Chapter XXXVII: Section 2: A III f (2)

Sometimes punishment consists of starvation, which is inflicted e.g., for refusal to wear the badge “East”. Such punishment has the result that workers faint at work (Klosterteich Camp, Gruenheim, Saxony). The consequence is complete exhaustion, an ailing state of health, and tuberculosis. The spread of tuberculosis among the Polish factory workers is a result of the deficient food rations meted out in the community camps, because energy spent in the heavy work assigned to them cannot be replaced.

* * * * *

The quantities of bread and [other] food fixed for Polish children in the camps is thoroughly insufficient for building up substance for growing and developing their bodies. In some cases children up to the age of 10 and even more are allotted 200 grams of bread daily, 200 grams of butter or margarine and 250 grams of sugar monthly, and nothing else (factory in Zeititz, near Wurzen, Saxony). * * *

* * * * *

_Care of Children_—* * * An indication of the awful conditions this may lead to is given by the fact that in the camps for eastern workers (camp for eastern workers “Waldlust”, Post Office Lauf, Pegnitz) there are cases of 8-year-old, weak and undernourished children put to forced labor and perishing from such treatment. * * *

_Health Care_—The fact that these bad conditions dangerously affect the state of health and the vitality of the workers is proved by many cases of tuberculosis found in very young people returning from the Reich to the General Government unfit for work. Their state of health is usually deteriorated past hope of recovery.

The reason is that a state of exhaustion resulting from overwork and malnutrition is not recognized as a disease condition until the illness manifests itself in high fever and fainting spells.

* * * * *

_Protection of the Family_—Grave depression is caused among the eastern workers by the order forbidding marriage among them within the borders of the Reich. * * * No less suffering is caused by the separation of families when wives and mothers of small children are torn away from their families and sent to the Reich for forced labor.

* * * * *

_Religious Care_—If under these bad conditions there is no moral support such as is normally provided by regular family life, then at least such moral support which the religious feeling of the Polish population require should be maintained and increased. The elimination of religious services, worship, and religious care from the life of the Polish workers, the prohibition of church attendance at a time when there is a religious service for other people, and other measures show a certain contempt for the influence of religion on the feelings and outlook of the workers. * * *

* * * * *

[Stamp] THE POLISH CENTRAL COMMITTEE

[Signed] [name illegible]
President

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 208-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 55

REPORT BY SAUCKEL, 7 JULY 1944, ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS
OF LABOR MOBILIZATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1944

Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation

Berlin W8, 7 July 1944
65 Mohren Street
Thuring House

Secret

NR 520/44/g Dr. ST/Ka

_Special Delivery Letter_

To: All Top Reich Authorities
The Reich Leader of the NSDAP
All Top Army Agencies
All Gauleiters

Subject: Accomplishments of the Labor Mobilization in the first half of
1944.

Enclosed I am submitting the total figures on additional manpower placed at the disposal of the German war effort by the German Labor Offices in the first half-year of 1944. They represent only such manpower that was not previously employed in the German war effort.

According to the quota of 4,050,000 laborers set for this year, 2,000,000 new workers would have had to be secured in the first half of the year. Because of increased difficulties in Italy and in the occupied Western countries, regrettably one-half million less than that were found. If despite the known difficult situation it was possible to mobilize 1,500,000 people in the first half of the year, it is solely due to the exertion of all available energy.

Since the Proclamation of 17 February 1944, around 62,000 women have reported for “Voluntary Honorary Service,” and 52,000 of them have already been assigned to work.

Heil Hitler!
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL

Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation

Berlin, 7 July 1944
_New Manpower Placed at the Disposal of the Economy
between 1 January and 30 June 1944_

A. Entire Economy:

Total 1,482,000

Of these were: Germans 848,000
Foreigners 537,400
War prisoners 96,600

B. Breakdown of allocation of [the persons listed under] A:

Agriculture and Forestry 231,000
Of them, foreigners 156,000
Mining 46,000
Of them, foreigners 34,000
Metal industry 415,000
Of them, foreigners 250,000
All other [branches of] economy 790,000
Of them, foreigners 194,000

C. Origin of foreign labor:

Occupied Eastern Territories 284,000
General Government 52,000
Protectorate 23,000
France, excluding Northern France 33,000
Belgium, including Northern France 16,000
Netherlands 15,000
Italy 37,000
Rest of Europe 77,400

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3819-PS[86]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 56

MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE ON 11 JULY 1944 ATTENDED BY MILCH, CONCERNING
THE LABOR PROBLEM

_LIST OF ATTENDANCE FOR THE CONFERENCE IN THE
REICH CHANCELLERY ON 11 JULY 1944 1600 HOURS_

Name Official capacity Agency
Dr. Kuehne Chief of Mil. Adm. [illegible]

(1) Warlimont General of Artillery [Lt. OKW
Gen.]

Dr. Kohlhaase Director of Labor Section of the Supreme
Commissioner, Adriatic Coast,
Trieste

Dr. Landfried State Secretary, Chief of Italy
Mil. Adm.

(2) Walter Funk and Albert Speer

Milch [illegible]

(3) Krosigk

(3) Steengracht State Secretary Foreign Office

Abetz Ambassador German Embassy in Paris

Hanel [?] Major General Armaments Commissioner Staff,
France

von Linstow Colonel, GSC Military Commander, France

Sass Colonel, GSC General [Plenipotentiary] for
Italy

Franssen Major General Armaments Inspector, Belgium

Waeger Major General Armaments Office

Sarnow Ministerialdirektor Gen. Staff of Army, QM Section

Koegel Lieut. Col., GSC Gen. Staff of Army, QM Section

Reeder Chief of Mil. Adm. Brussels

Heider Chief of General Staff Brussels (4) Ley

(5) Sauckel Labor Plenipotentiary Berlin

H. Backe Minister Reich Food Ministry

Marrenbach Chief [of Dept.] German Labor Front

Leyers Armaments Plenipotentiary Italy

Also present:

Ministerial Direktor Klopfer (Party Chancellery)
Ministerialrat Froehling
Ambassador Rahn
Dr. Huber
(6) Chief of Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner
General Labor Fuehrer Kretschmann
Colonel Meixner (OKW)

(1) United States _vs._ Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. See vols. X and XI.

(2) Trial before International Military Tribunal. See Trial of Major War Criminals, vols. I-XIII, Nuremberg, 1947.

(3) United States _vs._ Ernst von Welzsaecker et al. See vols. XII, XIII and XIV.

(4) Trial before International Military Tribunal. See Trial of the Major War Criminals, vols. I-XLII, Nuremberg, 1947.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid.

Berlin, 12 July 1944

_To Rk. 5815 C_

Subject: Stepped-up Procuring of Foreign Manpower

Executive Conference, 11 July 1944

_Note_

Participating in the executive conference were the departmental chiefs and representatives indicated in the attached list of those present. No guarantee can be given for the completeness of the list, as not all participants signed the register.

_Reich Minister Dr. Lammers_[87] reported by way of introduction on the various proposals on hand by the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation calculated to bring about the increase in labor in Germany which is absolutely essential for winning the final victory. He limited the theme of the discussion by saying that all possibilities were to be examined by which the present deficit of foreign manpower could be offset, for example, the question of the reestablishment of an acceptable price and wage differential between the Reich and non-German territories. But the primary consideration will have to remain the solution of the question whether and in what form greater compulsion could be exerted to accept work in Germany. In this connection it must be examined how the police agencies, regarding the inadequacy of which the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation has serious complaints, could be strengthened, on the one hand, through bringing influence to bear on the foreign governments and, on the other, through reorganizing the indigenous police forces by an increased use of the Wehrmacht, the police or other German agencies. Reich Minister Dr. Lammers then gave the floor to the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation, Gauleiter Sauckel.

_Gauleiter Sauckel_ stated that the present deficit of the half-year program for 2,025,000 foreign workers, to be filled by 30 June of the current year, totals 500,000. Of the total of 1,500,000 workers procured up to now, no less than 865,000 were Germans, of whom half were apprentices and women, two categories which cannot be regarded as full-fledged workers. Of the 560,000 foreigners put to work, three-fourths came from the East alone. This result was a scandal considering that the German people now are mobilized for work to the fullest extent and it represents the complete bankruptcy of German authorities in Italy and France, where hundreds of thousands of workers were still idling. In mobilizing the manpower we did not exert the necessary severity and, in particular, we were unable to achieve the necessary unity of the German authorities. It was quite improper for German authorities to interfere irresponsibly in the tasks of the GBA [Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation]. He had to have much greater freedom of action, just as was the case in 1942. With the present methods of recruitment for voluntary employment we would not make any progress, for one thing because any volunteers still available exposed themselves to danger to life and limb from reprisals by their own fellow countrymen. If, on the other hand, they were forcibly hired and decently treated at their jobs, they would do completely satisfactory work. Attention to the wage and price questions connected with the subject was desirable, but in the present situation no longer so important. If no effective action were taken now, our manpower mobilization program would fail, with the consequence that the combat troops would no longer receive the weapons they need.

_State Secretary von Steengracht_, Foreign Office, stressed that the Reich Foreign Minister from the beginning had favored the same standpoint as the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation. The Foreign Office, however, could do nothing except press the foreign governments more or less urgently to meet German demands, and this has been done consistently up to the present. The police power was handled by others who, therefore, would now have to voice their opinion on the subject of the conference.

_The Deputy for the Chief of the OKW, General Warlimont_, referred to a recently issued Fuehrer order, according to which all German forces had to put themselves at the disposal of the task to secure manpower. Wherever the Wehrmacht was not employed exclusively in essential military duties (as, for example, in the construction of the coastal defenses), it would be available, but it could not actually be _assigned_ for the purposes of the GBA [Sauckel]. General Warlimont made the following practical suggestions:

_a._ The troops employed in fighting partisans are to take over
the additional task of securing manpower in the partisan areas.
Everyone who cannot fully show cause for his presence in these
areas is to be seized for labor;

_b._ When large cities, due to the difficulty of providing food,
are wholly or partly evacuated, the population suitable for
labor commitment is to be put to work with the assistance of the
Wehrmacht;

_c._ The seizing of labor recruits among the refugees from the
areas near the front is to receive special attention with the
assistance of the Wehrmacht.

_Gauleiter Sauckel_ accepted these suggestions with thanks and said that he expected that a certain measure of success would no doubt be achieved by these means.

On behalf of the _Military Commander of Belgium and Northern France_, the _Chief of the Military Administration, Reeder_, put up for discussion the possibility of expanding the Military Police, now totaling only 70, and of the Civilian Searching Service [Fahndungsdienst] consisting of Flemings and Walloons (1,100 strong). If the Military Police were increased to 200, appreciable results could be achieved. Upon inquiry by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, General Warlimont promised on behalf of the OKW that the searching service would be reinforced.

On further inquiry by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, as to whether the population suitable for work could not be taken along as the troops withdrew from an area, _Colonel Saas_ ([_Plenipotentiary_] _General for Italy_) stated that Field Marshal Kesselring had already directed that the population in a zone of 30 kilometers’ depth behind the front was to be “captured”. This measure, however, could not be extended to areas extending farther behind the lines, because of the most severe shock that would be inflicted on the whole structure of these areas, especially in regard to the industry still in full production.

_Gauleiter Sauckel_ was of the opinion that widest circles of the Wehrmacht saw something disreputable in the labor recruiting program. There had been actual instances where German soldiers had endeavored to protect the population from being taken away by German labor recruiting agencies. Therefore it was essential to explain to the front troops the extraordinary importance of labor recruiting. In contrast to the much too mild German method, it was part of the Bolshevist conception of war for the fighting troops, on occupying a new territory, to put the entire population to work at once. The question for the administration thus was not one of mass recruiting, but of being consistent. It would be necessary to establish a few object lessons, and the passive resistance would quickly change into active cooperation. Nor ought one to shrink from proceeding drastically against the administrative heads [Behoerdenleiter] themselves who sabotage the labor recruitment. Not the small refractory offenders should be punished, but the responsible administrative heads. In addition to these compulsory measures, other means too must be applied. Thus it would be advisable to remove a large part of the exceptional Italian crops in order to improve the rations of the German and foreign workers. A special problem was presented by the entirely insufficient rations for the Italian military internees who were almost starving. The Fuehrer should be asked to have the statute for these military internees gradually altered. This would release a not inconsiderable labor potential.

_Reich Leader Dr. Ley_ underscored these statements and suggested the establishment of a searching service made up by all German forces in the non-German territories, that would carry out the ruthless recruiting in large areas.

These proposals were countered by the following objections:

_Reich Minister Funk_ holds that ruthless raids would entail considerable disturbances in the industries of the non-German territories. The same opinion is held by the _Chief of the Military Administration of Italy, State Secretary Dr. Landfried_, who believes that the German forces making up the executive body are too weak, and fears that the Italian population would escape seizure in great numbers and flee to uncontrollable areas.

_Reich Minister Speer_ states that he had an interest in both promoting increased labor recruiting for the Reich and maintaining the production in the non-German territories. Up to the present, 25 to 30 percent of the German war production was furnished by the occupied Western territories and Italy, with Italy alone supplying 12½ percent. The Fuehrer had recently decided that this production must be maintained as long as possible, in spite of the difficulties already existing, especially in the field of transportation. The Military Administration, in the opinion of Reich Minister Speer, was easily capable to seize sufficient foreign workers at its present strength, as only a relatively small police force was needed for that purpose. The chief need was for stricter orders, but violent measures or large-scale round-ups were not to be carried out. Rather it would be advisable to proceed gradually with clean methods.

On behalf of the _Military Commander in France, Chief of Military Administration Dr. Michel_, referred to the statements of State Secretary Dr. Landfried and stated that the situation in France was similar. The calling up of entire age groups was being prepared in France, but had not yet begun as the German military authorities had not yet been able to give their consent. The good will of the highest French authorities could not be doubted, but it was lacking partly at the lower and middle levels. The friendly administrators and individuals willing to work and showing cooperativeness toward the German authorities, exposed themselves to reprisals by the French population.

_Ambassador Abetz_ confirmed these statements. The application of severe measures, such as the shooting of French functionaries, was of no avail. Such a policy only served to drive the population into the Maquis. In these territories, where there were large German armed forces, it would no doubt be possible to obtain a few more ten-thousands of workers. Then these same German forces could be employed in police duty, which would also turn up large numbers of workers. In Paris, the evacuation of which was being considered, 100,000 to 200,000 workers could be seized. In this connection it might be possible to transfer the manpower of entire industries in a body.

The _Chief of the Security Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner_, declared himself willing, if asked by the GBA, to place the Security Police at his disposal for this purpose, but pointed out their numerical weakness. For all of France he had only 2,400 men available. It was questionable whether entire age groups could be seized with these feeble forces. In his opinion, the Foreign Office must exercise a stronger influence on the foreign governments.

_State Secretary von Steengracht_, Foreign Office, commented to the effect that the agreements made with the foreign governments were entirely sufficient. The governments had always been willing, upon requests of the Foreign Office, to issue the necessary orders. If these orders were not carried out, this was due to the inadequate police power of the foreign governments themselves. In France, it had been reduced to a minimum for political reasons. In Italy an executive power was no longer extant. The Foreign Office was willing at any time, he said, to exercise stronger pressure on the foreign governments, but did not expect too much from that. State Secretary von Steengracht asked Ambassador Rahn to comment on this for Italy.

_Ambassador Rahn_ believes that there is still a sufficient number of workers in Italy, so that in theory 1 million could still be taken out, although 2/3 of the Italian territory and population had been lost. He had always been in favor of the system of drafting age classes. This was generally successful until the fall of Rome, as could be seen from the fact that it was possible to seize 200,000 Italians for military service. Since that time the situation in Italy had become extremely difficult, however, as the fall of Rome was an enormous shock to the Italian people. The German authorities had done what they could to neutralize these effects and to that end had merged all executive power in the person of Marshal Graziani. At present, however, the use of violent methods on a large scale was impracticable because it would cause complete disorder and disrupt production. The best example for this is the retaliatory action ordered by the Fuehrer because of the strikes in Turin, when 10 percent of all factory labor forces were to be conscripted because they were shirkers. A force of 4,000 Germans was brought together for that purpose. The result was that the food and power supply of Turin was cut off by the resistance movement so that 250,000 workers had to stop working. This could not be tolerated in view of the substantial contribution of the Italian armament industry to the war effort. Field Marshal Kesselring declared that continuation of forced recruitment would cause not only the loss of the armament production in the upper Italian area, but the loss of the entire theater of war. In the face of this statement the hardiest political will must keep silent. The only thing which could be done was the execution of the forced recruitment in the rebellious area proper. Ambassador Rahn believes the following practical suggestions could be carried out:

_a._ The recruitment of volunteers is to be continued.

_b._ To a limited extent, plants are to be transferred to the Reich with machinery and workers.

_c._ The transfer of wage savings of the Italian workers in Germany to their homeland, which is not functioning well, is to be ensured. For this purpose an automatic procedure is to be introduced which Ambassador Rahn had already proposed in another connection.

_d._ The system of the induction of age classes will be resumed when the German military authorities consider the time ripe.

In answer to the reported remark of Field Marshal Kesselring, _General Warlimont_ (OKW) commented that this remark was unknown to the OKW. The OKW’s approval of this standpoint could therefore not yet be assumed.

_Gauleiter Sauckel_ declared that all these proposals were inadequate since they were not suited to mobilize the masses of manpower which he needed. The execution of all these proposals had already been tried in practice since the labor mobilization authorities had at no time limited themselves to any single method. He still had to name as seriously damaging to the execution of the labor mobilization plan the fact that his far-reaching jurisdiction and powers had been made the subject of discussion. What he needed, as already said, was “elbow room”.

At the suggestion of Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, Gauleiter Sauckel declared himself willing to set up several programmatic demands on which he would consult with the interested parties and which then would be submitted to the Fuehrer with a request for endorsement and translation into law. A written formulation will follow. For the time being the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation presents his demands as follows:

_a._ The proposals of General Warlimont will be discussed directly among the interested parties and will be carried out jointly.

_b._ The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation receives permission to establish local security and recruiting machineries for labor recruitment, which will operate on the basis of his orders and directives without interference by other offices.

_c._ The regulations on recruitment of labor for Germany promulgated by French and Italian authorities are to be given solid foundations by concrete implementation orders which guarantee the most active collaboration of foreign authorities in the acquisition of manpower.

After these statements were made Reich Minister Dr. Lammers closed the meeting, pointing out that he would leave the further handling of the problem to those concerned, as proposed.

[Initialed] L. [LAMMERS]

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 1

EXTRACT FROM REPORT ON FUEHRER CONFERENCE ATTENDED
BY MILCH ON 19 FEBRUARY 1942

_POINTS OF DISCUSSION ON VISIT TO FUEHRER HEADQUARTERS
ON 19 FEBRUARY 1942_

* * * * *

16. Upon recommendation of Field Marshal Milch, the Fuehrer decides that the 6-month contracts for foreign workers should be dropped and that tax regulations, which stand in the way against this measure, are to be rescinded. Rather, contracts are to be introduced which would provide, in the event of employment of longer duration (exceeding six months), a single lump sum compensation of some kind—also in view of the fact that there would be a corresponding saving of the cost of travel back and forth.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 32

EXTRACT FROM THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE MINUTES,
21 AND 22 APRIL 1942

_POINTS OF DISCUSSION FROM THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE
OF 21 AND 22 APRIL 1942_

* * * * *

SPEER:

20. The Fuehrer explains clearly in an elaborate form that he does not approve the bad food dispensed to the Russians. The Russians must absolutely be given sufficient food, and Sauckel has to see to it that this food will now be guaranteed by Backe.

21. The Fuehrer is surprised that the civilian Russians are kept like prisoners of war behind a barbed wire fence. I told him that this was due to a decree issued by him. The Fuehrer knows nothing of such a decree. I request the documents pertaining thereto to be included in the forthcoming Fuehrer file and at the same time to see to it that Sauckel will arrange to have the civilian Russians no longer treated like prisoners of war.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 2

EXTRACT FROM THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE MINUTES
OF 3, 4, 5 JANUARY 1943

Berlin, 8 January 1943
_POINTS OF DISCUSSION AT THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE
OF 3, 4, 5 JANUARY 1943_

* * * * *

SPEER:

55. The Fuehrer demands unequivocally that in no case must it be permitted that France be less burdened than Germany. Germany must sacrifice her blood for this war. We must insist that France intensify her economic contribution. Any French workers on that job showing signs of resistance will be deported, if necessary, as civilian internees. At the slightest attempt of sabotage the most rigorous measures must be taken. Any maudlin humanitarianism is out of place.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-II-PS[88]
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 3

REPORT FROM SAUCKEL TO HITLER, 10 MARCH 1943, CONCERNING
DIFFICULTIES ORIGINATING FROM THE DRAFT OF
MANPOWER IN FORMER SOVIET TERRITORIES

_Teletype_
10 March 1943

To the Fuehrer Fuehrer Headquarters

_With the urgent request to be submitted to the Fuehrer in person immediately for decision_

Subject: Difficulties originating from draft of manpower in former Soviet
territories.

My Fuehrer,

You may be assured that the labor assignment is being pushed by me with fanatical will but also with circumspection and with due consideration for economic and technical as well as human necessities and conditions.

Replacement for soldiers who will be relieved and the stockpiling of additional labor needed for the armament programs can and will be carried through, notwithstanding the fact that especially during the last two winter months the greatest difficulties had to be overcome. Yet it was possible to make 258,000 foreign workers available to the war economy for January and February alone despite the fact that in the East transports practically ceased. The employment of German men and women is in full progress.

Inasmuch as the difficulties of the winter months will now gradually disappear, and as preparations were made by me, also the transports from the East can again be resumed in full measure. Although the yield of the registration and employment of German men and women is excellent, the employment of the strongest and most efficient foreigners who are used to work cannot be neglected.

Unfortunately, some of the commanding generals [Oberbefehlshaber] in the East have prohibited the compulsory enrollment of men and women in the conquered Soviet territories for—as Gauleiter Koch[89] informs me—political reasons.

My Fuehrer, in order to enable me to carry out my assignment, I ask that these orders be rescinded. I consider it entirely impossible that the population of former Soviet nationality could be accorded a greater measure of consideration than our German people on whom I have been forced to place very drastic measures. Should it no longer be possible to enforce the compulsion to work in the East, nor to draft labor, then the German war economy and agriculture will likewise no longer be able to fulfil their tasks in full measure.

I myself am of the opinion that under no circumstances should the commanders of our armies give credence to the Bolshevist propaganda of atrocities and defamation. After all, it is to the interest of the generals themselves that replacements for the troops be made in opportune time.

I take permission to point out that—without wishing to discredit their best will—it is impossible to put German women—entirely inexperienced in work—into the place of hundreds of thousands of excellent workers who now have to go to the front as soldiers. It must be possible for me to replace them with people from the Eastern territories.

I myself report to you that all foreign nationals who are working with us are being treated satisfactorily according to humane standards; that they are being treated correctly and fairly; they are being fed, housed, yes, even clothed. Because of my own experience in the service of foreign nations, I am even bold enough to claim that never before have foreign workers been so decently treated anywhere in the world as is being done by the German people during this the hardest of all wars.

I therefore ask you, my Fuehrer, to cancel orders which prevent the enrollment of foreign male and female workers and to kindly advise me whether my concept of the assignment as laid down herein still is correct.

I ask your permission to report to you in person on several important points of the labor recruitment early next week, possibly on Tuesday.

In lasting gratitude, loyalty and obedience, yours,

[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 33

EXTRACT FROM REPORT ON FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 30 MAY 1943

Obersalzberg, 1 June 1943
_Fuehrer Conference on 30 May 1943_

* * * * *

SPEER: [Marginal Note] Schieber, Pleiger, Sauckel, Backe, Keitel, Waeger.

19. The coal situation causes the Fuehrer to call a meeting with Pleiger, Sauckel, Backe, and Keitel.

At this meeting will be discussed the allocation of sufficient labor for the coal district, the removal of Russian prisoners of war from farming and small war industries (insofar as they are employed as unskilled labor) and their replacement by other workers from the Ukraine, Poland, etc.

Furthermore it is intended, if possible, to raise the food rations of the German miners, even above present levels. The Russians are to get plentiful additional rations, which will be individually allotted by plant managers on the basis of efficiency.

Additionally the German workers—and particularly also the Russian prisoners of war—will receive bonuses for higher production in the form of tobacco and similar items.

The details are to be discussed in a preliminary conference so as to establish uniform data as regards quantities, etc., for submission to the Fuehrer.

On no account must we capitulate to existing conditions on the coal question. Coal is _the_ critical basis for maintaining our production and the entire domestic economy.

[Marginal Note] Saur, Kippung, Milch, Dornberger.

20. The Fuehrer desires that in areas which are certainly recurrent targets of enemy air attacks (Ruhr District, Krupp-Essen) about 100 to 200 rocket projector batteries be installed, which experimentally are to fire a steady stream of rockets set for the computed altitude of the enemy formations.

Some of these rockets will, on detonating, loose wire coils. The Fuehrer expects, after all, significant and not only psychological effects from massed, unaimed fire against concentrated air attacks on these targets.

Milch and Dornberger are to state their views on the subject.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 4

EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF
11-12 SEPTEMBER 1943

14 September 1943
_FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 11-12 SEPTEMBER 1943_

* * * * *

DETHLEFFSEN:

16. The Fuehrer brings up the question of air force matériel production and the discussion with Messerschmitt, and asks for my personal intervention with the Reich Marshal [Goering] and Field Marshal Milch to cut down appreciably on the number of aircraft types.

17. The Fuehrer approves Messerschmitt’s recommendation that a monthly conference be held on questions pertaining to developments and productions for the Luftwaffe, on the introduction of new types and modifications with the participation of construction designers and production experts. This is to be discussed with Field Marshal Milch.

MILCH:

18. The Fuehrer is displeased that the long-range Messerschmitt plane had not yet been taken up by the Luftwaffe. M. is said to have been unable to obtain the support of the Luftwaffe for it.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 34

EXTRACT FROM FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 1-4 JANUARY 1944,
CONCERNING SPEER’S REPORT ON THE FRENCH
LABOR SITUATION

6 January 1944
_FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 1-4 JANUARY 1944_

* * * * *

[Marginal Note] Kehrl, Waeger.

The Fuehrer has been informed of the differences of opinion with the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation. According to my arguments, the principal thing is to exploit the industry of France for Germany to a larger extent, in order to be able to locate there about 1 million additional workers. However, Sauckel is of the opinion that first of all workers have to be brought to Germany.

The Fuehrer explains that in his view the transfer to France is of extreme importance, be it only on account of the possibility to increase the production of iron connected therewith. In spite of this, in his opinion, one cannot do without bringing additional French labor to Germany. It must, therefore, be attempted to find a happy union of both things. In this connection he proposes to designate protected works in France, in order to induce the French to work in these plants just through the pressure of allocation of labor for Germany. Upon my statement that the protected plants have already been established, he affirms again the importance of this institution and the necessity to create here a basis of long-range confidence. He thinks that it is my affair whether I will be able to do without French labor or not; Sauckel could be only happy if I would do without them.

Upon my reply that this is not the only problem, but that also the question of the _executive power_ is involved, since otherwise a loss of prestige for Germany and a disorder in the allocation of French labor would be inevitable, the Fuehrer declares that this is, of course, one of the most important bases for further discussions. I then told him that on 3 January there will be a meeting between Himmler, Keitel, Sauckel, and myself (Kehrl) (is the Foreign Office to be included?), at which these problems will be discussed. Subsequently there shall be a meeting with him, at which the possibility of executive power in France, as far as the allocation, and the transport of French workers to Germany is concerned, will be laid before him. (Kehrl to do advance work, that we also make a claim for executive power for the protection of the factories in France against terror bands.)

-----

[74] The basic importance of this Hitler conference on 23 May 1939 was emphasized by the IMT Judgment. See Trial of Major War Criminals, vol. I, pp. 188 and 200, Nuremberg, 1947.

For translation of entire document see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. VII, pp. 847-854, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.

[75] When the prosecution introduced this document in evidence, the following colloquy ensued (Tr. p. 49):

JUDGE SPEIGHT: Do you establish a chain between all of these documents which you read and the defendant?

MR. DENNEY: If your Honor please, the prosecution, in presenting these documents, has in mind to give an over-all picture of the way slave labor was treated in Germany, going back to the early days showing that this defendant knew because of attendance at the May 1939, conference that slave labor was going to be employed. Then as Air Ordnance Master General, later as Chief of the Jaegerstab, and later as a member of the Central Planning Board, we will connect him with enterprises involving slave labor.

JUDGE SPEIGHT: Very well.

[76] Allgemeines Wehrmachtamt of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. See case of United States _vs._ Wilhelm von Leeb, et al., vols. X, XI.

[77] For more complete translation of document see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. V, pp. 744-754, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.

[78] For complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, pp. 46-59, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.

[79] For complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, pp. 130-146, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.

[80] For complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, pp. 242-251, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.

[81] Otto Braeutigam, member of the Economic Political Department of the Foreign Office. As of May 1941 detached by the German Foreign Office to Rosenberg’s Agency, the Eastern Ministry (Ost-Ministerium).

[82] For more complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, pp. 778-9, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.

[83] For more complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. IV, pp. 79-93, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.

[84] For more complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, pp. 234-238, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.

[85] For more complete translation, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. VIII, pp. 104-107, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.

[86] For more complete translation, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. VI pp. 760-772, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.

[87] United States _vs._ Ernst von Welzsaecker, et al. See Vols. XII, XIII, XIV.

[88] After Dr. Bergold read this document into the record he made the following statement (Tr. pp. 520-521):

“Which proves that until March 1943, the commanders in the
conquered territories were opposed to the labor conscription,
and that it was Sauckel who demanded that this opposition be
removed, because he was of the opinion that foreign people had
to produce the same as the German people. It is further
important that he didn’t declare that to the Fuehrer alone but
also to the defendant [witness] Speer and the defendant Milch.
Accordingly, the defendant [witness] Speer later on will attest
that never before have foreigners been treated so fairly. In
other words, he lied to the men who were to work with him.”

[89] 1130-PS. See Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, pp. 797-799, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.

2. THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD

_EXCERPT FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE PROSECUTION
REGARDING MILCH’S ACTIVITY IN THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD, 6 JANUARY 1947_[90]

MR. DENNEY: We come now to the part of the proof which places the defendant in the very center of the Slave Labor Program.

We have shown that from the outset of the war and prior thereto, he was thoroughly informed of the Nazi plan for total war, which contemplated the full use of all human material resources within the homeland. We will show he was active in the formation and announcement of decisions of the Central Planning Board. We will show the Board exercised jurisdiction in the matter of procurement, allocation, and use. He carried out the master plan for requisition, allocation, and use of human raw material for the war machine. There are words we will have by necessity to repeat as we introduce the documents—requisition, allocation, and use.

Our evidence will show that Milch, a member of the Central Planning Board, belonged to an organization—and here again we have another important word “belong”. He was one of two most essential men in the Planning Board that guided the decisions of that organization.

We will present to the Court excerpts from the minutes of some 12 conferences at every one of which Milch was present, starting with the first held in April 1942 and ending with the fifty-eighth held in May 1944. Actually, he was at all but eight conferences, and we use the figure “eight” advisably. We are not sure, he may have been in some of those. There is no question that he was in every one of those meetings which we introduce here. On occasions when Speer was not present Milch presided. We will show he actively participated when the Central Planning Board arrived at decisions with respect to the request, allocation, and use of this labor.

We will show he was active in the formation of the announcement of decisions of the Central Planning Board. We will show the Board exercised jurisdiction in the matter of procurement, allocation, and use of labor. And all of them were prisoners of war and were allocated to the German war effort. Requisition, allocation, and use were the dominating voice. Decisive influence, active participation, forced labor, illegal occupation—these are the words with which we are concerned, and these are the things with which he concerned himself.

Evidence

_Prosecution Documents_

Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page
R-124 48-B Stenographic record of the 447
first conference of the
Central Planning Board on 27
April 1942.

R-124 48-B Letter of 20 October 1942 448
transmitting the statutes of
the Central Planning Board.

1510-PS 58 Extracts from decree of 16 450
September 1943, defining the
duties of the Planning Office
of the Central Planning
Board.

3721-PS 41-A Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, 22 452
September 1945, regarding the
jurisdiction of the Central
Planning Board.

NI-1098 63 Extracts from affidavit of 456
Fritz Sauckel, 22 September
1946, regarding the
jurisdiction of the Central
Planning Board.

R-124 48-A Extracts from report on the 457
eleventh conference of the
Central Planning Board, 22
July 1942.

R-124 48-A Extracts from report on the 459
seventeenth conference of the
Central Planning Board, 28
October 1942.

R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 461
minutes of twenty-first
conference of Central
Planning Board, 30 October
1942.

R-124 48-B Extracts from stenographic 465
minutes of the twenty-third
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 3 November
1942.

R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 467
minutes of the thirty-third
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 16 February
1943.

R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 471
minutes of the thirty-sixth
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 22 April
1943.

R-124 48-A Report of the forty-second 475
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 23 June 1943.

R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 478
minutes of the fifty-third
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 16 February
1944.
R-124 48-B Report on the fifty-third 479
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 16 February
1944.

R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 484
minutes of the fifty-fourth
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 1 March 1944.

R-124 48-D Extracts from the report on the 498
fifty-sixth conference of the
Central Planning Board, 4
April 1944.

NOKW-287 49 Letter from Milch to Sauckel, 8 499
April 1943, concerning the
protection of industry.

R-124 48-A Speer’s minutes of a conference 501
with Hitler on 8 July 1943.

R-124 48-A Extract from the report by Saur 502
of the conference with the
Fuehrer, 5 March 1944.

_Defense Documents_

Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page
R-124 5 Extract from the stenographic 509
report of the eleventh
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 22 July 1942.

R-124 6 Extract from the stenographic 510
minutes of the twenty-second
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 2 November
1942.

R-124 7 Extract from the stenographic 510
minutes of the thirty-second
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 12 February
1943.

R-124 8 Extract from the stenographic 511
minutes of the thirty-third
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 16 February
1943.

R-124 9 Extract from stenographic 516
minutes of the thirty-ninth
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 23 April
1943.

R-124 31 Extracts from the stenographic 517
minutes of the fifty-fourth
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 1 March 1944.

_Testimony_

Excerpts from the testimony given by defense witness Albert 502
Speer before commission on 19 February 1947

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B

STENOGRAPHIC RECORD OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE
CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD ON 27 APRIL 1942

Berlin, 27 April 1942

Secret

_“THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD” IN THE FOUR YEAR PLAN_

_1ST CONFERENCE_

Present:
The three members:
Reich Minister Speer,
Field Marshal Milch,
State Secretary Koerner.
Furthermore:
State Secretary Dr. Schulze-Fielitz, Ministry of Munitions,
Ministerialrat von Normann, Four Year Plan.

Result:

I. The _Central Planning_ in the Four Year Plan (Decree of the Reich Marshal of Greater Germany of 22 April 1942—VP 6707 g) is a task for leaders. It encompasses only principles and executive matters. It makes unequivocal decisions and supervises the execution of its directives. The Central Planning does not rely on anonymous institutions difficult to control, but always on individuals and fully responsible persons who are free in the selection of their work methods and their collaboration as far as there are no directives issued by the Central Planning.

II. _Discussion of the situation in iron._

A. The objective is to reach a production of 2,2 million tons per month. In the first place it has to be established whether, after taking into account the excessive requests which were certainly made and of the difficulties confronting an increase of production (coal, transport) the present figures are sufficient (2 million tons). For the distribution in the third quarter these 2 million tons have to serve in any case as a basis.

B. The principles of distribution and the new quotas will be discussed in a subsequent conference with a wider circle of participants (see special protocol).

C. The _iron-producing industry_ will be organized into a Reich association. It is to be established and made to operate as soon as possible. The creation of an interimistic liaison organization (Planning Group Iron) has, therefore, been abandoned. The task of the Reich Association ends with the production of iron and before the distribution of the iron.

D. For the position of president of the Reich Association Iron, Generaldirektor Voegler and Geheimrat Roechling[91] are suggested. Roechling was chosen, the appointment of whom would be approved by the Fuehrer, according to Reich Minister Speer. State Secretary Koerner will submit the proposal to the Reich Marshal [Goering].

III. The reorganization of the Upper Silesian Territory with the object of the highest and best utilization for war economy in mind is urgent. The selection of locations and the determining of capacities in this territory has to be expedited with regard to raw material, transport, and labor.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B

LETTER OF 20 OCTOBER 1942 TRANSMITTING THE STATUTES
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD

The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan. Central Planning Board. _Z. P. 1_

Berlin, October 20, 1942

Enclosed I send you, for your information, the statutes of the Central Planning Board with the request to support the office of the “Central Planning Board” in every possible way in its work, and to direct, more particularly, your section chiefs and reporters to forward all information requested orally or by writing, in the shortest possible time. By this collaboration of your section chiefs and reporters, the building up of a larger apparatus in the framework of the “Central Planning Board” is to be avoided.

BY ORDER:
[Typewritten] WALTHER SCHIEBER
Certified: SCHWINGE
Ministerialregistrator

[Stamp of the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan.]

Distribution to—

_a._ The highest Reich authorities.
_b._ The Reich Protector.
_c._ The Governor General.
_d._ The executive authorities in the occupied territories.

_STATUTES OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_

1. The Central Planning Board, created by the Fuehrer and the Reich Marshal in order to unify armament and war economy, deals only with the decision of basic questions. Professional questions remain the task of the competent departments, which in their fields remain responsible within the framework of the decisions made by the Central Planning Board.

2. In order to have the conferences properly prepared and to have the execution of the decisions supervised, the Central Planning Board appoints an office. This office consists of the deputies appointed by each of three members of the Central Planning Board; one of these three deputies shall be appointed chief of the office.

[Handwritten marginal note on left side of the document: “To be forwarded”.]

3. In accordance with the attached Table of Organization [not reproduced], the office appoints reporters. These reporters are at the disposal of all members of the Central Planning Board. The office appoints one reporter to keep the record.

4. Office and reporters have to see to it, above all, and to draw the attention of the Central Planning Board, if necessary, to the required measures, that—

_a._ All decisive tasks of war economy are achieved quickly,
without red tape, and ruthlessly, by mutual adapting of all
composing branches.

_b._ All such work as is obviously without importance for
winning the war, be discontinued.

5. _Tasks of the office_

_a._ The office prepares the meetings of the Central Planning
Board in such a manner that the members of the Central Planning
Board have the agenda and the material of discussion 24 hours in
advance. For this purpose the office conducts preliminary talks
with the competent departments, etc.

_b._ On the strength of the record made by the reporter, the
office sees to the execution of the decisions of the Central
Planning Board by the competent agencies, and sees to it that
the deadlines fixed are complied with.

_c._ The members of the office keep the members of the Central
Planning Board informed between the sessions.

6. The distribution of work, dealing with incoming mail, etc., is arranged by the office itself. The members of the office sign: “By order” of the Central Planning Board.

7. _Tasks of the reporters_

Reporters have to keep in constant touch with the departments, with regard to the sectors of work they are in charge of. In the regular sittings of the office they report on the progress made and on the measures which are required for the carrying on of the war economy, especially for the increase in production, for other improvements in the supply with raw materials, and for necessary changes in distribution. They do the preliminary work for the meetings of the board (see also 5 _a_) and in their working sector they are primarily responsible for the execution, within the established time limits, of the decisions of the Central Planning Board.

Berlin, 20 October 1942.

[Typewritten] MILCH
[Typewritten] SPEER
[Typewritten] KOERNER

[Stamp] Berlin 6-11-1942 No. L 16-501

Copy to the State Secretary for his information.

[Typewritten] DR. SCHATTENMANN

Certified: Schulz, Reg. Sekr.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1510-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 58

EXTRACTS FROM DECREE OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1943, DEFINING THE
DUTIES OF THE PLANNING OFFICE OF THE
CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD

Berlin, 16 September 1943

_DECREE OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1948 OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY GENERAL FOR ARMAMENT TASKS WITHIN THE FOUR YEAR PLAN AND OF THE REICH MINISTER FOR ARMAMENT AND WAR PRODUCTION CONCERNING THE TASK OF THE PLANNING OFFICE_

The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich has established a Planning Office in my department by decree of 4 September 1943 for the purpose of concentrated handling of all fundamental questions of war economical planning.

In this connection I order:

I

1. The Planning Office prepares the decisions of the Central Planning Board and supervises their execution.

2. In this connection it will especially prepare the distribution to consumers of basic materials (for instance, iron, metals, coal, mineral oil, nitrogen, and other important raw materials).

3. As a working basis for Central Planning Board, the Planning Office has to draw up plans for production and distribution for the entire war economy, the demand schedules being based on the demands of the entire German sphere of power. In this connection imports and exports are to be considered. The entire planning is to be synchronized in advance with the participating departments and specialist offices, taking into account production requisites. The Planning Office will constantly have to summarize and to evaluate the necessary statistical material.

4. The Planning Office will have to submit to the Central Planning Board for decision the proposed assignment of manpower to the individual big sectors of employment (trade industry for war effort [gewerbliche Kriegswirtschaft], traffic, foodstuffs, etc.). It also has to evaluate statistically the carrying through of the assignments.

* * * * *

6. The Planning Office will have to advocate towards the Reich Ministry of Economics the requirements of war industry in connection with the establishment of import and export quotas.

It has to report constantly to the Central Planning Board about the state of imports essential for war economy.

* * * * *

II

* * * * *

4. The Planning Office has to evaluate statistically the industrial and war production existing within the power sphere of Greater Germany or of the states allied with the Reich; it has to develop out of that evaluation proposals for a common exchange of production in order to increase the initial war production.

* * * * *

[Signed] SPEER
The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production
Plenipotentiary General for
Armament Tasks within the Four Year Plan

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3721-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT NO. 41-A[92]

TESTIMONY OF FRITZ SAUCKEL, 22 SEPTEMBER 1945, REGARDING
THE JURISDICTION OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD

TESTIMONY OF FRITZ SAUCKEL TAKEN AT NUERNBERG, GERMANY, 1030 HOURS TO 1210 HOURS ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1945, BY JOHN J. MONIGAN JR., MAJ., CAC, OUSCC

MAJOR MONIGAN: Principally, what I am interested in are the functions and responsibilities of the Central Planning Board in their relationship to your office and their relationship to industry.