Chapter XXXII: Philebus (4)

Next, we may observe that these [Greek: duscherei=s], whoever they were, are spoken of with much respect by Plato, even while he combats their doctrine (p. 44 C). I think it not likely that he would have spoken thus of Antisthenes. We are told that there prevailed between the two a great and reciprocal acrimony. And this sentiment is manifested in the Sophistês (p. 251 B), where the opponents whom Plato is refuting are described with the most contemptuous bitterness--and where Schleiermacher, and the critics generally, declare that he alludes to Antisthenes. The passage in the Sophistês represents, in my judgment, the probable sentiment of Plato towards Antisthenes: the passage in the Philêbus is at variance with it.

I imagine that the [Greek: duscherei=s] to whom Plato makes allusion in the Philêbus, are the persons from whom his nephew and successor Speusippus derived the doctrine declared in the first portion of this note. The "vetus omnia Academia" of Aulus Gellius is an exaggerated phrase; but many of the old Academy, or companions of Plato, probably held the theory that pleasure was only one form of evil,--especially the pythagorising _Platonici_, adopting the tendencies of Plato himself in his old age. That Speusippus was among the borrowers from the Pythagoreans, we know from Aristotle (Eth. Nikom. i. 4, 1096, b. 8).

Now the Pythagorean canon of life, like the Orphic (both of them supposed by Herodotus to be derived in great part from Egypt--ii. 81), was distinguished by a multiplicity of abstinences, disgusts, antipathies, in respect to alimentation and other physical circumstances of life--which were held to be of the most imperative force and necessity; so that offences against them were of all others the most intolerable. A remarkable fragment of the [Greek: Krê=tes] of Euripides (ed. Dind., vol. ii. p. 912) describes a variety of this _purism_ analogous to the Orphic and Pythagorean:--[Greek: Pa/lleuka d' e)/chôn ei)/mata, pheu/gô ge/nesi/n te bro/tôn, kai\ nekrothê/kês ou) chrimpto/menos; tê\n t' e)mpsu/chôn brô=sin e)destô=n pephu/lagmai.] Compare Eurip. Hippol. 957; Alexis Comicus, ap. Athenæ, iv. p. 161. See the work of M. Alfred Maury, Histoire des Religions de la Grèce Antique, vol. iii. pp. 368-384.

It appears to me that the [Greek: duscherei=s], to whom Plato alludes in the Philêbus, were most probably pythagorising friends of his own; who, adopting a ritual of extreme rigour, distinguished themselves by the violence of their antipathies towards [Greek: ta\s ê(dona\s ta\s tô=n a)schêmo/nôn]. Plato speaks of them with respect; partly because ethical theorists, who denounce _pleasure_, are usually characterised in reverential terms, as persons of exalted principle, even by those who think their reasonings inconclusive; partly because these men only pushed the consequences of Plato's own reasonings, rather farther than Plato himself did. In fact they were more consistent than Plato was: for the principles laid down in the Philêbus, if carried out strictly, would go to the exclusion of all pleasures--not less of the few which he tolerates, than of the many which he banishes.

These pythagorising _Platonici_ might well be termed [Greek: deinoi\ peri\ phu/sin]. They paid much attention to the interpretation of nature, though they did so according to a numerical and geometrical symbolism.]

[Footnote 141: Plato, Republic, x. p. 607.]

[Side-note: Forced conjunction of Kosmology and Ethics--defect of the Philêbus.]

In my judgment, this is one main defect pervading the Platonic Philêbus--the forced conjunction between Kosmology and Ethics--the violent pressure employed to force Pleasures and Pains into the same classifying framework as cognitive Beliefs--the true and the false. In respect to the various pleasures, the dialogue contains many excellent remarks, the value of which is diminished by the purpose to which they are turned.[142] One of Plato's main batteries is directed against the intense, extatic, momentary enjoyments, which he sets in contrast against the gentle, serene, often renewable.[143] That the former are often purchasable only at the cost of a distempered condition of body and mind, which ought to render them objects shunned rather than desired by a reasonable man--this is a doctrine important to inculcate: but nothing is gained by applying the metaphorical predicate _false_, either to them, or to the other classes of mixed pleasures, &c., which Plato discountenances under the same epithet. By thus condemning pleasures in wholesale and in large groups, we not only set aside the innocuous as well as others, but we also leave unapplied, or only half applied, that principle of Measure or Calculation which Plato so often extols as the main item in Summum Bonum.

[Footnote 142: We read in Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric (Book i. ch. 7, pp. 168-170) some very good remarks on the erroneous and equivocal assertions which identify Truth and Good--a thesis on which various Platonists have expended much eloquence. Dr. Campbell maintains the just distinction between the Emotions and Will on one side, and the Understanding on the other.

"Passion" (he says) "is the mover to action, Reason is the guide. Good is the object of the Will; Truth the object of the Understanding."]

[Footnote 143: Plato, Philêbus, p. 45 D. [Greek: e)n u(/brei mei/zous ê(dona/s, ou) plei/ous le/gô], &c.

So in the Republic, also, [Greek: ê(donê\ u(perba/llousa] is declared to be inconsistent with [Greek: sôphrosu/nê] (iii. 402 E).]

[Side-note: Directive sovereignty of Measure--how explained and applied in the Protagoras.]

In this dialogue as well as others, Measure is thus exalted, and exalted with emphasis, at the final conclusion: but it is far less clearly and systematically applied, as far as human beings are concerned, than in the Protagoras. The Sokrates of the Protagoras does not recognise any pleasures as false--nor any class of pleasures as absolutely unmixed with pain: he does not set pleasure in pointed opposition to the avoidance of pain, nor the intense momentary pleasures to the gentle and more durable. He considers that the whole course of life is a perpetual intermixture of pleasures and pains, in proportions variable and to a certain extent modifiable: that each item in both lists has its proper value, commensurable with the others; that the purpose of a well-ordered life consists, in rendering the total sum of pleasure as great, and the total sum of pain as small, as each man's case admits: that avoidance of pain and attainment of pleasure are co-ordinate branches of this one comprehensive End. He farther declares that men are constantly liable to err by false remembrances, estimates, and comparisons, of pleasures and pains past--by false expectations of pleasures and pains to come: that the whole security of life lies in keeping clear of such error--in right comparison of these items and right choice between them: that therefore the full sovereign controul of each man's life must be vested in the Measuring Science or Calculating Intelligence.[144] Not only all comprehensive sovereignty, but also ever-active guidance, is postulated for this Measuring Science: while at the same time its special function, and the items to which it applies, are more clearly defined than in any other Platonic dialogue. If a man be so absorbed by the idea of an intense momentary pleasure or pain, as to forget or disregard accompaniments or consequences of an opposite nature, greatly overbalancing it--this is an error committed from default of the Measuring Science: but it is only one among many errors arising from the like deficiency. Nothing is required but the Measuring Science or Intelligence, to enable a man to make the best of those circumstances in which he may be placed: this is true of all men, under every variety of place and circumstances. Measure is not the Good, but the one condition which is constant as well as indispensable to any tolerable approach towards Good.

[Footnote 144: This argument is carried on by Sokrates from p. 351 until the close of the Protagoras, p. 357 A. [Greek: e)peidê\ de\ ê(donê=s te kai\ lu/pês e)n o)rthê=| _tê=| ai(re/sei e)pha/nê ê(mi=n ê( sôtêri/a tou= bi/ou ou)=sa_, tou= te ple/onos kai\ e)la/ttonos kai\ mei/zonos kai\ smikroterou= kai\ por)r(ôte/rô kai\ e)ggute/rô, a)=ra prô=ton me\n _ou) metrêtikê\ phai/netai_, u(perbolê=s te kai\ e)ndei/as ou)=sa kai\ i)so/têtos pro\s a)llê/las ske/psis? . . . E)pei\ de\ metrêtikê/, a)na/gkê| dê/pou te/chnê kai\ e)pistê/mê.]

Yet Plato in the Philêbus, imputing to the Hedonistic theory that it sets aside all idea of measure, regulation, limit, advances as an argument in the case, that Pleasure and Pain in their own nature have no limit (Philêbus, pp. 25-26 B, 27 E. Compare Dr. Badham's note, p. 30 of his edition).

The imputation is unfounded, and the argument without application, in regard to the same theory as expounded by Sokrates in the Protagoras.

At the end of the Philêbus (p. 67 B) Plato makes Sokrates exclaim, "We cannot put Pleasure first among the items of Good, even though all oxen, horses, and other beasts affirm it". This rhetorical flourish is altogether misplaced in the Philêbus: for Plato had already specified it as one of the conditions of the Good, That it must be acceptable and must give satisfaction to all animals, and even to all plants (pp. 22 B, 60 C), as well as to men.]

[Side-note: How explained in Philêbus--no statement to what items it is applied.]

In the Philêbus, too, Measure--The Exact Quantum--The Exact Moment--are proclaimed as the chief item in the complex called--The Good.[145] But to what Items does Sokrates intend the measure to be applied? Not certainly to pleasures: the comparison of quantity between one pleasure and another is discarded as useless or misleading, and the comparison of quality alone is admitted--_i. e._, true and false: the large majority of human pleasures being repudiated in the lump as false, and a small remnant only being tolerated, on the allegation that they are true. Nor, again, is the measure applied to pains: for though Plato affirms that a life altogether without pains (as without pleasures) would be the truly divine Ideal, yet he never tells us that the Measuring Intelligence is to be made available in the comparison and choice of pains, and in avoidance of the greater by submitting to the less. Lastly, when we look at the concession made in this dialogue to Gorgias and his art, we find that Plato no longer claims for his Good or Measure any directive function, or any paramount influence, as to utility, profit, reputation, or the greater ends which men usually pursue in life:[146] he claims for it only the privilege of satisfying the aspiration for truth, in minds wherein such aspiration is preponderant over all others.

[Footnote 145: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 A. [Greek: me/tron--to\ me/trion--to\ kai/rion].]

[Footnote 146: Plato, Philêbus, p. 58 B-D.]

Comparing the Philêbus with the Protagoras, therefore, we see that though, in both, Measuring Science or Intelligence is proclaimed as supreme, the province assigned to it in the Philêbus is comparatively narrow. Moreover the practical side or activities of life (which are prominent in the Protagoras) appear in the Philêbus thrust into a corner; where scanty room is found for them on ground nearly covered by the speculative, or theorising, truth-seeking, pursuits. Practical reason is forced into the same categories as theoretical.

The classification of _true_ and _false_ is (as I have already remarked) unsuitable for pleasures and pains. We have now to see how Plato applies it to cognitions, to which it really belongs.

[Side-note: Classification of true and false--how Plato applies it to Cognitions.]

The highest of these Cognitions is set apart as Dialectic or Ontology: the Object of which is, Ens or Entia, eternal, ever the same and unchangeable, ever unmixed with each other: while the corresponding Subject is, Reason, Intelligence, Wisdom, by which it is apprehended and felt. In this Science alone reside perfect Truth and Purity. Where the Objects are shifting, variable, mixed or confounded together, there Reason cannot apply herself; no pure or exact truth can be attained.[147] These unchangeable Entities are what in other dialogues Plato terms Ideas or Forms--a term scarcely used in the Philêbus.

[Footnote 147: Plato, Philêbus, p. 59 C. [Greek: ô(s ê)\ peri\ e)kei=na e)/sth' ê(mi=n to/ te be/baion kai\ to\ katharo\n kai\ to\ a)lêthe\s kai\ o(\ dê\ le/gomen ei)likrine/s, peri\ ta\ a)ei\ kata\ ta\ au)ta\ ô(sau/tôs a)mikto/tata e)/chonta--ê)\ deute/rôs e)kei/nôn o(/ ti ma/lista/ e)sti xuggene/s; ta\ d' a)/lla pa/nta deu/tera/ te kai\ u(/stera lekte/on.] 62 A: [Greek: phronô=n a)/nthrôpos _au(tê=s peri\ dikaiosu/nês_, o(/, ti e)/sti, kai\ lo/gon e)/chôn e(po/menon tô=| noei=n . . . ku/klou me\n kai\ sphai/ras au)tê=s tê=s thei/as to\n lo/gon e)/chôn.]]

Though pure truth belongs exclusively to Dialectic and to the Objects thereof, there are other Sciences which, having more or less of affinity to Dialectic, may thus be classified according to the degree of such affinity. Mathematics approach most nearly to Dialectic. Under Mathematics are included the Sciences or Arts of numbering, measuring, weighing--Arithmetic, Metrêtic, Static--which are applied to various subordinate arts, and impart to these latter all the scientific guidance and certainty which is found in them. Without Arithmetic, the subordinate arts would be little better than vague guesswork or knack. But Plato distinguishes two varieties of Arithmetic and Metrêtic: one purely theoretical, prosecuted by philosophers, and adapted to satisfy the love of abstract truth--the other applied to some department of practice, and employed by the artist as a guide to the execution of his work. Theoretical Arithmetic is characterised by this feature, that it assumes each unit to be equal, like, and interchangeable with every other unit: while practical Arithmetic adds together concrete realities, whether like and equal to each other or not.[148]

[Footnote 148: Plato, Philêbus, p. 56 E.]

It is thus that the theoretical geometer and arithmetician, though not coming up to the full and pure truth of Dialectic, is nevertheless nearer to it than the carpenter or the ship-builder, who apply the measure to material objects. But the carpenter, ship-builder, architect, &c., do really apply measure, line, rule, &c.: they are therefore nearer to truth than other artists, who apply no measure at all. To this last category belong the musical composer, the physician, the husbandman, the pilot, the military commander, neither of whom can apply to their processes either numeration or measurement: all of them are forced to be contented with vague estimate, conjecture, a practised eye and ear.[149]

[Footnote 149: Plato, Philêbus, p. 56 A-B.]

[Side-note: Valuable principles of this classification--difference with other dialogues.]

The foregoing classification of Sciences and Arts is among the most interesting points in the Philêbus. It coincides to a great degree with that which we read in the sixth and seventh books of the Republic, though it is also partially different: it differs too in some respects from doctrines advanced in other dialogues. Thus we find here (in the Philêbus) that the science or art of the physician, the pilot, the general, &c., is treated as destitute of measure and as an aggregate of unscientific guesses: whereas in the Gorgias[150] and elsewhere, these are extolled as genuine arts, and are employed to discredit Rhetoric by contrast. Again, all these arts are here placed lower in the scientific scale than the occupations of the carpenter or the ship-builder, who possess and use some material measures. But these latter, in the Republic,[151] are dismissed with the disparaging epithet of snobbish ([Greek: ba/nausoi]) and deemed unworthy of consideration.

[Footnote 150: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 501 A, 518 A. Compare Republic, i. pp. 341-342.]

[Footnote 151: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 522 B.]

Dialectic appears here exalted to the same pre-eminence which is assigned to it in the Republic--as the energy of the pure Intellect, dealing with those permanent real Essences which are the objects of Intellect alone, intelligible only and not visible. The distinction here drawn by Plato between the theoretical and practical arithmetic and geometry, compared with numeration or mensuration of actual objects of sense--is also remarkable in two ways: first, as it marks his departure from the historical Sokrates, who recognised the difference between the two, but discountenanced the theoretical as worthless:[152] next as it brings clearly to view, the fundamental assumption or hypothesis upon which abstract arithmetic proceeds--the concept of units all perfectly like and equal. That this _is_ an assumption (always departing more or less from the facts of sense)--and that upon its being conceded depends the peculiar certainty and accuracy of arithmetical calculation--was an observation probably then made for the first time; and not unnecessary to be made even now, since it is apt to escape attention. It is enunciated clearly both here and in the Republic.[153]

[Footnote 152: Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 7, 2-8. The contrast drawn in this chapter of the Memorabilia appears to me to coincide pretty exactly with that which is taken in the Philêbus, though the preference is reversed. Dr. Badham (p. 78) and Mr. Poste (pp. 106-113) consider Plato as pointing to a contrast between pure and applied Mathematics: which I do not understand to be his meaning. The distinction taken by Aristotle in the passage cited by Mr. Poste is different, and does really designate Pure and Applied Mathematics. Mr. Poste would have found a better comparison in Ethic. Nikom. i. 7, 1098, a. 29.]

[Footnote 153: Plato, Philêbus, p. 56 E. [Greek: oi( d' ou)k a)/n pote au)toi=s sunakolouthê/seian, ei) mê\ mona/da mona/dos e(ka/stês tô=n muri/ôn mêdemi/an a)/llên a)/llês diaphe/rousa/n tis thê/sei]--where it is formally proclaimed as an assumption or postulate. See Republic, vii. pp. 525-526, vi. p. 510 C.

Mr. John Stuart Mill thus calls attention to the same remark in his instructive chapters on Demonstration and Necessary Truth (System of Logic, Book ii. ch. vi. sect. 3).

"The inductions of Arithmetic are of two sorts: first, those that we have just expounded, such as One and One are Two, Two and One are Three, &c., which may be called the definitions of the various numbers, in the improper or geometrical sense of the word Definition; and, secondly, the two following Axioms. The sums of Equals are equal, the differences of Equals are equal.

"These axioms, and likewise the so-called Definitions, are (as already shown) results of induction: true of all objects whatsoever, and as it may seem, exactly true, without the hypothetical assumption of unqualified truth where an approximation to it is all that exists. On more accurate investigation, however, it will be found that even in this case, there is one hypothetical element in the ratiocination. In all propositions concerning numbers a condition is implied without which none of them would be true, and that condition is an assumption which may be false. The condition is that 1 = 1: that all the numbers are numbers of the same or of equal units. Let this be doubtful, and not one of the propositions in arithmetic will hold true. How can we know that one pound and one pound make two pounds, if one of the pounds may be troy and the other avoirdupois? They may not make two pounds of either or of any weight. How can we know that a forty-horse power is always equal to itself, unless we assume that all horses are of equal strength? One actual pound weight is not exactly equal to another, nor one mile's length to another; a nicer balance or more exact measuring instruments would always detect some difference."]

The long preliminary discussion of the Philêbus thus brings us to the conclusion--That a descending scale of value, relatively to truth and falsehood, must be recognised in cognitions as well as in pleasures: many cognitions are not entirely true, but tainted in different degrees by error and falsehood: most pleasures also, instead of being true and pure, are alloyed by concomitant pains or delusions or both: moreover, all the intense pleasures are incompatible with Measure, or a fixed standard,[154] and must therefore be excluded from the category of Good.

[Footnote 154: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 52 D--57 B.]

[Side-note: Close of the Philêbus--Graduated elements of Good.]

In arranging the quintuple scale of elements or conditions of the Good, Plato adopts the following descending order: I report them as well as I can, for I confess that I understand them very imperfectly.

1. Measure; that which conforms to Measure and to proper season: with everything else analogous, which we can believe to be of eternal nature.--These seem to be unchangeable Forms or Ideas, which are here considered objectively, apart from any percipient Subject affected by them.[155]

2. The Symmetrical, Beautiful, Perfect, Sufficient, &c.--These words seem to denote the successive manifestations of the same afore-mentioned attributes; but considered both objectively and subjectively, as affecting and appreciated by some percipient.

3. Intelligent or Rational Mind--Here the Subject is brought in by itself.

4. Sciences, Cognitions, Arts, Right Opinions, &c.--Here we have the intellectual manifestations of the Subject, but of a character inferior to No. 3, descending in the scale of value relatively to truth.

5. Lastly come the small list of true and painless pleasures.--These, being not intellectual at all, but merely emotional (some as accompaniments of intellectual, others of sensible, processes), are farther removed from Good and Measure than even No. 4--the opining or uncertain phases of the intellect.[156]

The four first elements belong to the Kosmos as well as to man: for the Kosmos has an intelligent soul. The fifth marks the emotional nature of man.

[Footnote 155: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 A.

The Appendix B, subjoined by Mr. Poste to his edition of the Philêbus (pp. 149-165), is a very valuable Dissertation, comparing and explaining the abstract theories of Plato and Aristotle. He remarks, justly contrasting the Philêbus with the Timæus, as to the doctrine of Limit: "In the Philêbus the limit is always quantitative. Quality, including all the elementary forces, is the substratum that has to receive the quantitative determination. Just, however, as Quality underlies quantity, we can conceive a substratum underlying quality. This Plato in the Timæus calls the Vehicle or Receptacle ([Greek: to\ dektiko/n]), and Aristotle in his writings the primary Matter ([Greek: prô/tê u(/lê]). The Philêbus, however, does not carry the analysis so far. It regards quality as the ultimate matter, the substratum to be moulded and measured out in due quantity by the quantitative limit" (p. 160).

I doubt whether the Platonic idea of [Greek: to\ me/trion] is rightly expressed by Mr. Poste's translation--a _mean_ (p. 158). It rather implies, even in Politikus, p. 306, to which he refers, something adjusted according to a positive standard or conformable to an assumed measure or perfection: there being undoubtedly error in excess above it and error in defect below it--but the standard being not necessarily mid-way between the two. The Pythagoreans used [Greek: kairo\s] in a very large sense, describing it as the First Cause of Good. Proklus ad Plat. Alkib. i. p. 270-272, Cousin.]

[Footnote 156: Neither the Introduction of Schleiermacher (p. 134 seq.), nor the elucidation of Trendelenburg (De Philebi Consilio, pp. 16-23), nor the Prolegomena of Stallbaum (pp. 76-77 seq.), succeed in making this obscure close of the Philêbus clearly intelligible. Stallbaum, after indicating many commentators who have preceded him, observes respecting the explanations which they have given: "Ea sunt adeo varia atque inter se diversa, ut tanquam adversâ fronte inter ipsa pugnare dicenda sint" (p. 72).]

I see no sufficient ground for the hypothesis of Stallbaum and some other critics, who, considering the last result abrupt and unsatisfactory, suspect that Plato either intended to add more, or did add more which has not come down to us.[157] Certainly the result (as in many other Platonic dialogues) is inconsiderable, and the instruction derivable from the dialogue must be picked out by the reader himself from the long train of antecedent reasoning. The special point emphatically brought out at the end is the discredit thrown upon the intense pleasures, and the exclusion of them from the list of constituents of Good. If among Plato's contemporaries who advocated the Hedonistic doctrine, there were any who laid their main stress upon these intense pleasures, he may be considered to have replied to them under the name of Philêbus. But certainly this result might have been attained with a smaller array of preliminaries.

[Footnote 157: Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 10.]

[Side-note: Contrast between the Philêbus and the Phædrus, and Symposion, in respect to Pulchrum, and intense Emotions generally.]

Moreover, in regard to these same intense emotions we have to remark that Plato in other dialogues holds a very different opinion respecting them--or at least respecting some of them. We have seen that at the close of the Philêbus he connects Bonum and Pulchrum principally, and almost exclusively, with the Reason; but we find him, in the Phædrus and Symposion, taking a different, indeed an opposite, view of the matter; and presenting Bonum and Pulchrum as objects, not of the unimpassioned and calculating Reason, but of ardent aspiration and even of extatic love. Reason is pronounced to be insufficient for attaining them, and a peculiar vein of inspiration a species of madness, _eo nomine_--is postulated in its place. The life of the philosophical aspirant is compared to that of the passionate lover, beginning at first with attachment to some beautiful youth, and rising by a gradual process of association, so as to transfer the same fervent attachment to his mental companionship, as a stimulus for generating intellectual sympathies and recollections of the world of Ideas. He is represented as experiencing in the fullest measure those intense excitements and disturbances which Eros alone can provoke.[158] It is true that Plato here repudiates sensual excitements. In this respect the Phædrus and Symposion agree with the Philêbus. But as between Reason and Emotion, they disagree with it altogether: for they dwell upon ideal excitements of the most vehement character. They describe the highest perfection of human nature as growing out of the better variety of madness--out of the glowing inspirations of Eros: a state replete with the most intense alternating emotions of pain and pleasure. How opposite is the tone of Sokrates in the Philêbus, where he denounces all the intense pleasures as belonging to a distempered condition--as adulterated with pain, and as impeding the tranquil process of Reason--and where he tolerates only such gentle pleasures as are at once unmixed with pain and easily controuled by Reason! In the Phædrus and Symposion, we are told that Bonum and Pulchrum are attainable only under the stimulus of Eros, through a process of emotion, feverish and extatic, with mingled pleasure and pain: and that they crown such aspirations, if successfully prosecuted, with an emotional recompense, or with pleasure so intense as to surpass all other pleasures. In the Philêbus, Bonum and Pulchrum come before us as measure, proportion, seasonableness: as approachable only through tranquil Reason--addressing their ultimate recompense to Reason alone--excluding both vehement agitations and intense pleasures--and leaving only a corner of the mind for gentle and unmixed pleasures.[159]

[Footnote 158: See in the Symposion the doctrines of the prophetess Diotima, as recited by Sokrates, pp. 204-212: also the Phædrus, the second [Greek: e)gkô/mion] delivered by Sokrates upon Eros, pp. 36-60, repeated briefly and confirmed by Sokrates, pp. 77-78.

Compare these with the latter portion of the Philêbus; the difference of spirit and doctrine will appear very manifest.

To illustrate the contrast between the Phædrus and the Philêbus, we may observe that the former compares the excitement and irritation of the inspired soul when its wings are growing to ascend to Bonum and Pulchrum, with the [Greek: knê=sis] or irritation of the gums when a child is cutting teeth--[Greek: zei= ou)=n e)n tou/tô| o(/lê kai\ a)nakêki/ei, kai\ o(/per to\ tô=n o)dontophuou/ntôn pa/thos peri\ tou\s o)do/ntas gi/gnetai o(/tan a)/rti phuô=si knê=si/s te kai\ a)gana/ktêsis peri\ ta\ ou)=la, tau)to\n dê\ pe/ponthen ê( tou= pterophuei=n a)rchome/nou psuchê/; zei= te kai\ a)ganaktei= kai\ gargali/zetai phu/ousa ta\ ptera/] (Phædrus, p. 251). These are specimens of the strong metaphors used by Plato to describe the emotional condition of the mind during its fervour of aspiration towards Bonum and Pulchrum. On the other hand, in the Philêbus, [Greek: knê=sis] and [Greek: gargalismo\s] are noted as manifestations of that distempered condition which produces indeed moments of intense pleasure, but is quite inconsistent with Reason and the attainment of Good. See Philêbus, pp. 46 E, 51 D, and Gorgias, p. 494.]

[Footnote 159: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66.]

The comparison, here made, of the Philêbus with the Phædrus and Symposion, is one among many proofs of the different points of view with which Plato, in his different dialogues,[160] handled the same topics of ethical and psychological discussion. And upon this point of dissent, Eudoxus and Epikurus, would have agreed with the Sokrates of the Philêbus, in deprecating that extatic vein of emotion which is so greatly extolled in the Phædrus and Symposion.

[Footnote 160: Maximus Tyrius remarks this difference (between the erotic dialogues of Plato and many of the others) in one of his discourses about the [Greek: e)rôtikê\] of Sokrates. [Greek: Ou)de\n ga\r au)to\s au(tô=| o(/moios o( Sôkra/tês e)rô=n tô=| sôphronou=nti, kai\ o( e)kplêtto/menos tou\s kalou\s tô=| e)le/gchonti tou\s a)/phronas], &c. (Diss. xxiv. 5, p. 466 ed. Reiske).]