Chapter XXIX: Sophistes--Politikus (2)

Probably (replies Theætêtus) these philosophers would contend that the soul or mind had a body; but they would be ashamed either to deny that justice, prudence, &c., existed as realities--or to affirm that justice, prudence, &c. were all bodies.[48] These philosophers must then have become better (rejoins the Eleate): for the primitive and genuine leaders of them will not concede even so much as that. But let us accept the concession. If they will admit any incorporeal reality at all, however small, our case is made out. For we shall next call upon them to say, what there is in common between these latter, and those other realities which have bodies connate with and essential to them--to justify the names _real_--_essence_--bestowed upon both.[49] Perhaps they would accept the following definition of Ens or the Real--of Essence or Reality. Every thing which possesses any sort of power, either to act upon any thing else or to be acted upon by any thing else, be it only for once or to the smallest degree--every such thing is true and real Ens. The characteristic mark or definition of Ens or the Real is, power or potentiality.[50]

[Footnote 48: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 B. [Greek: A)pokri/nontai . . . tê\n me\n psuchê\n au)tê\n dokei=n sphi/si sô=ma/ ti kektê=sthai, phro/nêsin de\ kai\ tô=n a)/llôn e(/kaston ô(=n ê)rô/têkas, ai)schu/nontai to\ tolma=|n ê)\ mêde\n tô=n o)/ntôn au)ta\ o(mologei=n, ê)\ pa/nt' ei)=nai sô/mata dii+schuri/zesthai.]]

[Footnote 49: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 C-D. [Greek: ei) ga/r ti kai\ smikro\n e)the/lousi tô=n o)/ntôn sugchôrei=n a)sô/maton, e)xarkei=. to\ ga\r e)pi/ te tou/tois a(/ma kai\ e)p' e)kei/nois o(/sa e)/chei sô=ma xumphue\s gegono/s, ei)s o(\ ble/pontes a)mpho/tera _ei)=nai_ le/gousi, tou=to au)toi=s r(ête/on.]]

[Footnote 50: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 D-E. [Greek: le/gô dê\ to\ kai\ o(poianou=n kektême/non _du/namin_, ei)/t' ei)s to\ poiei=n e(/teron o(tiou=n pephuko\s ei)/t' ei)s to\ pathei=n kai\ smikro/taton u(po\ tou= phaulota/tou, ka)\n ei) mo/non ei)sa/pax, pa=n tou=to o)/ntôs ei)=nai; ti/themai ga\r o(/ron o(ri/zein ta\ o)/nta, ô(s e)/stin ou)k a)/llo ti plê\n _du/namis_.]]

[Side-note: Argument against the Idealists--who distinguish Ens from the generated, and say that we hold communion with the former through our minds, with the latter through our bodies and senses.]

The Eleate now turns to the philosophers of the opposite school--the Mentalists or Idealists,--whom he terms the friends of Forms, Ideas, or species.[51] These men (he says) distinguish the generated, transitory and changeable--from Ens or the Real, which is eternal, unchanged, always the same: they distinguish generation from essence. With the generated (according to their doctrine) we hold communion through our bodies and our bodily perceptions: with Ens, we hold communion through our mind and our intellectual apprehension. But what do they mean (continues the Eleate) by this "holding of communion"? Is it not an action or a passion produced by a certain power of agent and patient coming into co-operation with each other? and is not this the definition which we just now laid down, of Ens or the Real.

[Footnote 51: Plato, Sophist. p. 248 A. [Greek: tou\s tô=n ei)dô=n phi/lous].]

[Side-note: Holding communion--What? Implies Relativity. Ens is known by the mind. It therefore suffers or undergoes change. Ens includes both the unchangeable and the changeable.]

_No_--these philosophers will reply--we do not admit your definition as a definition of Ens: it applies only to the generated. Generation does involve, or emanate from, a reciprocity of agent and patient: but neither power nor action, nor suffering, have any application to Ens or the Real. But you admit (says the Eleate) that the mind knows Ens:--and that Ens is known by the mind. Now this _knowing_, is it not an action--and is not the _being known_, a passion? If _to know_ is an action, then Ens, being known, is acted upon, suffers something, or undergoes some change,--which would be impossible if we assume Ens to be eternally unchanged. These philosophers might reply, that they do not admit _to know_ as an action, nor _to be known_ as a passion. They affirm Ens to be eternally unchanged, and they hold to their other affirmation that Ens is known by the mind. But (urges the Eleate) can they really believe that Ens is eternally the same and unchanged,--that it has neither life, nor mind, nor intelligence, nor change, nor movement? This is incredible. They must concede that Change, and the Changeable, are to be reckoned as Entia or Realities: for if these be not so reckoned, and if all Entia are unchangeable, no Ens can be an object of knowledge to any mind. But though the changeable belongs to Ens, we must not affirm that _all_ Ens is changeable. There cannot be either intellect or knowledge, without something constant and unchangeable. It is equally necessary to recognise something as constant and unchangeable--something else as moving and changeable: Ens or reality includes alike one and the other. The true philosopher therefore cannot agree with those "Friends of Forms" who affirm all Ens or Reality to be at rest and unchangeable, either under one form or under many:--still less can he agree with those opposite reasoners, who maintain all reality to be in perpetual change and movement. He will acknowledge both and each--rest and motion--the constant and the changeable--as making up together total reality or Ens Totum.

[Side-note: Motion and rest are both of them Entia or realities. Both agree in Ens. Ens is a _tertium quid_--distinct from both. But how can anything be distinct from both?]

Still, however, we have not got over our difficulties. Motion and Rest are contraries; yet we say that each and both are Realities or Entia. In what is it that they both agree? Not in moving, nor in being at rest, but simply in existence or reality. Existence or reality therefore must be a _tertium quid_, apart from motion and rest, not the sum total of those two items. Ens or the Real is not, in its own proper nature, either in motion or at rest, but is distinct from both. Yet how can this be? Surely, whatever is not in motion, must be at rest--whatever is not at rest, must be in motion. How can any thing be neither in motion nor at rest; standing apart from both?[52]

[Footnote 52: Plato, Sophist. p. 250 C.]

[Side-note: Here the Eleate breaks off without solution. He declares his purpose to show, That Ens is as full of puzzle as Non-Ens,]

Here the Eleate breaks off his enquiry, without solving the problems which he has accumulated. My purpose was (he says[53]) to show that Ens was just as full of difficulties and embarrassments as Non-Ens. Enough has been said to prove this clearly. When we can once get clear of obscurity about Ens, we may hope to be equally successful with Non-Ens.

[Footnote 53: Plato, Sophist. p. 250 D.]

[Side-note: Argument against those who admit no predication to be legitimate, except identical. How far Forms admit of intercommunion with each other.]

Let us try (he proceeds) another path. We know that it is a common practice in our daily speech to apply many different predicates to one and the same subject. We say of the same man, that he is fair, tall, just, brave, &c., and several other epithets. Some persons deny our right to do this. They say that the predicate ought always to be identical with the subject: that we can only employ with propriety such propositions as the following--man is man--good is good, &c.: that to apply many predicates to one and the same subject is to make one thing into many things.[54] But in reply to these opponents, as well as to those whom we have before combated, we shall put before them three alternatives, of which they must choose one. 1. Either all Forms admit of intercommunion one with the other. 2. Or no Forms admit of such intercommunion. 3. Or some Forms do admit of it, and others not. Between these three an option must be made.[55]

[Footnote 54: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 B. [Greek: ô(s a)du/naton ta/ te polla\ e(\n kai\ to\ e(\n polla\ ei)=nai], &c.]

[Footnote 55: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 E.]

[Side-note: No intercommunion between any distinct forms. Refuted. Common speech is inconsistent with this hypothesis.]

If we take the first alternative--that there is no intercommunion of Forms--then the Forms _motion_ and _rest_ can have no intercommunion with the Forms, _essence_ or _reality_. In other words, neither motion nor rest exist: and thus the theory both of those who say that all things are in perpetual movement, and of those who say that all things are in perpetual rest, becomes unfounded and impossible. Besides, these very men, who deny all intercommunion of Forms, are obliged to admit it implicitly and involuntarily in their common forms of speech. They cannot carry on a conversation without it, and they thus serve as a perpetual refutation of their own doctrine.[56]

[Footnote 56: Plato, Sophist. p. 252 D.]

[Side-note: Reciprocal intercommunion of all Forms--inadmissible.]

The second alternative--that all Forms may enter into communion with each other--is also easily refuted. If this were true, motion and rest might be put together: motion would be at rest, and rest would be in motion--which is absurd. These and other forms are contrary to each other. They reciprocally exclude and repudiate all intercommunion.[57]

[Footnote 56: Plato, Sophist. p. 252 E.]

[Side-note: Some Forms admit of intercommunion, others not. This is the only admissible doctrine. Analogy of letters and syllables.]

Remains only the third alternative--that some forms admit of intercommunion--others not. This is the real truth (says the Eleate). So it stands in regard to letters and words in language: some letters come together in words frequently and conveniently--others rarely and awkwardly--others never do nor ever can come together. The same with the combination of sounds to obtain music. It requires skill and art to determine which of these combinations are admissible.

[Side-note: Art and skill are required to distinguish what Forms admit of intercommunion, and what Forms do not. This is the special intelligence of the Philosopher, who lives in the bright region of Ens: the Sophist lives in the darkness of Non-Ens.]

So also, in regard to the intercommunion of Forms, skill and art are required to decide which of them will come together, and which will not. In every special art and profession the case is similar: the ignorant man will fail in deciding this question--the man of special skill alone will succeed.--So in regard to the intercommunion of Forms or Genera universally with each other, the comprehensive science of the true philosopher is required to decide.[58] To note and study these Forms, is the purpose of the philosopher in his dialectics or ratiocinative debate. He can trace the one Form or Idea, stretching through a great many separate particulars; he can distinguish it from all different Forms: he knows which Forms are not merely distinct from each other, but incapable of alliance and reciprocally repulsive--which of them are capable of complete conjunction, the one circumscribing and comprehending the other--and which of them admit conjunction partial and occasional with each other.[59] The philosopher thus keeps close to the Form of eternal and unchangeable Ens or Reality--a region of such bright light that the eyes of the vulgar cannot clearly see him: while the Sophist on the other hand is also difficult to be seen, but for an opposite reason--from the darkness of that region of Non-Ens or Non-Reality wherein he carries on his routine-work.[60]

[Footnote 58: Plato, Sophist. p. 253 B. [Greek: a)=r' ou) met' e)pistê/mês tino\s a)nagkai=on dia\ tô=n lo/gôn poreu/esthai to\n o)rthô=s me/llonta dei/xein poi=a poi/ois sumphônei= tô=n genô=n kai\ poi=a a)/llêla ou) de/chetai?]]

[Footnote 59: Plato, Sophist. p. 253 D-E.]

[Footnote 60: Plato, Sophist. p. 254 A. [Greek: O( de/ ge philo/sophos, tê=| tou= o)/ntos a)ei\ dia\ logismô=n proskei/menos i)de/a|, dia\ to\ lampro\n au)= tê=s chô/ras ou)damô=s eu)pe/tês o)phthê=nai; ta\ ga\r tê=s tô=n pollô=n psuchê=s o)/mmata karterei=n pro\s to\ thei=on a)phorô=nta a)du/nata.]]

[Side-note: He comes to enquire what Non-Ens is. He takes for examination five principal Forms--Motion--Rest--Ens--Same--Different.]

We have still to determine, however (continues Plato), what this Non-Ens or Non-Reality is. For this purpose we will take a survey, not of all Forms or Genera, but of some few the most important. We will begin with the two before noticed--Motion and Rest ( = Change and Permanence), which are confessedly irreconcileable and reciprocally exclusive. Ens however enters into partnership with both: for both of them _are_, or exist.[61] This makes up three Forms or Genera--Motion, Rest, Ens: each of the three being the same with itself, and different from the other two. Here we have pronounced two new words--Same--Different.[62] Do these words designate two other Forms, over and above the three before-named, yet necessarily always intermingling in partnership with those three, so as to make five Forms in all? Or are these two--Same and Different--essential appendages of the three before-named? This last question must be answered in the negative. Same and Different are not essential appendages, or attached as parts, to Motion, Rest, Ens. Same and Different may be predicated both of Motion and of Rest: and whatever can be predicated alike of two contraries, cannot be an essential portion or appendage of either. Neither Motion nor Rest therefore _are_ essentially either Same or Different: though both of them partake of Same or Different--_i.e._, come into accidental co-partnership with one as well as the other.[63] Neither can we say that Ens is identical with either Idem or Diversum. Not with Idem--for we speak of both Motion and Rest as Entia or Existences: but we cannot speak of them as the same. Not with Diversum--for _different_ is a name relative to something else from which it is different, but Ens is not thus relative. Motion and Rest _are_ or exist, each in itself: but each is _different_, relatively to the other, and to other things generally. Accordingly we have here five Forms or Genera--Ens, Motion, Rest, Idem, Diversum: each distinct from and independent of all the rest.[64]

[Footnote 61: Plato, Sophist. p. 254 D. [Greek: to\ de/ ge o)\n mikto\n a)mphoi=n; _e)sto\n_ ga\r a)/mphô pou.]]

[Footnote 62: Plato, Sophist. p. 254 E. [Greek: ti/ pot' au)= nu=n ou(/tôs ei)rê/kamen to/ te tau)to\n kai\ tha/teron? po/tera du/o ge/nê tine\ au)tô/, tô=n me\n triô=n a)/llô], &c.]

[Footnote 63: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 B. [Greek: mete/cheton mê\n a)/mphô tau)tou= kai\ thate/rou . . . Mê\ toi/nun le/gômen ki/nêsi/n _g' ei)=nai_ tau)to\n ê)\ tha/teron, mêd' au)= sta/sin.]]

[Footnote 64: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 D.]

[Side-note: Form of Diversum pervades all the others.]

This Form of Diversum or Different pervades all the others: for each one of them is different from the others, not through any thing in its own nature, but because it partakes of the Form of Difference.[65] Each of the five is different from others: or, to express the same fact in other words, each of them _is not_ any one of the others. Thus motion is different from rest, or _is not_ rest: but nevertheless motion _is_ or exists, because it partakes of the Form--Ens. Again, Motion is different from Idem: it _is not_ the Same: yet nevertheless it _is_ the same, because it partakes of the nature of Idem, or is the same with itself. Thus then both predications are true respecting motion: it _is_ the same: it _is not_ the same, because it partakes of or enters into partnership with both Idem and Diversum.[66] If motion in any way partook of Rest, we should be able to talk of stationary motion: but this is impossible: for we have already said that some Forms cannot come into intercommunion--that they absolutely exclude each other.

[Footnote 65: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 E. [Greek: kai\ dia\ pa/ntôn ge au)tê\n phê/somen ei)=nai dielêluthui=an (tê\n thate/rou phu/sin) e(\n e(/kaston ga\r e(/teron ei)=nai tô=n a)/llôn, _ou) dia\ tê\n au)tou= phu/sin_, a)lla\ dia\ to\ mete/chein tê=s i)de/as tê=s thate/rou.]]

[Footnote 66: Plato, Sophist. p. 256 A. [Greek: tê\n ki/nêsin dê\ tau)to/n t' ei)=nai kai\ mê\ tau)to\n o(mologête/on kai\ ou) duscherante/on], &c.]

[Side-note: Motion is different from Diversum, or is not Diversum. Motion is different from Ens--in other words, it is Non-Ens. Each of these Forms is both Ens and Non-Ens.]

Again, Motion is different not only from Rest, and from Idem, but also from Diversum itself. In other words, it is both Diversum in a certain way, and also not Diversum: different and not different.[67] As it is different from Rest, from Idem, from Diversum--so also it is different from Ens, the remaining one of the five forms or genera. In other words Motion is not Ens,--or is Non-Ens. It is both Ens, and Non-Ens: Ens, so far as it partakes of Entity or Reality--Non-Ens, so far as it partakes of Difference, and is thus different from Ens as well as from the other Forms.[68] The same may be said of the other Forms,--Rest, Idem, Diversum: each of them is Ens, because it partakes of entity or reality: each of them is also Non-Ens, or different from Ens, because it partakes of Difference. Moreover, Ens itself is different from the other four, and so far as these others go, it is Non-Ens.[69]

[Footnote 67: Plato, Sophist. p. 256 C. [Greek: ou)ch e(/teron a)]r' e)sti/ pê| kai\ e(/teron kata\ to\n nu=n dê\ lo/gon.]]

[Footnote 68: Plato, Sophist. p. 256 D. [Greek: ou)kou=n dê\ saphô=s ê( ki/nêsis o)/ntôs ou)k o)/n e)sti kai\ o)\n, e)pei/per tou= o)/ntos mete/chei?]]

[Footnote 69: Plato, Sophist. p. 257 A. [Greek: kai\ to\ o)/n a)/r' ê(mi=n, o(/sa per e)/sti ta\ a)/lla, kata\ tosau=ta ou)k e)/stin; e)kei=na ga\r ou)k o)\n e(\n me\n au)to/ e)stin, a)pe/ranta de\ to\n a)rithmo\n ta)/lla ou)k e)/stin au)=.]]

[Side-note: By Non-Ens, we do not mean anything contrary to Ens--we mean only something different from Ens. Non-Ens is a real Form, as well as Ens.]

Now note the consequence (continues the Eleate). When we speak of Non-Ens, we do not mean any thing contrary to Ens, but only something different from Ens. When we call any thing _not great_, we do not affirm it to be the contrary of great, or to be _little_: for it may perhaps be simply equal: we only mean that it is different from great.[70] A negative proposition, generally, does not signify anything contrary to the predicate, but merely something else distinct or different from the predicate.[71] The Form of Different, though of one and the same general nature throughout, is distributed into many separate parts or specialties, according as it is attached to different things. Thus _not beautiful_ is a special mode of the general Form or Genus Different, placed in antithesis with another Form or Genus, _the beautiful_. The antithesis is that of one Ens or Real thing against another Ens or Real thing: _not beautiful_, _not great_, _not just_, exist just as much and are quite as real, as _beautiful_, _great_, _just_. If the Different be a real Form or Genus, all its varieties must be real also. Accordingly Different from Ens is just as much a real Form as Ens itself:[72] and this is what we mean by Non-Ens:--not any thing contrary to Ens.

[Footnote 70: Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B. [Greek: O(po/tan to\ mê\ o)\n le/gômen, ô(s e)/oiken, ou)k e)nanti/on ti le/gomen tou= o)/ntos, a)ll' e(/teron mo/non . . . Oi(=on o(/tan ei)pôme/n _ti mê\ me/ga_, to/te ma=llo/n ti/ soi phaino/metha to\ smikro\n ê)\ to\ i)/son dêlou=n tô=| r(ê/mati.]

Plato here means to imply that [Greek: to\ smikro\n] is the real contrary of [Greek: to\ me/ga]. When we say [Greek: mê\ me/ga], we do not necessarily mean [Greek: smikro/n]--we may mean [Greek: i)/son]. Therefore [Greek: to\ mê\ me/ga] does not (in his view) imply the contrary of [Greek: me/ga].]

[Footnote 71: Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B. [Greek: Ou)k a)/r' e)nanti/on, o(/tan a)po/phasis le/gêtai, sêmai/nein sugchôrêso/metha, tosou=ton de\ mo/non, o(/ti tô=n a)/llôn ti mênu/ei to\ mê\ kai\ to\ ou) protithe/mena tô=n e)pio/ntôn o)noma/tôn, ma=llon de\ tô=n pragma/tôn peri\ a)/tt' a)\n ke/êtai ta\ e)piphtheggo/mena u(/steron tê=s a)popha/seôs o)no/mata.]]

[Footnote 72: Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B. [Greek: ê( tê=s thate/rou mori/ou phu/seôs kai\ tê=s tou= o)/ntos pro\s a)/llêla a)ntikeime/nôn a)ntithesis ou)de\n ê)=tton, ei) the/mis ei)pei=n au)tou= tou= o)/ntos ou)si/a e)sti/n; ou)k e)nanti/on e)kei/nô| sêmai/nousa, a)lla\ tosou=ton mo/non, e(/teron e)kei/nou.]]

[Side-note: The Eleate claims to have refuted Parmenides, and to have shown both that Non-Ens is a real Form, and also what it is.]

Here then the Eleate professes to have found what Non-Ens is: that it is a real substantive Form, numerable among the other Forms, and having a separate constant nature of its own, like _not beautiful_, _not great_:[73] that it is real and existent, just as much as _Ens_, _beautiful_, _great_, &c. Disregarding the prohibition of Parmenides, we have shown (says he) not only that Non-Ens exists, but also what it is. Many Forms or Genera enter into partnership or communion with each other; and Non-Ens is the partnership between Ens and Diversum. Diversum, in partnership with Ens, _is_ (exists), in consequence of such partnership:--yet _it is not_ that with which it is in partnership, but different therefrom--and being thus different from Ens, it is clearly and necessarily Non-Ens: while Ens also, by virtue of its partnership with Diversum, is different from all the other Forms, or _is not_ any one of them, and to this extent therefore Ens is Non-Ens. We drop altogether the idea of contrariety, without enquiring whether it be reasonably justifiable or not: we attach ourselves entirely to the Form--_Different_.[74]

[Footnote 73: Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B-C. [Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n bebai/ôs e)sti\ tê\n au)tou= phu/sin e)/chon . . . e)na/rithmon tô=n pollô=n o)/ntô=n ei)=dos e(/n.]]

[Footnote 74: Plato, Sophist. pp. 258 E--259 A. [Greek: ê(mei=s ga\r peri\ me\n e)nanti/ou tino\s au)tô=| chai/rein pa/lai le/gomen, ei)/t' e)/stin ei)/te mê\ lo/gon e)/chon ê)\ kai\ panta/pasin a)/logon], &c.

[Greek: to\ me\n e(/teron metascho\n tou= o)/ntos _e)/sti_ me\n dia\ tau/tên tê\n me/thexin, ou) mê\n e)kei=no ge ou)= me/teschen, a)ll' e(/teron, e(/teron de\ tou= o)/ntos o)/n e)sti saphe/stata e)x a)na/gkês ei)=nai mê\ o)/n], &c.]

[Side-note: The theory now stated is the only one, yet given, which justifies predication as a legitimate process, with a predicate different from the subject.]

Let those refute this explanation, who can do so (continues the Eleate), or let them propose a better of their own, if they can: if not, let them allow the foregoing as possible.[75] Let them not content themselves with multiplying apparent contradictions, by saying that the same may be in some particular respect different, and that the different may be in some particular respect the same, through this or the other accidental attribute.[76] All these sophisms lead but to make us believe--That no one thing can be predicated of any other--That there is no intercommunion of the distinct Forms one with another, no right to predicate of any subject a second name and the possession of a new attribute--That therefore there can be no dialectic debate or philosophy, which is all founded upon such intercommunion of Forms.[77] We have shown that Forms do really come into conjunction, so as to enable us to conjoin, truly and properly, predicate with subject, and to constitute proposition and judgment as taking place among the true Forms or Genera. Among these true Forms or Genera, Non-Ens is included as one.[78]

[Footnote 75: Plato, Sophist. p. 259 A-C. [Greek: o(\ de\ nu=n ei)rê/kamen ei)=nai to\ mê\ o)/n, ê)\ peisa/tô tis ô(s ou) kalô=s le/gomen e)le/gxas, ê)\ me/chri per a)\n a)dunatê=|, lekte/on kai\ e)kei=nô| katha/per ê(mei=s le/gomen . . . to\ tau=ta _e)a/santa ô(s dunata/_. . . .]

The language of the Eleate here is altogether at variance with the spirit of Plato in his negative or Searching Dialogues. To say, as he does, "Either accept the explanation which I give, or propose a better of your own"--is a dilemma which the Sokrates of the Theætêtus, and other dialogues, would have declined altogether. The complaint here made by the Eleate, against disputants who did nothing but propound difficulties--is the same as that which the hearers of Sokrates made against _him_ (see Plato, Philêbus, p. 20 A, where the remark is put into the mouth, not of an opponent, but of a respectful young listener); and many a reader of the Platonic Parmenidês has indulged in the complaint.]

[Footnote 76: Plato, Sophist. p. 259 D. [Greek: e)kei/nê| kai\ kat' e)kei=no o(/ phêsi tou/tôn peponthe/nai po/teron.]]

[Footnote 77: Plato, Sophist. p. 259 B, E. [Greek: dia\ ga\r tê\n a)llê/lôn tô=n ei)dô=n sumplokê\n o( lo/gos ge/gonen ê(mi=n.] 252 B: [Greek: oi( mêde\n e)ô=ntes koinôni/a| pathê/matos e(te/rou tha/teron prosagoreu/ein.]]

[Footnote 78: Plato, Sophist. p. 260 A. [Greek: pro\s to\ to\n lo/gon ê(mi=n tô=n o)/ntôn e(/n ti genô=n ei)=nai.] 258 B: [Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n bebai/ôs e)sti\ tê\n au(tou= phu/sin e)/chon.]]

[Side-note: Enquiry, whether the Form of Non-Ens can come into intercommunion with the Forms of Proposition, Opinion, Judgment.]

The Eleate next proceeds to consider, whether these two Genera or Forms--Proposition, Judgment, Opinion, on the one hand, and Non-Ens on the other--are among those which may or do enter into partnership and conjunction with each other. For we have admitted that there are some Forms which cannot come into partnership; and the Sophist against whom we are reasoning, though we have driven him to concede that Non-Ens is a real Form, may still contend that it is one of those which cannot come into partnership with Proposition, Judgment, Opinion--and he may allege that we can neither embody in language, nor in mental judgment, that which _is not_.[79]

[Footnote 79: Plato, Sophist. p. 260 C-D-E.]

[Side-note: Analysis of a Proposition. Every Proposition must have a noun and a verb--it must be proposition of _Something_. False propositions, involve the Form of Non-Ens, in relation to the particular subject.]

Let us look attentively what Proposition, Judgment, Opinion, are. As we said about Forms and letters, so about words: it is not every combination of words which is possible, so as to make up a significant proposition. A string of nouns alone will not make one, nor a string of verbs alone. To compose the simplest proposition, you must put together at least one noun and one verb, in order to signify something respecting things existing, or events past, present, and future.[80] Now every proposition must be a proposition about something, or belonging to a certain subject: every proposition must also be of a certain quality.[81] _Theætêtus is sitting down_--_Theætêtus is flying._ Here are two propositions, both belonging to the same subject, but with opposite qualities: the former true, the latter false. The true proposition affirms respecting Theætêtus real things as they are; the false proposition affirms respecting him things different from real, or non-real, as being real. The attribute of _flying_ is just as real in itself as the attribute of _sitting_: but as respects Theætêtus, or as predicated concerning him, it is different from the reality, or non-real.[82] But still Theætêtus is the subject of the proposition, though the predicate _flying_ does not really belong to him: for there is no other subject than he, and without a subject the proposition would be no proposition at all. When therefore different things are affirmed as the same, or non-realities as realities, respecting you or any given subject, the proposition so affirming is false.[83]

[Footnote 80: Plato, Sophist. pp. 261-262.]

[Footnote 81: Plato, Sophist. p. 262 E. [Greek: lo/gon a)nagkai=on, o(/tan per ê)=|, tino\s ei)=nai lo/gon; mê\ de/ tinos a)du/naton . . . Ou)kou=n kai\ _poi=o/n tina_ au)to\n ei)=nai dei=?]]

[Footnote 82: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 B [Greek: O)/ntôn de/ ge o)/nta e(/tera peri\ sou=.]

That is, [Greek: e(/tera tô=n o)/ntôn],--being the explanation given by Plato of [Greek: ta\ mê\ o)/nta].]

[Footnote 83: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 D.]

[Side-note: Opinion, Judgment, Fancy, &c., are akin to Proposition, and may be also false, by coming into partnership with the Form Non-Ens.]

As propositions may be true or false, so also opinion or judgment or conception, may be true or false: for opinion or judgment is only the concluding result of deliberation or reflection--and reflection is the silent dialogue of the mind with itself: while conception or phantasy is the coalescence or conjunction of opinion with present perception.[84] Both opinion and conception are akin to proposition. It has thus been shown that false propositions, and false opinions or judgments, are perfectly real, and involve no contradiction: and that the Form or Genus--Proposition, Judgment, Opinion--comes properly and naturally into partnership with the Form Non-Ens.

[Footnote 84: Plato, Sophist. pp. 263-264. 264 A-B: [Greek: Ou)kou=n e)/peiper lo/gos a)lêthê\s ê)=n kai\ pseudê/s, tou/tôn d' e)pha/nê dia/noia me\n au)tê=s pro\s e(autê\n psuchê=s dia/logos, do/xa de\ dianoi/as a)poteleu/têsis, phai/netai de\ o(\ le/gomen (phantasi/a) su/mmixis ai)sthê/seôs kai\ do/xês, a)na/gkê dê\ kai\ tou/tôn tô=| lo/gô| xuggenô=n o)/ntôn pseudê= te au)tô=n e)/nia kai\ e)ni/ote ei)=nai?]]

This was the point which Plato's Eleate undertook to prove against Parmenides, and against the plea of the Sophist founded on the Parmenidean doctrine.

* * * * *

[Side-note: It thus appears that Falsehood, imitating Truth, is theoretically possible, and that there may be a profession, like that of the Sophist, engaged in producing it.]

Here Plato closes his general philosophical discussion, and reverts to the process of logical division from which he had deviated. In descending the predicamental steps, to find the logical place of the Sophist, Plato had reached a point where he assumed Non-Ens, together with false propositions and judgments affirming Non-Ens. To which the Sophist is conceived as replying, that Non-Ens was contradictory and impossible, and that no proposition could be false. On these points Plato has produced an elaborate argument intended to refute him, and to show that there was such a thing as falsehood imitating truth, or passing itself off as truth: accordingly, that there might be an art or profession engaged in producing such falsehood.

[Side-note: Logical distribution of Imitators--those who imitate what they know, or what they do not know--of these last, some sincerely believe themselves to know, others are conscious that they do not know, and designedly impose upon others.]

Now the imitative profession may be distributed into those who know what they imitate--and those who imitate without knowing.[85] The man who mimics your figure or voice, knows what he imitates: those who imitate the figure of justice and virtue often pass themselves off as knowing it, yet do not really know it, having nothing better than fancy or opinion concerning it. Of these latter again--(_i.e._ the imitators with mere opinion, but no knowledge, respecting that which sincerely they imitate)--there are two classes: one, those who sincerely mistake their own mere opinions for knowledge, and are falsely persuaded that they really know: the other class, those who by their perpetual occupation in talking, lead us to suspect and apprehend that they are conscious of not knowing things, which nevertheless they discuss before others as if they did know.[86]

[Footnote 85: Plato, Sophist. p. 267 A-D.]

[Footnote 86: Plato, Sophist. p. 268 A. [Greek: to\ de\ thate/rou schê=ma, dia\ tê\n e)n toi=s lo/gois kuli/ndêsin, e)/chei pollê\n u(popsi/an kai\ pho/bon ô(s a)gnoei= tau=ta a(\ pro\s tou\s a)/llous ô(s ei)dô\s e)schêma/tistai.]]

[Side-note: Last class divided--Those who impose on numerous auditors by long discourse, the Rhetor--Those who impose on select auditors, by short question and answer, making the respondent contradict himself--the Sophist.]

Of this latter class, again, we may recognise two sections: those who impose upon a numerous audience by long discourses on public matters: and those who in private, by short question and answer, compel the person conversing with them to contradict himself.[87] The man of long discourse is not the true statesman, but the popular orator: the man of short discourse, but without any real knowledge, is not the truly wise man, since he has no real knowledge--but the imitator of the wise man, or Sophist.

[Footnote 87: Plato, Sophist. p. 268 B. [Greek: to\n me\n dêmosi/a| te kai\ makroi=s lo/gois pro\s plê/thê dunato\n _ei)rôneu/esthai_ kathorô=; to\n de\ i)di/a| te kai\ brache/si lo/gois a)nagka/zonta to\n prosdialego/menon e)nantiologei=n au)to\n au)tô=|.]]

* * * * *

[Side-note: Dialogue closed. Remarks upon it. Characteristics ascribed to a Sophist.]

We have here the conclusion of this abstruse and complicated dialogue, called Sophistês. It ends by setting forth, as the leading characteristics of the Sophist--that he deals in short question and answer so as to make the respondent contradict himself: That he talks with small circles of listeners, upon a large variety of subjects, on which he possesses no real knowledge: That he mystifies or imposes upon his auditors; not giving his own sincere convictions, but talking for the production of a special effect. He is [Greek: e)nantiopoiologiko\s] and [Greek: ei)/rôn], to employ the two original Platonic words, neither of which is easy to translate.

[Side-note: These characteristics may have belonged to other persons, but they belonged in an especial manner to Sokrates himself.]

I dare say that there were some acute and subtle disputants in Athens to whom these characteristics belonged, though we do not know them by name. But we know one to whom they certainly belonged: and that was, Sokrates himself. They stand manifest and prominent both in the Platonic and in the Xenophontic dialogues. The attribute which Xenophon directly predicates about him, that "in conversation he dealt with his interlocutors just as he pleased,"[88] is amply exemplified by Plato in the Protagoras, Gorgias, Euthyphron, Lachês, Charmides, Lysias, Alkibiadês I. and II., Hippias I. and II., &c. That he cross-examined and puzzled every one else without knowing the subjects on which he talked, better than they did--is his own declaration in the Apology. That the Athenians regarded him as a clever man mystifying them--talking without sincere persuasion, or in a manner so strange that you could not tell whether he was in jest or in earnest--overthrowing men's established convictions by subtleties which led to no positive truth--is also attested both by what he himself says in the Apology, and by other passages of Plato and Xenophon.[89]

[Footnote 88: Xen. Memor. i. 2, 14, [Greek: toi=s de\ dialegome/nois au)tô=| pa=si chrô/menon e)n toi=s lo/gois o(/pôs bou/loito.]

Compare, to the same purpose, i. 4, 1, where we are told that Sokrates employed his colloquial Elenchus as a means of chastising ([Greek: kolastêri/ou e(/neka]) those who thought that they knew every thing: and the conversation of Sokrates with the youthful Euthydêmus, especially what is said by Xenophon at the close of it (iv. 4, 39-40).

The power of Sokrates to vanquish in dialogue the persons called Sophists, and to make them contradict themselves in answering--is clearly brought out, and doubtless intentionally brought out, in some of Plato's most consummate dialogues. Alkibiades says, in the Platonic Protagoras (p. 336), "Sokrates confesses himself no match for Protagoras in long speaking. If Protagoras on his side confesses himself inferior to Sokrates in dialogue, Sokrates is satisfied."]

[Footnote 89: Plato, Apolog. p. 37 E. [Greek: e)a/n te ga\r le/gô, o(/ti tô=| theô=| a)peithei=n tou=t' e)/stin, kai\ dia\ tou=t' a)du/naton ê(suchi/an a)/gein, ou) pei/sesthe/ moi ô(s ei)rôneuome/nô|.]

Xen. Memor. iv. 4, 9. [Greek: a)rkei= ga\r] (says Hippias to Sokrates), [Greek: o(/ti tô=n a)/llôn katagela=|s, e)rôtô=n kai\ e)le/gchôn pa/ntas, au)to\s de\ ou)deni\ the/lôn u(pe/chein lo/gon, ou)de\ gnô/mên a)pophai/nesthai peri\ ou)deno/s.] See also Memorab. iii. 5, 24.

Compare a striking passage in Plato's Menon, p. 80 A; also Theætêt. p. 149; and Plutarch, Quæst. Platonic. p. 1000.

The attribute [Greek: ei)rônei/a], which Plato here declares as one of the main characteristics of the Sophists, is applied to Sokrates in a very special manner, not merely in the Platonic dialogues, but also by Timon in the fragments of his Silli remaining--[Greek: Au)tê\ e)kei/nê ê( eiôthui=a _ei)rônei/a Sôkra/tous_] (Plato, Repub. i. p. 337 A); and again--[Greek: prou)/legon o(/ti su\ a)pokri/nasthai me\n ou)k e)thelêsois, _ei)rôneu/soio_ de\ kai\ pa/nta ma=llon poiê/sois ê)\ a)pokri/noio, ei)/ tis ti/ se e)rôta=|.] So also in the Symposion, p. 216 E, Alkibiades says about Sokrates [Greek: _ei)rôneuo/menos_ de\ kai\ pai/zôn pa/nta to\n bi/on pro\s tou\s a)nthrô/pous diatelei=.] And Gorgias, p. 489 E. In another part of the Gorgias (p. 481 B), Kallikles says, "Tell me, Chærephon, does Sokrates mean seriously what he says, or is he bantering?" [Greek: spouda/zei tau=ta Sôkra/tês ê)\ pai/zei?] Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias, &c., do not seem to have been [Greek: ei)/rônes] at all, as far as our scanty knowledge goes.

The words [Greek: ei)/rôn, ei)rôniko/s, ei)rônei/a] seem to include more than is implied in our words _irony_, _ironical_. Schleiermacher translates the words [Greek: a(plou=n mimê/tên, ei)rôniko\n mimê/tên], at the end of the Sophistês, by "den ehrlichen, den Schlauen, Nachahmer"; which seems to me near the truth,--meaning one who either speaks what he does not think, or evades speaking what he does think, in order to serve some special purpose.]

[Side-note: The conditions enumerated in the dialogue (except the taking of a fee) fit Sokrates better than any other known person.]

Moreover, if we examine not merely the special features assigned to the Sophist in the conclusion of the dialogue, but also those indicated in the earlier part of it, we shall find that many of them fit Sokrates as well as they could have fitted any one else. If the Sophists hunted after rich young men,[90] Sokrates did the same; seeking opportunities for conversation with them by assiduous frequentation of the palæstræ, as well as in other ways. We see this amply attested by Plato and Xenophon:[91] we see farther that Sokrates announces it as a propensity natural to him, and meritorious rather than otherwise. Again, the argumentative dialogue--disputation or eristic reduced to an art, and debating on the general theses of just and unjust, which Plato notes as characterising the Sophists[92]--belonged in still higher perfection to Sokrates. It not only formed the business of his life, but is extolled by Plato elsewhere,[93] as the true walk of virtuous philosophy. But there was undoubtedly this difference between Sokrates and the Sophists, that he conversed and argued gratuitously, delighting in the process itself: while they both asked and received money for it. Upon this point, brought forward by Plato both directly and with his remarkable fertility in multiplying indirect allusions, the peculiarity of the Sophist is made mainly to turn. To ask or receive a fee for communicating knowledge, virtue, aptitude in debate, was in the view of Sokrates and Plato a grave enormity: a kind of simoniacal practice.[94]

[Footnote 90: Plato, Sophist. p. 223. [Greek: ne/ôn plousi/ôn kai\ e)ndo/xôn thê/ra].]

[Footnote 91: In the opening words of the Platonic Protagoras, we read as a question from the friend or companion of Sokrates, [Greek: Po/then, ô)= Sô/krates, phai/nei? ê)\ _a)po\ kunêgesi/ou tou=_ peri\ tê\n A)lkibia/dou ô(/ran?]

See also the opening of the Charmides, Lysis, Alkibiadês I., and the speech of Alkibiades in the Symposion.

Compare also Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 2, 1-2-6, with the commencement of the Platonic Protagoras; in which the youth Hippokrates, far from being run after by the Sophist Protagoras, is described as an enthusiastic admirer of that Sophist from reputation alone, and as eagerly soliciting Sokrates to present him to Protagoras (Protag. pp. 310-311).]

[Footnote 92: Plato, Sophist. p. 225 C. [Greek: To\ de/ ge e)/ntechnon kai\ peri\ dikai/ôn au)tôn kai\ a)di/kôn kai\ peri\ tô=n a)/llôn o(/lôs a)mphisbêtou=n.]

Spengel says truly--in his [Greek: Sunagôgê\ Technô=n] p. 40--"Quod si sermo et locus hic esset de Sophistarum doctrinâ et philosophiâ, odium quod nunc vulgo in eos vertunt, majore ex parte sine causâ et ratione esse conceptum, eosque laude magis quam vituperatione dignos esse censendos--haud multâ cum operâ exponi posset. Sic, quo proscinduntur convicio, juvenes non nisi magno pretio eruditos esse, levissimum est: immo hoc sophistas suæ ipsorum scientiæ satis confisos esse neque eam despexisse, docet: et vitium, si modo vitium dicendum, commune est vel potius ortum optimis lyricæ poeseos asseclis, Simonide, Pindaro, aliis."]

[Footnote 93: Plato, Theætet. p. 175 C.]

[Footnote 94: It is to be remembered, however, that Plato, though doubtless exacting no fee, received presents from rich admirers like Dion and Dionysius: and there were various teachers who found presents more lucrative than fees. "M. Antonius Guipho, fuisse dicitur ingenii magni, memoriæ singularis, nec minus Graicé, quam Latino, doctus: præterea comi fucilique naturâ, _nec unquam de mercedibus pactus--eoque plura ex liberalitate discentium consecutus._" (Sueton. De Illustr. Grammat. 7.)]

[Side-note: The art which Plato calls "the thoroughbred and noble Sophistical Art" belongs to Sokrates and to no one else. The Elenchus was peculiar to him. Protagoras and Prodikus were not Sophists in this sense.]

We have seen also that Plato assigns to what he terms "the thoroughbred and noble Sophistic Art" ([Greek: ê( ge/nei gennai/a sophistikê\]), the employment of the Elenchus, for the purpose of destroying, in the minds of others, that false persuasion of existing knowledge which was the radical impediment to their imbibing acquisitions of real knowledge from the teacher.[95] Here Plato draws a portrait not only strikingly resembling Sokrates, but resembling no one else. As far as we can make out, Sokrates stood alone in this original conception of the purpose of the Elenchus, and in his no less original manner of working it out. To prove to others that they knew nothing, is what he himself represents to be his mission from the Delphian oracle. Sokrates is a Sophist of the most genuine and noble stamp: others are Sophists, but of a more degenerate variety. Plato admits the analogy with reluctance, and seeks to attenuate it.[96] We may remark, however, that according to the characteristic of the true Sophist here given by Plato, Protagoras and Prodikus were less of Sophists than Sokrates. For though we know little of the two former, yet there is good reason to believe, That the method which they generally employed was, that of continuous and eloquent discourse, lecture, exhortation: that disputation by short question and answer was less usual with them, and was not their strong point: and that the Elenchus, in the Sokratic meaning, can hardly be said to have been used by them at all. Now Plato, in this dialogue, tells us that the true and genuine Sophist renounces the method of exhortation as unprofitable; or at least employs it only subject to the condition of having previously administered the Elenchus with success, as his own patent medicine.[97] Upon this definition, Sokrates is more truly a Sophist than either Protagoras or Prodikus: neither of whom, so far as we know, made it their business to drive the respondent to contradictions.

[Footnote 95: Plato, Sophist. p. 230 D. [Greek: pri\n a)\n e)le/gchôn tis to\n e)legcho/menon ei)s ai)schu/nên katastê/sas, ta\s toi=s mathê/masin e)mpodi/ous do/xas e)xelô/n, katharo\n a)pophê/nê| kai\ tau=ta ê(gou/menon, a(/per oi)=den ei)de/nai mo/na, plei/ô de\ mê/.]]

[Footnote 96: Plato, Sophist. p. 231 C.]

[Footnote 97: Plato, Sophist. p. 230 E.]

[Side-note: Universal knowledge--was professed at that time by all Philosophers--Plato, Aristotle, &c.]

Again, Plato tells us that the Sophist is a person who disputes about all matters, and pretends to know all matters: respecting the invisible Gods, respecting the visible Gods, Sun, Moon, Stars, Earth, &c., respecting transcendental philosophy, generation and essence--and respecting all civil, social, and political questions--and respecting special arts. On all these miscellaneous topics, according to Plato, the Sophists pretended to be themselves instructed, and to qualify their disciples for arguing on all of them.

Now it is possible that the Sophists of that day may have pretended to this species of universal knowledge; but most certainly Plato and Aristotle did the same. The dialogues of Plato embrace all that wide range of topics which he tells us that the Sophists argued about, and pretended to teach. In an age when the amount of positive knowledge was so slender, it was natural for a clever talker or writer to fancy that he knew every thing. In reference to every subject then discussed, an ingenious mind could readily supply deductions from both hypotheses--generalities ratiocinative or imaginative--strung together into an apparent order sufficient for the exigencies of hearers. There was no large range of books to be studied; no stock of facts or experience to be mastered. Every philosopher wove his own tissue of theory for himself, without any restraint upon his intellectual impulse, in regard to all the problems then afloat. What the theories of the Sophists were, we do not know: but Plato, author of the Timæus, Republic, Leges, Kratylus, Menon--who affirmed the pre-existence as well as post-existence of the mind, and the eternal self-existence of Ideas--has no fair ground for reproaching them with blamable rashness in the extent and diversity of topics which they presumed to discuss. They obtained indeed (he says justly) no truth or knowledge, but merely a fanciful semblance of knowledge--an equivocal show or imitation of reality.[98] But Plato himself obtains nothing more in the Timæus: and we shall find Aristotle pronouncing the like condemnation on the Platonic self-existent Ideas. If the Sophists professed to be encyclopedists, this was an error natural to the age; and was the character of Grecian philosophy generally, even in its most illustrious manifestations.

[Footnote 98: Plato, Sophistês, p. 233 C. [Greek: doxastikê\n a)/ra tina\ peri\ pa/ntôn e)pistê/mên o( sophistê\s ê(mi=n, a)ll' ou)k a)lêthei/an e)/chôn a)nape/phantai.] 234 B: [Greek: mimê/mata kai\ o(mô/numa tô=n o)/ntôn.]

When the Eleate here says about the Sophists (p. 233 B), [Greek: dokou=si pro\s tau=ta e)pistêmo/nôs e)/chein au)toi\ pro\s a(/per a)ntile/gousin], this is exactly what Sokrates, in the Platonic Apology, tells us about the impression made by his own dialectics or refutative conversation, Plato, Apolog. p. 23 A.

[Greek: e)k tau/têsi dê\ tê=s e)xeta/seôs pollai\ me\n a)pe/chtheiai/ moi gego/nasi kai\ oi(=ai chalepô/tatai kai\ baru/tatai, ô(/ste polla\s diabola\s a)p' au)tô=n gegone/nai, o)/noma/ te tou=to le/gesthai, sopho\s ei)=nai; oi)=ontai ga/r me e(ka/stoth' oi( paro/ntes tau=t' ei)=nai sopho\n a(\ a)\n a)/llon e)xele/gxô.]]

[Side-note: Inconsistency of Plato's argument in the Sophistês. He says that the Sophist is a disputatious man who challenges every one for speaking falsehood. He says also that the Sophist is one who maintains false propositions to be impossible.]

Having traced the Sophist down to the character of a man of delusion and imposture, passing off appearance as if it were reality, and falsehood as if it were truth--Plato (as we have seen) suddenly turns round upon himself, and asks how such a character is possible. He represents the Sophist as maintaining that no man could speak falsely[99]--that a false proposition was self-contradictory, inasmuch as Non-Ens was inconceivable and unutterable. I do not see how the argument which Plato here ascribes to the Sophist, can be reconciled with the character which he had before given of the Sophist--as a man who passed his life in disputation and controversy; which involves the perpetual arraigning of other men's opinions as false. A professed disputant may perhaps be accused of admitting nothing to be true: but he cannot well be charged with maintaining that nothing is false.

[Footnote 99: Plato, Sophist. pp. 240-241. Compare 260 E.]

[Side-note: Reasoning of Plato about Non-Ens--No predications except identical.]

To pass over this inconsistency, however--the reasoning of Plato himself on the subject of Non-Ens is an interesting relic of ancient speculation. He has made for himself an opportunity of canvassing, not only the doctrine of Parmenides, who emphatically denied Non-Ens--but also the opposite doctrine of other schools. He farther comments upon a different opinion, advanced by other philosophers--That no proposition can be admitted, in which the predicate is different from the subject: That no proposition is true or valid, except an identical proposition. You cannot say, Man is good: you can only say, Man is Man, or Good is good. You cannot say--Sokrates is good, brave, old, stout, flat-nosed, &c., because you thereby multiply the one Sokrates into many. One thing cannot be many, nor many things one.[100]

[Footnote 100: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 B-C. Compare Plato, Philêbus, p. 14 C.]

[Side-note: Misconception of the function of the copula in predication.]

This last opinion is said to have been held by Antisthenes, one of the disciples of Sokrates. We do not know how he explained or defended it, nor what reserves he may have admitted to qualify it. Plato takes no pains to inform us on this point. He treats the opinion with derision, as an absurdity. We may conceive it as one of the many errors arising from a misconception of the purpose and function of the copula in predication. Antisthenes probably considered that the copula implied identity between the predicate and the subject. Now the explanation or definition of _man_ is different from the explanation or definition of _good_: accordingly, if you say, Man is good, you predicate identity between two different things: as if you were to say Two is Three, or Three is Four. And if the predicates were multiplied, the contradiction became aggravated, because then you predicated identity not merely between one thing and another different thing, but between one thing and many different things. The opinion of Antisthenes depends upon two assumptions--That each separate word, whether used as subject or as predicate, denotes a Something separate and existent by itself: That the copula implies identity. Now the first of these two assumptions is not unfrequently admitted, even in the reasonings of Plato, Aristotle, and many others: while the latter is not more remarkable than various other erroneous conceptions which have been entertained, as to the function of the copula.

[Side-note: No formal Grammar or Logic existed at that time. No analysis or classification of propositions before the works of Aristotle.]

What is most important to observe is--That at the time which we are here discussing, there existed no such sciences either grammar or formal logic. There was a copious and flexible language--a large body of literature, chiefly poetical--and great facility as well as felicity in the use of speech for the purposes of communication and persuasion. But no attempt had yet been made to analyse or theorise on speech: to distinguish between the different functions of words, and to throw them into suitable classes: to generalise the conditions of good or bad use of speech for proving a conclusion: or to draw up rules for grammar, syntax, and logic. Both Protagoras and Prodikus appear to have contributed something towards this object, and Plato gives various scattered remarks going still farther. But there was no regular body either of grammar or of formal logic: no established rules or principles to appeal to, no recognised teaching, on either topic. It was Aristotle who rendered the important service of filling up this gap. I shall touch hereafter upon the manner in which he proceeded: but the necessity of laying down a good theory of predication, and precepts respecting the employment of propositions in reasoning, is best shown by such misconceptions as this of Antisthenes; which naturally arise among argumentative men yet untrained in the generalities of grammar and logic.

[Side-note: Plato's declared purpose in the Sophistês--To confute the various schools of thinkers--Antisthenes, Parmenides, the Materialists, &c.]

Plato announces his intention, in this portion of the Sophistês, to confute all these different schools of thinkers, to whom he has made allusion.[101] His first purpose, in reasoning against those who maintained Non-Ens to be an incogitable absurdity, is, to show that there are equal difficulties respecting Ens: that the Existent is just as equivocal and unintelligible as the Non-Existent. Those who recognise two co-ordinate and elementary principles (such as Hot and Cold) maintain that both are really existent, and call them both, Entia. Here (argues Plato) they contradict themselves: they call their two elementary principles _one_. What do they mean by existence, if this be not so?

[Footnote 101: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 C-D. [Greek: I(/na toi/nun pro\s a(/pantas ê(mi=n o( lo/gos ê)=| tou\s pô/pote peri\ ou)si/as kai\ o(tiou=n dialechthe/ntas, e)/stô kai\ pro\s tou/tous kai\ pro\s tou\s a)/llous, o(/sois e)/mprosthen dieile/gmetha, ta\ nu=n ô(s e)n e)rôtê/sei lechthêso/mena.]]

Then again, Parmenides--and those who affirm that Ens Totum was essentially Unum, denying all plurality--had difficulties on their side to surmount. Ens could not be identical with Unum, nor was the name _Ens_, identical with the thing named Ens. Moreover, though Ens Unum was _Totum_, yet Totum was not identical with Ens or with Unum. _Totum_ necessarily implied _partes_: but the _Unum per se_ was indivisible or implied absence of parts. Though it was true therefore that Ens was both Unum and Totum, these two were both of them essentially different from Ens, and belonged to it only by way of adjunct accident. Parmenides was therefore wrong in saying that Unum alone existed.

[Side-note: Plato's refutation throws light upon the doctrine of Antisthenes.]

The reasoning here given from Plato throws some light upon the doctrine just now cited from Antisthenes. You cannot say (argues Plato against the advocates of duality) that _two_ elements (Hot and Cold) are both of them Entia or Existent, because by so doing you call them _one_. You cannot say (argues Antisthenes) that Sokrates is good, brave, old, &c., because by such speech you call one thing three. Again, in controverting the doctrine of Parmenides, Plato urges, That Ens cannot _be_ Unum, because it is Totum (Unum having no parts, while Totum has parts): but it may carry with it the accident Unum, or may have Unum applied to it as a predicate by accident. Here again, we have difficulties similar to those which perplexed Antisthenes. For the same reason that Plato will not admit, That Ens _is_ Unum--Antisthenes will not admit, That Man _is_ good. It appeared to him to imply essential identity between the predicate and the subject.

All these difficulties and others to which we shall come presently, noway peculiar to Antisthenes--attest the incomplete formal logic of the time: the want of a good theory respecting predication and the function of the copula.

[Side-note: Plato's argument against the Materialists.]