Chapter XXIV: Part 24

Mr. LAWSON. I was notified that there would be a trip, but that I would have more information on November 8; yes, sir; and I was given more information on November 8.

Mr. DULLES. And when was it in that period that you were notified that Dallas was to be visited?

Mr. LAWSON. On November 4.

Mr. DULLES. On November 4?

Mr. LAWSON. I was told that I would be going to Dallas, but they didn't know very many of the details yet and wouldn't until November 8.

Mr. STERN. Mr. Lawson, I show you a document marked for identification Commission No. 767. Can you identify that?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir; I can. It is my preliminary report for the Dallas trip.

Mr. STERN. And that was prepared when?

Mr. LAWSON. That was prepared in Dallas, late afternoon or early evening Tuesday, November 19, and sent to Washington by airplane.

Mr. STERN. Mr. Chairman, may this be admitted?

Mr. McCLOY. It may be admitted.

(Commission Exhibit No. 767 was received in evidence.)

Mr. STERN. I now show you a document marked for identification Commission No. 768. Can you identify that, Mr. Lawson?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir; that is a final survey report which I prepared upon my return from Dallas.

Mr. STERN. And that is the final report in this preliminary-final report arrangement----

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. Which you have described? And can you identify this additional document marked for identification Commission Exhibit No. 769?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir; this is a statement of the activities that I had, to the best of my knowledge, in connection with the Presidential visit to Dallas covering my activities only pertaining to the Dallas trip from November 4 through 21.

Mr. STERN. This, I take it, was not a routine report?

Mr. LAWSON. No, sir; it was not.

Mr. STERN. It was prepared because of what transpired at Dallas? Mr. Chairman, may we have admitted 768 and 769?

Mr. McCLOY. They may be admitted.

(Commission Exhibits Nos. 768 and 769 were received in evidence.)

Mr. STERN. Now, beginning November 8, can you tell us the preparations for your trip that you did here in Washington?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes. Acting on the instruction to come into the office on November 8 for the additional instructions that I had been told I would receive, Mr. Roy Kellerman, who is an assistant special agent in charge of the detail, gave myself and other members of the advance teams going out what information they had up to that time on their respective stops. Mr. Kellerman told me the name of Mr. Jack Puterbaugh, whom I would meet on an airplane taking the advance agents to Dallas the next week. I contacted the White House Communications Agency to see if they were sending a communications representative along to help out as they usually did, and was given his name. Mr. Kellerman gave me the name of a car contact in the Dallas area so that we would be able to obtain cars for the motorcade, which is normal.

Mr. STERN. These are cars, as I understand it----

Mr. LAWSON. For the Presidential party.

Mr. STERN. Furnished to you by----

Mr. LAWSON. The Ford Motor Co.

Mr. STERN. By people in the area that you visit----

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. For use during the visit of the President? Were you told anything about the assistance you would have in doing advance work for the Dallas trip?

Mr. LAWSON. Could you be more explicit, please?

Mr. STERN. Whether you would have another agent assigned to do the work with you?

Mr. LAWSON. Oh, yes. I had been told earlier, sometime between November 4 and 8, that another agent would be accompanying me, but, because of the Presidential trips which were occurring right at that time, that they would not be able to send out one at the same time, and he would have to join me later in Dallas after some of the other trips had been taken care of.

Mr. STERN. What were the usual arrangements as far as assignments?

Mr. LAWSON. Quite often two agents would go out at the same time; yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. And your responsibilities and those of this other agent when he joined you pertained only to Dallas; is that correct?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. You were not concerned with any other city in the President's route?

Mr. LAWSON. Not on that occasion; no, sir.

Mr. STERN. And each of those cities had its own advance agent or agents?

Mr. LAWSON. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. Doing the same work you were doing?

Mr. LAWSON. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. When, in fact, did the other agent join you?

Mr. LAWSON. On Monday evening. May I refer to the date of this?

Mr. STERN. Please.

Mr. LAWSON. November 18; Monday evening.

Mr. STERN. Now, what steps did you take in Washington before you left, with respect to determining the names and other information about persons who might be in the Dallas area and who might be regarded as potential threats to the President?

Mr. LAWSON. I went--on November 8, after leaving Mr. Kellerman's office, I went to the office in the Executive Office Building where our agents of the Protective Research Section are, and notified agents at that location that I was being assigned the advance for Dallas, Tex., trip, the date of this trip, and that I requested them to check their files and determine as to whether I should have the name of any individual in the Dallas area who was of record to us as an active subject.

Mr. STERN. Was this request made in writing?

Mr. LAWSON. It was oral, sir.

Mr. STERN. Is it usually made that way, orally? Do you ever make a written request?

Mr. LAWSON. I have never done so. I don't know about the other individuals.

Mr. STERN. What did they tell you?

Mr. LAWSON. I was told after waiting there a little while that there were no subjects of record in the Dallas area, of active PRS individuals that we would expect to harm the President.

Mr. STERN. And this check was made while you were present in the office?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Representative FORD. How long did it take, for example?

Mr. LAWSON. I believe I was there approximately 10 minutes. Not much more than 10 minutes, sir.

Representative FORD. In other words, they made this check on your behalf in that period of time?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Do you know how they went about it? Did you observe how they went about it?

Mr. LAWSON. In looking back I can recall the individuals going to certain files, but I have never worked in the PRS Section and I only know general information about it.

Representative FORD. You asked somebody to check on the names of people who might be a threat in Dallas?

Mr. LAWSON. That is correct, sir.

Representative FORD. And within a period of 10 minutes they came back and said there were no names?

Mr. LAWSON. That is right, sir.

Mr. DULLES. What was their answer again? I didn't quite clearly hear it when you said it the first time.

Mr. LAWSON. I don't believe I could give you an exact answer.

Mr. DULLES. In general what was your recollection?

Mr. LAWSON. There were no PRS subjects, active PRS subjects which would be a threat to the President to our knowledge in the Dallas area in the files.

Mr. DULLES. And would you define PRS?

Mr. LAWSON. Protective Research Section.

Mr. STERN. Was there a file that you yourself checked preliminary to your trip?

Mr. LAWSON. I don't believe so.

Mr. STERN. Not a file of individuals but a file that might be helpful to you in your advance work for Dallas?

Mr. LAWSON. We have files of past trips, some of President Eisenhower's. I am not sure how long ago they go back because they are probably taken out and put some place else periodically. But for example we have all of President Kennedy's trips right now plus President Johnson's current ones, and an agent could if he desired, if he was being assigned to a city, go and see if the President had been there recently, and look in that for names or perhaps if he was going to the same hotel or something, this would give him names of people to contact there. He might obtain information. There was no report on Dallas for President Kennedy.

Mr. STERN. You checked?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. And found no report. This file would contain the reports such as your final report which we have marked "768," is that right?

Mr. LAWSON. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. There was nothing in there----

Mr. LAWSON. No, sir.

Mr. STERN. Reflecting any recent trip to the Dallas area?

Mr. LAWSON. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. Did anything else transpire before you left for Dallas as far as advance preparation?

Mr. LAWSON. I picked up paraphernalia that we use, sometimes more than other times depending on the type of trip it is. If there is to be a motorcade as there is in this case, we usually get car numbers for the windows and some identification pins for people who will not have identification supplied by a local committee, and other paraphernalia of this type, and I obtained those and took them with me.

Mr. STERN. Did anything else happen before you left for Dallas?

Mr. LAWSON. I called the Dallas office, the agent in charge was not in, and talked to another agent, told him that I was coming down with other agents on the Texas trip and would be dropped off at approximately 7:30 on the evening, Tuesday evening, of the next week, and----

Mr. STERN. What was the date?

Mr. LAWSON. I believe that is the 12th of November. That Mr. Puterbaugh and Chief Warrant Officer Bales from the Communications Agency, White House, would be accompanying me, and would they make arrangements to please have us met at the airport and for rooms. And then dictated a confirming memo before I left on the eighth.

Representative FORD. Did you have any other contacts with PRS other than this one?

Mr. LAWSON. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. STERN. You then went to Dallas on November 12?

Mr. LAWSON. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. What did you do in Dallas from the time of your arrival in connection with trying to learn about people who might be potentially dangerous to the President?

Mr. LAWSON. I was aware of the so-called Stevenson incident and so I didn't have to be told that there.

Mr. STERN. How did you become aware of that?

Mr. LAWSON. I had read it in the paper, and so without making inquiries I was aware of that when I went there.

Mr. STERN. You received no specific advice about that from PRS?

Mr. LAWSON. No, sir; I was aware of this fact. And then of course it was after I arrived there people were talking about it also. And although to my knowledge none of the people involved in that particular incident had threatened the President or were known to us as threatening the President, I asked Agent Howlett if he would view some films of this incident that I understood one of the local TV stations had.

I was informed of this by a local executive of the local paper who was on the host committee, that they had such films. And Agent Howlett did view these and had some still shots made of these individuals, although we still did not know that they were against President Kennedy or might harm him in any way. This was an extra on my part. I had asked Agent Howlett if he had any contact with any individuals, informants in the area that he might have, that the office might have about rightwing elements and what they might do, and was told that prior to my arrival in Dallas they had received some information on some rightwing activity, and that an investigation had been made, and that he also had talked to an informant or two I believe. But to their knowledge there was nothing in the radical-type rightwing movement so-called in the Dallas area that they knew of that was going to harm President Kennedy.

Mr. STERN. Did anything else occur? Did you have any discussions of this problem with the local police?

Mr. LAWSON. We talked with the local police on many occasions as to what would happen if there were demonstrations, pickets and so forth, if they knew of any activity, and I believe S. A. Howlett from the Dallas office did the same thing. The papers, the newspapers in Dallas had a few articles on how watchful the police were going to be of the crowd, with particular emphasis on disturbances or pickets, and some of the local committee, host committee, as well as some of the local political groups in the area were worried that perhaps the police would be overzealous in controlling picketing or disturbances, and asked me if I could find out just what the police were planning to do in this event, that there were some wild rumors as to just what the police were going to do. And because we like to have our local Agents who have to work with the police in these areas maintain the liaison I asked Mr. Sorrels if he would contact the chief of police and find out exactly what they planned to do in relation to picketing, and discussed the new ordinance that had been passed on the Monday, November 18 I believe it is, prior to the President's visit. And we were told that the police would accept peaceful picketing, but that the new ordinance was strictly to give them some power to act if pickets or individuals were interfering with lawful assembled groups, if they were trying to make noise to drown out people who were bona fide speakers at lawful groups, or if they were trying to interfere with any person entering or departing a lawful assembly.

Mr. STERN. Did anything occur in connection with a circular that was being circulated at the time?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes sir; I learned of a circular which had been distributed in various parts of the city, blue in color with President Kennedy's picture on it, and a list of grievances against him called treasonist to the United States. I was given a copy of the circular in the police chief's office, and requested Mr. Sorrels, our local agent in charge--he had received a copy of this circular, and I asked him to check with the district attorney's office, the Federal district attorney, to see if it was against the Federal law. At quick reading myself it didn't look like it was a violation of Federal law but I was in no position to judge it, and I could see no direct threat.

Mr. DULLES. What Federal law did you have in mind then?

Mr. LAWSON. Under our jurisdiction, sir, of protection of the President and investigation of letters or other threats in connection to the President.

Mr. DULLES. This circular that you referred to is this the advertisement in the papers?

Mr. LAWSON. No.

Mr. DULLES. Was this something different?

Mr. LAWSON. I never saw the advertisement in the paper the morning of the 22d, and the first knowledge I had of that particular advertisement was after I had returned from Dallas.

(Discussion off the record.)

Representative FORD. What page?

Mr. STERN. Exhibit 4 to the attachment of exhibits.

Mr. Lawson, I show you a one-page document marked "Commission Exhibit No. 770" for identification with two photographs of President Kennedy, and the title "Wanted for Treason." Is this a copy, a photograph of the circular you have been describing?

Mr. LAWSON. It is, sir.

Mr. STERN. May it be admitted?

Mr. McCLOY. It may be admitted.

(Commission Exhibit No. 770 was received in evidence.)

Mr. STERN. The newspaper advertisement was a series of questions addressed to President Kennedy asking why he had done certain things.

Mr. DULLES. I remember seeing it. Have you any idea as to the number of these circulars that were distributed, any estimate?

Mr. LAWSON. No sir; I have no idea how many were put out. They appeared in certain sections of the city I was told. The police told me they had no idea who had put them out or when they had been put out, and Mr. Sorrels said that some had been brought over to his office by the FBI, which is how he had known about it, and that neither he nor they knew the source of them.

Mr. DULLES. And nobody was apprehended or seen in the act of circulating these.

Mr. LAWSON. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. DULLES. By any authority as far as you know?

Mr. LAWSON. That is right.

Mr. STERN. In respect to questions like what steps are taken to assure the security of the President on the trip and how to work out liaison arrangements with local Federal and municipal authorities, what is your understanding of the division of responsibility between yourself as the advance agent and the head of the local Secret Service office?

Mr. LAWSON. The advance agent who goes out from Washington is responsible for the overall stop, for making the advance arrangements, and on the day of the movement would have authority over the other agents at the stop already or the agents accompanying the President, and of course the agent in charge of the detail coming from Washington would also have authority naturally over the agents.

However, he is just arriving in the city probably for the first time, and the advance agent would have certain knowledge about certain events and would have more authority than he does in certain respects or he would ask his advice. So that there is a boss over the agents which would be the advance agent and also the gentleman in charge of the detail coming from Washington. The local agent in charge of the local office assists the advance agent in all of his arrangements in the territory that is to be visited, and the local agent in charge conducts such investigations to assist the advance agent, and the local agent in charge would be in charge of any liaison with local officials, local police officials.

Mr. STERN. Insofar as the concern is for persons who might be dangerous or threatening to the President, the agent in charge of the Dallas office would be responsible for liaison arrangements with local authorities but you ultimately would be responsible as the delegate of the head of the White House detail, for decisions as to what steps should be taken?

Mr. LAWSON. That is correct.

Mr. DULLES. What police powers, if any, can you exercise in that situation in a sovereign State?

Mr. LAWSON. I believe the actual police powers as such would only be in the event of actual knowledge of a threat on the President's life, anything that we have jurisdiction of. If we hear of an oral threat or see a written threat on the life of the President or see someone attempt to take his life, this is our jurisdiction, and we would be able to act as such.

Mr. DULLES. You could effect an arrest.

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir; however, anything which would fall under the jurisdiction of the local police such as firearms laws or picketing laws or disturbances or anything like that we have to depend upon the local police to use their jurisdiction.

Mr. McCLOY. Suppose the President is shot and you apprehend the murderer. Can you arrest him and put him into custody?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir; I could arrest him for the shooting of the President, but it is my understanding actually for the murder, no, but because he tried to take the life of the President I could.

Mr. McCLOY. I understand there may be some question, there is a gap in the law there that it fits no Federal crime.

Mr. LAWSON. I will have to refer to counsel here as to just where it stops, when it becomes murder actually where we have no jurisdiction, and an attempt on the life of the President.

Mr. DULLES. Let's take a less-clear case. If you suspected Mr. X was a man who was going to interfere with the President, although he had committed no overt act, could you move in then or would you call upon the local police?

Mr. LAWSON. If he was a suspect, sir, and we had a belief that he might try to harm the President while he was in Dallas, I would try to assign a Secret Service agent in conjunction with local police authorities, to watch him. If it was a function where it was by invitation only or there was some kind of control as to how the people got in, you would make sure that he did not get in because you were watchful of the ticketholders, et cetera.

However the function was to be handled; if it was a ball park where anyone could buy a ticket to go in, then we would just have to have the man watched, or perhaps the local police themselves somehow could keep him from going to that ball park. But I as an agent could not.

Mr. DULLES. Even if the President were in attendance in the ball park?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir; unless there was some reason that I could have him arrested, I would not be able to do so. But I would have him watched if I knew that there might be a threat.

Mr. DULLES. Am I asking questions that should go to counsel?

Mr. SMITH. I don't have any disagreement with what Agent Lawson has said so far.

Mr. DULLES. Is there not some confusion of jurisdiction though here?

Mr. McCLOY. Isn't the panel studying this?

Mr. STERN. We are.

Mr. McCLOY. That is what I thought. The panel is working on the law.

Mr. DULLES. You are working on the law?

Mr. STERN. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. You have got all the evidence that you want?

Mr. STERN. Yes; and there is a large area where Federal jurisdiction does not exist except on some strained theory of conspiracy. There is no substantive Federal jurisdiction with respect to great areas.

Mr. LAWSON. Might I add one thing please. The White House detail agents are supposed to protect the life of the President wherever he is. If there is a shot from the crowd or something happens, whether the President is hit or not, get him away, get him out, and still protect him. However, if you were riding on a car and actually saw someone do something, and you were able to get to that individual, you would then hold that person. But a White House detail agent would not drop the President and then go look for someone who might have tried to harm him at the time that he is there. That is not our function.

Mr. STERN. Turning now to the question of the motorcade route, Mr. Lawson, what can you tell us about how that was selected?

Mr. LAWSON. On November 8 when Mr. Kellerman was giving me some of the information on the proposed trip to Dallas, all of the advance agents for the respective stops were given the current itinerary as prepared by the White House staff for their stops, and for the Dallas stop there was a 45 minute time lapse from the time the President landed at the airport until the time that he attended the luncheon, and at the time that I left Washington, it had not been decided whether he would attend this luncheon at the Trade Mart where it later was planned to have it, or at the Women's Building on the Fair Grounds. And this figured a great deal in the parade route, the 45 minutes.

Mr. STERN. The 45 minute time interval?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. Was established for you by the White House?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. And were you specifically instructed to prepare a parade route or was this your reaction to the time lag?

Mr. LAWSON. This is my function. I wasn't specifically asked to, but this would be the function of the advance agent.

Mr. STERN. Were you instructed that there would be a motorcade?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. And that is what this 45 minutes was for?

Mr. LAWSON. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. How was the actual route determined then once the Trade Mart had been selected as the site for the luncheon?

Mr. LAWSON. Various routes were under consideration. We could have gone from the airport direct to the Trade Mart the way that we should have returned, the 4-mile route returning from the Trade Mart to the airport, or we could have taken a city street-type route all the way downtown and all the way back, or we could have taken a freeway downtown and a freeway back.

But the route that was chosen was chosen because it was the consensus of opinion that it was probably the best route under the circumstances. It allowed us 45 minutes to go from the airport to the Trade Mart at the speed that I figured the President would go from past experience with him in advances, and as a regular working agent riding in a followup car.

It allowed us to go downtown, which was wanted back in Washington, D.C. It afforded us wide streets most of the way, because of the buses that were in the motorcade. It afforded us a chance to have alternative routes if something happened on the motorcade route. It was the type of suburban area a good part of the way where the crowds would be able to be controlled for a great distance, and we figured that the largest crowds would be downtown, which they were, and that the wide streets that we would use downtown would be of sufficient width to keep the public out of our way. Prime consideration in a motorcade is to make sure the President isn't stopped unless he plans it himself. You must have room to maneuver, alternative routes to turn off from, room for buses and so forth, and particularly room to keep the public out of the street.

Mr. STERN. What was the extent of your review of the parade route with the local police?

Mr. LAWSON. With the local police I went over the entire route on one occasion, went to the various stops at other times and so actually did parts of the route at that time, the part of the route which would be near the stop like the airport and the Trade Mart. But the actual route I went over with two police officers from the Dallas Police Department.

Mr. McCLOY. By went over you mean you actually drove along the entire route?

Mr. LAWSON. We drove it sir, with them taking notes, and them making suggestions and Mr. Sorrels and I making suggestions.

Mr. STERN. To what extent did they actually participate in the decision that this be the route?

Mr. LAWSON. They were asked their advice on possible routes that you could go to the Trade Mart.

Mr. STERN. And they had no disagreement with the route----

Mr. LAWSON. No, sir.

Mr. STERN. That was actually selected, no criticism of it? What arrangements did you make with the Dallas police for security along the route, starting from Love Field and getting to the Trade Mart?

Mr. LAWSON. A good deal of it was traffic control, both to keep people out of our path as the motorcade progressed so that they would have at least the major intersections covered and as many of the other ones as possible. Those which were not, all intersections that were not able to be controlled physically by a policeman or more than one policeman were to be controlled by motorcycles that would hop-skip the motorcade, or other police vehicles in the motorcade.

At certain times certain intersections were to be cutoff as we proceeded so that it would allow time for any traffic ahead of us to clear the area before we arrived there. Where it was felt from past experience and the type of area that we were passing through there would be large crowds, more police were requested for along the route, and on the routes.

Mr. STERN. Foot policemen or motorcycle patrolmen?

Mr. LAWSON. Both, sir. They were requested at the corners to have more than one policeman, so that there would be policemen for watching the crowd and controlling the crowd, and other policemen who would have jurisdiction over the traffic in the area, so that someone wouldn't be watching the crowd and a car going by him or vice versa. We saw the underpasses or overpasses or bridges that were on the route, and they were requested to have officers, depending on the type of installation there that I just mentioned, the type that it was, either under it or over it, on the underpasses. The railroad lines were checked and here was no rail traffic of a scheduled nature over the two rail crossings that we would pass, none on the way in but two on the way out.

However, just to make sure that a switch engine or other trains wouldn't come along about the time we were due there, and then stop the President's motorcade, why we had police stationed at the railroad crossings that were on the same level as the road.

Mr. STERN. What were the instructions that you asked be given to the police who were stationed on overpasses and railroad crossings?

Mr. LAWSON. They were requested to keep the people to the sides of the bridge or the overpass so that--or underpass--so that people viewing from a vantage point like that would not be directly over the President's car so that they could either inadvertently knock something off or drop something on purpose or do some other kind of harm.

Mr. STERN. This is all people, not just outside members of the public?

Mr. LAWSON. Any citizen that was trying to view the motorcade, they were to be kept from right directly over the President's car, if it was a bridge or an underpass.

Mr. STERN. What about the deployment of police on rooftops of buildings at any point along the route?

Mr. LAWSON. We had--police were requested at points where I knew that the President would be out of the car for any length of time.

Mr. STERN. And where was that?

Mr. LAWSON. At the Trade Mart and at the airport.

Mr. McCLOY. May I interrupt at this point. During the course of the motorcade while the motorcade was in motion, no matter how slowly, you had no provision for anyone on the roofs?

Mr. LAWSON. No, sir.

Mr. McCLOY. Or no one to watch the windows?

Mr. LAWSON. Oh, yes. The police along the area were to watch the crowds and their general area. The agents riding in the followup car as well as myself in the lead car were watching the crowds and the windows and the rooftops as we progressed.

Mr. McCLOY. It was part of your routine duties when you were going through a street in any city, to look at the windows as well as the crowds?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir; and if the President's car slowed to such a point or the crowd ever pressed in to such a point that people are getting too close to the President, the agents always get out and go along the car.

Mr. STERN. Perhaps you had better describe the vehicles and passengers in the motorcade beginning with the pilot car and going, say, through the Vice Presidential followup car.

Mr. LAWSON. At one time I could have probably listed them all by name.

Mr. STERN. No, not their names, but the vehicle order.

Mr. LAWSON. The vehicle itself, yes sir.

Mr. STERN. And the agents, the number of agents.

Mr. LAWSON. And the function of the vehicle.

Mr. STERN. And the function of the vehicle and the responsibility of the agents in the vehicle.

Mr. LAWSON. Yes sir. This varies, but in a usual motorcade, as in this particular instance, there is what we call a pilot car. This is usually a local police car that precedes the motorcade some distance, depending on the crowd. It would usually precede it by at least a quarter of a mile. This is to see if there is any kind of a disturbance up ahead far enough so that we are able to take an alternate route if the need arises. It being a police car, it has radio communications with the whole network of the police and also the police at the stops, the ones we have just left and the particular function like the Trade Mart or airport that we are going to.

In this car ride a few command officers of the local police department, and it is their job to make sure that the traffic is stopped as it was planned to be, look out for any disturbances, and in general be a front guard for the motorcade.

Mr. McCLOY. Do you have a communications system with the Secret Service agents for this pilot car?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir; because the next car in the motorcade is what we call a lead car and it is actually a rolling command car. We try to have a command officer from every jurisdiction of police with a radio net of their own in that vehicle. Sometimes if you are in an area where there are State police and local police and sheriff's and quite a few jurisdictions, where it is a long motorcade and you are going through various counties you are not able to have a command officer of every jurisdiction in that.

But in Dallas the lead ear, the car that I was in directly ahead of the President was a police car, and of course it had a radio that was in contact with the pilot car and any other radio on the police net. In addition to that, I had a portable radio on the Secret Service White House network.

Mr. McCLOY. Was there a Secret Service agent riding in the pilot car?

Mr. LAWSON. No sir; there was not.

Mr. McCLOY. The first Secret Service agent was----

Mr. LAWSON. In the lead car.

Mr. McCLOY. Was in the lead car. I don't know whether you want to--I have got to leave. Are you going to ask why they didn't go down Main Street?

Mr. STERN. Yes.

Mr. McCLOY. Take care of that. The suggestion was made yesterday--you are going to cover that?

(Discussion off the record.)

Representative FORD. I would like if I might to follow up with a question which you asked a minute ago on the record. As I recall your testimony, Mr. Lawson, you indicated that the police who were assigned along the route had the responsibility to check windows and the crowd. Is that what you indicated?

Mr. LAWSON. And also the agents as they went by; yes sir. It wouldn't be just a police responsibility; no, sir.

Representative FORD. How did the police know they had that responsibility?

Mr. LAWSON. In our police meetings, of which we had three or four listed in here, we talked about crowd control and watching the crowd, and of course the agents just do that anyway. That is part of their function. And in the newspaper accounts it said how watchful the police were going to be of all kinds of activity, and actually they requested public assistance, as I recall it, anyone that noticed anything unusual they had asked that they notify the police.

Representative FORD. When you meet with police officials, in this case Chief Curry, Sheriff Decker, and who else, is this clearly laid out that the members of their organization have the specific responsibility of checking windows? Do you followup to see whether this is actually put in writing to the members of the police force, and the Sheriff's department?

Mr. LAWSON. No, sir; I do not followup to see if it was put in writing.

Mr. DULLES. You mean an external check don't you? You don't mean going through each building?

Representative FORD. No. As I understood it, policemen have the responsibility to check windows and to look at the crowd, and I was just wondering whether there is any followup to be sure that the chief of police and the sheriff or anybody else actually makes this specific communication to the people in their organizations.

Mr. LAWSON. In this particular instance there was not. Sometimes on my own advances I have received copies of police directives. Sometimes this is covered and sometimes there are other directives. This is not normal though. It is just that the police say "Here is a copy of one of our orders." Sometimes it is the posting of police, sometimes it is that. In Berlin where I was assisting on an advance for President Kennedy's trip in June, we received all kinds of information of this type, even to the fact where the police had requested anyone to notify them of anyone that tried to gain entry into their room that didn't belong there, if it was a business office or if it was a private home or if all of a sudden they discovered they had a friend that they never knew they had before and all that. But this is not always done.

Mr. McCLOY. I want to get it clear. In your presence, in the instructions to the police in Dallas, did you tell the police to keep their eye on windows as you went along?

Mr. LAWSON. I cannot say definitely that I told the police to watch windows. I usually do. On this particular case I cannot say whether I definitely said that. I believe I did, but I would not swear to the fact that I said watch all the windows.

Mr. McCLOY. I have heard it rumored that there was a general routine in the Secret Service that when you were going through in a motorcade or by car, that the problem of watching windows was so great that you didn't do it. It was only as you came to a stop that it was the standing instructions that then roofs should be watched and places of advantage would be inspected or looked at. Is that true?

Mr. LAWSON. No, sir; the agents in the motorcade are to watch the route and the rooftops and the windows as they can. Of course there were thousands of windows there, over 20,000 I believe on that motorcade. But agents are supposed to watch as they go along.

Representative FORD. An advance agent such as yourself goes to talk with local police officials?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Do you have a checklist? Do you have a procedure in writing that you hand to a local law enforcement agent so that he is clear as to the responsibilities of himself and his people?

Mr. LAWSON. No, sir; I have no checklist, although myself I have a number of things that I have marked down from past advances and seeing what other individuals do that I usually try to follow.

However, every situation is so different. Sometimes there are motorcades and sometimes there are not, and it just wouldn't fit every situation.

Representative FORD. But there is no specific list of instructions that the Secret Service gives to a local law enforcement agency?

Mr. LAWSON. No.

Representative FORD. At the time of the Presidential visit?

Mr. LAWSON. No.

Representative FORD. Do you think that it would be helpful?

Mr. LAWSON. It would be helpful in a general way. And it could be augmented to fit the situation.

Representative FORD. In other words, if you had general instructions you could give those to the local law enforcement people, and as you say, for special circumstances, or different circumstances, you could augment them at the scene?

Mr. LAWSON. I believe it would be helpful. For example, I know that New York police have, because we were up there so often, and I just returned from there yesterday, they have a checklist of their own in the police meetings with the Secret Service that they go over, what time the arrival is, where he is going to be met, is it a motorcade, is it a helicopter, et cetera. But still there are many more things that should be in there.

Representative FORD. But I would think for every Presidential visit there would be certain mandatory things that would have to be done, areas of responsibility of Federal officials, areas of responsibility for local officials.

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Such a memorandum or checklist I should think would be helpful in defining the areas of responsibility, being certain that there is no misunderstanding as to whose responsibility it is for A, B, C, or D operations.

Mr. LAWSON. I agree.

Mr. STERN. Were any arrangements made to inspect buildings along the parade route?

Mr. LAWSON. No, sir; other than those buildings that we were stopping at.

Mr. STERN. And this would be?

Mr. LAWSON. The Trade Mart.

Mr. STERN. And Love Field?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Is it recognized in your business, if it is a fact, that a building that affords a window that looks down parallel with the motorcade is an unusually vulnerable point? Do you get the trend of my question?

Mr. McCLOY. Parallel rather that at right angles?

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. LAWSON. I know that there are some windows that are more vulnerable than others, let's say.

Mr. DULLES. That give a more vulnerable point of attack?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir; if you were going in a motorcade at 50 or 60 miles an hour and then all of sudden there was some reason why something narrowed down and you had to slow up or you knew there was going to be a big crowd here and the President would probably slow his vehicle like he usually did for big crowds and stand up and wave, then you would be more concerned about those windows in that area than other areas. This motorcade to my knowledge, we went 15 or 20 miles an hour through most of it except the downtown section at about 7 or 10.

Mr. McCLOY. 10 or 7 did you say?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir; 7 to 10 miles an hour.

Mr. DULLES. In this case I assume that if anyone had been looking at windows, the car that would have seen the rifle and the man would have been a car several cars back from the President's car, is that not correct?

Mr. McCLOY. It might have been the other.

Representative FORD. The testimony of one of these young men that we had, if it is accurate, I would have thought that the lead car might have seen the Book Depository.

Mr. STERN. We will hear testimony from another passenger in the lead car, Mr. Sorrels, who was in charge of the Dallas Secret Service Office, that as the car turned from Houston onto Elm, he saw people in the windows of the School Book Depository Building. He cannot recall seeing anyone on the sixth floor, and it is more likely that he saw people on the fifth floor from his descriptions. He saw some Negro employees. But he could see from the lead car people in the Book Depository Building as it came in view around the corner.

Mr. McCLOY. Did you see anybody in the School Book Depository?

Mr. LAWSON. No, sir; at this point just as we started around that corner I asked Chief Curry if it was not true that we were probably 5 minutes from the Trade Mart, and it is quite usual to make a radio call to your next point of stop that you are 5 minutes away. Therefore right about the time we turned that corner and were a little ways past it, I am sure I was speaking on the radio, because the White House Communications Agency has about the time I gave the 5 minutes away warning signal, and within seconds after that the shots were fired.

Representative FORD. As you came or as the lead car came down Houston Street----

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. You were facing the Texas School Depository?

Mr. LAWSON. Right.

Representative FORD. Did you look at or scan that building?

Mr. LAWSON. I do not, no, because part of my job is to look backwards at the President's car. The speed of the motorcade is controlled by the President's car, unless is it is an emergency situation. If he stands up and is waving at the crowd and there are quite a few crowds then, of course, the car goes slower. If the density of the crowd is quite scarce or there is a time factor why you are going faster. So the person in the lead car in this rolling command car usually keeps turning around and watching the President's car. If his car comes up on our bumper that means we are not going fast enough and we should go faster, and you tell the command officer to call the motorcycles, the pilot car, et cetera, to move out faster. If you notice that his car is dropping back from you, that means their car wants to go slower and you do the same thing in reverse. So I was watching the crowds along the sides, requesting Chief Curry to move motorcycles up or back, depending on the crowd, move them up towards the President's car because at certain times people were almost out to the car, and to use them as kind of a wedge. Other times they were able to drop back or go forward, so that I was looking back a good deal of the time, watching his car, watching the sides, watching the crowds, giving advice or asking advice from the Chief and also looking ahead to the known hazards like overpasses, underpasses, railroads, et cetera.

Representative FORD. But as the lead car turned from Main onto Houston and proceeded toward Elm, you were more preoccupied with looking at the President?

Mr. LAWSON. I don't know whether I was looking sideways or backwards then, but I do recall noticing the Book Depository Building and that corner and then deciding that we must be about 5 minutes away, and asking Chief Curry if this was not so and then making a radio broadcast.

Representative FORD. So as you drove down Houston Street, you didn't have an opportunity to look at the Texas School Depository?

Mr. LAWSON. I may have, but I don't remember if I saw this. I was doing so many things all at once.

Representative FORD. What was Sorrels' responsibility at this point?

Mr. LAWSON. His responsibility would be again to watch the crowds and the windows a little bit more than I because it was my responsibility to be watching the Presidential car.

Mr. STERN. He was sitting in the rear right, was he not?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir; and I was in the right front.

Representative FORD. He didn't have the responsibility of looking back like you did?

Mr. LAWSON. Not as much as I would have; no, sir.

Representative FORD. In light of the problem of trying to have individuals in numerous buildings, inspecting the buildings and so forth, is it desirable to have more people in another car ahead of the lead car for the purpose of scanning buildings?

Mr. LAWSON. Giving a personal opinion now, I would say that that would be a good factor. However, if someone stayed back from the window until you went by and then stuck his gun out the window, why it might not be as good.

Representative FORD. It wouldn't be any worse.

Mr. LAWSON. No, sir; but if they did see something that wasn't a likely occurrence, then they could broadcast over the radio stop the President or turn right or turn left.

Representative FORD. But as I understand your responsibilities in the lead car, it doesn't appear that you had an opportunity to do the scanning?

Mr. LAWSON. No, sir.

Representative FORD. Which was necessary.

Mr. LAWSON. No, sir; I would not.

Representative FORD. So you are really left up to one individual in the lead car in the Secret Service for that purpose?

Mr. LAWSON. Yes.

Representative FORD. I raise the question whether that is adequate for the overall purpose.

Mr. SMITH. Sir, I don't want to interfere with the procedures but could I ask a question off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. McCLOY. I think you might go on the record with this. There has been some question as to whether we are referring directly only to the lead car or whether to all the personnel in the cavalcade. I gather, Mr. Ford, you were referring to the personnel in the lead car as distinguished from the other Secret Service personnel and other police in the motorcade as a whole?

Representative FORD. That is correct. I am cognizant of the fact we have a followup car. What are the responsibilities of those in the followup car?

Mr. McCLOY. By followup car do you mean the President's car because there will be Secret Service men in the President's car too?

Representative FORD. There was only one on this occasion, or two, the driver and Mr. Kellerman. The driver was certainly preoccupied, and as I remember Mr. Kellerman's testimony, he was so engaged he didn't have an opportunity to do the kind of scanning that would appear to be necessary. So whatever scanning there was done by either the lead car or the Presidential car or the followup car primarily had to be done by the people in the followup car. Is that a fair analysis?

Mr. LAWSON. I don't recall if you mentioned the pilot car, but they would have had an opportunity in the pilot car to do some scanning.

Representative FORD. But there are no Secret Service people there.

Mr. LAWSON. No Secret Service people in that one.

Mr. McCLOY. There would be Secret Service men in the Vice Presidential car, and of course there is the Secret Service car that follows the Presidential car, all through the route there are interspersed Secret Service men.

Mr. DULLES. It must have been the third or fourth or fifth car in the motorcade that was right opposite the window at the time the assassin put the rifle well out of the window and shot.

Mr. McCLOY. Why do you say that?

Mr. DULLES. The shooting took place when the President's car was somewhere here (indicating to photograph of scene). It had made the turn, you see. Here is the building. Now there is the window up here roughly. He didn't shoot here. They went around the turn and were down here. There was a barricade there. There was something there that obstructed the view you will remember.

Mr. McCLOY. That is the sign here like this.

Mr. DULLES. It would be down that far.

Mr. McCLOY. It might have been there.

Mr. DULLES. As close as that? Whatever it was, the car that was right opposite the window and going in this direction at that time must have been the fourth or fifth car--the car which had the best view of the assassination. You wouldn't be looking I shouldn't think, if you were in a car here, you wouldn't be looking back there. You would be looking off here and off here for protection.

I should think that car in this strange situation, where he was shooting right down the street--isn't that correct? I don't know if you have ever followed that up. I don't know what car it is. It is some car along here, though, that would have been right opposite the window at the time the shooting took place, not one of the lead cars or the President's car.

Mr. STERN. By these cars you mean, sir----

Mr. DULLES. In the motorcade. Some of these down here. It might have been even the wire services or the press cars. I don't know how many cars but I think from our photographs we ought to be able to identify that.

Representative FORD. A man named Jackson who was a photographer in one of the cars with photographers is an individual who identified the fact that somebody was in that window with a rifle as I recall.

Mr. DULLES. He was in one of the press cars was he?

Representative FORD. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. The wire service car is the seventh car including the lead police vehicle. Well, the lead car, if you count the lead car, six, the sixth car.

Representative FORD. He testified as I recall that the car in which he was--was halfway down the block between Main and Elm at the time that he looked up and saw the building and saw people in windows.

Mr. DULLES. This is Houston and this is Elm. Houston and Elm isn't it, not Main. Main and Elm, or yes.