Chapter XXIX: Sophistes--Politikus (4)

[Footnote 135: Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 264-265) is upon this point more satisfactory than the other Platonic commentators. He points out--not only without disguise, but even with emphasis--the discrepancies and contradictions between the doctrines ascribed to the Eleate in the Sophistês, and those ascribed to Sokrates in the Republic, Phædon, and other Platonic dialogues. These are the main premisses upon which Socher rests his inference, that the Sophistês is not the composition of Plato. I do not admit his inference: but the premisses, as matters of fact, appear to me undeniable. Stallbaum, in his Proleg. to the Sophistês, p. 40 seq., attempts to explain away these discrepancies--in my opinion his remarks are obscure and unsatisfactory. Various other commentators, also holding the Sophistês to be a genuine work of Plato, overlook or extenuate these premisses, which they consider unfavourable to that conclusion. Thus Alkinous, in his [Greek: Ei)sagôgê/], sets down the explanation of [Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n] which is given in the Sophistês, as if it were the true and Platonic explanation, not adverting to what is said in the Republic and elsewhere (Alkin. c. 35, p. 189 in the Appendix Platonica annexed to the edition of Plato by K. F. Hermann). The like appears in the [Greek: Prolego/mena tê=s Pla/tônos philosophi/as]: c. 21, p. 215 of the same edition. Proklus, in his Commentary on the Parmenidês, speaks in much the same manner about [Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n]--considering the doctrine advanced and defended by the Eleate in the Sophistês, to represent the opinion of Plato (p. 785 ed. Stallbaum; see also the Commentary of Proklus on the Timæus, b. iii. p. 188 E, 448 ed. Schneid.). So likewise Simplikius and the commentators on Aristotle, appear to consider it--see Schol. ad Aristotel. Physica, p. 332, a. 8, p. 333, b., 334, a., 343, a. 5. It is plain from these Scholia that the commentators were much embarrassed in explaining [Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n]. They take the Sophistês as if it delivered Plato's decisive opinion upon that point (Porphyry compares what Plato says in the Timæus, but not what he says in the Republic or in Theætêtus, p. 333, b. 25); and I think that they accommodate Plato to Aristotle, in such manner as to obscure the real antithesis which Plato insists upon in the Sophistês--I mean the antithesis according to which Plato excludes what is [Greek: e)nanti/on tou= o)/ntos] and admits only what is [Greek: e(/teron tou= o)/ntos].

Ritter gives an account (Gesch. der Philos. part ii. pp. 288-289) of Plato's doctrine in the Sophistês respecting Non-Ens; but by no means an adequate account. K. F. Hermann also omits (Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philos. pp. 504-505-507) to notice the discrepancy between the doctrine of the Sophistês, and the doctrine of the Republic, and Theætêtus, respecting [Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n]--though he pronounces elsewhere that the Republic is among the most indisputably positive of all Plato's compositions (p. 536).]

Again, the doctrine maintained by the Eleate in the Sophistês respecting Ens, as well as respecting Ideas or Forms, is in other ways inconsistent with what is laid down in other Platonic dialogues. The Eleate in the Sophistês undertakes to refute two different classes of opponents; first, the Materialists, of whom he speaks with derision and antipathy--secondly, others of very opposite doctrines, whom he denominates the Friends of Ideas or Forms, speaking of them in terms of great respect. Now by these Friends of Forms or Ideas, Schleiermacher conjectures that Plato intends to denote the Megaric philosophers. M. Cousin, and most other critics (except Ritter), have taken up this opinion. But to me it seems that Socher is right in declaring the doctrine, ascribed to these Friends of Ideas, to be the very same as that which is laid down by Plato himself in other important dialogues--Republic, Timæus, Phædon, Phædrus, Kratylus, &c.--and which is generally understood as that of the Platonic Ideas.[136] In all these dialogues, the capital contrast and antithesis is that between Ens or Entia on one side, and Fientia (the transient, ever generated and ever perishing), on the other: between the eternal, unchangeable, archetypal Forms or Ideas--and the ever-changing flux of particulars, wherein approximative likeness of these archetypes is imperfectly manifested. Now it is exactly this antithesis which the Friends of Forms in the Sophistês are represented as upholding, and which the Eleate undertakes to refute.[137] We shall find Aristotle, over and over again, impugning the total separation or demarcation between Ens and Fientia ([Greek: ei)/dê--ge/nesis--chôrista/]), both as the characteristic dogma, and the untenable dogma, of the Platonic philosophy: it is exactly the same issue which the Eleate in the Sophistês takes with the Friends of Forms. He proves that Ens is just as full of perplexity, and just as difficult to understand, as Non-Ens:[138] whereas, in the other Platonic dialogues, Ens is constantly spoken of as if it were plain and intelligible. In fact, he breaks down the barrier between Ens and Fientia, by including motion, change, the moving or variable, among the world of Entia.[139] Motion or Change belongs to Fieri; and if it be held to belong to Esse also (by recognising a Form or Idea of Motion or Change, as in the Sophistês), the antithesis between the two, which is so distinctly declared in other Platonic dialogues, disappears.[140]

[Footnote 136: Socher, p. 266; Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Sophistes, p. 134; Cousin, Oeuvres de Platon, vol. xi. 517, notes.

Schleiermacher gives this as little more than a conjecture; and distinctly admits that any man may easily suppose the doctrine ascribed to these Friends of Forms to be Plato's own doctrine--"Nicht zu verwundern wäre es, wenn Mancher auf den Gedanken käme, Platon meinte hier sich selbst und seine eigene Lehre," &c.

But most of the subsequent critics have taken up Schleiermacher's conjecture (that the Megarici are intended), as if it were something proved and indubitable.

It is curious that while Schleiermacher thinks that the opinions of the Megaric philosophers are impugned and refuted in the Sophistês, Socher fancies that the dialogue was composed by a Megaric philosopher, not by Plato. Ueberweg (Aechtheit der Platon. Schr. pp. 275-277) points out as explicitly as Socher, the discrepancy between the Sophistês and several other Platonic dialogues, in respect to what is said about Forms or Ideas. But he draws a different inference: he infers from it a great change in Plato's own opinion, and he considers that the Sophistês is later in its date of composition than those other dialogues which it contradicts. I think this opinion about the late composition of the Sophistês, is not improbable; but the premisses are not sufficient to prove it.

My view of the Platonic Sophistês differs from the elaborate criticism on it given by Steinhart (Einleitung zum Soph. p. 417 seq.) Moreover, there is one assertion in that Einleitung which I read with great surprise. Steinhart not only holds it for certain that the Sophistes was composed after the Parmenidês, but also affirms that it solves the difficulties propounded in the Parmenidês--discusses the points of difficulty "in the best possible way" ("in der wünschenwerthesten Weise" (pp. 470-471).

I confess I cannot find that the difficulties started in the Parmenidês are even noticed, much less solved, in the Sophistês. And Steinhart himself tells that the Parmenidês places us in a circle both of persons and doctrines entirely different from those of the Sophistês (p. 472). It is plain also that the other Platonic commentators do not agree with Steinhart in finding the Sophistês a key to the Parmenidês: for most of them (Ast, Hermann, Zeller, Stallbaum, Brandis, &c.) consider the Parmenidês to have been composed at a later date than the Sophistês (as Steinhart himself intimates; compare his Einleitung zum Parmenides, p. 312 seq.). Ueberweg, the most recent enquirer (posterior to Steinhart), regards the Parmenidês as the latest of all Plato's compositions--if indeed it be genuine, of which he rather doubts. (Aechtheit der Platon. Schrift. pp. 182-183.)

M. Mallet (Histoire de l'École de Megare, Introd. pp. xl.-lviii., Paris, 1845) differs from all the three opinions of Schleiermacher, Ritter, and Socher. He thinks that the philosophers, designated as Friends of Forms, are intended for the Pythagoreans. His reasons do not satisfy me.]

[Footnote 137: Plato, Sophist. pp. 246 B, 248 B. The same opinion is advanced by Sokrates in the Republic, v. p. 479 B-C. Phædon, pp. 78-79. Compare Sophist, p. 248 C with Symposion, p. 211 B. In the former passage, [Greek: to\ pa/schein] is affirmed of the Ideas: in the latter passage, [Greek: to\ pa/schein mêde/n].]

[Footnote 138: Plato, Sophist p. 245 E. Yet he afterwards talks of [Greek: to\ lampro\n tou= o)/ntos a)ei\] as contrasted with [Greek: to\ skoteino\n tou= mê\ o)/ntos], p. 254 A, which seems not consistent.]

[Footnote 139: Plato, Sophist. p. 249 B. "Ipsæ ideæ per se simplices sunt et immutabiles: sunt æternæ, ac semper fuerunt ab omni liberæ mutatione," says Stallbaum ad Platon. Republ. v. p. 476; see also his Prolegg. to the Parmenidês, pp. 39-40. This is the way in which the Platonic Ideas are presented in the Timæus, Republic, Phædon, &c., and the way in which they are conceived by the [Greek: ei)dô=n phi/loi] in the Sophistês, whom the Eleate seeks to confute.

Zeller's chapter on Plato seems to me to represent not so much what we read in the separate dialogues, as the attempt of an able and ingenious man to bring out something like a consistent and intelligible doctrine which will do credit to Plato, and to soften down all the inconsistencies (see Philos. der Griech. vol. ii. pp. 394-415-429 ed. 2nd).]

[Footnote 140: See a striking passage about the unchangeableness of Forms or Ideas in the Kratylus, p. 439 D-E; also Philêbus, p. 15.

In the Parmenidês (p. 132 D) the supposition [Greek: ta\ ei)/dê e)sta/nai e)n tê=| phu/sei] is one of those set up by Sokrates and impugned by Parmenides. Nevertheless in an earlier passage of that dialogue Sokrates is made to include [Greek: ki/nêsis] and [Greek: sta/sis] among the [Greek: ei)/dê] (p. 129 E). It will be found, however, that when Parmenides comes to question Sokrates, What [Greek: ei)/dê] do you recognise? attributes and subjects only (the latter with hesitation) are included: no such thing as actions, processes, events--[Greek: to\ poiei=n kai\ pa/schein] (p. 130). In Republic vii. 529 D, we find mention made of [Greek: to\ o)\n ta/chos] and [Greek: ê( ou)=sa bradu/tês], which implies [Greek: ki/nêsis] as among the [Greek: ei)/dê]. In Theætêt. pp. 152 D, 156 A, [Greek: ki/nêsis] is noted as the constituent and characteristic of Fieri--[Greek: to\ gigno/menon]--which belongs to the domain of sensible perception, as distinguished from permanent and unchangeable Ens.]

[Side-note: The persons whom Plato here attacks as Friends of Forms are those who held the same doctrine as Plato himself espouses in Phædon, Republic, &c.]

If we examine the reasoning of the Eleate, in the Sophistês, against the persons whom he calls the Friends of Forms, we shall see that these latter are not Parmenideans only, but also Plato himself in the Phædon, Republic, and elsewhere. We shall also see that the ground, taken up by the Eleate, is much the same as that which was afterwards taken up by Aristotle against the Platonic Ideas. Plato, in most of his dialogues, declares Ideas, Forms, Entia, to be eternal substances distinct and apart from the flux and movement of particulars: yet he also declares, nevertheless, that particulars have a certain communion or participation with the Ideas, and are discriminated and denominated according to such participation. Aristotle controverts both these doctrines: first, the essential separation of the two, which he declares to be untrue: next, the participation or coming together of the two separate elements--which he declares to be an unmeaning fiction or poetical metaphor, introduced in order to elude the consequences of the original fallacy.[141] He maintains that the two (Entia and Fientia--Universals and Particulars) have no reality except in conjunction and implication together; though they are separable by reason ([Greek: lo/gô| chôrista\--tô=| ei)nai, chôrista/]) or abstraction, and though we may reason about them apart, and must often reason about them apart.[142] Now it is this implication and conjunction of the Universal with its particulars, which is the doctrine of the Sophistês, and which distinguishes it from other Platonic dialogues, wherein the Universal is transcendentalized--lodged in a separate world from particulars. No science or intelligence is possible (says the Eleate in the Sophistês) either upon the theory of those who pronounce all Ens to be constant and unchangeable, or upon that of those who declare all Ens to be fluent and variable. We must recognise both together, the constant and the variable, as equally real and as making up the totality of Ens.[143] This result, though not stated in the language which Aristotle would have employed, coincides very nearly with the Aristotelian doctrine, in one of the main points on which Aristotle distinguishes his own teaching from that of his master.

[Footnote 141: Aristot. Metaphys. A. 991-992.]

[Footnote 142: Aristot. Metaph. vi. 1038, a-b. The Scholion of Alexander here (p. 763, b. 36, Brandis) is clearer than Aristotle himself. [Greek: To\ prokei/meno/n e)sti dei=xai ô(s ou)de\n tô=n katho/lou ou)si/a e)/stin; ou)/te ga\r o( katho/lou a)/nthrôpos ê)\ o( katho/lou i(/ppos, ou)/te a)/llo ou)de/n; a)ll' e(/kaston au)tôn _dianoi/as a)po/maxi/s_ e)stin _a)po\ tô=n kath' e(/kasta_ kai\ prô/tôs kai\ ma/lista legome/nôn ou)siô=n kai\ o(moi/ôma.]]

[Footnote 143: Plato, Sophist. p. 249 C-D. [Greek: Tô=| dê\ philoso/phô| kai\ tau=ta ma/lista timô=nti pa=sa a)na/gkê dia\ tau=ta mê/te tô=n e(\n ê)\ kai\ ta\ polla\ ei)/dê lego/ntôn to\ pa=n e(stêko\s a)pode/chesthai, tô=n te au)= pantachê=| to\ o)\n kinou=ntôn mêde\ to\ para/pan a)kou/ein; a)lla\ kata\ tê\n tô=n pai/dôn eu)chê/n, o(/sa a)ki/nêta/ te kai\ kekinême/na, to\ o)/n te kai\ to\ pa=n, xunampho/tera le/gein.]

Ritter states the result of this portion of the Sophistês correctly. "Es bleibt uns als Ergebniss aller dieser Untersuchungen über das Seyn, dass die Wahrheit sowohl des Werdens, als auch des beharrlichen Seyns, anerkannt werden müsse" (Geschichte der Philos. ii. p. 281).]

[Side-note: The Sophistês recedes from the Platonic point of view, and approaches the Aristotelian.]

That the Eleate in the Sophistes recedes from the Platonic point of view and approaches towards the Aristotelian, will be seen also if we look at the lesson of logic which he gives to Theætêtus. In his analysis of a proposition--and in discriminating such conjunctions of words as are significant, from such as are insignificant--he places himself on the same ground as that which is travelled over by Aristotle in the Categories and the treatise De Interpretatione. That the handling of the topic by Aristotle is much superior, is what we might naturally expect from the fact that he is posterior in time. But there is another difference between the two which is important to notice. Aristotle deals with this topic, as he does with every other, in the way of methodical and systematic exposition. To expound it as a whole, to distribute it into convenient portions each illustrating the others, to furnish suitable examples for the general principles laid down--are announced as his distinct purposes. Now Plato's manner is quite different. Systematic exposition is not his primary purpose: he employs it up to a certain point, but as means towards another and an independent purpose--towards the solution of a particular difficulty, which has presented itself in the course of the dialogue.--"_Nosti morem dialogorum._" Aristotle is demonstrative: Plato is dialectical. In our present dialogue (the Sophistês), the Eleate has been giving a long explanation of Non-Ens; an explanation intended to prove that Non-Ens was a particular sort of Ens, and that there was therefore no absurdity (though Parmenides had said that this was absurdity) in assuming it as a passable object of Cognition, Opination, Affirmation. He now goes a step further, and seeks to show that it is, actually and in fact, an object of Opination and Affirmation.[144] It is for this purpose, and for this purpose only, that he analyses a proposition, specifies the constituent elements requisite to form it, and distinguishes one proposition from another.

[Footnote 144: Plato, Sophist. p. 261 D.]

Accordingly, the Eleate,--after pointing out that neither a string of nouns repeated one after the other, nor a string of verbs so repeated, would form a significant proposition,--declares that the conjunction of a noun with a verb is required to form one; and that opination is nothing but that internal mental process which the words of the proposition express. The smallest proposition must combine a noun with a verb:--the former signifying the agent, the latter, the action or thing done.[145] Moreover, the proposition must be a proposition _of something_; and it must be of a certain quality. By a proposition _of something_, Plato means, that what is called technically the subject of the proposition (in his time there were no technical terms of logic) must be something positive, and cannot be negative: by the quality of the proposition, he means that it must be either true or false.[146]

[Footnote 145: Plato, Sophist. p. 262 C.]

[Footnote 146: Plato, Sophist. p. 262 E. [Greek: Lo/gon a)nagkai=on, o(/tan per ê)=|, tino\s ei)=nai lo/gon, _mê\ de/ tinos_, a)du/naton . . . Ou)kou=n kai\ poio/n tina au)to\n ei)=nai dei=?] Compare p. 237 E.

In the words here cited Plato unconsciously slides back into the ordinary acceptation of [Greek: mê/ ti]: that is, to [Greek: mê\] in the sense of negation. If we adopt that peculiar sense of [Greek: mê/], which the Eleate has taken so much pains to prove just before in the case of [Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n] (that is, if we take [Greek: mê\] as signifying not negation but simply difference), the above argument will not hold. If [Greek: ti/s] signifies one subject (A), and [Greek: mê/ tis] signifies simply another subject (B) different from A ([Greek: e(/teron]), the predicate [Greek: a)du/naton] cannot be affirmed. But if we take [Greek: mê/ tis] in its proper sense of negation, the [Greek: a)du/naton] will be so far true that [Greek: ou)k a)/nthrôpos, ou) Theai/têtos], cannot be the subject of a proposition. Aristotle says the same in the beginning of the Treatise De Interpretatione (p. 16, a. 30).]

[Side-note: Aristotle assumes without proof, that there are some propositions true, others false.]

This early example of rudimentary grammatical or logical analysis, recognising only the two main and principal parts of speech, is interesting as occurring prior to Aristotle; by whom it is repeated in a manner more enlarged, systematic,[147] and instructive. But Aristotle assumes, without proof and without supposing that any one will dispute the assumption--that there are some propositions true, other propositions false: that a name or noun, taken separately, is neither true nor false:[148] that propositions (enunciations) only can be true or false.

[Footnote 147: Aristotel. De Interpr. init. with Scholia of Ammonius, p. 98, Bekk.]

[Footnote 148: In the Kratylus of Plato Sokrates maintains that names may be true or false as well as propositions, pp. 385 D, 431 B.]

[Side-note: Plato in the Sophistês has undertaken an impossible task--He could not have proved, against his supposed adversary, that there _are_ false propositions.]

The proceeding of Plato in the Sophistês is different. He supposes a Sophist who maintains that no proposition either is false or can be false, and undertakes to prove against him that there are false propositions: he farther supposes this antagonist to reject the evidence of sense and visible analogies, and to acknowledge no proof except what is furnished by reason and philosophical deduction.[149] Attempting, under these restrictions, to prove his point, Plato's Eleatic disputant rests entirely upon the peculiar meaning which he professes to have shown to attach to Non-Ens. He applies this to prove that Non-Ens may be predicated as well as Ens: assuming that such predication of Non-Ens constitutes a false proposition. But the proof fails. It serves only to show that the peculiar meaning ascribed by the Eleate to Non-Ens is inadmissible. The Eleate compares two distinct propositions--_Theætêtus is sitting down_--_Theætêtus is flying_. The first is true: the second is false. Why? Because (says the Eleate) the first predicates Ens, the second predicates Non-Ens, or (to substitute his definition of Non-Ens) another Ens different from the Ens predicated in the first.[150] But here the reason assigned, why the second proposition is false, is not the real reason. Many propositions may be assigned, which predicate attributes different from the first, but which are nevertheless quite as much true as the first. I have already observed, that the reason why the second proposition is false is, because it contradicts the direct testimony of sense, if the persons debating are spectators: if they are not spectators, then because it contradicts the sum total of their previous sensible experience, remembered, compared, and generalised, which has established in them the conviction that no man does or can fly. If you discard the testimony of sense as unworthy of credit (which Plato assumes the Sophist to do), you cannot prove that the second proposition is false--nor indeed that the first proposition is true. Plato has therefore failed in giving that dialectic proof which he promised. The Eleate is forced to rely (without formally confessing it), on the testimony of sense, which he had forbidden Theætêtus to invoke, twenty pages before.[151] The long intervening piece of dialectic about Ens and Non-Ens is inconclusive for his purpose, and might have been omitted. The proposition--_Theætêtus is flying_--does undoubtedly predicate attributes _which are not_ as if they were,[152] and is thus false. But then we must consult and trust the evidence of our perception: we must farther accept _are not_ in the ordinary sense of the words, and not in the sense given to them by the Eleate in the Platonic Sophistês. His attempt to banish the specific meaning of the negative particle, and to treat it as signifying nothing more than difference, appears to me fallacious.[153]

[Footnote 149: Plato, Sophist. p. 240 A. It deserves note that here Plato presents to us the Sophist as rejecting the evidence of sense: in the Theætêtus he presents to us the Sophist as holding the doctrine [Greek: e)pistê/mê = ai)/sthêsis]. How these propositions can both be true respecting the Sophists as a class I do not understand. The first may be true respecting some of them; the second may be true respecting others; respecting a third class of them, neither may be true. About the Sophists in a body there is hardly a single proposition which can be safely affirmed.]

[Footnote 150: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 C.]

[Footnote 151: Theætêtus makes this attempt and is checked by the Eleate, pp. 239-240. It is in p. 261 A that the Eleate begins his proof in refutation of the supposed Sophist--that [Greek: do/xa] and [Greek: lo/gos] may be false. The long interval between the two is occupied with the reasoning about Ens and Non-Ens.]

[Footnote 152: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 E. [Greek: ta\ mê\ o)/nta ô(s o)/nta lego/mena], &c.

The distinction between these two propositions, the first as true, the second as false (Theætêtus is sitting down, Theætêtus is flying), is in noway connected with the distinction which Plato had so much insisted upon before respecting the intercommunion of Forms, Ideas, General Notions, &c., that some Forms will come into communion with each other, while others will not (pp. 252-253).

There is here no question of repugnancy or intercommunion of Forms: the question turns upon the evidence of vision, which informs us that Theætêtus is sitting down and not standing up or flying. If any predicate be affirmed of a subject, contrary to what is included in the definition of that subject, then indeed repugnancy of Forms might be urged.]

[Footnote 153: Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B.]

[Side-note: What must be assumed in all dialectic discussion.]

In all reasoning, nay in all communication by speech, you must assume that your hearer understands the meaning of what is spoken: that he has the feelings of belief and disbelief, and is familiar with those forms of the language whereby such feelings are expressed: that there are certain propositions which he believes--in other words, which he regards as true: that there are certain other propositions which he disbelieves, or regards as false: that he has had experience of the transition from belief to disbelief, and _vice versâ_--in other words, of having fallen into error and afterwards come to perceive that it was error. These are the mental facts realised in each man and assumed by him to be also realised in his neighbours, when communication takes place by speech. If a man could be supposed to believe nothing, and to disbelieve nothing;--if he had no forms of speech to express his belief, disbelief, affirmation, and denial--no information could be given, no discussion would be possible. Every child has to learn this lesson in infancy; and a tedious lesson it undoubtedly is.[154] Antisthenes (who composed several dialogues) and the other disputants of whom we are now speaking, must have learnt the lesson as other men have: but they find or make some general theory which forbids them to trust the lesson when learnt. It was in obedience to some such theory that Antisthenes discarded all predication except essential predication, and discarded also the form suited for expressing disbelief--the negative proposition: maintaining, That to contradict was impossible. I know no mode of refuting him, except by showing that his fundamental theory is erroneous.

[Footnote 154: Aristotel. Metaphys. vii. 1043, b. 25. [Greek: ô(/ste ê( a)pori/a ê(\n oi( A)ntisthe/neioi kai\ oi( ou(/tôs _a)pai/deutoi_ ê)po/roun, e)/chei tina\ kairo/n], &c.

Compare respecting this paradox or [Greek: the/sis] of Antisthenes, the scholia of Alexander on the passage of Aristotle's Topica above cited, p. 259, b. 15, in Schol. Bekk.

If Antisthenes admitted only identical predications, of course [Greek: to\ a)ntilo/gein] became impossible. I have endeavoured to show, in a previous note on this dialogue, that a misconception (occasionally shared even by Plato) of the function of the copula, lay at the bottom of the Antisthenean theory respecting identical predication. Compare Aristotel. Physic. i. p. 185, b. 28, together with the Scholia of Simplikius, pp. 329-330, ed. Bekk., and Plato, Sophistês, p. 245.]

[Side-note: Discussion and theorising presuppose belief and disbelief, expressed in set forms of words. They imply predication, which Antisthenes discarded.]

Discussion and theorising can only begin when these processes, partly intellectual, partly emotional, have become established and reproducible portions of the train of mental association. As processes, they are common to all men. But though two persons agree in having expressed the feeling of belief, and in expressing that feeling by one form of proposition--also in having the feeling of disbelief, and in expressing it by another form of proposition--yet it does not follow that the propositions which these two believe or disbelieve are the same. How far such is the case must be ascertained by comparison--by appeal to sense, memory, inference from analogy, induction, feeling, consciousness, &c. The ground is now prepared for fruitful debate: for analysing the meaning, often confused and complicated, of propositions: for discriminating the causes, intellectual and emotional, of belief and disbelief, and for determining how far they harmonise in one mind and another: for setting out general rules as to sequence, or inconsistency, or independence, of one belief as compared with another. To a certain extent, the grounds of belief and disbelief in all men, and the grounds of consistency or inconsistency between some beliefs and others, will be found to harmonise: they can be embodied in methodical forms of language, and general rules can be laid down preventing in many cases inadvertence or erroneous combination. It is at this point that Aristotle takes up rational grammar and logic, with most profitable effect. But he is obliged to postulate (what Antisthenes professed to discard) predication, not merely identical, but also accidental as well as essential--together with names and propositions both negative and affirmative.[155] He cannot avoid postulating thus much: though he likewise postulates a great deal more, which ought not to be granted.

[Footnote 155: See the remarks in Aristotel. Metaphys. [Greek: G]. 1005, b. 2, 1006, a. 6. He calls it [Greek: a)paideusi/a--a)paideusi/a tô=n a)nalutikô=n]--not to be able to distinguish those matters which can be proved and require to be proved, from those matters which are true, but require no proof and are incapable of being proved. But this distinction has been one of the grand subjects of controversy from his day down to the present day; and between different schools of philosophers, none of whom would allow themselves to deserve the epithet of [Greek: a)pai/deutoi].

Aristotle calls Antisthenes and his followers [Greek: a)pai/deutoi], in the passage cited in the preceding note.]

[Side-note: Precepts and examples of logical partition, illustrated in the Sophistês.]

The long and varied predicamental series, given in the Sophistês, illustrates the process of logical partition, as Plato conceived it, and the definition of a class-name founded thereupon. You take a logical whole, and you subtract from it part after part until you find the _quæsitum_ isolated from every thing else.[156] But you must always divide into two parts (he says) wherever it can be done: dichotomy or bipartition is the true logical partition: should this be impracticable, trichotomy, or division into the smallest attainable number of parts, must be sought for.[157] Moreover, the bipartition must be made according to Forms (Ideas, Kinds): the parts which you recognise must be not merely parts, but Forms: every form is a part, but every part is not a form.[158] Next, you must draw the line of division as nearly as you can through the middle of the _dividendum_, so that the parts on both sides may be nearly equal: it is in this way that your partition is most likely to coincide with forms on both sides of the line.[159] This is the longest way of proceeding, but the safest. It is a logical mistake to divide into two parts very unequal: you may find a form on one side of the line, but you obtain none on the other side. Thus, it is bad classification to distribute the human race into Hellênes + Barbari: the _Barbari_ are of infinite number and diversity, having no one common form to which the name can apply. It is also improper to distribute Number into the myriad on side, and all other numbers on the other--for a similar reason. You ought to distribute the human race into the two forms, Male--Female: and number into the two, Odd--Even.[160] So also, you must not divide gregarious creatures into human beings on one side, and animals on the other; because this last term would comprise numerous particulars utterly disparate. Such a classification is suggested only by the personal feeling of man, who prides himself upon his intelligence. But if the classification were framed by any other intelligent species, such as Cranes,[161] they would distinguish Cranes on the one side from animals on the other, including Man as one among many disparate particulars under _animal_.

[Footnote 156: Plato, Politikus, p. 268 D. [Greek: me/ros a)ei\ me/rous a)phairoume/nous e)p' a)/kron e)phiknei=sthai to\ zêtou/menon.]

Ueberweg thinks that Aristotle, when he talks of [Greek: ai( gegramme/nai diaire/seis] alludes to these logical distributions in the Sophistês and Politikus (Aechtheit der Platon. Schr. pp. 153-154).]

[Footnote 157: Politik. p. 287 C.]

[Footnote 158: Politik. p. 263 C.]

[Footnote 159: Politik. pp. 262 B, 265 A. [Greek: dei= mesotomei=n ô(s ma/lista], &c.]

[Footnote 160: Politikus, p. 262 D-E.]

[Footnote 161: Politikus, p. 262 D. [Greek: semnu=non au(to\ e(auto/], &c.]

[Side-note: Recommendation of logical bipartition.]

The above-mentioned principle--dichotomy or bipartition into two equal or nearly equal halves, each resting upon a characteristic form--is to be applied as far as it will go. Many different schemes of partition upon this principle may be found, each including forms subordinated one to the other, descending from the more comprehensive to the less comprehensive. It is only when you can find no more parts which are forms, that you must be content to divide into parts which are not forms. Thus after all the characteristic forms, for dividing the human race, have been gone through, they may at last be partitioned into Hellênes and Barbari, Lydians and non-Lydians, Phrygians and non-Phrygians: in which divisions there is no guiding form at all, but only a capricious distribution into fractions with separate names[162]--meaning by _capricious_, a distribution founded on some feeling or circumstance peculiar to the distributor, or shared by him only with a few others; such as the fact, that he is himself a Lydian or a Phrygian, &c.

[Footnote 162: Politikus, p. 262 E. [Greek: Ludou\s de\ ê)\ Phru/gas ê)/ tinas e(te/rous pro\s a(/pantas ta/ttôn a)po/schizoi to/te, ê(ni/ka a)poroi= ge/nos a)/ma kai\ me/ros eu(ri/skein e(ka/teron tô=n schisthe/ntôn.]]

[Side-note: Precepts illustrated by the Philêbus.]

These precepts in the Sophistês and Politikus, respecting the process of classification, are illustrated by an important passage of the Philêbus:[163] wherein Plato tells us that the constitution of things includes the Determinate and the Indeterminate implicated with each other, and requiring study to disengage them. Between the highest One, Form, or Genus--and the lowest array of indefinite particulars--there exist a certain number of intermediate Ones or Forms, each including more or fewer of these particulars. The process of study or acquired cognition is brought to bear upon these intermediate Forms: to learn how many there are, and to discriminate them in themselves as well as in their position relative to each other. But many persons do not recognise this: they apprehend only the Highest One, and the Infinite Many, not looking for any thing between: they take up hastily with some extreme and vague generality, below which they know nothing but particulars. With knowledge thus imperfect, you do not get beyond contentious debate. Real, instructive, dialectic requires an understanding of all the intermediate forms. But in descending from the Highest Form downwards, you must proceed as much as possible in the way of bipartition, or if not, then of tripartition, &c.: looking for the smallest number of forms which can be found to cover the whole field. When no more forms can be found, then and not till then, you must be content with nothing better than the countless indeterminate particulars.

[Footnote 163: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 16-17.

The notes of Dr. Badham upon this passage in his edition of the Philêbus, p. 11, should be consulted as a just correction of Stallbaum in regard to [Greek: pe/ras] and [Greek: tô=n e(\n e)kei/nôn].]

This instructive passage of the Philêbus--while it brings to view a widespread tendency of the human mind, to pass from the largest and vaguest generalities at once into the region of particulars, and to omit the distinctive sub-classes which lie between--illustrates usefully the drift of the Sophistês and Politikus. In these two last dialogues it is the method itself of good logical distribution which Plato wishes to impress upon his readers: the formal part of the process.[164] With this view, he not only makes the process intentionally circuitous and diversified, but also selects by preference matters of common sensible experience, though in themselves indifferent, such as the art of weaving,[165] &c.

[Footnote 164: He states this expressly, Politik. p. 286 D.]

[Footnote 165: Plato, Politik. p. 285 D.]

[Side-note: Importance of founding logical Partition on resemblances perceived by sense.]

The reasons given for this preference deserve attention. In these common matters (he tells us) the resemblances upon which Forms are founded are perceived by sense, and can be exhibited to every one, so that the form is readily understood and easily discriminated. The general terms can there be explained by reference to sense. But in regard to incorporeal matters, the higher and grander topics of discussion, there is no corresponding sensible illustration to consult. These objects can be apprehended only by reason, and described only by general terms. By means of these general terms, we must learn to give and receive rational explanations, and to follow by process of reasoning from one form to another. But this is more difficult, and requires a higher order of mind, where there are no resemblances or illustrations exposed to sense. Accordingly, we select the common sensible objects as an easier preparatory mode of a process substantially the same in both.[166]

[Footnote 166: Plato, Politik. pp. 285 E--286 A. [Greek: tou\s plei/stous le/lêthen o(/ti toi=s me\n tô=n o)/ntôn r(a|di/ôs katamathei=n ai)sthêtai/ tines o(moio/têtes pephu/kasin, a(\s ou)de\n chalepo\n dêlou=n, o(/tan au)tô=n tis boulê/thê| tô=| lo/gon ai)tou=nti peri\ tou, mê\ meta\ pragma/tôn a)lla\ chôri\s lo/gou r(a|di/ôs e)ndei/xasthai; toi=s d' au)= megi/stois ou)=si kai\ timiôta/tois ou)k e)/stin ei)/dôlon ou)de\n pro\s tou\s a)nthrô/pous ei)rgasme/non e)nargô=s, ou(= deichthe/ntos], &c.

About the [Greek: ei)/dôlon ei)rgasme/non e)nargô=s], which is affirmed in one of these two cases and denied in the other, compare a striking analogy in the Phædrus, p. 250 A-E.]

[Side-note: Province of sensible perception--is not so much narrowed by Plato here as it is in the Theætêtus.]

This explanation given by Plato, in itself just, deserves to be compared with his view of sensible objects as knowable, and of sense as a source of knowledge. I noticed in a preceding chapter the position which Sokrates is made to lay down in the Theætêtus,[167]--That ([Greek: ai)/sthêsis]) sensible perception reaches only to the separate impressions of sense, and does not apprehend the likeness and other relations between them. I have also noticed the contrast which he establishes elsewhere between Esse and Fieri: _i.e._, between Ens which alone (according to him) is knowable, and the perpetual flux of Fientia which is not knowable at all, but is only matter of opinion or guess-work. Now in the dialogue before us, the Politikus, there is no such marked antithesis between opinion and knowledge. Nor is the province of [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] so strictly confined: on the contrary, Plato here considers sensible perception as dealing with Entia, and as appreciating resemblances and other relations between them. It is by an attentive study and comparison of these facts of sense that Forms are detected. "When a man (he says) has first perceived by sense the points of communion between the Many, he must not desist from attentive observation until he has discerned in that communion all the differences which reside in Forms: and when he has looked at the multifarious differences which are visible among these Many, he must not rest contented until he has confined all such as are really cognate within one resemblance, tied together by the essence of one common Form."[168]

[Footnote 167: Plato, Theæt. pp. 185-186. See above p. 161.]

[Footnote 168: Plato, Politikus, p. 285 B. [Greek: de/on, o(/tan me\n tê\n tô=n pollô=n tis pro/teron ai)/sthêtai koinôni/an, mê\ proaphi/stasthai pri\n a)\n e)n au)tê=| ta\s diaphora\s i)/dê| pa/sas o(po/sai per e)n ei)/desi kei=ntai; ta\s de\ au)= pantodapa\s a)nomoio/têtas, o(/tan e)n plê/thesin o)phthô=si, mê\ dunato\n ei)=nai dusôpou/menon pau/esthai, pri\n a)\n xu/mpanta ta\ oi)kei=a e)nto\s mia=s o(moio/têtos e(/rxas ge/nous tino\s ou)si/a| periba/lêtai.]]

[Side-note: Comparison of the Sophistês with the Phædrus.]

These passages may be compared with others of similar import in the Phædrus.[169] Plato here considers the Form, not as an Entity _per se_ separate from and independent of the particulars, but as implicated in and with the particulars: as a result reached by the mind through the attentive observation and comparison of particulars: as corresponding to what is termed in modern language abstraction and generalisation. The self-existent Platonic Ideas do not appear in the Politikus:[170] which approximates rather to the Aristotelian doctrine:--that is, the doctrine of the universal, logically distinguishable from its particulars, but having no reality apart from them ([Greek: chôrista\ lo/gô| mo/non]). But in other dialogues of Plato, the separation between the two is made as complete as possible, especially in the striking passages of the Republic: wherein we read that the facts of sense are a delusive juggle--that we must turn our back upon them and cease to study them--and that we must face about, away from the sensible world, to contemplate Ideas, the separate and unchangeable furniture of the intelligible world--and that the whole process of acquiring true Cognition, consists in passing from the higher to the lower Forms or Ideas, without any misleading illustrations of sense.[171] Here, in the Sophistês and Politikus, instead of having the Universal behind our backs when the particulars are before our faces, we see it _in and amidst_ particulars: the illustrations of sense, instead of deluding us, being declared to conduce, wherever they can be had, to the clearness and facility of the process.[172] Here, as well as in the Phædrus, we find the process of Dialectic emphatically recommended, but described as consisting mainly in logical classification of particulars, ascending and descending divisions and conjunctions, as Plato calls them[173]--analysis and synthesis. We are enjoined to divide and analyse the larger genera into their component species until we come to the lowest species which can no longer be divided: also, conversely, to conjoin synthetically the subordinate species until the highest genus is attained, but taking care not to omit any of the intermediate species, in their successive gradations.[174] Throughout all this process, as described both in the Phædrus and in the Politikus, the eye is kept fixed upon the constituent individuals. The Form is studied in and among the particulars which it comprehends: the particulars are looked at in groups put together suitably to each comprehending Form. And in both dialogues, marked stress is laid upon the necessity of making the division dichotomous; as well as according to Forms, and not according to fractions which are not legitimate Forms.[175] Any other method, we are told, would be like the wandering of a blind man.

[Footnote 169: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 249 C, 265 D-E.]

[Footnote 170: This remark is made by Stallbaum in his Prolegg. ad Politicum, p. 81; and it is just, though I do not at all concur in his general view of the Politikus, wherein he represents the dialogue as intended to deride the Megaric philosophers.]

[Footnote 171: See the Republic, v. pp. 476-479, vi. pp. 508-510-511, and especially the memorable simile about the cave and the shadows within it, in Book vii. pp. 518-519, together with the [Greek: periagôgê\] which he there prescribes--[Greek: a)po\ tou= gignome/nou ei)s to\ o)/n]--and the remarks respecting observations in astronomy and acoustics, p. 529.]

[Footnote 172: Compare the passage of the Phædrus (p. 263 A-C) where Plato distinguishes the sensible particulars on which men mostly agree, from the abstractions (Just and Unjust, &c., corresponding with the [Greek: a)sô/mata, ka/llista, me/gista, timiô/tata], Politikus, p. 286 A) on which they are perpetually dissenting.]

[Footnote 173: Plato, Phædrus, p. 266 B. [Greek: tou/tôn dê\ e)/gôge au)to/s te e)rastê\s tô=n diaire/seôn kai\ sunagôgô=n . . . tou\s duname/nous au)to\ dra=|n . . . kalô= dialektikou/s.] The reason which Sokrates gives in the Phædrus for his attachment to dialectics, that he may become competent in discourse and in wisdom ([Greek: i(/n' oi(=o/s te ô)= le/gein kai\ phronei=n]), is the same as that which the Eleate assigns in recommendation of the logical exercises in the Politikus.]

[Footnote 174: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 271 D, 277 B. [Greek: o(risa/meno/s te pa/lin kat' ei)/dê me/chri tou= a)tmê/tou te/mnein e)pistê/thê|.]]

[Footnote 175: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 265 E, 270 E. [Greek: e)oi/koi a)\n ô(/sper tuphlou= porei/a|.]]

What distinguishes the Sophistês and Politikus from most other dialogues of Plato, is, that the method of logical classification is illustrated by setting the classifier to work upon one or a few given subjects, some in themselves trivial, some important. Though the principles of the method are enunciated in general terms, yet their application to the special example is kept constantly before us; so that we are never permitted, much less required, to divorce the Universal from its Particulars.

[Side-note: Comparison of the Politikus with the Parmenidês.]

As a dialogue illustrative of this method, the Politikus (as I have already pointed out) may be compared to the Phædrus: in another point of view, we shall find instruction in comparing it to the Parmenidês. This last too is a dialogue illustrative of method, but of a different variety of method.

[Side-note: Variety of method in dialectic research--Diversity of Plato.]

What the Sophistês and Politikus are for the enforcement of logical classification, the Parmenidês is for another part of the philosophising process--laborious evolution of all the consequences deducible from the affirmative as well as from the negative of every hypothesis bearing upon the problem. And we note the fact, that both in the Politikus and Parmenidês, Plato manifests the consciousness that readers will complain of him as prolix, tiresome, and wasting ingenuity upon unprofitable matters.[176] In the Parmenidês, he even goes the length of saying that the method ought only to be applied before a small and select audience; to most people it would be repulsive, since they cannot be made to comprehend the necessity for such circuitous preparation in order to reach truth.[177]

[Footnote 176: Plato, Politikus, p. 283 B. [Greek: pro\s dê\ to\ no/sêma to\ toiou=ton], and the long series of questions and answers which follows to show that the prolixity is unavoidable, pp. 285 C, 286 B-E.]

[Footnote 177: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 D-E.]