Chapter XXVIII: Theætetus (2)

To illustrate this farther (continues Sokrates)--suppose we have here six dice. If I compare them with three other dice placed by the side of them, I shall call the six dice _more_ and _double_: if I put twelve other dice by the side of them, I shall call the six _fewer_ and _half_. Or take an old man--and put a growing youth by his side. Two years ago the old man was taller than the youth: now, the youth is grown, so that the old man is the shorter of the two. But the old man, and the six dice, have remained all the time unaltered, and equal to themselves. How then can either of them become either greater or less? or how can either _really be_ so, when they were not so before?[30]

[Footnote 30: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 154-155. Compare the reasoning in the Phædon, pp. 96-97-101.]

[Side-note: Relativity twofold--to the comparing Subject--to another object, besides the one directly described.]

The illustration here furnished by Sokrates brings out forcibly the negation of the absolute, and the affirmation of universal relativity in all conceptions, judgments, and predications, which he ascribes to Protagoras and Herakleitus. The predication respecting the six dice denotes nothing real, independent, absolute, inhering in them: for they have undergone no change. It is relative, and expresses a mental comparison made by me or some one else. It is therefore relative in two different senses:--1. To some other object with which the comparison of the dice is made:--2. To me as comparing Subject, who determine the objects with which the comparison shall be made.[31]--Though relativity in both senses is comprehended by the Protagorean affirmation--Homo Mensura--yet relativity in the latter sense is all which that affirmation essentially requires. And this is true of all propositions, comparative or not--whether there be or be not reference to any other object beyond that which is directly denoted. But Plato was here illustrating the larger doctrine which he ascribes to Protagoras in common with Herakleitus: and therefore the more complicated case of relativity might suit his purpose better.

[Footnote 31: The Aristotelian Category of Relation ([Greek: ta\ pro\s ti/], Categor. p. 6, a. 36) designates one object apprehended and named relatively to some other object--as distinguished from object apprehended and named not thus relatively, which Aristotle considers as _per se_ [Greek: kath' au(to/] (Ethica Nikomach. i. p. 1096, a. 21). Aristotle omits or excludes relativity of the object apprehended to the percipient or concipient subject, which is the sort of relativity directly noted by the Protagorean doctrine.

Occasionally Aristotle passes from relativity in the former sense to relativity in the latter; as when he discusses [Greek: e)pistêto\n] and [Greek: e)pistê/mê], alluded to in one of my former notes on this dialogue. But he seems unconscious of any transition. In the Categories, Object, as implicated with Subject does not seem to have been distinctly present to his reflection. In the third book of the Metaphysica, indeed, he discusses professedly the opinion of Protagoras; and among his objections against it, one is, that it makes everything relative or [Greek: pro\s ti/] (Metaph. [Greek: G]. p. 1011, a. 20, b. 5). This is hardly true in the sense which [Greek: pro\s ti/] bears as one of his Categories: but it is true in the other sense to which I have adverted.

A clear and full exposition of what is meant by the Relativity of Human Knowledge, will be found in Mr. John Stuart Mill's most recent work, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy,' ch. ii. pp. 6-15.]

Sokrates now re-states that larger doctrine, in general terms, as follows.

[Side-note: Statement of the doctrine of Herakleitus--yet so as to implicate it with that of Protagoras.]

The universe is all flux or motion, divided into two immense concurrent streams of force, one active, the other passive; adapted one to the other, but each including many varieties. One of these is Object: the other is, sentient, cognizant, concipient, Subject. Object as well as Subject is, in itself and separately, indeterminate and unintelligible--a mere chaotic Agent or Patient. It is only by copulation and friction with each other that they generate any definite or intelligible result. Every such copulation, between parts adapted to each other, generates a twin offspring: two correlative and inseparable results infinitely diversified, but always born in appropriate pairs:[32] a definite perception or feeling, on the subjective side--a definite thing perceived or felt, on the objective. There cannot be one of these without the other: there can be no objective manifestation without its subjective correlate, nor any subjective without its objective. This is true not merely about the external senses--touch, taste, smell, sight, hearing--but also about the internal,--hot and cold, pleasure and pain, desire, fear, and all the countless variety of our feelings which have no separate names.[33] Each of these varieties of feeling has its own object co-existent and correlating with it. Sight, hearing, and smell, move and generate rapidly and from afar; touch and taste, slowly and only from immediate vicinity: but the principle is the same in all. Thus, _e.g._, when the visual power of the eye comes into reciprocal action with its appropriate objective agent, the result between them is, that the visual power passes out of its abstract and indeterminate state into a concrete and particular act of vision--the seeing a white stone or wood: while the objective force also passes out of its abstract and indeterminate state into concrete--so that it is no longer whiteness, but a piece of white stone or wood actually seen.[34]

[Footnote 32: Plato, Theætêt. p. 156 A. [Greek: ô(s to\ pa=n ki/nêsis ê)=n, kai\ a)/llo para\ tou=to ou)de/n, tê=s de\ kinê/seôs du/o ei)/dê, plê/thei me\n a)/peiron e(ka/teron, du/namin de\ to\ me\n poiei=n e)/chon, to\ de\ pa/schein. E)k de\ tê=s tou/tôn o(mili/as te kai\ tri/pseôs pro\s a)/llêla gi/gnetai e)/kgona] plê/thei me\n a)/peira, di/duma de/--to\ me\n ai)sthêto/n, to\ de\ ai)/sthêsis], a)ei\ sunekpi/ptousa kai\ gennôme/nê meta\ tou= ai)sthêtou=.]]

[Footnote 33: Plato, Theætêt. p. 156 B.]

[Footnote 34: Plato, Theætêt. p. 156 E. [Greek: o( me\n o)phthalmo\s a)/ra o)/pseôs e)/mpleôs e)ge/neto kai\ o(ra=| dê\ to/te kai\ _e)ge/neto ou)/ ti o)/psis a)lla\ o)phthalmo\s o(rô=n_, to\ de\ xuggennê=san to\ chrô=ma leuko/têtos perieplê/sthê kai\ _e)ge/neto ou) leuko/tês au)=_ a)lla\ leuko/n, ei)/te xu/lon ei)/te li/thos ei)/te o(tiou=n xune/bê chrê=ma chrôsthê=nai tô=| toiou/tô| chrô/mati.]

Plato's conception of the act of vision was--That fire darted forth from the eyes of the percipient and came into confluence or coalescence with fire approaching from the perceived object (Plato, Timæus, pp. 45 C, 67 C).]

[Side-note: Agent and Patient--No absolute Ens.]

Accordingly, nothing can be affirmed to exist separately and by itself. All existences, come only as twin and correlative manifestations of this double agency. In fact neither of these agencies can be conceived independently and apart from the other: each of them is a nullity without the other.[35] If either of them be varied, the result also will vary proportionally: each may be in its turn agent or patient, according to the different partners with which it comes into confluence.[36] It is therefore improper to say--Such or such a thing _exists_. Existence absolute, perpetual, and unchangeable is nowhere to be found: and all phrases which imply it are incorrect, though we are driven to use them by habit and for want of knowing better. All that is real is, the perpetual series of changeful and transient conjunctions; each Object, with a certain Subject,--each Subject, with a certain Object.[37] This is true not merely of individual objects, but also of those complex aggregates rationally apprehended which receive generic names, _man_, animal, stone, &c.[38] You must not therefore say that any thing _is_, absolutely and perpetually, good, honourable, hot, white, hard, great--but only that it is so felt or esteemed by certain subjects more or less numerous.[39]

[Footnote 35: Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 A. [Greek: e)pei\ kai\ to\ poiou=n ei)=nai ti kai\ to\ pa/schon au)= ti e)pi\ e(no\s noê=sai, ô(/s phasin, ou)k ei)=nai pagi/ôs. Ou)/te ga\r poiou=n e)sti/ ti, pri\n a)\n tô=| pa/schonti xune/lthê|--ou)/te pa/schon, pri\n a)\n tô=| poiou=nti], &c.]

[Footnote 36: Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 A. [Greek: to/ te/ tini xuneltho\n kai\ poiou=n a)/llô| au)= prospeso\n pa/schon a)nepha/nê.]]

[Footnote 37: Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 A. [Greek: ou)de\n ei)=nai e(\n au)to\ kath' au(to/, a)lla/ tini a)ei\ gi/gnesthai, to\ d' ei)=nai panta/chothen e)xairete/on], &c.]

[Footnote 38: Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 B. [Greek: dei= de\ kai\ kata\ me/ros ou(/tô le/gein kai\ peri\ pollô=n a)throisthe/ntôn, ô(=| dê\ a)throi/smati a)/nthrôpo/n te ti/thentai kai\ li/thon kai\ e(/kaston zô=o/n te kai\ ei)=dos.]

In this passage I follow Heindorf's explanation which seems dictated by the last word [Greek: ei)=dos]. Yet I am not sure that Plato does really mean here the _generic_ aggregates. He had before talked about sights, sounds, hot, cold, hard, &c., the separate sensations. He may perhaps here mean simply individual things as aggregates or [Greek: a)throi/smata]--a _man_, a _stone_, &c.]

[Footnote 39: Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 E.]

[Side-note: Arguments derived from dreams, fevers, &c., may be answered.]

The arguments advanced against this doctrine from the phenomena of dreams, distempers, or insanity, admit (continues Sokrates) of a satisfactory answer. A man who is dreaming, sick, or mad, believes in realities different from, and inconsistent with, those which he would believe in when healthy. But this is because he is, under those peculiar circumstances, a different Subject, unlike what he was before. One of the two factors of the result being thus changed, the result itself is changed.[40] The cardinal principle of Protagoras--the essential correlation, and indefeasible fusion, of Subject and Object, exhibits itself in a perpetual series of definite manifestations. To say that I (the Subject) perceive,--is to say that I perceive some Object: to perceive and perceive nothing, is a contradiction. Again, if an Object be sweet, it must be sweet to some percipient Subject: sweet, but sweet to no one, is impossible.[41] Necessity binds the essence of the percipient to that of something perceived: so that every name which you bestow upon either of them implies some reference to the other; and no name can be truly predicated of either, which implies existence (either perpetual or temporary) apart from the other.[42]

[Footnote 40: Plato, Theætêt. p. 159.]

[Footnote 41: Plato, Theætêt. p. 160 A.]

[Footnote 42: Plato, Theætêt. p. 160 B. [Greek: e)/peiper ê(mô=n ê( a)na/gkê tê\n ou)si/an sundei= me/n, sundei= de ou)deni\ tô=n a)/llôn, ou)d' au)= ê(mi=n au)toi=s; a)llê/lois dê\ lei/petai sundede/sthai] (_i. e._ [Greek: to\n ai)sthano/menon] and [Greek: to\ poiou=n ai)stha/nesthai]). [Greek: Ô/ste ei)/te _tis ei)=nai ti/ o)noma/zei, tini\ ei)=nai, ê)\ tino/s, ê)\ pro/s ti, r(ête/on au)tô=|, ei)/te gi/gnesthai; au)to\ de\ e)ph' au(tou= ti ê)\ o)\n ê)\ gigno/menon ou)/te au)tô=| lekte/on, ou)/t' a)/llou le/gontos a)podekte/on_.]

Compare Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: G]. 6, p. 1011, a. 23.]

[Side-note: Exposition of the Protagorean doctrine, as given here by Sokrates is to a great degree just. You cannot explain the facts of consciousness by independent Subject and Object.]

Such is the exposition which Sokrates is here made to give, of the Protagorean doctrine. How far the arguments, urged by him in its behalf, are such as Protagoras himself either really urged, or would have adopted, we cannot say. In so far as the doctrine asserts essential fusion and implication between Subject and Object, with actual multiplicity of distinct Subjects--denying the reality either of absolute and separate Subject, or of absolute and separate Object[43]--I think it true and instructive. We are reminded that when we affirm any thing about an Object, there is always (either expressed or tacitly implied) a Subject or Subjects (one, many, or all), _to whom_ the Object _is_ what it is declared to be. This is the fundamental characteristic of consciousness, feeling, and cognition, in all their actual varieties. All of them are bi-polar or bi-lateral, admitting of being looked at either on the subjective or on the objective side. Comparisons and contrasts, gradually multiplied, between one consciousness and another, lead us to distinguish the one of these points of view from the other. In some cases, the objective view is brought into light and prominence, and the subjective thrown into the dark and put out of sight: in other cases, the converse operation takes place. Sometimes the Ego or Subject is prominent, sometimes the Mecum or Object.[44] Sometimes the Objective is as it were divorced from the Subject, and projected outwards, so as to have an illusory appearance of existing apart from and independently of any Subject. In other cases, the subjective view is so exclusively lighted up and conspicuous, that Object disappears, and we talk of a mind conceiving, as if it had no correlative Concept. It is possible, by abstraction, to indicate, to name, and to reason about, the one of these two points of view without including direct notice of the other: this is abstraction or logical separation--a mental process useful and largely applicable, yet often liable to be mistaken for real distinctness and duality. In the present case, the two abstractions become separately so familiar to the mind, that this supposed duality is conceived as the primordial and fundamental fact: the actual, bilateral, consciousness being represented as a temporary derivative state, generated by the copulation of two factors essentially independent of each other. Such a theory, however, while aiming at an impracticable result, amounts only to an inversion of the truth. It aims at explaining our consciousness as a whole; whereas all that we can really accomplish, is to explain, up to a certain point, the conditions of conjunction and sequence between different portions of our consciousness. It also puts the primordial in the place of the derivative, and transfers the derivative to the privilege of the primordial. It attempts to find a generation for what is really primordial--the total series of our manifold acts of consciousness, each of a bilateral character, subjective on one side and objective on the other: and it assigns as the generating factors two concepts obtained by abstraction from these very acts,--resulting from multiplied comparisons,--and ultimately exaggerated into an illusion which treats the logical separation as if it were bisection in fact and reality.

[Footnote 43: Aristotle, in a passage of the treatise De Animâ (iii. 1, 2-4-7-8, ed. Trendelenburg, p. 425, b. 25, p. 426, a. 15-25, Bekk.), impugns an opinion of certain antecedent [Greek: phusio/logoi] whom he does not specify; which opinion seems identical with the doctrine of Protagoras. These philosophers said, that "there was neither white nor black without vision, nor savour without the sense of taste". Aristotle says that they were partly right, partly wrong. They were right in regard to the actual, wrong in regard to the potential. The actual manifestation of the perceived is one and the same with that of the percipient, though the two are not the same logically in the view of the reflecting mind ([Greek: ê( de\ tou= ai)sthêtou= e)ne/rgeia kai\ tê=s ai)sthê/seôs ê( au)tê\ me/n e)sti kai\ mi/a, to\ d' ei)=nai ou) tau)to\n au)tai=s]). But this is not true when we speak of them potentially--[Greek: dichô=s ga\r legome/nês tê=s ai)sthê/seôs kai\ tou= ai)sthêtou=, tô=n me\n kata\ du/namin tô=n de\ kat' e)ne/rgeian, e)pi/ tou/tôn me\n sumbai/nei to\ lechthe/n, e)pi\ de\ tô=n e(te/rôn ou) sumbai/nei. A)ll' e)kei=noi a(plô=s e)/legon peri\ tô=n legome/nôn ou)ch a(plô=s.]

I think that the distinction, which Aristotle insists upon as a confutation of these philosophers, is not well founded. What he states, in very just language, about _actual perception_ is equally true about _potential perception_. As the present fact of actual perception implicates essentially a determinate percipient subject with a determinate perceived object, and admits of being looked at either from the one point of view or from the other--so the concept of potential perception implicates in like manner an indeterminate perceivable with an indeterminate subject competent to perceive. The perceivable or cogitable has no meaning except in relation to some Capax Percipiendi or Capax Cogitandi.]

[Footnote 44: The terms Ego and Mecum, to express the antithesis of these two [Greek: lo/gô| mo/non chôrista\], are used by Professor Ferrier in his very acute treatise, the Institutes of Metaphysic, pp. 93-96. The same antithesis is otherwise expressed by various modern writers in the terms Ego and non-Ego--le moi et le non-moi. I cannot think that this last is the proper way of expressing it. You do not want to negative the Ego, but to declare its essential implication with a variable correlate; to point out the bilateral character of the act of consciousness. The two are not merely _Relata secundum dici_ but _Relata secundum esse_, to use a distinction recognised in the scholastic logic.

The implication of Subject and Object is expressed in a peculiar manner (though still clearly) by Aristotle in the treatise De Animâ, iii. 8, 1, 431, b. 21. [Greek: ê( psuchê\ ta\ o)/nta _pô/s_ e)sti pa/nta; ê)\ ga\r ai)sthêta\ ta\ o)/nta ê)\ noêta/. e)sti\ d' ê( e)pistê/mê me\n ta\ e)pistêta/ _pôs_, ê( d' ai)/sthêsis ta\ ai)sthêta/.] The adverb [Greek: pôs] ([Greek: tro/pon tina/], as Simplikius explains it, fol. 78, b. 1) here deserves attention. "The soul is all existing things _in a certain way_ (or looked at under a certain aspect). All things are either Percepta or Cogitata: now Cognition is in a certain sense the Cognita--Perception is the Percepta." He goes on to say that the Percipient Mind is the Form of Percepta, while the matter of Percepta is without: but that the Cogitant Mind is identical with Cogitata, for they have no matter (iii. 4, 12, p. 430, a. 3, with the commentary of Simplikius p. 78, b. 17, f. 19, a. 12). This is in other words the Protagorean doctrine--That the mind is the measure of all existences; and that this is even more true about [Greek: noêta\] than about [Greek: ai)sthêta/]. That doctrine is completely independent of the theory, that [Greek: e)pistê/mê] is [Greek: ai)/sthêsis].

It is in conformity with this affirmation of Aristotle (partially approved even by Cudworth--see Mosheim's Transl. of Intell. Syst. Vol. II. ch. viii. pp. 27-28)--[Greek: ê( psuchê\ ta\ o)/nta pô/s e)sti pa/nta]--that Mr. John Stuart Mill makes the following striking remark about the number of ultimate Laws of Nature:--

"It is useful to remark, that the ultimate Laws of Nature cannot possibly be less numerous than the distinguishable sensations or other feelings of our nature: those, I mean, which are distinguishable from one another in quality, and not merely in quantity or degree. For example, since there is a phenomenon _sui generis_ called colour, which our consciousness testifies to be not a particular degree of some other phenomenon, as heat, or odour, or motion, but intrinsically unlike all others, it follows that there are ultimate laws of colour . . The ideal limit therefore of the explanation of natural phenomena would be to show that each distinguishable variety of our sensations or other states of consciousness has only one sort of cause." (System of Logic, Book iii. ch. 14, s. 2.)]

[Side-note: Plato's attempt to get behind the phenomena. Reference to a double potentiality--Subjective and Objective.]

In Plato's exposition of the Protagorean theory, the true doctrine held by Protagoras,[45] and the illusory explanation (whether belonging to him or to Plato himself), are singularly blended together. He denies expressly all separate existence either of Subject or Object--all possibility of conceiving or describing the one as a reality distinct from the other. He thus acknowledges consciousness and cognition as essentially bilateral. Nevertheless he also tries to explain the generation of these acts of consciousness, by the hypothesis of a _latens processus_ behind them and anterior to them--two continuous moving forces, agent and patient, originally distinct, conspiring as joint factors to a succession of compound results. But when we examine the language in which Plato describes these forces, we see that he conceives them only as Abstractions and Potentialities;[46] though he ascribes to them a metaphorical copulation and generation. "Every thing is motion (or change): of which there are two sorts, each infinitely manifold: one, having power to act--the other having power to suffer." Here instead of a number of distinct facts of consciousness, each bilateral--we find ourselves translated by abstraction into a general potentiality of consciousness, also essentially bilateral and multiple. But we ought to recollect, that the Potential is only a concept abstracted from the actual,--and differing from it in this respect, that it includes what has been and what may be, as well as what is. But it is nothing new and distinct by itself: it cannot be produced as a substantive antecedent to the actual, and as if it afforded explanation thereof. The general proposition about motion or change (above cited in the words of Plato), as far as it purports to get behind the fact of consciousness and to assign its cause or antecedent--is illusory. But if considered as a general expression for that fact itself, in the most comprehensive terms--indicating the continuous thread of separate, ever-changing acts of consciousness, each essentially bilateral, or subjective as well as objective--in this point of view the proposition is just and defensible.[47]

[Footnote 45: The elaborate Dissertation of Sir William Hamilton, on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned (standing first in his 'Discussions on Philosophy'), is a valuable contribution to metaphysical philosophy. He affirms and shows, "That the Unconditioned is incognisable and inconceivable: its notion being only a negation of the Conditioned, which last can alone be positively known and conceived" (p. 12); refuting the opposite doctrine as proclaimed, with different modifications, both by Schelling and Cousin.

In an Appendix to this Dissertation, contained in the same volume (p. 608), Sir W. Hamilton not only re-asserts the doctrine ("Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is relative, conditioned--relatively conditioned. Of things absolutely or in themselves, be they external, be they internal, we know nothing, or know them only as incognisable," &c.)--but affirms farther that philosophers of every school, with the exception of a few late absolute theorisers in Germany, have always held and harmoniously re-echoed the same doctrine.

In proof of such unanimous agreement, he cites passages from seventeen different philosophers.

The first name on his list stands as follows:--"1. Protagoras--(as reported by Plato, Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, &c.)--Man is (for himself) the measure of all things".

Sir William Hamilton understands the Protagorean doctrine as I understand it, and as I have endeavoured to represent it in the present chapter. It has been very generally misconceived.

I cannot, however, agree with Sir William Hamilton, in thinking that this theory respecting the Unconditioned and the Absolute, has been the theory generally adopted by philosophers. The passages which he cites from other authors are altogether insufficient to prove such an affirmation.]

[Footnote 46: Plato, Theætêt. p. 156 A. [Greek: tê=s de\ kinê/seôs du/o ei)/dê, plê/thei me\n a)/peiron e(ka/teron, du/namin de\ to\ me\n poiei=n e)/chon, to\ de\ pa/schein.]]

[Footnote 47: In that distinction, upon which Aristotle lays so much stress, between Actus and Potentia, he declares Actus or actuality to be the Prius--Potentia or potentiality to be the Posterius. See Metaphysica, [Greek: Th]. 8, 1049, b. 5 seqq.; De Animâ, ii. 4, 415, a. 17. The Potential is a derivative from the Actual--derived by comparison, abstraction, and logical analysis: a Mental concept, helping us to describe, arrange, and reason about, the multifarious acts of sense or consciousness--but not an anterior generating reality.

Turgot observes (OEuvres, vol. iii. pp. 108-110; Article in the Encyclopédie, _Existence_):--

"Le premier fondement de la notion de l'_existence_ est la conscience de notre propre sensation, et le sentiment du _moi_ qui résulte de cette conscience. La relation nécessaire entre l'être appercevant, et l'être apperçu considéré hors du _moi_, suppose dans les deux termes la même réalité. Il y a dans l'un et dans l'autre un fondement de cette relation, que l'homme, s'il avoit un langage, pourroit désigner par le nom commun d'_existence_ ou de _présence_: car ces deux notions ne seroient point encore distinguées l'une de l'autre. . . .

"Mais il est très-important d'observer que ni la simple sensation des objets présens, ni la peinture que fait l'imagination des objets absens, ni le simple rapport de distance ou d'activité réciproque, commun aux uns et aux autres, ne sont précisément la chose que l'esprit voudroit désigner par le nom général d'_existence_; c'est le fondement même de ces rapports, supposé commun au _moi_, à l'objet vu et à l'objet simplement distant, sur lequel tombe véritablement et le nom d'_existence_ et notre affirmation, lorsque nous disons qu'une chose _existe_. Ce fondement n'est ni ne peut être connu immédiatement, et ne nous est indiqué que par les rapports différents qui le supposent: nous nous en formons cependant une espèce d'idée que nous tirons par voie d'abstraction du témoignage que la conscience nous rend de nous-mêmes et de notre sensation actuelle: c'est-à-dire, que nous transportons en quelque sorte cette conscience du _moi_ sur les objets extérieurs, par une espèce d'assimilation vague, démentie aussitôt** par la séparation de tout ce qui caractérise le _moi_, mais qui ne suffit pas moins pour devenir le fondement _d'une abstraction ou d'un signe commun, et pour être l'objet de nos jugemens_."]

It is to be remembered, that the doctrine here criticised is brought forward by the Platonic Sokrates as a doctrine not his own, but held by others; among whom he ranks Protagoras as one.

Having thus set forth in his own language, and as an advocate, the doctrine of Protagoras, Sokrates proceeds to impugn it: in his usual rambling and desultory way, but with great dramatic charm and vivacity. He directs his attacks alternately against the two doctrines: 1. _Homo Mensura_: 2. Cognition is sensible perception.

I shall first notice what he advances against _Homo Mensura_.

[Side-note: Arguments advanced by the Platonic Sokrates against the Protagorean doctrine. He says that it puts the wise and foolish on a par--that it contradicts the common consciousness. Not every one, but the wise man only, is a measure.]

It puts every man (he says) on a par as to wisdom and intelligence: and not only every man, but every horse, dog, frog, and other animal along with him. Each man is a measure for himself: all his judgments and beliefs are true: he is therefore as wise as Protagoras and has no need to seek instruction from Protagoras.[48] Reflection, study, and dialectic discussion, are superfluous and useless to him: he is a measure to himself on the subject of geometry, and need not therefore consult a professed geometrician like Theodôrus.[49]

[Footnote 48: Plato, Theætêt. p. 161. Compare Plato, Kratylus, p. 386 C, where the same argument is employed.]

[Footnote 49: Plato, Theætêt. p. 169 A.]

The doctrine is contradicted (continues Sokrates) by the common opinions of mankind: for no man esteems himself a measure on all things. Every one believes that there are some things on which he is wiser than his neighbour--and others on which his neighbour is wiser than he. People are constantly on the look out for teachers and guides.[50] If Protagoras advances an opinion which others declare to be false, he must, since he admits their opinion to be true, admit his own opinion to be false.[51] No animal, nor any common man, is a measure; but only those men, who have gone through special study and instruction in the matter upon which they pronounce.[52]

[Footnote 50: Plato, Theætêt. p. 170.]

[Footnote 51: Plato, Theætêt. p. 171 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n tê\n au(tou= a)\n pseudê= xugchôroi=, ei) tê\n tô=n ê(goume/nôn au)to\n pseu/desthai o(mologei= a)lêthê= ei)=nai?]]

[Footnote 52: Plato, Theætêt. p. 171 C.]

[Side-note: In matters of present sentiment every man can judge for himself. Where future consequences are involved special knowledge is required.]

In matters of present and immediate sensation, hot, cold, dry, moist, sweet, bitter, &c., Sokrates acknowledges that every man must judge _for himself_, and that what each pronounces is true _for himself_. So too, about honourable or base, just or unjust, holy or unholy--whatever rules any city may lay down, are true _for itself_: no man, no city,--is wiser upon these matters than any other.[53] But in regard to what is good, profitable, advantageous, healthy, &c., the like cannot be conceded. Here (says Sokrates) one man, and one city, is decidedly wiser, and judges more truly, than another. We cannot say that the judgment of each is true;[54] or that what every man or every city anticipates to promise good or profit, will necessarily realise such anticipations. In such cases, not merely present sentiment, but future consequences are involved.

[Footnote 53: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 172 A, 177 E.]

[Footnote 54: Plato, Theætêt. p. 172.]

Here then we discover the distinction which Plato would draw.[55] Where present sentiment alone is involved, as in hot and cold, sweet and bitter, just and unjust, honourable and base, &c., there each is a judge for himself, and one man is no better judge than another. But where future consequences are to be predicted, the ignorant man is incapable: none but the professional Expert, or the prophet,[56] is competent to declare the truth. When a dinner is on table, each man among the guests can judge whether it is good: but while it is being prepared, none but the cook can judge whether it _will be_ good.[57] This is one Platonic objection against the opinion of Protagoras, when he says that every opinion of every man is true. Another objection is, that opinions of different men are opposite and contradictory,[58] some of them contradicting the Protagorean dictum itself.

[Footnote 55: Plato, Theætêt. p. 178.]

[Footnote 56: Plato, Theætêt. p. 179. [Greek: ei)/ pê| tou\s suno/ntas e)/peithen, o(/ti kai\ to\ me/llon e)/sesthai/ te kai\ do/xein ou)/te ma/ntis ou)/te tis a)/llos a)/meinon kri/neien a)\n ê)\ au)to\s au(tô=|.]]

[Footnote 57: Plato, Theætêt. p. 178.]

[Footnote 58: Plato, Theætêt. p. 179 B.

_Theodor._ [Greek: E)kei/nê| moi dokei= ma/lista a(li/skesthai o( lo/gos, a(lisko/menos kai\ tau/tê|, ê)=| ta\s tô=n a)/llôn do/xas kuri/as poiei=, au(=tai de\ e)pha/nêsan tou\s e)kei/nou lo/gous ou)damê=| a)lêthei=s ê(gou/menai.]

_Sokrat._ [Greek: Pollachê=| kai\ a)/llê| a)\n to/ ge toiou=ton a(loi/ê, mê\ pa=san panto\s a)lêthê= do/xan ei)=nai; peri\ de\ to\ paro\n e(ka/stô| pa/thos, e)x ô(=n ai( ai)sthê/seis kai\ ai( kata\ tau/tas do/xai gi/gnontai . . . I)/sôs de\ ou)de\n le/gô, a)na/lôtoi ga/r, ei) e)/tuchon, ei)si/n.]]

[Side-note: Plato, when he impugns the doctrine of Protagoras, states that doctrine without the qualification properly belonging to it. All belief relative to the condition of the believing mind.]

Such are the objections urged by Sokrates against the Protagorean doctrine--_Homo Mensura_. There may have been perhaps in the treatise of Protagoras, which unfortunately we do not possess, some reasonings or phrases countenancing the opinions against which Plato here directs his objections. But so far as I can collect, even from the words of Plato himself when he professes to borrow the phraseology of his opponent, I cannot think that Protagoras ever delivered the opinion which Plato here refutes--_That every opinion of every man is true_. The opinion really delivered by Protagoras appears to have been[59]--_That every opinion delivered by every man is true, to that man himself_. But Plato, when he impugns it, leaves out the final qualification; falling unconsciously into the fallacy of passing (as logicians say) _a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter_.[60] The qualification thus omitted by Plato forms the characteristic feature of the Protagorean doctrine, and is essential to the phraseology founded upon it. Protagoras would not declare any proposition to be true absolutely, or false absolutely. The phraseology belonging to that doctrine is forced upon him by Plato. Truth Absolute there is none, according to Protagoras. All truth is and must be truth relative to some one or more persons, either actually accepting and believing in it, or conceived as potential believers under certain circumstances. Moreover since these believers are a multitude of individuals, each with his own peculiarities--so no truth can be believed in, except under the peculiar measure of the believing individual mind. What a man adopts as true, and what he rejects as false, are conditioned alike by this limit: a limit not merely different in different individuals, but variable and frequently varying in the same individual. You cannot determine a dog, or a horse, or a child to believe in the Newtonian astronomy: you could not determine the author of the Principia in 1687 to believe what the child Newton had believed in 1647.[61] To say that what is true to one man, is false to another--that what _was_ true to an individual as a child or as a youth, becomes false to him in his advanced years, is no real contradiction: though Plato, by omitting the qualifying words, presents it as if it were such. In every man's mind, the beliefs of the past have been modified or reversed, and the beliefs of the present are liable to be modified or reversed, by subsequent operative causes: by new supervening sensations, emotions, intellectual comparisons, authoritative teaching, or society, and so forth.

[Footnote 59: Plato, Theætêt. p. 152 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ou(/tô pôs le/gei] (Protagoras) [Greek: ô(s oi(=a me\n e(/kasta e)moi\ phai/netai, toiau=ta me/n e)stin e)moi/--oi(=a de\ soi/, toiau=ta de\ au)= soi/.] 158 A. [Greek: ta\ phaino/mena e(ka/stô| tau=ta kai\ ei)=nai tou/tô| ô(=| phai/netai.] 160 C. [Greek: A)lêthê\s a)/ra e)moi\ ê( e)mê\ ai)/sthêsis; tê=s ga\r e)mê=s ou)si/as a)ei/ e)sti; kai\ e)gô\ kritê\s kata\ to\n Prôtago/ran tô=n te o)/ntôn e)moi/, ô(s e)/sti, kai\ tô=n mê\ o)/ntôn, ô(s ou)k e)/stin.]

Comp. also pp. 166 D, 170 A, 177 C.

Instead of saying [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] (in the passage just cited, p. 160 D), we might with quite equal truth put [Greek: A)lêthê\s a)/ra e)moi\ ê( e)mê\ _no/êsis_; tê=s ga\r e)mê=s ou)si/as a)ei/ e)/stin]. In this respect [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] and [Greek: no/êsis] are on a par. [Greek: No/êsis] is just as much relative to [Greek: o( noô=n] as [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] to [Greek: o( ai)sthano/menos].

Sextus Empiricus adverts to the doctrines of Protagoras (mainly to point out how they are distinguished from those of the Sceptical school, to which he himself belongs) in Pyrrhon. Hypot. i. sects. 215-219; adv. Mathematicos, vii. s. 60-64-388-400. He too imputes to Protagoras both the two doctrines. 1. That man is the measure of all things: that what appears to each person is, _to him_: that all truth is thus relative. 2. That all phantasms, appearances, opinions, are _true_. Sextus reasons at some length (390 seq.) against this doctrine No. 2, and reasons very much as Protagoras himself would have reasoned, since he appeals to individual sentiment and movement of the individual mind ([Greek: ou)k ô(sau/tôs ga\r kinou/metha], 391-400). It appears to me perfectly certain that Protagoras advanced the general thesis of Relativity: we see this as well from Plato as from Sextus--[Greek: kai\ ou(/tôs ei)sa/gei to\ pro/s ti--tô=n pro/s ti ei)=nai tê\n a)lêthei/an] (Steinhart is of opinion that these words [Greek: tô=n pro/s ti ei)=nai tê\n a)lêthei/an] are an addition of Sextus himself, and do not describe the doctrine of Protagoras; an opinion from which I dissent, and which is contradicted by Plato himself: Steinhart, Einleitung, note 8). If Protagoras also advanced the doctrine--all opinions are true--this was not consistent with his cardinal principle of relativity. Either he himself did not take care always to enunciate the qualifications and limitations which his theory requires, and which in common parlance are omitted--Or his opponents left out the limitations which he annexed, and impugned the opinion as if it stood without any. This last supposition I think the most probable.

The doctrine of Protagoras is correctly given by Sextus in the Pyrrhon. Hypot.]

[Footnote 60: Aristotle, in commenting on the Protagorean formula, falls into a similar inaccuracy in slurring over the restrictive qualification annexed by Protagoras. Metaphysic. [Greek: G]. p. 1009, a. 6. Compare hereupon Bonitz's note upon the passage, p. 199 of his edition.

This transition without warning, _à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter_, is among the artifices ascribed by Plato to the Sophists Euthydêmus and Dionysodôrus (Plat. Euthyd. p. 297 D).]

[Footnote 61: The argument produced by Plato to discredit the Protagorean theory--that it puts the dog or the horse on a level with man--furnishes in reality a forcible illustration of the truth of the theory.

Mr. James Harris, the learned Aristotelian of the last century, remarks, in his Dialogue on Happiness (Works, ed. 1772, pp. 143-168):--

"Every particular Species is, itself to itself, the Measure of all things in the Universe. As things vary in their relations to it, they vary also in their value. If their value be ever doubtful, it can noway be adjusted but by recurring with accuracy to the natural State of the Species, and to those several Relations which such a State of course creates."]

[Side-note: All exposition and discussion is an assemblage of individual judgments and affirmations. This fact is disguised by elliptical forms of language.]

The fact, that all exposition and discussion is nothing more than an assemblage of individual judgments, depositions, affirmations, negations, &c, is disguised from us by the elliptical form in which it is conducted. For example:--I, who write this book--can give nothing more than my own report, as a witness, of facts known to me, and of what has been said, thought, or done by others,--for all which I cite authorities:--and my own conviction, belief or disbelief, as to the true understanding thereof, and the conclusions deducible. I produce the reasons which justify my opinion: I reply to those reasons which have been supposed by others to justify the opposite. It is for the reader to judge how far my reasons appear satisfactory to his mind.[62] To deliver my own convictions, is all that is in my power: and if I spoke with full correctness and amplitude, it would be incumbent on me to avoid pronouncing any opinion to be _true_ or _false_ simply: I ought to say, it is _true to me--or false to me_. But to repeat this in every other sentence, would be a tiresome egotism. It is understood once for all by the title-page of the book: an opponent will know what he has to deal with, and will treat the opinions accordingly. If any man calls upon me to give him absolute truth, and to lay down the canon of evidence for identifying it--I cannot comply with the request, any farther than to deliver my own best judgment, what is truth--and to declare what is the canon of evidence which guides my own mind. Each reader must determine for himself whether he accepts it or not. I might indeed clothe my own judgments in oracular and vehement language: I might proclaim them as authoritative dicta: I might speak as representing the Platonic Ideal, Typical Man,--or as inspired by a [Greek: dai/môn] like Sokrates: I might denounce opponents as worthless men, deficient in all the sentiments which distinguish men from brutes, and meriting punishment as well as disgrace. If I used all these harsh phrases, I should only imitate what many authors of repute think themselves entitled to say, about THEIR beliefs and convictions. Yet in reality, I should still be proclaiming nothing beyond my own feelings:--the force of emotional association, and antipathy towards opponents, which had grown round these convictions in my own mind. Whether I speak in accordance with others, or in opposition to others, in either case I proclaim my own reports, feelings and judgments--nothing farther. I cannot escape from the Protagorean limit or measures.[63]

[Footnote 62: M. Destutt Tracy observes as follows:--

"De même que toutes nos propositions peuvent être ramenées à la forme de propositions énonciatives, parce qu'au fond elles expriment toutes un jugement; de même, toutes nos propositions énonciatives peuvent ensuite être toujours réduites à n'être qu'une de celles-ci: 'je pense, je sens, ou je perçois, que telle chose est de telle manière, ou que tel être produit tel effet'--_propositions dont nous sommes nous-mêmes le sujet, parce qu'au fond nous sommes toujours le subjet de tous nos jugemens_, puisqu'ils n'expriment jamais qu'une impression que nous éprouvons." (Idéologie: Supplément à la première Section, vol. iv. p. 165, ed. 1825 duodec.)

"On peut même dire que comme nous ne sentons, ne savons, et ne connaissons, rien que par rapport à nous, l'idée, sujet de la proposition, est toujours en définitif notre moi; car quand je dis _cet arbre est vert_, je dis réellement _je sens, je sais, je vois, que cet arbre est vert_. Mais _précisément parce que ce préambule se trouve toujours et nécessairement compris dans toutes nos propositions, nous le supprimons quand nous voulons_; et toute idée peut être le sujet de la proposition." (Principes Logiques, vol. iv. ch. viii. p. 231.)]

[Footnote 63: Sokrates himself states as much as this in the course of his reply to the doctrine of Protagoras, Theætêt. 171 D.: [Greek: a)ll' ê(mi=n a)na/gkê, oi)=mai, chrê=sthai ê(mi=n au)toi=s . . . kai\ ta\ dokou=nta a)ei/, tau=ta le/gein.]

The necessity ([Greek: a)na/gkê]) to which Sokrates here adverts, is well expressed by M. Degérando. "En jugeant ce que pensent les autres hommes, en comprenant ce qu'ils éprouvent, nous ne sortons point en effet de nous-mêmes, comme on seroit tenté de le croire. C'est dans nos propres idées que nous voyons leurs idées, leurs manières d'être, leur existence même. Le monde entier ne nous est connu que dans une sorte de chambre obscure: et lorsqu'au sortir d'une société nombreuse nous croyons avoir lu dans les esprits et dans les coeurs, avoir observé des caractères, et senti (si je puis dire ainsi) la vie d'un grand nombre d'hommes--nous ne faisons en effet que sortir d'une grande galerie dont notre imagination a fait tous les frais; dont elle a créé tous les personnages, et dessiné, avec plus ou moins de vérité, tous les tableaux." (Degérando, Des Signes et de l'Art de Penser, vol. i. ch. v. p. 132.)]

[Side-note: Argument--That the Protagorean doctrine equalises all men and animals. How far true. Not true in the sense requisite to sustain Plato's objection.]

To this theory Plato imputes as a farther consequence, that it equalises all men and all animals. No doubt, the measure or limit as generically described, bears alike upon all: but it does not mark the same degree in all. Each man's bodily efforts are measured or limited by the amount of his physical force: this is alike true of all men: yet it does not follow that the physical force of all men is equal. The dog, the horse, the new-born child, the lunatic, is each a measure of truth to himself: the philosopher is so also to himself: this is alike true, whatever may be the disparity of intelligence: and is rather more obviously true when the disparity is great, because the lower intelligence has then a very narrow stock of beliefs, and is little modifiable by the higher. But though the Protagorean doctrine declares the dog or the child to be a measure of truth--each to himself--it does not declare either of them to be a measure of truth to me, to you, or to any ordinary by-stander. How far any person is a measure of truth to others, depends upon the estimation in which he is held by others: upon the belief which they entertain respecting his character or competence. Here is a new element let in, of which Plato, in his objection to the Protagorean doctrine, takes no account. When he affirms that Protagoras by his equalising doctrine acknowledged himself to be no better in point of wisdom and judgment than a dog or a child, this inference must be denied.[64] The Protagorean doctrine is perfectly consistent with great diversities of knowledge, intellect, emotion, and character, between one man and another. Such diversities are recognised in individual belief and estimation, and are thus comprehended in the doctrine. Nor does Protagoras deny that men are teachable and modifiable. The scholar after being taught will hold beliefs different from those which he held before. Protagoras professed to know more than others, and to teach them: others on their side also believed that he knew more than they, and came to learn it. Such belief on both sides, noway contradicts the general doctrine here under discussion. What the scholar believes to be true, is still true to him: among those things which he believes to be true, one is, that the master knows more than he: in coming to be taught, he acts upon his own conviction. To say that a man is wise, is to say, that he is wise _in some one's estimation_: your own or that of some one else. Such estimation is always implied, though often omitted in terms. Plato remarks very truly, that every one believes some others to be on certain matters wiser than himself. In other words, what is called authority--that predisposition to assent, with which we hear the statements and opinions delivered by some other persons--is one of the most operative causes in determining human belief. The circumstances of life are such as to generate this predisposition in every one's mind to a greater or less degree, and towards some persons more than towards others.

[Footnote 64: Plato, Theætêt. p. 161 D. [Greek: o( d' a)/ra e)tu/gchanen ô)\n ei)s phro/nêsin ou)de\n belti/ôn batra/chou guri/nou, mê\ o(/ti a)/llou tou a)nthrô/pôn.] I substitute the dog or horse as illustrations.]

[Side-note: Belief on authority is true to the believer himself--The efficacy of authority resides in the believer's own mind.]

Belief on authority is true to the believer himself, like all his other beliefs, according to the Protagorean doctrine: and in acting upon it,--in following the guidance of A, and not following the guidance of B,--he is still a measure to himself. It is not to be supposed that Protagoras ever admitted all men to be equally wise, though Plato puts such an admission into his mouth as an inference undeniable and obvious. His doctrine affirms something altogether different:--that whether you believe yourself to be wise or unwise, in either case the belief is equally your own--equally the result of your own mental condition and predisposition,--equally true to yourself,--and equally an item among the determining conditions of your actions. That the beliefs and convictions of one person might be modified by another, was a principle held by Protagoras not less than by Sokrates: the former employed as his modifying instrument, eloquent lecturing--the latter, dialectical cross-examination. Both of them recognise the belief of the person to whom they address themselves as true to him, yet at the same time as something which may be modified and corrected, by appealing to what they thought the better parts of it against the worse.

[Side-note: Protagorean formula--is false, to those who dissent from it.]

Again--Sokrates imputes it as a contradiction to Protagoras--"Your doctrine is pronounced to be false by many persons: but you admit that the belief of all persons is true: therefore your doctrine is false".[65] Here also Plato omits the qualification annexed by Protagoras to his general principle--Every man's belief is true--that is, true _to him_. That a belief should be true, to one man, and false to another--is not only no contradiction to the formula of Protagoras, but is the very state of things which his formula contemplates. He of course could only proclaim it as true to himself. It is the express purpose of his doctrine to disallow the absolutely true and the absolutely false. His own formula, like every other opinion, is false to those who dissent from it: but it is not false absolutely, any more than any other doctrine. Plato therefore does not make out his charge of contradiction.

[Footnote 65: Plato, Theætêt. p. 171 A. Sextus Empiric. (adv. Mathem. vii. 61) gives a pertinent answer to this objection.]

[Side-note: Plato's argument--That the wise man alone is a measure--Reply to it.]

Some men (says Sokrates) have learnt,--have bestowed study on special matters,--have made themselves wise upon those matters. Others have not done the like, but remain ignorant. It is the wise man only who is a measure: the ignorant man neither is so, nor believes himself to be so, but seeks guidance from the wise.[66]

[Footnote 66: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 171 C, 179 B.]

Upon this we may remark--First, that even when the untaught men are all put aside, and the erudites or Experts remain alone--still these very erudites or Experts, the men of special study, are perpetually differing among themselves; so that we cannot recognise one as a measure, without repudiating the authority of the rest.[67] If by a measure, Plato means an infallible measure, he will not find it in this way: he is as far from the absolute as before. Next, it is perfectly correct that if any man be known to have studied or acquired experience on special matters, his opinion obtains an authority with others (more or fewer), such as the opinion of an ignorant man will not possess. This is a real difference between the graduated man and the non-graduated. But it is a difference not contradicting the theory of Protagoras; who did not affirm that every man's opinion was equally trustworthy in the estimation of others, but that every man's opinion was alike a measure to the man himself. The authority of the guide resides in the belief and opinion of those who follow him, or who feel prepared to follow him if necessity arises. A man gone astray on his journey, asks the way to his destination from residents whom he believes to know it, just as he might look at a compass, or at the stars, if no other persons were near. In following their direction, he is acting on his own belief, that he himself is ignorant on the point in question and that they know. He is a measure to himself, both of the extent of his own ignorance, and of the extent of his own knowledge. And in this respect all are alike--every man, woman, child, and animal;[68] though they are by no means alike in the estimation of others, as trustworthy authorities.

[Footnote 67: "Nam, quod dicunt omnino, se credere ei quem judicent fuisse sapientem--probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti judicare potuissent (statuere enim, qui sit sapiens, vel maximé videtur esse sapientis). _Sed, ut potuerint, potuerunt, omnibus rebus auditis, cognitis etiam reliquorum sententiis: judicaverunt autem re semel auditâ, atque ad unius se auctoritatem contulerunt._" (Cicero, Acad. Priora, ii. 3, 9.)]

[Footnote 68: Plato, Theætêt. p. 171 E. I transcribe the following from the treatise of Fichte (Beruf des Menschen, Destination de l'Homme; Traduction de Barchou de Penhoën, ch. i. Le Doute, pp. 54-55):--

"De la conscience de chaque individu, la nature se contemplant sous un point de vue différent, il en résulte que je m'appelle _moi_, et que tu t'appelles _toi_. Pour toi, je suis hors de toi; et pour moi, tu es hors de moi. Dans ce qui est hors de moi, je me saisis d'abord de ce qui m'avoisine le plus, de ce qui est le plus à ma portée: toi, tu fais de même. Chacun de notre côté, nous allons ensuite au delà. Puis, ayant commencé à cheminer ainsi dans le monde de deux points de départ différens, nous suivons, pendant le reste de notre vie, des routes qui se coupent çà et là, mais qui jamais ne suivent exactement la même direction, jamais ne courent parallèlement l'une à l'autre. Tous les individus possibles peuvent être: par conséquent aussi, tous les points de vue de conscience possibles. _La somme de ces consciences individuelles fait la conscience universelle: il n'y a pas d'autre._ Ce n'est en effet que dans l'individu que se trouve à la fois et la limitation et la réalité. Dans l'individu la conscience est entièrement déterminée par la nature intime de l'individu. Il n'est donné à personne de savoir autre chose que ce qu'il sait. Il ne pourrait pas davantage savoir les mêmes choses d'une autre façon qu'il ne les sait."

The same doctrine is enforced with great originality and acuteness in a recent work of M. Eugène Véron, Du Progrès Intellectuel dans l'Humanité, Supériorité des Arts Modernes sur les Arts Anciens (Paris, 1862, Guillaumin). M. Véron applies his general doctrine mainly to the theory of Art and Æsthetics: moreover he affirms more than I admit respecting human progress as a certain and constant matter of fact. But he states clearly, as an universal truth, the relative point of view--the necessary measurement for itself, of each individual mind--and the consequent obligation, on each, to allow to other minds the like liberty. We read, pp. 14-16-17:--

"Cela revient à dire que dans quelque cas que nous supposions, nous ne pouvons sentir que dans la mesure de notre sensibilité, comprendre et juger que dans la mesure de notre intelligence; et que nos facultés étant en perpetuel developpement, les variations de notre personnalité entrainent nécessairement celles de nos jugemens, même quand nous n'en avons pas conscience. . . Chaque homme a son esprit particulier. Ce que l'un comprend sans peine, un autre ne le peut saisir; ce qui répugne à l'un, plait à l'autre: ce qui ce me parait odieux, mon voisin l'approuve. Quelque bonne envie que nous semblions avoir de nous perdre dans la foule, de dépouiller notre individualité pour emprunter des jugemens tout faits et des opinions taillées à la mesure et à l'usage du public--il est facile de voir que, tout en ayant l'air de répéter la leçon apprise, nous jugeons à notre manière, quand nous jugeons: que notre jugement, tout en paraissant être celui de tout le monde, n'en reste pas moins personnel, et n'est pas une simple imitation: que cette ressemblance même est souvent plus apparente que réelle: que l'identité extérieure des formules et des expressions ne prouve pas absolument celle de la pensée. Rien n'est élastique comme les mots, et comme les principes généraux dans lesquels on pense enfermer les intelligences. C'est souvent quand le langage est le plus semblable qu'on est le plus loin de s'entendre.