Chapter XXXI: Kratylus (2)

About Plato's etymologies, as seriously intended, see Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 375 C-D-E, with the note of Wyttenbach. Harris, in his Hermes (pp. 369-370-407), alludes to the etymologies of Plato in the Kratylus as being ingenious, though disputable, but not at all as being derisory caricatures. Indeed the etymology of _Scientia_, which he cites from Scaliger, p. 370, is quite as singular as any in the Kratylus. Sydenham (Notes to the translation of Plato's Philêbus, p. 35) calls the Kratylus "a dialogue, in which is taught the nature of things, as well the permanent as the transient, from a supposed etymology of names and words.

I find, in the very instructive comments of Bishop Colenso on the Pentateuch (Part iv. ch. 24, p. 250), a citation from St. Augustine, illustrating the view which I believe Plato to have taken of these etymologies: "Quo loco prorsus non arbitror prætereundum, quod pater Valerius animadvertit admirans, in quorundam rusticanorum (_i.e._, Africans, near Carthage) collocutione. Cum enim alter alteri dixisset _Salus_--quæsivit ab eo, qui et Latiné nosset et Punicé, quid esset _Salus_: responsum est, _Tria_. Tum ille agnoscens cum gaudio, salutem nostram esse Trinitatem, convenientiam linguarum non fortuitu sic sonuisse arbitratus est, sed occultissimâ dispensatione divinæ providentiæ--ut cum Latiné nominatur _Salus_, à Punicis intelligantur _Tria_--et cum Punici linguâ suâ _Tria_ nominant, Latiné intelligatur _Salus_ . . . Sed _hæc verborum consonantia_, sive provenerit sive provisa sit, _non pugnaciter agendum est ut ei quisque consentiat, sed quantum interpretantis elegantiam hilaritas audientis admittit._"

So in the etymologies of the Kratylus: Plato follows out threads of analogy, which, with indulgent hearers, he reckons will be sufficient for proof: and which, even when not accepted as proof, will be pleasing to the fancy of unbelieving hearers, as they are to his own. There is no intention to caricature: no obvious absurdities piled up with a view to caricature.]

[Footnote 32: Schleiermacher, Introduction to Kratylus, vol. iv. p. 6: "Dagegen ist viel gewonnen durch die Entdeckung neuerer Zeiten," &c. To the same purpose, Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., part ii. p. 402, edit. 2nd, and Brandis, Gesch. Gr. Röm. Phil., part ii. sect. cvii. p. 285.

Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Platon. Cratylum, p. 4, says: "Quod mirum est non esse ab iis animadversum, qui Platonem putaverunt de linguæ et vocabulorum origine hoc libro suam sententiam explicare voluisse. Isti enim adeo nihil senserunt irrisionis, ut omnia atque singula pro philosophi decretis venditarint, ideoque ei absurdissima quæque commenta affinxerint. Ita Menagius. . . . Nec Tiedemannus Argum, Dial. Plat. multo rectius judicat. Irrisionem primi senserunt Garnierius et Tennemann." &c. Stallbaum, moreover, is perpetually complaining in his notes, that the Etymological Lexicons adopt Plato's derivations as genuine. Ménage (ad Diogen. Laert. iii. 25) declares most of the etymologies of Plato in the Kratylus to be [Greek: pseude/tuma], but never hints at the supposition that they are intended as caricatures. During the centuries between Plato and Ménage, men had become more critical on the subject of etymology: in the century after Ménage, they had become more critical still, as we may see by the remarks of Turgot on the etymologies of Ménage himself.

The following are the remarks of Turgot, in the article 'Etymologie' (Encycl. Franc. in Turgot's collected works, vol. iii. p. 33): "Ménage est un exemple frappant des absurdités dans lesquelles on tombe, en adoptant sans choix ce que suggère la malheureuse facilité de supposer tout ce qui est possible: car il est très vrai qu'il ne fait aucune supposition dont la possibilité ne soit justifiée par des exemples. Mais nous avons prouvé qu'en multipliant à volonté les altérations intermédiaires, soit dans le son, soit dans la signification, il est aisé de dériver un mot quelconque de tout autre mot donné: c'est le moyen _d'expliquer tout, et dès-lors de ne rien expliquer_; c'est le moyen aussi de justifier tous les mépris de l'ignorance."

Steinhart (Einleitung zum Kratylus, pp. 551-552) agrees with Stallbaum to a certain extent, that Plato in the Kratylus intended to mock and caricature the bad etymologists of his own day; yet also that parts of the Kratylus are seriously intended. And he declares it almost impossible to draw a line between the serious matter and the caricature.

It appears to me that the Platonic critics here exculpate Plato from the charge of being a bad etymologist, only by fastening upon him another intellectual defect quite as serious.

Dittrich, in his Dissertation De Cratylo Platonis, Leipsic, 1841, adopts the opinion of Schleiermacher and the other critics, that the etymological examples given in this dialogue, though Sokrates announces them as proving and illustrating his own theory seriously laid down, are really bitter jests and mockery, intended to destroy it--"hanc sententiam facetissimis et irrisione plenis exemplis, dum comprobare videtur, reverâ infringit" (p. 12). Dittrich admits that Kratylus, who holds the theory derided, understands nothing of this _acerbissima irrisio_ (p. 18). He thinks that Protagoras, not Prodikus nor Antisthenes, is the person principally caricatured (pp. 32-34-38).]

[Footnote 33: Schleiermacher, Introd. to Kratyl. pp. 8-16; Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Krat. p. 17. Winckelmann suspects that Hermogenes in the Kratylus is intended to represent Antisthenes (Antisth. Fragment. p. 49).

Lobeck (Aglaophamus, p. 866) says that the Pythagoreans were among the earliest etymologising philosophers, proposing such etymologies as now appear very absurd.]

[Side-note: Dissent from this theory--No proof that the Sophists ever proposed etymologies.]

To me this modern discovery or hypothesis appears inadmissible. It rests upon assumptions at best gratuitous, and in part incorrect: it introduces difficulties greater than those which it removes. We find no proof that the Sophists ever proposed such etymologies as those which are here supposed to be ridiculed--or that they devoted themselves to etymology at all. If they etymologised, they would doubtless do so in the manner (to our judgment loose and fantastic) of their own time and of times long after them. But what ground have we for presuming that Plato's views on the subject were more correct? and that etymologies which to them appeared admissible, would be regarded by him as absurd and ridiculous?

Now if the persons concerned were other than the Sophists, scarcely any critic would have thought himself entitled to fasten upon them a discreditable imputation without some evidence. Of Prodikus we know (and that too chiefly from some sarcasms of Plato) that he took pains to distinguish words apparently, but not really, equivalent: and that such accurate distinction was what he meant by "rectitude of names" (Plato, Euthydêm. 277 E.) Of Protagoras we know that he taught, by precept or example, correct speaking or writing: but we have no information that either of them pursued etymological researches, successfully or unsuccessfully.[34] Moreover this very dialogue (Kratylus) contains strong presumptive evidence that the Platonic etymologies could never have been intended to ridicule Protagoras. For these etymologies are announced by Sokrates as exemplifying and illustrating a theory of his own respecting names: which theory (Sokrates himself expressly tells us) is founded upon the direct negation of the cardinal doctrine of Protagoras.[35] That Sophist, therefore, could not have been ridiculed by any applications, however extravagant, of a theory directly opposed to him.[36]

[Footnote 34: See a good passage of Winckelmann, Prolegg. ad Platon. Euthydemum, p. xlvii., respecting Protagoras and Prodikus, as writers and critics on language.

Stallbaum says, Proleg. ad Krat. p. 11:--"Quibus verbis _haud dubié_ notantur Sophistæ; qui, neglectis linguæ elementis, derivatorum et compositorum verborum originationem temeré ad suum arbitrium tractabant". Ibid. p. 4:--"In Cratylo ineptæ etymologiæ specimina exhibentur, ita quidem ut _haudquaquam dubitari liceat_, quin ista omnia ad mentem sophistarum maximeque Protagoreorum _joculari imitatione_ explicata sint".

In spite of these confident assertions,--first, that the Sophists are the persons _intended_ to be ridiculed, next, that they _deserved_ to be so ridiculed--Stallbaum has another passage, p. 15, wherein he says, "Jam vero quinam fuerint philosophi isti atque etymologi, qui in Cratylo ridentur et exploduntur, _vulgo parum exploratum habetur_". He goes on to say that neither Prodikus nor Antisthenes is meant, but Protagoras and the Protagoreans. To prove this he infers, from a passage in this dialogue (c. 11, p. 391 C), that Protagoras had written a book [Greek: peri\ o)rtho/têtos tô=n o)noma/tôn] (Heindorf and Schleiermacher, with better reason, infer from the passage nothing more than the circumstance that Protagoras taught [Greek: o)rthoepei/an] or correct speaking and writing). The passage does not prove this; but if it did, what did Protagoras teach in the book? Stallbaum tells us (p. 16):--"Jam si quæras, quid tandem Protagoras ipse de nominum ortu censuerit, _fateor unâ conjecturâ nitendum esse, ut de hâc re aliquid eruatur_". He then proceeds to _conjecture_, from the little which we know respecting Protagoras, what that Sophist must have laid down upon the origin of names; and he finishes by assuming the very point which he ought to have proved (p. 17):--"_ex ipso Cratylo intelligimus et cognoscimus_, mox inter Protagoræ amicos exstitisse qui inepté hæc studia persequentes, non e verbis et nominibus mentis humanæ notiones elicere et illustrare, sed in verba et nomina sua ipsi decreta transferre et sic ea probare et confirmare niterentur. Quid quidem homines à Platone hoc libro _facetissimâ irrisione_ exagitantur," &c. I repeat, that in spite of Stallbaum's confident assertions, he fails in giving the smallest proof that Protagoras or the Sophists proposed etymologies such as to make them a suitable butt for Plato on this occasion. Ast also talks with equal confidence and equal absence of proof about the silly and arbitrary etymological proceedings of the Sophists, which (he says) this dialogue is intended throughout to ridicule (Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 253-254-264, &c.).]

[Footnote 35: Plato, Kratylus, c. 4-5, pp. 386-387.]

[Footnote 36: Lassalle (Herakleitos, vol. ii. pp. 379-384) asserts and shows very truly that Protagoras cannot be the person intended to be represented by Plato under the name of Kratylus, or as holding the opinion of Kratylus about names. Lassalle affirms that Plato intends Kratylus in the dialogue to represent Herakleitus himself (p. 385); moreover he greatly extols the sagacity of Herakleitos for having laid down the principle, that "Names are the essence of things," in which principle Lassalle (so far as I understand him) himself concurs.

Assuming this to be the case, we should naturally suppose that if Plato intends to ridicule any one, by presenting caricatured etymologies as flowing from this principle, the person intended as butt must be Herakleitus himself. Not so Lassalle. He asserts as broadly as Stallbaum that it was Protagoras and the other Sophists who grossly abused the doctrine of Herakleitus, for the purpose of confusing and perverting truth by arbitrary etymologies. His language is even more monstrous and extravagant than that of Stallbaum; yet he does not produce (any more than Stallbaum) the least fragment of proof that the Sophists or Protagoras did what he imputes to them (pp. 400-401-403-422).

M. Lenormant, in his recent edition of the Kratylus (Comm. p. 7-9), maintains also that neither the Sophists nor the Rhetors pretended to etymologise, nor are here ridiculed. But he ascribes to Plato in the Kratylus a mystical and theological purpose which I find it difficult to follow.]

[Side-note: Plato did not intend to propose mock-etymologies, or to deride any one. Protagoras could not be ridiculed here. Neither Hermogenes nor Kratylus understand the etymologies as caricature.]

Suppose it then ascertained that Plato intended to ridicule and humiliate some rash etymologists, there would still be no propriety in singling out the Sophists as his victims--except that they are obnoxious names, against whom every unattested accusation is readily believed. But it is neither ascertained, nor (in my judgment) probable, that Plato here intended to ridicule or humiliate any one. The ridicule, if any was intended, would tell against himself more than against others. For he first begins by laying down a general theory respecting names: a theory unquestionably propounded as serious, and understood to be so by the critics:[37] moreover, involving some of his favourite and peculiar doctrines. It is this theory that his particular etymologies are announced as intended to carry out, in the way of illustration or exemplification. Moreover, he undertakes to prove this theory against Hermogenes, who declares himself strongly opposed to it: and he proves it by a string of arguments which (whether valid or not) are obviously given with a serious and sincere purpose of establishing the conclusion. Immediately after having established that there was a real rectitude of names, and after announcing that he would proceed to enquire wherein such rectitude consisted,[38] what sense or consistency would there be in his inventing a string of intentional caricatures announced as real etymologies? By doing this, he would be only discrediting and degrading the very theory which he had taken so much pains to inculcate upon Hermogenes. Instead of ridiculing Protagoras, he would ridicule himself and his own theory for the benefit of opponents generally, one among them being Protagoras: who (if we imagine his life prolonged) would have had the satisfaction of seeing a theory, framed in direct opposition to his doctrine, discredited and parodied by his own advocate. Hermogenes, too (himself an opponent of the theory, though not concurring with Protagoras), if these etymologies were intended as caricatures, ought to be made to receive them as such, and to join in the joke at the expense of the persons derided. But Hermogenes is not made to manifest any sense of their being so intended: he accepts them all as serious, though some as novel and surprising, in the same passive way which is usual with the interlocutors of Sokrates in other dialogues. Farther, there are some among these etymologies plain and plausible enough, accepted as serious by all the critics.[39] Yet these are presented in the series, without being parted off by any definite line, along with those which we are called upon to regard as deliberate specimens of mock-etymology. Again, there are also some, which, looking at their etymological character, are as strange and surprising as any in the whole dialogue: but which yet, from the place which they occupy in the argument, and from the plain language in which they are presented, almost exclude the supposition that they can be intended as jest or caricature.[40] Lastly, Kratylus, whose theory all these etymologies are supposed to be intended to caricature, is so far from being aware of this, that he cordially approves every thing which Sokrates had said.[41]

[Footnote 37: Schleiermacher, Introd. to Krat. pp. 7-10; Lassalle, Herakleit. ii. p. 387.]

[Footnote 38: Plato, Kratylus, p. 391 B.]

[Footnote 39: See, as an example, his derivation of [Greek: _Di/philos_] from [Greek: Dii+/ phi/los], p. 399: [Greek: _Mou=sa_], p. 406: [Greek: dai/môn] from [Greek: daê/môn], p. 398: for [Greek: _A)phrodi/tê_] he takes the Hesiodic etymology, p. 406. [Greek: _A)/rês_] and [Greek: _a)/r)r(ên_] (p. 407). His derivation of [Greek: _ai)thê/r_--a)po\ tou= a)ei\ the/ein] (p. 410) is given twice by Aristotle (De Coelo, i. 3, p. 270, b. 22; Meteorol. i. 3, p. 339, b. 25) as well as in the Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mundo, p. 392, a. 8. None of the Platonic etymologies is more strange than that of [Greek: psuchê/], quasi [Greek: phuse/chê, a)po\ tou= tê\n phu/sin o)chei=n kai\ e)/chein] (Kratyl. p. 400). Yet Proklus cites this as serious, Scholia in Kratylum, p. 4, ed. Boissonnade. Plato, in the Treatise De Legibus, derives [Greek: cho/ros] from [Greek: chara/] and [Greek: no/mos] from [Greek: nou=s] or [Greek: no/os] (ii. 1, p. 654 A, xii. 8, p. 957 D).]

[Footnote 40: See Plato, Kratyl. p. 437 A-B.

This occurs in the latter portion of the dialogue carried on by Sokrates with Kratylus, and is admitted by Lassalle to be seriously meant by Plato: though Lassalle maintains that the etymologies in the first part of the dialogue (between Sokrates and Hermogenes) are mere mockery and parody. (Lassalle, Herakleitos der Dunkle, vol. ii., pp. 402-403).

I venture to say that none of those Platonic etymologies, which Lassalle regards as caricatures, are more absurd than those which he here accepts as serious. Liddell and Scott in their Lexicon say about [Greek: thumo/s], "probably rightly derived from [Greek: thu/ô] by Plat. Crat. 419 E, [Greek: a)po\ tê=s thu/seôs kai\ ze/seôs tê=s psuchê=s.]" The manner in which Schleiermacher and Steinhart also (Einleit. zum Kratylos, pp. 552-554), analysing this dialogue, represent Plato as passing backwards and forwards from mockery to earnest and from earnest to mockery, appears to me very singular: as well as the principle which Schleiermacher lays down (Introduct. p. 10), that Plato intended the general doctrines to be seriously understood, and the particular etymological applications to be mere mockery and extravagance (um wer weiss welche Komödie aufzuführen). What other philosopher has ever propounded serious doctrines, and then followed them up by illustrations knowingly and intentionally caricatured so as to disparage the doctrines instead of recommending them?

It** is surely less difficult to believe that Plato conceived as plausible and admissible those etymologies which appear to us absurd.

As a specimen of the view entertained by able men of the seventeenth century respecting the Platonic and Aristotelian etymologies, see the Institutiones Logicæ of Burgersdicius, Lib. i. c. 25, not. 1. Lehrsch (Die Sprachphilosophie der Alten, Part i. p. 34-35) agrees with the other commentators, that the Platonic etymologies in the Kratylus are caricatured to deride the boastful and arbitrary etymologies of the Sophists about language. But he too produces no evidence of such etymologies on the part of the Sophists; nay, what is remarkable, he supposes that _both_ Protagoras and Prodikus agreed in the Platonic doctrine that names were [Greek: phu/sei] (see pp. 17-19).]

[Footnote 41: Plato, Kratylus, p. 429 C. Steinhart (Einleit. zum Krat. pp. 549-550) observes that both Kratylus and Hermogenes are represented as understanding seriously these etymologies which are now affirmed to be meant as caricatures.

As specimens of Plato's view respecting admissible etymologies, we find him in Timæus, p. 43 C, deriving [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] from [Greek: a)i+/ssô]: again in the same dialogue, p. 62 A, [Greek: thermo\s] from [Greek: kermati/zein]. In Legg. iv. 714, we have [Greek: tê\n tou= nou= dianomê\n e)ponoma/zontas no/mon]. In Phædrus, p. 238 C, we find [Greek: e)/rôs] derived from [Greek: e)r)r(ôme/nôs r(ôsthei=sa].

Aristotle derives [Greek: o)/sphus] from [Greek: i)sophue/s], Histor. Animal. i. 13, p. 493, a. 22: also [Greek: di/kaion] from [Greek: di/cha], Ethic. Nikom. v. 7, 1132, a. 31; [Greek: methu/ein--meta\ to\ thu/ein], Athenæus, ii. 40. The Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise [Greek: Peri\ Ko/smou] (p. 401, a. 15) adopts the Platonic etymology of [Greek: Di/a-Zê=na] as [Greek: di' o(\n zô=men]

Plutarch, De Primo Frigido, c. 9, p. 948, derives [Greek: kne/phas] from [Greek: keno\n pha/ous].

The Emperor Marcus Antoninus derives [Greek: a)kti/s], the ray of the Sun, [Greek: a)po\ tou= e)ktei/nesthai], Meditat. viii. 57.

The Stoics, who were fond of etymologising, borrowed many etymologies from the Platonic Kratylus (Villoison, de Theologiâ Physicâ Stoicorum, in Osann's edition of Cornutus De Naturâ Deorum, p. 512). Specimens of the Stoic etymologies are given by the Stoic Balbus in Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, ii. 25-29 (64-73).

Dähne (in his Darstellung der Judisch-Alexandrinischen Religions-Philosophie, i. p. 73 seq.) remarks on the numerous etymologies not merely propounded, but assumed as grounds of reasoning by Philo Judæus in commenting upon the Pentateuch, etymologies totally inadmissible and often ridiculous.]

[Side-note: Plato intended his theory as serious, but his exemplifications as admissible guesses. He does not cite particular cases as proofs of a theory, but only as illustrating what he means.]

I cannot therefore accept as well-founded this "discovery of modern times," which represents the Platonic etymologies in the Kratylus as intentionally extravagant and knowingly caricatured, for the purpose of ridiculing the Sophists or others. In my judgment, Plato did not put them forward as extravagant, nor for the purpose of ridiculing any one, but as genuine illustrations of a theory of his own respecting names. It cannot be said indeed that he advanced them as proof of his theory: for Plato seldom appeals to particulars, except when he has a theory to attack. When he has a theory to lay down, he does not generally recognise the necessity of either proving or verifying it by application to particular cases. His proof is usually deductive or derived from some more general principle asserted _à priori_--some internal sentiment enunciated as a self-justifying maxim. Particular examples serve to illustrate what the principle is, but are not required to establish its validity.[42] But I believe that he intended his particular etymologies as _bonâ fide_ guesses, more or less probable (like the developments in the Timæus, which he[43] repeatedly designates as [Greek: ei)ko/ta], and nothing beyond): some certain, some doubtful, some merely novel and ingenious: such as would naturally spring from the originating _afflatus_ of diviners (like Euthyphron, to whom he alludes more than once[44]) who stepped beyond the ordinary regions of human affirmation. Occasionally he proposes alternative and distinct etymologies: feeling assured that there was some way of making out the conclusion--but not feeling equally certain about his own way of making it out. The sentiment of belief attaches itself in Plato's mind to general views and theorems: when he gives particular consequences as flowing from them, his belief graduates down through all the stages between full certainty and the lowest probability, until in some cases it becomes little more than a fanciful illustration--like the mythes which he so often invents to expand and enliven these same general views.[45]

[Footnote 42: See some passages in this very dialogue, Krat. pp. 436 E, 437 C, 438 C.

Lassalle remarks that neither Herakleitus nor Plato were disposed to rest the proof of a general principle upon an induction of particulars (Herakleitos, p. 406).]

[Footnote 43: Spengel justly remarks (Art. Scr. p. 52) respecting the hypotheses of the Platonic commentators:--"Platonem quidem liberare gestiunt, falsâ, ironiâ, non ex animi sententiâ omnia in Cratylo prolata esse dicentes. Sed præter alia multa et hoc neglexerunt viri docti, easdem verborum originationes, quas in Cratylo, in cæteris quoque dialogis, ubi nullus est facetiis locus, et seria omnia aguntur, recurrere."

This passage is cited by K. F. Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. d. Platon. Phil. Not. 474, p. 656. Hermann's own remarks on the dialogue (pp. 494-497) are very indistinct, but he seems to agree with Schleiermacher in singling out Antisthenes as the object of attack.

The third portion of Lehrsch's work, _Ueber die Sprachphilosophie der Alten_, cites numerous examples of the etymologies attempted by the ancients, from Homer downwards, many of them collected from the Etymologicon Magnum. When we read the etymologies propounded seriously by Greek and Latin philosophers (especially the Stoic Chrysippus), literary men, jurists, and poets, we shall not be astonished at those found in the Platonic Kratylus. The etymology of [Greek: Theo\s a)po\ tou= thei=n], given in the Kratylus (p. 397 D), as well as in the Pythagorean Philolaus (see Boeckh, Philolaus, pp. 168-175), and repeated by Clemens Alexandrinus, is not more absurd than that of [Greek: theo\s a)po\ tou= thei=nai], given by Herodot. ii. 52, and also repeated by Clemens, see Wesseling's note. None of the etymologies of the Kratylus is more strange than that of [Greek: Zeu\s-Di/a-Zê=na] (p. 396 B). Yet this is reproduced in the Pseudo-Aristotelian Treatise, [Greek: Peri\ Ko/smou] (p. 401, a. 15), as well as by the Stoic Zeno (Diogen. Laert. vii. 147). The treatise of Cornutus, De Nat. Deor. with Osann's Commentary, is instructive in enabling us to appreciate the taste of ancient times as to what was probable or admissible in etymology. There are few of the etymologies in the Kratylus more singular than that of [Greek: a)/nthrôpos] from [Greek: a)nathrô=n a)\ o(/pôpen]. Yet this is cited by Ammonius as a perfectly good derivation, ad Aristot. De Interpret. p. 103, b. 8, Schol. Bekk., and also in the Etymologicon Magnum.]

[Footnote 44: Compare Plato, Euthyphron, p. 6 D. Origination and invention often pass in Plato as the workings of an ordinary mind (sometimes even a feeble mind) worked upon from without by divine inspiration, quite distinct from the internal force, reasoning, judging, testing, which belongs to a powerful mind. See Phædrus, pp. 235 C, 238 D, 244 A; Timæus, p. 72 A; Menon, p. 81 A.]

[Footnote 45: I have made some remarks to this effect upon the Platonic mythes in my notice of the Phædon, see ch. xxv. p. 415, ad Phædon, p. 114.]

[Side-note: Sokrates announces himself as Searcher. Other etymologists of ancient times admitted etymologies as rash as those of Plato.]

We must remember that Sokrates in the Kratylus explicitly announces himself as having no formed opinion on the subject, and as competent only to the prosecution of the enquiry, jointly with the others. What he says must therefore be received as conjectures proposed for discussion. I see no ground for believing that he regarded any of them, even those which appear to us the strangest, as being absurd or extravagant--or that he proposed any of them in mockery and caricature, for the purpose of deriding other Etymologists. Because these etymologies, or many of them at least, appear to us obviously absurd, we are not warranted in believing that they must have appeared so to Plato. They did not appear so (as I have already observed) to Dionysius of Halikarnassus--nor to Diogenes, nor to the Platonists of antiquity nor to any critics earlier than the seventeenth century.[46] By many of these critics they were deemed not merely serious, but valuable. Nor are they more absurd than many of the etymologies proposed by Aristotle, by the Stoics, by the Alexandrine critics, by Varro, and by the _grammatici_ or literary men of antiquity generally; moreover, even by Plato himself in other dialogues occasionally.[47] In determining what etymologies would appear to Plato reasonable or admissible, Dionysius, Plutarch, Proklus, and Alkinous, are more likely to judge rightly than we: partly because they had a larger knowledge of the etymologies proposed by Greek philosophers and _grammatici_ than we possess--partly because they had no acquaintance with the enlarged views of modern etymologists--which, on the point here in question, are misleading rather than otherwise. Plato held the general theory that names, in so far as they were framed with perfect rectitude, held embodied in words and syllables a likeness or imitation of the essence of things. And if he tried to follow out such a theory into detail, without any knowledge of grammatical systems, without any large and well-chosen collection of analogies within his own language, or any comparison of different languages with each other--he could scarcely fail to lose himself in wonderful and violent transmutations of letters and syllables.[48]

[Footnote 46: Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verbor. c. 16, p. 96, Reiske; Plutarch, De Isid. et Osir. c. 60, p. 375.

Proklus advises that those who wish to become dialecticians should begin with the study of the Kratylus (Schol. ad Kratyl. p. 3, ed. Boiss.).

We read in the Phædrus of Plato (p. 244 B) in the second speech ascribed to Sokrates, two etymologies:--1. [Greek: mantikê\] derived from [Greek: manikê\] by the insertion of [Greek: t], which Sokrates declares to be done in bad taste, [Greek: oi( de\ nu=n a)peiroka/lôs to\ _tau=_ e)pemba/llontes mantikê\n e)ka/lasan.] 2. [Greek: oi)ônistikê\], quasi [Greek: oi)onoi+stikê\], from [Greek: oi)/êsis, nou=s, i(stori/a]. Compare the etymology of [Greek: E)/rôs], p. 238 C. That these are real word-changes, which Plato believes to have taken place, is the natural and reasonable interpretation of the passage. Cicero (Divinat. i. 1) alludes to the first of the two as Plato's real opinion; and Heindorf as well as Schleiermacher accept it in the same sense, while expressing their surprise at the want of etymological perspicacity in Plato. Ast and Stallbaum, on the contrary, declare that these two etymologies are mere irony and mockery, spoken by Plato, _ex mente Sophistarum_, and intended as a sneer at the perverse and silly Sophists. No reason is produced by Ast and Stallbaum to justify this hypothesis, except that you cannot imagine "_Platonem tam cæcum fuisse_," &c. To me this reason is utterly insufficient; and I contend, moreover, that sneers at the Sophists would be quite out of place in a speech, such as the palinode of Sokrates about Eros.]

[Footnote 47: See what Aristotle says about [Greek: Pa/ntê] in the first chapter of the treatise De Coelo; also about [Greek: au)to/maton] from [Greek: au)to\ ma/tên], Physic. ii. 5, p. 197, b. 30.

Stallbaum, after having complimented Plato for his talent in caricaturing the etymologies of others, expresses his surprise to find Aristotle reproducing some of these very caricatures as serious, see Stallbaum's note on Kratyl. p. 411 E.

Respecting the etymologies proposed by learned and able Romans in and before the Ciceronian and Augustan age, Ælius Stilo, Varro, Labeo, Nigidius, &c., see Aulus Gellius, xiii. 10; Quintilian, Inst. Or. i. 5; Varro, de Linguâ Latinâ.

Even to Quintilian, the etymologies of Varro appeared preposterous; and he observes, in reference to those proposed by Ælius Stilo and by others afterwards, "Cui non post Varronem sit venia?" (i. 6, 37). This critical remark, alike good tempered and reasonable, might be applied with still greater pertinence to the Kratylus of Plato. In regard to etymology, more might have been expected from Varro than from Plato; for in the days of Plato, etymological guesses were almost a novelty; while during the three centuries which elapsed between him and Varro, many such conjectures had been hazarded by various scholars, and more or less of improvement might be hoped from the conflict of opposite opinions and thinkers.

M. Gaston Boissier (in his interesting Étude sur la vie et les Ouvrages de M. Terentius Varron, p. 152, Paris, 1861) observes respecting Varro, what is still more applicable to Plato:--"Gardons nous bien d'ailleurs de demander à Varron ce qu'exige la science moderne: pour n'être pas trop sévères, remettons-le dans son époque et jugeons-le avec l'esprit de son temps.** Il ne semble pas qu'alors on réclamât, de ceux qui recherchaient les étymologies, beaucoup d'exactitude et de sévérité. _On se piquait moins d'arriver à l'origine réelle du mot, que de le décomposer d'une manière ingénieuse et qui en gravât le sens dans la mémoire._ Les jurisconsultes eux-mêmes, malgré la gravité de leur profession et l'importance pratique de leurs recherches, ne suivaient pas une autre méthode. Trebatius trouvait dans _sacellum_ les deux mots _sacra cella_: et Labéon faisait venir _soror_ de _seorsum_, parce que la jeune fille se sépare de le maison paternelle pours suivre son époux: tout comme Nigidius trouvoit dans _frater ferè alter_--c'est à dire, un autre soi-même," &c.

Lobeck has similar remarks in his Aglaophamus (pp. 867-869):--"Sané ita J. Capellus veteres juris consultos excusat, _mutuum_ interpretantes _quod ex meo tuum fiat, testamentum_ autem _testationem mentis_, non quod eam verborum originem esse putarent, sed ut significationem eorum altius in legentium animis defigerent. Similiterque ecclesiastici quidam auctores, quum nomen Pascha a græco verbo [Greek: pa/schein] repetunt, non per ignorantiam lapsi, sed allusionis quandam gratiam aucupati videntur."]

[Footnote 48: Gräfenhahn (Gesch. d. classichen Philologie, vol. i. sect. 36, pp. 151-164) points out how common was the hypothesis of fanciful derivation of names or supposed etymologies among the Greek poets, and how it passed from them to the prose writers. He declares that the etymologies in Plato not only in the Kratylus but in other dialogues are "etymologische monstra," but he professes inability to distinguish which of them are serious (pp. 163-164).

Lobeck remarks that the playing and quibbling with words, widely diffused among the ancient literati generally, was especially likely to belong to those who held the Platonic theory about language:--"Is intelligat necesse est, hoc universum genus ab antiquitatis** ingenio non alienum, ei vero, qui imagines rerum in vocabulis sic ut in cerâ expressas putaret, convenientissimum fuisse" (Aglaophamus, p. 870).]

[Side-note: Continuance of the dialogue--Sokrates endeavours to explain how it is that the Names originally right have become so disguised and spoiled.]

Having expressed my opinion that the etymologies propounded by Sokrates in the Kratylus are not intended as caricatures, but as _bonâ fide_ specimens of admissible etymological conjecture, or, at the least, of discoverable analogy--I resume the thread of the dialogue.

These etymologies are the hypothetical links whereby Sokrates reconciles his first theory of the essential rectitude of Names (that is, of Naming, as a process which can only be performed in one way, and by an Artist who discerns and uses the Name-Form), with the names actually received and current. The contrast between the sameness and perfection postulated in the theory, and the confusion of actual practice, is not less manifest than the contrast between the benevolent purposes ascribed to the Demiurgus (in the Timæus) and the realities of man and society:--requiring intermediate assumptions, more or less ingenious, to explain or attenuate the glaring inconsistencies. Respecting the Name-Form, Sokrates intimates that it may often be so disguised by difference of letters and syllables, as not to be discernible by an ordinary man, or by any one except an artist or philosopher. Two names, if compound, may have the same Name-Form, though few or none of the letters in them be the same. A physician may so disguise his complex mixtures, by apparent differences of colour or smell, that they shall be supposed by others to be different, though essentially the same. _Beta_ is the name of the letter B: you may substitute, in place of the three last letters, any others which you prefer, and the name will still be appropriate to designate the letter B.[49]

[Footnote 49: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 393-394.]

[Side-note: Letters, as well as things, must be distinguished with their essential properties, each must be adapted to each.]

To explain the foundations of the onomastic (name-giving or speaking) art,[50] we must analyse words into their primordial constituent letters. The name-giving Artists have begun from this point, and we must follow in their synthetical track. We must distinguish letters with their essential forms--we must also distinguish things with their essential forms--we must then assign to each essence of things that essence of letters which has a natural aptitude to signify it, either one letter singly or several conjoined. The rectitude of the compound names will depend upon that of the simple and primordial.[51] This is the only way in which we can track out the rectitude of names: for it is no account of the matter to say that the Gods bestowed them, and that therefore they are right: such recourse to a _Deus ex machinâ_ is only one among the pretexts for evading the necessity of explanation.[52]

[Footnote 50: Plato, Kratyl. p. 425 A. [Greek: tê=| o)nomastikê=|, ê)\ r(êtorikê=|, ê)\ ê(/tis e)sti\n ê( te/chnê.]]

[Footnote 51: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 424 B-E, 426 A, 434 A.]

[Footnote 52: Plato, Kratyl. p. 425 E.]

This extreme postulate of analysis and adaptation may be compared with that which Sokrates lays down, in the Phædrus, in regard to the art of Rhetoric. You must first distinguish all the different forms of mind--then all the different forms of speech; you must assign the sort of speech which is apt for persuading each particular sort of mind. Phædrus, pp. 271-272.]

[Side-note: Essential significant aptitude consists in resemblance.]

Essential aptitude for signification consists in resemblance between the essence of the letter and that of the thing signified. Thus the letter _Rho_, according to Sokrates, is naturally apt for the signification of rush or vehement motion, because in pronouncing it the tongue is briskly agitated and rolled about. Several words are cited, illustrating this position.[53] _Iota_ naturally designates thin and subtle things, which insinuate themselves everywhere. _Phi_, _Chi_, _Psi_, _Sigma_, the sibilants, imitate blowing. _Delta_ and _Tau_, from the compression of the tongue, imitate stoppage of motion, or stationary condition. _Lambda_ imitates smooth and slippery things. _Nu_ serves, as confining the voice in the mouth, to form the words signifying in-doors and interior. _Alpha_ and _Eta_ are both of them large letters: the first is assigned to signify size, the last to signify length. _Omicron_ is suited to what is round or circular.[54]

[Footnote 53: Plato, Kratyl. p. 426 D-E. [Greek: krou/ein, thrau/ein, e(rei/kein], &c. Leibnitz (Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain, Book iii. ch. 2, p. 300 Erdm.); and Jacob Grimm (in his Dissertation Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache, Berlin, 1858, ed. 4) give views very similar to those of Plato, respecting the primordial growth of language, and the original significant or symbolising power supposed to be inherent in each letter (Kein Buchstabe, "ursprünglich steht bedeutungslos oder ueberflüssig," pp. 39-40). Leibnitz and Grimm say (as Plato here also affirms) that Rho designates the Rough--Lambda, the Smooth: see also what he says about Alpha, Iota, Hypsilon. Compare, besides, M. Renan, Orig. du Langage, vi. p. 137.

The comparison of the Platonic speculations on the primordial powers of letters, with those of a modern linguistic scholar so illustrious as Grimm (the earliest speculations with the latest) are exceedingly curious--and honourable to Plato. They serve as farther reasons for believing that this dialogue was not intended to caricature Protagoras.]

[Footnote 54: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 426-427.]

It is from these fundamental aptitudes, and some others analogous, that the name-giving Artist, or Lawgiver, first put together letters to compound and construct his names. Herein consists their rectitude, according to Sokrates. Though in laying down the position Sokrates gives it only as the best which _he_ could discover, and intimates that some persons may turn it into derision--yet he evidently means to be understood seriously.[55]

[Footnote 55: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 426 B, 427 D.]

[Side-note: Sokrates assumes that the Name-giving Lawgiver was a believer in the Herakleitean theory.]

In applying this theory--about the fundamental significant aptitudes of the letters of the alphabet--to show the rectitude of the existing words compounded from them--Sokrates assumes that the name-giving Artists were believers in the Herakleitean theory: that is, in the perpetual process of flux, movement, and transition into contraries. He cites a large variety of names, showing by their composition that they were adapted to denote this all-pervading fact, as constituting the essence of things.[56] The names given by these theorists to that which is good, virtuous, agreeable, &c., were compounded in such a manner as to denote what facilitates, or falls in with, the law of universal movement: the names of things bad or hurtful, denote what obstructs or retards movement.[57]

[Footnote 56: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 401 C--402 B. 436 E: [Greek: ô(s tou= panto\s i)o/ntos te kai\ pherome/non kai\ r(e/ontos phame\n sêmai/nein ê(mi=n tê\n ou)si/an ta\ o)no/mata.] Also p. 439 B.]

[Footnote 57: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 415-416-417, &c.]

[Side-note: But the Name-Giver may be mistaken or incompetent--the rectitude of the name depends upon his knowledge.]

Many names (pursues Sokrates), having been given by artistic lawgivers who believed in the Herakleitean theory, will possess intrinsic rectitude, if we assume that theory to be true. But how if the theory be not true? and if the name-givers were mistaken on this fundamental point? The names will then not be right. Now we must not assume the theory to be true, although the Name-givers believed it to be so. Perhaps they themselves (Sokrates intimates) having become giddy by often turning round to survey the nature of things, mistook this _vertige_ of their own for a perpetual revolution and movement of the things which they saw, and gave names accordingly.[58] A Name-Giver who is real and artistic is rare and hard to find: there are more among them incompetent than competent: and the name originally bestowed represents only the opinion or conviction of him by whom it is bestowed.[59] Yet the names bestowed will be consistent with themselves, founded on the same theory.

[Footnote 58: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 409**-411 C. [Greek: Ai)tiô=ntai dê\ ou) to\ e)/ndon to\ para\ sphi/si pa/thos ai)/tion ei)=nai tau/tês tê=s do/xês, a)ll' au)ta\ ta\ pra/gmata ou(/tô pephuke/nai], &c.

"He that is giddy thinks the world turns round," &c.]

[Footnote 59: Plato, Kratyl. p. 418 C. [Greek: Oi)=stha ou)=n o(/ti mo/non tou=to dêloi= to\ a)rchai=on o)/noma tê\n dia/noian tou= theme/nou?] Also p. 419 A.]

[Side-note: Changes and transpositions introduced in the name--hard to follow.]

Again, the names originally bestowed differ much from those in use now. Many of them have undergone serious changes: there have been numerous omissions, additions, interpolations, and transpositions of letters, from regard to euphony or other fancies: insomuch that the primitive root becomes hardly traceable, except by great penetration and sagacity.[60] Then there are some names which have never been issued at all from the mint of the name-giver, but have either been borrowed from foreigners, or perhaps have been suggested by super-human powers.[61]

[Footnote 60: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 394 B, 399 B, 414 C, 418 A.]

[Footnote 61: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 397 B, 409 B.]

* * * * *

[Side-note: Sokrates qualifies and attenuates his original thesis.]

To this point Sokrates brings the question during his conversation with Hermogenes: against whom he maintains--That there is a natural intrinsic rectitude in Names, or a true Name-Form--that naming is a process which must be performed in the natural way, and by an Artist who knows that way. But when, after laying down this general theory, he has gone a certain length in applying it to actual names, he proceeds to introduce qualifications which attenuate and explain it away. Existing names were bestowed by artistic law-givers, but under a belief in the Herakleitean theory--which theory is at best doubtful: moreover the original names have, in course of time, undergone such multiplied changes, that the original point of significant resemblance can hardly be now recognised except by very penetrating intellects.

[Side-note: Conversation of Sokrates with Kratylus: who upholds that original thesis without any qualification.]

It is here that Sokrates comes into conversation with Kratylus: who appears as the unreserved advocate of the same general theory which Sokrates had enforced upon Hermogenes. He admits all the consequences of the theory, taking no account of qualifications. Moreover he announces himself as having already bestowed reflection on the subject, and as espousing the doctrine of Herakleitus.[62]

[Footnote 62: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 428 B, 440 E.

It appears that on this point the opinion of Herakleitus coincided with that of the Pythagoreans, who held that names were [Greek: phu/sei kai\ ou) the/sei] and maintained as a corollary that there could be only one name for each thing and only one thing signified by each name (Simplikius ad Aristot. Categ. p. 43, b. 32, Schol. Bekk.).

In general Herakleitus differed from Pythagoras, and is described as speaking of him with bitter antipathy.]

If names are significant by natural rectitude, or by partaking of the Name-Form, it follows that all names must be right or true, one as well as another. If a name be not right, it cannot be significant: that is, it is no name at all: it is a mere unmeaning sound. A name, in order to be significant, must imitate the essence of the thing named. If you add any thing to a number, or subtract any thing from it, it becomes thereby a new number: it is not the same number badly rendered. So with a letter: so too with a name. There is no such thing as a bad name. Every name must be either significant, and therefore, right--or else it is not a name. So also there is no such thing as a false proposition: you cannot say the thing that is not: your words in that case have no meaning; they are only an empty sound. The hypothesis that the law-giver may have distributed names erroneously is therefore not admissible.[63] Moreover, you see that he must have known well, for otherwise he would not have given names so consistent with each other, and with the general Herakleitean theory.[64] And since the name is by necessity a representation or copy of the thing, whoever knows the name, must also know the thing named. There is in fact no other way of knowing or seeking or finding out things, except through their names.[65]

[Footnote 63: Plato, Kratyl. p. 429 B-C.

_Sokr._ [Greek: Pa/nta a)/ra ta\ o)no/mata o)rthôs kei=tai?]

_Krat._ [Greek: O(/sa ge o)no/mata e)/sti.]

_Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n? E(rmoge/nei tô=|de po/teron mêde\ o)/noma tou=to kei=sthai phô=men, ei) mê/ ti au)tô=| E(rmou= gene/seôs prosê/kei, ê)\ kei=sthai me/n, ou) me/ntoi o)rthô=s ge?]

_Krat._ [Greek: Ou)de\ kei=sthai e)/moige dokei=, _a)lla\ dokei=n kei=sthai_. ei)=nai de\ e(te/rou tou=to tou)/noma, ou(=per kai\ ê( phu/sis ê( to\ o)/noma dêlou=sa.]

The critics say that these last words ought to be read [Greek: ê)\n to\ o)/noma dêloi=], as Ficinus has translated, and Schleiermacher after him. They are probably in the right; at the same time, reasoning upon the theory of Kratylus, we say without impropriety, that "the thing indicates the name".

That which is erroneously called a bad name is no name at all (so Kratylus argues), but only seems to be a name to ignorant persons. Thus also in the Platonic Minos (c. 9, p. 317): a bad law is no law in reality, but only seems to be a law to ignorant men, see above, ch. xiv. p. 88.**

Compare the like argument about [Greek: no/mos] in Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2, 42-47, and Lassalle, Herakleitos, vol. ii. p. 392.]

[Footnote 64: Plato, Krat. p. 436 C. [Greek: A)lla\ mê ou)ch ou(/tôs e)/chê|, a)ll' a)nagkai=on ê)=|, ei)do/ta ti/thesthai to\n tithe/menon ta\ o)no/mata; ei) de\ mê/, o(/per pa/lai e)gô\ e)/legon, ou)d' a)\n o)no/mata ei)/ê. Me/giston de/ soi e)/stô tekmê/rion o(/ti ou)k e)/sphaltai tê=s a)lêthei/as o( tithe/menos; ou) ga\r a)\n pote ou(/tô xu/mphôna ê)=n au)tô=| a(/panta. ê)\ _ou)k e)neno/eis au)to\s le/gôn ô(s pa/nta kat' au)to\ kai\ e)pi\ tau)to\n e)gi/gneto ta\ o)no/mata?_]

These last words allude to the various particular etymologies which had been enumerated by Sokrates as illustrations of the Herakleitean theory. They confirm the opinion above expressed, that Plato intended his etymologies seriously, not as mockery or caricature. That Plato should have intended them as caricatures of Protagoras and Prodikus, and yet that he should introduce Kratylus as welcoming them in support of _his_ argument, is a much greater absurdity than the supposition that Plato mistook them for admissible guesses.]

[Footnote 65: Plato, Krat. c. 111, pp. 435-436.]

[Side-note: Sokrates goes still farther towards retracting it,]

These consequences are fairly deduced by Kratylus from the hypothesis, of the natural rectitude of names, as laid down in the beginning of the dialogue, by Sokrates: who had expressly affirmed (in his anti-Protagorean opening of the dialogue) that unless the process of naming was performed according to the peremptory dictates of nature and by one of the few privileged name-givers, it would be a failure and would accomplish nothing;[66] in other words, that a non-natural name would be no name at all. Accordingly, in replying to Kratylus, Sokrates goes yet farther in retracting his own previous reasoning at the beginning of the dialogue--though still without openly professing to do so. He proposes a compromise.[67] He withdraws the pretensions of his theory, as peremptory or exclusive; he acknowledges the theory of Hermogenes as true, and valid in conjunction with it. He admits that non-natural names also, significant only by convention, are available as a make-shift--and that such names are in frequent use. Still however he contends, that natural names, significant by likeness, are the best, so far as they can be obtained: but inasmuch as that principle will not afford sufficiently extensive holding-ground, recourse must be had by way of supplement to the less perfect rectitude (of names) presented by customary or conventional significance.[68]

[Footnote 66: Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 C. [Greek: e)a\n de\ mê/, e)xamartê/setai/ te kai\ ou)de\n poiê/sei.] Compare p. 389 A.]

[Footnote 67: Plato, Kratyl. p. 430 A. [Greek: phe/re dê/, e)a/n pê| diallachthô=men, ô= Kra/tule], &c.]

[Footnote 68: Plato, Krat. p. 435 C. [Greek: e)moi\ me\n ou)=n kai\ au)tô=| a)re/skei me\n kata\ to\ dunato\n o(/moia ei)=nai ta\ o)no/mata toi=s pra/gmasin; a)lla\ mê\ ô(s a)lêthô=s glischra\ ê)=| ê( o)lkê\ au)tê\ tê=s o(moio/têtos, a)nagkai=on de\ ê)=| kai\ tô=| phortikô=| tou/tô| proschrê=sthai, tê=| xunthê/kê|, ei)s o)noma/tôn o)rtho/têta; e)pei\ i)/sôs kata/ ge to\ dunato\n ka/llist' a)\n le/goito, o(/tan ê)\ pa=sin ê)\ ô(s plei/stois o(moi/ois le/gêtai, tou=to d' e)sti\ prosêkousin, ai)/schista de\ tou)nanti/on.]]

[Side-note: There are names better--more like, or less like to the things named: Natural Names are the best, but they cannot always be had. Names may be significant by habit, though in an inferior way.]

You say (reasons Sokrates with Kratylus) that names must be significant by way of likeness. But there are degrees of likeness. A portrait is more or less like its original, but it is never exactly like: it is never a duplicate, nor does it need to be so. Or a portrait, which really belongs to and resembles one person, may be erroneously assigned to another. The same thing happens with names. There are names more or less like the thing named--good or bad: there are names good with reference to their own object, but erroneously fitted on to objects not their own. The name does not cease to be a name, so long as the type or form of the thing named is preserved in it: but it is worse or better, according as the accompanying features are more or less in harmony with the form.[69] If names are like things, the letters which are put together to form names, must have a natural resemblance to things--as we remarked above respecting the letters Rho, Lambda, &c. But the natural, inherent, powers of resemblance and significance, which we pronounced to belong to these letters, are not found to pervade all the actual names, in which they are employed. There are words containing the letters _Rho_ and _Lambda_, in a sense opposite to that which is natural to them--yet nevertheless at the same time significant; as is evident from the fact, that you and I and others understand them alike. Here then are words significant, without resembling: significant altogether through habit and convention. We must admit the principle of convention as an inferior ground and manner of significance. Resemblance, though the best ground as far as it can be had, is not the only one.[70]

[Footnote 69: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 432-434.]

[Footnote 70: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 434-435.]

[Side-note: All names are not consistent with the theory of Herakleitus: some are opposed to it.]

All names are not like the things named: some names are bad, others good: the law-giver sometimes gave names under an erroneous belief. Hence you are not warranted in saying that things must be known and investigated through names, and that whoever knows the name, knows also the thing named. You say that the names given are all coherent and grounded upon the Herakleitean theory of perpetual flux. You take this as a proof that that theory is true in itself, and that the law-giver adopted and proceeded upon it as true. I agree with you that the law-giver or name-giver believed in the Herakleitean theory, and adapted many of his names to it: but you cannot infer from hence that the theory is true--for he may have been mistaken.[71] Moreover, though many of the existing names consist with, and are based upon, that theory, the same cannot be said of all names. Many names can be enumerated which are based on the opposite principle of permanence and stand-still. It is unsafe to strike a balance of mere numbers between the two: besides which, even among the various names founded on the Herakleitean theory, you will find jumbled together the names of virtues and vices, benefits and misfortunes. That theory lends itself to good and evil alike; it cannot therefore be received as true--whether the name-giver believed in it or not.[72]

[Footnote 71: Plato, Kratyl. p. 439 B-C. [Greek: E)/ti toi/nun to/de skepsômetha, o(/pôs mê\ ê(ma=s ta\ polla\ tau=ta o)no/mata e)s tauto\n tei/nonta e)xapata=|, kai\ tô=| o)/nti me\n oi( the/menoi au(ta\ _dianoêthe/ntes te e)/thento_ ô(s i)o/ntôn a)pa/ntôn a)ei\ kai\ r(eo/ntôn--_phai/nontai ga\r e)/moige kai\ au)toi\ ou)/tô dianoêthê=nai_--to\ d', ei) e)/tuchen, ou)ch ou)/tôs e)/chei], &c.

These words appear to me to imply that Sokrates is perfectly serious, and not ironical, in delivering his opinion, that the original imposers of names were believers in the Herakleitean theory.]

[Footnote 72: Plato, Krat. pp. 437-438 C.

Sokrates here enumerates the particular names illustrating his judgment. However strange the verbal transitions and approximations may appear to us, I think it clear that he intends to be understood seriously.]

[Side-note: It is not true to say, That Things can only be known through their names.]

Lastly, even if we granted that things may be known and studied through their names, it is certain that there must be some other way of knowing them; since the first name-givers (as you yourself affirm) knew things, at a time when no names existed.[73] Things may be known and ought to be studied, not through names, but by themselves and through their own affinities.[74]

[Footnote 73: Plato, Krat. p. 438 A-B. Kratylus here suggests that the first names may perhaps have been imposed by a super-human power. But Sokrates replies, that upon that supposition all the names must have been imposed upon the same theory: there could not have been any contradiction between one name and another.]

[Footnote 74: Plato, Krat. pp. 438-439. 438 E:--[Greek: di' a)llê/lôn ge, ei)/ pê| xuggenê= e)sti/, kai\ au)ta\ di' au(tô=n.]]

[Side-note: Unchangeable Platonic Forms--opposed to the Herakleitean flux, which is true only respecting sensible particulars.]

Sokrates then concludes the dialogue by opposing the Platonic ideas to the Herakleitean theory. I often dream or imagine the Beautiful _per se_, the Good _per se_, and such like existences or Entia.[75] Are not such existences real? Are they not eternal, unchangeable and stationary? Particular beautiful things--particular good things--are in perpetual change or flux: but The Beautiful, The Good--The Ideas or Forms of these and such like--remain always what they are, always the same.

[Footnote 75: Plato, Krat. p. 439 C-D. [Greek: ske/psai o( e)/gôge polla/kis o)neirô/ttô, po/teron phô=me/n ti ei)=nai au)to\ kalo\n kai\ a)gatho\n kai\ e(\n e(/kaston tô=n o)/ntôn ou(/tôs, ê)\ mê/? . . .

mê\ ei) pro/sôpo/n ti/ e)sti kalo\n ê)/ ti tô=n toiou=tôn, kai\ dokei= tau=ta pa/nta r(ei=n; a)ll' au)to\ to\ kalo\n ou) toiou=ton a)ei/ e)stin oi(=o/n e)stin?]]