Chapter XXIX: Sophistes--Politikus (3)

Pursuing the purpose of establishing his conclusion (_viz._ That Ens involved as many perplexities as Non-Ens), Plato comes to the two opposite sects:--1. Those (the Materialists) who recognised bodies and nothing else, as the real Entia or Existences. 2. Those (the Friends of Forms, the Idealists) who maintained that incorporeal and intelligible Forms or Species were the only real existences; and that bodies had no existence, but were in perpetual generation and destruction.[102]

[Footnote 102: Plato, Sophist. p. 246 B.]

Respecting the first, Plato says that they must after all be ashamed not to admit, that justice, intelligence, &c., are something real, which may be present or absent in different individual men, and therefore must exist apart from all individuals. Yet justice and intelligence are not bodies. Existence therefore is something common to body and not-body. The characteristic mark of existence is, power or potentiality. Whatever has power to act upon any thing else, or to be acted on by any thing else, is a real Ens or existent something.[103]

[Footnote 103: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 D-E. [Greek: le/gô dê\ to\ kai\ o(poianou=n kektême/non _du/namin_, ei)/t' ei)s to\ poiei=n e(/teron o(tiou=n pephuko\s ei)/t' ei)s to\ pathei=n** kai\ smikro/taton u(po\ tou= phaulota/tou, ka)\n ei) mo/non ei)sa/pax, pa=n tou=to o)/ntôs ei)=nai; ti/themai ga\r o(/ron o(ri/zein ta\ o)/nta, ô(s e)/stin ou)k a)/llo ti plê\n _du/namis_.]]

[Side-note: Reply open to the Materialists.]

Unfortunately we never know any thing about the opponents of Plato, nor how they would have answered his objection--except so much as he chooses to tell us. But it appears to me that the opponents whom he is here confuting would have accepted his definition, and employed it for the support of their own opinion. "We recognise (they would say) just men, or hard bodies, as existent, because they conform to your definition: they have power to act and be acted upon. But justice, apart from just men--hardness, apart from hard bodies--has no such power: they neither act upon any thing, nor are acted on by any thing: therefore we do not recognise them as existent." According to their view, objects of perception acted on the mind, and therefore were to be recognised as existent: objects of mere conception did not act on the mind, and therefore had not the same claim to be ranked as existent: or at any rate they acted on the mind in a different way, which constitutes the difference between the real and unreal. Of this difference Plato's definition takes no account.[104]

[Footnote 104: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 E. [Greek: to\ kai\ o(poianou=n kektême/non du/namin], &c.]

[Side-note: Plato's argument against the Idealists or Friends of Forms. Their point of view against him.]

Plato now presents this same definition to the opposite class of philosophers: to the Idealists, or partisans of the incorporeal--or of self-existent and separate Forms. These thinkers drew a marked distinction between the Existent and the Generated--between Ens and Fiens--[Greek: to\ o)\n] and [Greek: to\ gigno/menon]. Ens or the Existent was eternal and unchangeable: Fiens or the Generated was always in change or transit, coming or going. We hold communion (they said) with the generated or transitory, through our bodies and sensible perceptions: we hold communion with unchangeable Ens through our mind and by intellection. They did not admit the definition of existence just given by Plato. They contended that that definition applied only to Fiens or to the sensible world--not to Ens or the intelligible world.[105] Fiens had power to act and be acted upon, and existed only under the condition of being so: that is, its existence was only temporary, conditional, relative: it had no permanent or absolute existence at all. Ens was the real existent, absolute and independent--neither acting upon any thing nor being acted upon. They considered that Plato's definition was not a definition of Existence, or the Absolute: but rather of Non-Existence, or the Relative.

[Footnote 105: Plato, Sophist. p. 248 C.]

[Side-note: Plato argues--That to know, and be known, is action and passion, a mode of relativity.]

But (asks Plato in reply) what do you mean by "the mind holding communion" with the intelligible world? You mean that the mind knows, comprehends, conceives, the intelligible world: or in other words, that the intelligible world (Ens) is known, is comprehended, is conceived, by the mind. To be known or conceived, is to be acted on by the mind.[106] Ens, or the intelligible world, is thus acted upon by the mind, and has a power to be so acted upon: which power is, in Plato's definition here given, the characteristic mark of existence. Plato thus makes good his definition as applying to Ens, the world of intelligible Forms--not less than to Fiens, the world of sensible phenomena.

[Footnote 106: Plato, Sophist. p. 248 D. [Greek: ei) prosomologou=si tê\n me\n psuchê\n ginô/skein, tê\n d' ou)si/an gignô/skesthai . . . Ti/ de/? to\ ginô/skein ê)\ gignô/skesthai phate\ poi/êma ê)\ pa/thos ê)\ a)mpho/teron?]]

The definition of _existence_, here given by Plato, and the way in which he employs it against the two different sects of philosophers--Materialists and Idealists--deserves some remark.

[Side-note: Plato's reasoning--compared with the points of view of both.]

According to the Idealists or Immaterialists, Plato's definition of existence would be supposed to establish the case of their opponents the Materialists, who recognised nothing as existing except the sensible world: for Plato's definition (as the Idealists thought) fitted the sensible world, but fitted nothing else. Now these Idealists did not recognise the sensible world as existent at all. They considered it merely as Fiens, ever appearing and vanishing. The only Existent, in their view, was the intelligible world--Form or Forms, absolute, eternal, unchangeable, but neither visible nor perceivable by any of the other senses. This is the opinion against which Plato _here_ reasons, though in various other dialogues he gives it as his own opinion, or at least, as the opinion of his representative spokesman.

In this portion of the present dialogue (Sophistês) the point which he makes is, to show to the Idealists, or Absolutists, that their Forms are not really absolute, or independent of the mind: that the existence of these forms is relative, just as much as that of the sensible world. The sensible world exists relatively to our senses, really or potentially exercised: the intelligible world exists relatively to our intelligence, really or potentially exercised. In both cases alike, we hold communion with the two worlds: the communion cannot be left out of sight, either in the one case or in the other. The communion is the entire and fundamental fact, of which the Subject conceiving and the Object conceived, form the two opposite but inseparable faces--the concave and convex, to employ a favourite illustration of Aristotle. Subject conceiving, in communion with Object conceived, are one and the same indivisible fact, looked at on different sides. This is, in substance, what Plato urges against those philosophers who asserted the absolute and independent existence of intelligible Forms. Such forms (he says) exist only in communion with, or relatively to, an intelligent mind: they are not absolute, not independent: they are Objects of intelligence to an intelligent Subject, but they are nothing without the Subject, just as the Subject is nothing without them or some other Object. Object of intelligence implies an intelligent Subject: Object of sense implies a sentient Subject. Thus Objects of intelligence, and Objects of sense, exist alike relatively to a Subject--not absolutely or independently.

[Side-note: The argument of Plato goes to an entire denial of the Absolute, and a full establishment of the Relative.]

This argument, then, of Plato against the Idealists is an argument against the Absolute--showing that there can be no Object of intelligence or conception without its obverse side, the intelligent or concipient Subject. The Idealists held, that by soaring above the sensible world into the intelligible world, they got out of the region of the Relative into that of the Absolute. But Plato reminds them that this is not the fact. Their intelligible world is relative, not less than the sensible; that is, it exists only in communion with a mind or Subject, but with a Cogitant or intelligent Subject, not a percipient Subject.

[Side-note: Coincidence of his argument with the doctrine of Protagoras in the Theætêtus.]

The argument here urged by Plato coincides in its drift and result with the dictum of Protagoras--Man is the measure of all things. In my remarks on the Theætêtus,[107] I endeavoured to make it appear that the Protagorean dictum was really a negation of the Absolute, of the Thing in itself, of the Object without a Subject:--and an affirmation of the Relative, of the Thing in communion with a percipient or concipient mind, of Object implicated with Subject--as two aspects or sides of one and the same conception or cognition. Though Plato in the Theætêtus argued at length against Protagoras, yet his reasoning here in the Sophistês establishes by implication the conclusion of Protagoras. Here Plato impugns the doctrine of those who (like Sokrates in his own Theætêtus) held that the sensible world alone was relative, but that the intelligible world or Forms were absolute. He shows that the latter were no less relative to a mind than the former; and that mind, either percipient or cogitant, could never be eliminated from "communion" with them.

[Footnote 107: See my notice of the Theætêtus, in the chapter immediately preceding, where I have adverted to Plato's reasoning in the Sophistês.]

[Side-note: The Idealists maintained that Ideas or Forms were entirely unchangeable and eternal. Plato here denies this, and maintains that ideas were partly changeable, partly unchangeable.]

These same Idealist philosophers also maintained--That Forms, or the intelligible world, were eternally the same and unchangeable. Plato here affirms that this ideas or opinion is not true: he contends that the intelligible world includes both change and unchangeableness, motion and rest, difference and sameness, life, mind, intelligence, &c. He argues that the intelligible world, whether assumed as consisting of one Form or of many Forms, could not be regarded either as wholly changeable or wholly unchangeable: it must comprise both constituents alike. If all were changeable, or if all were unchangeable, there could be no Object of knowledge; and, by consequence, no knowledge.[108] But the fact that there _is_ knowledge (cognition, conception), is the fundamental fact from which we must reason; and any conclusion which contradicts this must be untrue. Therefore the intelligible world is not all homogeneous, but contains different and even opposite Forms--change and unchangeableness--motion and rest--different and same.[109]

[Footnote 108: Plato, Sophist. p. 249 B. [Greek: xumbai/nei d' ou)=n a)kinê/tôn te o)/ntôn nou=n mêdeni\ peri\ mêdeno\s ei)=nai mêdamou=.]]

[Footnote 109: Plato, Sophist. p. 249 C.]

[Side-note: Plato's reasoning against the Materialists.]

Let us now look at Plato's argument, and his definition of existence, as they bear upon the doctrine of the opposing Materialist philosophers, whom he states to have held that bodies alone existed, and that the Incorporeal did not exist:--in other words that all real existence was concrete and particular: that the abstract (universals, forms, attributes) had no real existence, certainly no separate existence. As I before remarked, it is not quite clear what or how much these philosophers denied. But as far as we can gather from Plato's language, what they denied was, the existence of attributes _apart from_ a substance. They did not deny the existence of just and wise men, but the existence of justice and wisdom, apart from men real or supposable.

[Side-note: Difference between Concrete and Abstract, not then made conspicuous. Large meaning here given by Plato to Ens--comprehending not only objects of Perception, but objects of Conception besides.]

In the time of Plato, distinction between the two classes of words, Concrete and Abstract, had not become so clearly matter of reflection as to be noted by two appropriate terms: in fact, logical terminology was yet in its first rudiments. It is therefore the less matter of wonder that Plato should not here advert to the relation between the two, or to the different sense in which existence might properly be predicable of both. He agrees with the materialists or friends of the Concrete, in affirming that sensible objects, Man, Horse, Tree, exist (which the Idealists or friends of the Abstract denied): but he differs from them by saying that other Objects, super-sensible and merely intelligible, exist also--namely, Justice, Virtue, Whiteness, Hardness, and other Forms or Attributes. He admits that these last-mentioned objects do not make themselves manifest to the senses; but they do make themselves manifest to the intelligence or the conception: and that is sufficient, in his opinion, to authenticate them as existent. The word _existent_, according to his definition (as given in this dialogue), includes not only all that is or may be perceived, but also all that is or may be known by the mind; _i.e._, understood, conceived, imagined, talked or reasoned about. Existent, or Ens, is thus made purely relative: having its root in a Subject, but ramifying by its branches in every direction. It bears the widest possible sense, co-extensive with _Object_ universally, either of perception or conception. It includes all fictions, as well as all (commonly called) realities. The conceivable and the existent become equivalent.

[Side-note: Narrower meaning given by Materialists to Ens--they included only Objects of Perception. Their reasoning as opposed to Plato.]

Now the friends of the Concrete, against whom Plato reasons, used the word _existent_ in a narrower sense, as comprising only the concretes of the sensible world. They probably admitted the existence of the abstract, along with and particularised in the concrete: but they certainly denied the _separate_ existence of the Abstract--_i.e._, of Forms, Attributes, or classes, apart from particulars. They would not deny that many things were conceivable, more or less dissimilar from the realities of the sensible world: but they did not admit that all those conceivable things ought to be termed existent or realities, and put upon the same footing as the sensible world. They used the word _existent_ to distinguish between Men, Horses, Trees, on the one hand--and Cyclopes, Centaurs, [Greek: Trage/laphoi], &c., on the other. A Centaur is just as intelligible and conceivable as either a man or a horse; and according to this definition of Plato, would be as much entitled to be called really existent. The attributes of _man_ and _horse_ are real, because the objects themselves are real and perceivable: the class _man_ and the class _horse_ is real, for the same reason: but the attributes of a Centaur, and the class Centaurs, are not real, because no individuals possessing the attributes, or belonging to the class, have ever been perceived, or authenticated by induction. Plato's Materialist opponents would here have urged, that if he used the word _existent_ or Ens in so wide a sense, comprehending all that is conceivable or nameable, fiction as well as reality--they would require some other words to distinguish fiction from reality--Centaur from Man: which is what most men mean when they speak of one thing as non-existent, another thing as existent. At any rate, here is an equivocal sense of the word Ens--a wider and a narrower sense--which, we shall find frequently perplexing us in the ancient metaphysics; and which, when sifted, will often prove, that what appears to be a difference of doctrine, is in reality little more than a difference of phraseology.[110]

[Footnote 110: Plato here aspires to deliver one definition of Ens, applying to all cases. The contrast between him and Aristotle is shown in the more cautious procedure of the latter, who entirely renounces the possibility of giving any one definition fitting all cases. Aristotle declares Ens to be an equivocal word ([Greek: o(mô/numon]), and discriminates several different significations which it bears: all these significations having nevertheless an analogical affinity, more or less remote, with each other. See Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. 1017, a. 7, seq.; vi. 1028, a. 10.

It is declared by Aristotle to be the question first and most disputed in Philosophia Prima, Quid est Ens? [Greek: kai\ dê\ kai\ to\ pa/lai te kai\ nu=n kai\ a)ei\ zêtou/menon kai\ a)ei\ a)porou/menon, tou=to e)sti, ti/s ê( ou)si/a] (p. 1028, b. 2). Compare, B. 1001, a. 6, 31.

This subject is well treated by Brentano, in his Dissertation Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden im Aristoteles. See pp. 49-50 seq., of that work.

Aristotle observes truly, that these most general terms are the most convenient hiding-places for equivocal meaning (Anal. Post. ii. 97, b. 29).

The analogical varieties of Ens or Essence are graduated, according to Aristotle: Complete, Proper, typical, [Greek: ou)si/a], stands at the head: there are then other varieties more or less approaching to this proper type: some of them which [Greek: mikro\n ê)\ ou)the\n e)/chei tou= o)/ntos.] (Metaphys. vi. 1029, b. 9.)]

[Side-note: Different definitions of Ens--by Plato--the Materialists, the Idealists.]

This enquiry respecting Ens is left by Plato professedly unsettled; according to his very frequent practice. He pretends only to have brought it to this point: that Ens or the Existent is shown to present as many difficulties and perplexities as Non-Ens or the non-existent.[111] I do not think that he has shown thus much; for, according to his definition, Non-Ens is an impossibility: the term is absolutely unmeaning: it is equivalent to the Unknowable or Inconceivable--as Parmenides affirmed it to be. But he has undoubtedly shown that Ens is in itself perplexing: which, instead of lightening the difficulties about Non-Ens, aggravates them: for all the difficulties about Ens must be solved, before you can pretend to understand Non-Ens. Plato has shown that Ens is used in three different meanings:--

1. According to the Materialists, it means only the concrete and particular, including all the attributes thereof, essential and accidental.

2. According to the Idealists or friends of Forms, it means only Universals, Forms, and Attributes.

3. According to Plato's own definition here given, it means both the one and the other: whatever the mind can either perceive or conceive: whatever can act upon the mind in any way, or for any time however short. It is therefore wholly relative to the mind: yet not exclusively to the _perceiving_ mind (as the Materialists said), nor exclusively to the _conceiving_ mind (as the friends of Forms said): but to both alike.

[Footnote 111: Plato, Sophist. p. 250 E.]

[Side-note: Plato's views about Non-Ens examined.]

Here is much confusion, partly real but principally verbal, about Ens. Plato proceeds to affirm, that the difficulty about Non-Ens is no greater, and that it admits of being elucidated. The higher Genera or Forms (he says) are such that some of them will combine or enter into communion with each other, wholly or partially, others will not, but are reciprocally exclusive. Motion and Rest will not enter into communion, but mutually exclude each other: neither of them can be predicated of the other. But each or both of them will enter into communion with Existence, which latter may be predicated of both. Here are three Genera or Forms: motion, rest, and existence. Each of them is the _same_ with itself, and _different_ from the other two. Thus we have two new distinct Forms or Genera--_Same_ and _Different_--which enter into communion with the preceding three, but are in themselves distinct from them.[112] Accordingly you may say, motion _partakes_ of (or enters into communion with) Diversum, because motion differs from rest: also you may say, motion _partakes_ of Idem, as being identical with itself: but you cannot say, motion _is_ different, motion _is_ the same; because the subject and the predicate are essentially distinct and not identical.[113]

[Footnote 112: In the Timæus (pp. 35-36-37), Plato declares these three elements--[Greek: Tau)to/n, Tha/teron, Ou)si/a]--to be the three constituent elements of the cosmical soul, and of the human rational soul.]

[Footnote 113: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 B.

[Greek: Mete/cheton mê\n a)/mphô (ki/nêsis kai\ sta/sis) tau)tou= kai\ thate/rou. . . .]

[Greek: Mê\ toi/nun le/gômen ki/nêsin g' _ei)=nai_ tau)to\n ê)\ tha/teron, mêd' au)= sta/sin.] He had before said--[Greek: A)ll' ou)/ ti mê\n ki/nêsi/s ge kai\ sta/sis ou)th' e(/teron ou)/te tau)to/n _e)stin_] (p. 255 A).

Plato here says, It is true that [Greek: ki/nêsis _mete/chei_ tau)tou=], but it is not true that [Greek: ki/nêsi/s e)sti tau)to/n]. Again, p. 259 A. [Greek: to\ me\n e(/teron metascho\n tou= o)/ntos _e)/sti_ me\n dia\ tau/tên tê\n me/thexin, ou) mê\n e)kei=no/ ge ou)= mete/schen a)ll' e(/teron.] He understands, therefore, that [Greek: e)sti], when used as copula, implies identity between the predicate and the subject.

This is the same point of view from which Antisthenes looked, when he denied the propriety of saying [Greek: A)/nthrôpo/s _e)stin_ a)gatho/s--A)/nthrôpo/s _e)sti_ kako/s]: and when he admitted only identical propositions, such as [Greek: A)/nthrôpo/s _e)stin_ a)/nthrôpos--A)/gatho/s _e)stin_ a)gatho/s.] He assumed that [Greek: e)sti], when intervening between the subject and the predicate, implies identity between them; and the same assumption is made by Plato in the passage now before us. Whether Antisthenes would have allowed the proposition--[Greek: A)/nthrôpos _mete/chei_ kaki/as], or other propositions in which [Greek: e)sti] does not appear as copula, we do not know enough of his opinions to say.

Compare Aristotel. Physic. i. 2, 185, b. 27, with the Scholia of Simplikius, p. 330, a. 331, b. 18-28, ed. Brandis.]

Some things are always named or spoken of _per se_, others with reference to something else. Thus, Diversum is always different from something else: it is relative, implying a correlate.[114] In this, as well as in other points, Diversum (or Different) is a distinct Form, Genus, or Idea, which runs through all other things whatever. Each thing is different from every other thing: but it differs from them, not through any thing in its own nature, but because it partakes of the Form or Idea of Diversum or the Different.[115] So, in like manner, the Form or Idea of Idem (or Same) runs through all other things: since each thing is both different from all others, and is also the same with itself.

[Footnote 114: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 C-D. [Greek: tô=n o)/ntôn ta\ me\n au)ta\ kath' au(ta/, ta/ de\ pro\s a)/llêla a)ei\ _le/gesthai_ . . . To\ d' e(/teron a)ei\ pro\s e(/teron . . . Nu=n de\ a)technô=s ê(mi=n o(/, ti per a)\n e(/teron ê)=|, sumbe/bêken e)x a)na/gkês _e(te/rou tou=to o(/per e)sti\n ei)=nai_.] These last words partly anticipate Aristotle's explanation of [Greek: ta\ pro/s ti] (Categor. p. 6, a. 38).

Here we have, for the first time so far as I know (certainly anterior to Aristotle), names _relative_ and _non-relative_, distinguished as classes, and contrasted with each other. It is to be observed that Plato here uses [Greek: le/gesthai] and [Greek: ei)=nai] as equivalent; which is not very consistent with the sense which he assigns to [Greek: e)stin] in predication: see the note immediately preceding.]

[Footnote 115: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 E. [Greek: pe/mpton dê\ tê\n thate/rou phu/sin lekte/on e)n toi=s ei)/desin ou)=san, e)n oi(=s proairou/metha . . . kai\ dia\ pa/ntôn ge au)tê\n au)tô=n phê/somen ei)=nai dielêluthui=an; e(\n e(/kaston ga\r e(/teron ei)=nai tô=n a)/llôn ou) dia\ tê\n au(tou= phu/sin, a)lla\ dia\ to\ _mete/chein tê=s i)de/as tê=s thate/rou_.]]

[Side-note: His review of the select Five Forms.]

Now motion is altogether different from rest Motion therefore _is not_ rest. Yet still motion _is_, because it partakes of existence or Ens. Accordingly, motion both _is_ and _is not_.

Again, motion is different from Idem or the Same. It is therefore _not the same_. Yet still motion _is the same_; because every thing partakes of identity, or is the same with itself. Motion therefore both _is_ the same and _is not_ the same. We must not scruple to advance both these propositions. Each of them stands on its own separate ground.[116] So also motion is different from Diversum or The Different; in other words, it _is not_ different, yet still it _is_ different. And, lastly, motion is different from Ens, in other words, _it is not Ens_, or is non-Ens: yet still _it is Ens_, because it partakes of existence. Hence motion is both Ens, and Non-Ens.

[Footnote 116: Plato, Sophist. pp. 255-256.]

Here we arrive at Plato's explanation of Non-Ens, [Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n]: the main problem which he is now setting to himself. Non-Ens is equivalent to, _different from Ens_. It is the Form or Idea of Diversum, considered in reference to Ens. Every thing is Ens, or partakes of entity, or existence. Every thing also is different from Ens, or partakes of difference in relation to Ens: it is thus Non-Ens. Every thing therefore is at the same time both Ens, and Non-Ens. Nay, Ens itself, inasmuch as it is different from all other things, is Non-Ens in reference to them. It is Ens only as one, in reference to itself: but it is Non-Ens an infinite number of times, in reference to all other things.[117]

[Footnote 117: Plato, Sophist. pp. 256-257.]

[Side-note: Plato's doctrine--That Non-Ens is nothing more than different from Ens.]

When we say Non-Ens, therefore (continues Plato), we do not mean any thing _contrary_ to Ens, but merely something _different from_ Ens. When we say _Not-great_, we nothing do not mean any thing contrary to Great, but only something different from great. The negative generally, when annexed to any name, does not designate any thing contrary to what is meant by that name, but something different from it. The general nature or Form of difference is disseminated into a multitude of different parts or varieties according to the number of different things with which it is brought into communion: _Not-great_, _Not-just_, &c., are specific varieties of this general nature, and are just as much realities as _great_, _just_. And thus Non-Ens is just as much a reality as Ens being not contrary, but only that variety of the general nature of difference which corresponds to Ens. _Non-Ens_, _Not-great_, _Not-just_, &c., are each of them permanent Forms, among the many other Forms or Entia, having each a true and distinct nature of its own.[118]

[Footnote 118: Plato, Sophist. p. 258 C. [Greek: o(/ti to\ mê\ o)\n bebai/ôs e)sti\ tê\n au)tou= phu/sin e)/chon . . . ou(/tô de\ kai\ to\ mê\ o)\n kata\ tau)to\n ê)=n te kai\ e)/stin mê\ o)/n, e)na/rithmon tô=n pollô=n o)/ntôn ei)=dos e(/n.]]

I say nothing about contrariety (concludes Plato), or about any thing contrary to Ens; nor will I determine whether Non-Ens in this sense be rationally possible or not. What I mean by Non-Ens is a particular case under the general doctrine of the communion or combination of Forms: the combination of Ens with Diversum, composing that which is different from Ens, and which is therefore Non-Ens. Thus Ens itself, being different from all other Forms, is Non-Ens in reference to them all, or an indefinite number of times[119] (_i.e._ an indefinite number of negative predications may be made concerning it).

[Footnote 119: Plato, Sophist. pp. 258 E-259 A. [Greek: ê(mei=s ga\r peri\ me\n e)nanti/ou tino\s au)tô=| (tô=| o)/nti) chai/rein pa/lai le/gomen, ei)/t' e)/stin ei)/te mê\ lo/gon e)/chon ê)\ kai\ panta/pasin a)/logon; o(\ de\ nu=n ei)rê/kamen ei)=nai to\ mê\ o)/n], &c.]

Non-Ens being thus shown to be one among the many other Forms, disseminated among all the others, and entering into communion with Ens among the rest--we have next to enquire whether it enters into communion with the Form of Opinion and Discourse. It is the communion of the two which constitutes false opinion and false proposition: if therefore such communion be possible, false opinion and false proposition are possible, which is the point that Plato is trying to prove.[120]

[Footnote 120: Plato, Sophist. p. 260 B.]

[Side-note: Communion of Non-Ens with proposition--possible and explicable.]

Now it has been already stated (continues Plato) that some Forms or Genera admit of communion with each other, others do not. In like manner some words admit of communion with each other--not others. Those alone admit of communion, which, when put together, make up a proposition significant or giving information respecting Essence or Existence. The smallest proposition must have a noun and a verb put together: the noun indicating the agent, the verb indicating the act. Every proposition must be a proposition concerning something, or must have a logical subject: every proposition must also be of a certain quality. Let us take (he proceeds) two simple propositions: _Theætêtus is sitting down_--_Theætêtus is flying._[121] Of both these two, the subject is the same: but the first is true, the second is false. The first gives things existing as they are, respecting the subject: the second gives respecting the subject, things different from those existing, or in other words things non-existent, as if they did exist.[122] A false proposition is that which gives things different as if they were the same, and things non-existent as if they were existent, respecting the subject.[123]

[Footnote 121: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 A. [Greek: Theai/têtos ka/thêtai . . . Theai/têtos pe/tetai.]]

[Footnote 122: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 B. [Greek: le/gei de\ au)tô=n] ([Greek: tô=n lo/gôn] of the two propositions) [Greek: o( me\n a)lêthê\s ta\ o)/nta, ô(s e)sti peri\ sou= . . . O( de\ dê\ pseudê\s e(/tera tô=n o)/ntôn . . . Ta\ mê\ o)/nt' a)/ra ô(s o)/nta le/gei . . . O)/ntôn de/ ge o)/nta e(/tera peri\ sou=. Polla\ me\n ga\r e)/phamen o)/nta peri\ e(/kaston ei)=nai/ pou, polla\ de\ ou)k o)/nta.]]

[Footnote 123: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 D. [Greek: Peri\ dê\ sou= lego/mena me/ntoi tha/tera ô(s ta\ au)ta/, kai\ mê\ o)/nta ô(s o)/nta, panta/pasin, ô(s e)/oiken, ê( toiau/tê su/nthesis e)/k te r(êma/tôn gignome/nê kai\ o)noma/tôn o)/ntôs te kai\ a)lêthô=s gi/gnesthai lo/gos pseudê/s.]

It is plain that this explanation takes no account of negative propositions: it applies only to affirmative propositions.]

[Side-note: Imperfect analysis of a proposition--Plato does not recognise the predicate.]

The foregoing is Plato's explanation of Non-Ens. Before we remark upon it, let us examine his mode of analysing a proposition. He conceives the proposition as consisting of a noun and a verb. The noun marks the logical _subject_, but he has no technical word equivalent to _subject_: his phrase is, that a proposition must be _of something_ or _concerning something_. Then again, he not only has no word to designate the predicate, but he does not even seem to conceive the predicate as distinct and separable: it stands along with the copula embodied in the verb. The two essentials of a proposition, as he states them, are--That it should have a certain subject--That it should be of a certain quality, true or false.[124] This conception is just, as far as it goes: but it does not state all which ought to be known about proposition, and it marks an undeveloped logical analysis. It indicates moreover that Plato, not yet conceiving the predicate as a distinct constituent, had not yet conceived the copula as such: and therefore that the substantive verb [Greek: e)/stin] had not yet been understood by him in its function of pure and simple copula. The idea that the substantive verb when used in a proposition must mark _existence_ or _essence_, is sufficiently apparent in several of his reasonings.

[Footnote 124: Since the time of Aristotle, the _quality_ of a proposition has been understood to designate its being either affirmative or negative: that being _formal_, or belonging to its form only. Whether affirmative or negative, it may be true or false: and this is doubtless a _quality_, but belonging to its matter, not to its form. Plato seems to have taken no account of the formal distinction, _negative_ or _affirmative_.]

I shall now say a few words on Plato's explanation of Non-Ens. It is given at considerable length, and was, in the judgment of Schleiermacher, eminently satisfactory to Plato himself. Some of Plato's expressions[125] lead me to suspect that his satisfaction was not thus unqualified: but whether he was himself satisfied or not, I cannot think that the explanation ought to satisfy others.

[Footnote 125: Plato, Sophistês, p. 259 A-B. Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Sophistes, vol. iv. p. 134, of his translation of Plato.]

[Side-note: Plato's explanation of Non-Ens is not satisfactory--Objections to it.]

Plato here lays down the position--That the word _Not_ signifies nothing more than difference, with respect to that other word to which it is attached. It does not signify (he says) what is contrary; but simply what is different. _Not-great_, _Not-beautiful_--mean what is different from great or beautiful: Non-Ens means, not what is contrary to Ens, but simply what is different from Ens.

First, then, even if we admit that Non-Ens has this latter meaning and nothing beyond--yet when we turn to Plato's own definition of Ens, we shall find it so all-comprehensive, that there can be absolutely nothing different from Ens:--these last words can have no place and no meaning. Plato defines Ens so as to include all that is knowable, conceivable, thinkable.[126] One portion of this total differs from another: but there can be nothing which differs from it all. The Form or nature of Diversum (to use Plato's phrase) as it is among the knowable or conceivable, is already included in the total of Ens, and comes into communion (according to the Platonic phraseology) with one portion of that total as against another portion. But with Ens as a whole, it cannot come into communion, for there is nothing apart from Ens. Whenever we try to think of any thing apart from Ens, we do by the act of thought include it in Ens, as defined by Plato. _Different from great_--_different from white_ (_i.e._ not great, not white, sensu Platonico) is very intelligible: but _Different from Ens_, is not intelligible: there is nothing except the inconceivable and incomprehensible: the words professing to describe it, are mere unmeaning sound. Now this is just[127] what Parmenides said about Non-Ens. Plato's definition of Ens appears to me to make out the case of Parmenides about Non-Ens; and to render the Platonic explanation--_different from Ens_--open to quite as many difficulties, as those which attach to Non-Ens in the ordinary sense.

[Footnote 126: Plato, Sophist. pp. 247-248.]

[Footnote 127: Compare Kratylus, 430 A.]

Secondly, there is an objection still graver against Plato's explanation. When he resolves negation into an affirmation of something different from what is denied, he effaces or puts out of sight one of the capital distinctions of logic. What he says is indeed perfectly true: _Not-great_, _Not-beautiful_, _Non-Ens_, are respectively different from _great_, _beautiful_, _Ens_. But this, though true, is only a part of the truth; leaving unsaid another portion of the truth which, while equally essential, is at the same time special and characteristic. The negative not only differs from the affirmative, but has such peculiar meaning of its own, as to exclude the affirmative: both cannot be true together. _Not-great_ is certainly different from _great_: so also, _white_, _hard_, _rough_, _just_, _valiant_, &c, are all different from _great_. But there is nothing in these latter epithets to exclude the co-existence of great. _Theætêtus is great_--_Theætêtus is white_; in the second of these two propositions I affirm something respecting Theætêtus quite different from what I affirm in the first, yet nevertheless noway excluding what is affirmed in the first.[128] The two propositions may both be true. But when I say--_Theætêtus is dead_--_Theætêtus is not dead_: here are two propositions which cannot both be true, from the very form of the words. To explain _not-great_, as Plato does, by saying that it means _only_ something different from great,[129] is to suppress this peculiar meaning and virtue of the negative, whereby it simply excludes the affirmative, without affirming any thing in its place. Plato is right in saying that _not-great_ does not affirm the _contrary_ of great, by which he means _little_.[130] The negative does not affirm any thing: it simply denies. Plato seems to consider the negative as a species of affirmative:[131] only affirming something different from what is affirmed by the term which it accompanies. Not-Great, Not-Beautiful, Not-Just--he declares to be Forms just as real and distinct as Great, Beautiful, Just: only different from these latter. This, in my opinion, is a conception logically erroneous. Negative stands opposed to affirmative, as one of the modes of distributing both terms and propositions. A purely negative term cannot stand alone in the subject of a proposition: _Non-Entis nulla sunt prædicata_--was the scholastic maxim. The apparent exceptions to this rule arise only from the fact, that many terms negative in their form have taken on an affirmative signification.

[Footnote 128: Proklus, in his Commentary on the Parmenidês (p. 281, p. 785, Stallbaum), says, with reference to the doctrine laid down by Plato in the Sophistês, [Greek: o(/lôs ga\r ai( a)potha/seis e)ggonoi/ ei)si tê=s e(tero/têtos tê=s noera=s; dia\ tou=to ga\r _ou)ch i(/ppos_, o(/ti e(/teron--kai\ dia\ tou=to _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_, o(/ti a)/llo.]

Proklus here adopts and repeats Plato's erroneous idea of the negative proposition and its function. When I deny that Caius is just, wise, &c., my denial does not intimate simply that I know him to be something _different_ from just, wise; for he may have fifty _different_ attributes, co-existent and consistent with justice and wisdom.

To employ the language of Aristotle (see a pertinent example, Physic. i. 8, 191, b. 15, where he distinguishes [Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n kath' au(to\] from [Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n kata\ sumbebêko/s]), we may say that it is not of the essence of the Different to deny or exclude that from which it is different: the Different may deny or exclude, but that is only by _accident_--[Greek: kata\ sumbebêko/s]. Plato includes, in the essence of the Different, that which belongs to it only by accident.

Aristotle in more than one place distinguishes [Greek: diaphora\] from [Greek: e)nanti/ôsis]--not always in the same language. In Metaphysic. I. p. 1055 a. 33, he considers that the root of all [Greek: e)nanti/ôsis] is [Greek: e(/xis] and [Greek: ste/rêsis], understood in the widest sense, _i.e._ affirmative and negative. See Bonitz, not. ad loc., and Waitz, ad Categor. p. 12, a. 26. The last portion of the treatise [Greek: Peri\ E(rmênei/as] was interpreted by Syrianus with a view to uphold Plato's opinion here given in the Sophistes (Schol. ad Aristot. p. 136, a. 15 Brandis).]

[Footnote 129: Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B. [Greek: ou)k e)nanti/on e)kei/nô| sêmai/nousa, a)lla\ _tosou=ton mo/non_, e(/teron e)kei/nou.]

If we look to the Euthydêmus we shall see that this confusion between what is different from A, and what is incompatible with or exclusive of A, is one of the fallacies which Plato puts into the mouth of the two Sophists Euthydêmus and Dionysodôrus, whom he exhibits and exposes in that dialogue. [Greek: A)/llo ti ou)=n e(/teros, ê)= d' o(/s] (Dionysodorus), [Greek: ô)\n li/thou, ou) li/thos ei)=? kai\ e(/teros ô)\n chrusou=, ou) chruso\s ei)=? E)/sti tau=ta. Ou)kou=n kai\ o( Chaire/dêmos, e)/phê, e(/teros ô)\n patro/s, ou)k a)\n patê\r ei)/ê?] (Plat. Euthydem. p. 298 A).]

[Footnote 130: Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B.]

[Footnote 131: Plato, Sophist. pp. 257 E, 258 A.

[Greek: O)/ntos dê\ pro\s o)\n a)nti/thesis, ô(s e)/oik', ei)=nai xumbai/nei to\ _mê\ kalo/n_. . . .

O(moi/ôs a)/ra to\ mê\ me/ga, kai\ to\ me/ga au)to\ _ei)=nai_ lekte/on.]

Plato distinctly recognises here Forms or Ideas [Greek: tô=n a)popha/seôn], which the Platonists professed not to do, according to Aristotle, Metaphys. A. 990, b. 13--see the instructive Scholia of Alexander, p. 565, a. Brandis.]

[Side-note: Plato's view of the negative is erroneous. Logical maxim of contradiction.]

The view which Plato here takes of the negative deserves the greater notice, because, if it were adopted, what is called the maxim of contradiction would be divested of its universality. Given a significant proposition with the same subject and the same predicate, each taken in one and the same signification--its affirmative and its negative cannot both be true. But if by the negative, you mean to make a new affirmation, different from that contained in the affirmative--the maxim just stated cannot be broadly maintained as of universal application: it may or may not be valid, as the case happens to stand. The second affirmation may be, as a matter of fact, incompatible with the first: but this is not to be presumed, from the mere fact that it is different from the first: proof must be given of such incompatibility.

[Side-note: Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato--How do we know that one is true, the other false?]

We may illustrate this remark by looking at the two propositions which Plato gives as examples of true and false. _Theætêtus is sitting down_--_Theætêtus is flying_. Both the examples are of affirmative propositions: and it seems clear that Plato, in all this reasoning, took no account of negative propositions: those which simply deny, affirming nothing. The second of these propositions (says Plato) affirms _what is not_, as if it were, respecting the subject But how do we know this to be so? In the form of the second proposition there is nothing to show it: there is no negation of any thing, but simply affirmation of a different positive attribute. Although it happens, in this particular case, that the two attributes are incompatible, and that the affirmation of the one includes the negation of the other--yet there is nothing in the form of either proposition to deny the other:--no formal incompatibility between them. Both are alike affirmative, with the same subject, but different predicates. These two propositions therefore do not serve to illustrate the real nature of the negative, which consists precisely in this formal incompatibility. The proper negative belonging to the proposition--_Theætêtus is sitting down_--would be, _Theætêtus is not sitting down_. Plato ought to maintain, if he followed out his previous argument, that Not-Sitting down is as good a Form as Sitting-down, and that it meant merely--Different from Sitting down. But instead of doing this Plato gives us a new affirmative proposition, which, besides what it affirms, conceals an implied negation of the first proposition. This does not serve to illustrate the purpose of his reasoning--which was to set up the formal negative as a new substantive attribute, different from its corresponding affirmative. As between the two, the maxim of contradiction applies: both cannot be true. But as between the two propositions given in Plato, that maxim has no application: they are two propositions with the same subject, but different predicates; which happen in this case to be, the one true, the other false--but which are not formally incompatible. The second is not false because it differs from the first; it has no essential connection with the first, and would be equally false, even if the first were false also.

The function of the negative is to deny. Now denial is not a species of affirmation, but the reversal or antithesis of affirmation: it nullifies a belief previously entertained, or excludes one which might otherwise be entertained,--but it affirms nothing. In particular cases, indeed, the denial of one thing may be tantamount to the affirmation of another: for a man may know that there are only two suppositions possible, and that to shut out the one is to admit the other. But this is an inference drawn in virtue of previous knowledge possessed and contributed by himself: another man without such knowledge would not draw the same inference, nor could he learn it from the negative proposition _per se_. Such then is the genuine meaning of the negative; from which Plato departs, when he tells us that the negative is a kind of affirmation, only affirming something different--and when he illustrates it by producing two affirmative propositions respecting the same subject, affirming different attributes, the one as matter of fact incompatible with the other.

[Side-note: Necessity of accepting the evidence of sense.]

But how do we know that the first proposition--_Theætêtus is sitting down_--affirms what is:--and that the second proposition--_Theætêtus is flying_--affirms what is not? If present, our senses testify to us the truth of the first, and the falsehood of the second: if absent, we have the testimony of a witness, combined with our own past experience attesting the frequency of facts analogous to the one, and the non-occurrence of facts analogous to the other. When we make the distinction, then,--we assume that what is attested by sense or by comparisons and inductions from the facts of sense, is real, or _is_: and that what is merely conceived or imagined, without the attestation of sense (either directly or by way of induction), is not real, or _is not_. Upon this assumption Plato himself must proceed, when he takes it for granted, as a matter of course, that the first proposition is true, and the second false. But he forgets that this assumption contradicts the definition which, in this same dialogue,[132] he had himself given of Ens--of the real or _the thing that is_. His definition was so comprehensive, as to include not only all that could be seen or felt, but also all that had capacity to be known or conceived by the mind: and he speaks very harshly of those who admit the reality of things perceived, but refuse to admit equal reality to things only conceived. Proceeding then upon this definition, we can allow no distinction as to truth or falsehood between the two propositions--_Theætêtus is sitting down_--_Theætêtus is flying_: the predicate of the second affirms what is, just as much as the predicate of the first: for it affirms something which, though neither perceived nor perceivable by sense, is distinctly conceivable and conceived by the mind. When Plato takes for granted the distinction between the two, that the first affirms _what is_, and the second _what is not_--he unconsciously slides into that very recognition of the testimony of sense (in other words, of fact and experience), as the certificate of reality, which he had so severely denounced in the opposing materialist philosophers: and upon the ground of which he thought himself entitled, not merely to correct them as mistaken, but to reprove them as wicked and impudent.[133]

[Footnote 132: Plato, Sophist. pp. 247 D-E, 248 D-E.]

[Footnote 133: Plato, Sophist. p. 246 D.]

[Side-note: Errors of Antisthenes--depended partly on the imperfect formal logic of that day.]

I have thus reviewed a long discussion--terminating in a conclusion which appears to me unsatisfactory--of the meaning and function of the negative. I hardly think that Plato would have given such an explanation of it, if he had had the opportunity of studying the Organon of Aristotle. Prior to Aristotle, the principles and distinctions of formal logic were hardly at all developed; nor can we wonder that others at that time fell into various errors which Plato scornfully derides, but very imperfectly rectifies. For example, Antisthenes did not admit the propriety of any predication, except identical, or at most essential, predication: the word [Greek: e)/stin] appeared to him incompatible with any other. But we perceive in this dialogue, that Plato also did not conceive the substantive verb as performing the simple function of copula in predication: on the contrary he distinguishes [Greek: e)/stin], as marking identity between subject and predicate--from [Greek: mete/chei], as marking accidental communion between the two. Again, there were men in Plato's day who maintained that Non-Ens ([Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n]) was inconceivable and impossible. Plato, in refuting these philosophers, gives a definition of Ens ([Greek: to\ o)\n]), which puts them in the right--fails in stating what the true negative is--and substitutes, in place of simple denial, a second affirmation to overlay and supplant the first.

[Side-note: Doctrine of the Sophistês--contradicts that of other Platonic dialogues.]

To complete the examination of this doctrine of the Sophistês, respecting Non-Ens, we must compare it with the doctrine on the same subject laid down in other Platonic dialogues. It will be found to contradict, very distinctly, the opinion assigned by Plato to Sokrates both in the Theætêtus and in the fifth Book of the Republic:[134] where Sokrates deals with Non-Ens in its usual sense as the negation of Ens: laying down the position that Non-Ens can be neither the object of the cognizing Mind, nor the object of the opining ([Greek: doxa/zôn]) or cogitant Mind: that it is uncognizable and incogitable, correlating only with Non-Cognition or Ignorance. Now we find that this doctrine (of Sokrates, in Theætêtus and Republic) is the very same as that which is affirmed, in the Sophistês, to be taken up by the delusive Sophist: the same as that which the Eleate spends much ingenuity in trying to refute, by proving that Non-Ens is not the negation of Ens, but only that which differs from Ens, being itself a particular variety of Ens. It is also the same doctrine as is declared, both by the Eleate in the Sophistês and by Sokrates in the Theætêtus, to imply as an undeniable consequence, that the falsehood of any proposition is impossible. "A false proposition is that which speaks the thing that is not ([Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n]). But this is an impossibility. You can neither know, nor think, nor speak, the thing that is not. You cannot know without knowing something: you cannot speak without speaking something (_i. e._ something that is)." Of this consequence--which is expressly announced as included in the doctrine, both by the Eleate in the Sophistês and by the Platonic Sokrates in the Theætêtus--no notice is taken in the Republic.[135]

[Footnote 134: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 477-478. Theætêt. pp. 188-189. Parmenidês, pp. 160 C, 163 C. Euthydêmus, p. 284 B-C.

Aristotle (De Interpretat. p. 21, a. 22) briefly expresses his dissent from an opinion, the same as what is given in the Platonic Sophistês--that [Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n] is [Greek: o)/n ti]. He makes no mention of Plato, but Ammonius in the Scholia alludes to Plato (p. 129, b. 20, Schol. Bekk.).

We must note that the Eleate in the Sophistês states both opinions respecting [Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n]: first that which he refutes--next that which he advances. The Scholiast may, therefore, refer to both opinions, as _stated_ in the Sophistês, though one of them is stated only for the purpose of being refuted.

We may contrast with these views of Plato (in the Sophistês) respecting [Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n], as not being a negation [Greek: tou= o)/ntos], but simply a something [Greek: e(/teron tou= o)/ntos], the different views of Aristotle about [Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n], set forth in the instructive Commentary of M. Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, p. 360.

"Le non-être s'oppose à l'être, comme sa négation: ce n'est donc pas, non plus que l'être, une chose simple; et autant il y a de genres de l'être, autant il faut que le non-être ait de genres. Cependant l'opposition de l'être et du non-être, différente, en realité, dans chacune des catégories, est la même dans toutes par sa forme. Dans cette forme, le second terme n'exprime pas autre chose que l'absence du premier. Le rapport de l'être et du non-être consiste donc dans une pure contradiction: dernière forme à laquelle toute opposition doit se ramener."

Aristotle seems to allude to the Sophistês, though not mentioning it by its title, in three passages of the Metaphysica--E. 1026, b. 14; K. 1064, b. 29; N. 1089, a. 5 (see the note of Bonitz on the latter passage)--perhaps also elsewhere (see Ueberweg, pp. 153-154). Plato replied in one way, Leukippus and Demokritus in another, to the doctrine of Parmenides, who banished Non-Ens as incogitable. Leukippus maintained that Non-Ens equivalent to [Greek: to\ keno/n], and that the two elements of things were [Greek: to\ plê=res] and [Greek: to\ keno/n], for which he used the expressions [Greek: de\n] and [Greek: ou)de/n]. Plato replied as we read in the Sophistês: thus both he and Leukippus tried in different ways to demonstrate a positive nature and existence for Non-Ens. See Aristot. Metaph. A. 985, b. 4, with the Scholia, p. 538, Brandis. The Scholiast cites Plato [Greek: e)n tê=| Politei/a|], which seems a mistake for [Greek: e)n tô=| Sophi/stê|].]