Chapter L: Section 2: A III f (15)

“If I want something from industry, then industry comes and
says, ‘Yes, I have those and those requests.’ Only then can I do
what you want.”

He again speaks of the death penalty when he says—

“Gentlemen, in this connection I may call your attention to
another important point. If I visit an office and find out that
something is being hidden there, then I ask for the death
penalty for such a crime today. That is fraud. That is sabotage
of the German armament industry.”

Can it be seriously contended that these words were regarded by the listeners as mere outbursts?

Next we have another illuminating passage on his attitude toward prisoners of war.

“Then there is still the human factor. We often had considerable
difficulty with the human factor. The fluctuation there is very
considerable. The quota of the Luftwaffe in the distribution of
manpower was considerably lowered. The foreigners run away. They
do not keep any contract. There are difficulties with Frenchmen,
Italians, Dutch. The prisoners of war are partly unruly and
fresh. The people are also supposed to be carrying on sabotage.
These elements cannot be made more efficient by small means.
They are just not handled strictly enough. If a decent foreman
would sock one of those unruly guys because the fellow won’t
work, the situation would soon change. International law cannot
be observed here. I have asserted myself very strongly and, with
the help of Saur, I have represented the point of view very
strongly that the prisoners, with the exception of the English
and the Americans, should be taken away from the military
authorities. The soldiers are not in a position, as experience
has shown, to cope with these fellows who know all the answers.
I shall take very strict measures here and shall put such a
prisoner of war before my court martial. If he has committed
sabotage or refused to work, I will have him hanged right in his
own factory. I am convinced that that will not be without
effect.”

These words are strangely reminiscent of his speech at the 53d meeting of the Central Planning Board. He knew he had advocated and participated in flagrant violations of international law and here he went on record on this subject.

We see the defendant making a “big request” of the Quartermaster General and calling for “energetic action” by the chief of supply. This was a meeting of considerable moment and these statements did not go unheeded.

He spoke of the laborers.

“* * * We in the Luftwaffe armament industry have Russians,
French prisoners of war, Dutch, and members of 32 other nations.
The obtaining of interpreters alone presents a big difficulty
there.”

Then he adds—

“We, the Quartermaster General and Generalluftzeugmeister, have
already agreed that we are to balance the personnel also. Above
all it is necessary that the member of the troops be treated in
exactly the same way as the industrial worker.”

We have a strong statement concerning the feelings of the German worker. He said—

“By unjust treatment the German worker means that the treatment
is not the same for all. That is what makes the German worker
indignant. He wants everyone to be treated the same way. He
wants justice and does not want to be ill-treated in words or
any other way. He cannot stand it and he is right in not being
able to stand it.”

The defendant advocated that the German worker be carefully handled. The Tribunal has heard from the witnesses Ferrier, Le Friec, and Krysiak how the foreign workers were handled.

He outlined the working program for the Easter week end—

“Finally I ask that the troops receive the fundamental order to
work on Good Friday, the Saturday before Easter, and on Easter
Monday in the same way as the people in the factories. The
soldiers just do not have to go on furlough either. They must be
told why.”

Are these the words of a man who is without authority to issue orders concerning the troops?

He acknowledged his employment of Russian prisoners of war and advocated that shirkers among the factory laborers be whipped back to their jobs. He said—

“I further ask for support by the Luftwaffe physicians. With all
the rabble that we have among the foreign workers there is of
course a lot of shirking. At the moment the Russians—that is,
the Russian prisoners of war—are feigning a lot of fatigue and
illness. The incidence of sickness of one and a half to two
percent which we have had up to now has at least doubled, and in
some factories it has been increased to eight, nine, and ten
percent. That is, of course, done by previous agreement. There
the official physicians must undertake an examination and if the
physicians, who have to be very strict, find out that it is not
true, then we return the fellows to work by means of the whip.
Then the whip serves as cure.”

He again spoke of orders that have been given.

“If the factory knows: Now we are going to be attacked, and it
has a few trench shelters but does not have a bombproof shelter
or the like, then the people simply ran away from the factory
automatically at each raid after the first one, and they could
usually not be caught the next day either. That applies
particularly to the foreigners. We have therefore now issued the
following order, and have equipped the superiors accordingly
with weapons and pistols: As soon as a factory which has already
been attacked a few times can count on the raid’s being aimed at
that particular factory again, then the personnel leave the
factory, but in closed groups by shops, under the leadership of
the man in charge of the shop, and, to the extent that they are
German personnel, they leave singing military songs.”

Are superiors armed with weapons and pistols to lead contented German workers away from a factory in case of an air-raid? Little wonder that the foreigners who had been brought in like chattels ran away when the opportunity presented itself. Were these workers who were fleeing, voluntary workers?

Commenting on the gravity of the task of fighter production, and the importance of the months of April and May 1944, he said—

“That will be decided in six to eight weeks. If we succeed in
this, then we will once again have time to carry out all the
other tasks and jobs of this war and can also achieve greater
successes in other fields.”

Were the “other fields” tasks to be accomplished in the sowing of seeds of the Reich’s culture?

The defendant has said that he knew nothing about the living conditions of the foreigners. It is obvious that he knew something, for he said—

“I also ask you to be of considerable assistance in the question
of lodging in connection with the question of the relationship
between our military personnel at the airfields and the workers.
If we bring the people over to work, we also have to provide
them with places to live. As far as foreigners are concerned,
this has to be done in some suitable way. They cannot be put
together with our people, just like that. But they should not be
so far away from the airfield that one cannot get them to work
at all.”

No, don’t let them live with the native workers, but be sure that they live close enough to the factory so that they can put in their 72 hours a week!

The importance of the fighter program is emphasized when he said—

“There are no laws of bureaucracy, there are no regulations,
there is nothing at all as important as the task of winning the
war.”

The defendant could not agree with anything that Hitler stood for after March 1943. He was trying to get out, but here he speaks of Hitler and his henchmen—men who, he said, were leading Germany to certain catastrophe:

“It is quite surprising how the population has endured this
thing so far and how it always gets on its feet again when it is
led in the proper way by true leaders who, thank God, are
present among the people through the Party and the rest of the
leadership. But you must not forget, gentlemen, war nerves have
reached a point which cause us in the leadership group worry.”

He has said that he was not a wholehearted Nazi, but here he referred to himself as one of the true leaders and this at a time when the hands on the clock tolling the hours of the Reich were approaching twelve. Yet he would have you believe that he was a minor man.

He did not confine his speaking efforts solely to the Luftwaffe; he was one of the leaders, and as such it was natural that he should address the armament feeder industry. On that subject he said—

“What I am telling you today was told the other day to the
entire armament feeder industry—that includes the blacksmiths,
foundries, crankshaft workers of the iron producing industry,
etc. They were likewise exhorted to produce the maximum. In the
same way the Gauleitungen, all of the provincial offices,
wherever we were, were addressed by us to that effect. But
everyone considers that if he does not do his duty, we do not
ask whether there is a law, we ask only that he is the
responsible one, and that we will seize him no matter who he
is.”

His first peroration is indicative of his attitude.

“Please go wherever you are going and knock everybody down who
blocks your way! We cover up everything here. We do not ask
whether he is allowed to or whether he is not allowed to. For
us, there is nothing but this one task. We are fanatics in this
sphere. We do not even consider letting anything at all distract
us from that task. No order exists which could prevent me from
fulfilling this task. Nor shall I ever be given such an order.”

Yes, the defendant was a fanatic. Too, he was one who could cover up. It was a willful man who could say that.

There is an interesting statement concerning the number of employees of the Luftwaffe. The defendant set it at 1.8 million. This is somewhat in excess of the .5 million figure that one witness mentioned.

It has been insisted that he had nothing to do with labor, it has been insisted that he could give no orders, yet in his second peroration to the same speech, he said—

“We have given orders that will make you laugh. Some labor
control office or other suddenly declared that the Jaegerstab
was not entitled, according to paragraph so-and-so, to establish
a 72-hour workweek; it was not valid. I said: The gentleman is
herewith informed, if he should say such a thing once more, he
will be picked up; I have excellent cellars in this house. Then
the opposition disappears immediately. But you have to count on
such things, and the difficulty for you is that, in order to get
through all the junk, one should clean out, first of all, a
whole lot of little pigsties. Something will come out of this
whole affair with us, yet. Whoever of my technical people from
the Ministry does not earn his keep with the Jaegerstab now, and
does not cooperate, I guarantee that he will never appear again
in this Ministry, in the machine where I give the orders.”

Is this the man who said he could not have people sent to concentration camps? The witness Krysiak was “picked up” for having said in 1940 that Germany would lose the war. He was arrested by the Gestapo as the result of a private conversation. It is unbelievable that a field marshal could not, and did not, exercise the same power.

Today is the third anniversary of the speech of 25 March 1944 made by the defendant. His closing remarks on that day detail decisively the philosophy of the then field marshal of the Luftwaffe. Those assembled had been listening to their chief since midmorning. The hour was late. The hands of the clock were past twelve. Germany was in the fifth year of war. The defendant was concluding his speech. He said—

“Gentlemen, I know, not every subordinate can say: for me the
law no longer exists, but he has to have someone who covers up
for him. Not out of cowardice, but if you act according to the
spirit of the old field service regulation, ‘Abstaining from
doing something hurts us more than erring in the choice of the
means’, and if, moreover, you keep in touch and immediately
clarify difficult points so that something can be done, then we
are willing to accept the responsibility, whether this is the
law or not. I see only two possibilities for me and for Germany;
either we succeed and thereby save Germany, or we continue these
slipshod methods and then get the fate that we deserve. I prefer
to fall, while I am doing something that is against the rules
but that is right and sensible, and be called to account for it,
and, if you like, hanged, rather than be hanged because Papa
Stalin is here in Berlin or the Englishmen. I have no desire for
that. I would rather die in a different way. But I think we can
accomplish this task, too. We are in the fifth year of war—I
repeat: The decision will come during the next six weeks. Heil
Hitler!”

The time is at hand for another decision, a decision which will follow the dictates of sound reason. The record which will be made by this Tribunal and its judgment will be one that shall give courage to peaceful free men everywhere. Indeed, the defendant is fortunate that the decision in the present case is in the hands of those who do believe that the law exists and will continue to exist. There is no place for passion or for prejudice in the ceaseless tasks, the seeking of truth and the establishing of justice.

-----

[143] Mr. Clark Denney delivered the closing statement before the Tribunal on 25 March 1947, Tr. pp. 2436-2488.

[144] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 306, Nuremberg, 1947.

[145] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Karl Brandt, et al. See Vol. I.

[146] Defendant in case of United States _vs._ Karl Brandt, et al. See Vol. I.

[147] Same as preceeding footnote.

[148] Same as preceeding footnote.

[149] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 321, Nuremberg, 1947.

[150] Ibid., p. 232.

[151] Ibid., p. 246.

B. Closing Statement of the Defense[152]

DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal. In my opening statement I drew a picture of the defendant Milch which differs considerably from the description given by the prosecution. It is my hope that in the long course of producing evidence I have given proof that my conception is the full truth.

According to the testimony of the witness Richter, the affidavit of the witness von Mueller and according to the defendant Milch’s own testimony, nobody can doubt that Milch has never been a good National Socialist. His love for peace and his longing for a final understanding between the nations of Europe, especially between Belgium, France, England, and Germany, became completely obvious. No one who believes in justice would refuse to believe him if he states that he regarded the war as a misfortune. He was also one of the few intelligent men to admit Germany’s defeat in the First World War. There was no proof supplied that in any way prior to 1933 he supported any armaments. His testimony and military affidavit from von Mueller have shown that under his management the Luftwaffe was always a peaceful instrument of communication among the nations. It is to be regretted that the examination of foreign politicians, such as Van Zeeland, Pierre Cot, and Delbos, were not permitted, because only then the personality of Milch would have been shown in its true light. He must have been a peaceful and just man; otherwise, all these statesmen would not have had confidence in him. Even the witness delegate Messersmith, whose affidavit, Document 1760-PS, was introduced in the International Military Tribunal proceedings, affirmed that Milch condemned the coercive methods of the Nazis. He was different from the other Party members, so that after 1937 he lost Goering’s confidence. At that time he asked to be allowed to retire but in spite of his threat of suicide, he did not obtain that permission.

Such a man of such a past must be believed when he testified that even in 1939 he had no knowledge of Hitler’s aggressive intentions. Milch had misgivings about Hitler because he regarded the measures taken against Czechoslovakia as a breach of peace, and he was sufficiently intelligent to see that Britain would no longer tolerate such violations. Hitler was dishonest with him and always put before him his intentions for peace, even forbidding him the manufacture of bombs. The defendant never requested the manufacture of bombs because he intended to lead a war of offense, but only because, understanding the international situation, he was convinced that England would fight against the Nazi regime.

Up to that time, your Honor, nobody can find any inconsistency in the defendant’s outlook. It was no offense if he requested a Wehrmacht for his country in view of the world situation, and therefore he favored a reasonable rearmament. As long as all nations were peace-minded and maintained armies, Germany had the right to maintain armed forces as well. I beg you to remember that the defendant demanded from his superiors that rearmament should be effected in a slow and reasonable manner and that he had differences with them on account of this.

It was not for nothing, your Honor, I repeat that. Only for one to keep all these things in mind will it be possible to judge whether or not the defendant’s statement regarding the conference of 23 May 1939 is correct. A man who loves peace and works for peace was present at that conference and states today, or testified that the speech in question did not contain any mention of aggressive war against Poland or any other country. He even testified in this courtroom that this speech did not have the contents as it is laid down in the Schmundt protocol.

I realize that the International Military Tribunal came to the conclusion that the Schmundt protocol is correct. All defendants and witnesses who were heard at that time declared that the contents of the speech were not of so aggressive a nature as it is laid down in the minutes. The defense counsel made a mistake at that time of not calling all the witnesses which I requested. Nobody went to the trouble of critically examining the text of the record. I can understand why the IMT reached a different conclusion, having heard only the defendants’ general objection, which remained unsubstantiated in detail. Nowhere is it yet permissible in law to maintain the verdict of a previous court when new and better evidence has been submitted.

The witnesses Warlimont, Schniewind, Engel, and Raeder stated that several passages of the Schmundt record contained a number of false assertions regarding Hitler’s words. Warlimont testified that he was not present, although he is listed as among those present. Milch’s testimony made it absolutely definite that Goering was not present. If there were only so few persons present and there were mistakes made concerning the presence of persons, the record must have been made up a long time after the event, otherwise no faults of that kind would have been possible. Schniewind testified that a number of points contained in the Schmundt record were never discussed at that time at all. He had the opinion that many ideas laid down in the record were borne out at a later period, that is to say, 1940. These ideas concerned, for example, the use which could be made of war production after the defeat of France, the importance of aircraft carriers for convoys, the collaboration of Italy, and the break-through of the Maginot Line by this force, about Japan, and last but not least, the so-called Fuehrer Decree. By the statement of Felmy it is proved forever that the so-called Fuehrer order was given only on 12 December 1940. Even Raeder stated that the principles of the Fuehrer order were laid down at another occasion and that they were accordingly carried out afterwards. This other occasion was given by the statement of Felmy. Also Raeder did not hear anything about Japan; he considered it impossible that Italy and the break-through of the Maginot Line were discussed and he also states that nobody mentioned a better production of cruisers. He also testified that in that meeting a two-front war was not mentioned because he, as an officer, would have noticed that. Furthermore, he testified that Belgium and Holland were not referred to and that after the speech Goering did not open a debate. Even though the witness was not present at all times, it is rather strange that he should not have heard mention of any of the very points not heard by the other witnesses. The defendant Milch gave you the precise details of those points of the speech which were not mentioned at the time, and he was even in a position to tell you when these various points were first conceived.

Who, assuming responsibility for justice, can still seriously maintain the findings of the IMT now that these precise statements have shown us the errors of the Schmundt record? A record containing so many grave mistakes is no longer of probative value and can never be made the basis for any judgment. I am convinced that after this trial the historians of the whole world will regard the Schmundt record as the product of a later period, i.e., between the fall of 1940 and the spring of 1941 and that they will regard it as the result of time, drawn up to make Hitler, then regarded as the victor, seem possessed of a prophetic gift which in reality he never had.

The conference did take place on 23 May 1939; that is true. Its real topics, however, can no longer be stated on the basis of the Schmundt record. Thus, the statements made in the first Nuernberg trial gain a different and greater significance. Never again, therefore, will it be possible for anyone to say that on that occasion Hitler preached war and the enslavement of Europeans.

There is yet another argument possible against this record, which, it is alleged, also contains the plan for slave labor. Document EC-194, Exhibit 8, and 016-PS, Exhibit 13, submitted by the prosecution, show in all clarity that the use of European peoples in German armament works was a measure forced by the emergencies of the war and that the idea was born and realized only by the military difficulties resulting from the war with Russia.

With clean hands and a pure heart, Milch entered the war in August 1939 having previously advised Goering to fly to Britain to prevent the war. He himself became the victim of Hitler’s deception, and he himself believed that the war had been forced upon Hitler. Who can disregard justice to such an extent as to reproach Milch with having held that belief? It is his misfortune, but not his guilt, to have been deflected from the truth by misleading propaganda. Who would so misinterpret patriotism, heretofore regarded as one of man’s noblest instincts, as to reproach Milch for having done in 1939 his duty as a soldier?

He never prepared any aggressive wars. In every case he was informed shortly before the event, and nothing is more typical of the opinion his superiors held of him than the fact that he chanced to hear about the preparations for the war against Russia through a subordinate, who had been told of Hitler’s plan before the field marshal was told. The first Nuernberg trial has already shown that Milch saw Goering at once in an effort to prevent that war. Goering himself admitted this. Milch’s good intentions were of no avail because Goering turned him down. As Milch’s superior officer, he even went so far as to forbid Milch to see Hitler and to tell him that he, Goering, would prevent Milch from being admitted to Hitler’s presence.

One of your Honors, in putting questions to the defendant, aimed to show that it might be regarded as incriminating to the defendant that he did not resign in 1941 or at least in 1943. Your Honors, only if one has lived in Germany these last years is it possible truly to judge that problem. As I said in my opening speech, one can judge the man only against his background, through his upbringing, from which usually nobody can escape no matter in what country he lives. Milch was brought up as a soldier. He absorbed ideas which for centuries were regarded as true and inviolate laws. It is no guilt for him not to have freed himself from them. I have said this once before.

At that time nobody in Germany was in a position to protest against certain events, against certain aims of the Party. All that one could do was to criticize things within one’s own immediate circle and tell one’s intimate collaborators how to improve matters. If in Germany anybody had attempted at any time to express criticism publicly, either by word or by publicly resigning, nobody would have been the wiser for it. This system was so ruthless and its stranglehold over public opinion so great that it would and could suppress anything.

You need only remember that during the first IMT trial it was shown that von Papen’s criticism in his Marburg speech was completely withheld from the German public. Had Milch done anything, nobody would have heard about it, and his action would have been useless, perhaps senseless, as nothing would have been changed for the better. Your Honors may not know that six to eight generals, including General von Falkenhausen, once Commander in Chief in Belgium, and Colonel General Halder, one of Germany’s highest and best leaders, were thrown into concentration camps because they had deviated from Hitler’s line. This is not connected with 20 July 1944. Nobody in Germany knew about this. Pictures of General Count Sponeck were sold as of a hero two years after this man had vanished into a concentration camp. Such were the lies and the deceptions of Goebbels’ propaganda. We have learned since the end of the war that prior to 20 July 1944, there were 50 to 60 generals in Moabit prison, without anyone in Germany knowing anything about that. You will understand the full falsehood of propaganda when you recall the base distortions by which the dismissals of Generals von Blomberg and von Fritsch were announced to the German public.

Believe me, your Honors, protests in Germany were not possible at that time. The only result would have been the futile death of the protesting person. If Milch had attempted to fly abroad, his whole family—such were the detestable methods of those in power—would have been put to death on the basis of what was known as family responsibility.

Milch cannot be reproached with not having refused service and allegiance. No soldier could do this. Should a member of the Anglo-American Air Forces suddenly have refused to go out on an operation which would bring death to innocent women and children, he would not have been regarded as a hero. He would have been put before a court martial.

That Milch did not participate in an attempt on Hitler’s life, who would accuse him of that? Although he was an energetic man, the defendant was, because of several concussions of the brain which he suffered, inclined to terrifying fits of rage, or ranting speeches, but the evidence has shown that in his heart of hearts he was kind and soft. He would ameliorate sentences already passed, and as the witness Richter testified, he compensated for a fine, which he inflicted himself, by secretly passing into the family of the punished man a very large sum of money, larger than the fine itself. The witness Vorwald expressly stated that basically Milch was a man soft of heart, who conducted himself *self soft, who only in a rage caused by disease and worry utters harsh words never followed by action, is not capable of murder. Thus, no just man will charge him with not liquidating Hitler, and Milch did what in his conscience he felt to be possible and necessary. He had the courage of telling the dictator to his face what he thought of the situation. He demanded that Hitler desist from his plans, dismiss the most important men, such as Goering, Ribbentrop, and Keitel, give up the supreme command, and establish a cabinet of equal powers, and he finally desired that peace should be brought about.

Your Honors, it would be easy to say that as a field marshal he did not thereby endanger himself. The statement of the next witness Krysiak, the fate of the generals which I mentioned to you, show what was done in Germany to men who did such things, but the defendant went one step further. He succeeded in inducing Goering also to demand the end of the dictatorship and the instituting of a Reich cabinet. Your Honors, this means that this defendant thereby risked his life. He could not foresee that nothing would happen to him. That nothing did happen to him was not due to his rank, but to Hitler’s opinion that this man was not yet dispensable. Everybody can only be sentenced according to his potentialities. Your Honors must not compare conditions in your free and noble country to those in Germany. Only the German world as it was should be the basis of your judgment here. It is not true to say that Milch gave his continued support to the objectionable aims of the Party. He continued to do his duty because, as he testified, he wished to prevent the worst from happening to his people, the total destruction of the cities and of Germany’s culture. It was his constant hope to organize the defense in such manner as to prevent bombing warfare from taking its full effect, that same bombing warfare which is the scourge of mankind, whatever one may think of its military value. Would it be for us to judge him on the fact that he did not obtain his aim because of the stupidity and failings of his superiors? Milch furthermore testified before you that by an improved defense he hoped to achieve better peace terms for his people. I can assure your Honors that since 1941 Goebbels’ propaganda told the German people time and again of the horrible terms the enemy would impose on them in the event of peace. That included an item to the effect that the whole of the German male population would be castrated should Germany lose the war so that the German people would perish. Who has the courage to say it is despicable for a man of battle to organize a defensive system under the news impact of such items in order to obtain better peace terms?

It would be a distortion to say that Milch thus believed Hitler’s aim of destroying Europe, for he knew that the war was lost. He was intelligent enough to see that with the lost war the end of Hitler’s ideology would come. It was not the Party he wanted to serve when he hoped for less severe peace terms with a better defense, but a lost war that would not mean the loss of the legal rights of a whole nation as is the case unhappily today. Only he who comprehends and understands all these things can appreciate Milch’s actions and judge them fairly. And later, when he saw that his objective of saving the German people from the worst would fail, Milch withdrew from the regime. He could not resign on his own. That, for a soldier in Germany, was an impossibility. He did not choose to act dishonorably, which no one can expect from a decent man. In Germany soldiers are removed from their offices only by their superiors. Thus, as he put it himself, Milch could only organize his own elimination from office by gradually transferring his tasks to Speer’s Ministry. As his superiors thereupon regarded him as superfluous and were glad to be rid of this man, Milch was finally free. Then began the scheme on the part of his superiors to liquidate him. Such was the position of Milch, the man, and such by and large were his motives. For him to have acted in this and no other way is not dishonorable, and only he can cast the first stone who never in his born days gave in to public opinion in defiance of his better judgment, who has never considered his superiors, and who proved himself to be above his upbringing, and had the courage of fighting for his convictions even with the most brutal methods.

Before dealing with the details of the indictment I should like to make these basic points. The prosecution created the impression that under the conspiracy count it would hold Milch responsible for everything in totality that was done in connection with labor assignments and experiments within the confines of the Luftwaffe, nay, within the confines of the German government departments. This is not admissible. The indictment may be referred to Control Council Law No. 10. Nothing is mentioned there that conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity or war crimes constitutes a punishable offense. Only conspiracy against peace is punishable. The way the law is formulated, particularly count 2 of Article 2, makes it clear beyond doubt that activities listed therein only concern participation but no independent types of crime. Where there is an independent crime then also in the case of war crimes and crimes against humanity there would have to be a provision similar in count 1-A, Article 2 of the Control Council law where a crime is defined as “participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the purpose of committing one of the crimes above set forth.” In this connection the verdict of the IMT must also be considered. At the end of the sixth part of the verdict it states:[153] “Count one, however, charges not only the conspiracy to commit aggressive war, but also to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity,” but the Charter does not define as a separate crime any conspiracy except the one to commit acts of aggressive war. Article 6 of the Charter provides: “Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.” In the opinion of the Tribunal these words do not add a new and separate crime to those already listed. The words are designed to establish the responsibility of persons participating in a common plan. The Tribunal will therefore disregard the charges in count 1, that the defendants conspired to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, and will consider only the common plan to prepare, initiate, and wage aggressive war. And under figure 8, the IMT states further:[154] “As heretofore stated, the Charter does not define as a separate crime any conspiracy except the one set out in Article 6(a) dealing with crimes against peace.” The verdict was so formulated because the Charter was unclear at this point. As above stated, the Control Council law contains no such provisions, so much the less because in this case conspiracy does not constitute a separate crime. The provision set forth in Article 2, paragraph 2, No. 6, “whoever was connected with this planning or execution”, is only a form of individual defense and cannot be put on a par with the concept of the common plan or conspiracy. Article 2 defines clearly the type of crime referred to in paragraph 1, namely (1) the individual crime of violation of peace; (2) conspiracy against peace; (3) individual war crimes; (4) individual crimes against humanity; and finally, the form of participation in paragraph 2. Therefore, it is rendered that a so-called conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity is not a punishable offense.

It has to be examined therefore whether Milch made himself guilty of any individual type of participation. It would have to be shown that either as a principal or accessory he participated in a crime or that he especially ordered or initiated it. It would have to be proved that he gave his approval for a definite crime. That approval, however, cannot refer to a general approbation but can only be considered as participation in crime if, by his approval, he strengthened and stiffened the criminal will of the perpetrators. It must therefore be made clear that he knew of the individual crimes and that he intended to put them into action by means of his approval. Even in that case his subsequent approval would not suffice; since still nowhere in the world is anyone punished because of an inner or moral attitude. Finally, it must be examined whether Milch was connected with the planning or commission of such crimes. Here again it must be understood, of course, that this connection must be capable of causing the crime, and that Milch knew about the connection and therefore the crime. The question of membership in any organization or association which was connected with the execution of crimes requires special examination. It is clear that mere membership, as such, in any organization wherein any member may at one time have committed a punishable act cannot make every other member of that organization punishable. Otherwise a monstrous situation would arise where the commander in chief of a large army was punishable if any member of that army committed a war crime. Where in this world in all time has it happened that in such a huge organization as wartime armies’ soldiers did not at one time or another commit punishable acts? This is inevitable and it occurs in all armies. It can therefore only be a question here whether the organization or the association of which the defendant was a member had as its particular purpose the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity.

Letter (_f_) of Article 2, paragraph 2, must be considered here. Since Milch is not charged with a crime against peace, it would also have to be especially proved that he participated in the common plan of conspiracy for the commission of crimes against the peace. That he held high office cannot of its own make him punishable. This is also evident from the Tribunal of the IMT who acquitted three persons who held equally high office in Germany.

Bearing in mind these points of view, one has to examine the individual counts of the indictment. In answer to the prosecution’s charge that Milch in February 1944 had ordered two Russian officers to be shot, Exhibits Milch 40 to 44, and the testimony of the witness Vorwald have proven that the said officers were shot on the basis of an expressed order by Hitler who received, through political channels, the report of the incident earlier than Milch. Exhibits Milch 40 to 44 and the testimony of Vorwald have made it clear that Milch, first of all, had no possibility of issuing such an order, and secondly, that he did not cause its being ordered, and thirdly, that he only gained knowledge of the incident after the officers had been shot.

The witness Vorwald was in a position to testify that Milch even angrily protested against such an order.

The passage in the record of the 53d meeting of the Central Planning Board of 16 February 1944 contained in Defense Exhibit 11, can therefore not be made the basis for a judgment. Whoever, knowing the German language, reads the text critically must realize that the utterances of Milch recorded therein are contradictory in themselves and, therefore, cannot possibly contain the real statements made by Milch. They are contradictory to the true course of events; they are contradictory to Milch’s real authority, and finally, they are contradictory to the inner attitude of the defendant who himself angrily described this act as a crime.

It is significant for the question of the probative value of all verbatim records submitted to consider that such recording of the true events is found here. Such records containing such mistakes cannot be made the basis for a judgment. If we assume, however, that Milch really made these utterances which are so wrong, then this passage would remove all doubt that Milch during moments of excitement was no longer master of his thoughts and words and, therefore, cannot be held responsible for them. It would be a serious offense against justice, however, if judgment was to be pronounced on the basis of such stenographic notes taken by an unknown person who may have been in error.

Milch is furthermore accused of having abetted, participated in, and been connected with cruel and inhuman experiments carried out on concentration camp inmates at Dachau. I believe that here, too, evidence has shown that Milch is innocent. It has been proved by the clear, although long-winded, deposition of the witness Hippke that the defendant had heard for the first time on 31 August 1942 that human experiments were being carried out on others than the volunteering members of the Luftwaffe; that is, at a moment when the high-altitude experiments were already completed and when the freezing experiments were about to be completed.

In this connection I recall that the final report on freezing experiments was available in print already on 10 October 1942, so that these experiments too must have been completed by a considerably earlier date. On 31 August 1942, the defendant learned merely from Hippke that human experiments had been carried out on criminals who had been sentenced to death and who had volunteered to obtain a pardon. He was told expressly that nothing had happened so far during these experiments. It is obvious that experiments as such do not in themselves constitute an offense against humanity, whether or not they are in use in some foreign countries. At any rate much evidence has already been submitted by the defense in the medical trial, proving that, also in democratic states of the world, experiments have been carried out and are being carried out on volunteering criminals, experiments which constitute a danger to the life and health of the experimental subject.

The prosecutor has submitted in evidence his last exhibit, Document 1971-PS, Prosecution Exhibit 161, showing irrefutably that Himmler too had ordered that only men sentenced to death are to be used for these experiments. Hippke did not even misinform Milch. That, besides the experiments which were of importance to the Luftwaffe, Himmler had also started secret experiments is shown from this very Exhibit 161 because therein Himmler directs Rascher to continue these special experiments on which he had reported to him and even to carry out revival experiments.

Both witnesses Ruff and Romberg have testified unanimously that nothing has happened during these experiments. Death casualties had occurred during Rascher’s own experiments which he carried out on Himmler’s behalf. Only the aim of these experiments remained unclear to the witness, which is now being clarified by Exhibit 161, but Milch had no knowledge of all this. He fully believed what Hippke told him, nor did he ever have any cause to distrust Hippke and he could not distrust him more as he knew that high-altitude experiments had already previously been carried out on Luftwaffe personnel of his own air force without any danger being involved. Not even Hippke has had any knowledge of cruelties and death casualties. How much the less can be proved that the defendant could have had any knowledge. It does not say anything against the defendant that he had signed already before 31 August 1942 some letters which had been submitted to him by his offices. Nobody has been able to state that Milch had dictated these letters at all. It could not even be proved that he had seen or read the letters from the SS to which these letters refer. It is impossible for a man who has such a burden of work and such a large sphere of tasks as the defendant to take care of every trifling matter in his office, that these letters—which to anybody who has no knowledge of the underlying facts appear harmless and unimportant—could also not arouse the defendant’s suspicion. Should he be charged with responsibility for them then, this would be a responsibility which could not be borne by anybody. This would mean to overestimate human working capacity. It is the very idea of any great organization to relieve the chiefs or the heads of attentions to details in order to make them free for the main tasks. If such a man were to be asked to take care of everything, then the organization would be unsuccessful and no man in the world could form a great work comprising many people, and no man in the world would be willing to head such an organization if the chief of the organization should be held responsible for everything that his subordinate agencies commit. Everybody has the right generally to trust his subordinates as long as he has no reason to distrust them.

Hippke’s descriptions were unimpeachable and gave no reason for misgivings. His tenure of office at that time was irreproachable so that Milch had not to distrust Hippke’s activities and all the less so because already at an earlier date human experiments had been carried out by the Luftwaffe in a manner above reproach. Milch has testified to the effect that he had not read the report on high-altitude experiments. Evidence has shown that he has not seen the film nor could he have cause for this film to be shown, only if he would have stayed in Berlin, but he was not even in Berlin on that day; therefore, he could not become suspicious from what occurred. Likewise Milch never received the report on freezing experiments nor did he ever get a final report on this matter.

Finally, Milch had no reason to distrust the fact that the SS participated in the experiments. He knew that Hippke was part of it and was therefore entitled to believe that everything was in order. Therefore, Milch was neither a principal in nor an accessory to, nor has he ordered or instigated these experiments. He has never given his consent to the crimes committed because he had no knowledge whatsoever of them nor was he connected with their planning or their execution, nor was he a member of any organization aiming at the commission of such crimes. It is not the aim of the Luftwaffe to carry out such criminal experiments, and with the DVL he had nothing to do at all. It is irrelevant that at that time Rascher was a member of the Luftwaffe. Exhibit 161 proves that Rascher received the orders to execute the crimes as a member of the SS from Himmler himself and also carried them out in that capacity. Finally, it must be said that the Wolff letter of November 1942 was only written after the crimes were committed. It has not been proved that Milch ever saw this letter. He was not in Berlin when the letter arrived. That he has testified. The letter was sent to the Medical Inspectorate which only answered it in 1943 as Hippke has testified. Also, the fact that Rascher was transferred to the SS had nothing to do with the defendant. That was a matter settled outside of his competency. The personnel chief of the Luftwaffe was at no time subordinated to him, and it must also be taken into consideration that, according to the evidence, Milch had no knowledge of Rascher’s having committed any crimes. One cannot charge Milch with the fact that Rascher referred to him. The testimony of Neff and Defense Exhibit 56, the affidavit of Punzengruber, have shown to this Tribunal that Rascher was a confirmed liar whose statements have no probative value and, therefore, I believe that Milch in this matter too has shown to this Tribunal his complete innocence.

Before I go into the charges against Milch for his participation in the so-called slave labor program, I must make a few fundamental statements. I shall begin by examining the question as to what extent the Hague Convention on land warfare and the Geneva Convention of 1929 were valid for the treatment of Russian prisoners of war. By the statements of witness von Neurath, it has been confirmed that the U.S.S.R. in 1919 specifically withdrew from the Hague Convention on land warfare as well as the former Geneva Convention. Jurists will not dispute the fact that a formal withdrawal from agreements is of greater importance in the relations between states than the act of joining such a convention. Even if one were of the opinion that the Hague Convention on land warfare and the Geneva Convention represented merely the codification of already existing international law, so that the state that did not join the conventions would also be bound to this already existing international law in all details, even in such a case the expressly stated withdrawal from such a convention must mean also a withdrawal from the natural international law. If this were not the case, the withdrawal from such conventions would be an act without meaning which such intelligent politicians as those found in the U.S.S.R. would never undertake. Nor is this conception of mine contradicted by the expert opinion offered in the first Nuernberg trial (_Canaris Doc. No. EC-338_)[155] because this expert opinion is only concerned with the order of Hitler and Keitel regarding the killing and cruel treatment of prisoners. It is, of course, clear that inhumane acts do not become permissible because of withdrawal from conventions. What we must examine here, however, is purely the question whether or not, and for what activities, such prisoners of war may be used. Detailed regulations of international law, which in themselves do not contain atrocities, can in my opinion be nullified by expressly withdrawing from a convention codifying existing international law. Finally, we wish to draw attention to Article 82, paragraph 2, of the Geneva Convention of 1929 which contains the following regulation: “If in wartime one of the belligerents is not a member of the convention, the regulations of this convention remain valid, nevertheless, for the belligerents who have signed the convention.” This does not mean that the signatories are bound to the Geneva Convention also with regard to the treatment of soldiers of a nonsignatory power, but only with regard to soldiers of the signatories who are at war. Article 82, paragraph 2, of the Geneva Convention, therefore, states that with regard to the relations of nonsignatories the convention is not valid. The regulation was made so that it should not be thought that if a nonsignatory participated in the war the Geneva Convention would not apply to that war.

That my opinion was shared by the U.S.S.R. becomes clear beyond doubt from Defense Exhibit 49 presented by me, which contains the decision of the Council of the Peoples Commissioners of the U.S.S.R. of 1 July 1941. This decision does not mention any limitation with regard to the use of prisoners of war for labor except for the regulations under number 25. According to this, prisoners of war may not be used as workers in the battle zone nor for the personal needs of the administrations, or by other prisoners of war (orderly services). Defense Exhibit 51, concerning employment of German women prisoners of war in Russia, also reveals the same conception of the U.S.S.R.

The objections that not Russia’s conception but that of the United States of America matters here is not justified. Existing regulations between two states can only be judged on the legal relations valid for those two states. If both states regulate a given question in agreement with conclusive acts in the same way, that regulation becomes international law valid for the relations of those two states and must be taken into consideration by all other states. It is the right of sovereign states to regulate their relations as they wish. Other states have no right to interfere in the right of sovereignty and they must acquiesce in the legal conception existing between those two states regarding any issue concerning their citizens. Therefore, legal opinions of another state must not be taken as a basis for the judging of actions which occurred between the nationals of these two states.

As in Milch’s sphere of competency Russian prisoners of war were used neither at the front nor as orderlies, he cannot be found guilty so far as the treatment of Russian prisoners of war is concerned.

All this also applies to the treatment of the Russian civilian population whose rights could have been cared for by the Hague Convention for land warfare alone. Here, too, Russia’s express withdrawal from the convention is of great importance.