Chapter XL: Section 2: A III f (5)

Berlin, 8 April 1944
[Signed] DR. GOERNER

Top Secret State Matter
_REPORT ON THE 56TH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD ON 4 APRIL 1944_

_Building Allocation 1944_

* * * * *

The _Jaegerstab_ is to get a quota of 550 million including 150 million definitely pledged from the reserve and the _air administration_ is to have a quota of 200 million; both are to be checked against each other. Regarding the air administration quota, precise details (as to specific amounts, number of workers required, quantities of material, etc.) are to be submitted, building projects for the supplying industry (optical glass) are to be transferred to the office of armament supplies, trial projects are to be discussed between the commissioner of building and air H.C., the remaining demands are to be cleared between air chief administration and the Chief of the General Staff.

* * * * *

The quota recipients will be informed of their respective quotas as of guiding figures within the limits of which the commissioner of building may give assignments. The quota recipients themselves are, on the basis of these guiding figures, to re-plan their projects by concentrating on priority issues and to report which of their building projects will have to fall out including the resulting figures. Field Marshal Milch will report to the Fuehrer on the total situation of building. Reports on the quotas Air Ministry, Navy, Army, and Reichsbahn are to be sent to Field Marshal Milch forthwith.

Demands of labor, building materials, etc., as resulting from the quota allocations are to be discussed with the planning office by the quota recipients taking into account such amounts of the quota as were already used up for building purposes since 1 January 1944.

[Typed signature] STEFFLER.

Present:

Field Marshal Milch
Reich Minister Funk
State Secretary Koerner[97]
President Kehrl[98]
Dr. Ing. Goerner
Min. Rat Steffler

[follow names of 27 others who attended, including Under Secretary Ohlendorf,[99] Lt. Gen. (Artillery) Von Leeb,[100] and Professor Krauch.[101]]

[Signed] STAATSRAT SCHIEBER

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-287
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 49

LETTER FROM MILCH TO SAUCKEL, 8 APRIL 1943, CONCERNING
THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRY

Copy

The Reich Air Minister and Supreme Commander of the Air Force St/GL

Secret

File note: 16m 10 No. 220/43 secret (GL/A-W Wi 3 II)

Berlin W 8, 8 April 1943
7 Leipziger Street
Tel. 12 0047, Ext. 5530

To the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation Berlin SW 11 96 Saarland Street

Subject: Protection of Industry.

The continuously increasing drafting of German workers from the production as well as from the security teams (plant protection and plant fireguards) make it necessary to assign more and more foreign labor to the factories of the armament industry. This assignment of foreign labor faces the plants of the armament industry with special tasks of security, which cannot be guaranteed with the forces at present at the disposal of the industry. According to what I have found out the statistics of 31 December 1942 have already shown an unfulfilled demand of 15 percent in plant protection personnel. Moreover, the extension of the air force industry brings about a further increase in the requirements for plant protection personnel, an increase which up to now has not been covered by the labor offices.

An investigation I made in a number of plants of the air force industry a short while ago has shown that even after the introduction of the compulsory labor law most of the labor offices could not make the necessary forces available for protection and fireguard tasks, while other labor agencies could not entirely satisfy the needs. The labor office of Halberstadt has even refused to deal with this requirement because these men were required for organizations without productive value.

In the field of the air force industry I already ordered, at the beginning of the war, the 84-hour week for these sectors. So that no further increase can be made with these working hours, for otherwise, there would be an increase of illness which would bring about a further unwarranted weakening in the numbers of the personnel. Even the decree for the securing of the necessary forces of protectory guards, issued by you on 29 December 1942, (File note: Va 5550.917) has not yet shown any results up to now in the field of the armament industry.

Therefore, you are urgently requested to direct the labor offices to place at the disposal of the armament plants, upon their request as quickly as possible the competent forces for plant protection and fireguards, because otherwise normal security in the plants does not seem to be guaranteed any longer.

In the field of air force industry, this would involve approximately 2,500 to 3,000 men.

We ask you to kindly inform us about the steps taken.

Copy, for information, to: OKW W Stb [Economic Staff of the Armed Forces]

BY ORDER:
MILCH [Typewritten]

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A

SPEER’S MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE WITH HITLER ON 8 JULY 1943

Top Secret State Matter
Berlin, 10 July 1943
_CONFERENCE WITH THE FUEHRER, 8 JULY 1943_

* * * * *

17. The Fuehrer laid down in the coal discussion that 70,000 Russian prisoners of war fit for mining work should be sent each month to the mines. He also pointed out that an approximate minimum of 150,000-200,000 fit Russian prisoners of war must be earmarked for the mines in order to obtain the required number of men suitable for this work.

If the Russian prisoners of war cannot be released by the army, the male population in the partisan infested areas should without distinction be proclaimed prisoners of war and sent off to the mines.

At the same time the Fuehrer ordered that prisoners of war not fit for the mines should immediately be placed in the iron industry, in manufacturing and supply industries, and in the armament industry.

The Fuehrer further ordered that he should receive a monthly report giving (_a_) the total number of Russian prisoners of war, and (_b_) the number of Russian prisoners of war fit for mining, made available for the mines and a report addressed to Field Marshal Keitel as to why the remainder could not be used.

The joint report of Sauckel and Pleiger is also to be sent to me.

[Signed] SPEER

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A

EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT BY SAUR OF THE CONFERENCE
WITH THE FUEHRER, 5 MARCH 1944

Top Secret State Matter
Berlin, 6 March 1944
_POINTS FROM THE CONFERENCE (SAUR) WITH THE
FUEHRER ON 5 MARCH 1944_

_Jointly with Field Marshal Milch, Lt. Gen. of the Air Force_
_Bodenschatz, Colonel von Below_

* * * * *

18. Told the Fuehrer of the Reich Marshal’s wish for the future utilization of the productive capacity of prisoners of war by giving the direction of the Stalag to the SS, with the exception of the British and Americans. The Fuehrer considers the proposal a good one and has asked Colonel von Below to arrange matters accordingly.

* * * * *

(Prepared by Saur)
(Seen by Speer)

EXCERPTS FROM THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY DEFENSE WITNESS
ALBERT SPEER[102] BEFORE COMMISSION ON 19 FEBRUARY 1947

* * * * *

_EXAMINATION_

* * * * *

JUDGE MUSMANNO: Herr Speer, I would like to understand the machinery by which labor was brought into Germany beginning with the request by any particular department for any particular number of workers. Let us suppose that someone appeared before the Central Planning Board and said, “I will need fifty thousand men for a factory that I am about to construct.” Now please tell us just what happened. Would you issue an order to somebody? Would he then in turn order someone else and how did these workers finally then arrive in Germany?

WITNESS SPEER: If somebody on the Central Planning Board requested labor, the Central Planning Board did not issue an order that these workers must be supplied, but the Central Planning Board agreed that those workers can be supplied. An order by the Central Planning Board, Sauckel would not have accepted. That is a definite fact.

It is quite clear that the requests for labor did not occur in these long intervals between the meetings of the Central Planning Board, but this had to happen in much shorter intervals and in a constant collaboration with the people concerned, for the enemy air raids and changes in programs which became necessary because of the military situation made these changes very often necessary. Therefore, for the whole of our armament industry and also for certain branches of production outside armament that were in my ministry, we decided on so-called framework contingents, and priority lists were drawn up. I do not know whether you are interested in that part.

Q. Well, not particularly. I want very succinctly a statement as to the steps which ensue after the declaration of someone before the Central Planning Board that he needed a certain number of workers. Who was informed of this request? Who authorized the call for the workers? Who submitted the demand? Who then at the other end gathered the workers? Not in detail—I just want the steps in movement from the Central Planning Board until the men actually arrived.

A. The Central Planning Board did not deal with that matter anymore afterwards. Let us say the request of labor, say, of the coal mining industry——

Q. Yes.

A. ——was reported to Sauckel by the coal mining industry itself. Therefore, one could call a meeting of the Central Planning Board as a statement for Sauckel that such labor is very important for the coal mining industry, and that as far as possible he has to supply them. That is necessary within the framework of economic planning, but beyond that the Central Planning Board did not pursue the matter any further or was not even in a position to do so.

Q. Well, did you know there at the fountainhead of labor—because if you made the request originally, that is what started the machinery in motion—did you not know that bringing in workers forcibly from occupied territories to work in the war operation constituted a violation of international convention? Weren’t you aware of that right at the very source?

A. What I say now is not meant to be an excuse. I really did not know it. Up to the beginning of my trial here, the regulations of international law were unknown to me, and nobody ever drew my attention to the fact that such regulations exist; but I want to say once more, I don’t say this in order to excuse myself, here, but it is a fact that it was like this.

Q. Well, you were certainly quite aware from the decision of the International Military Tribunal just how illegal and improper that was.

A. I took note of it there, and, after all, I received my punishment for it now.

Q. Well, could you not have followed the same line of reasoning adopted by the Tribunal, which, after all, was based upon international convention? You were a man of education, a man of great cultural attainments and of great technical ability, and it was because of these attributes that you were chosen by Hitler to become the Minister of Armaments. Could you not have reasoned that out by yourself? Wasn’t it very clear and obvious?

A. I believe that the general knowledge of the principles of international law can only be brought to the knowledge of a wider circle of legal laymen if after a war legal offenses committed during the war will be revealed by a public trial, and thereby a more general knowledge of offenses against international law becomes known. You know that I was an architect and that such knowledge as I had in the field of law I merely received from newspapers, and I knew, for instance, all about various legal commitments of architects which are fairly extensive as far as construction of buildings goes.

I would say that a great mistake has been committed here by omitting after the First World War to establish international legal conditions by trials, and at the same time to adjust it to the developments of technical warfare instead of which, after the First World War, the whole question of the deportation of labor, for instance, was decided by the highest German courts, and as far as I know, the decision of that court was not particularly lucid. This is how the basis of ignorance is laid in the field of international law, and I believe that many a mistake and many a violation in this war could have been avoided or at least mitigated if a general knowledge of international law had been prevalent.

Q. Would you say that had there been, following the First World War, trials such as those we are now conducting, that you then would have been aware of the illegality of the practices in which you were engaged; or rather, you would have been aware of the illegality of such practices and you then would not have participated in them?

A. I am of the opinion that trials against the responsible men for the First World War after its conclusion would have enlightened the public and myself on the tenets of international law. I do not wish to go as far as to say that I would not have committed these breaches of law, for it is very difficult to excuse one’s self after the event by saying one committed the act only through ignorance of international law. Nevertheless, I should say that the observance of international law would have been possible without losing much momentum in my armament drive. Of course only that part of international law is meant here which deals with the recruiting of labor, whereas the other factor, the so-called legal looting of occupied territories as it is called, there is no doubt that that would have been necessary for an increased output of armaments. Violations of international law as far as the assignment of labor was concerned were in my opinion not only unnecessary, but unreasonable. We would have achieved more if we had observed international law. This is a very complicated topic; I do not know whether you are interested why this should be so.

Q. Well, I merely want you to enlighten me, if you care to, on this specific angle. You are considered a specialist. Now, had there been an international trial following the First World War, and the decision in that trial had been very clear and specific—as was the decision in this trial—you would have then known the limitations very specifically on the conduct of war; and having then known that you couldn’t do certain things, would you then have refused to participate as you did in this World War as a specialist? Having been put on notice that you cannot take labor from other countries forcibly and throw them into the armament industries—knowing all that, would you then have refused to give your services to Hitler in the prosecution of this war?

A. As to the first part of the question I wish to say if a trial and a clear decision had been handed down after the First World War, then certainly somebody would have put the international laws and regulations on my desk; that is to say, he would have informed me of it. The second question—it is not possible to give a simple answer to the second part of the question for when I started my office in 1942 the war in all its aspects had already departed from all existing international regulations. Please don’t misunderstand me if I point out here that economic warfare was waged by the British and Americans with extreme concentration on bombing warfare, which was not a matter of national reprisal because it hit industries in occupied territories. On the other hand the war with Russia had gone beyond the normal limits, if I can call it that. It is difficult for me to say who was the guilty party.

Q. I do not refer to the time after the war had reached such a state that there were no restrictions. I am speaking of the period before the war started. I would like to know whether a man of your education could have been enlisted in a practice which you knew and would then have known was entirely illegal and contrary to international law as well as the precepts and dictates of humanity.

A. I would not have participated if I had known the whole documentary material which became known in our first big trial. If I had known that Hitler since 1938 had prepared for war and had tied the fate of his people to his own to such an extent that his end was the end of his own nation——

Q. I didn’t intend to enter into such a long discussion on this. All I had in mind was that if those in your classification, as specialists, would have observed international law, and would have known clearly what international law was—the restrictions, the limitations and so on—and if we assumed that these specialists were men of character, then, even though Germany had at the helm a navigator who had become mad, he could not have run the ship on to the rocks for the simple reason that you and the other specialists who assisted in the present shipwreck, would have refused to ship on a venture which was so obviously bound for the rocks, internationally speaking. Is that true or not?

A. That is so without a doubt.

Q. And would you go so far as to say that had there been an international trial of the proportions of the one we have just had, and these which are now following, after the First World War, and the knowledge resulting from decisions handed down would have become well-known because of the punishments which would have been inflicted, would you say that that might have served as a bar against a Second World War?

A. I do not wish to say that it could have stopped and Hitler——

Q. If Hitler had not had specialists, Hitler could not have wrecked the world himself. Hitler had to have a Speer and had to have the others who were condemned in the first International Military Tribunal. He could not have done it alone.

A. That’s quite clear, but these specialists were taken into their part of the war without realizing what the connections were and an international trial is not a wholly certain method to prevent a new war; but I think it’s a very essential contribution toward that aim. I am unable to answer your question by saying that Hitler would have been unable to find collaborators if, after the First World War, these trials had been held, but I do wish to say it would have been much more difficult for him, also because our specialists were not very intimately connected with the Party circles.

Q. Well, I think that’s a point I wanted to find out; that, if the specialists had refused to collaborate, knowing that the contribution of their service meant a completely illegal undertaking, then Hitler could not have conducted a war by himself and therefore there could not have been a war?

A. In technical warfare the specialists are decisive factors for the conduct of war, but the specialists are not to be regarded as being the parties principally responsible. They do not have the necessary knowledge of the background, the political background—essential in view of Hitler’s untruthfulness—to see where he is taking the ship.

Q. The ship could go nowhere without you specialists. That’s all.

A. I thank you.

JUDGE MUSMANNO: Do you have any questions, Dr. Bergold?

_DIRECT EXAMINATION_

DR. BERGOLD: Yes, sir, I have. Witness, his Honor has asked you how it would be if a factory, for instance, would need and would request 50,000 workers, which way and in which channel would take this request up to the point in foreign territories where 50,000 foreigners would have been gathered and taken to Germany for that purpose. Isn’t it correct that such a proposal of bringing 50,000 workers to this factory did not mean that 50,000 foreign workers would be brought but meant only that 50,000 workers altogether were brought? That meant German workers as well as foreign workers which were actually already in Germany and employed there and also new recruits? That included all that, did it not?

SPEER: I was deflected from my answer in that particular case and I did not really give an answer to the question. If 50,000 workers were requested for a certain branch in our industry the request gave a figure which did not show how many of them were Germans and how many of them were foreign workers. The bigger part of the workers which were supplied came from what was called fluctuation. Fluctuation meant the transfer of workers from one plant to another. It’s quite clear that production is in a constant development. One always follows the other and in some cases one orders particular workers and then it loses that importance for military reasons. The plan is that some workers available are constantly released and sent on to different plants or industries. A second source was the newly mobilized German workers, I mean the women workers, and a third source was the sending of foreign workers already in Germany, and a fourth source the prisoners of war who were also sent on from one branch to the next, and the fifth source consisted of some that came in from foreign countries. How these various workers from these various sources were distributed among branches, neither my offices nor the factories who had requested workers could find out. That was a matter which had to be decided by the labor exchanges because it took an enormous amount of work to find the proper workers for the proper branches. * * *

Q. Thank you. Witness, do you know that when the French Government, which at that time existed in Paris, had issued an order for the calling up of labor did that mean compulsory labor?

A. These details became known to me during the trial. My tasks were enormous and at that time I did not bother much about details. I cannot say anything about this from my knowledge.

Q. Witness, you must know this; at the time when you had discussions with Mr. Bichelonne, French Minister, I should think that the existence of compulsory labor service in France should have been discussed at that time.

A. Perhaps I misunderstood you. I said quite clearly last time that I knew about the fact that in occupied territories workers were taken to Germany against their free will. The various districts, etc., are not known to me.

Q. No. I mean if such a decree had been issued at all. That’s what I am speaking of.

A. I had to assume that but I wasn’t actually informed about it.

Q. Did you consider the French Government, which at that time was in Paris, France—did you consider it a regular government?

A. This is the same sort of question which his Honor put to me too. I had no basis to find out whether the French Government was legal or not, because these are problems of international law which are beyond me as a layman.

Q. Witness, do you not know that the Government of Pétain had been recognized and was recognized by the American Government, and that the American Government had an ambassador, if I recall correctly—and I am not sure I can pronounce his name—at that time, Mr. Leahy, Admiral Leahy?

A. I know that, but I must say frankly that I did not spend my time thinking about whether the French Government was legal or not.

Q. Thank you. I have no further questions.

JUDGE MUSMANNO: Herr Speer, what I was endeavoring to elucidate, or have you elucidate for us, was not whether you knew if a government was legal or not, if it was recognized internationally or not. I wanted to draw your attention to something quite more fundamental, and that was the employment against its will of population in a war activity, all of which was prohibited by international law. And if you and all the specialists in the Hitler regime knew of the limitation and were thoroughly aware, and the knowledge was so widespread that you couldn’t help but know that it was illegal and that you would be punished if you did it, that is, to bring in workers from another country and put them into war operations—if that were a matter of such general knowledge that every college man and every person that was well read would know of it, would Hitler not have had difficulty in obtaining such a crew to run a ship, regardless of what he may have had in mind as to the illegal port which he hoped to attain by that voyage?

SPEER: I can only speak about the time in which I worked, that is to say, from 1942 onwards. In that time, I am sure that if these legal matters had been made quite clear a large number of technicians or industrial leaders would not have collaborated to the extent they did if they had realized the illegality and the possible punishment.

I would like to stress this particularly for the period from 1943 onwards. From that time onwards, many intelligent people realized that the war had been lost, and from that time onwards it would have made a great impression if in former trials heavy punishment was meted out. Not everybody would have been impressed; certain people would have followed the old line, but the majority of so-called specialists, certainly—

Q.—would have recognized the illegality of what they were asked to do. I understand you to say that the majority of the specialists would have recognized the illegality of what they were asked to do and would have refused. That is what I understand you to say.

A. Yes, that is what I wanted to say.

JUDGE MUSMANNO: Very well. Thank you very much.

* * * * *

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 5

EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE ELEVENTH
CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD,
22 JULY 1942

_REPORT OF THE 11TH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL_
_PLANNING BOARD ON 22 JULY 1942_[103]

[page 2 of original]
_Safeguarding of Food Supplies_

A net increase of one million foreign workers is anticipated. This figure has not been reached during the past months. Even if more than one million workers are brought here during the months to come, the limit of one million will actually never be exceeded due to continued losses. Food for this number of workers is guaranteed.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 6[104]

EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
TWENTY-SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD, 2 NOVEMBER 1942

_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 22D CONFERENCE_
_OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD CONCERNING_
_ASSIGNMENT OF LABOR, MONDAY, 2 NOVEMBER_
_1942, 12:00 O’CLOCK IN THE REICH MINISTRY_
_FOR AVIATION_

* * * * *

MILCH: In my opinion agriculture has to be provided with its labor. If, theoretically, agriculture could have been given 100,000 more men, there would be 100,000 fairly well-fed men, while those we get now, particularly the prisoners of war, are not exactly fit for work. If agriculture will get them in time, they will again be able to feed these people up again. However, it will not be very happy about it. * * *

* * * * *

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 7

EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
THIRTY-SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD, 12 FEBRUARY 1943

_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 32D CONFERENCE_
_OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD—THE FOUR_
_YEAR PLAN ON 12 FEBRUARY 1943_

* * * * *

MILCH: Everybody sticks to his old methods until he is literally beaten away from them. However, one must not only beat, one must give advice, too. They must be good experts who will tell people: You will do that this way or that; it is not necessary that you use just this sum. Who does such a thing will never give in and say, I can do with less. Mining has been partly beaten[105] into iron by saying we cannot give you anything but iron on account of the shortage of lumber.

* * * * *

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 8[106]

EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
THIRTY-THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD, 16 FEBRUARY 1943

_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 33D CONFERENCE_[107]
_OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_

Subject: Assignment of Labor, 16 February 1943, 16 o’clock, in the Reich
Ministry for Armament and Munitions, Berlin.

* * * * *

SPEER: We are in complete agreement. You will not receive any list from us for this action but the whole armament industry including the anticipated deliveries will be devoted to this action. The administrations too must be served at the same time. But the authorities including army, air and navy shall not get a single person from the action. This must be adhered to. You know what the Reich Minister Dr. Lammers said: That he must therefore have some new women typists at the Reich Chancellory at once. That makes no sense.

MILCH: Where France is concerned, there exists in France an industry which makes aircraft motors and parts, all complete. We have transferred there all the things which can be made there without endangering secrecy in any way. These are training aircraft, transport aircraft, etc. However, since we want to make the most of the production in other ways, we have moved away part of it to a large extent. As a whole these things must be kept secret from the French but in every part subject to secrecy there are only a few parts which are real secret. The bulk consists of other parts. These have also gone there to a great extent just as we engaged aircraft builders in France to a great extent. We now currently have work waiting in France for several thousand aircraft builders. At the moment the industry working for us there needs, according to its claims, some 20,000 men, who are asked of us, in order to be able to keep to the program. The production is still far behind that which was agreed upon with you in the program. Whereas we in Germany fully carry out our program, only 30 percent of it is carried out in France. In fact it has only begun to function in the last weeks and months after we have been more active there. In principle, we have excluded the State from this whole cooperation with industry and set the German firms to work with the French firms.

Sponsor firms have been appointed so as to make the affair operate. This system is not yet fully completed but has been favorably initiated everywhere and indeed brings quite other returns to some extent. The reproach is always made to us that nearly all Europe is at our disposal. The production we draw from France, with the exception of motor cars, is minute as regards the army. The whole French production potential is not yet fully exploited by us or only to a quite small proportion. If it were necessary for us to produce in France, because in Germany the capacity, space machine tools, etc., which are not convenient for removal are lacking, if the accommodation of the people were not so difficult, etc., we would in fact be reduced to the point of taking everything to Germany and have the work done here. But this would entail too great a decrease in the production in our own country, not to mention the reluctance of the people.

We came to an agreement yesterday. I am very thankful that this matter is now, thanks to yourself, Gauleiter Sauckel, together with Gen. v. d. Heyde and Col. Brueckner, to be settled on the spot. It is difficult to induce Frenchmen to come over here. An official agency alone cannot either appreciate or realize this, only a sponsoring firm can realize it. I therefore suggest that sponsor firms be called upon to cooperate, precisely because in France the sub-contract system is very widespread.

Behind the factory which actually organizes the thing, there are other factories which belong to the semi-finished goods and preparatory industry. This industry, however, can be supervised by our sponsor industries. We should have to assign to our people the task of investigating the individual firms and find out which people are working for our program. All others we annex ourselves. When we have got hold of them and annex them in German industry, that is, only those people who are really necessary to us, it will be possible to utilize them in the right way.

The proportion of specialist workers there is higher than in this country. We have indeed drained a certain number of them into our factories last year because they were the easiest to get. The Frenchmen must work with more specialists than we. We must work with more specialists than the Russian, and the Russian must have still more specialists than the American. In America they can place any simpleton before any machine, he will put it right in a flash. Only the installation requires a specialist. The man need only have arms; a head is a superfluous luxury.

In France the system is quite different. The Frenchman has adapted himself to it and has always indeed had unemployment. A labor organization as we conceive it does not exist. With the same number of Frenchmen and all other installations, facilities, etc., being the same, one will only obtain, as compared with German personnel, half at the most or only one-third of the production, even if the personnel have all good will and zeal. It is a matter of system. This system we cannot simply alter, neither can the sponsor firms, but we must try in this way to obtain from them to a certain extent the additional resources which we need for our industry and armament. By proceeding thus, we can put things right. I believe the sponsor firms have an obvious interest in this. If industry has too many specialist workers there working for us, let us draw upon them ourselves, because we are suffering a great shortage of them. This resource should be left to our firms after this extensive drain on specialist workers has been suffered. We want to raise our armament.

Now to another point. I have today ordered in my jurisdiction that an extensive action should take place; today, when we are counting upon obtaining a great number of women in virtue of the obligatory service whose age limit we hope to see extended to 55. The British have extended obligatory service to the age of 65. The additional 10 years are a trifle exaggerated. Women are not able to go to the machines immediately and perform heavy work. The few days that are necessary for them to instruct the personnel are immaterial. We can still spare that much time if it were not that it would convey to the population an impression to the following effect: Now that we have reported for work, it is months before we are called up. I have ordered, within my jurisdiction, that the women should as much as possible be employed in offices where men are now to be found, for instance in the wage offices, etc. In these, women and elderly men can be easily trained, as they will be able to do without further difficulty. In this way, men in the commercial offices, etc., should be released for the accountancy offices and similar offices. This involves, in the case of industry, over 20,000 individuals and there are other branches besides.

It amounts to quite a considerable number consisting solely of people who, in view of the war economy, are unfortunately necessary now. These men must now be placed at our machines insofar as they are not drafted, that is to say, are not soldiers. These people are more likely to be able to render better service at the machines or in the factories than the women now assigned, insofar as women are disposed to go to the machines. Of course, there will be women who have done such work before and who are now willing to turn to this work but who have not reported for work so far because they have not found it necessary to work for a living on account of the dole.

Where the assignment of women is concerned, I should suggest that, in the process of the action, only those women be assigned for whom work at the machine is not involved if a man is thereby released.

TIMM: The danger lies in this that the draftees were partly to be released without replacement having actually been forthcoming.

FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: That is quite another matter. When female auxiliaries of the Signal Corps are assigned, it is not additionally but only in the proportion that soldiers are released thereby. There are indeed several 100,000 men in the signal corps of the army and air force. In our department, 250 to 300,000 have been such. Whether there are so many now, I do not know. They are all young men fit for combat. I have always campaigned against this and said: one ought to assign women preferably so as to release soldiers. If that is done now, it will really release a large number, it does not matter whether for the workshop or for the front. Of course, there is a front somewhere in the East too. This front will be maintained for a certain time. The only useful thing the Russian will inherit from the territories evacuated by us will be the people. It might be better in principle to withdraw the population in time as far as 100 km. behind the front. The whole civilian population will move back to 100 km. behind the front. Nobody will now be assigned to trench [digging] work.

TIMM: We tried to withdraw the population of Kharkov. 90 to 120,000 people were required by the fortress commandant of Kharkov for trench work alone so that in some cases we had to organize whole convoys.

WEGER: Actual demolitions were even carried out.

FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: But that is done by the engineer corps. There is definitely no more hope that more prisoners of war will come from the East.

SAUCKEL: The prisoners taken are used there.

FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: We have made the request that there should be a certain percentage of Russians with us in the antiaircraft artillery. 50,000 altogether are expected. 30,000 are already there as gunners. It is a funny thing that Russians must operate the guns. The other 20,000 are still missing. I received a letter from the High Command of the Army yesterday saying: We can no longer turn over a single one, we have too few ourselves. So this thing will not turn out so successfully for us.

SPEER: It would be advisable to make the draft of women somewhat clearer in the press.

FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: That would primarily have to be placed in the foreground. In this respect the question is whether I will receive the accounts from our industry in time. The matter is bound to be settled some time. There will be no deception. People who want to deceive also deceive now, whether they have this personnel or not, whether their accounts are up to date or not. The other people are honest. The mass has not engaged in deception. Whether we are a little backward in checking prices will not be very important. The most important thing is to work. We know what is produced abroad, having now received the figures. The Russian actually makes 2,000 aircraft a month in the way of front-line aircraft. This figure is far higher than ours. This must not be forgotten. We must get to the assembly line and produce quite other figures.

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 9

EXTRACT FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE THIRTY-NINTH
CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD,
23 APRIL 1943

_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 39TH CONFERENCE_
_OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_

Subject: Food Situation and Armament Industry.

_Held on Friday 23 April 1943, 9:30 A.M. in the Festival Barrack_
_near the Zoo, Jebenstrasse_

* * * * *

MILCH: I am convinced that there are more Russian prisoners of war. At that time 4,000,000 were captured. A large part of them died, however the number of those who are still living is higher than we are told now. We reckon here with hundred thousand Russian prisoners of war in the agriculture. Altogether, we have 300,000 of them in the Reich. During the First World War I had 200 Italian prisoners of war with me. These prisoners were to be turned over, however, we kept ours by reporting them dead in order to keep them. And these people also wanted to stay in spite of the fact that we told them that they would be reported dead even to their families. We dragged these prisoners around with us till the end of the war.

KEHRL: If the food supplies of the labor brought in from abroad are taken from the German rations then, while we think that we are very rich for having these people, the German rations are in reality reduced, and the decrease in the working capacity of our own workers does more harm than the good done by the new people.

SPEER: But from the figures of this incoming labor we have to deduct those who leave the country because of expired foreign agreements, and the others which we lose because of cases of death or illness. On the whole the increase of labor in our total war economy is not at all so very important. (Interpolation: the more labor we fetch from the East, the more this total figure will increase.)

BACKE: But there is a limit, too, in the number of men we can absorb. At that time we were told that one million was to be taken into the country, from the East. Now we have already got several millions.

MILCH: You cannot count that way. Before all these measures in the second year of the war, the air force had 1.8 million men and today it has less than two million. The whole air armament which is a considerable part of the total war armament, in the course of the war or in the last 2½ years of the war has not even increased by 10 percent. In reality the total increase in this field amounts to about 125,000 to 150,000 men. We are always looking for those people. That is our main problem.

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 31

EXTRACTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
FIFTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING
BOARD, 1 MARCH 1944

_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 54TH CONFERENCE[108]
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_

Re: Labor Allocation on Wednesday, 1 March 1944, 1000 hours, at the
Reich Air Ministry.

SAUCKEL: * * * I have a Gau armament supervisor in Thuringia and I have just been inspecting the plants in Thuringia. At the railroad car factory in Gotha I have set things going so that within a few days it will be turning out 20 percent of its production again. Everything has been done. But one thing you must bear in mind: Labor allocation as an institution must be independent and must remain so. Furthermore I must ask you not to support constantly the opinion of the armament inspectors: Sauckel must be put under the control of the Ministry then everything will be better. Gentlemen, please see to it that that does not happen this year. As a National Socialist of long standing I am determined to cooperate unreservedly with you, the Minister for Armament and Production, indeed with all those gentlemen, but, in consideration of the difficulty in this sphere of work I must be given the amount of freedom to make decisions of my own which was guaranteed me by the Fuehrer’s decrees and those of the Reich Marshal. I would never have taken on the task without these decrees, because I know it cannot be accomplished without them. I beg you therefore, to create such an atmosphere as is necessary among the lower ranks too so that the Gau labor offices in the first place may be recognized as organizations which are entrusted to me and put at my disposal for keeping the labor commitment in order on the lower levels. * * *

* * * * *

SAUCKEL: I would like to insist on the fact that, in the future also, the S-plants be checked; for the S-plants form a suction pump, and, since it is known all over Italy and France, that whoever works in the S-plants is protected from any interference on my part is proved by the following fact. During the first three months I wanted to take out of Italy 1 million people before 30 May. In these two months hardly 7,000 men have come. That is just the difficulty. The bulk goes to the S-plants, and only the dregs are left for employment in Germany. I would like to achieve yet, that for the important plants in Italy, at least the number of S-plants be restricted, that is that the number of S-plants be not increased.

SCHIEBER: In Italy for every protected plant there is an agreement made. Over, beyond the situation on 15 February or 10 February, S-plants are established only with the approval of the services under me. We have them registered, and only when we aim at an agreement are they declared protected plants.

SAUCKEL: Now the question arises: If in such a protected plant there are more hands than are needed according to German standards, could they be handed over?

SCHIEBER: They are to be combed through but the people combed through are to be put only in other protected plants. Down there in Italy in your services there is a demand for 7,000 hands and more. The gentlemen are right to laugh at us saying: What does that mean, you want people, but at the same time our great task must be the transfer of people! I spoke with Leyers on Sunday and told him that I wished to have a conversation with the Gauleiter about this matter: If the labor offices state that there is still a certain surplus of hands employed, a commissioner appointed by General Leyers must then visit the respective plant together with a commissioner of Gauleiter Sauckel’s; they must examine the situation, and these two gentlemen must then come to an agreement, as to the people they remove from plants. * * * Besides these promises concerning nutrition have not been kept to the extent we wished. The extra food, as we had planned it has not yet appeared at all so that there is no incentive felt; apart from this certain inner evolutions are influencing industry at present in Italy, with the result that especially the leading workmen who are so valuable for us partly fail to come to the factory any more. They wait patiently until, during the next three or four weeks, the elections and convocations in the factories concerning socialization and the introduction of commissars, etc., are over. * * *

SAUCKEL: In Italy, it seems, things are going on smoothly in general, but not yet in France.

MILCH: When workmen are transferred how are their families ensured?

SAUCKEL: Automatically.

SCHIEBER: That is quite easy. If it is possible in any way, we shall have the whole personnel transferred to another factory. * * *

* * * * *

SAUCKEL: Years ago we made an investigation like this in France and saw that in German armament production, corresponding to districts A and B, some 600,000 workers were occupied out of the total of some 2½ to 3 million metal workers we had anticipated. Therefore there must still be some more metal workers hidden in France, people who were formerly in metal trades.

MILCH: So 75 percent are still free, and 25 percent are tied up in the S-industries.

SAUCKEL: We have to deduct the prisoners of war who are now in Germany. But there are hundreds of thousands of skilled workers who, according to the agreements made, have returned to France and Belgium month after month.

* * * * *

SAUCKEL: In reply to that I must ask you the following: What do you want to do now in Germany? In Germany you now have plane construction, the manufacture of highly expensive apparatus, complicated engine construction, you have here in general the most complicated manufactures in the world. If I brought the scum of French manpower to Germany for you what would you get as regards production? We of the Labor Allocation were always of the opinion in the French industries we must under all circumstances maintain a certain level of the trained workers and a certain degree of production. And we wanted to compel these French industries to lower their level of a hundred percent skilled personnel for the benefit of the German industries which have been bled of their skilled hands.

As Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor I considered my task to be not the transfer to Germany of the scum of Europe, but the bringing of efficient manpower. But a part of your gentlemen in France, and in your Ministry too, had no understanding for this. That I must say quite plainly. It would be mere child’s play for me to bring you the refuse of Europe if you would be satisfied with it. I would simply grab all the whores and gigolos in Paris and put them at your disposal, then I would not have to touch your armament industries. But if I have to provide you with real workers who will prove efficient in Germany, then in France—and that was just my program—we must do the same as we did in every German plant and in every German enterprise: when a German company is split in two, some of the good workers and some of the bad ones had to be given up and not just the bad workers. And French armaments never were harmed thereby. It is a fact, is it not, that a French worker of quality produces the double amount if he is put in a German factory under German discipline, with German supervision and German welfare?

If we agree to re-examine all S-plants—and that is all I ask—and if we take out all superfluous expert workers and assistant workers, then we put them at the disposal of the other French enterprises which need them, to the extent that they need them, and when they are satisfied, I have to request that if I am to carry out my program, then from these plants too, workers must be transferred to Germany. If that is not approved of and it is insisted that the severe formula be observed: S-plants are out of question for labor commitments to Germany, then, according to my experience, this program of January 4 can hardly be achieved. Then you are responsible for the decision of what was better at the end of this year, to have these people in France or in Germany. That is the responsibility you have to bear and which I shift from my shoulders. I was told: Why did you not take the Russian workers away in time, now they are in the Russian regiments. Exactly the same would happen here. My opinion is that the introducing of S-plants was altogether a great mistake which is damaging to the general interests of Germany. The French government jumped to that with the greatest cleverness. * * * That is the way we did it the first year, and up to 700,000 Frenchmen came to the Reich according to the program. These were all decent French workers. From the fall of this year on this came to an end. No more skilled French workers came, nor any others either. It was the entire collapse of the labor allocation built up on the slogan: From now on no worker needs to go from France to Germany.

* * * * *

KEHRL: The consideration which originated at that time with Minister Speer and which led to the arrangement with Bichelonne was the following: If I cannot transfer the people by force from France to Germany to the extent necessary, which is shown, by developments now, and if at the same time I run the danger of having the people leave the plants in which they are now working for fear of being taken by force, then it is a lesser evil for me to try and put these people to work in France and Belgium, in which case I do not have to use German force to get them across the frontier. Then at least I am sure that the people are not running away from the plants in the first place and secondly that additional employment will be brought there.