Chapter XXVI: Phædrus--Symposion (2)

After the speech of Alkibiades is concluded, the close of the banquet is described by the primary narrator. He himself, with Agathon and Aristophanes, and several other fresh revellers, continue to drink wine until all of them become dead drunk. While Phædrus, Eryximachus, and others retire, Sokrates remains. His competency to bear the maximum of wine without being disturbed by it, is tested to the full. Although he had before, in acceptance of the challenge of Alkibiades, swallowed the contents of the wine cooler, he nevertheless continues all the night to drink wine in large bowls, along with the rest. All the while, however, he goes on debating his ordinary topics, even though no one is sufficiently sober to attend to him. His companions successively fall asleep, and at day-break, he finds himself the only person sober,[44] except Aristodemus (the narrator of the whole scene), who has recently waked after a long sleep. Sokrates quits the house of Agathon, with unclouded senses and undiminished activity--bathes--and then visits the gymnasium at the Lykeion; where he passes all the day in his usual abundant colloquy.[45]

[Footnote 44: In Sympos. p. 176 B, Sokrates is recognised as [Greek: dunatô/tatos pi/nein], above all the rest: no one can be compared with him. In the two first books of the Treatise De Legibus, we shall find much to illustrate what is here said (in the Symposion) about the power ascribed to him of drinking more wine than any one else, without being at all affected by it. Plato discusses the subject of strong potations ([Greek: me/thê]) at great length; indeed he seems to fear that his readers will think he says too much upon it (i. 642 A). He considers it of great advantage to have a test to apply, such as wine, for the purpose of measuring the reason and self-command of different men, and of determining how much wine is sufficient to overthrow it, in each different case (i. 649 C-E). You can make this trial (he argues) in each case, without any danger or harm; and you can thus escape the necessity of making the trial in a real case of emergency. Plato insists upon the [Greek: chrei/a tê=s me/thês], as a genuine test, to be seriously employed for the purpose of testing men's reason and force of character (ii. p. 673). In the Republic, too (iii. p. 413 E), the [Greek: phu/lakes] are required to be tested, in regard to their capacity of resisting pleasurable temptation, as well as pain and danger.

Among the titles of the lost treatises of Theophrastus, we find one [Greek: Peri\ Me/thês] (Diog. L. v. 44). It is one of the compliments that the Emperor Marcus Antoninus (i. 16) pays to his father--That he was, like Sokrates, equally competent both to partake of, and to abstain from, the most seductive enjoyments, without ever losing his calmness and self-mastery.]

[Footnote 45: Plato, Sympos. p. 223.]

[Side-note: Symposion and Phædon--each is the antithesis and complement of the other.]

The picture of Sokrates, in the Symposion, forms a natural contrast and complement to the picture of him in the Phædon; though the conjecture of Schleiermacher[46]--that the two together are intended to make up the Philosophus, or third member of the trilogy promised in the Sophistês--is ingenious rather than convincing. The Phædon depicts Sokrates in his last conversation with his friends, immediately before his death; the Symposion presents him in the exuberance of life, health, and cheerfulness: in both situations, we find the same attributes manifested--perfect equanimity and self-command, proof against every variety of disturbing agency--whether tempting or terrible--absorbing interest in philosophical dialectic. The first of these two elements, if it stood alone, would be virtuous sobriety, yet not passing beyond the limit of mortal virtue: the last of the two superadds a higher element, which Plato conceives to transcend the limit of mortal virtue, and to depend upon divine inspiration or madness.[47]

[Footnote 46: Einleitung zum Gastmahl, p. 359 seq.]

[Footnote 47: Plato, Phædrus, p. 256 C-E. [Greek: sôphrosu/nê thnêtê/--e)rôtikê\ mani/a: sôphrosu/nê a)nthrôpi/nê--thei/a mani/a.] Compare p. 244 B.]

[Side-note: Symposion of Plato compared with that of Xenophon.]

The Symposion of Plato affords also an interesting subject of comparison with that of his contemporary Xenophon, as to points of agreement as well as of difference.[48] Xenophon states in the beginning that he intends to describe what passed in a scene where he himself was present; because he is of opinion that the proceedings of excellent men, in hours of amusement, are not less worthy of being recorded than those of their serious hours. Both Plato and Xenophon take for their main subject a festive banquet, destined to celebrate the success of a young man in a competitive struggle. In Plato, the success is one of mind and genius--Agathon has gained the prize of tragedy: in Xenophon, it is one of bodily force and skill--Autolykus victor in the pankration. The Symposion of Xenophon differs from that of Plato, in the same manner as the Memorabilia of Xenophon generally differ from the Sokratic dialogues of Plato--that is, by approaching much nearer to common life and reality. It describes a banquet such as was likely enough to take place, with the usual accompaniments--a professional jester, and a Syracusan ballet-master who brings with him a dancing-girl, a girl to play on the flute and harp, and a handsome youth. These artists contribute to the amusement of the company by music, dancing, throwing up balls and catching them again, jumping into and out of a circle of swords. All this would have occurred at an ordinary banquet: here, it is accompanied and followed by remarks of pleasantry, buffoonery and taunt, interchanged between the guests. Nearly all the guests take part, more or less: but Sokrates is made the prominent figure throughout. He repudiates the offer of scented unguents: but he recommends the drinking of wine, though moderately, and in small cups. The whole company are understood to be somewhat elevated with wine, but not one of them becomes intoxicated. Sokrates not only talks as much fun as the rest, but even sings, and speaks of learning to dance, jesting on his own corpulence.[49] Most part of the scene is broad farce, in the manner, though not with all the humour, of Aristophanes.[50] The number and variety of the persons present is considerable, greater than in most of the Aristophanic plays.[51] Kallias, Lykon, Autolykus, Sokrates, Antisthenes, Hermogenes, Nikeratus, Kritobulus, have each his own peculiarity: and a certain amount of vivacity and amusement arises from the way in which each of them is required, at the challenge of Sokrates, to declare on what it is that he most prides himself. Sokrates himself carries the burlesque farther than any of them; pretending to be equal in personal beauty to Kritobulus, and priding himself upon the function of a pander, which he professes to exercise. Antisthenes, however, is offended, when Sokrates fastens upon him a similar function: but the latter softens the meaning of the term so as to appease him. In general, each guest is made to take pride in something the direct reverse of that which really belongs to him; and to defend his thesis in a strain of humorous parody. Antisthenes, for example, boasts of his wealth. The Syracusan ballet-master is described as jealous of Sokrates, and as addressing to him some remarks of offensive rudeness; which Sokrates turns off, and even begins to sing, for the purpose of preventing confusion and ill-temper from spreading among the company:[52] while he at the same time gives prudent advice to the Syracusan about the exhibitions likely to be acceptable.

[Footnote 48: Pontianus, one of the speakers in Athenæus (xi. 504), touches upon some points of this comparison, with a view of illustrating the real or supposed enmity between Plato and Xenophon; an enmity not in itself improbable, yet not sufficiently proved.

Athenæus had before him the Symposion of Epikurus (not preserved) as well as those of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle (xv. 674); and we learn from him some of its distinctive points. Masurius (the speaker in Athenæus, v. init.) while he recognises in the Symposia of Xenophon and Plato a dramatic variety of characters and smartness--finds fault with both, but especially with Plato, for levity, rudeness, indecency, vulgarity, sneering, &c. The talk was almost entirety upon love and joviality. In the Symposion of Epikurus, on the contrary, nothing was said about these topics; the guests were fewer, the conversation was grave and dull, upon dry topics of science, such as the atomic theory ([Greek: prophê/tas a)to/môn], v. 3, 187 B, 177 B. [Greek: E)pi/kouros de\ sumpo/sion philoso/phôn mo/non pepoi/êtai]), and even upon bodily ailments, such as indigestion or fever (187 C). The philosophers present were made by Epikurus to carry on their debate in so friendly a spirit, that the critic calls them "flatterers praising each other"; while he terms the Platonic guests "sneerers insulting each other" ([Greek: muktêristô=n a)llê/lous tôthazo/ntôn], 182 A), though this is much more true about the Xenophontic Symposion than about the Platonic. He remarks farther that the Symposion of Epikurus included no libation or offering to the Gods (179 D).

It is curious to note these peculiarities in the compositions (now lost) of a philosopher like Epikurus, whom many historians of philosophy represent as thinking about nothing but convivial and sexual pleasure.]

[Footnote 49: Xenophon, Sympos. vii. 1; ii. 18-19. [Greek: proga/stôr], &c.]

[Footnote 50: The taunt ascribed to the jester Philippus, about the cowardice of the demagogue Peisander, is completely Aristophanic, ii. 14; also that of Antisthenes respecting the bad temper of Xanthippê, ii. 10; and the caricature of the movements of the [Greek: o)rchêstri\s] by Philippus, ii. 21. Compare also iii. 11.]

[Footnote 51: Xen. Symp. c. 4-5.]

[Footnote 52: Xen. Symp. vi. [Greek: Au)tê\ me\n ê( paroini/a ou(/tô katesbe/sthê], vii. 1-5.

Epiktêtus insists upon this feature in the character of Sokrates--his patience and power of soothing angry men (ii. 12-14).]

[Side-note: Small proportion of the serious, in the Xenophontic Symposion.]

Though the Xenophontic Symposion is declared to be an alternate mixture of banter and seriousness,[53] yet the only long serious argument or lecture delivered is by Sokrates; in which he pronounces a professed panegyric upon Eros, but at the same time pointedly distinguishes the sentimental from the sensual. He denounces the latter, and confines his panegyric to the former--selecting Kallias and Autolykus as honourable examples of it.[54]

[Footnote 53: Xen. Symp. iv. 28. [Greek: a)nami\x e)skôpsa/n te kai\ e)spou/dasan], viii. 41.]

[Footnote 54: Xen. Symp. viii. 24. The argument against the sensual is enforced with so much warmth that Sokrates is made to advert to the fact of his being elate with wine--[Greek: o(/ te ga\r oi)=nos sunepai/rei, kai\ o( a)ei\ su/noikos e)moi\ e)/rôs kentri/zei ei)s to\n a)nti/palon e)/rôta au)tou= par)r(êsia/zesthai.]

The contrast between the customs of the Thebans and Eleians, and those of the Lacedæmonians, is again noted by Xenophon, Rep. Laced. ii. 13. Plato puts (Symp. 182) a like contrast into the mouth of Pausanias, assimilating the customs of Athens in this respect to those of Sparta. The comparison between Plato and Xenophon is here curious; we see how much more copious and inventive is the reasoning of Plato.]

The Xenophontic Symposion closes with a pantomimic scene of Dionysus and Ariadnê as lovers represented (at the instance of Sokrates) by the Syracusan ballet-master and his staff. This is described as an exciting spectacle to most of the hearers, married as well as unmarried, who retire with agreeable emotions. Sokrates himself departs with Lykon and Kallias, to be present at the exercise of Autolykus.[55]

[Footnote 55: Xen. Symp. viii. 5, ix. 7. The close of the Xenophontic Symposion is, to a great degree, in harmony with modern sentiment, though what is there expressed would probably be left to be understood. The Platonic Symposion departs altogether from that sentiment.]

[Side-note: Platonic Symposion more ideal and transcendental than the Xenophontic.]

We see thus that the Platonic Symposion is much more ideal, and departs farther from common practice and sentiment, than the Xenophontic. It discards all the common accessories of a banquet (musical or dancing artists), and throws the guests altogether upon their own powers of rhetoric and dialectic, for amusement. If we go through the different encomiums upon Eros, by Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Diotima--we shall appreciate the many-coloured forms and exuberance of the Platonic imagination, as compared with the more restricted range and common-place practical sense of Xenophon.[56] All the Platonic speakers are accomplished persons--a man of letters, a physician, two successful poets, a prophetess: the Xenophontic personages, except Sokrates and Antisthenes, are persons of ordinary capacity. The Platonic Symposion, after presenting Eros in five different points of view, gives pre-eminence and emphasis to a sixth, in which Eros is regarded as the privileged minister and conductor to the mysteries of philosophy, both the lowest and the highest: the Xenophontic Symposion dwells upon one view only of Eros (developed by Sokrates) and cites Kallias as example of it, making no mention of philosophy. The Platonic Symposion exalts Sokrates, as the representative of Eros Philosophus, to a pinnacle of elevation which places him above human fears and weaknesses[57]--coupled however with that eccentricity which makes the vulgar regard a philosopher as out of his mind: the Xenophontic Symposion presents him only as a cheerful, amiable companion, advising temperance, yet enjoying a convivial hour, and contributing more than any one else to the general hilarity.

[Footnote 56: The difference between the two coincides very much with that which is drawn by Plato himself in the Phædrus--[Greek: thei/a mani/a] as contrasted with [Greek: sôphrosu/nê thnêtê\] (p. 256 E). Compare Athenæus, v. 187 B.]

[Footnote 57: Plato, Phædrus, p. 249 D. [Greek: nouthetei=tai me\n u(po\ tô=n pollô=n ô(s parakinô=n, e)nthousia/zôn de\ le/lêthe tou\s pollou\s. . . . ai)ti/an e)/chei ô(s manikô=s diakei/menos.]]

Such are the points of comparison which present themselves between the same subject as handled by these two eminent contemporaries, both of them companions, and admirers of Sokrates: and each handling it in his own manner.[58]

[Footnote 58: Which of these two Symposia was the latest in date of composition we cannot determine with certainty: though it seems certain that the latest of the two was not composed in imitation of the earliest.

From the allusion to the [Greek: dioi/kisis] of Mantineia (p. 193 A) we know that the Platonic Symposion must have been composed after 385 B.C.: there is great probability also, though not full certainty, that it was composed during the time when Mantineia was still an aggregate of separate villages and not a town--that is, between 385-370 B.C., in which latter year Mantineia was re-established as a city. The Xenophontic Symposion affords no mark of date of composition: Xenophon reports it as having been himself present. It does indeed contain, in the speech delivered by Sokrates (viii. 32), an allusion to, and a criticism upon, an opinion supported by Pausanias [Greek: o( A)ga/thônos tou= poiêtou= e)rastê/s], who discourses in the Platonic Symposion: and several critics think that this is an allusion by Xenophon to the Platonic Symposion. I think this opinion improbable. It would require us to suppose that Xenophon is inaccurate, since the opinion which he ascribes to Pausanias is not delivered by Pausanias in the Platonic Symposion, but by Phædrus. Athenæus (v. 216) remarks that the opinion is not delivered by Pausanias, but he does not mention that it _is_ delivered by Phædrus. He remarks that there was no known written composition of Pausanias himself: and he seems to suppose that Xenophon must have alluded to the Platonic Symposion, but that he quoted it inaccurately or out of another version of it, different from what we now read. Athenæus wastes reasoning in proving that the conversation described in the Platonic Symposion cannot have really occurred at the time to which Plato assigns it. This is unimportant: the speeches are doubtless all composed by Plato. If Athenæus was anxious to prove anachronism against Plato, I am surprised that he did not notice that of the [Greek: dioi/kisis] of Mantineia mentioned in a conversation supposed to have taken place in the presence of Sokrates, who died in 399 B.C.

I incline to believe that the allusion of Xenophon is not intended to apply to the Symposion of Plato. Xenophon ascribes one opinion to Pausanias, Plato ascribes another; this is noway inconceivable. I therefore remain in doubt whether the Xenophontic or the Platonic Symposion is earliest. Compare the Præf. of Schneider to the former, pp. 140-143.]

[Side-note: Second half of the Phædrus--passes into a debate on Rhetoric. Eros is considered as a subject for rhetorical exercise.]

I have already stated that the first half of the Phædrus differs materially from the second; and that its three discourses on the subject of Eros (the first two depreciating Eros, the third being an effusion of high-flown and poetical panegyric on the same theme) may be better understood by being looked at in conjunction with the Symposion. The second half of the Phædrus passes into a different discussion, criticising the discourse of Lysias as a rhetorical composition: examining the principles upon which the teaching of Rhetoric as an Art either is founded, or ought to be founded: and estimating the efficacy of written discourse generally, as a means of working upon or instructing other minds.

[Side-note: Lysias is called a logographer by active politicians. Contempt conveyed by the word. Sokrates declares that the only question is, Whether a man writes well or ill.]

I heard one of our active political citizens (says Phædrus) severely denounce Lysias, and fasten upon him with contempt, many times over, the title of a logographer. Active politicians will not consent to compose and leave behind them written discourses, for fear of being called Sophists.[59] To write discourses (replies Sokrates) is noway discreditable: the real question is, whether he writes them well.[60] And the same question is the only one proper to be asked about other writers on all subjects--public or private, in prose or in verse. How to speak _well_, and how to write _well_--is the problem.[61] Is there any art or systematic method, capable of being laid down beforehand and defended upon principle, for accomplishing the object _well_? Or does a man succeed only by unsystematic knack or practice, such as he can neither realise distinctly to his own consciousness, nor describe to others?

[Footnote 59: Plato, Phædrus, p. 257 C.]

[Footnote 60: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 257 E, 258 D.

The two appellations--[Greek: logogra/phos] and [Greek: sophistê/s]--are here coupled together as terms of reproach, just as they stand coupled in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 417. It is plain that both appellations acquired their discreditable import mainly from the collateral circumstance that the persons so denominated took money for their compositions or teaching. The [Greek: logogra/phos] wrote for pay, and on behalf of any client who could pay him. In the strict etymological sense, neither of the two terms would imply any reproach.

Yet Plato, in this dialogue, when he is discussing the worth of the reproachful imputation fastened on Lysias, takes the term [Greek: logogra/phos] only in this etymological, literal sense, omitting to notice the collateral association which really gave point to it and made it serve the purpose of a hostile speaker. This is the more remarkable, because we find Plato multiplying opportunities, even on unsuitable occasions, of taunting the Sophists with the fact that they took money. Here in the Phædrus, we should have expected that if he noticed the imputation at all, he would notice it in the sense intended by the speaker. In this sense, indeed, it would not have suited the purpose of his argument, since he wishes to make it an introduction to a philosophical estimate of the value of writing as a means of instruction.

Heindorf observes, that Plato has used a similar liberty in comparing the [Greek: logogra/phos] to the proposer of a law or decree. "Igitur, quum solemne legum initium ejusmodi esset, [Greek: e)/doxe tê=| boulê=|], &c., Plato aliter longé quam vulgo acciperetur, neque sine calumniâ quâdam, interpretatus est" (ad p. 258).]

[Footnote 61: Plato, Phædrus, p. 259 E. [Greek: o(/pê| kalô=s e)/chei le/gein te kai\ gra/phein, kai\ o(/pê| mê/, skepte/on.]--p. 258 D. [Greek: ti/s o( tro/pos tou= kalô=s te kai\ mê\ gra/phein.]]

[Side-note: Question about teaching the art of writing well or speaking well. Can it be taught upon system or principle? Or does the successful Rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack?.]

First let us ask--When an orator addresses himself to a listening crowd upon the common themes--Good and Evil, Just and Unjust--is it necessary that he should know what is really and truly good and evil, just and unjust? Most rhetorical teachers affirm, that it is enough if he knows what the audience or the people generally believe to be so: and that to that standard he must accommodate himself, if he wishes to persuade.[62]

[Footnote 62: Plato, Phædrus, p. 260 A.]

[Side-note: Theory of Sokrates--that all art of persuasion must be founded upon a knowledge of the truth, and of gradations of resemblance to the truth.]

He may persuade the people under these circumstances (replies Sokrates), but if he does so, it will be to their misfortune and to his own. He ought to know the real truth--not merely what the public whom he addresses believe to be the truth--respecting just and unjust, good and evil, &c. There can be no genuine art of speaking, which is not founded upon knowledge of the truth, and upon adequate philosophical comprehension of the subject-matter.[63] The rhetorical teachers take too narrow a view of rhetoric, when they confine it to public harangues addressed to the assembly or to the Dikastery. Rhetoric embraces all guidance of the mind through words, whether in public harangue or private conversation, on matters important or trivial. Whether it be a controversy between two litigants in a Dikastery, causing the Dikasts to regard the same matters now as being just and good, presently as being unjust and evil: or between two dialecticians like Zeno, who could make his hearers view the same subjects as being both like and unlike--both one and many--both in motion and at rest: in either case the art (if there be any art) and its principles are the same. You ought to assimilate every thing to every thing, in all cases where assimilation is possible: if your adversary assimilates in like manner, concealing the process from his hearers, you must convict and expose his proceedings. Now the possibility or facility of deception in this way will depend upon the extent of likeness between things. If there be much real likeness, deception is easy, and one of them may easily be passed off as the other: if there be little likeness, deception will be difficult. An extensive acquaintance with the real resemblances of things, or in other words with truth, constitutes the necessary basis on which all oratorical art must proceed.[64]

[Footnote 63: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 260-261.]

[Footnote 64: Plato, Phædrus, p. 262.]

[Side-note: Comparison made by Sokrates between the discourse of Lysias and his own. Eros is differently understood: Sokrates defined what he meant by it: Lysias did not define.]

Sokrates then compares the oration of Lysias with his own two orations (the first depreciating, the second extolling, Eros) in the point of view of art; to see how far they are artistically constructed. Among the matters of discourse, there are some on which all men are agreed, and on which therefore the speaker may assume established unanimity in his audience: there are others on which great dissension and discord prevail. Among the latter (the topics of dissension), questions about just and unjust, good and evil, stand foremost:[65] it is upon these that deception is most easy, and rhetorical skill most efficacious. Accordingly, an orator should begin by understanding to which of these two categories the topic which he handles belongs: If it belongs to the second category (those liable to dissension) he ought, at the outset, to define what he himself means by it, and what he intends the audience to understand. Now Eros is a topic on which great dissension prevails. It ought therefore to have been defined at the commencement of the discourse. This Sokrates in his discourse has done: but Lysias has omitted to do it, and has assumed Eros to be obviously and unanimously apprehended by every one. Besides, the successive points in the discourse of Lysias do not hang together by any thread of necessary connection, as they ought to do, if the discourse were put together according to rule.[66]

[Footnote 65: Plato, Phædrus, p. 263 B. Compare Plato, Alkibiad. i. p. 109.]

[Footnote 66: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 263-265.]

[Side-note: Logical processes--Definition and Division--both of them exemplified in the two discourses of Sokrates.]

Farthermore, in the two discourses of Sokrates, not merely was the process of _logical definition_ exemplified in the case of Eros--but also the process of _logical division_, in the case of Madness or Irrationality. This last extensive genus was divided first into two species--Madness, from human distemper--Madness, from divine inspiration, carrying a man out of the customary orthodoxy.[67] Next, this last species was again divided into four branches or sub-species, according to the God from whom the inspiration proceeded, and according to the character of the inspiration--the prophetic, emanating from Apollo--the ritual or mystic, from Dionysus--the poetic, from the Muses--the amatory, from Eros and Aphroditê.[68] Now both these processes, definition and division, are familiar to the true dialectician or philosopher: but they are not less essential in rhetoric also, if the process is performed with genuine art. The speaker ought to embrace in his view many particular cases, to gather together what is common to all, and to combine them into one generic concept, which is to be embodied in words as the definition. He ought also to perform the counter-process: to divide the genus not into parts arbitrary and incoherent (like a bad cook cutting up an animal without regard to the joints) but into legitimate species;[69] each founded on some positive and assignable characteristic. "It is these divisions and combinations (says Sokrates) to which I am devotedly attached, in order that I may become competent for thought and discourse: and if there be any one else whom I consider capable of thus contemplating the One and the Many as they stand in nature--I follow in the footsteps of that man as in those of a God. I call such a man, rightly or wrongly, a Dialectician."[70]

[Footnote 67: Plato, Phædrus, p. 265 A. [Greek: u(po\ thei/as e)xallagê=s tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn nomi/môn.]]

[Footnote 68: Plato, Phædrus, p. 265.]

[Footnote 69: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 265-266. 265 D: [Greek: ei)s mi/an te i)de/an sunorô=nta a)/gein ta\ pollachê= diesparme/na, i(/n' e(/kaston o(rizo/menos dê=lon poi=ê| peri\ ou(= a)\n a)ei\ dida/skein e)the/lê|.] 265 E: [Greek: to\ pa/lin kat' ei)/dê du/nasthai te/mnein kat' a)/rthra, ê(=| pe/phuke, kai\ mê\ e)picheirei=n katagnu/nai me/ros mêde/n, kakou= magei/rou tro/pô| chrô/menon.]

Seneca, Epist. 89, p. 395, ed. Gronov. "Faciam ergo quod exigis, et philosophiam in partes, non in frusta, dividam. Dividi enim illam, non concidi, utile est."]

[Footnote 70: Plato, Phædrus, p. 266 B. [Greek: Tou/tôn dê\ e)/gôge au)to/s te e)rastê/s, ô)= Phai=dre, tô=n diaire/seôn kai\ sunagôgô=n, i(/n' oi(=o/s te ô)= le/gein te kai\ phronei=n; e)a/n te/ tin' a)/llon ê(gê/sômai dunato\n ei)s e(\n kai\ e)pi\ polla\ pephuko\s o(ra=|n, tou=ton diô/kô kato/pisthe met' i)/chnion ô(/ste theoi=o. kai\ me/ntoi kai\ tou\s duname/nous au)to\ dra=|n ei) me\n o)rthô=s ê)\ mê\ prosagoreu/ô, theo\s oi)=de; kalô= de\ ou)=n me/chri tou=de dialektikou/s.]]

This is Dialectic (replies Phædrus); but it is not Rhetoric, as Thrasymachus and other professors teach the art.

[Side-note: View of Sokrates--that there is no real Art of Rhetoric, except what is already comprised in Dialectic--The rhetorical teaching is empty and useless.]

What else is there worth having (says Sokrates), which these professors teach? The order and distribution of a discourse: first, the exordium, then recital, proof, second proof, refutation, recapitulation at the close: advice how to introduce maxims or similes: receipts for moving the anger or compassion of the dikasts. Such teaching doubtless enables a speaker to produce considerable effect upon popular assemblies:[71] but it is not the art of rhetoric. It is an assemblage of preliminary accomplishments, necessary before a man can acquire the art: but it is not the art itself. You must know when, how far, in what cases, and towards what persons, to employ these accomplishments:[72] otherwise you have not learnt the art of rhetoric. You may just as well consider yourself a physician because you know how to bring about vomit and purging--or a musician, because you know how to wind up or unwind the chords of your lyre. These teachers mistake the preliminaries or antecedents of the art, for the art itself. It is in the right, measured, seasonable, combination and application of these preliminaries, in different doses adapted to each special matter and audience--that the art of rhetoric consists. And this is precisely the thing which the teacher does not teach, but supposes the learner to acquire for himself.[73]

[Footnote 71: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 267-268.]

[Footnote 72: Plato, Phædrus, p. 268 B. [Greek: e)re/sthai ei) prosepi/statai kai\ ou(sti/nas dei= kai\ o(po/te e(/kasta tou/tôn poiei=n, kai\ me/chri o(po/sou?]]

[Footnote 73: Plato, Phædrus, p. 269.]

[Side-note: What the Art of Rhetoric ought to be--Analogy of Hippokrates and the medical Art.]

The true art of rhetoric (continues Sokrates) embraces a larger range than these teachers imagine. It deals with mind, as the medical researches of Hippokrates deal with body--as a generic total with all its species and varieties, and as essentially relative to the totality of external circumstances. First, Hippokrates investigates how far the body is, in every particular man, simple, homogeneous, uniform: and how far it is complex, heterogeneous, multiform, in the diversity of individuals. If it be one and the same, or in so far as it is one and the same, he examines what are its properties in relation to each particular substance acting upon it or acted upon by it. In so far as it is multiform and various, he examines and compares each of the different varieties, in the same manner, to ascertain its properties in relation to every substance.[74] It is in this way that Hippokrates discovers the nature or essence of the human body, distinguishing its varieties, and bringing the medical art to bear upon each, according to its different properties. This is the only scientific or artistic way of proceeding.

[Footnote 74: Plato, Phædrus, p. 270 D. [Greek: A)=r' ou)ch ô(=de dei= dianoei=sthai peri\ o(touou=n phu/seôs? Prô=ton me\n, a(plou=n ê)\ polueide/s e)stin, ou(= peri\ boulêso/metha ei)=nai au)toi\ technikoi\ kai\ a)/llon dunatoi\ poiei=n? e)/peita de/, e)a\n me\n a(plou=n ê)=|, skopei=n tê\n du/namin au)tou=, ti/na pro\s ti/ pe/phuken ei)s to\ dra=|n e)/chon ê)\ ti/na ei)s to\ pathei=n u(po\ tou=? e)a\n de\ plei/ô ei)/dê e)/chê|, tau=ta a)rithmêsa/menos, o(/per e)ph' e(no/s, tou=t' i)dei=n e)ph' e(ka/stou, tô=| ti/ poiei=n au)to\ pe/phuken ê)\ tô=| ti/ pathei=n u(po\ tou=?]]

[Side-note: Art of Rhetoric ought to include a systematic classification of minds with all their varieties, and of discourses with all their varieties. The Rhetor must know how to apply the one to the other, suitably to each particular case.]

Now the true rhetor ought to deal with the human mind in like manner. His task is to work persuasion in the minds of certain men by means of discourse. He has therefore, first, to ascertain how far all mind is one and the same, and what are the affections belonging to it universally in relation to other things: next, to distinguish the different varieties of minds, together with the properties, susceptibilities, and active aptitudes, of each: carrying the subdivision down until he comes to a variety no longer admitting division.[75] He must then proceed to distinguish the different varieties of discourse, noting the effects which each is calculated to produce or to hinder, and the different ways in which it is likely to impress different minds.[76] Such and such men are persuadable by such and such discourses--or the contrary. Having framed these two general classifications, the rhetor must on each particular occasion acquire a rapid tact in discerning to which class of minds the persons whom he is about to address belong: and therefore what class of discourses will be likely to operate on them persuasively.[77] He must farther know those subordinate artifices of speech on which the professors insist; and he must also be aware of the proper season and limit within which each can be safely employed.[78]

[Footnote 75: Plato, Phædrus, p. 277 B. [Greek: o(risa/meno/s te pa/lin kat' ei)/dê me/chri tou= a)tmê/tou te/mnein e)pistêthê=|.]]

[Footnote 76: Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 A. [Greek: _Prô=ton_, pa/sê| a)kribei/a| gra/psei te kai\ poiê/sei psuchê\n i)dei=n, po/teron e(\n kai\ o(/moion pe/phuken ê)\ kata\ sô/matos morphê\n polueide/s; tou=to ga/r phamen _phu/sin_ ei)=nai deiknu/nai.

_Deu/teron_ de/ ge, o(/tô| ti/ poiei=n ê)\ pathei=n u(po\ tou= pe/phuken.

_Tri/ton_ de\ dê\ diataxa/menos ta\ lo/gôn te kai\ psuchê=s ge/nê kai\ ta\ tou/tôn pathê/mata, di/eisi ta\s ai)ti/as, prosarmo/ttôn e(/kaston e(ka/stô|, kai\ dida/skôn oi(/a ou)=sa u(ph' oi(/ôn lo/gôn di' ê(\n ai)ti/an e)x a)na/gkês ê( me\n pei/thetai, ê( de\ a)peithei=.]]

[Footnote 77: Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 D. [Greek: dei= mê\ tau=ta i(kanô=s noê/santa, meta\ tau=ta theô/menon au)ta\ e)n tai=s pra/xesin o)/nta te kai\ pratto/mena, _o)xe/ôs_ tê=| ai)sthê/sei du/nasthai e)pakolouthei=n], &c.]

[Footnote 78: Plato, Phædrus, p. 272 A. [Greek: tau=ta de\ ê)/dê pa/nt' e)/chonti, _proslabo/nti kairou\s tou= po/te lekte/on kai\ e)pischete/on_, brachulogi/as te au)= kai\ e)leeinologi/as kai\ deinô/seôs, e(ka/stôn te o(/s' a)\n ei)/dê ma/thê| lo/gôn, tou/tôn _tê\n eu)kairi/an te kai\ a)kairi/an diagno/nti_, kalô=s te kai\ tele/ôs e)sti\n ê( te/chnê a)peirgasme/nê, _pro/teron d' ou)/_.]]

[Side-note: The Rhetorical Artist must farther become possessed of real truth, as well as that which his auditors believe to be truth. He is not sufficiently rewarded for this labour.]

Nothing less than this assemblage of acquirements (says Sokrates) will suffice to constitute a real artist, either in speaking or writing. Arduous and fatiguing indeed the acquisition is: but there is no easier road. And those who tell us that the rhetor need not know what is really true, but only what his audience will believe to be true--must be reminded that this belief, on the part of the audience, arises from the likeness of that which they believe, to the real truth. Accordingly, he who knows the real truth will be cleverest in suggesting apparent or quasi-truth adapted to their feelings. If a man is bent on becoming an artist in rhetoric, he must go through the process here marked out: yet undoubtedly the process is so laborious, that rhetoric, when he has acquired it, is no adequate reward. We ought to learn how to speak and act in a way agreeable to the Gods, and this is worth all the trouble necessary for acquiring it. But the power of speaking agreeably and effectively to men, is not of sufficient moment to justify the expenditure of so much time and labour.[79]

[Footnote 79: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 273-274.]

[Side-note: Question about Writing--As an Art, for the purpose of instruction, it can do little--Reasons why. Writing may remind the reader of what he already knows.]

We have now determined what goes to constitute genuine art, in speaking or in writing. But how far is writing, even when art is applied to it, capable of producing real and permanent effect? or indeed of having art applied to it at all? Sokrates answers himself--Only to a small degree. Writing will impart amusement and satisfaction for the moment: it will remind the reader of something which he knew before, if he really did know. But in respect to any thing which he did not know before, it will neither teach nor persuade him: it may produce in him an impression or fancy that he is wiser than he was before, but such impression is illusory, and at best only transient. Writing is like painting--one and the same to all readers, whether young or old, well or ill informed. It cannot adapt itself to the different state of mind of different persons, as we have declared that every finished speaker ought to do. It cannot answer questions, supply deficiencies, reply to objections, rectify misunderstanding. It is defenceless against all assailants. It supersedes and enfeebles the memory, implanting only a false persuasion of knowledge without the reality.[80]

[Footnote 80: Plato, Phædrus, p. 275 D-E. [Greek: tau)to\n de\ kai\ oi( lo/goi (oi( gegramme/noi); do/xais me\n a)\n ô(/s ti phronou=ntas au)tou\s le/gein e)a\n de/ ti e(/rê| tô=n legome/nôn boulo/menos mathei=n, e(/n ti sêmai/nei mo/non tau)to\n a)ei/. O(/tan de\ a(/pax graphê=|, kulindei=tai me\n pantachou= pa=s lo/gos o(moi/ôs para\ toi=s e)pai+/ousin, ô(s d' au)tô=s par' oi(=s ou)de\n prosê/kei, kai\ ou)k e)pi/statai le/gein oi(=s dei= ge kai\ mê/.]]

[Side-note: Neither written words, nor continuous speech, will produce any serious effect in teaching. Dialectic and cross-examination are necessary.]

Any writer therefore, in prose or verse--Homer, Solon, or Lysias--who imagines that he can by a ready-made composition, however carefully turned,[81] _if simply heard or read without cross-examination or oral comment_, produce any serious and permanent effect in persuading or teaching, beyond a temporary gratification--falls into a disgraceful error. If he intends to accomplish any thing serious, he must be competent to originate spoken discourse more effective than the written. The written word is but a mere phantom or ghost of the spoken word: which latter is the only legitimate offspring of the teacher, springing fresh and living out of his mind, and engraving itself profoundly on the mind of the hearer.[82] The speaker must know, with discriminative comprehension, and in logical subdivision, both the matter on which he discourses, and the minds of the particular hearers to whom he addresses himself. He will thus be able to adapt the order, the distribution, the manner of presenting his subject, to the apprehension of the particular hearers and the exigencies of the particular moment. He will submit to cross-examination,[83] remove difficulties, and furnish all additional explanations which the case requires. By this process he will not indeed produce that immediate, though flashy and evanescent, impression of suddenly acquired knowledge, which arises from the perusal of what is written. He will sow seed which for a long time appears buried under ground; but which, after such interval, springs up and ripens into complete and lasting fruit.[84] By repeated dialectic debate, he will both familiarise to his own mind and propagate in his fellow-dialogists, full knowledge; together with all the manifold reasonings bearing on the subject, and with the power also of turning it on many different sides, of repelling objections and clearing up obscurities. It is not from writing, but from dialectic debate, artistically diversified and adequately prolonged, that full and deep teaching proceeds; prolific in its own nature, communicable indefinitely from every new disciple to others, and forming a source of intelligence and happiness to all.[85]

[Footnote 81: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 277-278. [Greek: ô(s oi( r(apsô|dou/menoi (lo/goi) a)/neu a)nakri/seôs kai\ didachê=s peithou=s e(/neka e)le/chthêsan], &c.]

[Footnote 82: Plato, Phædrus, p. 276 A. [Greek: a)/llon o(rô=men lo/gon tou/tou a)delpho\n gnê/sion tô=| tro/pô| te gi/gnetai, kai\ o(/sô| a)mei/nôn kai\ dunatô/teros tou/tou phu/etai? . . . . O(/s met' e)pistê/mês gra/phetai e)n tê=| tou= mantha/nontos psuchê=|, dunato\s me\n a)mu=nai e(autô=|, e)pistê/môn de\ le/gein te kai\ siga=|n pro\s ou(\s dei=. To\n tou= ei)do/tos lo/gon le/geis zô=nta kai\ e)/mpsuchon, ou(= o( gegramme/nos ei)/dôlon a)/n ti le/goito dikai/ôs], &c. 278 A.]

[Footnote 83: Plato, Phædrus, p. 278 C. [Greek: ei) me\n ei)dô\s ê(=| ta)lêthe\s e)/chei sune/thêke tau=ta (ta\ suggra/mmata) kai\ e)/chôn boêthei=n, ei)s e)/legchon i)ô\n peri\ ô(=n e)/grapse, kai\ le/gôn au)to\s dunato\s ta\ gegramme/na phau=la a)podei=xai], &c.]

[Footnote 84: Plato, Phædrus, p. 276 A.]

[Footnote 85: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 276-277.]

This blending of philosophy with rhetoric, which pervades the criticisms on Lysias in the Phædrus, is farther illustrated by the praise bestowed upon Isokrates in contrast with Lysias. Isokrates occupied that which Plato in Euthydêmus calls "the border country between philosophy and politics". Many critics declare (and I think with probable reason[86]) that Isokrates is the person intended (without being named) in the passage just cited from the Euthydêmus. In the Phædrus, Isokrates is described as the intimate friend of Sokrates, still young; and is pronounced already superior in every way to Lysias--likely to become superior in future to all the rhetors that have ever flourished--and destined probably to arrive even at the divine mysteries of philosophy.[87]

[Footnote 86: See above, vol. ii. ch. xxi. p. 227.]

[Footnote 87: Plato, Phædrus, p. 279 A.]

When we consider that the Phædrus was pretty sure to bring upon Plato a good deal of enmity--since it attacked, by name, both Lysias, a resident at Athens of great influence and ability, and several other contemporary rhetors more or less celebrated--we can understand how Plato became disposed to lighten this amount of enmity by a compliment paid to Isokrates. This latter rhetor, a few years older than Plato, was the son of opulent parents at Athens, and received a good education; but when his family became impoverished by the disasters at the close of the Peloponnesian war, he established himself as a teacher of rhetoric at Chios: after some time, however, he returned to Athens, and followed the same profession there. He engaged himself also, like Lysias, in composing discourses for pleaders before the dikastery[88] and for speakers in the assembly; by which practice he acquired both fortune and reputation. Later in life, he relinquished these harangues destined for real persons on real occasions, and confined himself to the composition of discourses (intended, not for contentious debate, but for the pleasure and instruction of hearers) on general questions--social, political, and philosophical: at the same time receiving numerous pupils from different cities of Greece. Through such change, he came into a sort of middle position between the rhetoric of Lysias and the dialectic of Plato: insomuch that the latter, at the time when he composed the Phædrus, had satisfaction in contrasting him favourably with Lysias, and in prophesying that he would make yet greater progress towards philosophy. But at the time when Plato composed the Euthydêmus, his feeling was different.[89] In the Phædrus, Isokrates is compared with Lysias and other rhetors, and in that comparison Plato presents him as greatly superior: in the Euthydêmus, he is compared with philosophers as well as with rhetors, and is even announced as disparaging philosophy generally: Plato then declares him to be a presumptuous half-bred, and extols against him even the very philosopher whom he himself had just been caricaturing. To apply a Platonic simile, the most beautiful ape is ugly compared with man--the most beautiful man is an ape compared with the Gods:[90] the same intermediate position between rhetoric and philosophy is assigned by Plato to Isokrates.

[Footnote 88: Dion. Hal. De Isocrate Judicium, p. 576. [Greek: desma\s pa/nu polla\s dikanikô=n lo/gôn periphe/resthai/ phêsin u(po\ tô=n bibliopôlô=n A)ristote/lês], &c.

Plutarch, Vit. x. Oratt. pp. 837-838.

The Athenian Polykrates had been forced, by loss of property, to quit Athens and undertake the work of a Sophist in Cyprus. Isokrates expresses much sympathy for him: it was a misfortune like what had happened to himself (Orat. xi. Busiris 1). Compare De Permutation. Or. xv. s. 172.

The assertion made by Isokrates--that he did not compose political and judicial orations, to be spoken by individuals for real causes and public discussions--may be true comparatively, and with reference to a certain period of his life. But it is only to be received subject to much reserve and qualification. Even out of the twenty-one orations of Isokrates which we possess, the last five are composed to be spoken by pleaders before the dikastery. They are such discourses as the logographers, Lysias among the rest, were called upon to furnish, and paid for furnishing.]

[Footnote 89: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 306. I am inclined to agree with Ueberweg in thinking that the Euthydêmus is later than the Phædrus. Ueberweg, Aechtheit der Platon. Schriften, pp. 256-259-265.]

[Footnote 90: Plato, Hipp. Major, p. 289.]

From the pen of Isokrates also, we find various passages apparently directed against the viri Socratici including Plato (though without his name): depreciating,[91] as idle and worthless, new political theories, analytical discussions on the principles of ethics, and dialectic subtleties; maintaining that the word philosophy was erroneously interpreted and defined by many contemporaries, in a sense too much withdrawn from practical results: and affirming that his own teaching was calculated to impart genuine philosophy. During the last half of Plato's life, his school and that of Isokrates were the most celebrated among all that existed at Athens. There was competition between them, gradually kindling into rivalry. Such rivalry became vehement during the last ten years of Plato's life, when his scholar Aristotle, then an aspiring young man of twenty-five, proclaimed a very contemptuous opinion of Isokrates, and commenced a new school of rhetoric in opposition to him.[92] Kephisodôrus, a pupil of Isokrates, retaliated; publishing against Aristotle, as well as against Plato, an acrimonious work which was still read some centuries afterwards. Theopompus, another eminent pupil of Isokrates, commented unfavourably upon Plato in his writings: and other writers who did the same may probably have belonged to the Isokratean school.[93]

[Footnote 91: Isokrates, Orat. x. 1 (Hel. Enc.); Orat. v. (Philipp.) 12; Or. xiii. (Sophist.) 9-24; Orat. xv. (Permut.) sect. 285-290. [Greek: philosophi/an me\n ou)=n ou)k oi)=mai dei=n prosagoreu/ein tê\n mêde\n e)n tô=| paro/nti mê/te pro\s to\ le/gein mê/te pro\s to\ pra/ttein ô(/phelou=san--tê\n kaloume/nên u(po/ tinôn philosophi/an ou)k ei)=nai phêmi/], &c.]

[Footnote 92: Cicero, De Oratore, iii. 35, 141; Orator. 19, 62; Numenius, ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. xiv. 6, 9. See Stahr, Aristotelia, i. p. 63 seq., ii. p. 44 seq.

Schroeder's Quæstiones Isocrateæ (Utrecht, 1859), and Spengel's work, Isokrates und Plato, are instructive in regard to these two contemporary luminaries of the intellectual world at Athens. But, unfortunately, we can make out few ascertainable facts. When I read the Oration De Permut., Or. xv. (composed by Isokrates about fifteen years before his own death, and about five years before the death of Plato, near 353 B.C.), I am impressed with the belief that many of his complaints about unfriendly and bitter criticism refer to the Platonic School of that day, Aristotle being one of its members. See sections 48-90-276, and seq. He certainly means the Sokratic men, and Plato as the most celebrated of them, when he talks of [Greek: oi( peri\ ta\s e)rôtê/seis kai\ a)pokri/seis, ou(\s a)ntilogikou\s kalou=sin--oi( peri\ ta\s e)/ridas spouda/zontes]--those who are powerful in contentious dialectic, and at the same time cultivate geometry and astronomy, which others call [Greek: a)doleschi/a] and [Greek: mikrologi/a] (280)--those who exhorted hearers to virtue about which others knew nothing, and about which they themselves were in dispute. When he complains of the [Greek: perittolo/giai] of the ancient Sophists, Empedokles, Ion, Parmenides, Melissus, &c., we cannot but suppose that he had in his mind the Timæus of Plato also, though he avoids mention of the name.]

[Footnote 93: Athenæus, iii. p. 122, ii. 60; Dionys. Hal. Epistol. ad Cn. Pomp. p. 757.]

[Side-note: The Dialectician and Cross-Examiner is the only man who can really teach. If the writer can do this, he is more than a writer.]

This is the true philosopher (continues Sokrates)--the man who alone is competent to teach truth about the just, good, and honourable.[94] He who merely writes, must not delude himself with the belief that upon these important topics his composition can impart any clear or lasting instruction. To mistake fancy for reality hereupon, is equally disgraceful, whether the mistake be made by few or by many persons. If indeed the writer can explain to others orally the matters written--if he can answer all questions, solve difficulties, and supply the deficiencies, of each several reader--in that case he is something far more and better than a writer, and ought to be called a philosopher. But if he can do no more than write, he is no philosopher: he is only a poet, or nomographer, or logographer.[95]

[Footnote 94: Plato, Phædrus, p. 277 D-E.]

[Footnote 95: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 278-279.]

[Side-note: Lysias is only a logographer: Isokrates promises to become a philosopher.]

In this latter class stands Lysias. I expect (concludes Sokrates) something better from Isokrates, who gives promise of aspiring one day to genuine philosophy.[96]

[Footnote 96: Respecting the manner in which Plato speaks of Isokrates in the Phædrus, see what I have already observed upon the Euthydêmus, vol. ii. ch. xxi. pp. 227-229.]

* * * * *

[Side-note: Date of the Phædrus--not an early dialogue.]

I have already observed that I dissent from the hypothesis of Schleiermacher, Ast, and others, who regard the Phædrus either as positively the earliest, or at least among the earliest, of the Platonic dialogues, composed several years before the death of Sokrates. I agree with Hermann, Stallbaum, and those other critics, who refer it to a much later period of Plato's life: though I see no sufficient evidence to determine more exactly either its date or its place in the chronological series of dialogues. The views opened in the second half of the dialogue, on the theory of rhetoric and on the efficacy of written compositions as a means of instruction, are very interesting and remarkable.

[Side-note: Criticism given by Plato on the three discourses--His theory of Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic.]

The written discourse of Lysias (presented to us as one greatly admired at the time by his friends, Phædrus among them) is contrasted first with a pleading on the same subject (though not directed towards the attainment of the same end) by Sokrates (supposed to be improvised on the occasion); next with a second pleading of Sokrates directly opposed to the former, and intended as a recantation. These three discourses are criticised from the rhetorical point of view,[97] and are made the handle for introducing to us a theory of rhetoric. The second discourse of Sokrates, far from being Sokratic in tenor, is the most exuberant effusion of mingled philosophy, poetry, and mystic theology, that ever emanated from Plato.

[Footnote 97: Plato, Phædrus, p. 235 A.]

[Side-note: His theory postulates, in the Rhetor, knowledge already assured--it assumes that all the doubts have been already removed.]

The theory of rhetoric too is far more Platonic than Sokratic. The peculiar vein of Sokrates is that of confessed ignorance, ardour in enquiry, and testing cross-examination of all who answer his questions. But in the Phædrus we find Plato (under the name of Sokrates) assuming, as the basis of his theory, that an expositor shall be found who _knows_ what is really and truly just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable--distinct from, and independent of, the established beliefs on these subjects, traditional among his neighbours and fellow-citizens:[98] assuming (to express the same thing in other words) that all the doubts and difficulties, suggested by the Sokratic cross-examination, have been already considered, elucidated, and removed.

[Footnote 98: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 259 E, 260 E, and 262 B.]

[Side-note: The Expositor, with knowledge and logical process, teaches minds unoccupied and willing to learn.]

The expositor, master of such perfect knowledge, must farther be master (so Plato tells us) of the arts of logical definition and division: that is, he must be able to gather up many separate fragmentary particulars into one general notion, clearly identified and embodied in a definition: and he must be farther able to subdivide such a general notion into its constituent specific notions, each marked by some distinct characteristic feature.[99] This is the only way to follow out truth in a manner clear and consistent with itself: and truth is equally honourable in matters small or great.[100]

[Footnote 99: Plato, Phædrus, p. 266.]

[Footnote 100: Plato, Phædrus, p. 261 A.

That truth upon matters small and contemptible deserves to be sought out and proved as much as upon matters great and sublime, is a doctrine affirmed in the Sophistês, Politikus, Parmenidês: Sophist. pp. 218 E, 227 A; Politik. 266 D; Parmenid. 130 E.]

Thus far we are in dialectic: logical exposition proceeding by way of classifying and declassifying: in which it is assumed that the expositor will find minds unoccupied and unprejudiced, ready to welcome the truth when he lays it before them. But there are many topics on which men's minds are, in the common and natural course of things, both pre-occupied and dissentient with each other. This is especially the case with Justice, Goodness, the Honourable, &c.[101] It is one of the first requisites for the expositor to be able to discriminate this class of topics, where error and discordance grow up naturally among those whom he addresses. It is here that men are liable to be deceived, and require to be undeceived--contradict each other, and argue on opposite sides: such disputes belong to the province of Rhetoric.

[Footnote 101: Plato, Phædrus, p. 263 A.]

[Side-note: The Rhetor does not teach, but persuades persons with minds pre-occupied--guiding them methodically from error to truth.]