Chapter XXVI: Phædrus--Symposion (1)

[Side-note: These two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. Phædrus is the originator of both.]

I put together these two dialogues, as distinguished by a marked peculiarity. They are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. They have one great and interesting subject common to both: though in the Phædrus, this subject is blended with, and made contributory to, another. They agree also in the circumstance, that Phædrus is, in both, the person who originates the conversation. But they differ materially in the manner of handling, in the comparisons and illustrations, and in the apparent purpose.

[Side-note: Eros as conceived by Plato. Different sentiment prevalent in Hellenic antiquity and in modern times. Position of women in Greece.]

The subject common to both is, Love or Eros in its largest sense, and with its manifold varieties. Under the totally different vein of sentiment which prevails in modern times, and which recognises passionate love as prevailing only between persons of different sex--it is difficult for us to enter into Plato's eloquent exposition of the feeling as he conceives it. In the Hellenic point of view,[1] upon which Plato builds, the attachment of man to woman was regarded as a natural impulse, and as a domestic, social, sentiment; yet as belonging to a common-place rather than to an exalted mind, and seldom or never rising to that pitch of enthusiasm which overpowers all other emotions, absorbs the whole man, and aims either at the joint performance of great exploits or the joint prosecution of intellectual improvement by continued colloquy. We must remember that the wives and daughters of citizens were seldom seen abroad: that the wife was married very young: that she had learnt nothing except spinning and weaving: that the fact of her having seen as little and heard as little as possible, was considered as rendering her more acceptable to her husband:[2] that her sphere of duty and exertion was confined to the interior of the family. The beauty of women yielded satisfaction to the senses, but little beyond. It was the masculine beauty of youth that fired the Hellenic imagination with glowing and impassioned sentiment. The finest youths, and those too of the best families and education, were seen habitually uncovered in the Palæstra and at the public festival-matches; engaged in active contention and graceful exercise, under the direction of professional trainers. The sight of the living form, in such perfection, movement, and variety, awakened a powerful emotional sympathy, blended with aesthetic sentiment, which in the more susceptible natures was exalted into intense and passionate devotion. The terms in which this feeling is described, both by Plato and Xenophon, are among the strongest which the language affords--and are predicated even of Sokrates himself. Far from being ashamed of the feeling, they consider it admirable and beneficial; though very liable to abuse, which they emphatically denounce and forbid.[3] In their view, it was an idealising passion, which tended to raise a man above the vulgar and selfish pursuits of life, and even above the fear of death. The devoted attachments which it inspired were dreaded by the despots, who forbade the assemblage of youths for exercise in the palæstra.[4]

[Footnote 1: Schleiermacher (Einleit. zum Symp. p. 367) describes this view of Eros as Hellenic, and as "gerade den anti-modernen and anti-christlichen Pol der Platonischen Denkungsart". Aristotle composed [Greek: The/seis E)rôtikai\] or [Greek: E)rôtika/s], Diogenes Laert. v. 22-24. See Bernays, Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 133, Berlin, 1863.

Compare the dialogue called [Greek: E)rôtiko/s], among the works of Plutarch, p. 750 seq., where some of the speakers, especially Protogenes, illustrate and enlarge upon this Platonic construction of Eros--[Greek: a)lêthinou= de\ E)/rôtos ou)d' o(tiou=n tê=| gunaikôni/tidi me/testin], &c. (750 C, 761 B, &c.)

In the Treatise De Educatione Puerorum (c. 15, p. 11 D-F) Plutarch hesitates to give a decided opinion on the amount of restriction proper to be imposed on youth: he is much impressed with the authority of Sokrates, Plato, Xenophon, Æschines, Kebês, [Greek: kai\ to\n pa/nta cho/ron e)kei/nôn tô=n a)ndrô=n, oi( tou\s a)/r)r(enas e)doki/masan e)/rôtas], &c. See the anecdote about Episthenes, an officer among the Ten Thousand Greeks under Xenophon, in Xenophon, Anabasis, vii. 4, 7, and a remarkable passage about Zeno the Stoic, Diog. Laert. vii. 13. Respecting the general subject of [Greek: paiderasti/a] in Greece, there is a valuable Excursus in Bekker's Charikles, vol. i. pp. 347-377, Excurs. ii. I agree generally with his belief about the practice in Greece, see Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iv. 33, 70. Bekker quotes abundant authorities, which might be farther multiplied if necessary. In appreciating the evidence upon this point, we cannot be too careful to keep in mind what Sokrates says (in the Xenophontic Symposion, viii. 34) when comparing the Thebans and Eleians on one side with the Athenians and Spartans on the other--[Greek: E)kei/nois me\n ga\r tau=ta no/mima, ê(mi=n de\ e)ponei/dista.] We must interpret passages of the classical authors according to their fair and real meanings, not according to the conclusions which we might wish to find proved.

If we read the oration of Demosthenes against Neæra (which is full of information about Athenian manners), we find the speaker Apollodôrus distributing the relations of men with women in the following manner (p. 1386)--[Greek: to\ ga\r sunoikei=n tou=t' e)sti/n, o(\s a)\n paidopoiê=tai kai\ ei)sa/gê| ei)/s te tou\s dêmo/tas kai\ tou\s phra/toras tou\s ui(ei=s, kai\ ta\s thugate/ras e)kdidô=| ô(s au)tou= ou)/sas toi=s a)ndra/si. Ta\s me\n ga\r e(tai/ras, ê(donê=s e(/neka e)/chomen--ta\s de\ pallaka/s, tê=s kath' ê(me/ran therapei/as tou= sô/matos--ta\s de\ gunai=kas, tou= paidopoiei=sthai gnêsi/ôs, kai\ tô=n e(/ndon phu/laka pi/stên e)/chein.]

To the same purpose, the speaker in Lysias ([Greek: U(pe\r tou= E)ratosthe/nous pho/nou]--sect. 7), describing his wife, says--[Greek: e)n me\n ou)=n tô=| prô/tô| chro/nô| pasô=n ê)=n belti/stê; kai\ ga\r oi)kono/mos deinê\ kai\ pheidôlo\s a)gathê\ kai\ a)kribô=s pa/nta dioikou=sa.]

Neither of these three relations lent itself readily to the Platonic vein of sentiment and ideality: neither of them led to any grand results either in war--or political ambition--or philosophical speculation; the three great roads, in one or other of which the Grecian ideality travelled. We know from the Republic that Plato did not appreciate the value of the family life, or the purposes for which men marry, according to the above passage cited from Demosthenes. In this point, Plato differs from Xenophon, who, in his Oeconomicus, enlarges much (in the discourse of Ischomachus) upon the value of the conjugal union, with a view to prudential results and good management of the household; while he illustrates the sentimental and affectionate side of it, in the story of Pantheia and Abradates (Cyropædia).]

[Footnote 2: See the Oeconomicus of Xenophon, cap. iii. 12, vii. 5.]

[Footnote 3: The beginning of the Platonic Charmidês illustrates what is here said, pp. 154-155; also that of the Protagoras and Lysis, pp. 205-206.

Xenophon, Sympos. i. 8-11; iv. 11, 15. Memorab. i. 3, 8-14 (what Sokrates observes to Xenophon about Kritobulus). Dikæarchus (companion of Aristotle) disapproved the important influence which Plato assigned to Eros (Cicero, Tusc. D. iv. 34-71).

If we pass to the second century after the Christian Era, we find some speakers in Athenæus blaming severely the amorous sentiments of Sokrates and the narrative of Alkibiades, as recited in the Platonic Symposium (v. 180-187; xi. 506-508 C). Athenæus remarks farther, that Plato, writing in this strain, had little right to complain (as we read in the Republic) of the licentious compositions of Homer and other poets, and to exclude them from his model city. Maximus Tyrius, in one of his four discourses (23-5) on the [Greek: e)rôtikê\] of Sokrates, makes the same remark as Athenæus about the inconsistency of Plato in banishing Homer from the model city, and composing what we read in the Symposion; he farther observes that the erotic dispositions of Sokrates provoked no censure from his numerous enemies at the time (though they assailed him upon so many other points), but had incurred great censure from contemporaries of Maximus himself, to whom he replies--[Greek: tou\s nuni\ katêgo/rous] (23, 6-7). The comparisons which he institutes (23, 9) between the sentiments and phrases of Sokrates, and those of Sappho and Anakreon, are very curious.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus speaks of the [Greek: e)gkô/mia] on Eros in the Symposion, as "unworthy of serious handling or of Sokrates". (De Admir. Vi Dic. Demosth. p. 1027.)

But the most bitter among all the critics of Plato, is Herakleitus--author of the Allegoriæ Homericæ. Herakleitus repels, as unjust and calumnious, the sentence of banishment pronounced by Plato against Homer, from whom all mental cultivation had been derived. He affirms, and tries to show, that the poems of Homer--which he admits to be full of immorality if literally understood--had an allegorical meaning. He blames Plato for not having perceived this; and denounces him still more severely for the character of his own writings--[Greek: e)r)r(i/phthô de\ kai\ Pla/tôn o( ko/lax, O(mê/rou sukopha/ntês--Tou\s de\ Pla/tônos dialo/gous, a)/nô kai\ ka/tô paidikoi\ kathubri/zousin e)/rôtes, ou)damou= de ou)chi tê=s a)r)r(e/nos e)pithumi/as mesto/s e)stin o( a)nê/r] (Herakl. All. Hom., c. 4-74, ed. Mehler, Leiden, 1851).]

[Footnote 4: Plato, Sympos. 182 C. The proceedings of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, which illustrate this feeling, are recounted by Thucydides, vi. 54-57. These two citizens were gratefully recollected and extensively admired by the Athenian public.]

[Side-note: Eros, considered as the great stimulus to improving philosophical communion. Personal Beauty, the great point of approximation between the world of sense and the world of Ideas. Gradual generalisation of the sentiment.]

Especially to Plato, who combined erotic and poetical imagination with Sokratic dialectics and generalising theory--this passion presented itself in the light of a stimulus introductory to the work of philosophy--an impulse at first impetuous and undistinguishing, but afterwards regulated towards improving communion and colloquy with an improvable youth. Personal beauty (this is[5] the remarkable doctrine of Plato in the Phædrus) is the main point of visible resemblance between the world of sense and the world of Ideas: the Idea of Beauty has a brilliant representative of itself among concrete objects--the Ideas of Justice and Temperance have none. The contemplation of a beautiful youth, and the vehement emotion accompanying it, was the only way of reviving in the soul the Idea of Beauty which it had seen in its antecedent stage of existence. This was the first stage through which every philosopher must pass; but the emotion of love thus raised, became gradually in the better minds both expanded and purified. The lover did not merely admire the person, but also contracted the strongest sympathy with the feelings and character, of the beloved youth: delighting to recognise and promote in him all manifestations of mental beauty which were in harmony with the physical, so as to raise him to the greatest attainable perfection of human nature. The original sentiment of admiration, having been thus first transferred by association from beauty in the person to beauty in the mind and character, became gradually still farther generalised; so that beauty was perceived not as exclusively specialised in any one individual, but as invested in all beautiful objects, bodies as well as minds. The view would presently be farther enlarged. The like sentiment would be inspired, so as to worship beauty in public institutions, in administrative arrangements, in arts and sciences. And the mind would at last be exalted to the contemplation of that which pervades and gives common character to all these particulars--Beauty in the abstract--or the Self-Beautiful--the Idea or Form of the Beautiful. To reach this highest summit, after mounting all the previous stages, and to live absorbed in the contemplation of "the great ocean of the beautiful," was the most glorious privilege attainable by any human being. It was indeed attainable only by a few highly gifted minds. But others might make more or less approach to it: and the nearer any one approached, the greater measure would he ensure to himself of real good and happiness.[6]

[Footnote 5: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 249 E, 250 B-E.]

[Footnote 6: Plato, Sympos. pp. 210-211.

Respecting the Beautiful, I transcribe here a passage from Ficinus, in his Argument prefixed to the Hippias Major, p. 757. "Unumquodque è singulis pulchris, _pulchrum hoc_ Plato vocat: formam in omnibus, pulchritudinem; speciem et ideam supra omnia, ipsum pulchrum. Primum sensus attingit opinioque. Secundum ratio cogitat. Tertium mens intuetur.

"Quid ipsum Bonum? Ipsum rerum omnium principium, actus purus, actus sequentia cuncta vivificans. Quid ipsum Pulchrum? Vivificus actus e primo fonte bonorum effluens, Mentem primo divinam idearum ordine infinité decorans, Numina deinde sequentia mentesque rationum serie complens, Animas tertio numerosis discursibus ornans, Naturas quarto seminibus, formis quinto materiam."]

[Side-note: All men love Good, as the means of Happiness, but they pursue it by various means. The name _Eros_ is confined to one special case of this large variety.]

Such is Plato's conception of Eros or Love and its object. He represents it as one special form or variety of the universal law of gravitation pervading all mankind. Every one loves, desires, or aspires to _happiness_: this is the fundamental or primordial law of human nature, beyond which we cannot push enquiry. Good, or good things, are nothing else but the means to happiness:[7] accordingly, every man, loving happiness, loves good also, and desires not only full acquisition, but perpetual possession of good. In this wide sense, love belongs to all human beings: every man loves good and happiness, with perpetual possession of them--and nothing else.[8] But different men have different ways of pursuing this same object. One man aspires to good or happiness by way of money-getting, another by way of ambition, a third by gymnastics--or music--or philosophy. Still no one of these is said to love, or to be under the influence of Eros. That name is reserved exclusively for one special variety of it--the impulse towards copulation, generation, and self-perpetuation, which agitates both bodies and minds throughout animal nature. Desiring perpetual possession of good, all men desire to perpetuate themselves, and to become immortal. But an individual man or animal cannot be immortal: he can only attain a quasi-immortality by generating a new individual to replace himself.[9] In fact even mortal life admits no continuity, but is only a succession of distinct states or phenomena: one always disappearing and another always appearing, each generated by its antecedent and generating its consequent. Though a man from infancy to old age is called the same, yet he never continues the same for two moments together, either in body or mind. As his blood, flesh, bones, &c., are in perpetual disappearance and renovation, always coming and going--so likewise are his sensations, thoughts, emotions, dispositions, cognitions, &c. Neither mentally nor physically does he ever continue the same during successive instants. The old man of this instant perishes and is replaced by a new man during the next.[10] As this is true of the individual, so it is still more true of the species: continuance or immortality is secured only by perpetual generation of new individuals.

[Footnote 7: Plato, Sympos. pp. 204-205. [Greek: Phe/re, o( e)rô=n tô=n a)gathô=n, ti/ e)ra=|? Gene/sthai, ê)=n d' e)gô/, au)tô=|. Kai\ ti/ e)/stai e)kei/nô| ô(=| a)\n ge/nêtai ta)gatha/? Tou=t' eu)porô/teron, ê)=n d' e)gô/, e)/chô a)pokri/nasthai, o(/ti eu)dai/môn e)/stai. Ktê/sei ga/r, e)/phê, a)gathô=n, oi( eu)dai/mones eu)dai/mones; Kai\ ou)ke/ti prosdei= e)re/sthai, i(/na ti/ de\ bou/letai eu)dai/môn ei)=nai o( boulo/menos, a)lla\ te/los dokei= e)/chein ê( a)po/krisis. . . . Tau/tên dê\ tê\n bou/lêsin kai\ to\n e)/rôta tou=ton, po/tera koino\n ei)=nai pa/ntôn a)nthrô/pôn, kai\ pa/ntas ta)gatha\ bou/lesthai au)toi=s ei)=nai a)ei/, ê)\ pô=s le/geis? Ou(/tôs, ê)=n d' e)gô/, koino\n ei)=nai pa/ntôn.]]

[Footnote 8: Plato, Sympos. p. 206 A. [Greek: ô(s ou)de/n ge a)/llo e)sti\n ou)= e)rô=sin a)/nthrôpoi ê)\ tou= a)gathou=.]]

[Footnote 9: Plato, Sympos. p. 207 C.]

[Footnote 10: Plato, Sympos. pp. 207-208.]

[Side-note: Desire of mental copulation and procreation, as the only attainable likeness of immortality, requires the sight of personal beauty as an originating stimulus.]

The love of immortality thus manifests itself in living beings through the copulative and procreative impulse, which so powerfully instigates living man in mind as well as in body. Beauty in another person exercises an attractive force which enables this impulse to be gratified: ugliness on the contrary repels and stifles it. Hence springs the love of beauty--or rather, of procreation in the beautiful--whereby satisfaction is obtained for this restless and impatient agitation.[11] With some, this erotic impulse stimulates the body, attracting them towards women, and inducing them to immortalise themselves by begetting children: with others, it acts far more powerfully on the mind, and determines them to conjunction with another mind for the purpose of generating appropriate mental offspring and products. In this case as well as in the preceding, the first stroke of attraction arises from the charm of physical, visible, and youthful beauty: but when, along with this beauty of person, there is found the additional charm of a susceptible, generous, intelligent mind, the effect produced by the two together is overwhelming; the bodily sympathy becoming spiritualised and absorbed by the mental. With the inventive and aspiring intelligences--poets like Homer and Hesiod, or legislators like Lykurgus and Solon--the erotic impulse takes this turn. They look about for some youth, at once handsome and improvable, in conversation with whom they may procreate new reasonings respecting virtue and goodness--new excellences of disposition--and new force of intellectual combination, in both the communicants. The attachment between the two becomes so strong that they can hardly live apart: so anxious are both of them to foster and confirm the newly acquired mental force of which each is respectively conscious in himself.[12]

[Footnote 11: Plato, Sympos. p. 206 E. [Greek: o(/then dê\ tô=| kuou=nti/ te kai\ ê)/dê spargô=nti pollê\ ê( pto/êsis ge/gone peri\ to\ kalo\n dia\ to\ mega/lês ô)di=nos a)polu/ein to\n e)/chonta. E)sti\ ga\r ou) tou= kalou= o( e)/rôs, a)lla\--tê=s gennê/seôs kai\ tou= to/kou e)n tô=| kalô=|.]]

[Footnote 12: Plato, Sympos. p. 209.]

[Side-note: Highest exaltation of the erotic impulse in a few privileged minds, when it ascends gradually to the love of Beauty _in genere_. This is the most absorbing sentiment of all.]

Occasionally, and in a few privileged natures, this erotic impulse rises to a still higher exaltation, losing its separate and exclusive attachment to one individual person, and fastening upon beauty in general, or that which all beautiful persons and beautiful minds have in common. The visible charm of beautiful body, though it was indispensable as an initial step, comes to be still farther sunk and undervalued, when the mind has ascended to the contemplation of beauty _in genere_, not merely in bodies and minds, but in laws, institutions, and sciences. This is the highest pitch of philosophical love, to which a few minds only are competent, and that too by successive steps of ascent: but which, when attained, is thoroughly soul-satisfying. If any man's vision be once sharpened so that he can see beauty pure and absolute, he will have no eyes for the individual manifestations of it in gold, fine raiment, brilliant colours, or beautiful youths.[13] Herein we have the climax or consummation of that erotic aspiration which first shows itself in the form of virtuous attachment to youth.[14]

[Footnote 13: Plato, Symposion, p. 211.]

[Footnote 14: Plato, Symposion, p. 211 B. [Greek: o(/tan dê/ tis a)po\ tô=nde dia\ to\ o)rthô=s paiderastei=n e)paniô\n e)kei=no to\ kalo\n a)/rchêtai kathora=|n, schedo\n a)/n ti a(/ptoito tou= te/lous], &c.]

[Side-note: Purpose of the Symposion, to contrast this Platonic view of Eros with several different views of it previously enunciated by the other speakers; closing with a panegyric on Sokrates, by the drunken Alkibiades.]

It is thus that Plato, in the Symposion, presents Love, or erotic impulse: a passion taking its origin in the physical and mental attributes common to most men, and concentrated at first upon some individual person--but gradually becoming both more intense and more refined, as it ascends in the scale of logical generalisation and comes into intimate view of the pure idea of Beauty. The main purpose of the Symposion is to contrast this Platonic view of Eros or Love--which is assigned to Sokrates in the dialogue, and is repeated by him from the communication of a prophetic woman named Diotima[15]--with different views assigned to other speakers. Each of the guests at the Banquet--Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Sokrates--engages to deliver a panegyric on Eros: while Alkibiades, entering intoxicated after the speeches are finished, delivers a panegyric on Sokrates, in regard to energy and self-denial generally, but mainly and specially in the character of Erastes. The pure and devoted attachment of Sokrates towards Alkibiades himself--his inflexible self-command under the extreme of trial and temptation--the unbounded ascendancy which he had acquired over that insolent youth, who seeks in every conceivable manner to render himself acceptable to Sokrates--are emphatically extolled, and illustrated by singular details.

[Footnote 15: Plat. Sympos. p. 201 D. [Greek: gunaiko\s mantikê=s Dioti/mas, ê( tau=ta/ te sophê\ ê)=n kai\ a)/lla polla/, kai\ A)thênai/ois pote\ thusame/nois pro\ tou= loimou= de/ka e)/tê a)nabolê\n e)poi/êse tê=s no/sou, ê)\ dê\ kai\ e)me\ ta\ e)rôtika\ e)di/daxen.]

Instead of [Greek: gunaiko\s mantikê=s], which was the old reading, Stallbaum and other editors prefer to write [Greek: gunaiko\s Mantinikê=s], also 211 D. I cannot but think that [Greek: mantikê=s] is right. There is no pertinence or fit meaning in [Greek: Mantinikê=s], whereas the word [Greek: mantikê=s] is in full keeping with what is said about the special religious privileges and revelations of Diotima--that she procured for the Athenians an adjournment of the plague for ten years. The Delphian oracle assured the Lydian king Kroesus that Apollo had obtained from the [Greek: Moi=rai] a postponement of the ruin of the Lydian kingdom for three years, but that he could obtain from them no more (Herodot. i. 91).]

[Side-note: Views of Eros presented by Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon.]

Both Phædrus[16] and Pausanias, in their respective encomiums upon Eros, dwell upon that God as creating within the human bosom by his inspirations the noblest self-denial and the most devoted heroism, together with the strongest incentives to virtuous behaviour. Pausanias however makes distinctions: recognising and condemning various erotic manifestations as abusive, violent, sensual--and supposing for these a separate inspiring Deity--Eros Pandêmus, contrasted with the good and honourable Eros Uranius[17] or Coelestis. In regard to the different views taken of Eros by Eryximachus, Aristophanes, and Agathon--the first is medical, physiological, cosmical[18]--the second is comic and imaginative, even to exuberance--the third is poetical or dithyrambic: immediately upon which follows the analytical and philosophical exposition ascribed to Sokrates, opened in his dialectic manner by a cross-examination of his predecessor, and proceeding to enunciate the opinions communicated to him by the prophetess Diotima.

[Footnote 16: Sydenham conceives and Boeckh (ad Plat. Legg. iii. 694) concurs with him, that this discourse, assigned to Phædrus, is intended by Plato as an imitation of the style of Lysias. This is sufficiently probable. The encomium on Eros delivered by Agathon, especially the concluding part of it (p. 197), mimics the style of florid effeminate poetry, overcharged with balanced phrases ([Greek: i)so/kôla, a)nti/theta]), which Aristophanes parodies in Agathon's name at the beginning of the Thesmophoriazusæ, Athenæus, v. 187 C.]

[Footnote 17: Plato, Sympos. pp. 180-181.]

[Footnote 18: Respecting this view of Eros or Aphrodite, as a cosmical, all-pervading, procreative impulse, compare Euripides, Frag. Incert. 3, 6, assigned by Welcker (Griech. Trag. p. 737) to the lost drama--the first Hippolytus; also the beautiful invocation with which the poem of Lucretius opens, and the fragmentary exordium remaining from the poem of Parmenides.]

[Side-note: Discourse of Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He describes Eros as not a God, but an intermediate Dæmon between Gods and men, constantly aspiring to divinity, but not attaining it.]

Sokrates treats most of the preceding panegyrics as pleasing fancies not founded in truth. In his representation (cited from Diotima) Eros is neither beautiful, nor good, nor happy; nor is he indeed a God at all. He is one of the numerous intermediate body of Dæmons, inferior to Gods yet superior to men, and serving as interpreting agents of communication between the two.[19] Eros is the offspring of Poverty and Resource (Porus).[20] He represents the state of aspiration and striving, with ability and energy, after goodness and beauty, but never actually possessing them: a middle condition, preferable to that of the person who neither knows that he is deficient in them, nor cares to possess them: but inferior to the condition of him who is actually in possession. Eros is always Love of something--in relation to something yet unattained, but desired: Eros is to be distinguished carefully from the object desired.[21] He is the parallel of the philosopher, who is neither ignorant nor wise: not ignorant, because genuine ignorance is unconscious of itself and fancies itself to be knowledge: not wise, because he does not possess wisdom, and is well aware that he does not possess it. He is in the intermediate stage, knowing that he does not possess wisdom, but constantly desiring it and struggling after it. Eros, like philosophy, represents this continual aspiration and advance towards a goal never attained.[22]

[Footnote 19: Plato, Sympos. pp. 202-203.]

[Footnote 20: What Sokrates says here in the Symposion about Eros is altogether at variance with what Sokrates says about Eros in Phædrus, wherein we find him speaking with the greatest reverence and awe about Eros as a powerful God, son of Aphroditê (Phædrus, pp. 242 D, 243 D, 257 A).]

[Footnote 21: Plato, Symposion, pp. 199-200. [Greek: O( E)/rôs e)/rôs e)sti\n ou)deno\s ê(\ tino/s? Pa/nu me\n ou)=n e)/stin. . . . Po/teron o( E)/rôs e)kei/nou ou(= e)/stin e)/rôs, e)pithumei= au)tou= ê)\ ou)/? Pa/nu ge. . . . A)na/gkê to\ e)pithumou=n e)pithumei=n ou)= e)ndee/s e)stin, ê)\ mê\ e)pithumei=n, e)a\n mê\ e)ndee\s ê)=|.]]

[Footnote 22: Plato, Sympos. p. 204 A. [Greek: Ti/nes ou)=n oi( philosophou=ntes, ei) mê/te oi( sophoi\ mê/te oi( a)mathei=s? . . . Oi( metaxu\ tou/tôn a)mphote/rôn, ô(=n au)= kai\ o( E)/rôs. E)sti\ ga\r dê\ tô=n kalli/stôn ê( sophi/a, E)/rôs d' e)sti\n e)/rôs peri\ to\ kalo/n; ô(/ste a)nagkai=on E)/rôta philo/sophon ei)=nai, philo/sophon de\ o)/nta metaxu\ ei)=nai sophou= kai\ a)mathou=s.]]

[Side-note: Analogy of the erotic aspiration with that of the philosopher, who knows his own ignorance and thirsts for knowledge.]

It is thus that the truly Platonic conception of Love is brought out, materially different from that of the preceding speakers--Love, as a state of conscious want, and of aspiration or endeavour to satisfy that want, by striving after good or happiness--Philosophy as the like intermediate state, in regard to wisdom. And Plato follows out this coalescence of love and philosophy in the manner which has been briefly sketched above: a vehement impulse towards mental communion with some favoured youth, in the view of producing mental improvement, good, and happiness to both persons concerned: the same impulse afterwards expanding, so as to grasp the good and beautiful in a larger sense, and ultimately to fasten on goodness and beauty in the pure Idea: which is absolute--independent of time, place, circumstances, and all variable elements--moreover the object of the one and supreme science.[23]

[Footnote 23: Plato, Symposion, pp. 210-211.]

[Side-note: Eros as presented in the Phædrus--Discourse of Lysias, and counter-discourse of Sokrates, adverse to Eros--Sokrates is seized with remorse, and recants in a high-flown panegyric on Eros.]

I will now compare the Symposion with the Phædrus. In the first half of the Phædrus also, Eros, and the Self-Beautiful or the pure Idea of the Beautiful, are brought into close coalescence with philosophy and dialectic--but they are presented in a different manner. Plato begins by setting forth the case against Eros in two competing discourses (one cited from Lysias,[24] the other pronounced by Sokrates himself as competitor with Lysias in eloquence) supposed to be addressed to a youth, and intended to convince him that the persuasions of a calm and intelligent friend are more worthy of being listened to than the exaggerated promises and protestations of an impassioned lover, from whom he will receive more injury than benefit: that the inspirations of Eros are a sort of madness, irrational and misguiding as well as capricious and transitory: while the calm and steady friend, unmoved by any passionate inspiration, will show himself worthy of permanent esteem and gratitude.[25] By a sudden revulsion of feeling, Sokrates becomes ashamed of having thus slandered the divine Eros, and proceeds to deliver a counter-panegyric or palinode upon that God.[26]

[Footnote 24: Plato, Phædrus, p. 230 seq.]

[Footnote 25: Plato, Phædrus, p. 237 seq.]

[Footnote 26: Eros, in the Phædrus, is pronounced to be a God, son of Aphroditê (p. 242 E); in the Symposion he is not a God but a Dæmon, offspring of Porus and Penia, and attendant on Aphroditê, according to Diotima and Sokrates (p. 203).]

[Side-note: Panegyric--Sokrates admits that the influence of Eros is a variety of madness, but distinguishes good and bad varieties of madness, both coming from the Gods. Good madness is far better than sobriety.]

Eros (he says) is, mad, irrational, superseding reason and prudence in the individual mind.[27] This is true: yet still Eros exercises a beneficent and improving influence. Not all madness is bad. Some varieties of it are bad, but others are good. Some arise from human malady, others from the inspirations of the Gods: both of them supersede human reason and the orthodoxy of established custom[28]--but the former substitute what is worse, the latter what is better. The greatest blessings enjoyed by man arise from madness, when it is imparted by divine inspiration. And it is so imparted in four different phases and by four different Gods: Apollo infuses the prophetic madness--Dionysus, the ritual or religious--The Muses, the poetical--and Eros, the erotic.[29] This last sort of madness greatly transcends the sober reason and concentration upon narrow objects which is so much praised by mankind generally.[30] The inspired and exalted lover deserves every preference over the unimpassioned friend.

[Footnote 27: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 265-266. [Greek: to\ a)/phron tê=s dianoi/as e(/n ti koinê=| ei)=dos. . . . to\ tê=s paranoi/as ô(s e(\n e)n ê(mi=n pephuko\s ei)=dos.] Compare p. 236 A.]

[Footnote 28: Plato, Phædrus, p. 265 A. [Greek: Mani/as de/ ge ei)/dê du/o; tê\n me/n, u(po\ nosêma/tôn a)nthrôpi/nôn, tê\n de/, u(po\ thei/as e)xallagê=s tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn nomi/môn gignome/nên.] Compare 249 D.]

[Footnote 29: Plato, Phædrus, p. 244 A. [Greek: ei) me\n ga\r ê)=n a(plou=n to\ mani/an kako\n ei)=nai, kalô=s a)\n e)le/geto; nu=n de\ ta\ me/gista tô=n a)gathô=n ê(mi=n gi/gnetai dia\ mani/as, thei/a| me/ntoi do/sei didome/nês.]

Compare Plutarch, [Greek: E)rôtiko/s], c. 16. pp. 758-759, &c.]

[Footnote 30: Plato, Phædrus, p. 245 B. [Greek: mêde/ tis ê(ma=s lo/gos thorubei/tô deditto/menos ô(s pro\ tou= kekinême/nou to\n sô/phrona dei= proairei=sthai phi/lon.]

P. 256 E; [Greek: ê( de\ a)po\ tou= mê\ e)rô=ntos oi)keio/tês, sôphrosu/nê| thnêtê=| kekrame/nê, thnêta/ te kai\ pheidôla\ oi)konomou=sa, a)neleutheri/an u(po\ plê/thous e)panoume/nên ô(s a)retê\n tê=| phi/lê|** psuchê=| e)ntekou=sa], &c.]

[Side-note: Poetical mythe delivered by Sokrates, describing the immortality and pre-existence of the soul, and its pre-natal condition of partial companionship with Gods and eternal Ideas.]

Plato then illustrates, by a highly poetical and imaginative mythe, the growth and working of love in the soul. All soul or mind is essentially self-moving, and the cause of motion to other things. It is therefore immortal, without beginning or end: the universal or cosmic soul, as well as the individual souls of Gods and men.[31] Each soul may be compared to a chariot with a winged pair of horses. In the divine soul, both the horses are excellent, with perfect wings: in the human soul, one only of them is good, the other is violent and rebellious, often disobedient to the charioteer, and with feeble or half-grown wings.[32] The Gods, by means of their wings, are enabled to ascend up to the summit of the celestial firmament--to place themselves upon the outer circumference or back of the heaven--and thus to be carried round along with the rotation of the celestial sphere round the Earth. In the course of this rotation they contemplate the pure essences and Ideas, truth and reality without either form or figure or colour: they enjoy the vision of the Absolute--Justice, Temperance, Beauty, Science. The human souls, with their defective wings, try to accompany the Gods; some attaching themselves to one God, some to another, in this ascent. But many of them fail in the object, being thrown back upon earth in consequence of their defective equipment, and the unruly character of one of the horses: some however succeed partially, obtaining glimpses of Truth and of the general Ideas, though in a manner transient and incomplete.

[Footnote 31: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 245-246. Compare Krische, De Platonis Phædro, pp. 49-50 (Göttingen, 1848).

Plato himself calls this panegyric in the mouth of Sokrates a [Greek: muthiko/s tis u(/mnos] (Phædr. p. 265 D).]

[Footnote 32: The reader will recollect Homer, Iliad, xvi. 152, where the chariot and horses of Patroklus are described, when he is about to attack the Trojans; the mortal horse Pedasus is harnessed to it alongside of the two immortal horses Xanthus and Balius.]

[Side-note: Operation of such pre-natal experience upon the Intellectual faculties of man--Comparison and combination of particular sensations indispensable--Reminiscence.]

Those souls which have not seen Truth or general Ideas at all, can never be joined with the body of a man, but only with that of some inferior animal. It is essential that some glimpse of truth should have been obtained, in order to qualify the soul for the condition of man:[33] for the mind of man must possess within itself the capacity of comparing and combining particular sensations, so as to rise to one general conception brought together by reason.[34] This is brought about by the process of reminiscence; whereby it recalls those pure, true, and beautiful Ideas which it had partially seen during its prior extra-corporeal existence in companionship with the Gods. The rudimentary faculty of thus reviving these general Conceptions--the visions of a prior state of existence--belongs to all men, distinguishing them from other animals: but in most men the visions have been transient, and the power of reviving them is faint and dormant. It is only some few philosophers, whose minds, having been effectively winged in their primitive state for ascent to the super-celestial regions, have enjoyed such a full contemplation of the divine Ideas as to be able to recall them with facility and success, during the subsequent corporeal existence. To the reminiscence of the philosopher, these Ideas present themselves with such brilliancy and fascination, that he forgets all other pursuits and interests. Hence he is set down as a madman by the generality of mankind, whose minds have not ascended beyond particular and present phenomena to the revival of the anterior Ideas.

[Footnote 33: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 249-250. [Greek: pa=sa me\n a)nthrô/pou psuchê\ phu/sei tethe/atai ta\ o)/nta--ê)\ ou)k a)\n ê)=lthen ei)s to/de** to\ zô=on; a)namimnê/skesthai d' e)k tô=nde e)kei=na ou) r(a/|dion a(pa/sê|], &c.]

[Footnote 34: Plato, Phædrus, p. 249 B. [Greek: Ou) ga\r ê(/ ge mê/ pote i)dou=sa tê\n a)lê/theian ei)s to/de ê(/xei to\ schê=ma. Dei= ga\r a)/nthrôpon xunie/nai kat' ei)=dos lego/menon, e)k pollô=n i)o\n ai)sthê/seôn ei)s e(\n logismô=| xunairou/menon. Tou=to de/ e)stin a)na/mnêsis e)kei/nôn, a(/ pot' ei)=den ê(mô=n ê( psuchê\ sumporeuthei=sa theô=| kai\ u(peridou=sa a(\ nu=n ei)=nai/ phamen, kai\ a)naku/psasa ei)s to\ o)\n o)/ntôs.]]

[Side-note: Reminiscence is kindled up in the soul of the philosopher by the aspect of visible Beauty, which is the great link between the world of sense and the world of Ideas.]

It is by the aspect of visible beauty, as embodied in distinguished youth, that this faculty of reminiscence is first kindled in minds capable of the effort. It is only the embodiment of beauty, acting as it does powerfully upon the most intellectual of our senses, which has sufficient force to kindle up the first act or stage of reminiscence in the mind, leading ultimately to the revival of the Idea of Beauty. The embodiments of justice, wisdom, temperance, &c., in particular men, do not strike forcibly on the senses, nor approximate sufficiently to the original Idea, to effect the first stroke of reminiscence in an unprepared mind. It is only the visible manifestation of beauty, which strikes with sufficient shock at once on the senses and the intellect, to recall in the mind an adumbration of the primitive Idea of Beauty. The shock thus received first develops the reminiscent faculty in minds apt and predisposed to it, and causes the undeveloped wings of the soul to begin growing. It is a passion of violent and absorbing character; which may indeed take a sensual turn, by the misconduct of the unruly horse in the team, producing in that case nothing but corruption and mischief--but which may also take a virtuous, sentimental, imaginative turn, and becomes in that case the most powerful stimulus towards mental improvement in both the two attached friends. When thus refined and spiritualised, it can find its satisfaction only in philosophical communion, in the generation of wisdom and virtue; as well as in the complete cultivation of that reminiscent power, which vivifies in the mind remembrance of Forms or Ideas seen in a prior existence. To attain such perfection, is given to few; but a greater or less approximation may be made to it. And it is the only way of developing the highest powers and virtues of the mind; which must spring, not from human prudence and sobriety, but from divine madness or erotic inspiration.[35]

[Footnote 35: Plato, Phædrus, p. 256 B. [Greek: ou(= mei=zon a)gatho\n ou)/te sôphrosu/nê a)nthrôpi/nê ou)/te thei/a mani/a dunatê\ pori/sai a)nthrô/pô|.]--245 B: [Greek: e)p' eu)tuchi/a tê=| megi/stê| para\ theô=n ê( toiau/tê mani/a di/dotai.]

The long and highly poetical mythe, of which I have given some of the leading points, occupies from c. 51 to c. 83 (pp. 244-257) of the dialogue. It is adapted to the Hellenic imagination, and requires the reader to keep before him the palæstræ of Athens, as described in the Lysis, Erastæ, and Charmidês of Plato--visited both by men like Sokrates and by men like Kritias (Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 29).]

Such is the general tenor of the dialogue Phædrus, in its first half: which presents to us the Platonic love, conceived as the source and mainspring of exalted virtue--as the only avenue to philosophy--as contrasted, not merely with sensual love, but also with the sobriety of the decent citizen who fully conforms to the teaching of Law and Custom. In the Symposion, the first of these contrasts appears prominently, while the second is less noticed. In the Phædrus, Sokrates declares emphatically that madness, of a certain sort, is greatly preferable to sobriety: that the temperate, respectable, orthodox citizen, is on the middle line, some madmen being worse than he, but others better: that madness springing from human distemper is worse, but that when it springs from divine inspiration, it is in an equal degree better, than sobriety: that the philosophical _oestrus_, and the reminiscence of the eternal Ideas (considered by Plato as the only true and real Entia), is inconsistent with that which is esteemed as sobriety: and is generated only by special inoculation from Eros or some other God. This last contrast, as I have just observed, is little marked in the Symposion. But on the other hand, the Symposion (especially the discourse of Sokrates and his repetition of the lessons of Diotima), insists much more upon the generalisation of the erotic impulse. In the Phædrus, we still remain on the ground of fervent attachment between two individuals--an attachment sentimental and virtuous, displaying itself in an intercourse which elicits from both of them active intelligence and exalted modes of conduct: in the Symposion, such intercourse is assimilated explicitly to copulation with procreative consequences, but it is represented as the first stage of a passion which becomes more and more expanded and comprehensive: dropping all restriction to any single individual, and enlarging itself not merely to embrace pursuits, and institutions, but also to the plenitude and great ocean of Beauty in its largest sense.

[Side-note: Elevating influence ascribed, both in Phædrus and Symposion, to Eros Philosophus. Mixture in the mind of Plato, of poetical fancy and religious mysticism, with dialectic theory.]

The picture here presented by Plato, of the beneficent and elevating influence of Eros Philosophus, is repeated by Sokrates as a revelation made to him by the prophetess Diotima. It was much taken to heart by the Neo-Platonists.[36] It is a striking manifestation of the Platonic characteristics: transition from amorous impulse to religious and philosophical mysticism--implication of poetical fancy with the conception of the philosophising process--surrender of the mind to metaphor and analogy, which is real up to a certain point, but is forcibly stretched and exaggerated to serve the theorising purpose of the moment. Now we may observe, that the worship of youthful masculine beauty, and the belief that contemplation of such a face and form was an operative cause, not only raising the admiration but also quickening the intelligence of the adult spectator, and serving as a provocative to instructive dialogue--together with a decided attempt to exalt the spiritual side of this influence and depreciate the sensual--both these are common to Plato with Sokrates and Xenophon. But what is peculiar to Plato is, that he treats this merely as an initial point to spring from, and soars at once into the region of abstractions, until he gets clear of all particulars and concomitants, leaving nothing except Beauty Absolute--[Greek: to\ Kalo\n--to\ au)to\-kalo\n]--the "full sea of the beautiful". Not without reason does Diotima express a doubt whether Sokrates (if we mean thereby the historical Sokrates) could have followed so bold a flight. His wings might probably have failed and dropped him: as we read in the Phædrus respecting the unprepared souls who try to rise aloft in company with the Gods. Plato alone is the true Dædalus equal to this flight, borne up by wings not inferior to those of Pindar[37]--according to the comparison of Dionysius of Halikarnassus.

[Footnote 36: Porphyry, Vit. Plotini, 23.

Plato's way of combining, in these two dialogues--so as to pass by an easy thread of association from one to the other--subjects which appear to us unconnected and even discordant, is certainly remarkable. We have to recognise material differences in the turn of imagination, as between different persons and ages. The following remark of Professor Mohl, respecting the Persian lyric poet Hafiz, illustrates this point. "Au reste, quand même nous serions mieux renseignés sur sa vie, il resterait toujours pour nous le singulier spectacle d'un homme qui tantôt célèbre l'absorption de l'âme dans l'essence de Dieu, tantôt chante le vin et l'amour, sans grossièreté, il est vrai, mais avec un laisser aller et un naturel qui exclut toute idée de symbolisme--et qui généralement glisse de l'une dans l'autre de ces deux manières de sentir, qui nous paraissent si différentes, sans s'apercevoir lui-même qu'il change de sujet. Les Orientaux ont cherché la solution de cette difficulté dans une interprétation mystique de toutes ses poésies; mais les textes s'y refusent. Des critiques modernes ont voulu l'expliquer en supposant une hypocrisie de l'auteur, qui lui aurait fait mêler une certaine dose de piété mystique, à ses vers plus légers, pour les faire passer: mais ce calcul parait étranger à la nature de l'homme. Je crois qu'il faut trouver le mot de l'énigme dans l'état général des esprits et de la culture de son temps: et la difficulté pour nous est seulement de nous réprésenter assez vivement l'état des esprits en Perse à cette époque, et la nature de l'influence que le Soufisme y exerçait depuis des siècles sur toutes les classes cultivées de la nation."--Mohl (Rapport Annuel à la Société Asiatique, 1861, p. 89.)]

[Footnote 37: Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. in Demosth., p. 972, Reiske.]

Various remarks may be made, in comparing this exposition of Diotima in the Symposion with that which we read in the Phædrus and Phædon.

[Side-note: Differences between Symposion and Phædrus. In-dwelling conceptions assumed by the former, pre-natal experiences by the latter.]

First, in the Phædrus and Phædon (also in the Timæus and elsewhere), the pre-existence of the soul, and its antecedent familiarity, greater or less, with the world of Ideas,--are brought into the foreground; so as to furnish a basis for that doctrine of reminiscence, which is one of the peculiar characteristics of Plato. The Form or Idea, when once disengaged from the appendages by which it has been overgrown, is said to be recognised by the mind and welcomed as an old acquaintance. But in the Symposion, no such doctrine is found. The mind is described as rising by gradual steps from the concrete and particular to the abstract and general, by recognising the sameness of one attribute as pervading many particulars, and by extending its comparisons from smaller groups of particulars to larger; until at length one and the same attribute is perceived to belong to all. The mind is supposed to evolve out of itself, and to generate in some companion mind, certain abstract or general conceptions, correlating with the Forms or Concepta without. The fundamental postulate here is, not that of pre-existence, but that of in-dwelling conceptions.

[Side-note: Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in Symposion.]

Secondly, in the Phædrus and Phædon, the soul is declared to be immortal, _à parte post_ as well as _à parte ante_. But in the Symposion, this is affirmed to be impossible.[38] The soul yearns for, but is forbidden to reach, immortality: or at least can only reach immortality in a metaphorical sense, by its prolific operation--by generating in itself as long as it lasts, and in other minds who will survive it, a self-renewing series of noble thoughts and feelings--by leaving a name and reputation to survive in the memory of others.

[Footnote 38: Plato, Sympos. pp. 207-208.]

[Side-note: Form or Idea of Beauty presented singly and exclusively in Symposion.]

Thirdly, in Phædrus, Phædon, Republic, and elsewhere, Plato recognises many distinct Forms or Ideas--a world or aggregate of such Entia Rationis[39]--among which Beauty is one, but only one. It is the exalted privilege of the philosophic mind to come into contemplation and cognition of these Forms generally. But in the Symposion, the Form of Beauty ([Greek: to\ kalo\n]) is presented singly and exclusively--as if the communion with this one Form were the sole occupation of the most exalted philosophy.

[Footnote 39: Plat. Repub. v. 476. He recognises Forms of [Greek: a)/dikon, kako/n, ai)schro/n], as well as Forms of [Greek: di/kaion, a)gatho/n, kalo/n], &c.]

[Side-note: Eros recognised, both in Phædrus and Symposion, as affording the initiatory stimulus to philosophy--Not so recognised in Phædon, Theætêtus, and elsewhere.]

Fourthly, The Phædrus and Symposion have, both of them in common, the theory of Eros as the indispensable, initiatory, stimulus to philosophy. The spectacle of a beautiful youth is considered necessary to set light to various elements in the mind, which would otherwise remain dormant and never burn: it enables the pregnant and capable mind to bring forth what it has within and to put out its hidden strength. But if we look to the Phædon, Theætêtus, Sophistês, or Republic, we shall not find Eros invoked for any such function. The Republic describes an elaborate scheme for generating and developing the philosophic capacity: but Eros plays no part in it. In the Theætêtus, the young man so named is announced as having a pregnant mind requiring to be disburthened, and great capacity which needs foreign aid to develop it: the service needed is rendered by Sokrates, who possesses an obstetric patent, and a marvellous faculty of cross-examination. Yet instead of any auxiliary stimulus arising from personal beauty, the personal ugliness of both persons in the dialogue is emphatically signified.

I note these peculiarities, partly of the Symposion, partly of the Phædrus along with it--to illustrate the varying points of view which the reader must expect to meet in travelling through the numerous Platonic dialogues.

[Side-note: Concluding scene and speech of Alkibiades in the Symposion--Behaviour of Sokrates to Alkibiades and other handsome youths.]

In the strange scene with which the Symposion is wound up, the main purpose of the dialogue is still farther worked out. The spirit and ethical character of Eros Philosophus, after having been depicted in general terms by Diotima, are specially exemplified in the personal history of Sokrates, as recounted and appreciated by Alkibiades. That handsome, high-born, and insolent youth, being in a complete state of intoxication, breaks in unexpectedly upon the company, all of whom are as yet sober: he enacts the part of a drunken man both in speech and action, which is described with a vivacity that would do credit to any dramatist. His presence is the signal for beginning to drink hard, and he especially challenges Sokrates to drink off, after him, as much wine as will fill the large water-vessel serving as cooler; which challenge Sokrates forthwith accepts and executes, without being the least affected by it. Alkibiades instead of following the example of the others by delivering an encomium on Eros, undertakes to deliver one upon Sokrates. He proceeds to depict Sokrates as the votary of Eros Philosophus, wrapped up in the contemplation of beautiful youths, and employing his whole time in colloquy with them--yet as never losing his own self-command, even while acquiring a magical ascendency over these companions.[40] The abnormal exterior of Sokrates, resembling that of a Satyr, though concealing the image of a God within--the eccentric pungency of his conversation, blending banter with seriousness, homely illustrations with impressive principles--has exercised an influence at once fascinating, subjugating, humiliating. The impudent Alkibiades has been made to feel painfully his own unworthiness, even while receiving every mark of admiration from others. He has become enthusiastically devoted to Sokrates, whom he has sought to attach to himself, and to lay under obligation, by tempting offers of every kind. The details of these offers are given with a fulness which cannot be translated to modern readers, and which even then required to be excused as the revelations of a drunken man. They present one of the boldest fictions in the Greek language--if we look at them in conjunction with the real character of Alkibiades as an historical person.[41] Sokrates is found proof against every variety of temptation, however seductive to Grecian feeling. In his case, Eros Philosophus maintains his dignity as exclusively pure, sentimental, and spiritual: while Alkibiades retires more humiliated than ever. We are given to understand that the like offers had been made to Sokrates by many other handsome youths also--especially by Charmides and Euthydemus--all of them being treated with the same quiet and repellent indifference.[42] Sokrates had kept on the vantage-ground as regards all:--and was regarded by all with the same mixture of humble veneration and earnest attachment.

[Footnote 40: Plato, Sympos. p. 216 C-D.]

[Footnote 41: Plato, Sympos. p. 219. See also, respecting the historical Alkibiades and his characte, Thucyd. vi. 15; Xenoph. Memor. i. 1; Antisthenes, apud Athenæum, xii. 534.

The invention of Plato goes beyond that of those ingenious men who recounted how Phrynê and Lais had failed in attempts to overcome the continence of Xenokrates, Diog. L. iv. 7: and the saying of Lais, [Greek: ô(s ou)k a)p' a)ndro/s, a)ll' a)p' a)ndri/antos, a)nastai/ê.] Quintilian (viii. 4, 22-23) aptly enough compares the description given by Alkibiades--as the maximum of testimony to the "invicta continentia" of Sokrates--with the testimony to the surpassing beauty of Helen, borne by such witnesses as the Trojan [Greek: dêmoge/rontes] and Priam himself (Hom. Iliad iii. 156). One of the speakers in Athenæus censures severely this portion of the Platonic Symposion, xi. 506 C, 508 D, v. 187 D. Porphyry (in his life of Plotinus, 15) tells us that the rhetor Diophanes delivered an apology for Alkibiades, in the presence of Plotinus; who was much displeased, and directed Porphyry to compose a reply.]

[Footnote 42: Plato, Symp. p. 222 B.

In the Hieron of Xenophon (xi. 11)--a conversation between the despot Hieron and the poet Simonides--the poet, exhorting Hieron to govern his subjects in a mild, beneficent, and careful spirit, expatiates upon the popularity and warm affection which he will thereby attract to himself from them. Of this affection one manifestation will be (he says) as follows:--[Greek: ô(/ste ou) mo/non philoi=o a)/n, a)lla\ kai\ e)rô=|o, u(p' a)nthrô/pôn; _kai\ tou\s kalou\s ou) peira=|n, a)lla\ peirô/menon u(p' au)tô=n a)ne/chesthai a)/n se de/oi_], &c.

These words illustrate the adventure described by Alkibiades in the Platonic Symposion.

Herakleides of Pontus, Dikæarchus, and the Peripatetic Hieronymus, all composed treatises [Greek: Peri\ E)rôtos], especially [Greek: peri\ paidikô=n e)rô/tôn] (Athenæ. xiii. 602-603).]

[Side-note: Perfect self-command of Sokrates--proof against every sort of trial.]

Not merely upon this point but upon others also, Alkibiades recounts anecdotes of the perfect self-mastery of Sokrates: in endurance of cold, heat, hunger, and fatigue--in contempt of the dangers of war, in bravery on the day of battle--even in the power of bearing more wine than any one else, without being intoxicated, whenever the occasion was such as to require him to drink: though he never drank much willingly. While all his emotions are thus described as under the full control of Reason and Eros Philosophus--his special gift and privilege was that of conversation--not less eccentric in manner, than potent, soul-subduing,[43] and provocative in its effects.

[Footnote 43: Plato, Sympos. pp. 221-222.

Alkibiades recites acts of distinguished courage performed by Sokrates, at the siege of Potidæa as well as at the battle of Delium.

About the potent effect produced by the conversation of Sokrates upon his companions, compare Sympos. p. 173 C-D.

In the Xenophontic Apology (s. 18), Sokrates adverts to the undisturbed equanimity which he had shown during the long blockade of Athens after the battle of Ægospotami, while others were bewailing the famine and other miseries.]

[Side-note: Drunkenness of others at the close of the Symposion--Sokrates is not affected by it, but continues his dialectic process.]