Chapter XXVIII: Theætetus (5)

[Footnote 143: In the Sophistês, the Eleate establishes (to his own satisfaction) that [Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n] is not [Greek: e)nanti/on tou= o)/ntos], but [Greek: e(/teron tou= o)/ntos] (p. 257 B), that it is one [Greek: ge/nos] among the various [Greek: ge/nê] (p. 260 B), and that it ([Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n koinônei=]) enters into communion or combination with [Greek: do/xa, lo/gos, phantasi/a], &c. It is therefore possible that there may be [Greek: pseudê\s do/xa] or [Greek: pseudê\s lo/gos], when you affirm, respecting any given subject, [Greek: e(/tera tô=n o)/ntôn] or [Greek: ta\ mê\ o)/nta ô(s o)/nta] (p. 263 B-C). Plato considers that the case is thus made out against the Sophist, as the impostor and dealer in falsehoods; false opinion being proved to be possible and explicable.

But if we turn to the Theætêtus (p. 189 seq.), we shall see that this very explication of [Greek: pseudê\s do/xa] is there enunciated and impugned by Sokrates in a long argument. He calls it there [Greek: a)llodoxi/a, e(terodoxi/a, to\ e(terodoxei=n] (pp. 189 A, 190 E, 193 D). No man (he says) can mistake one thing for another; if this were so, he must be supposed both to know and not to know the same thing, which is impossible (pp. 196 A, 200 A). Therefore [Greek: pseudê\s do/xa] is impossible.

Of these objections, urged by Sokrates in the Theætêtus, against the possibility of [Greek: a)llodoxi/a], no notice is taken in the Sophistês either by Sokrates, or by Theætêtus, or by the Eleate in the Sophistês. Indeed the Eleate congratulates himself upon the explanation as more satisfactory than he had expected to find (p. 264 B): and speaks with displeasure of the troublesome persons who stir up doubts and contradictions (p. 259 C): very different from the tone of Sokrates in the Theætêtus (p. 195, B-C).

I may farther remark that Plato, in the Republic, reasons about [Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n] in the Parmenidean sense, and not in the sense which he ascribed to it in the Sophistês, and which he recognises in the Politikus, p. 284 B. (Republic, v. pp. 477 A, 478 C.)

Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 260-270) points out the discrepancy between the doctrines of the Eleate in the Sophistês, and those maintained by Sokrates in other Platonic dialogues; inferring from thence that the Sophistês and Politikus are not compositions of Plato. As between the Theætêtus and the Sophistês, I think a stronger case of discrepancy might be set forth than he has stated; though the end of the former is tied to the beginning of the latter plainly, directly, and intentionally. But I do not agree in his inference. He concludes that the Sophistês is not Plato's composition: I conclude, that the scope for dissident views and doctrine, within the long philosophical career and numerous dialogues of Plato, is larger than his commentators admit.]

[Side-note: Plato considered that the search for Truth was the noblest occupation of life.]

Such a string of objections never answered, and of difficulties without solution, may appear to many persons nugatory as well as tiresome. To Plato they did not appear so. At the time when most of his dialogues were composed, he considered that the Search after truth was at once the noblest occupation, and the highest pleasure, of life. Whoever has no sympathy with such a pursuit--whoever cares only for results, and finds the chase in itself fatiguing rather than attractive--is likely to take little interest in the Platonic dialogues. To repeat what I said in