Chapter XXXI: Kratylus (1)

The dialogue entitled Kratylus presents numerous difficulties to the commentators: who differ greatly in their manner of explaining, First, What is its main or leading purpose? Next, How much of it is intended as serious reasoning, how much as mere caricature or parody, for the purpose of exposing and reducing to absurdity the doctrines of opponents? Lastly, who, if any, are the opponents thus intended to be ridiculed?

[Side-note: Persons and subjects of the dialogue Kratylus--Sokrates has no formed opinion, but is only a Searcher with the others.]

The subject proposed for discussion is, the rectitude or inherent propriety of names. How far is there any natural adaptation, or special fitness, of each name to the thing named? Two disputants are introduced who invoke Sokrates as umpire. Hermogenes asserts the negative of the question; contending that each name is destitute of natural significance, and acquires its meaning only from the mutual agreement and habitual usage of society.[1] Kratylus on the contrary maintains the doctrine that each name has a natural rectitude or fitness for its own significant function:--that there is an inherent bond of connection, a fundamental analogy or resemblance between each name and the thing signified. Sokrates carries on the first part of the dialogue with Hermogenes, the last part with Kratylus.[2] He declares more than once, that the subject is one on which he is ignorant, and has formed no conclusion: he professes only to prosecute the search for a good conclusion, conjointly with his two companions.[3]

[Footnote 1: In the arguments put into the mouth of Hermogenes, he is made to maintain two opinions which are not identical, but opposed. 1. That names are significant by habit and convention, and not by nature. 2. That each man may and can give any name which he pleases to any object (pp. 384-385).

The first of these two opinions is that which is really discussed here: impugned in the first half of the dialogue, conceded in the second. It is implied that names are to serve the purpose of mutual communication and information among persons living in society; which purpose they would not serve if each individual gave a different name to the same object. The second opinion is therefore not a consequence of the first, but an implied contradiction of the first.

He who says that the names Horse and Dog are significant by convention, will admit that at the outset they might have been inverted in point of signification; but he will not say that any individual may invert them at pleasure, now that they are established. The purposes of naming would no longer be answered, if this were done.]

[Footnote 2: The question between Hermogenes and Kratylus was much debated among the philosophers and literary men throughout antiquity (Aul. Gell. x. 4). Origen says (contra Celsum, i. c. 24)--[Greek: lo/gos bathu\s kai\ a)po/r)r(êtos o( peri\ phu/seôs o)noma/tôn, po/teron, ô(s oi)/etai A)ristote/lês, the/sei ei)=nai ta\ o)no/mata, ê)\, ô(s nomi/zousin oi( a)po\ tê=s Stoa=s, phu/sei.]

Aristotle assumes the question in favour of [Greek: the/sei], in his treatise De Interpretatione, without any reasoning, against the Platonic Kratylus; but his commentators, Ammonius and Boethius, note the controversy as one upon which eminent men in antiquity were much divided.

Plato connects his opinion, that names have a natural rectitude of signification, with his general doctrine of self-existent, archetypal, Forms or Ideas. The Stoics, and others who defended the same opinion afterwards, seem to have disconnected it from this latter doctrine.]

[Footnote 3: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 384 C, 391 A.]

[Side-note: Argument of Sokrates against Hermogenes--all proceedings of nature are conducted according to fixed laws--speaking and naming among the rest.]

Sokrates, refuting Hermogenes, lays down the following doctrines.[4] If propositions are either true or false, names, which are parts of propositions, must be true or false also.[5] Every thing has its own fixed and determinate essence, not relative to us nor varying according to our fancy or pleasure, but existing _per se_ as nature has arranged.[6] All agencies either by one thing upon other things, or by other things upon it, are in like manner determined by nature, independent of our will and choice. If we intend to cut or burn any substance, we must go to work, not according to our own pleasure, but in the manner that nature prescribes: by attempting to do it contrary to nature, we shall do it badly or fail altogether.[7] Now _speaking_ is one of these agencies, and _naming_ is a branch of _speaking_: what is true of other agencies is true of these also--we must name things, not according to our own will and pleasure, but in the way that nature prescribes that they shall be named.[8] Farther, each agency must be performed by its appropriate instrument: cutting by the axe, boring by the gimlet, weaving by the bodkin. The name is the instrument of naming, whereby we communicate information and distinguish things from each other. It is a didactic instrument: to be employed well, it must be in the hands of a properly qualified person for the purpose of teaching.[9] Not every man, but only the professional craftsman, is competent to fabricate the instruments of cutting and weaving. In like manner, not every man is competent to make a name: no one is competent except the lawgiver or the gifted name-maker, the rarest of all existing artists.[10]

[Footnote 4: Aristot. De Interpretat. ii. 1-2: [Greek: O)/noma me\n ou)=n e)sti\ phônê\ sêmantikê\ kata\ sunthê/kên a)/neu chro/nou . . . to\ de\ kata\ sunthê/kên, o(/ti phu/sei tô=n o)noma/tôn ou)de/n e)stin], &c.

This is the same doctrine which Plato puts into the mouth of Hermogenes (Kratylus, p. 384 E), and which Sokrates himself, in the latter half of the dialogue, admits as true to a large extent: that is, he admits that names are significant [Greek: kata\ sunthê/kên], though he does not deny that they are or may be significant [Greek: phu/sei].

[Greek: To\ a)po\ tau)toma/tou] (p. 397 A) is another phrase for expressing the opinion opposed to [Greek: o)noma/tôn o)rtho/tês].]

[Footnote 5: Plato, Kratyl. p. 385.

Here too, Aristotle affirms the contrary: he says (with far more exactness than Plato) that propositions alone are true or false; and that a name taken by itself is neither. (De Interpret. i. 2.)

The mistake of Plato in affirming Names to be true or false, is analogous to that which we read in the Philêbus, where Pleasures are distinguished as true and false.]

[Footnote 6: Plato, Kratyl. p. 386 D. [Greek: dê=lon dê\ o(/ti au)ta\ au(tô=n ou)si/an e)/chonta/ tina be/baio/n e)sti ta\ pra/gmata, ou) pro\s ê(ma=s ou)de\ u(ph' ê(mô=n, e)lko/mena a)/nô kai\ ka/tô tô=| ê(mete/rô| phanta/smati, a)lla\ kath' au(ta\ pro\s tê\n au(tôn ou)si/an e)/chonta ê(=|per pe/phuken.]]

[Footnote 7: Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 A.]

[Footnote 8: Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 C. [Greek: Ou)kou=n kai\ to\ o)noma/zein pra=xis ti/s e)stin, ei)/per kai\ to\ le/gein pra=xis tis ê)=n peri\ ta\ pra/gmata? . . . Ai( de\ pra/xeis e)pha/nêsan ê(mi=n ou) pro\s ê(ma=s ou)=sai, a)ll' au(tô=n tina i)di/an phu/sin e)/chousai? . . . Ou)kou=n kai\ o)nomaste/on ê(=| pe/phuke ta\ pra/gmata o)noma/zein te kai\ o)noma/zesthai, kai\ ô(=|, a)ll' ou)ch ê(=| a)\n ê(mei=s boulêthô=men, ei)/per ti toi=s e)/mprosthen me/llei o(mologou/menon ei)=nai? kai\ ou(/tô me\n a)\n ple/on ti poioi=men kai\ o)noma/zoimen, a)/llôs de\ ou)/?]

Speaking and naming are regarded by Plato as acts whereby the thing (spoken of or) named is acted upon or suffers. So in the Sophistês (p. 248) he considers Knowing as an act performed, whereby the thing known suffers. Deuschle (Die Platonische Sprach-philosophie, p. 59, Marpurg. 1859) treats this comparison made by Plato between naming and material agencies, as if it were mere banter--and even indifferent banter. Schleiermacher in his note thinks it seriously meant and Platonic; and I fully agree with him (Schl. p. 456).]

[Footnote 9: Plato, Kratyl. p. 388 C. [Greek: O)/noma a)/ra didaskaliko/n ti/ e)stin o)/rganon, kai\ diakritiko\n tê=s ou)si/as, ô(/sper kerki\s u(pha/smatos.] See Boethius ap. Schol. ad Aristot. Interp. p. 108, a. 40. Aristotle (De Interpr. iv. 3) says: [Greek: e)/sti de\ lo/gos a(/pas me\n sêmantiko/s, ou)ch ô(s o)/rganon de/, a)lla\ kata\ sunthê/kên.] Several even of the Platonic critics consider Plato's choice of the metaphor [Greek: o)/rganon] as inappropriate: but modern writers on logic and psychology often speak of names as "_instruments_ of thought".]

[Footnote 10: Plato, Kratyl. p. 389 A. [Greek: o( nomothe/tês, o(\s dê\ tô=n dêmiourgô=n spaniô/tatos e)n a)nthrô=pois gi/gnetai.]]

[Side-note: The name is a didactic instrument; fabricated by the law-giver upon the type of the Name-Form, and employed as well as appreciated, by the philosopher.]

To what does the lawgiver look when he frames a name? Compare the analogy of other instruments. The artisan who constructs a bodkin or shuttle for weaving, has present to his mind as a model, the Idea or Form of the bodkin--the self-existent bodkin of Nature herself. If a broken shuttle is to be replaced, it is this Idea or type, not the actual broken instrument, which he seeks to copy. Whatever may be the variety of web for which the shuttle is destined, he modifies the new instrument accordingly: but all of them must embody the Form or Idea of the shuttle. He cannot choose another type according to his own pleasure: he must embody the type, prescribed by nature, in the iron, wood, or other material of which the instrument is made.[11]

[Footnote 11: Plato, Kratyl. p. 389 B-C. [Greek: au)to\ o( e)/sti kerki/s . . . pa/sas me\n dei= to\ tê=s kerki/dos e)/chein ei)=dos . . . ou)ch oi(=on a)\n au)to\s boulê/thê, a)ll' oi(=on e)pephu/kei.]]

So about names: the lawgiver, in distributing names, must look to the Idea, Form, or type--the self-existent name of Nature--and must embody this type, as it stands for each different thing, in appropriate syllables. The syllables indeed may admit of great variety, just as the material of which the shuttle is made may be diversified: but each aggregate of syllables, whether Hellenic or barbaric, must embody the essential Name-Idea or Type.[12] The lawgiver[13] ought to know, enumerate, and classify all the sorts of things on the one hand, and all the varieties of letters or elements of language on the other; distinguishing the special significative power belonging to each letter. He ought then to construct his words, and adapt each to signify that with which it is naturally connected. Who is to judge whether this process has been well or ill performed? Upon that point, the judge is, the professional man who uses the instrument. It is for the working weaver to decide whether the shuttle given to him is well or ill made. To have a good ship and rudder, it must be made by a professional builder, and appreciated by a professional pilot or steersman. In like manner, the names constructed by the lawgiver must be appreciated by the man who is qualified by training or study to use names skilfully: that is, by the dialectician or philosopher, competent to ask and answer questions.[14]

[Footnote 12: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 389 D, 390 A. [Greek: to\ e(ka/stô| phu/sei pephuko\s o)/noma to\n nomothe/tên e)kei=non ei)s tou\s phtho/ggous kai\ ta\s sullaba\s dei= e)pi/stasthai tithe/nai, kai\ ble/ponta _pro\s au)to\ e)kei=no o(\ e)/stin o)/noma_, pa/nta ta\ o)no/mata poiei=n te kai\ ti/thesthai, _ei) me/llei ku/rios ei)=nai o)noma/tôn the/tês_. . . .

Ou(/tôs a)xiô/seis kai\ to\n nomothe/tên to/n te e)ntha/de kai\ to\n e)n toi=s barba/rois, e(/ôs a)\n to\ _tou= o)no/matos ei)=dos_ a)podidô=| _to\ prosê=kon e(ka/stô| e)n o(poiaisou=n sullabai=s_, ou)de\n chei/rô nomothe/tên ei)=nai to\n e)ntha/de ê)\ to\n o(pouou=n a)/llothi?]]

[Footnote 13: Plato, Kratyl. p. 424 D-E.]

[Footnote 14: Plato, Kratyl. p. 390 C.]

[Side-note: Names have an intrinsic aptitude for signifying one thing and not another.]

It is the fact then, though many persons may think it ridiculous, that names--or the elementary constituents and letters, of which names are composed--have each an intrinsic and distinctive aptitude, fitting them to signify particular things.[15] Names have thus a standard with reference to which they are correct or incorrect. If they are to be correct, they cannot be given either by the freewill of an ordinary individual, or even by the convention of all society. They can be affixed only by the skilled lawgiver, and appreciated only by the skilled dialectician.

[Footnote 15: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 425-426.]

[Side-note: Forms of Names, as well as Forms of things nameable--essence of the Nomen, to signify the Essence of its Nominatum.]

Such is the theory here laid down by Sokrates respecting Names. It is curious as illustrating the Platonic vein of speculation. It enlarges to an extreme point Plato's region of the absolute and objective. Not merely each thing named, but each name also, is in his view an Ens absolutum; not dependent upon human choice--not even relative (so he alleges) to human apprehension. Each name has its own self-existent Idea, Form, or Type, the reproduction or copy of which is imperative. The Platonic intelligible world included Ideas of things, and of names correlative to them: just as it included Ideas of master and slave correlative to each other. It contained Noumena of names, as well as Noumena of things.[16] The essence of the name was, to be significant of the essence of the thing named: though such significance admitted of diversity, multiplication, or curtailment, in the letters or syllables wherein it was embodied.[17] The name became significant, by imitation or resemblance: that name was right, the essence of which imitated the essence of the thing named.[18] The vocal mimic imitates sounds, the painter imitates the colours: the name-giver imitates in letters or syllables, the essence of colours, sounds, and every thing else which is nameable.

[Footnote 16: Plato, Parmenid. p. 133 E.]

[Footnote 17: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 393 D, 432.]

[Footnote 18: Plato, Kratyl. p. 422 D. [Greek: tô=n o)noma/tôn ê( o)rtho/tês toiau/tê tis e)bou/leto ei)=nai, oi(=a dêlou=n oi(=on e(/kasto/n e)sti tô=n o)/ntôn.]--423 D: [Greek: ou) kai\ _ou)si/a dokei=_ soi ei)=nai e(ka/stô|, ô(/sper kai\ chrô=ma kai\ a(\ nu=n dê\ e)le/gomen? prô=ton au)tô=| tô=| chrô/mati kai\ tê=| phônê=| ou)k e)/stin ou)si/a tis e(kate/rô| au)tô=n kai\ toi=s a)/llois pa=sin, _o(/sa êxi/ôtai tau/tês tê=s prosrê/seôs tou= ei)=nai?_ . . . Ti/ ou)=n?** ei)/ tis au)to\ tou=to mimei=sthai du/naito, e(ka/stou** tê\n ou)si/an, gra/mmasi/ te kai\ sullabai=s, a)=r' ou)k a)\n dêloi= e(/kaston o(\ e)/stin?] Compare p. 433.

The story given by Herodotus (ii. 2) about the experiment made by the Egyptian king Psammetichus, is curious. He wished to find out whether the Egyptians or the Phrygians were the oldest or first of mankind: he accordingly caused two children to be brought up without having a word spoken to them, with a view to ascertain what language they would come to by nature. At the age of two years they uttered the Phrygian word signifying _bread_. Psammetichus was then satisfied that the Phrygians were the first of mankind.

This story undoubtedly proceeds upon the assumption that there is one name which naturally suggests itself for each object. But when M. Renan says that the assumption is the same "as Plato has developed with so much subtlety in the Kratylus," I do not agree with him. The Absolute Name-Form or Essence, discernible only by the technical Lawgiver, is something very different. See M. Renan, De l'Origine du Langage, ch. vi. p. 146, 2nd ed.]

Another point here is peculiar to Plato. The Name-Giver must provide names such as can be used with effect by the dialectician or philosopher: who is the sole competent judge whether the names have genuine rectitude or not.[19] We see from hence that the aspirations of Plato went towards a philosophical language fit for those who conversed with forms or essences: something like (to use modern illustrations) a technical nomenclature systematically constructed for the expositions of men of science: such as that of Chemistry, Botany, Mineralogy, &c. Assuredly no language actually spoken among men, has ever been found suitable for this purpose without much artificial help.[20]

[Footnote 19: Plato, Kratyl. p. 390 D. Respecting the person called [Greek: o( dialektiko/s], whom Plato describes as grasping Ideas, or Forms, Essences, and employing nothing else in his reasoning--[Greek: lo/gon didou\s kai\ lamba/nôn tê=s ou)si/as]--see Republic, vi. p. 511 B, vii. pp. 533-534-537 C.]

[Footnote 20: Plato, Kratyl. p. 426 A. [Greek: o( peri\ o)noma/tôn techniko/s], &c.]

[Side-note: Exclusive competence of a privileged lawgiver, to discern these essences, and to apportion names rightly.]

As this theory of naming is a deduction from Plato's main doctrine of absolute or self-existing Ideas, so it also illustrates (to repeat what was said in the last chapter) his recognition of professional skill and of competence vested exclusively in a gifted One or Few: which he ranks as the sole producing cause of Good or the Best, setting it in contrast with those two causes which he considers as productive of Evil, or at any rate of the Inferior or Second-Best: 1. The One or Few, who are ungifted and unphilosophical: perhaps ambitious pretenders. 2. The spontaneous, unbespoken inspirations, conventions, customs, or habits, which grow up without formal mandate among the community. To find the right name of each thing, is no light matter, nor within the competence of any one or many ordinary men. It can only be done by one of the few privileged lawgivers. Plato even glances at the necessity of a superhuman name-giver: though he deprecates the supposition generally, as a mere evasion or subterfuge, introduced to escape the confession of real ignorance.[21]

[Footnote 21: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 397, 425, 438.]

[Side-note: Counter-Theory, which Sokrates here sets forth and impugns--the Protagorean doctrine--Homo Mensura.]

In laying down the basis of his theory respecting names, Plato states another doctrine as opposed to it: _viz._, the Protagorean doctrine--Man is the Measure of all things. I have already said something about this doctrine, in reviewing the Theætêtus, where Plato impugns it: but as he here impugns it again, by arguments in part different--a few words more will not be misplaced.

The doctrine of Protagoras maintains that all things are relative to the percipient, cogitant, concipient, mind: that all Object is implicated with a Subject: that as things appear to me, so they are to me--as they appear to you, so they are to you. Plato denies this, and says: "All things have a fixed essence of their own, absolutely and in themselves, not relative to any percipient or cogitant--nor dependent upon any one's appreciative understanding, or emotional susceptibility, or will. Things are so and so, without reference to us as sentient or cogitant beings: and not only the things are thus independent and absolute, but all their agencies are so likewise--agencies either by them or upon them. Cutting, burning, speaking, naming, &c., must be performed in a certain determinate way, whether we prefer it or not. A certain Name belongs, by Nature or absolutely, to a certain thing, whether we choose it or not: it is not relative to any adoption by us, either individually or collectively."

This Protagorean theory is here set forth by the Platonic Sokrates as the antithesis or counter-theory, to that which he is himself advancing, _viz._--That Names are significant by nature and not by agreement of men:--That each Nomen is tied to its Nominatum by a natural and indissoluble bond. His remarks imply, that those who do not accept this last-mentioned theory must agree with Protagoras. But such an antithesis is noway necessary: since (not to speak of Hermogenes himself in this very dialogue) we find also that Aristotle--who maintains that Names are significant by convention and not by nature--dissents also from the theory of Protagoras: and would have rested his dissent from it on very different grounds.

[Side-note: Objection by Sokrates--That Protagoras puts all men on a level as to wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance.]

This will show us--what I have already remarked in commenting on the Theætêtus--that Plato has not been very careful in appreciating the real bearing of the Protagorean doctrine. He impugns it here by the same argument which we also read in the Theætêtus. "Everyone admits" (he says) "that there are some men wise and good--others foolish and wicked. Now if you admit this, you disallow the Protagorean doctrine. If I contend that as things appear to me, so they truly are to me--as things appear to you or to him, so they truly are to you or to him--I cannot consistently allow that any one man is wiser than any other. Upon such a theory, all men are put upon the same level of knowledge or ignorance."

But the premisses of Plato here do not sustain his inference.

[Side-note: Objection unfounded--What the Protagorean theory really affirms--Belief always relative to the believer's mind.]

The Protagorean doctrine is, when stated in its most general terms,--That every man is and must be his own measure of truth or falsehood--That what appears to him true, _is true to him_, however it may appear to others--That he cannot by any effort step out of or beyond his own individual belief conviction, knowledge--That all his Cognita, Credita, Percepta, Cogitata, &c., imply himself as Cognoscens, Credens, Percipiens, Cogitans, inseparably and indivisibly--That in affirming an object, he himself is necessarily present as affirming subject, and that Object and Subject are only two sides of the same indivisible fact[22]--That though there are some matters which all men agree in believing, there is no criterion at once infallible and universally recognised, in matters where they dissent: moreover, the matters believed are just as much relative where all agree, as where some disagree.

[Footnote 22: M. Destutt Tracy observes, Logique, ch. ix. p. 347, ed. 1825:

"En effet, on ne saurait trop le redire, chacun de nous, et même tout être animé quelconque, est pour lui-même le centre de tout. Il ne perçoit par un sentiment direct et une conscience intime, que ce qui affecte et émeut sa sensibilité. Il ne conçoit et ne connaît son existence que par ce qu'il sent, et celle des autres êtres que parce qu'ils lui font sentir. Il n'y a de réel pour lui que ses perceptions, ses affections, ses idées: et tout ce qu'il peut jamais savoir, n'est toujours que des consequences et des combinaisons de ces premières perceptions ou idees."

The doctrine of the Sceptical philosophers, is explicitly announced by Sextus Empiricus as his personal belief: that which appears true to him, as far as his enquiry had reached. The passage deserves to be cited.

Sextus Empir. Pyrrh. Hypotyp. i. Sect. 197-199.

[Greek: O(/tan ou)=n ei)/pê| o( skeptiko\s "_ou)de\n o(ri/zô_" . . . tou=to/ phêsi le/gôn to\ _e(autô=| phaino/menon peri\ tô=n prokeime/nôn_, ou)k a)paggeltikô=s, meta\ pepoithê/seôs a)pophaino/menos, a)ll' o(\ pa/schei, diêgou/menos. . . . Kai\ ô(/sper o(le/gôn "_peripatô=_," ou(/tôs o( le/gôn "_pa/nta e)sti\n a)o/rista_" sussêmai/nei kath' ê(ma=s to\ ô(s _pro\s e)me ê)\ ô(s e)moi\ phai/netai_; ô(s ei)=nai to\ lego/menon toiou=ton "o(/sa e)pêlthon tô=n dogmatikô=s zêtoume/nôn, toiau=ta/ moi phai/netai_, ô(s mêde\n au)tô=n tou= machome/nou prou)/chein moi\ dokei=n kata\ pi/stin ê)\ a)pisti/an".]]

[Side-note: Each man believes others to be wiser on various points than himself--Belief on authority--not inconsistent with the affirmation of Protagoras.]

This doctrine is not refuted by the fact, that every man believes others to be wiser than himself on various points. A man is just as much a measure to himself when he acts upon the advice of others, or believes a fact upon the affirmation of others, as when he judges upon his own unassisted sense or reasoning. He is a measure to himself when he agrees with others, as much as when he disagrees with them. Opinions of others, or facts attested by others, may count as materials determining his judgment; but the judgment is and must be his own. The larger portion of every man's knowledge rests upon the testimony of others; nevertheless the facts thus reported become portions of _his_ knowledge, generating conclusions _in him_ and relatively _to him_. I believe the narrative of travellers, respecting parts of the globe which I have never seen: I adopt the opinion of A a lawyer, and of B a physician, on matters which I have not studied: I understand facts which I did not witness, from the description of those who did witness them. In all these cases the act of adoption is my own, and the grounds of belief are relative to my state of mind. Another man may mistrust completely the authorities which I follow: just as I mistrust the authority of Mahomet or Confucius, or various others, regarded as infallible by a large portion of mankind. The grounds of belief are to a certain extent similar, to a certain extent dissimilar, in different men's minds. Authority is doubtless a frequent ground of belief; but it is essentially variable and essentially relative to the believer. Plato himself, in many passages, insists emphatically upon the dissensions in mankind respecting the question--"_Who are_ the good and wise men?" He tells us that the true philosopher is accounted by the bulk of mankind foolish and worthless.

[Side-note: Analogy of physical processes (cutting and burning) appealed to by Sokrates--does not sustain his inference against Protagoras.]

In the Kratylus, Sokrates says (and I agree with him) that there are laws of nature respecting the processes of cutting and burning: and that any one who attempts to cut or burn in a way unconformable to those laws, will fail in his purpose. This is true, but it proves nothing against Protagoras. It is an appeal to a generalization from physical facts, resting upon experience and induction--upon sensation and inference which we and others, Protagoras as well as Plato, have had, and which we believe to be common to all. We know this fact, or have a full and certain conviction of it; but we are not brought at all nearer to the Absolute (_i.e._, to the Object without Subject) which Plato's argument requires. The analogy rather carries us away from the Absolute: for cutting and burning, with their antecedent conditions, are facts of sense: and Plato himself admits, to a great extent, that the facts of sense are relative. All experience and induction, and all belief founded thereupon, are essentially relative. The experience may be one common to all mankind, and upon which all are unanimous:[23] but it is not the less relative to each individual of the multitude. What is relative to all, continues to be relative to each: the fact that all sentient individuals are in this respect alike, does not make it cease to be relative, and become absolute. What I see and hear in the theatre is relative to me, though it may at the same time be relative to ten thousand other spectators, who are experiencing like sensations. Where all men think or believe alike, it may not be necessary for common purposes to distinguish the multiplicity of individual thinking subjects: yet the subjects are nevertheless multiple, and the belief, knowledge, or fact, is relative to each of them, whether all agree, or whether beliefs are many and divergent. We cannot suppress ourselves as sentient or cogitant subjects, nor find any _locus standi_ for Object pure and simple, apart from the ground of relativity. And the Protagorean dictum brings to view these subjective conditions, as being essential, no less than the objective, to belief and disbelief.

[Footnote 23: Proklus, in his Scholia on the Kratylus, p. 32, ed. Boisson, cites the argument used by Aristotle against Plato on this very subject of names--[Greek: _ta\ me\n phu/sei, para\ pa=si ta\ au)ta/_; ta\ de\ o)no/mata ou) para\ pa=si ta\ au)ta/; ô/ste ta\ phu/sei o)/nta ou)/k e)stin o)no/mata, kai\ ta\ o)no/mata ou)k ei)si phu/sei.] Ammonius ad Aristot. De Interpretat. p. 100, a. 28, Schol. Bekk. Sextus Empiricus adv. Mathemat. i. 145-147, p. 247, Fab.

Plato had assimilated naming to cutting and burning. Aristotle denies the analogy: he says that cutting and burning are the same to all, or _are by nature_: naming is not the same to all, and is therefore not by nature.

We find here the test pointed out to distinguish what _is by nature_ (that which Plato calls the [Greek: ou)si/an be/baion tô=n pragma/tôn]--p. 386 E),--_viz._ That it is the same to all or among all. What it is to one individual, it is to another also. There are a multitude of different judging subjects, but no dissentient subjects: myself, and in my belief all other subjects, are affected alike. This is the true and real Objective: a particular fact of sense, where Subject is not eliminated altogether, but becomes a constant quantity, and therefore escapes separate notice. An Objective _absolute_ (_i.e._, without Subject altogether) is an impossibility.

In the Aristotelian sense of [Greek: phu/sei], it would be correct to say that Language, or Naming _in genere_, is natural to man. No human society has yet been found without some language--some names--some speech employed and understood by each individual member. But many different varieties of speech will serve the purpose, not indeed with equal perfection, yet tolerably: enough to enable a society to get on. The uniformity ([Greek: to\ phu/sei]) here ceases. To a certain extent, the objects and agencies which are named, are the same in all societies: to a certain extent different. If we were acquainted with all the past facts respecting the different languages which have existed or do exist on the globe, we should be able to assign the reason which brought each particular _Nomen_ into association with its _Nominatum_. But this past history is lost.]

[Side-note: Reply of Protagoras to the Platonic objections.]

Protagoras would have agreed with Plato as to combustion--that there were certain antecedent conditions under which he fully expected it, and certain other conditions under which he expected with confidence that it would not occur. Only he would have declared this (assuming him to speak conformably to his own theory) to be his own full belief and conviction, derived from certain facts and comparisons of sense, which he also _knew_ to be shared by most other persons. He would have pronounced farther, that those who held opposite opinions were in his judgment wrong: but he would have recognised that their opinion was true to themselves, and that their belief must be relative to causes operating upon _their_ minds. Farthermore, he would have pointed out, that combustion itself, with its antecedents, were facts of sense, relative to individual sentients and observers, remembering and comparing what they had observed. This would have been the testimony of Protagoras (always assuming him to speak in conformity with his own theory), but it would not have satisfied Plato: who would have required a peremptory, absolute affirmation, discarding all relation to observers or observed facts, and leaving no scope for error or fallibility.

[Side-note: Sentiments of Belief and Disbelief, common to all men--Grounds of belief and disbelief, different with different men and different ages.]

Those who agree with Plato on this question, impugn the doctrine of Protagoras as effacing all real, intrinsic, distinction between truth and falsehood. Such objectors make it a charge against Protagoras, that he does not erect his own mind into a peremptory and infallible measure for all other minds.[24] He expressly recognises the distinction, so far as his own mind is concerned: he admits that other men recognise it also, each for himself. Nevertheless, to say that all men recognise one and the same objective distinction between truth and falsehood, would be to contradict palpable facts. Each man has a standard, an ideal of truth in his own mind: but different men have different standards. The grounds of belief, though in part similar with all men, are to a great extent dissimilar also: they are dissimilar even with the same man, at different periods of his life and circumstances. What all men have in common is the feeling of belief and the feeling of disbelief: the matters believed or disbelieved, as well as the ideal standard to which any new matter presented for belief or disbelief is referred, differ considerably. By rational discussion--by facts and reasonings set forth on both sides, as in the Platonic dialogues--opinions may be overthrown or modified: dissentients may be brought into agreement, or at least each may be rendered more fully master of the case on both sides. But this dialectic, the Platonic question and answer, is itself an appeal to the free action of the individual mind. The questioner starts from premisses conceded by the respondent. He depends upon the acquiescence of the respondent for every step taken in advance. Such a proceeding is relative, not absolute: coinciding with the Protagorean formula rather than with the Platonic negation of it.[25] No man ever claimed the right of individual judgment more emphatically than Sokrates: no man was ever more special in adapting his persuasions to the individual persons with whom he conversed.

[Footnote 24: To illustrate the impossibility of obtaining any standard absolute and purely objective, without reference to any judging Subject, I had transcribed a passage from Steinthal's work on the Classification of Human languages; but I find it too long for a note.

Steinthal, Charakteristik der Hauptsächlichen Typen des Sprachbaues, 2nd ed. Berlin, 1860, pp. 313-314-315.]

[Footnote 25: See the striking passages in the Gorgias, pp. 472 B, 474 B, 482 B; Theætêtus, p. 171 D.

Also in proclaiming the necessity of specialty of adaptation to individual minds--Plat. Phædr. pp. 271-272, 277 B.]

[Side-note: Protagoras did not affirm, that Belief depended upon the will or inclination of each individual but that it was relative to the circumstances of each individual mind.]

The grounds of belief, according to Protagoras, relative to the individual, are not the same with all men at all times. But it does not follow (nor does Protagoras appear to have asserted) that they vary according to the _will_ or _inclination_ of the individual. Plato, in impugning this doctrine, reasons as if these two things were one and the same--as if, according to Protagoras, a man believed whatever he chose.[26] This, however, is not an exact representation of the doctrine "Homo Mensura": which does not assert the voluntary or the arbitrary, but simply the relative as against the absolute. What a man believes does not depend upon his own will or choice: it depends upon an aggregate of circumstances, partly peculiar to himself, partly common to him with other persons more or fewer in number:[27] upon his age, organisation, and temperament--his experience, education, historical and social position--his intellectual powers and acquirements--his passions and sentiments of every kind, &c. These and other ingredients--analogous, yet neither the same nor combined in the same manner, even in different individuals of the same time and country, much less in those of different times and countries--compose the aggregate determining grounds of belief or disbelief in every one. Each man has in his mind an ideal standard of truth and falsehood: but that ideal standard, never exactly the same in any two men, nor in the same man at all times, often varies in different men to a prodigious extent. Now it is to this standard in the man's own mind that those reasoners refer who maintain that belief is relative. They do not maintain, that it is relative simply to his wishes, or that he believes and disbelieves what he chooses.

[Footnote 26: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 387-389, where [Greek: pro\s ê(ma=s] is considered as equivalent to [Greek: ô(s a)\n ê(mei=s boulô/metha--ê(=| a)\n ê(mei=s boulê/thômen]--both of them being opposed to [Greek: oi(=on e)pephu/kei--to\ kata\ phu/sin--i)di/an au)tô=n phu/sin e)/chousai.]

The error here noted is enumerated by by Mr. John Stuart Mill, among the specimens of Fallacies of Confusion, in his System of Logic, Book v. ch. vii. § 1: "The following is an argument of Descartes to prove, in his _à priori_ manner, the being of a God. The conception, says he, of an infinite Being proves the real existence of such a Being. For if there is not really any such Being, _I_ must have made the conception: but if I could make it, I can also unmake it--which evidently is not true: therefore there must be, externally to myself, an archetype from which the conception was derived. In this argument (which, it may be observed, would equally prove the real existence of ghosts and of witches) the ambiguity is in the pronoun _I_; by which, in one place, is to be understood _my will_--in another, the _laws of my nature_. If the conception, existing as it does in my mind, had no original without, the conclusion would unquestionably follow that _I_ made it--that is, the laws of my nature must have somehow evolved it: but that _my will_ made it, would not follow. Now when Descartes afterwards adds that I cannot unmake the conception, he means that I cannot get rid of it by an act of my will--which is true, but is not the proposition required. I can as much unmake this conception as I can any other: no conception which I have once had, can I ever dismiss by mere volition: but what some of the laws of my nature have produced, other laws, or those same laws in other circumstances, may, and often do, subsequently efface."]

[Footnote 27: To show how constantly this Protagorean dictum is misconceived, as if Protagoras had said that things were to each individual what he was pleased or chose to represent them as being, I transcribe the following passage from Lassalle's elaborate work on Herakleitus (vol. ii. p. 381):--"Des Protagoras Prinzip ist es, dass überhaupt Nichts Objektives ist; dass vielmehr alles Beliebige was Einem scheint, auch für ihn sei. Dies Selbstsetzen des Subjekts ist die einzige Wahrheit der Dinge, welche an sich selbst Nichts Objektives haben, sondern zur gleichgültigen Fläche geworden sind, auf die das Subjekt willkührlich und beliebig seine Charaktere schreibt."

Protagoras does not (as is here asserted) deny the Objective: he only insists on looking at it in conjunction with, or measured by, some Subject; and that Subject, not simply as desiring or preferring, but clothed in all its attributes.]

[Side-note: Facts of sense--some are the same to all sentient subjects, others are different to different subjects. Grounds of unanimity.]

When Plato says that combustibility and secability of objects are properties fixed and determinate,[28] this is perfectly true, as meaning that a certain proportion of the facts of sense affect in the same way the sentient and appreciative powers of each individual, determining the like belief in every man who has ever experienced them. Measuring and weighing are sensible facts of this character: seen alike by all, and conclusive proofs to all. But this implies, to a certain point, fundamental uniformity in the individual sentients and judges. Where such condition is wanting--where there is a fundamental difference in the sensible apprehension manifested by different individuals--the unanimity is wanting also. Such is the case in regard to colours and other sensations: witness the peculiar vision of Dalton and many others. The unanimity in the first case, the discrepancy in the second, is alike an aggregate of judgments, each individual, distinct, and relative. You pronounce an opponent to be in error: but if you cannot support your opinion by evidence or authority which satisfies _his_ senses or _his_ reason, he remains unconvinced. Your individual opinion stands good _to you_; his opinion stands good _to him_. You think that he ought to believe as you do, and in certain cases you feel persuaded that he will be brought to that result by future experience, which of course must be relative to him and to his appreciative powers. He entertains the like persuasion in regard to you.

[Footnote 28: When Plato asserts not only that Objects are absolute and not relative to any Subject--but that the agencies or properties of Objects are also absolute--he carries the doctrine farther than modern defenders of the absolute. M. Cousin, in the eighth and ninth Lectures of his Cours d'Hist. de la Philosophie Morale au 18me Siècle, lays down the contrary, maintaining that objects and essences alone are absolute, though unknowable; but that their agencies are relative and knowable.

"Nous savons qu'il exists quelque chose hors de nous, parceque nous ne pouvons expliquer nos perceptions sans les rattacher à des causes distinctes de nous mêmes: nous savons de plus que ces causes, dont nous ne connaissons pas d'ailleurs l'essence, _produisent les effets les plus variables, les plus divers, et même les plus contraires, selon qu'elles rencontrent telle nature ou telle disposition du sujet._ Mais savons-nous quelque chose de plus? et même, vu le caractère indéterminé des causes que nous concevons dans les corps, y-a-t-il quelque chose de plus à savoir? Y-a-t-il lieu de nous enquérir si nous percevons _les choses telles qu'elles sont? Non, évidemment. . . Je ne dis pas que le problème est insoluble: je dis qu'il est absurde, et renferme une contradiction._ Nous ne savons pas ce que ces causes sont en elles-mêmes, et la raison nous défend de chercher à les connaître: mais il est bien évident _à priori_ qu'elles ne sont pas en elles-mêmes ce qu'elles sont par rapport à nous, _puisque la présence du sujet modifie nécessairement leur action_. Supprimez tout sujet sentant, il est certain que ces causes agiraient encore, puisqu'elles continueraient d'exister: mais elles agiraient autrement; elles seraient encore des qualités et des propriétés, mais qui ne ressembleraient à rien de ce que nous connaissons. Le feu ne manifesterait plus aucune des propriétés que nous lui connaissons: que serait-il? C'est ce que nous ne saurons jamais. C'est d'ailleurs peut-être un problème qui ne répugne pas seulement à la nature de notre esprit mais à l'essence même des choses. Quand même en effet on supprimerait par la pensée tous les sujets sentants, il faudrait encore admettre que nul corps ne manifesterait ses propriétés autrement qu'en relation avec un sujet quelconque, et dans ce cas _ses propriétés ne seraient encore que relatives_: en sorte qu'il me paraît fort raisonnable d'admettre que les propriétés déterminées des corps _n'existent pas indépendamment d'un sujet quelconque_." (2de Partie, 8me Leçon, pp. 216-218, ed. Danton et Vacherot, Bruxelles, 1841.)]

* * * * *

[Side-note: Sokrates exemplifies his theory of the Absolute Name or the Name-Form. He attempts to show the inherent rectitude of many existing names. His etymological transitions.]

It is thus that Sokrates, in the first half of the Kratylus, lays down his general theory that names have a natural and inherent propriety: and that naming is a process which cannot be performed except in one way. He at the same time announces that his theory rests upon a principle opposed to the "Homo Mensura" of Protagoras. He then proceeds to illustrate his doctrine by exemplification of many particular names, which are alleged to manifest a propriety of signification in reference to the persons or matters to which they are applied. Many of these are proper names, but some are common names or appellatives. Plato regards the proper names as illustrating, even better than the common, the doctrine of inherent rectitude in naming: especially the names of the Gods, with respect to the use of which Plato was himself timidly scrupulous--and the names reported by Homer as employed by the Gods themselves. We must remember that nearly all Grecian proper names had some meaning: being compounds or derivatives from appellative nouns.

The proper names are mostly names of Gods or Heroes: then follow the names of the celestial bodies (conceived as Gods), of the elements, of virtues and vices, &c. All of them, however, both the proper and the common names, are declared to be compound, or derivative; presupposing other simple and primitive names from which they are formed.[29] Sokrates declares the fundamental theory on which the primitive roots rest; and indicates the transforming processes, whereby many of the names are deduced or combined from their roots. But these processes, though sometimes reasonable enough, are in a far greater number of instances forced, arbitrary, and fanciful. The transitions of meaning imagined, and the structural transformations of words, are alike strange and violent.[30]

[Footnote 29: See the Introduction to Pape's Wörterbuch der Griechischen Eigennamen.

Thus Proklus observes:--"The recklessness about proper names, is shown in the case of the man who gave to his son the name of Athanasius" (Proklus, Schol. ad Kratyl. p. 5, ed. Boiss.) Proklus adopts the distinction between divine and human names, citing the authority of Plato in Kratylus. The words of Proklus are remarkable, ad Timæum, ii. p. 197. Schneid. [Greek: Oi)kei=a ga/r e)stin o)no/mata pa/sê| ta/xei tô=n pragma/tôn, thei=a me\n toi=s thei/ois, dianoêta\ de\ toi=s dianoêtoi=s, doxasta\ de\ toi=s doxastoi=s.] See Timæus, p. 29 B. Compare also Kratylus, p. 400 E, and Philêbus, p. 12 C.

When Plato (Kratylus, pp. 391-392; compare Phædrus, p. 252 A) cites the lines of Homer mentioning appellations bestowed by the Gods, I do not understand him, as Gräfenhahn and others do, to speak in mockery, but _bonâ fide_. The affirmation of Clemens Alexandrinus (Stromat. i. 104) gives a probable account of Plato's belief:--[Greek: O( Pla/tôn kai\ toi=s theoi=s dialekto\n a)pone/mei tina/, ma/lista me\n a)po\ tô=n o)neira/tôn tekmairo/menos kai\ tô=n chrêsmô=n.] See Gräfenhahn, Gesch. der Klassischen Philologie, vol. i. p. 176.

When we read the views of some learned modern philologists, such as Godfrey Hermann, we cannot be surprised that many Greeks in the Platonic age should believe in an [Greek: o)rtho/tês o)noma/tôn] applicable to their Gods and Heroes:--"Unde intelligitur, ex nominibus naturam et munia esse cognoscenda Deorum: Nec Deorum tantum, sed etiam heroum, omninoque rerum omnium, nominibus quæ propria vocantur appellatarum" (De Mythologia Græcorum Antiquissimâ--in Opuscula, vol. ii. p. 167).

"Bei euch, Ihr Herrn, kann man das Wesen Gewöhnlich aus dem Namen lesen," &c. _Goethe_, Faust.

See a remarkable passage in Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, c. 22, p. 1119 E, respecting the essential rectitude and indispensable employment of the surnames and appellations of the Gods.

The supposition of a mysterious inherent relation, between Names and the things named, has found acceptance among expositors of many different countries.

M. Jacob Salvador (Histoire des Institutions de Moïse, Liv. x., ch. ii.; vol. iii. p. 136) says respecting the Jewish Cabbala:--"Que dirai-je de leur _Cabale_? mot signifiant aussi _tradition_. Elle se composait originairement de tous les principes abstraits qui ne se répandent pas chez le vulgaire: elle tomba bientôt dans la folie. Cacher quelques idées metaphysiques sous les figures les plus bizarres, et prendre ensuite une peine infinie pour retrouver ces idées premières: s'imaginer qu'il existe entre les noms et les choses une corrélation inévitable, et que la contexture littérale des livres sacrés par exemple, doit éclairer sur l'essence même et sur tous les secrets du Dieu qui les a dictés: tourmenter dès-lors chaque phrase, chaque mot, chaque lettre, avec la même ardeur qu'on en met de nos jours à décomposer et à recomposer tous les corps de la nature: enfin, après avoir établi la corrélation entre les mots et les choses, croire qu'en changeant, disposant, combinant, ces mots, on traverse de prétendus _canaux_ d'influence qui les unissent à ces choses, et qu'on agit sur elles: voilà, ce me semble, les principales prétentions de cette espèce de science occulte, échappée de l'Égypte, qui a dévoré beaucoup de bons esprits, et qui, d'une part, donne la main à la théologie, d'autre part, à l'astrologie et aux combinaisons magiques."]

[Footnote 30: I cite various specimens of the etymologies given by Plato:--

1. [Greek: A)game/mnôn--o( a)gasto\s kata\ tê\n e)pimonê/n]--in consequence of his patience in remaining ([Greek: monê\]) with his army before Troy (p. 395 A).

2. [Greek: A)treu\s--kata\ to\ a)teire/s, kai\ kata\ to\ a)/treston, kai\ kata\ to\ a)têro/n] (p. 395 C).

3. [Greek: Pe/lops--o( to\ e)ggu\s (pe/las) mo/non o(rô=n kai\ to\ parachrê=ma] (p. 395 D).

4. [Greek: Ta/ntalos--tala/ntatos] (p. 395 E).

5. [Greek: Zeu\s--Di/a--Zê=na--di' o(\n _zê=n_ a)ei\ pa=si toi=s zô=sin u(pa/rchei]--ut proprie unum debuerit esse vocabulum [Greek: Diazê=na]. Stallbaum, ad. p. 396 A. Proklus admired these etymologies (ad Timæum, ii. p. 226, ed. Schneid.).

6. [Greek: Oi( theoi\]--Sun, Moon, Earth, Stars, Uranus--[Greek: a(/te au)ta\ o(rôntes pa/nta a)ei\ i)o/nta dro/mô| kai\ the/onta, a)po\ tau/tês tê=s phu/seôs tê=s tou= thei=n _theou\s_ au)tou\s e)ponoma/sai] (p. 397 D).

7. [Greek: Dai/mones--o(/ti phro/nimoi kai\ daê/mones ê)=san, dai/monas au)tou\s ôno/masen] (Hesiod) (p. 398 B).

8. [Greek: Ê)/rôs]--either from [Greek: e)/rôs], as one sprung from the union of Gods with human females: or from [Greek: e)rôta=|n] or [Greek: ei)/rein],--from oral or rhetorical attributes, as being [Greek: r(ê/tores kai\ e)rôtêtikoi/] (p. 398 D).

9. [Greek: Di/philos--Dii+\ phi/los] (p. 399 B).

10. [Greek: A)/nthrôpos--o( a)nathrô=n a(\ o)/pôpen] (p. 399 C).

11. [Greek: Psuchê\]--a double derivation is proposed: first, [Greek: to\ a)na/psuchon], next, a second, _i.e._ [Greek: psuchê\ = phuse/chê, ê)\ phu/sin o)chei= kai\ e)/chei], which second is declared to be [Greek: technikô/teron], and the former to be ridiculous (pp. 399 E, 400 A-B).

12. [Greek: Sô=ma = to\ sê=ma tê=s phuchê=s], because the soul is buried in the body. Or [Greek: sô=ma], that is, preserved or guarded, by the body as by an exterior wall, in order that it may expiate wrongs of a preceding life (p. 400 C).

13. The first imposer of names was a philosopher who followed the theory of Herakleitus--perpetual flux of everything. Pursuant to this theory he gave to various Gods the names Kronos, Rhea, Tethys, &c., all signifying flux (p. 402 A-D).

14. Various derivations of the names Poseidon, Hades or Pluto, Persephonê or Pherrephatta, &c., are given (pp. 404-405); also of Apollo, so as to fit on to the four functions of the last-named God, [Greek: mousikê/, mantikê/, i)atrikê/, toxikê/] (p. 405).

15. [Greek: Mou=sa--mousikê\], from [Greek: mô=sthai] (recognised in Liddell and Scott from [Greek: ma/ô] p. 406 A). [Greek: A)phrodi/tê] from [Greek: a)phrou= ge/nesin], the Hesiodic derivation (p. 406 B-D).

16. [Greek: A)ê\r--o(/ti ai)/rei ta\ a)po\ tê=s gê=s--ê)\ o(/ti a)ei\ r(ei=--ê)\ o(/ti pneu=ma e)x au)tou= gi/gnetai r(e/ontos]--quasi [Greek: a)êto/r)r(oun. Ai)thê\r--o(/ti a)ei\ thei= peri\ to\n a)e/ra r(e/ôn] (p. 410 B).

17. [Greek: Phro/nêsis--phora=s kai\ r(ou= no/êsis u(polabei=n phora=s]. This and the following are put as derivatives from the Herakleitean theory (p. 411 D-E). [Greek: No/êsis = tou= ne/ou e)/sis. Sôphrosu/nê--sôtêri/a phronê/seôs]. This is recognised by Aristotle in the Nikom. Ethica, vi. 5.

18. [Greek: E)pistê/mê = e)pistême/nê--ô(s pherome/nois toi=s pra/gmasin e(pome/nês tê=s psuchê=s] (p. 412 A).

19. [Greek: Dikaiosu/nê--e)pi\ tê=| tou= dikai/ou sune/sei] (p. 412 C).

20. [Greek: Kaki/a = to\ kakô=s i)o/n. Deili/a--tê=s psuchê=s desmo\s i)schuro/s--o(\ dei= li/an. A)retê\ = a)eirei/tê]--that which has an easy and constant flux, or perhaps [Greek: ai(retê/] (p. 415 B-D). [Greek: Ai)schro\n = to\ a)eischorou=n--to\ a)ei\ i)/schon to\n r(ou=n] (p. 416 B). [Greek: Su/mphero\n = tê\ a(/ma phora\n tê=s psuchê=s meta\ tô=n pragma/tôn] (p. 417 A). [Greek: Lusite/loun = to\ tê=s phora=s lu/on to\ te/los] (p. 417 C-E). [Greek: Blabero\n = to\ bla/pton to\n r(ou=n].

The names of favourable import are such as designate facility of the universal flux, according to the Herakleitean theory. The names of unfavourable import designate obstruction of the flux.

21. [Greek: Zugo\n = duogo/n] (p. 418 D).

22. [Greek: Eu)phrosu/nê--a)po\ tou= eu)= pra/gmasi tê\n psuchê\n xumphe/resthai = eu)pherosu/nê] (p. 419 D).

23. [Greek: Thumo\s--a)po\ tê=s thu/seôs kai\ ze/seôs tê=s psuchê=s. E)pithumi/a--ê( e)pi\ to\n thumo\n i)ou=sa du/namis] (p. 419 E).

24. [Greek: To\ o)/n = to\ ou)= tugcha/nei zê/têma, to\ o)/noma. O)nomasto\n = o)/n, ou)= ma/sma e)sti/n. (Ma/sma = zê/têma: mai/esthai = zêtei=n)] (p. 421 A).

25. [Greek: A)lêthei/a--thei/a a)/lê], or [Greek: ê( thei/a tou= o)/ntos phora/. Pseu=dos] from [Greek: eu(/dein], with [Greek: psi=] prefixed, as being the opposite of movement and flux (p. 421 B-C).

26. Several derivations of names are given by Sokrates, as founded upon the theory opposed to Herakleitus--_i.e._, the theory that things were not in perpetual flux, but stationary:--

[Greek: E)pistê/mê--o(/ti i(/stêsin ê(mô=n e)pi\ toi=s pra/gmasi tê\n psuchê/n.

I(stori/a--o(/ti i(/stêsi to\n r(ou=n.

Pisto\n--i(sta=|n panta/pasi sêmai/nei.

Mnê/mê--monê\ e)n tê=| psuchê=|] (437 A-C).

27. We found before that some names of _good_ attributes were founded on the Herakleitean theory. But there are also names of _bad_ attributes founded on it.

[Greek: A)mathi/a = ê( tou= a(/ma theô=| i)o/ntos porei/a.

A)kolasi/a = ê( a)kolouthi/a toi=s pra/gmasin] (p. 437 C).

Sokrates contrasts the two theories of [Greek: sta/sis] and [Greek: ki/nêsis], and says that he believes the first Name-Givers to have apportioned names in conformity to the theory of [Greek: ki/nêsis], but that he thinks they were mistaken in adopting that theory (p. 439 C).]

[Side-note: These transitions appear violent to a modern reader. They did not appear so to readers of Plato until this century. Modern discovery, that they are intended as caricatures to deride the Sophists.]

Such is the light in which these Platonic etymologies appear to a modern critic. But such was not the light in which they appeared either to the ancient Platonists, or to critics earlier than the last century. The Platonists even thought them full of mysterious and recondite wisdom. Dionysius of Halikarnassus highly commends Plato for his speculations on etymology, especially in the Kratylus.[31] Plutarch cites some of the most singular etymologies in the Kratylus as serious and instructive. The modesty of the Protagorean formula becomes here especially applicable: for so complete has been the revolution of opinion, that the Platonic etymologies are _now_ treated by _most_ critics as too absurd to have been seriously intended by Plato, even as conjectures. It is called "a valuable discovery of modern times" (so Schleiermacher[32] terms it) that Plato meant all or most of them as mere parody and caricature. We are now told that it was not Plato who misconceived the analogies, conditions, and limits, of etymological transition, but others; whom Plato has here set himself to expose and ridicule, by mock etymologies intended to parody those which they had proposed as serious. If we ask who the persons thus ridiculed were, we learn that they were the Sophists, Protagoras, or Prodikus, with others; according to Schleiermacher, Antisthenes among them.[33]

[Footnote 31: Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verb. a. 16, p. 196, Schaefer. [Greek: ta\ kra/tista de\ ne/mô, ô(s prô/tô| to\n u(pe\r e)tumologi/as ei)sa/gonti lo/gon, Pla/tôni tô=| Sôkratikô=|, pollachê=| me\n kai\ a)/llothi, ma/lista de\ e)n tô=| Kratu/lô|.]