, must not, be surrendered. And, sir, if this question of the right of impressment was one on which we were to go to war with Great Britain, we ought to have gone to war _then_; because we were then told by the highest authority in that Government that this was a point which never would be given up.

I find, sir, that I cannot trust my broken voice to _read_ the book, now that it is in my hand, but must rely upon my recollection for facts.