Chapter XXXII: Philebus (2)

Now there are some philosophers who confound this distinction:[51] Philosophers respectable, but stern, who hate the very name of pleasure, deny its existence as a separate state _per se_, and maintain it to be nothing more than relief from pain: implying therefore, perpetually and inevitably, the conjunction or antecedence of pain. They consider the seduction of pleasure in prospect to be a mere juggle--a promise never realised. Often the expected moment brings no pleasure at all: and even when it does, there are constant accompaniments of pain, which always greatly impair, often countervail, sometimes far more than countervail, its effect. Pain is regarded by them as the evil--removal or mitigation of pain as the good--of human life.

[Footnote 51: Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 B-C. [Greek: kai\ ma/la deinou\s legome/nous ta\ peri\ phu/sin, oi( to\ para/pan ê(dona\s ou)/ phasin ei)=nai . . . lupô=n tau/tas ei)=nai pa/sas a)pothuga/s, a(\s nu=n oi( peri\ Phi/lêbon ê(dona\s e)ponoma/zousin.]]

[Side-note: Sokrates agrees with them in part, but not wholly.]

These philosophers (continues Sokrates) are like prophets who speak truth from the stimulus of internal temperament, without any rational comprehension of it. Their theory is partially true, but not universally.[52] It is true of a large portion of what are called pleasures, but it is not true of all pleasures. Most pleasures (indeed all the more vehement and coveted pleasures), correspond to the description given in the theory. The moment when the supposed intense pleasure arrives, is a disappointment of the antecedent hopes, either by not bringing the pleasure promised, or by bringing it along with a preponderant dose of pain. But there are some pleasures of which this cannot be said--which are really true and unmixed with pain. Which these are (continues Sokrates), I will presently explain: but I shall first state the case of the pleasure-hating philosophers, so far as I go along with it.

[Footnote 52: Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 C. [Greek: ô(/sper ma/ntesi proschrê=sthai/ tisi, manteuome/nois ou) te/chnê|, a)lla/ tini duscherei/a phu/seôs ou)k a)gennou=s], &c. Also p. 51 A.]

[Side-note: Theory of the pleasure-haters--We must learn what pleasure is by looking at the intense pleasures--These are connected with distempered body and mind.]

When we are studying any property (they say), we ought to examine especially those cases in which it appears most fully and prominently developed: thus, if we are enquiring into hardness, we must take for our first objects of investigation the hardest things, in preference to those which are less hard or scarcely hard at all.[53] So in enquiring into pleasure generally, we must investigate first the pleasures of extreme intensity and vehemence. Now the most intense pleasures are enjoyed not in a healthy state of body, but on the contrary under circumstances of distemper and disorder: because they are then preceded by the most violent wants and desires. The sick man under fever suffers greater thirst and cold than when he is in health, but in the satisfaction of those wants, his pleasure is proportionally more intense. Again when he suffers from the itch or an inflamed state of body, the pleasure of rubbing or scratching is more intense than if he had no such disorder.[54] The most vehement bodily pleasures can only be enjoyed under condition of being preceded or attended by pains greater or less as the case may be. The condition is not one of pure pleasure, but mixed between pain and pleasure. Sometimes the pain preponderates, sometimes the pleasure: if the latter, then most men, forgetting the accompanying pain, look upon these transient moments as the summit of happiness.[55] In like manner the violent and insane man, under the stimulus of furious passions and desires, experiences more intense gratifications than persons of sober disposition: his condition is a mixed one, of great pains and great pleasures. The like is true of all the vehement passions--love, hatred, revenge, anger, jealousy, envy, fear, sorrow, &c.: all of them embody pleasures mixed with pain, and the magnitude of the pleasure is proportioned to that of the accompanying pain.[56]

[Footnote 53: Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 E. [Greek: ô(s ei) boulê/theimen o(touou=n ei)=dous tê\n phu/sin i)dei=n, oi(=on tê\n tou= sklêrou=, po/teron ei)s ta\ sklêro/tta a)poble/pontes ou(/tôs a)\n ma=llon sunnoê/saimen ê)\ pro\s ta\ pollosta\ sklêro/têti?] Answer: [Greek: pro\s ta\ prô=ta mege/thei.]]

[Footnote 54: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 45-46.]

[Footnote 55: Plato, Philêbus, p. 47 A.]

[Footnote 56: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 49-50 D. Plato here introduces, at some length, an analysis of the mixed sentiment of pleasure and pain with which we regard scenic representations, tragedy and comedy--especially the latter. The explanation which he gives of the sentiment of the ludicrous is curious, and is intended to elucidate an obscure psychological phenomenon ([Greek: o(/sô| skoteino/tero/n e)sti], p. 48 B). But his explanation is not clear, and the sense which he gives to the word [Greek: phtho/nos] is a forced one. He states truly that the natural object (at least one among the objects) which a man laughs at, is the intellectual and moral infirmities of persons with whom he is in friendly intercourse, when such persons are not placed in a situation of power, so as to make their defects or displeasure pregnant with dangerous consequences. The laugher is amused with exaggerated self-estimation or foolish vanity displayed by friends, [Greek: doxosophi/a, doxokali/a] &c. (49 E). But how the laugher can be said to experience a mixture of pain and pleasure here, or how he can be said to feel [Greek: phtho/nos], I do not clearly see. At least [Greek: phtho/nos] is here used in the very unusual sense (to use Stallbaum's words, note p. 48 B, page 278) of "injusta lætitia de malis eorum, quibus bene cupere debemus": a sense altogether contrary to that which the word bears in Xen. Memor. iii. 9, 8; which Stallbaum himself cites, as if the definition of [Greek: phtho/nos] were the same in both.]

[Side-note: The intense pleasures belong to a state of sickness; but there is more pleasure, on the whole, enjoyed in a state of health.]

Recollect (observes Sokrates) that the question here is not whether _more pleasure_ is enjoyed, _on the whole_, in a state of health than in a state of sickness--by violent rather than by sober men. The question is, about the intense modes of pleasure. Respecting these, I have endeavoured to show that they belong to a distempered, rather than to a healthy, state both of state of body and mind:--and that they cannot be enjoyed pure, without a countervailing or preponderant accompaniment of pain.[57] This is equally true, whether they be pleasures of body alone, of mind alone, or of body and mind together. They are false and delusive pleasures: in fact, they are pleasures only in seeming, but not in truth and reality. To-morrow I will give you fuller proofs on the subject.[58]

[Footnote 57: Plato, Philêbus, p. 45 C-E. [Greek: mê/ me ê(gê=| dianoou/menon e)rôta=|n se, ei) _plei/ô chai/rousin_ oi( spho/dra nosou=ntes tô=n u(giaino/ntôn, a)ll' oi)/ou _me/getho/s_ me zêtei=n ê(donê=s, kai\ _to\ spho/dra_ peri\ tou= toiou/tou pou= pote\ gi/gnetai e(ka/stote], &c.]

[Footnote 58: Plato, Philêbus, p. 50 E. [Greek: tou/tôn ga\r a(pa/ntôn au(/rion e)thelê/sô soi lo/gon dou=nai], &c.]

[Side-note: Sokrates acknowledges some pleasures to be true. Pleasures of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, smells, &c. Pleasures of acquiring knowledge.]

Thus far (continues Sokrates) I have set forth the case on behalf of the pleasure-haters. Though I deny their full doctrine,--that there is no pleasure except cessation from pain--I nevertheless agree with them and cite them as witnesses on my behalf, to the extent of affirming that a large proportion of our so-called pleasures, and those precisely the most intense, are false and unreal: being poisoned and drenched in accompaniments of pain.[59] But there are some pleasures, true, genuine, and untainted. Such are those produced by beautiful colours and figures--by many odours--by various sounds: none of which are preceded by any painful want requiring to be satisfied. The sensation when it comes is therefore one of pure and unmixed pleasure. The figures here meant are the perfect triangle, cube, circle, &c.: the colours and sounds are such as are clear and simple. All these are beautiful and pleasurable absolutely and in themselves--not simply in relation to (or relatively to) some special antecedent condition. Smells too, though less divine than the others, are in common with them unalloyed by accompanying pain.[60] To these must be added the pleasure of acquiring knowledge, which supposes neither any painful want before it, nor any subsequent pain even if the knowledge acquired be lost. This too is one of the unmixed or pure pleasures; though it is not attainable by most men, but only by a select few.[61]

[Footnote 59: Plato, Philêbus, p. 51 A.]

[Footnote 60: Plato, Philêbus, p. 51 E. [Greek: to\ de\ peri\ ta\s o)sma\s ê(=tton me\n tou/tôn thei=on ge/nos ê(donô=n; to\ de\ mê\ summemi/chthai e)n au)tai=s a)nagkai/ous lu/pas], &c.]

[Footnote 61: Plato, Philêbus, p. 52 B. [Greek: tau/tas toi/nun ta\s tô=n mathêma/tôn ê(dona\s a)mi/ktous te ei)=nai lu/pais r(ête/on, kai\ ou)damô=s tô=n spho/dra o)li/gôn.]]

[Side-note: Pure and moderate pleasures admit of measure and proportion.]

Having thus distinguished the pure and moderate class of pleasures, from the mixed and vehement--we may remark that the former class admit of measure and proportion, while the latter belong to the immeasurable and the infinite. Moreover, look where we will, we shall find truth on the side of the select, small, unmixed specimens--rather than among the large and mixed masses. A small patch of white colour, free from all trace of any other colour, is truer, purer, and more beautiful, than a large mass of clouded and troubled white. In like manner, gentle pleasure, free from all pain, is more pleasurable, truer, and more beautiful, than intense pleasure coupled with pain.[62]

[Footnote 62: Plato, Philêbus, p. 53 B-C.]

[Side-note: Pleasure is generation, not substance or essence: it cannot therefore be an End, because all generation is only a means towards substance--Pleasure therefore cannot be the Good.]

There are yet other arguments remaining (continues Sokrates) which show that pleasure cannot be the Summum Bonum. If it be so, it must be an End, not a Means: it must be something for the sake of which other things exist or are done--not something which itself exists or is done for the sake of something else. But pleasure is not an End: it is essentially a means, as we may infer from the reasonings of its own advocates. They themselves tell us that it is generation, not substance:--essentially a process of transition or change, never attaining essence or permanence.[63] But generation or transition is always for the sake of the thing to be generated, or for Substance--not substance for the sake of generation: the transitory serves as a road to the permanent, not _vice versà_. Pleasure is thus a means, not an End. It cannot therefore partake of the essential nature and dignity of Good: it belongs to a subordinate and imperfect category.[64]

[Footnote 63: Plato, Philêbus, p. 53 C. [Greek: a)=ra peri\ ê(donê=s ou)k a)kêko/amen ô(s a)ei\ ge/nesi/s e)stin, ou)si/a de\ ou)k e)/sti to\ para/pan ê(dona=s; kompsoi\ ga\r dê/ tines au)= tou=ton to\n lo/gon e)picheirou=si mênu/ein ê(mi=n, oi(=s dei= cha/rin e)/chein. . . .]

53 D: [Greek: e)sto\n dê/ tine du/o, to\ me\n au)to\ kath' au(to/, to\ de\ a)ei\ e)phie/menon a)/llou . . . to\ me\n semno/taton a)ei\ pephuko/s, to\ de\ e)llipe\s e)kei/nou.]]

[Footnote 64: Plato, Philêbus, p. 54 D. [Greek: ê(donê\ ei)/per ge/nesi/s e)stin, ei)s a)/llên ê)\ tê\n tou= a)gathou= moi=ran au)tê\n tithe/ntes o)rthô=s thê/somen.]]

[Side-note: Other reasons why pleasure is not the Good.]

Indeed we cannot reasonably admit that there is no Good in bodies and in the universe generally, nor anywhere except in the mind:--nor that, within the mind, pleasure alone is good, while courage, temperance, &c., are not good:--nor that a man is good only while he is enjoying pleasure, and bad while suffering pain, whatever may be his character and merits.[65]

[Footnote 65: Plato, Philêbus, p. 55 B.]

[Side-note: Distinction and classification of the varieties of Knowledge or Intelligence. Some are more true and exact than others, according as they admit more or less of measuring and computation.]

Having thus (continues Sokrates) gone through the analysis of pleasures, distinguishing such as are true and pure, from such as are false and troubled--we must apply the like distinctive analysis to the various modes of knowledge and intelligence. Which varieties of knowledge, science, or art, are the purest from heterogeneous elements, and bear most closely upon truth? Some sciences and arts (we know) are intended for special professional practice: others are taught as subjects for improving the intellect of youth. As specimens of the former variety, we may notice music, medicine, husbandry, navigation, generalship, joinery, ship-building, &c. Now in all these, the guiding and directing elements are computation, mensuration, and statics--the sciences or arts of computing, measuring, weighing. Take away these three--and little would be left worth having, in any of the sciences or arts before named. There would be no exact assignable rules, no definite proportions: everything would be left to vague conjecture, depending upon each artisan's knack and practice which some erroneously call Art. In proportion as each of these professional occupations has in it more or less of computation and mensuration, in the same proportion is it exact and true. There is little of computation or mensuration in music, medicine, husbandry, &c.: there is more of them in joinery and ship-building, which employ the line, plummet, and other instruments: accordingly these latter are more true and exact, less dependent upon knack and conjecture, than the three former.[66] They approach nearer to the purity of science, and include less of the non-scientific, variable, conjectural, elements.

[Footnote 66: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 55-56.]

[Side-note: Arithmetic and Geometry are twofold: As studied by the philosopher and teacher: As applied by the artisan.]

But a farther distinction must here be taken (Sokrates goes on). Even in such practical arts as ship-building, which include most of computation and mensuration--these two latter do not appear pure, but diversified and embodied in a multitude of variable particulars. Arithmetic and geometry, as applied by the ship-builder and other practical men, are very different from arithmetic and geometry as studied and taught by the philosopher.[67] Though called by the same name, they are very different; and the latter alone are pure and true. The philosopher assumes in his arithmetic the exact equality of all units, and in his geometry the exact ratios of lines and spaces: the practical man adds together units very unlike each other--two armies, two bulls, things little or great as the case may be: his measurement too, always falls short of accuracy.[68] There are in short two arithmetics and two geometries[69]--very different from each other, though bearing a common name.

[Footnote 67: Plato, Philêbus, p. 56 D-E. [Greek: A)rithmêtikê\n prô=ton a)=r' ou)k a)/llên me/n tina tê\n tô=n pollô=n phate/on, a)/llên d' au)= tê\n tô=n philosophou/ntôn? . . .

logistikê\ kai\ metrêtikê\ ê( kata\ tektonikê\n kai\ kat' e)mporikê\n tê=s kata\ philosophi/an geômetri/as te kai\ logismô=n katameletôme/nôn--po/teron ô(s mi/a e(kate/ra lekte/on, ê)\ du/o tithô=men?]

Compare Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. i. 7, p. 1098, a. 30.]

[Footnote 68: Plato, Philêbus, p. 56 D-E. [Greek: oi( me\n ga/r pou mona/das a)ni/sous katarithmou=ntai tô=n peri\ a)rithmo/n, oi(=on strato/peda du/o kai\ bou=s du/o kai\ du/o ta\ smikro/tata ê)\ kai\ ta\ pa/ntôn me/gista; oi( d' ou)k a)/n pote au)toi=s sunakolouthê/seian, ei) mê\ mona/da mona/dos e(ka/stês tô=n muri/ôn mêdemi/an a)/llên a)/llês diaphe/rousa/n tis thê/sei.]]

[Footnote 69: Plato, Philêbus, p. 57 D.]

[Side-note: Dialectic is the truest and purest of all Cognitions. Analogy between Cognition and Pleasure: in each, there are gradations of truth and purity.]

We thus make out (continues Sokrates) that there is a difference between one variety and another variety of science or knowledge, analogous to that which we have traced between the varieties of pleasure. One pleasure is true and pure; another is not so, or is inseparably connected with pain and non-pleasurable elements--there being in each case a difference in degree. So too one variety of science, cognition, or art, is more true and pure than another: that is, it is less intermingled with fluctuating particulars and indefinite accompaniments. A science, bearing one and the same name, is different according as it is handled by the practical man or by the philosopher. Only as handled by the philosopher, does science attain purity: dealing with eternal and invariable essences. Among all sciences, Dialectic is the truest and purest, because it takes comprehensive cognizance of the eternal and invariable--_Ens semper Idem_--presiding over those subordinate sciences which bear upon the like matter in partial and separate departments.[70]

[Footnote 70: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 57-58.]

[Side-note: Difference with Gorgias, who claims superiority for Rhetoric. Sokrates admits that Rhetoric is superior in usefulness and celebrity: but he claims superiority for Dialectic, as satisfying the lover of truth.]

Your opinion (remarks Protarchus) does not agree with that of Gorgias. He affirms, that the power of persuasion (Rhetoric) is the greatest and best of all arts: inasmuch as it enables us to carry all our points, not by force, but with the free will and consent of others. I should be glad to avoid contradicting either him or you.

There is no real contradiction between us (replies Sokrates). You may concede to Gorgias that his art or cognition is the greatest and best of all--the most in repute, as well as the most useful to mankind. I do not claim any superiority of _that_ kind, on behalf of my cognition.[71] I claim for it superiority in truth and purity. I remarked before, that a small patch of unmixed white colour was superior in truth and purity to a large mass of white tarnished with other colours--a gentle and unmixed pleasure, in like manner, to one that is more intense but alloyed with pains. It is this superiority that I assert for Dialectic and the other sister cognitions. They are of little positive advantage to mankind: yet they, and only they, will satisfy both the demands of intelligence, and the impulse within us, in so far as we have an impulse to love and strain after truth.[72]

[Footnote 71: Plato, Philêbus, p. 58 B. [Greek: Ou) tou=t' e)/gôge e)zê/toun pô, ti/s te/chnê ê)\ ti/s e)pistê/mê pasô=n diaphe/rei tô=| megi/stê kai\ a)ri/stê kai\ plei=sta ô)phelou=sa ê(ma=s. a)lla\ ti/s pote to\ saphe\s kai\ ta)kribe\s kai\ to\ a)lêthe/staton e)piskopei=, ka)\n ê)=| smikra\ kai\ smikra\ o)ni/nasa. Tou=t' e)sti\n o(\ nu=n dê\ zêtou=men.]]

[Footnote 72: Plato, Philêbus, p. 58 D. [Greek: a)ll' ei)/ tis pe/phuke tê=s psuchê=s ê(mô=n du/namis e)ra=|n te tou= a)lêthou=s kai\ pa/nta e(/neka tou/tou pra/ttein, tau/tên ei)/pômen], &c.]

As far as straining after truth is concerned (says Protarchus), Dialectic and the kindred sciences have an incontestable superiority.

[Side-note: Most men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal manifestations of the Kosmos. They neglect the unchangeable essences, respecting which alone pure truth can be obtained.]

You must see (rejoins Sokrates) that Rhetoric, and most other arts or sciences, employ all their study, and seek all their standard, in opinions alone: while of those who study Nature, the greater number confine their investigations to this Kosmos, to its generation and its phenomenal operations--its manifestations past, present, and future.[73] Now all these manifestations are in perpetual flux, admitting of no true or certain cognition. Pure truth, corresponding to those highest mental endowments, Reason and Intelligence--can be found only in essences, eternal and unchangeable, or in matters most akin to them.[74]

[Footnote 73: Plato, Philêbus, p. 59. [Greek: ei) de\ kai\ peri\ phu/seôs ê(gei=tai/ tis zêtei=n, oi)=sth' o(/ti ta\ peri\ to\n ko/smon to/nde, o(/pê| te ge/gone kai\ o(/pê| pa/schei ti kai\ o(/pê| poiei=, tau=ta zêtei= dia\ bi/ou?]]

[Footnote 74: Plato, Philêbus, p. 59.]

[Side-note: Application. Neither Intelligence nor Pleasure separately, is the Good, but a mixture of the two--Intelligence being the most important. How are they to be mixed?]

We have now (continues Sokrates) examined pleasure separately and intelligence separately. We have agreed that neither of them, apart and by itself, comes up to the conception of Good; the attribute of which is, to be all sufficient, and to give plenary satisfaction, so that any animal possessing it desires nothing besides.[75] We must therefore seek Good in a certain mixture or combination of the two--Pleasure and Intelligence: and we must determine, what sort of combination of these two contains the Good we seek. Now, to mix all pleasures, with all cognitions, at once and indiscriminately, will hardly be safe. We will first mix the truest and purest pleasures (those which include pleasure in its purest form), with the truest or purest cognitions (those which deal altogether with eternal and unchangeable essence, not with fluctuating particulars). Will such a combination suffice to constitute Good, or an all-sufficient and all-satisfactory existence? Or do we want anything more besides?[76] Suppose a man cognizant of the Form or Idea of Justice, and of all other essential Ideas: and able to render account of his cognition, in proper words: Will this be sufficient?[77] Suppose him to be cognizant of the divine Ideas of Circle, Sphere, and other figures; and to employ them in architecture, not knowing anything of human circles and figures as they exist in practical life?[78]

[Footnote 75: Plato, Philêbus, p. 60 C. [Greek: tê\n ta)gathou= diaphe/rein phu/sin tô=|de tô=n a)/llôn . . . ô(=| parei/ê tou=t' a)ei\ tô=n zô/ôn dia\ te/lous pa/ntôs kai\ pa/ntê|, mêdeno\s e(te/rou pote\ e)/ti prosdei=sthai, to\ de\ i(kano\n teleô/taton e)/chein.]]

[Footnote 76: Plato, Philêbus, p. 61 E.]

[Footnote 77: Plato, Philêbus, p. 62 A. [Greek: E)/stô dê/ tis ê(mi=n phronô=n a)/nthrôpos au)tê=s peri\ dikaiosu/nês, o(/, ti e)/sti, kai\ lo/gon e)/chôn e(po/menon tô=| noei=n, kai\ dê\ kai\ peri\ tô=n a)/llôn a(pa/ntôn tô=n o)/ntôn ô(sau/tôs dianoou/menos?]]

[Footnote 78: Plato, Philêbus, p. 62 A. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n ou(=tos i(kanô=s e)pistê/mês e(/xei ku/klou me\n kai\ sphai/ras au)tê=s tê=s thei/as to\n lo/gon e)/chôn, tê\n de\ a)nthrôpi/nên tau/tên sphai=ran kai\ tou\s ku/klous tou/tous a)gnoô=n], &c.]

[Side-note: We must include all Cognitions, not merely the truest, but the others also. Life cannot be carried on without both.]

That would be a ludicrous position indeed (remarks Protarchus), to have his mind full of the divine Ideas or cognitions only.

What! (replies Sokrates) must he have cognition not only of the true line and circle, but also of the false, the variable, the uncertain?

Certainly (says Protarchus), we all must have this farther cognition, if we are to find our way from hence to our own homes.[79]

[Footnote 79: Plato, Philêbus, p. 62 B. [Greek: A)nagkai=on ga/r, ei) me/llei tis ê(mô=n kai\ tê\n o(do\n e(ka/stote e)xeurê/sein oi)/kade.]]

Must we then admit (says Sokrates) those cognitions also in music, which we declared to be full of conjecture and imitation, without any pure truth or certainty?

We must admit them (says Protarchus), if life is to be worth anything at all. No harm can come from admitting all the other cognitions, provided a man possesses the first and most perfect.

[Side-note: But we must include no pleasures except the true, pure, and necessary. The others are not compatible with Cognition or Intelligence--especially the intense sexual pleasures.]

Well then (continues Sokrates), we will admit them all. We have now to consider whether we can in like manner admit all pleasures without distinction. The true and pure must first be let in: next, such as are necessary and indispensable: and all the rest also, if any one can show that there is advantage without mischief in our enjoying every variety of pleasure.[80] We must put the question first to pleasures, next to cognitions--whether they can consent respectively to live in company with each other. Now pleasures will readily consent to the companionship of cognitions: but cognitions (or Reason, upon whom they depend) will not tolerate the companionship of all pleasures indiscriminately. Reason will welcome the true and pure pleasures: she will also accept such as are indispensable, and such as consist with health, and with a sober and virtuous disposition. But Reason will not tolerate those most intense, violent, insane, pleasures, which extinguish correct memory, disturb sound reflection, and consist only with folly and bad conduct. Excluding these violent pleasures, but retaining the others in company with Reason and Truth--we shall secure that perfect and harmonious mixture which makes the nearest approximation to Good.[81]

[Footnote 80: Plato, Philêbus, p. 63 A. [Greek: ei)/per pa/sas ê(dona\s ê(/desthai dia\ bi/ou sumphe/ron te ê(mi=n e)sti\ kai\ a)blabe\s a(/pasi, pa/sas xugkrate/on.]]

[Footnote 81: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 63-64.]

[Side-note: What causes the excellence of this mixture? It is Measure, Proportion, Symmetry. To these Reason is more akin than Pleasure.]

This mixture as Good (continues Sokrates) will be acceptable to all.[82] But what is the cause that it is so? and is that cause more akin to Reason or to Pleasure? The answer is, that this mixture and combination, like every other that is excellent, derives its excellence from Measure and Proportion. Thus the Good becomes merged in the Beautiful: for measure and proportion (Moderation and Symmetry) constitute in every case beauty and excellence.[83] In this case, Truth has been recognised as a third element of the mixture: the three together coalesce into Good, forming a Quasi-Unum, which serves instead of a Real Unum or Idea of Good.[84] We must examine these three elements separately--Truth--Moderation--Symmetry (Measure--Proportion) to find whether each of them is most akin to Reason or to Pleasure. There can be no doubt that to all the three, Reason is more akin than Pleasure: and that the intense pleasures are in strong repugnance and antipathy to all the three.[85]

[Footnote 82: Plato, Philêbus, p. 64 C. [Greek: Ti/ dê=ta e)n tê=| xummi/xei timiô/taton a(/ma kai\ ma/list' ai)/tion ei)=nai do/xeien a)\n ê(mi=n, _tou= pa=si gegone/nai prosphilê=_ tê\n toiau/tên dia/thesin?]]

[Footnote 83: Plato, Philêbus, p. 64 E. [Greek: nu=n dê\ katape/pheugen ê(mi=n ê( ta)gathou= du/namis ei)s tê\n tou= kalou= phu/sin; metrio/tês ga\r kai\ xummetri/a ka/llos dê/pou kai\ a)retê\ pantachou= xumbai/nei gi/gnesthai.]]

[Footnote 84: Plato, Philêbus, p. 64 E-65 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ei) mê\ mia=| duna/metha i)de/a| to\ a)gatho\n thêreu=sai, su\n trisi\ labo/ntes, ka/llei kai\ xummetri/a| kai\ a)lêthei/a|, le/gômen ô(s tou=to oi(=on e(\n o)rtho/tat' a)\n ai)tiasai/meth' a)\n tô=n e)n tê=| xummi/xei, kai\ dia\ tou=to ô(s a)gatho\n o)\n toiau/tên au)tê\n gegone/nai.]]

[Footnote 85: Plato, Philêbus, p. 65 C.]

[Side-note: Quintuple gradation in the Constituents of the Good. 1. Measure. 2. Symmetry. 3. Intelligence. 4. Practical Arts and Right Opinions. 5. True and Pure Pleasures.]

We thus see (says Sokrates in conclusion), in reference to the debate with Philêbus, that Pleasure stands neither first nor second in the scale of approximation to Good. First comes Measure--the Moderate--the Seasonable--and all those eternal Forms and Ideas which are analogous to these.[86] Secondly, come the Symmetrical--the Beautiful--the Perfect--the Sufficient--and other such like Forms and Ideas.[87] Thirdly, come Reason and Intelligence. Fourthly, the various sciences, cognitions, arts, and right opinions--acquirements embodied in the mind itself. Fifthly, those pleasures which we have discriminated as pure pleasures without admixture of pain; belonging to the mind itself but consequent on the sensations of sight, hearing, smell.[88]

[Footnote 86: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 A. [Greek: ô(s ê(donê\ ktê=ma ou)k e)/sti prô=ton ou)d' au)= deu/teron, a)lla\ prô=ton me/n pê| peri\ me/tron kai\ to\ me/trion kai\ kai/rion kai\ pa/nta o(po/sa chrê\ toiau=ta nomi/zein tê\n a)i+/dion ê(|rê=sthai phu/sin.]]

[Footnote 87: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 B. [Greek: deu/teron mê\n peri\ to\ su/mmetron kai\ kalo\n kai\ to\ te/leon kai\ i(kano\n, kai\ pa/nth' o(po/sa tê=s genea=s au)= tau/tês e)sti/n.]]

[Footnote 88: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 C.]

It is not necessary to trace the descending scale farther. It has been shown, against Philêbus--That though neither Intelligence separately, nor Pleasure separately, is an adequate embodiment of Good, which requires both of them conjointly--yet Intelligence is more akin to Good, and stands nearer to it in nature, than Pleasure.

* * * * *

Dionysius of Halikarnassus, while blaming the highflown metaphor and poetry of the Phædrus and other Platonic dialogues, speaks with great admiration of Plato in his appropriate walk of the Sokratic dialogues; and selects specially the Philêbus, as his example of these latter. I confess that this selection surprises me: for the Philêbus, while it explicitly renounces the peculiar Sokratic vein, and becomes didactic--cannot be said to possess high merit as a didactic composition. It is neither clear, nor orderly, nor comparable in animation to the expository books of the Republic.[89] Every commentator of Plato, from Galen downwards, has complained of the obscurity of the Philêbus.

[Footnote 89: Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. ap. Demosth. p. 1025.

Schleiermacher (Einleit. p. 136) admits the comparatively tiresome character and negligent execution of the Philêbus.

Galen had composed a special treatise, [Greek: Peri\ tô=n e)n Philê/bô| metaba/seôn], now lost (Galen, De Libris Propriis, 13, vol. xix. 46, ed. Kühn).

We have the advantage of two recent editions of the Philêbus by excellent English scholars, Dr. Badham and Mr. Poste; both are valuable, and that of Dr. Badham is distinguished by sagacious critical remarks and conjectures, but the obscurity of the original remains incorrigible.]

[Side-note: Remarks. Sokrates does not claim for Good the unity of an Idea, but a quasi-unity of analogy.]

Sokrates concludes his task, in the debate with Protarchus, by describing Bonum or the Supreme Good as a complex aggregate of five distinct elements, in a graduated scale of affinity to it and contributing to its composition in a greater or less degree according to the order in which they are placed. Plato does not intimate that these five complete the catalogue; but that after the fifth degree, the affinity becomes too feeble to deserve notice.[90] According to this view, no Idea of Good, in the strict Platonic sense, is affirmed. Good has not the complete unity of an Idea, but only the quasi-unity of analogy between its diverse elements; which are attached by different threads to the same root, with an order of priority and posteriority.[91]

[Footnote 90: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 C.]

[Footnote 91: Plato, Philêbus, p. 65 A. The passage is cited in note 5, p. 363.

About the difference, recognised partly by Plato but still more insisted on by Aristotle, between [Greek: ta\ lego/mena kath' e(\n (kata\ mi/an i)de/an)] and [Greek: ta\ lego/mena pro\s e(\n (pro\s mi/an tina\ phu/sin)], see my note towards the close of the Lysis, vol. ii. ch. xx.

Aristotle says about Plato (Eth. Nikom. i. 6): [Greek: Oi( de\ komi/santes tê\n do/xan tau/tên, ou)k e)poi/oun i)de/as e)n oi(=s to\ pro/teron kai\ to\ u(/steron e)/legon], &c.]

[Side-note: Discussions of the time about Bonum. Extreme absolute view, maintained by Eukleides: extreme relative by the Xenophontic Sokrates. Plato here blends the two in part; an Eclectic doctrine.]

In the discussions about Bonum, there existed among the contemporaries of Plato a great divergence of opinions. Eukleides of Megara represents the extreme absolute, ontological, or objective view: Sokrates (I mean the historical Sokrates, as reported by Xenophon) enunciated very distinctly the relative or subjective view. "Good (said Eukleides) is the One: the only real, eternal, omnipresent Ens--always the same or like itself--called sometimes Good, sometimes Intelligence, and by various other names: the opposite of Good has no real existence, but only a temporary, phenomenal, relative, existence." On the other hand, the Xenophontic Sokrates affirmed--"The Good and The Beautiful have no objective unity at all; they include a variety of items altogether dissimilar to each other, yet each having reference to some human want or desire: sometimes relieving or preventing pain, sometimes conferring pleasure. That which neither contributes to relieve any pain or want, nor to confer pleasure, is not Good at all."[92] In the Philêbus, Plato borrows in part from both of these points of view, though inclining much more to the first than to the last. He produces a new eclectic doctrine, comprising something from both, and intended to harmonise both; announced as applying at once to Man, to Animals, to Plants, and to the Universe.[93]

[Footnote 92: Diogen. Laert. ii. 106; Cicero, Academic. ii. 42; Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 8, 3-5.]

[Footnote 93: Plato, Philêbus, p. 64 A. [Greek: e)n tau/tê| mathei=n peira=sthai, ti/ _pote e(\n te a)nthrô/pô| kai\ tô=| panti\ pe/phuken a)gatho/n_, kai\ ti/na i)de/an au)tê\n ei)=nai/ pote manteute/on.]

Schleiermacher observes about the Philêbus:--"Dieses also lag ihm (Plato) am Herzen, das Gute zu bestimmen nicht nur für das Leben des Menschen, sondern auch zumal für das ganze Gebiet des gewordenen Seins," &c.

The partial affinity between the Kosmos and the human soul is set forth in the Timæus, pp. 37-43-44.]

[Side-note: Inconvenience of his method, blending Ontology with Ethics.]

Unfortunately, the result has not corresponded to his intentions. If we turn to the close of the dialogue, we find that the principal elements which he assigns as explanatory of Good, and the relation in which they stand to each other, stand as much in need of explanation as Good itself. If we follow the course of the dialogue, we are frequently embarrassed by the language, because he is seeking for phrases applicable at once to the Kosmos and to Man: or because he passes from one to the other, under the assumption of real analogy between them. The extreme generalities of Logic or Ontology, upon which Sokrates here dwells--the Determinant and Indeterminate, the Cause, &c.--do not conduct us to the attainment of Good as he himself defines it--That which is desired by, and will give full satisfaction to, all men, animals, and plants. The fault appears to me to lie in the very scheme of the dialogue. Attempts to discuss Ontology and Ethics in one and the same piece of reasoning, instead of elucidating both, only serve to darken both. Aristotle has already made a similar remark: and it is after reading the Philêbus that we feel most distinctly the value of his comments on Plato in the first book of the Nikomachean Ethics. Aristotle has discussed Ontology in the Metaphysica and in other treatises: but he proclaims explicitly the necessity of discussing Ethics upon their own principles: looking at what is good for man, and what is attainable by man.[94] We find in the Philêbus many just reflections upon pleasure and its varieties: but these might have been better and more clearly established, without any appeal to the cosmical dogmas. The parallelism between Man and the Kosmos is overstrained and inconclusive, like the parallelism in the Republic between the collective commonwealth and the individual citizen.

[Footnote 94: See especially Ethic. Nikom. i. 4, 1096-1097. Aristotle reasons there directly against the Platonic [Greek: i)de/a a)gathou=], but his arguments have full application to the exposition in the Philêbus. He distinguishes pointedly the ethical from the physical point of view. In his discussion of friendship, after touching upon various comparisons of the physiological poets, and of Plato himself repeating them, he says:--[Greek: ta\ me\n ou)=n phusika\ tô=n a)porêma/tôn paraphei/sthô; ou) ga\r oi)kei=a tê=s parou/sês ske/pseôs; o(/sa d' e)sti\n a)nthrôpika/ kai\ a)nê/kei ei)s ta\ ê)/thê kai\ ta\ pa/thê, tau=t' e)piskepsô/metha], Ethic. Nikom. viii. 1, 1155, b. 10.

The like contrast is brought out (though less clearly) in the Eudemian Ethics, viii. 1. 1235, a. 30.

He animadverts upon Plato on the same ground in the Ethica Magna, i. 1, 1182, a. 23-30. [Greek: u(pe\r ga\r tô=n o)/ntôn kai\ a)lêthei/as le/gonta, ou)k e)/dei u(pe\r a)retê=s phra/zein; ou)de\n ga\r tou/tô| ka)kei/nô| koino/n.]]

[Side-note: Comparison of Man to the Kosmos, which has reason, but no emotion, is unnecessary and confusing.]

Moreover, when Plato, to prove the conclusion that Intelligence and Reason are the governing attributes of man's mind, enunciates as his premiss that Intelligence and Reason are the governing attributes in the Kosmos[95]--the premiss introduced is more debateable than the conclusion; and would (as he himself intimates) be contested by those against whose opposition he was arguing. In fact, the same proposition (That Reason and Intelligence are the dominant and controlling attributes of man, Passion and Appetite the subordinate) is assumed without any proof by Sokrates, both in the Protagoras and in the Republic. The Kosmos (in Plato's view) has reason and intelligence, but experiences no emotion either painful or pleasurable: the rational nature of man is thus common to him with the Kosmos, his emotional nature is not so. That the mind of each individual man was an emanation from the all-pervading mind of the Kosmos or universe, and his body a fragmentary portion of the four elements composing the cosmical body--these are propositions which had been laid down by Sokrates, as well as by Philolaus and other Pythagoreans (perhaps by Pythagoras himself) before the time of Plato.[96] Not only that doctrine, but also the analysis of the Kosmos into certain abstract constituent _principia_--(the Finient or Determinant--and the Infinite or Indeterminate)--this too seems to have been borrowed by Plato from Philolaus.[97]

[Footnote 95: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 20-30.]

[Footnote 96: Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 11, 27: De Senectute, 21, 78; Xenophon, Memor. i. 4, 7-8; Cicero, Nat. Deor. ii. 6, 18; Plato, Timæus, pp. 37-38, &c.

In the Xenophontic dialogue here referred to, Sokrates inverts the premiss and the conclusion: he infers that Mind and Reason govern the Kosmos, because the mind and reason of man govern the body of man.]

[Footnote 97: See Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Philêb. pp. 41-42.]

[Side-note: Plato borrows from the Pythagoreans, but enlarges their doctrine. Importance of his views in dwelling upon systematic classification.]

But here in the Philêbus, that analysis appears expanded into a larger scheme going beyond Philolaus or the Pythagoreans: _viz._ the recognition of a graduated scale of limits, or a definite number of species and sub-species--intermediate between the One or Highest Genus, and the Infinite Many or Individuals--and descending by successive stages of limitation from the Highest to the Lowest. What is thus described, is the general framework of systematic logical classification, deliberately contrived, and founded upon known attributes, common as well as differential. It is prescribed as essential to all real cognition; if we conceive only the highest Genus or generic name as comprehending an infinity of diverse particulars, we have no real cognition, until we can assign the intermediate stages of specification by which we descend from one to the other.[98] The step here made by Plato, under the stimulus of the Sokratic dialectic, from the Pythagorean doctrine of Finient and Infinite to the idea of gradual, systematic, logical division and subdivision, is one very important in the history of science. He lays as much stress upon the searching out of the intermediate species, as Bacon does upon the Axiomata Media of scientific enquiry.[99]

[Footnote 98: Ueberweg (Æchtheit und Zeitf. Platon. Schriften, pp. 204-207) considers the Philêbus, as well as the Sophistês and Timæus, to be compositions of Plato's very late age--partly on the ground of their didactic and expository style, the dialogue serving only as form to the exponent Sokrates--partly because he thinks that the nearest approach is made in them to that manner of conceiving the doctrine of Ideas which Aristotle ascribes to Plato in his old age--that is, the two [Greek: stoichei=a] or factors of the Ideas. 1. [Greek: To\ e(\n]. 2. [Greek: To\ me/ga kai\ mikro/n]. This last argument seems to me far-fetched. I see no real and sensible approach in the Philêbus to this Platonic doctrine of the [Greek: stoichei=a] of the Ideas: at least, the approach is so vague, that one can hardly make it a basis of reasoning. But the didactic tone is undoubtedly a characteristic of the Philêbus, and seems to indicate that the dialogue was composed after Plato had been so long established in his school, as to have acquired a pedagogic ostentation.]

[Footnote 99: Bacon, Augment. Scient. v. 2. Nov. Organ. Aph. 105. "At Plato non semel innuit particularia infinita esse maximé: rursus generalia minus certa documenta exhibere. Medullam igitur scientiarum, quâ artifex ab imperito distinguitur, in mediis propositionibus consistere, quas per singulas scientias tradidit et docuit experientia."]

[Side-note: Classification broadly enunciated, and strongly recommended--yet feebly applied--in this dialogue.]

Though there are several other passages of the Platonic dialogues in which the method of logical division is inculcated, there is none (I think) in which it is prescribed so formally, or enunciated with such comprehensive generality, as this before us in the Philêbus. Yet the method, after being emphatically announced, is but feebly and partially applied, in the distinction of different species, both of pleasure and of cognition.[100] The announcement would come more suitably, as a preface to the Sophistês and Politikus: wherein the process is applied to given subjects in great detail, and at a length which some critics consider excessive: and wherein moreover the particular enquiry is expressly proclaimed as intended to teach as well as to exemplify the general method.[101]

[Footnote 100: The purpose of discriminating the different sorts of pleasure is intimated, yet seemingly not considered as indispensable, by Sokrates; and it is executed certainly in a very unsystematic and perfunctory manner, compared with what we read in the Sophistês and Politikus. (Philêbus, pp. 19 B, 20 C, 32 B-C.)

Mr. Poste, in his note on p. 55 A, expresses surprise at this point; and notices it as one among other grounds for suspecting that the Philêbus is a composition of two distinct fragments, rather carelessly soldered together:--"Again after Division and Generalization have been propounded as the only satisfactory method, it is somewhat strange that both the original problems are solved by ordinary Dialectic without any recourse to classification. All this becomes intelligible if we assume the Philêbus to have arisen from a boldly executed junction of two originally separate dialogues."

Acknowledging the want of coherence in the dialogue, I have difficulty in conceiving what the two fragments could have been, out of which it was compounded. Schleiermacher (Einleit. pp. 136-137) also points out the negligent execution and heavy march of the dialogue.]

[Footnote 101: See Politikus, pp. 285-286; Phædrus, p. 265; Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5, 12.

I have already observed that Socher (Ueber Platon. pp. 260-270) and Stallbaum (Proleg. ad Politik. pp. 52-54-65-67, &c.) agree in condemning the extreme minuteness, the tiresome monotony, the useless and petty comparisons, which Plato brings together in the multiplied bifurcate divisions of the Sophistês and Politikus. Socher adduces this as one among his reasons for rejecting the dialogue as spurious.]

[Side-note: What is the Good? Discussed both in Philêbus and in Republic. Comparison.]

The same question as that which is here discussed in the Philêbus, is also started in the sixth book of the Republic. It is worth while to compare the different handling, here and there. "Whatever else we possess (says Sokrates in the Republic), and whatever else we may know is of no value, unless we also possess and know Good. In the opinion of most persons, Pleasure is The Good: in the opinion of accomplished and philosophical men, intelligence ([Greek: phro/nêsis]) is the Good. But when we ask Intelligence, _of what_? these philosophers cannot inform us: they end by telling us, ridiculously enough, Intelligence of _The Good_. Thus, while blaming us for not knowing what The Good is, they make an answer which implies that we do already know it: in saying, Intelligence of the Good, they of course presume that we know what they mean by the word. Then again, those who pronounce Pleasure to be the Good, are not less involved in error; since they are forced to admit that some Pleasures are Evil; thus making Good and Evil to be the same. It is plain therefore that there are many and grave disputes what The Good is."[102]

[Footnote 102: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 B-C. [Greek: oi( tou=to ê(gu/menoi ou)k e)/chousi dei=xai ê(/ _tis phro/nêsis, a)ll'_ a)nagka/zontai teleutô=ntes tê\n tou= a)gathou= pha/nai . . . o)neidi/zonte/s ge o(/ti ou)k i)/smen to\ a)gatho/n, le/gousi pa/lin ô(s ei)do/si; phro/nêsin ga\r au)to/ phasin ei)=nai a)gathou=, ô(s au)= sunie/ntôn ê(mô=n o(/, ti le/gousin, e)peida\n to\ tou= a)gathou= phthe/gxôntai o)/noma.]

In the Symposion, there is a like tenor of questions about Eros or Love. Love must be Love of something: the term is relative. You confound Love with the object loved. See Plato, Symposion, pp. 199 C, 204 C.

When we read the objection here advanced by Plato (in the above passage of the Republic) as conclusive against the appeal to [Greek: phro/nêsis] absolutely (without specifying [Greek: phro/nêsis] _of what_), we are surprised to see that it is not even mentioned in the Philêbus.]

[Side-note: Mistake of talking about Bonum confidently, as if it were known, while it is subject of constant dispute. Plato himself wavers about it; gives different explanations, and sometimes professes ignorance, sometimes talks about it confidently.]

In this passage of the Republic Plato points out that Intelligence cannot be understood, except as determined by or referring to some Object or End: and that those who tendered Intelligence _per se_ for an explanation of The Good (as Sokrates does in the Philêbus), assumed as known the very point in dispute which they professed to explain. This is an important remark in regard to ethical discussions: and it were to be wished that Plato had himself avoided the mistake which he here blames in others. The Platonic Sokrates frequently tells us that he does not know what Good is. In the sixth Book of the Republic, having come to a point where his argument required him to furnish a positive explanation of it, he expressly declines the obligation and makes his escape amidst the clouds of metaphor.[103] In the Protagoras, he pronounces Good to be identical with pleasure and avoidance of pain, in the largest sense and under the supervision of calculating Intelligence.[104] In the second Book of the Republic, we find what is substantially the same explanation as that of the Protagoras, given (though in a more enlarged and analytical manner) by Glaukon and assented to by Sokrates; to the effect that Good is tripartite,[105] _viz._: 1. That which we desire for itself, without any reference to consequences--_e. g._, enjoyment and the innocuous pleasures. 2. That which we desire on a double account, both for itself and by reason of its consequences--_e. g._, good health, eyesight, intelligence, &c. 3. That which we do not desire, perhaps even shun, for itself: but which we desire, or at least accept, by reason of its consequences--such as gymnastics, medical treatment, discipline, &c. Again, in the Gorgias and elsewhere, Plato seems to confine the definition of Good to the two last of these three heads, rejecting the first: for he distinguishes pointedly the Good from the Pleasurable. Yet while thus wavering in his conception of the term, Plato often admits it into the discussions as if it were not merely familiar, but clear and well-understood by every one.

[Footnote 103: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 E.

Compare also Republic, vii. p. 533 C. [Greek: ô)=| ga\r a)rchê\ me\n o(\ mê\ oi)=de, teleutê\ de\ kai\ ta\ metaxu\ e)x ou)= mê\ oi)=de sumpe/plektai, ti/s mêchanê\ tê\n toiau=tên o(mologi/an pote\ e)pistê/mên gi/gnesthai?]]

[Footnote 104: Plato, Protagoras, pp. 356-7.]

[Footnote 105: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 357 B.]

[Side-note: Plato lays down tests by which Bonum may be determined: but the answer in the Philêbus does not satisfy those tests.]

In the present dialogue, Plato lays down certain characteristic marks whereby The Supreme Good may be known. These marks are subjective--relative to the feelings and appreciation of sentient beings--to all mankind, and even to animals and plants. Good is explicitly defined by the property of conferring happiness. The Good is declared to be "that habit and disposition of mind which has power to confer on all men a happy life":[106] it is perfect and all sufficient: every creature that knows Good, desires and hunts after it, demanding nothing farther when it is attained, and caring for nothing else except what is attained along with it:[107] it is the object of choice for all plants and animals, and if any one prefers any thing else, he only does so through ignorance or from some untoward necessity:[108] it is most delightful and agreeable to all.[109] This is what Plato tells us as to the characteristic attributes of Good. And the test which Sokrates applies, to determine whether Pleasure does or does not correspond with these attributes, is an appeal to individual choice or judgment. "Would you choose? Would _any one_ be satisfied?" Though this appeal ought by the conditions of the problem to be made to mankind generally, and is actually made to Protarchus as one specimen of them--yet Sokrates says at the end of the dialogue that all except philosophers choose wrong, being too ignorant or misguided to choose aright. Now it is certain that what these philosophers choose, will not satisfy the aspirations of all other persons besides. It may be Good, in reference to the philosophers themselves: but it will fail to answer those larger conditions which Plato has just laid down.

[Footnote 106: Plato, Philêbus, p. 11 E.]

[Footnote 107: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 20 D-E, 61 C, 67 A. [Greek: au)tarkei/a], &c.

Sydenham, Translation of Philêbus, note, p. 48, observes--"Whether Happiness be to be found in Speculative Wisdom or in Pleasure, or in some other possession or enjoyment, it can be seated nowhere but in the soul. For Happiness has no existence anywhere but where it is felt and known. Now, it is no less certain, that only the soul is sensible of pain and pleasure, than it is, that only the soul is capable of knowledge, and of thinking either foolishly or wisely."]

[Footnote 108: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 22 B, 61 A.]

[Footnote 109: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 61 E, 64 C. [Greek: to\n a)gapêto/taton bi/on pa=si prosphilê=].

Aristotle, Ethic. Nikomach. i. init. [Greek: ta)gatho/n, ou)= pa/nta e)phi/etai].

Seneca, Epistol. 118. "Bonum est quod ad se impetum animi secundum naturam movet."]

[Side-note: Inconsistency of Plato in his way of putting the question--The alternative which he tenders has no fair application.]

In submitting the question to individual choice, Plato does not keep clear either of confusion or of contradiction. If this Summum Bonum be understood as the End comprising the full satisfaction of human wishes and imaginations, without limitation by certain given actualities--and if the option be tendered to a man already furnished with his share of the various desires generated in actual life--such a man will naturally demand entire absence of all pains, with pleasures such as to satisfy all his various desires: not merely the most intense pleasures (which Plato intends to prove, not to be pleasures at all), but other pleasures also. He will wish (if you thus suppose him master of Fortunatus's wishing-cap) to include in his enjoyments pleasures which do not usually go together, and which may even, in the real conditions of life, exclude one another: no boundary being prescribed to his wishing power. He will wish for the pleasures of knowledge or intelligence, of self-esteem, esteem from others, sympathy, &c., as well as for those of sense. He will put in his claim for pleasures, without any of those antecedent means and conditions which, in real life, are necessary to procure them. Such being the state of the question, the alternative tendered by Plato--Pleasure, versus Intelligence or Knowledge--has no fair application. Plato himself expressly states that pleasure, though generically One, is specifically multiform, and has many varieties different from, even opposite to, each other: among which varieties one is, the pleasure of knowledge or intelligence itself.[110] The person to whom the question is submitted, has a right to claim these pleasures of knowledge among the rest, as portions of his Summum Bonum. And when Plato proceeds to ask--Will you be satisfied to possess pleasure only, without the least spark of intelligence, without memory, without eyesight?--he departs from the import of his previous question, and withdraws from the sum total of pleasure many of its most important items: since we must of course understand that the pleasures of intelligence will disappear along with intelligence itself,[111] and that the pains of conscious want of intelligence will be felt instead of them.

[Footnote 110: Plato, Philêbus, p. 12 D.]

[Footnote 111: Plato, Philêbus, p. 21 C.]

[Side-note: Intelligence and Pleasure cannot be fairly compared--Pleasure is an End, Intelligence a Means. Nothing can be compared with Pleasure, except some other End.]