Chapter XLVII: Section 2: A III f (12)

Q. Witness, that means that neither the labor office nor the Armament Inspectorate were under your supervision, as the GL.

A. Yes that is quite correct.

Q. But Speer has testified that until the very end you did not renounce the command of the air industry. What could you say to this effect?

A. If Speer should mean that my personnel official, in the way I described before, talked with his, Speer’s armament office, once a month, then it is quite correct; but my officials might have used these occasions, and how far he worked with my name on these occasions I do not know. I hope he did so in order to get his point through. I was never present. I never heard how these negotiations went on. Should Speer mean, however, that my work in that field was the same as his in his field, then he makes a mistake, for I did not have that organization nor did I have the task. My field was only a very specialized one compared to Speer’s field. * * * I might add perhaps, that Speer did not know my organization; of course we never discussed it. He knew, of course, that I had a technical office; he knew that I had a planning office, and he also knew that I had an economic department for the contracts of industry. After all, he fought a battle to take the whole economic department into his sphere, and when I said he couldn’t possibly do it, he waited until the whole armament industry came under his charge. We two always settled everything in a friendly manner after that up to the last moment. Even if there were a certain amount of conflicting interests, which sometimes were quite considerable, particularly between our subordinate officers—there were quite severe battles between those subordinate officers at times—but we always poured oil on the troubled waters, Mr. Speer and I.

Q. Witness, but couldn’t it be, that in the sphere of the Central Planning Board in presenting the labor demands of your industry, you spoke for your own interests?

A. I cannot recall, and I have read some of the records, but in not one of them, there is not one word said that I had any special demands for the Luftwaffe. Apart from the fact that once or twice I remarked that I was equally badly off, that I didn’t get anything, but that doesn’t mean that I was looking after my interests in the GL. If I talked about workers at the Central Planning Board, I did so at Speer’s request, to give him in the armament industry all the support. Speer was particularly pleased when I played the wild man and became a little strong. He once told me, “you are much better at this than I am; I am only a civilian; I can’t do it as well as you can”. And sometimes he pepped me up and said “Speak a little more fiercely, please”, which I was only too delighted to do for him. That was meant to achieve something which you may wish to ask me about a little later on: How we could get Sauckel to speak clearly. How we could get rid of the suspicion that we through our inefficiency cannot bring German industry up to the high level, to the right level.

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Q. Witness, during these conferences of the Central Planning Board did it happen that the bulk of the workers was discussed, or was it rather a question of bringing new workers into Germany?

A. No, it was only the labor question as such, only inasmuch as it was important for the increase of raw materials in accordance with Hitler’s order, and indeed always as an attack on Sauckel in order to get him to give us the people or to say he cannot do it. As we knew he could not supply them, our main demand which we wished to achieve was an open statement by Sauckel, “I haven’t got the workers whom you need”.

Q. Witness, but if your air force industry, for instance, either the labor offices or the Armament Inspectorates had made requests to Speer, and when your planning office had checked these demands in order to find out what was really necessary and what was unnecessary, was it a matter of proposing what kind of workers you wanted to have and what kind of workers should be distributed into these different production programs? Was it a question of deciding whether you needed German workers or rather more foreigners?

A. We did that in one sense, that for certain factories we simply had to have skilled workers, which we asked for, but never did we ask, “Give us foreigners; give us prisoners of war”, and so forth. Our wishes were to the effect to have Germans, but it was quite clear to us that there weren’t enough German workers to fulfill the demands. Had they been available, one needn’t have used prisoners of war or recruited foreign workers or sent the prisoners of war to work unless they volunteered for it.

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[March 14]

JUDGE PHILLIPS: The Tribunal understands you to say that Polish prisoners of war were changed into civilian workers and that you no longer considered them to be prisoners of war. How were they changed into civilian workers from prisoners of war?

A. Personally I cannot give you many details about this because that happened as early as 1939, and at that time I was not connected with the armament question. How it was worked I do not know. All I can imagine is that there was no longer a Polish Government and that the Governor General gave the order; whether any Polish office was asked, I don’t know; it is only in the files here that I found something about some Polish regional authority. I cannot give you any more clear details.

DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, perhaps I can clarify the matter.

PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Let’s let the witness clarify it. Witness, you are an old soldier. You have been a soldier for many years. How do you transfer a prisoner of war into a civilian, by discharging him?

A. Yes, he must be released from being a prisoner of war, and then there are various possibilities. One possibility would be—and this was resorted to by Germany—to make him a free worker and tell him that “You are being released, but you must do some work. That is the conditions which we put to you. You are being paid properly, and otherwise you live as a free man.”

There is also another possibility, which was the way chosen by the Americans, by which a prisoner of war is released and then regarded as an internee. I think that that procedure is not quite so favorable for the man concerned.

Q. You just transposed them from prisoners of war to civilian prisoners, then?

A. No, they were no longer prisoners. They were properly released, but they signed a document which obliged them to do some work for Germany.

Q. You imprisoned them by a document instead of in a stockade?

A. They were no longer locked up, Sir. The Polish workers—I saw them in the country, for instance—live quite freely.

Q. Could they go where they liked?

A. They could not change their places of work without permission. For instance, if they were allocated to a farmer, they had to stay with that farmer. Only if there were special reasons could they change their place of work. Then they were transferred.

Q. That is what you call freeing them?

A. It was not complete freedom, but it was a better status than previously when they were prisoners of war.

Q. What would happen to one of these free workers if he walked away from his place of employment?

A. Sir, that is what I do not know myself. But may I say something else? A German worker was not allowed to change his place of work either. Freedom for a German was not any bigger than freedom for a Pole, as long as the war lasted.

Q. The German went home to his family every night, did he not?

A. These Polish soldiers—I cannot speak comprehensively because I am not particularly well informed here—but those I saw were young people, and they lived with the farmer’s family.

Q. Witness, you don’t mean to tell this Tribunal seriously that the Polish worker, the former prisoner of war, had the same freedom of movement that the German civilian had?

A. I cannot speak on all fields of life because I do not know. All I do know was that he was under the obligation to remain with his employer, but, as I said before, the German worker had to remain with his employer.

Q. Oh, well, we had that in the United States, for that matter. I still don’t remember your answering my question: What would happen to a Polish worker who chose to walk away from his place of employment?

A. I am unable to answer that. I know of no such cases, nor was I told about one.

DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, the defendant cannot know, because he was a soldier, what the Polish worker had to do. Like the German worker, the Polish worker would have been punished and brought before a tribunal because he broke his contract, and he would have received a small punishment. Thousands of German workers have been punished for the same reason, and I have defended many a German worker for the same charge. That would have happened—nothing else.

PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Let me ask you, Dr. Bergold. Did you ever defend a Polish worker for walking away from his employment?

DR. BERGOLD: Yes, I did.

PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: I have no inclination to dispute you.

DR. BERGOLD: I defended quite a few foreign workers in wartime, not only Poles, but Frenchmen, Belgians, and Dutchmen.

PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Oh, maybe Belgians, Dutchmen, but Poles—?

DR. BERGOLD: Yes, definitely. I am prepared to make that statement on oath, Sir.

DEFENDANT MILCH: May I supply an observation of my own on the Polish question? Shortly before I was taken prisoner, I was in the country in Schleswig-Holstein. In that region the only foreigners there were Poles. Those Poles on the estate where I was, perhaps 30 or 40 of them, said that they did not wish to return home, that they would ask to be allowed to remain on the estate just as did their colleagues in the neighborhood. These people were dressed very neatly on Sundays. They looked very clean and healthy. They could not be told from any German in the neighborhood there except for certain racial distinctions. All of them had bicycles. On that bicycle they went on Sundays to the nearest pub and met their girl friends and danced, and they told me themselves that never before had they been so happy as they were in Germany. That was at a time when the British were 50 kilometers away from their village.

PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Perhaps that is why they were so happy.

A. No. They said that they did not want to leave there now. They wished to remain.

Q. I think you misunderstood my point. Perhaps their happiness arose from the fact that the British were only 50 kilometers away.

A. No. I understood what you were trying to say, Sir, but I also talked to the German employers there. I was there in a totally private capacity, and I knew these people quite well. They were friends of mine, and they told me that they were quite satisfied with their Poles, and they also said that the Poles had done very good work and that the Poles had asked to be allowed to remain after the collapse, because in those days they did not wish to return to Poland and they were quite well looked after here.

May I ask the Court to believe me that we in Germany were not all of us hangmen and people who delighted in other people’s misery. I may say here that I think that the majority of the German people are good-hearted and that they treat other people well and that these people did not know that in some isolated places there were isolated criminals who polluted our good name for a long time to come. The people are suffering from that now, and they will suffer in the future. That is what depresses all of us the most. Otherwise, one has to take the point of view that all Germans are criminals and then it might be justified to hang the lot. Then, please start on me.

* * * * *

DR. BERGOLD: Witness, after this question was discussed, you received information that this employment of foreign workers was admissible. Could you tell me now what you knew before, prior to that moment, concerning this question?

A. I know that after the First War, the question of deportation of Belgium workers had been examined by a committee of the German Reichstag. I know that this parliamentary committee examined people like Hindenburg, Ludendorff, I think also Mackensen and others; and that many questions were discussed, including that of Belgian civilian workers. As far as I can recall, that committee was presided over by a man who had been given the Nobel Prize, Professor Schuecking; I think that was his name. However, I was very interested in it, and closely followed it because Hindenburg whom I worshipped, was put before a court; and as far as I can recall, no sentence was passed upon that score; and nobody was reproached that international law had been violated. At that time the Hague Convention existed and the first Geneva Conference had taken place. I am not very well informed, but I think that was so.

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Q. Witness, I shall now come to the 54th meeting, concerning two points there. Witness, during that meeting[142] Sauckel mentioned that only a very small percentage of those sent to Germany came on a voluntary basis. This statement has been mentioned repeatedly in this trial and I want you to say something about that.

A. I might say that I do not remember having heard these words from Sauckel. It is possible that I was not there at the moment when he said that. However, it is possible that I overheard that remark, because during those long meetings, we had discussions among each other. We were also interested in other questions. During those long meetings there was at least one meeting, probably more, during which our concentration was not quite what it should have been. Had I heard it, I would have believed Sauckel just as little as I believed all the figures he gave us, because Sauckel had stated the contrary not long before. I know exactly it was not so long before that he had declared how well his system functioned and how he brought all these laborers on a voluntary basis.

* * * * *

Q. Witness, I shall now leave the meetings of the Central Planning Board and come to single questions in that connection. What do you know about the use of British and American prisoners of war?

A. According to my opinion and as far as I know, they went into the respective camps and they were not used for labor. I never saw such a prisoner of war any place.

Q. * * * What orders did you have toward the middle of January 1943? What orders did you receive from Hitler?

A. On 15 January 1943, in the evening I was called up and summoned to go to Hitler’s Headquarters the next day for a special mission. As far as I know, I believe that it was General Bodenschatz who called me to the Fuehrer’s Headquarters. The following morning I reported to Goering, who happened to be in Berlin at that time. Goering knew that the question of food for Stalingrad was involved. Stalingrad had been encircled for months, and the whole Sixth German Army was in it. On the 16th, in the morning, I flew to Hitler’s Headquarters in East Prussia; and then Hitler either in the afternoon or in the evening gave me the information that I should proceed to Czechoslovakia immediately by air in order to supervise Stalingrad’s food supplies from there.

Q. Witness, make it a little more brief, please.

A. Yes. I tried to carry out this mission. When I received the mission, the last airfield had been lost. The Russians had taken them. We looked for smaller places which were rather difficult to find there in those mountainous areas; and within the next few days we succeeded in carrying out a considerable air lift of supplies. However, it was too late. The resisting force of the defenders had broken down; the people were starving; they had hardly any vehicles or horses. They could not get the food from the landing places for the planes because they were too weak to do so. They could not carry the containers so that the air lift of supplies in the case of Stalingrad could not be kept up after the end of January or the beginning of February.

Q. Did you have a serious accident then?

A. Yes. At that moment when I wanted to fly into Stalingrad, before I hit the airfield, I was hit by a railroad engine, and I was seriously injured.

Q. Then you went back to Hitler?

A. I carried out the mission first. Then when Stalingrad had fallen, I withdrew and went to see Hitler and told him that I could not complete my mission. He told me, however, that it was not I who had not carried out the mission but that it was his fault. He said he gave me the orders too late; he had wanted to give the orders to me much earlier but had been talked out of it.

Q. Witness, during that occasion, did you tell Hitler your opinion about the war and the general situation of the war?

A. It was on 4 February when I reported back to Hitler. Hitler on that particular day was very crushed due to the loss of Stalingrad. It was not possible to have a quiet talk with him. He did not receive me at first, or my chief of staff, namely, General of the Tank Corps Model, who had a corps within that fortress. We both were under the impression that day that we would not be able to speak to him. However, he told me in a few words, “Now, go right ahead to your GL task, manufacturing. Now we will have transport planes in the first line, transport planes, and more transport planes.” He was talking about Stalingrad. He thought that had he had more transport planes he would have been able to keep Stalingrad.

With respect to Stalingrad, I had a long discussion with him on 5 March. That was the last time I saw him. That was about a month later. I was ordered to see him because he wanted to give me the mission to build high-altitude and fast bombers and put them in the first line of production. Those now were more important than transport planes. I availed myself of that opportunity on that day and had prepared myself in order to tell him my opinion about the general situation. That discussion took place in the evening. I had dinner with him alone. That was shortly before 9:00 o’clock; and it lasted until 3:15 a.m. Then in contrast to all other discussions I had with him, I was the one who was speaking all the time.

* * * * *

I told him first of all the truth about Stalingrad; and I told him that the question of leaving an army was a military mistake, when according to military and strategical points of view it should have withdrawn, something which had been suggested both by myself and by the army. It was a mistake; and it did end with the loss of 350,000 men on the German side. However, a withdrawal in time would have saved the greatest part of these soldiers. I told him that, after all, the Russians were not as anxious to attack as that; that in the winter they themselves were in a difficult position for attacking a German army and they would not have dared. I told him then that that point was the last turning point in the fate of the war. I told him that I had tried to reach him before the Russian campaign. However, I had been unable to do so because it had been forbidden. I said that the time was now five minutes past twelve. We use that expression in Germany when something is completed; when it is finished. I told him that by that I meant that the war was lost. I apologized for not considering his nervous condition. There was no time for that any more. I thought it my duty to tell him my sincere opinion; as a field marshal I thought myself entitled to do so.

I knew that he did not want to hear this. However, I wished that he would hear me in spite of that. He could do with me whatever he wanted to afterwards. I remembered, however, that he himself before the war had used strong words against the bad advisers of Wilhelm II, who out of cowardice, had not told him the truth. In no case did I wish to stand before my own conscience with such a reproach on myself. He told me then, “Yes, you can say today whatever you wish to say.”

I told him then that he was no more in a position to attack in the East. That those attacks which had already been developed, he should stop. That he could only defend himself, and I was of the direct opinion that instead of building great fortification works in France and Norway, that during the whole of the spring, summer, and autumn, he should concentrate on fortifying the Dnieper position, which lay about 800 kilometers behind the Russian front, with all the means at his disposal, with fortifications of concrete, etc., in a great width, between two-hundred and three-hundred kilometers depth, and in that way there would be strong fortifications and good shelter for soldiers, with good equipment and food and ammunition, and that then he should take the troops back to that position for the winter, and that he should give up the whole territory in front of that fortification, out of which he would not get anything at all, neither oil, coal, nor ore. By doing that he would shorten the length of the Russian front, and in such a way that the maintenance of those soldiers on the line would be much easier. Apart from that he should take more care of the eastern forces, and I am quite sure that on the whole eastern front of two-thousand kilometers, of about ten million German soldiers, not one million of them were fighting and he should take measures to change that. That was the only point he carried out later on, and unfortunately only towards the end of November of that year and the result was that the fighting infantry units on the whole eastern front amounts to 265,000 men of the army. It was impossible to hold that front with such a small number.

I furthermore suggested to him that a great personnel change should be made, namely, he himself should give up command over the army, that he should place a simple general in that position. As it was, he held before the German people a responsibility, which he could not bear. He was no soldier in that sense, since he was not trained for that. I suggested to him to dissolve my own branch as an independent Wehrmacht unit and to put the Luftwaffe entirely under the Wehrmacht, since there was no strategic air force any longer.

Now what I had to say was special for the army, and this was certainly of a personal nature, namely, to remove Reich Marshal Goering from the Luftwaffe, and give him a different task. I said also that it was now the opportune moment for the Reich Foreign Minister also to be removed from his position.

Q. Would you give the name?

A. Von Ribbentrop. I suggested to him that the Field Marshal be put in charge of the units at the front, and I gave as a reason that Keitel was too lenient in reference to Hitler, and did not know how to get his ideas across to Hitler; that he should have somebody who would force him to observe correct military measures. I told him then that the most important task in my opinion was the home defense of Germany; the air home defense of Germany, and to consider as having the highest priority; and also the fighter production should be placed in the first place, and armaments. I showed him the figures of the English, the American and the Russian armaments explicitly, and I showed him how these armaments would have their effect over Germany, and also at what point, or at what time this would happen. I reported to him that many false reports were made to him, and I gave him an exact instance. I told him that he overestimated himself, and his allies, and that he also underestimated the Russians, and the attitude of Stalin personally, and that that had led to the Stalingrad collapse, and he should be quite clear as to the facts if the attack was continued in the East; that he could hold the Dnieper position, and that if he held that position, the air defense would be able to prepare a military preparation for peace if the enemy would see that this crushing of Germany from the air was no longer possible and if the Russians would see that they would not be able to cross the Dnieper without being crushed; that I am sure with that preparedness which should be started at once, we ought to be coming to a peace. It might be possible to get away with bearable peace terms if they would act immediately.

Then I also discussed the peace question, and I told him he might make a real peace with France without taking territory, and I was sure that France would still consider that. The same applied to Belgium, and also Holland, as well as Norway. A peace with these countries would then induce the greater powers of the Western countries to be able to conclude peace with Germany which would be endurable.

Those were the main points of my opinion. I do not wish to recite details. He listened to and interrupted me only once, and that was on the question whether he could or could not attack in 1943, and I remember exactly that I said to him more than twenty times, “You cannot attack” and first he said in a quiet way, then got more excited and more excited until he was very cross, and knocked on the table, “I must attack.” I told him at the end, “I know I am very impolite, I don’t want to discuss this question of attacking anymore. But be convinced I shall not change my opinion.”

Then he waited for a short while, and I began to speak of something else, and then suddenly he said, “What would you say, Milch, if I would only make a short attack in order to be able to push through the Russian preparations before they can start developing.” I answered, “Wait a minute, it is a defensive measure, because a soldier carries out his defense by attacking in turn,” and he said, “Then we agree on that point.” I said, “No, I don’t think we do. If you are successful you will continue. I would say all the troops should go back after forty-eight hours that no matter what. Think of Verdun in 1916 when the same mistake was made; when they did not succeed in getting through on a surprise attempt, they went doggedly on.”

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Q. Witness, what was the development after Stalingrad of your relationship to Hitler and Goering?

PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Before you go on, will you ask for the date of this conference of Hitler’s again?

A. It was on 5 March 1943.

* * * * *

On the question of how my relationship to Hitler and Goering developed later on I have to say the following: It became worse and worse from time to time. It was due to a struggle which I had about the German air defense which contradicted Hitler’s idea of waging war, for this was the specific field of the Luftwaffe and I as Inspector General of the Luftwaffe was forced to make suggestions. I did not let this matter drop, and I repeatedly brought it to the front, in contrast with political proposals or proposals in the field of the army and navy, which were outside of my field of tasks and which I could not bring to anyone’s attention unless Hitler gave me his permission or if he wished me to.

Q. With respect to this conference, did you inform him of the fact that you wanted to have Goering gone?

A. Yes. I did. I told Goering about that. I did not want to stab him in the back.

Q. Then, what happened to your relationship with Goering?

A. I do not believe that this single incident had any influence on our relationship, which was bad anyway. Goering was not the kind of a man who would hold it against me. He had a certain understanding of the circumstances. There were other things that he did not like about me.

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[March 17]

Q. Witness, the last time you were giving us a description of the suggestions you made with Hitler with regard to achieving a change. What was the impression you had afterwards as to whether he was going to follow your suggestions or not?

A. At that time I first of all hoped that he would somehow react to my suggestion, because in the case of the Stalingrad assignment which had been given to me although too late, I saw indications that at that time he still had confidence in me, and also in my military ability. During the following weeks and months I waited for something to happen, but nothing did. In the spring of 1943, after my conference, new attacks were ordered by him on the eastern front. He was not making an attack for the purposes of defense, he was going to try to reestablish the front along the Volga River. He was also going to try again to advance towards the Caucasus. It was only in November 1943 that he followed one of my suggestions, namely, to ascertain how many men were fighting in the East, as I said last Friday, and I need not repeat it. The attack was catastrophic, but in spite of that, no basic changes were made after that. All the other suggestions, political, military, and those regarding the personnel, were not followed. Through that I lost my last hope, namely, that a final basis favorable to Germany could be established to bring an end to this war through political means, in other words, peace negotiations, which might have had certain prospects of success.

Q. Witness, now I shall have to put to you this question. Why, after you recognized that fact did you continue your activity at all. What were the reasons which made you place your service at their disposal at all?

A. The main reason was that I was responsible to my people, and even if all the plans failed to materialize, I, nevertheless, still had one last hope at least, that a proper air defense could be arranged for Germany in order to protect our home country and the people from the worst, and the destruction of their homes and places of culture. That was my main reason.

Q. What then are the steps that you took in order to achieve your last final aim for the German people?

A. After 1941 I had a constant struggle, I would like to say, with Goering and with Hitler in order to achieve an air defense which I considered necessary. My last effort then was the foundation of the Jaegerstab.

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Q. Witness, you have just testified that you had founded the Jaegerstab in order gradually to leave your post. Did that further have any other purpose, for instance, the removal of existing difficulties outside your own department?

A. Yes. Air armament within the entire armament program had very small, very negligible powers. As Hitler especially demanded army and naval rearmament, Speer’s Ministry for years had encroached on a large scale in all matters which were important for my industry. As a result experts and other workers had been simply taken away from us. The armament inspectors and district military administrative authorities, both of whom were under Speer, were able to carry this through. It was merely by accident that I learned of this in individual cases, when, for instance, one of the industrialists happened to come to see me. We raised objections but we could not alter the situation, I mentioned this the other day. I wanted to use the Jaegerstab in order to transfer part of this responsibility for air armament to Speer and his ministry so that such encroachment, which was particularly noticeable where materials were concerned, should no longer happen.

The man who had approximately the same task as my own in Speer’s Ministry was Mr. Saur. Saur was a very clever man, very able, very energetic, and since he was always sent to report to Hitler personally, he knew Hitler and his intentions very well, and he knew therefore that Hitler was not so keen on air armament, and from that he drew the conclusion which led to these encroachments into our sphere. I was very anxious to have him join the Jaegerstab so that there too he would share in the responsibility. There was a struggle about this with Speer until it finally came about that Saur joined the Jaegerstab. I did not want to found the Jaegerstab without him, and it turned out that Saur now tackled this new task very energetically and he did in fact succeed to some extent in bringing Hitler at least to a standstill. But Hitler’s views and Hitler’s orders he could not change. Apart from that it was necessary, if I wanted to transfer armament work to Speer, for the final armament would have to go through Saur’s hands eventually, so it was essential that Saur should be included right from the start.

Q. Thank you. Did you give him responsibility to a small or a large extent within the Jaegerstab?

A. Let me answer that like this: I gave him as much freedom of action as possible, since he was going to take it over later, and it was his nature that when any matter was placed in his hands he took it up very energetically, and I was happy to see that he was going ahead so vigorously.

Q. Witness, you have made notes about everything you did during the war. Can you tell this high Tribunal whether you gradually withdrew from the Jaegerstab and how many meetings you participated in each month?

A. In March, I participated in 15 meetings—they took place daily—and two trips. In April, I participated in eight meetings, and one journey. In May, I attended five meetings and took part in two journeys. In June I attended two meetings only, and had also two journeys. In July, I didn’t attend any meetings at all, neither did I participate in any journey. I took more active interest in the journeys, totaling seven, in order to go into the provinces and show that the handing over of my task to Saur was taking place with my agreement. These are the figures: March 15, then eight, then five, then two.

Q. You mean the meetings?

A. Yes; that applies to meetings. In other words, I participated in a total of 30 meetings.

Q. But there was one more on 1 August 1944, wasn’t there?

A. That was after my retirement. It was a meeting when Speer was in the chair, in which the Jaegerstab was now finally discontinuing its work, as the tasks of the Jaegerstab were now being incorporated with ordinary armament under Speer in the armament staff. It was a purely formal meeting of handing over, and I deliberately took part, so as not to create the impression that I was leaving reluctantly or that I was angry about anything, for, of course, the exact opposite was the case.

* * * * *

Q. Witness, did the Jaegerstab have anything to do with workers?

A. Do you mean building workers?

Q. I mean generally speaking, for the moment.

A. I see. Well, you have to draw a clear dividing line. There were two completely different conceptions for us, armament workers and building workers. Armament workers came through the existing channels; in other words, requests were made to Sauckel by the industries, and Sauckel fulfilled, or did not fulfill such requests. Information about this first of all went to Speer’s Ministry through the Armament Inspectorates, and secondly, there were statistical reports monthly from industry to air force. Building workers, on the other hand, did not concern any of us at all, not even statistically speaking; that is, insofar as the GL was concerned and his representatives on the Jaegerstab. This was entirely a problem for Todt’s Organization. We knew absolutely nothing about this problem as far as we were concerned.

Q. Witness, did the Jaegerstab include a representative of the GBA, the Plenipotentiary General for Labor, Sauckel, on its board?

A. I cannot at this moment recollect that accurately, but I believe not. As far as I know, for these questions there was only a representative from Speer’s Ministry. That was Mr. Schmelter, who has been a witness in this trial, and who on his part used to hear our requests and take our requests to his ministry to help as far as he could.

Q. In order to help in labor problems did Schmelter have to go to Sauckel on his part?

A. Yes, quite decidedly. He, on his own initiative, could not distribute workers because he did not have any workers reserves of any kind.

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Q. Witness, the construction work which Hitler stated had to be constructed either by Kammler or Dorsch, was that all for the purpose of the Jaegerstab or also for other armament purposes?

A. I know that these constructions were meant for many other purposes because if these questions were discussed in the Jaegerstab I repeatedly heard Saur or some of his representatives saying, “We wish to change this; we want to use this for making tanks; or here, for instance, we will have V-2 rockets.” That is how it fluctuated. In any case, I know that the subterranean constructions or tunnels were meant for other armament purposes.

Q. Witness, did you ever hear about the fact that for the construction of the surface concrete factories concentration camp inmates were to be used?

A. I heard about that in the Jaegerstab, I believe; and that is how we can explain Kammler’s task.

Q. Witness, in your capacities as GL, as member of the Central Planning Board, or member of the Jaegerstab, what did you have to do with the concentration camp inmates? Did you apply for those?

A. No, we had nothing whatsoever to do with it. But they were requisitioned for industry through channels which I did not know at the time. At that time I knew from a conference that in Oranienburg, at Heinkel’s, people were being used from the concentration camps which were near there. I heard one of my men say that the work that was being done over there was good work, I myself did not see these inmates working. However, at that time I was convinced of the fact, through my visit to the concentration camp of Dachau in 1935, that these were, in the main, only German criminals.

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Q. Witness, did you hear in connection with labor for concrete construction work, that Hitler gave orders for the use of one hundred thousand Jews, or did the Jaegerstab request this?

A. I am sure that the Jaegerstab did not do that. I cannot say for sure if before the collapse I knew anything at all about this matter. I know from the record that Hitler is said to have had a conference on 4 January 1944 about this question. However, I know that that conference lasted for quite a few days, I believe, from 1 to 4 January. I participated for a very short time in that conference on 4 January. I do not know, or I cannot recall, if during the time I was there they discussed that point.

Q. Did you later on find out that Jewish concentration camp inmates were used in this construction?

A. I never found out for sure.

Q. However, in the sessions of the Jaegerstab they had discussed that point?

A. I cannot remember anything about it. Many things were discussed there every day, so that it is not quite possible to remember every detail that they discussed.

Q. During those conferences or meetings, the number of which you had mentioned, did you always participate in these conferences?

A. No. I was called out very often. I left on my own initiative sometimes in order to make certain arrangements in connection with my other fields of work; otherwise, I should not have been able to do any work whatsoever in my other spheres. At that time I had the whole set-up of General Foerster under my orders, and also the entire training of the Luftwaffe; on top of that were the questions of the Inspectorate General and his problems.

Q. Witness, I shall come now to your speech of 25 March 1944, which has been repeatedly mentioned here, Document NOKW-017, Prosecution Exhibit 54. It is your speech to the chief engineers of the Luftwaffe and the chief quartermasters. It says here at one point that for construction a few hundred thousand laborers were being used who had been withdrawn from other places. By that don’t you mean those 100,000 Jews we just mentioned?

A. No. Under no circumstances. At that time workers had been transferred for these purposes from many other constructions which were already under way.

Q. Witness—

A. May I add to that, this: I could not possibly imagine why Jews should be used as construction workers. Therefore, I am sure that it would have struck me if I had heard that, for Jews are not used as carpenters and bricklayers. They are mostly people who work in offices, and one could hardly expect construction work from them. I don’t believe that I myself, as a man who has never done that kind of work, would be of any use for it.

Q. Witness, explain to us now the purpose of this speech of yours, which uses rather strong language.

A. During the severe air raids we had lost many stocks of material, mainly of parts. The new output of these parts could not possibly keep pace with the destruction. There was only one way left, namely, to take these parts from troops’ stocks. The troops had large stocks over which the GL himself had no power of disposal whatsoever. He just gave the orders for the manufacture of them. The requests of the troops, in my opinion, were always too high—4.2 billion marks’ worth of parts were being ordered at that time, that is proof of it. If we wanted to have these planes, which were half ready, in time, it was possible only if the troops would give us some of their parts. Prior to this conference many attempts to that effect had been made, but the Quartermaster General, because of the veto of his chief quartermasters and chief engineers, had refused my wishes. I was very annoyed about that. Saur came to see me and stressed once more that the completion of the planes was impossible. He thought that in the army that would have been taken care of long ago, but in the Luftwaffe there did not seem to be any definite power to give orders, and he would take this matter up with the higher authorities. That, for the second time, made me very cross, and when this conference took place immediately after these things, I spoke in very strong terms in order that the Quartermaster General with his staff should give me the parts that were needed. That was the purpose and the aim of the whole thing, and contrary to what had happened before, when they had refused me those parts, the harsh military speech I made was crowned with success.

Q. Witness, in this speech there are certain passages which in themselves have nothing to do with those aims you just mentioned. I would like to show you these passages. At one spot you come to the question concerning labor, and you say that the portion assigned to the Luftwaffe in the allocation of labor had been constantly diminished, that the foreigners were running away and not keeping their contracts, and that if a foreman reprimanded or beat one of these young laborers who was engaged in sabotage, he, the foreman, got into trouble; and that the international law could not be applied here and that you would see to it yourself that the prisoners, with the exception of the Americans and British, were removed from the power of the military organization—then, if a man committed sabotage, he should be hanged in his own factory or workshop. What does that have to do with this speech and these aims that you mentioned?

A. As far as prisoners of war were working with the Luftwaffe itself, the Quartermaster General and the Chief Quartermaster had something to do with it. This was to be a threat to that department, namely, that certain rights would be withdrawn from them. Of course, I could not do that. I don’t believe that Goering would have followed such a suggestion of mine either.

I have no excuse whatsoever for these words which I used. I have now had the time to read this passage in peace, and I cannot understand it myself. I can only repeat that I myself was in an impossible position. I could see what was coming, and I could no longer help my people. At that time—I do not wish to say this as an excuse, but just in order to explain—I was still suffering very badly from my accident, and I could not quite get over the concussion, because at that time I could not possibly be absent for one minute. I knew that because my doctor was worried about me and he tried to help me with all sorts of drugs and medicines.

Q. Witness, a number of witnesses who were here have stated that very often you had outbursts of rage. At the time when you made that statement did you have the sincere wish to carry through these measures?

A. No. I can say that with a good conscience. Never, never in my life did I do such a thing, and I believe that he who really knows me knows exactly that, on the contrary, I was different. However, at that time I simply had to give vent to my feelings, and I could not use strong words to the people I really wanted to use them on. That was not consistent with the discipline you have in an army. I also have to say that immediately after such a discussion I myself no longer knew what I had said during one of those outbursts of rage. Even today I could not say for sure that I said that. However, I cannot deny it.

Q. Witness, did you at that time use such wild expressions with reference to these Luftwaffe gentlemen, and did you threaten them as well?

A. Yes. I did. I read now that I did so. I am very sorry even today that I used such strong words against my comrades.

Q. Later on in another place you said that people who acted as if they were sick ought to be whipped to work and that the whip should be used as a medicine. That is a similar statement?

A. That was just silly talk, so to speak, and I also used strong words about myself and called myself an idiot once in a while.

Q. Did you ever issue orders to drive people to work with the whip?

A. Never, and I am sure that I myself would have intervened in such a case.

Q. Did you ever have anybody hanged because of sabotage at any time.

A. No. First, I did not do it. Second, I could not do it. I never had anybody punished for sabotage in any way because that was not within my competency, not even in the few instances where sabotage had actually taken place.

Q. Witness, weren’t you afraid, however, that if you spoke like that before this circle of men, that those people would actually act according to your words?

A. In this circle there was nobody who could possibly have the power to carry out such things, and second, I believe that everybody knew me, because my friends even at that time had told me that I had lost my control over myself. It was a very good thing that nobody took me seriously at such a time. I also always promised myself that I would not burst into rage again. However, at that time I did not have full control over myself because the situation was becoming more serious every day. Moreover, I knew that all this could have been avoided, that it had never been necessary to go to war, but if so, that the war could have been terminated long ago, and apart from all this, if nothing else, the destruction of Germany could have been avoided. That thought did not leave me alone day or night, and that actually contributed to these explosions. When everything was over, from that day I became more quiet.

Q. Witness, those people you spoke to were soldiers, were they not?

A. Yes.

Q. Could those soldiers, according to your knowledge, have possibly been led to carry out these orders which were against international law?

A. No, never. They quite rightly thought, as people often told me, that I was crazy during such outbursts. I myself was in no position to judge that, however.

Q. Witness, however, a certain number of measures in contradiction to international law were carried out in Germany. Did you know anything about that, could you have thought then that maybe you were also causing such measures against international law?

A. No. I did not know about that, with the very few exceptions that were discussed here. However, I never connected them with myself. There never was any connection at any time.

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[March 18]

Q. Witness, after you received the Knight’s Cross in 1940, did you receive any distinctions from Hitler, any decorations?

A. Yes, I did, in 1940 I received the promotion to a field marshal, and that was also in 1940. After 1940 I did not receive anything which I considered a distinction as a soldier, because the bonus I received in 1942—yes, I will refer to that later—I couldn’t see any distinction in that as a soldier.

Q. Will you now talk of this bonus which you received? Give us some details about it.

A. Hitler sent his adjutant on my 50th birthday, with a picture of Hitler, that is, a photograph, with a dedication, and a letter in which he congratulated me, and there was a check inside to the amount of 250,000 marks. Hitler wrote in his letter that he knew I was leading a very modest life and he would like to give me in this way the possibility of making it a little pleasanter.

I thanked Hitler, and I told him that I gladly accepted the money, because after all I could not refuse it, as a compensation for the fact that I had earned a little less by this amount than I would have earned if I had remained with the Lufthansa, because my salary in the Lufthansa was twice as high, and even later on, three times as high as the money I received from the State. Consequently, I did not consider that as a gift exceeding my merits.

Q. Witness, did the Air Ministry not offer you a bonus, also?