Chapter XXXIX: Section 2: A III f (4)

The intensive discussion yielded as the most expedient solution the use of Russian prisoners of war to fill the existing vacancies. The more homogeneous character of the shifts will bring about the necessary higher output resulting both from an increased capacity of such shifts and particularly from a restriction of fluctuations.

1. The present drive, which is to be carried out throughout the German economy proper, aims both at freeing Russian labor, fit for work in the mining industry and actually not employed as semi-skilled workmen, and at replacing it by additionally imported labor consisting of eastern workers, Poles, etc. Thus, about 50,000 workmen are expected to be made available up to the end of July 1943. This drive is to be accelerated.

Furthermore as an immediate measure it should be suggested to the Fuehrer—RVK [Reich Association Coal] and GBA [Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation] submitting the necessary figures for the statement to the Fuehrer—that 200,000 Russian prisoners fit for the heaviest work be made available from the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS through the chiefs of the army groups [Heeresgruppenchefs]. The prisoners will be selected on the spot by medical officers of the mining industry and officials of the office of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation will take charge of them there and then. Provisions are to be made for an extension of this program in order to satisfy any demand for manpower, which will have accumulated up to the end of the year 1943.

The manpower needed by the mining transport industry [Bergbau-Zubringer-Industrie] and by the iron-producing industry may be supplied from that same source provided that the necessities of the coal mining industry have previously been adjusted.

The performance of the Soviet Russians so employed is to be raised by a premium system. For this purpose, the present pay restrictions are to be lifted and the manager [Betriebsfuehrer] be allowed to distribute amongst the workers, according to his discretion, one Reichmark per head per day as premium for particular services rendered.

Furthermore, care will be taken that workmen can exchange these premiums, which will be paid out in camp money [Lagergeld] for goods. It is intended to put at their disposal various provisions (e.g., sunflower seeds, etc.) beer, tobacco, cigarettes and cigars, small items for daily use, etc.

The Reich Food Ministry in conjunction with the Reich Association Coal and the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs will clarify the question whether, beyond that, something else can be changed as far as rations are concerned.

2. Equally, in occupied countries, labor is to be tied more securely to the various factories by means of the distribution of additional ration cards as premium for good services. This refers in particular to the General Government and the occupied territories in the East. The output demanded of the General Government is to be fixed at the proposed amount, and the additional rations for armament workers may then be rated accordingly.

[Typewritten signature] DR. GRAMSCH
Present:

Reich Minister Speer
Field Marshal Milch
Staatstrat Schieber Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Oberbuergermeister Liebel Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Major General Waeger Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Dr. Ing. Groener Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
President Kehrl Reich Economic Ministry
Min. Dir. Gramsch Four Year Plan
Min. Dirig. Timm Plenipotentiary General for Labor
Allocation (GBA)
Staatsrat Pleiger Reich Association Coal (RVK)
Dr. Sogemeier Reich Association Coal (RVK)
Dr. Rosenkranz Reich Association Coal (RVK)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A

EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE FIFTY-THIRD
CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD,
16 FEBRUARY 1944

Secret!
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 53D CONFERENCE
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_

_Concerning Supply of Labor held on 16 February 1944, 10 o’clock,_
_in the Reich Air Ministry_

Present: Milch (for Central Planning Board), Kehrl, Backe, etc.

MILCH: The armament industry employs foreign workers to a large extent, according to the latest figures—40 percent. The new allocations of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation consist mostly of foreigners and we lost a lot of German personnel which was called up. Specially the air industry being a young industry employs a great many young people who should be called up. This will be very difficult as is easily seen if one deducts those working for experimental stations. In mass production the foreign workers by far prevail. It is about 95 percent and higher. Our best new engine is made 88 percent by Russian prisoners of war and the other 12 percent by German men and women. 50-60 Ju 52’s which we now regard only as transport planes are made per month. Only 6-8 German men are working on this machine, the rest are Ukrainian women who have beaten all the records of trained workers.

* * * * *

The list of the shirkers should be entrusted to Himmler’s trustworthy hands who will make them work, all right. This is very important for educating people and has also a deterrent effect on such others who would likewise feel inclined to shirk.

* * * * *

* * * It is, therefore, not possible to exploit fully all the foreigners unless we compel them by piece work or have the possibility of taking measures against foreigners who are not doing their bit. But if the foreman lays hands on a prisoner of war or smacks him, at once there is a terrible uproar, the man is put into prison, etc. There are sufficient officials in Germany who think it their most important duty to stand up for human rights instead of war production. I, too, am all for human rights. But if a Frenchman says, “You fellows will all be hanged and the chief of the factory will be beheaded first”, and if then the chief says, “I am going to hit him”, then he is in a mess. He is not protected, but the “poor fellow” who said that to him is protected. I have told my engineers, “I am going to punish you if you don’t hit such a man; the more you do in this respect the more I shall praise you. I shall see to it that nothing happens to you.” This is not yet sufficiently known. I cannot talk to all plant leaders. I should like to see the man who stays my arm because I can take care of anybody who does so. If the little plant leader does that he is put into a concentration camp and runs the risk of losing the prisoners of war. In one case two Russian officers took off with an airplane but crashed. I ordered that these two men be hanged at once. They were hanged or shot yesterday. I left that to the SS. I expressed the wish to have them hanged in the factory for the others to see. * * *

* * * * *

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B

REPORT ON THE FIFTY-THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD, 16 FEBRUARY 1944

[Marginal notes] St. 10-44 VII Top Secret

The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan Central Planning Board Z.P. 7 g. Rs. Pl. 030053

Berlin, 18 February 1944
W 8, Leipziger Strasse 3

Secret
31 copies, 3d copy
[Milch’s initial]
M
_REPORT ON THE 53D CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD ON 16 FEBRUARY 1944,
ON LABOR ALLOCATION 1944_

The purpose of this conference is to determine the labor needs and resources for the 1st quarter and the whole year of 1944. The session is opened by the discussion of the data submitted by the planning office (see enclosures 1-9). On the basis of the planning office’s estimate of the requirements (enclosure 9) these turn out, after discussion with the individual allottees, to be the following:

First Second-Fourth Quarter-44 Quarter-44 Total in 1000’s Agriculture 70 (1) 70 (2) 140 Forestry and Timber Industry 40 (3) . . (4) 40 Armament and War Production 544 (5) 3,000 (6) 3,544 Air Raid Damages 100 50 150 (7) Communications 85 (8) 265 350 Distribution . . . . . . Public Administration 62 (9) . . 62 Wehrmacht Administration 130 . . 130 ——— ——— ——— 1,031 3,385 4,416

(1) Not including the 200,000 of whom 100,000 each will flow back from industry and forestry.

(2) Not including the demand for seasonal workers amounting usually to 62,000.

(3) 25,000 for forestry and 15,000, including 8,000 women for the timber industry, as against a peacetime requirement of 150,000 male and 40,000 female seasonal workers, although now considerably increased production (1943:70 million cubic meters; 1944:80 million cubic meters) and particularly heavy combing-out through draft.

(4) Starting autumn 1944, the usual necessary transfer from agriculture.

(5) Found to be a priority requirement for February with the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation.

(6) Starting March, 200,000 monthly as compensation for fluctuations—2 million for period March to December 1944. Plus compensation for return to agriculture 100,000 (cp. note 1) including 30,000 retrained workers who perhaps will have to be covered by an over-all exchange system and about 900,000 as replacement for draftees, as reserves for increased programs, etc., making about 3 million men all told for the period from March to December 1944.

(7) 150,000 is the minimum requirement in addition to the hitherto assigned 70,000 OT, 100,000 GB construction and 118,000 workmen to the local and district assignments and 42,000 workers centrally assigned. The mobile formations are to be increased and sometimes to be reinforced by local help, particularly by people unemployed through bombings.

(8) Including 75,000 for the Reichsbahn, 1,000 for inland navigation, 7,000 for motor traffic, 2,000 for minor railways.

(9) Including 27,000 for the Reichspost and 35,000 for the Red Cross.

In this estimate, real fluctuation (departure from work) as well as fictitious fluctuation (change of work location) are taken into account. Fictitious fluctuation is still to be variously estimated in the various branches. For the armament section it is estimated at 50 percent of the total fluctuation (cp. note 6). The total requirements of approximately 4.4 million would thus decrease by up to 1 million. The above estimate of requirements ought, therefore, in no case to exceed the requirements determined at the Fuehrer’s conference on 4 January 1944, comprising only the real fluctuation and amounting to 4,05 million namely:

1. Maintenance of the status of activity in the whole of 2,5 million
the war economy including agriculture, taking into
account the replacement of deficiencies due to drafts
into the Wehrmacht, deaths, illness, expiration of
contract, etc. (real fluctuation)
2. For additional armament tasks and removal of bottleneck 1,30 million
situations in armament plants
3. Air raid defense constructions, etc. 0,25 million
—————
Total 4,05 million

Kehrl is charged with the task of ascertaining the magnitude of real and fictitious fluctuation, and as a basis thereto, on behalf of the Central Planning Board, together with the competent offices, to determine the concepts, “real and fictitious fluctuation,” furthermore the concepts, assignment, reserves [Aufstockung], etc., in a uniform terminology which will be binding for all agencies concerned.

The following resources are the GBA’s [Sauckel’s] estimated coverage of the requirements:

1. With the utmost efforts, other workers can be mobilized 500,000
from German domestic reserves (getting hold of labor
unemployed as result of enemy air raids, compulsory
registration, shutting down, combing out measures)
2. Recruitment of Italian labor numbering at the rate of 1,500,000
250,000 a month from January to April—1,000,000 and
500,000 from May to December
3. Recruitment of French labor at equal monthly rates, 1,000,000
from 1 February to 31 December 1944 (approx. 91,000 per
month)
4. Recruitment of labor from Belgium 250,000
5. Recruitment of labor from the Netherlands 250,000
6. Recruitment of labor from the eastern territories, 600,000
occupied former Soviet territories, Baltic states, and
General Government
7. Recruitment of workers from other European countries 100,000
—————
Approximately 4,2 million

In addition, the following possibilities are seen for the mobilization of more reserves: Intensification of employment of women (in England, 61 percent of women between 14 and 65 are conscripted for the war economy, in Germany only 46 percent) especially in agriculture (more stringent application of the Goering ordinance), reduction in number of domestic assistants, reduction of the idle classes (Sauckel-Kehrl-Himmler, in this respect regional round-ups are to be carried out separately for foreigners, men and women) improvement of the sanitary system (saving up to 3 percent), working out of equitable contractual wages with incentive wage premiums. The planning office undertakes in common with the GBA [Sauckel] the examination of these possibilities for an intensified mobilization. Kehrl is moreover commissioned to make a general examination of the question of an improvement of industrial labor assignment. Everyone concerned will transmit their data on faulty assignment of workers to the planning office. If necessary, this question will be handled at a special session of the Central Planning Board.

For the 1st quarter of 1944 the following resources (including a fictitious fluctuation of about 50,000 per month) are given by the estimate of the GBA [Sauckel]:

Assignments in January 145,000
Assignments February-March 500,000
————
Approximately 650,000

The adjustment of requirements and coverage will be effected at another session of the Central Planning Board.

[Signed] STEFFLER
Present:

Field Marshal Milch
State Secretary Koerner
President Kehrl
Ministerial Councillor Steffler
Maj. Gen. Waeger Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Teuscher Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
KVV Chief Bosch Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Ministerial Councillor Wissmann Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Lt. Col. Schaede Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Provincial Counsellor Berk Plenipotentiary for Labor
Allocation
State Secretary Hayler Reich Economic Ministry
General of Engineers Sellschopp Reich Air Ministry
Staff Engineer Kaufmann Reich Air Ministry
Staff Secretary Ganzenmueller Reich Transport Ministry
Ministerial Director Hassenpflug Reich Transport Ministry
Ministerial Councillor Hennig Reich Transport Ministry
State Secretary Backe Reich Food Ministry
State Secretary Alpers Reich Office for Forestry
Prof. Abetz Reich Office for Forestry
State Secretary Gutterer Propaganda Ministry
Mayor Ellgering Propaganda Ministry
Gen. Weidemann OKW
Major Koch OKW

Distribution:

Reich Minister Speer 1st copy
Reich Minister Funk 2d copy
Field Marshal Milch 3d copy
State Secretary Koerner 4th copy
President Kehrl 5th copy & 6th
Engineer Goerner 7th copy
Ministerial Councillor Steffler 8th & 9th copies
Maj. Gen. Waeger 10th copy
KVV Chief Bosch 11th copy
Ministerial Councillor Wissmann 12th copy
Provincial Councillor Berk 13th copy
State Secretary Hayler 14th copy
General Engineer Sellschopp 15th copy
State Secretary Ganzenmueller 16th copy
State Secretary Backe 17th copy
State Secretary Alpers 18th copy
State Secretary Gutterer 19th copy
Gen. Weidemann 20th copy
Major Koch 21st copy
Planning Office 22d & 23d copies
Registry V.P. 24th & 31st copies

Pla. 160/ 11.2.

List of persons invited to the Conference of the Central
Planning Board on 16 February 1944:

Chairman: Field Marshal Milch

Participants:

Reich Minister of Economy Funk
State Secretary Koerner
State Secretary Dr. Backe
General Forester Dr. Alpers
State Secretary Dr. Ganzenmueller
State Secretary Dr. Gutterer
President Kehrl
Maj. Gen. Waeger
Ministerial Manager Dr. Timm (crossed out and replaced by Provincial
Councillor Berk)
Military Government vice-regent Dr. Bosch
Ministerial Councillor Dr. Steffler

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A

EXTRACTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
FIFTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING
BOARD, 1 MARCH 1944

_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 54TH CONFERENCE_[96]
_OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_

Re: Labor Supply on Wednesday, 1 March 1944, 10 o’clock, at the
Ministry for Air Transport

SAUCKEL: Field Marshal [Milch], Gentlemen, it goes without saying that we shall satisfy as far as possible the demands agreed upon by the Central Planning Board. In this connection I wish to state that I call such deliveries as can be made by the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation “possible” by stressing every nerve of his organization. Already on 4 January I had to report to the Fuehrer with the greatest regret that for the first time I was not in a position to guarantee delivery of the grand total of 4,050,000 men then calculated in the Fuehrer’s Headquarters for the year 1944. In the presence of the Fuehrer I emphasized this several times. In the previous years I was able to satisfy the demands, at least with regard to the number of laborers, but this year I am no longer able to guarantee them in advance. In case I can deliver only a small number, I should be glad if those arriving would be distributed by percentage within the framework of your program. Of course, I shall readily agree if I am now told by the board: Now we have to change the program; now this or that is more urgent. It goes without saying that we will satisfy the demands whatever they may be, to the best of our ability, with due regard to the war situation. So much about figures!

We have no reason to contest the figures as such, for we ask nothing for ourselves. We are not even able to do anything with the laborers we collect; we only put them at the disposal of industry. I only wish to make some general statements and ask for your indulgence.

In the autumn of last year the supply program, inasmuch as it concerns supply from abroad was frustrated to a very great extent; I need not give the reasons in this circle; we have talked enough about them, but I have to state: the program has been smashed. People in France, Belgium, and Holland thought that labor was no longer to be directed from these countries to Germany because the work now had to be done within these countries themselves. For months—sometimes I visited these countries twice within a month—I have been called a fool who against all reason travelled around in these countries in order to extract labor. This went so far, I assure you, that all prefectures in France had general orders not to satisfy my demands since even the German authorities quarreled over whether or not Sauckel was a fool. If one’s work is smashed in such a way, repair is very, very difficult. * * *

* * * * *

* * * Today I am able to report that we stopped that decrease. According to most accurate statistics, which I had ordered, we have today again including foreign workers and prisoners of war, the same number of 29.1 million which we had in September. But we have added nothing since that time. Thus we dispatched to the Reich in those two months no more than 4,500 Frenchmen which amounts to nothing. From Italy only 7,000 civilians arrived. This, although from 1 December until today, I have had no hour, no Sunday, and no night for myself. I have visited all these countries and travelled through the whole Reich. My work was terribly difficult, but not for the reason that no more workers are to be found. I wish to state expressly, in France and in Italy there are still men galore. The situation in Italy is nothing but a European scandal, the same applies to a certain extent to France. Gentlemen, the French work badly and support themselves at the expense of the work done by the German soldier and laborer, even at the expense of the German food supply, and the same applies to Italy. I found out during my last stay that the food supply of the northern Italians cannot suffer any comparison with that of the southern Italians. The northern Italians, viz., as far to the south as Rome are so well nourished that they need not work; they are nourished quite differently from the German nation by their Father in Heaven without having to work for their bread. The labor reserves exist but the means of touching them have been smashed.

The most abominable point made by my adversaries is their claim that no executive had been provided within these areas in order to recruit in a sensible manner the Frenchmen, Belgians, and Italians and to dispatch them to work. Thereupon I even proceeded to employ and train a whole batch of French male and female agents who for good pay, just as was done in olden times for “shanghaiing”, went hunting for men and made them drunk by using liquor as well as words in order to dispatch them to Germany. Moreover I charged some able men with founding a special labor supply executive of our own, and this they did by training and arming, with the help of the Higher SS and Police Leader, a number of natives, but I still have to ask the Munitions Ministry for arms for the use of these men. * * *

* * * * *

* * * Especially the protected factories in the occupied countries make my work more difficult. According to reports received within the last days these protected factories are to a great part filled to capacity, and still labor is sucked up into these areas. This strong suction very much obstructs our desire to dispatch labor to the Reich. I wish to emphasize that I never opposed the use of French labor in factories which had been transferred from Germany to France. I am still sound of mind, and as recently as last summer I charged Mr. Hildebrand with an inquiry in France which had the following result: It would be easy to extract from French medium and small factories—80 percent of all French factories are small enterprises with only 36-40 working hours—1 million laborers for use in the transferred factories, and 1 million more for dispatch to Germany. To use 1 million within France should be quite possible unless the protected factories in France artificially suck up the labor completely and unless their number is continually increased, as happens according to my reports especially in Belgium, and unless new categories of works are continually declared protected, so that finally no labor is left which I may use in Germany. I wish here and now to repeat my thesis: A French workman, if treated in the right way, does double the amount of work in Germany that he would do in France, and he has here twice the value he has in France. I want to state clearly and fearlessly—the exaggerated use of the idea of protected factories in connection with the labor supply from France in my submission implies a grave danger for the German labor supply. If we cannot come to the decision that my assistants, together with the armament authorities, are to comb out every factory, this fountain of labor too in the future will remain blocked for the use of Germany, and in this case the program prescribed to me by the Fuehrer may well be frustrated. The same applies to Italy. In either country there are enough laborers, even enough skilled workers; only we must have enough courage to step into the French plants. What really happens in France, I do not know. That a smaller amount of work is done during enemy operations in France, like in every occupied country, than is done in Germany seems to me evident. If I am to fulfill the demands which you present to me, you must be prepared to agree with me and my assistants, that the term “protected factory” is to be restricted in France to what is really necessary and feasible by reasonable men, and the protected factories are not, as the Frenchmen think, protected against any extraction of labor from them for use in Germany. It is indeed very difficult for me to be presented to French eyes as a German of whom they may say, Sauckel is here stopped from acting for German armament! * * * On the other hand, I have grounds for hoping that I shall be just able to wiggle through, first by using my old corps of agents and my labor executive, and secondly by relying upon the measures which I was lucky enough to succeed in obtaining from the French Government. In a discussion lasting 5-6 hours I have exerted from M. Laval the concession that the death penalty will be threatened for officials endeavoring to sabotage the flow of labor supply and certain other measures. Believe me, this was very difficult. It required a hard struggle to get this through. But I succeeded and now in France, Germans ought to take really severe measures, in case the French Government does not do so. Don’t take it amiss, I and my assistants in fact have sometimes seen things happen in France that I was forced to ask, is there no respect any more in France for the German lieutenant with his 10 men. For months every word I spoke was countered by the answer: But what do you mean, Mr. Gauleiter, you know there is no executive at our disposal; we are not able to take action in France! This I have been answered over and over again. How then, am I to regulate the labor supply with regard to France. There is only one solution—the German authorities have to co-operate with each other, and if the Frenchmen despite all their promises do not act, then we Germans must make an example of one case, and, by reason of this law, if necessary put prefect or burgomaster against the wall, if he does not comply with the rules; otherwise no Frenchman at all will be dispatched to Germany. During the latter quarter the belief in a German victory and in all propaganda statements which we were still able to make has sunk below zero, and today it is still the same. I rather expect the new French ministers, especially Henriot [French (Vichy) Minister of Propaganda] will act ruthlessly; they are very willing and I have a good impression of them. The question is only how far they will be able to impress their will on the subordinated authorities. Such is the situation in France.

In Italy the situation is exactly the same, perhaps rather worse. * * *

Moreover, I am offended, and this grieves me most, by the statement that I was responsible for the European partisan nuisance. Even German authorities reproached me thus, although they were the last ones who have the right to make such statements. I wish to protest against this slander, and I can prove that it is not I who is responsible. * * *

* * * Numerous German authorities, even such as had no connections with economics and labor supply, inquired of me, why do you fetch these people to Germany at all? You make trouble for this area and render our existence there more difficult. To which I can only reply: It is my duty to insist on it that labor supply comes from abroad. There is no longer a German labor supply. That the latter is exhausted I already proved by my ill-famed manifesto of April of last year. But I am not able to transfer the German soil to France. Nor can I transfer the German traffic to France nor the German mines. Nor can I transfer the German armament works which still have to release part of their workers, if fit for war service, nor their machines. Here alone 2,500,000 men are in question as has been calculated in the Fuehrer conference. It is the flower of German workers who go to the front and must go there. I have always been one of those who says: If only energetic measures are applied in fetching labor from abroad, then we want to release in God’s name everybody from armaments work whom we can, in order to strengthen our companies. The 1st and 7th Armored Divisions from Thuringia are frequently mentioned in the armed forces report, I can only tell you that the number of soldiers killed in battle in some Thuringian villages has surpassed for some time already the number of soldiers killed in the World War [I] by twice that amount. This I mention in my capacity as Gauleiter. It is for this reason that we have to do our duty. The best kind of German men, and men in the prime of life, have to go to the front, and German women of more than 50 years of age cannot replace them. Therefore I have to continue to go to France, Belgium, Holland, and Italy, and there will be a time again when I shall go to Poland and extract workers there as fit and as many of them as I can get. In this circle I only wish to urge that you spread it around that I am not quite the insane fellow I have been said to be during the last quarter of a year. Even the Fuehrer has been told so. It goes without saying that just this slander has had the effect that I was unable to deliver in the last quarter at least 1½ million workers whom I would have been able to deliver as long ago as last year, had the atmospheric conditions been better. It was due to that “artificial atmospheric screen”, that they did not arrive. I am aware that they simply have to arrive this year. My duty to the Fuehrer, the Reich Marshal, Minister Speer, and towards you, Gentlemen, and to agriculture is apparent, and I shall fulfill it. A start has been made, and as many as 262,000 new workers have arrived, and I hope and am convinced to be able to deliver the bulk of the order. How the labor is to be distributed will then have to be decided according to the needs of the whole of German industry, and I shall always be prepared to keep the closest contact with you, Gentlemen, and to charge the labor exchanges and the district labor exchanges with intimately collaborating with you. Everything is functioning if such collaboration exists. * * *

* * * * *

MILCH: * * * I now proceed to the important question, where are we still able to get greater amounts of laborers from you, and without a doubt the answer is, from abroad. I have asked Mr. Schieber to make a short appearance here in order to give his opinion on Italy. I agree with your statement, Gauleiter, that it is only the bad organization of our work abroad which is responsible for the fact that you can’t do your job. Too many people meddle in your work. If someone tells you, there is no executive in France and Italy, I consider it an impudence, a foolish and stupid lie uttered by people who either are unable to think or consciously state an untruth. This kind of person is not interested in giving a clear lead in this respect and in analyzing the situation, probably because they are not smart enough. In this way, however, your work is rendered more difficult or frustrated, and all armament work at the same time. For we have it before our eyes what close relations exist between the situation in the occupied countries and that in the armaments industry. A more foolish policy can hardly be conceived. In case the invasion of France begins and succeeds only to a certain degree, then we shall experience a rising by partisans such as we have never experienced either in the Balkans or in the East, not because this would have happened in any case, but only because we made it possible by not dealing with them in the right manner. Four whole age groups have grown up in France, men between 18 and 23 years of age, who are, therefore, at that age when young people moved by patriotism or seduced by other people are ready to do anything which satisfies their personal hatred against us—and of course they hate us. These men ought to have been called up in age groups and dispatched to Germany; for they present the greatest danger which threatens us in case of invasion. I am firmly convinced and have said several times, if invasion starts, sabotage of all railways, works, and supply bases will be a daily occurrence, and then it will be really the case that our forces are no longer available to survey the execution of our orders within the country, but they will have to fight at the front, thereby leaving in their rear the much more dangerous enemy who destroys their communications, etc. If one had shown the nailed fist and a clear executive intention, a churchyard peace would reign in the rear of the front at the moment the uproar starts. This I have emphasized so frequently, but still nothing is happening, I am afraid. For if one intends to start to shoot at that moment, it will be too late for it; then we have no longer the men at our disposal to kill off the partisans. In the same way, we are aware of the fact that their supply of arms in the West is rather ample since the English are dropping them from planes. I consider it an idiotic statement if you, Gauleiter, are accused of having made these men into partisans. As soon as you arrive the men run away to protect themselves from being sent to Germany. Then they are away, and since they do not know how to exist, they automatically fall into the hands of the partisan leaders; but this is not the consequence of the fact that you wish to fetch them, but of the fact that your opposite number, the executive is not able to prevent their escape. You simply cannot act differently. The main crux of the problem is the fact that your work is made so extremely difficult, and this is why you cannot deliver the 4,050,000 workers. As long as it is feasible for these men to get away and not be caught by the executive, as long as the men are able not to return from leave and not to be found out on the other side, I do not think, Party Comrade Sauckel, that you will have a decisive success through employing your special corps. The men even then will be whisked away unless quite another authority and power is on the watch, and this can only be the army itself. The army alone can exercise effective executive. If some say they cannot do this kind of work, this is incorrect for within France there are training forces stationed in every hole and corner town and every place which could all be used for this work. If this would be done in time, the partisan nuisance would not emerge, just as it would not have done in the East if one had only acted in time. Once I had this task at Stalingrad. At Taganrog there were then 65,000 men of the army, and at the front one lieutenant and 6 men were actually available for each km. and they would have been only too glad if they had 20-30 for their assistance. In the rear there were great masses of men who had retreated in time and squatted down in the villages, and who now were available neither for fighting at the front nor for fighting the partisans. I am aware that I am placing myself in opposition to my own side, but I have seen such things happen everywhere, and can find no remedy but that the army should assert itself ruthlessly. You, Gauleiter Sauckel, the Reich Marshal, and the Central Planning Board ought to report on this question to the Fuehrer, and then he ought to decide at the same time on the duties of the military commanders. There ought to be orders of such lucidity that they could not be misunderstood, and it is then that things will be in order. It never can be too late to do so, but these duties and this work will be more difficult to perform with every passing day. The same applies to Italy as well.

* * * * *

SAUCKEL: I wish to insist on combing out the protected factories in the future also for the protected factories are working like a suction pump; and since it is known everywhere in Italy and France that every worker if he works in a protected factory is protected against any attempt of mine to extract him, it is only too natural that the men are pouring into these factories. How difficult my task becomes thereby is proved by the following fact. I intended to extract from Italy a million workers within the quarter ending 30 May. Hardly 7,000 arrived in the two months which expired so far. This is indeed the difficulty. The bulk enters the protected factories, and only the chaff remains for my purpose to send them to Germany. At least I hope to accomplish that with regard to larger enterprises as the number of protected factories is restricted in Italy, i.e., the number of protected factories, will not be further increased.

* * * * *

SAUCKEL: This indeed is the decisive question, the one we are dealing with now. If half of the program for 4 million workers to be brought to Germany—in other words 2 million—cannot be fulfilled, the employment of labor in Germany will fall off this year. The more useful workers, however, are in France, and of course in Italy too, employed in the protected factories. Therefore if I am not to touch the protected factories which are situated in these countries, this will have the effect that the less valuable workers instead of the more valuable type will arrive in Germany. And here we have to ponder about what is in fact more important and expedient. If we give up using these people in Germany, where we effectively rule the factories, where moreover we keep to a different labor discipline and reach better labor results than in France proper, then we give up the valuable kind, and then I shall only be able to transport to Germany the less valuable kind of people who still can be found on the streets of France or Italy, or people like waiters, hairdressers, small folk from tailor shops, etc.

MILCH: What is the percentage of protected factories in Italy compared with the whole of Italian labor?

SCHIEBER: I think 14 percent, but I don’t have the figures here.

MILCH: Would not the following method be better: We could take under German administration the entire food supply for the Italians and tell them: Only he gets any food who either works in a protected factory or goes to Germany.

SAUCKEL: True, the French worker in France is better nourished than the German worker is in Germany, and the Italian worker too, even if he does not work at all, is better nourished in the part of Italy occupied by us than if he works in Germany. This is why I asked the German food authorities over and over again to improve also the food of the German worker introducing the “factory sandwich”. When I am in Paris, of course, I go to Maxim’s. There one can experience miracles of nourishment. The Fuehrer still thinks that in these countries only very rich men who can go to Maxim’s are well provided with food. Thereupon I sent my assistants to the Paris suburbs, to the estaminets and lunch restaurants and was told that the Frenchmen who eat there did not feel the shortage caused by the war to any degree comparable with what our nation has to experience. The average French citizen too can still buy everything he wishes.

(Interruption: This is still more so in small places!)

Yes. Moreover, the Frenchman can pay for what he can get. Therefore he has no reason for wishing to go to Germany in order to get better food. This unfortunately is the case.

MILCH: Is there nothing we can do? True, we might not be able to control the distribution to the customer, but we ought to be able to intervene at an earlier stage of distribution.

KOERNER: We have requested from France really immense amounts of food; these requests have always been fulfilled; often after some pressure, but they have been fulfilled.

MILCH: But there is a simple remedy, let us cease supplying the troops from Germany, but tell them to provide the food for themselves from France. Then in a few weeks they will have everything eaten up, and then we can start distributing the food to the Frenchmen.

KOERNER: In France there still is for the time being a rationing system. The Frenchmen had his ration card on which he receives the minimum. The rest he provides in other ways, partly by receiving food parcels which we cannot touch at all. Every year we increase our food demands to the French Government who always satisfied them, though very frequently yielding to pressure, and in proportion to the harvest results, were they good or bad. In Italy the situation is that food is not rationed at all. The Italian can buy and eat what he wants, and since an Italian always has money and deals in the black market, he is in a much better situation than our German worker who practically has nothing but what he gets on his card.

MILCH: But don’t we even send food to Italy?

KOERNER: We are exchanging certain goods.

SAUCKEL: Moreover we are now at the point that the families of French and Italian workers are no longer in a better position owing to the money transfer if their bread-winning members are working in Germany than if they remain abroad; now nothing remains to induce them to go to Germany.

* * * * *

MILCH: Unfortunately, Reich Minister Speer is not present today. He certainly must have had an opinion about the whole system. His agreement with Bichelonne was to activate an additional labor supply in France itself for our armament with the aid of existing French capacities. We cannot compute the result here of what was achieved by that action. Whether the result he dreamed of has been achieved cannot be decided just yet; that is, have the S-plants given us an increase of armaments which is greater than what we would have achieved if the people had worked in Germany? I would propose that Minister Speer himself one day clarify this problem again. Because if only a negative result had been achieved, he would automatically change his point of view too.

The first question is: Is the percentage of trained people in the S-plants so great that all the others are to be regarded as rubbish? And the second question is: Is it possible at all, with the lack of so-called executive power and differing opinions on this question, to seize and transfer to Germany the remaining 80 percent who are not in the S-plants? So, in view of the general political and organizational conditions in France, would you be able to transfer some 10-15 percent of the best of these 80 percent?

SAUCKEL: I’ll have to get them.

MILCH: Can you do it at all?

SAUCKEL: Today I cannot promise anything. Today I can only do my work.

MILCH: I mean, in reference to the other 80 percent, if your hands are not tied by different circumstances, that first, there is nothing to attract these people to Germany; that second, they reckon with Germany’s defeat in a short time; that third, they are attached to their families and to their country; and that fourth, they shun work because they can still exist, and without it they look on the whole period as a period of transition. On the other hand you have the fact that the army does not assist you and that the German authorities are hostile to each other, a fact which is very cleverly utilized by the French.

SAUCKEL: That has changed since my last visit. All German authorities, the Military Commander, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, Field Marshal Sperrle, have supported me considerably in these affairs.

(MILCH: I refer to the smaller authorities, the executive ones.)

That has been spoiled—pardon me if I have to bring this up—because all departments, even armaments over there, were of the opinion up to 4 January, that my claims and, especially, my figures, were crazy.

(MILCH: But only people who could not understand such figures.)

Up to 4 January it was the same everywhere, from the military commander to the German Ambassador and the German armament departments. Up to then all the agencies in France had in general held the opinion: it has not been decided yet by any means, Sauckel’s figures are not correct, so we have to take it easy here. And that penetrated naturally down to the lower ranks of French authorities too.

MILCH: That is just what I mean about the differences of opinion between you and Minister Speer. You say: The best thing for me is to approach the protected industries; Speer says: Leave those people alone, take 80 percent away from the others. And if one is neutral, one has to say, always with the provision that these 20 percent in the S-plants really achieve something for us, Speer is right when he says: Please do not touch my 20 percent; there are enough among the 80 percent for your use. And now I say: Why do you not take the others? Is it so difficult to approach them?

SAUCKEL: No. I need the people as well. The fact is that Speer’s plants are filling up nowadays. For instance, I received the information the day before yesterday that the urge to work for the protected industries is especially strong in France just now and so the supply of skilled workers to Germany is practically cut off. Skilled workers can only be found in these plants.

KEHRL: May I explain briefly the opinion of my Minister? Otherwise the impression might be created that the measures taken by Minister Speer had been unclear or unreasonable, and I want to prevent this. Seen from our viewpoint, the situation is as follows: Up to the beginning of 1943 manufacturing for Germany was done in France only to a relatively modest extent, since generally only such work was transferred for which German capacity did not suffice; these were some few individual products, and moreover some basic industries. During all this time a great number of Frenchmen were recruited and voluntarily went to Germany.

(SAUCKEL: Some were recruited forcibly.)

The drafting started after the recruiting no longer yielded adequate results.

SAUCKEL: Out of the five million foreign workers who arrived in Germany, not even 200,000 came voluntarily.

KEHRL: Let us forget for the moment whether or not some slight pressure was used. Formally, at least, they were volunteers. After this recruitment no longer yielded satisfactory results, we started drafting according to age groups, and with regard to the first age group the success was rather good. Up to eighty percent of the age group were registered and sent to Germany. This started about June of last year. Following developments in the Russian war and the hopes raised thereby in the western nations, the results of this calling-up of age groups became considerably worse, as can be proved by the figures noted; viz., the men tried to dodge this call-up for transport to Germany, partly by simply not registering at all, partly by not arriving for the transport or by leaving the transport en route. When they found out through these first attempts during the months of July and August that the German executive either was not able or was not willing to catch these shirkers and either to imprison them or take them forcibly to Germany, the readiness to obey the call-ups sank to a minimum. Therefore, relatively small percentages were caught in individual countries. On the other hand, these men, moved by the fear the German executive might after all be able to catch them, did not enter French, Belgian, or Dutch factories, but took to the mountains where they found company and assistance from the small partisan groups there.

* * * * *

MILCH: Another question. Since now through the transfer of various industries so much is covered by French labor, as in the textile industry, etc., a corresponding number of German workers would necessarily become free as a result of that.

KEHRL: Then they will not be requisitioned here, though they would have been formerly.

TIMM: Nobody is going to be released. Probably other requests will be sent to the same factories.

SAUCKEL: In this respect I must also draw attention to the fact that the German factories which were shut down were much more up to date and probably worked with less personnel than the French factories.

MILCH: But we want all the factories to work for armaments.

KEHRL: That would also result in spreading the risk in case of air warfare.

MILCH: I believe the system to be good, as a still more severe commitment of workers for Germany would have the effect of making a considerable part of them remain over there for good. I wish you had something to back you up so you can have enough power to get it done. I do not think that anyone in France will enforce it.

SAUCKEL: But they will all right, if Germany goes at this thing the right way. It is not the insignificant French workman who should be punished, but the French policeman, who, instead of supplying people to Germany, goes to them beforehand and says: I’m coming tomorrow; you’d better get out. The French subordinate and intermediary authorities have to be punished.

MILCH: Even if Bichelonne and Laval have the best intention there will be resistance from the mayors, the gendarmes, and the prefects, just because these people are afraid that, first, they will be called to account afterwards for it, and, second, because of their patriotism, which makes them say: We must not work for the enemy of our country. Therefore, I would like to have an authority in our administration which would force these people to do it, because then the French could say: If you force us, we will do it, but voluntarily we will not do it. The same applies to Italy. There they say: Who knows who will win, whether it will be Mussolini or Badoglio or the King; only, if you force us, we are ready to do it. Therefore, we have to have something on our side which will exercise this pressure. I don’t see at all why big divisions should be necessary for this. The existing forces should be sufficient to accomplish it.

TIMM: I have the feeling that we are sticking too closely to the figures and are neglecting the qualitative side of the question. The present development may permit us to fulfill our programs with regard to figures, but in the demands made by the factories the important thing for them is to have so many metal workers, etc. Then we practically have to say: You will only get unskilled workers.

KEHRL: We realize that. The plants are getting unskilled workers, at the utmost it may be possible to obtain skilled workers by transferring plants from Italy to Germany.

SAUCKEL: Then in the course of the year the factories will declare: We cannot use these workers. And over against this you have the fact that in France we have a reservoir of unused skilled workers.

MILCH: I am not worrying about that. Naturally our plants will say: We want skilled workers. But they also need a certain number of unskilled workers.

TIMM: Will it not happen that the officers making the demands say one day: But we know that in the French plants there is an excess of skilled workers which cannot be justified?

MILCH: That should be discussed again later with Speer himself. First, Speer must have the proper perspective to see what has happened as the result of all his agreements.

I can imagine that first the _numerus clausus_ is introduced at once, so that the extent of the output in the S-plants is fixed, and that secondly it is decided later on that if a part of the S-plants has not worked properly after a certain period, they lose their protection again and the people from these plants can be transferred as a unit. I can foresee already now that in air armaments, part of the plants will turn out such bad production that I shall not be interested in keeping them up. So, protection for certain plants will simply be discontinued. And this will have a positive effect on the other plants, too, because they will say: If we don’t do our work properly, we shall be transferred. Now during the transfer it is necessary to see that people really do arrive and do not run away before or during the transfer. If a transport has left a town and has not arrived, 500 to 600 persons from this place must be arrested and sent to Germany as prisoners of war. Such a thing is then talked about everywhere. If actions like this and other similar ones are carried out often, they would exert a certain pressure. The whole thing would be made easier if we had control of food. The stuff offered by the black market has to come from a certain depot, and there we ought to cut in.

KEHRL: That is difficult. The transport of food by parcel post has taken on extraordinary proportions in France.

MILCH: If I were military commander, I would simply confiscate the whole of the parcel post!

* * * * *

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-D

EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT ON THE FIFTY-SIXTH CONFERENCE
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 4 APRIL 1944

The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan Central Planning Board Z.P. 18 Secr. St. Papers Pl. 030056