Chapter X: Section 14: of the Lever Bill, which became the Food Control (2)

Arms (small)--Plants engaged in manufacturing small arms for
the United States Government and the Allies.

Army and Navy cantonments and camps.

Chemicals--Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing chemicals.

Coke plants.

Domestic consumers.

Electrical equipment--Plants manufacturing same.

Electrodes--Plants producing electrodes.

Explosives--Plants manufacturing explosives.

Farm implements--Manufacturers exclusively of agricultural
implements and farm-operating Equipment.

Feed--Plants producing feed.

Ferro-alloys--Plants producing same.

Fertilizers--Manufacturers of fertilizers.

Fire brick--Plants producing same exclusively.

Food--Plants manufacturing, milling, preparing, refining,
preserving, and wholesaling food for human consumption.

Food containers--Manufacturers of tin and glass containers and
manufacturers exclusively of other food containers.

Gas--Gas-producing plants.

Guns (large)--Plants manufacturing same.

Hemp, jute, and cotton bags--Plants manufacturing exclusively
hemp, jute, and cotton bags.

Insecticides--Manufacturers exclusively of insecticides and
fungicides.

Iron and steel--Blast furnaces and foundries.

Laundries.

Machine tools--Plants manufacturing machine tools.

Mines.

Mines--Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing mining tools
and equipment.

Newspapers and periodicals--Plants printing and publishing
exclusively newspapers and periodicals.

Oil--Refineries of both mineral and vegetable oils.

Oil production--Plants manufacturing exclusively oil-well
equipment.

Public institutions and buildings.

Public utilities.

Railways--Plants manufacturing locomotives, freight cars and
rails, and other plants engaged exclusively in manufacture of
railway supplies.

Refrigeration--Refrigeration for food and exclusive
ice-producing plants.

Seeds--Producers or wholesalers of seeds (except flower seeds).

Ships (bunker coal)--Not including pleasure craft.

Ships--Plants engaged exclusively in building ships (not
including pleasure craft) or in manufacturing exclusively
supplies and equipment therefor.

Soap--Manufacturers of soap.

Steel--Steel plants and rolling mills.

Tanners--Tanning plants, save for patent leather.

Tanning extracts--Plants manufacturing tanning extracts.

Tin plate--Manufacturers of tin plate.

Twine (binder) and rope--Plants producing exclusively binder
twine and rope.

CIVIL WAR CONDITIONS

During the war period labor was much better off than during the Civil War epoch. The New York _World_ presented the following table from the _Merchants' Magazine_ of December, 1864, showing the rise of prices during the Civil War era:

_1862_ _1864_

Copper, 100 lbs $22.00 @ $25.00 $41.00 @ $42.00 Coal, ton 4.50 @ 5.00 9.00 @ 10.00 Iron, pig 21.00 @ 25.00 48.00 @ 49.00 Lead, 100 lbs 6.50 @ 6.75 11.75 @ 12.00 Nails, 100 lbs 3.25 @ 3.75 6.00 @ 6.25 Ashes, pot bbl 5.50 @ 5.75 8.75 @ 8.87 Dry cod, cwt 3.37 @ 4.25 6.50 @ 7.00 Flour, bbl 4.50 @ 5.60 7.30 @ 7.35 Corn, 100 bush 58.50 @ 60.00 131.00 @ 134.00 Hay, 100 lbs .80 @ .85 1.35 @ 1.40 Wheat, bush 1.30 @ 1.45 1.63 @ 1.65 Hemp, cwt 10.00 @ 11.25 14.00 @ 16.12 Barley, bush .85 @ 1.00 1.35 @ 1.50 Oats, bush .37 @ .39 .90 @ .91 Hops, 100 lbs 14.00 @ 20.00 26.00 @ 33.00 Clover seed, 100 lbs 7.50 @ 7.75 12.50 @ 13.50 Lime, bbl .60 @ .65 1.25 @ 1.35 Oil, whale, gal .25 @ .35 .58 @ .60 Oil, coal, gal .48 @ .57 1.10 @ 1.12 Pork, bbl 13.25 @ 13.75 21.75 @ 23.50 Beef, bbl 5.50 @ 8.00 10.00 @ 15.00 Lard, 100 lbs 7.50 @ 8.25 13.59 @ 14.00 Whisky, 100 gals 25.00 @ 25.50 89.00 @ 91.00 Tallow, 100 lbs 8.75 @ 9.00 12.62 @ 12.75 Whalebone, 100 lbs 68.00 @ 70.00 150.00 @ 155.00 Wool, fleece, 100 lbs 52.00 @ 53.00 78.00 @ 82.00 Wool, pl'd, 100 lbs 44.00 @ 45.00 70.00 @ 75.00 Butter, 100 lbs 16.00 @ 21.00 36.00 @ 37.00 Cheese, 100 lbs 5.00 @ 7.00 15.00 @ 18.00

"Wheat flour, one of the prime necessities, 'was at no time
during the Civil War above $7.35 per barrel, which is somewhat
less than four cents per pound,' while at the present time it
is seven cents per pound, 'or close to 100 per cent. higher
than the top notch of the '60s.' Lard has already advanced
about 100 per cent., while its greatest advance during the
Civil War was 75 per cent.

"'The present-day advance in the price of clothing in general
has not been proportionate with the advance of foodstuffs,
though it has been considerable, especially as to the cheaper
grades. Cotton shirts that sold for 48 cents in 1913 are now
bringing 90 cents to $1. Cheap hosiery has also about doubled
in value. Suits that formerly sold for $15 are now bringing
$17, which is about 10 per cent. advance. Cotton goods during
the Civil War were exceptionally high, owing to the difficulty
of procuring the staple. After the stocks on hand at the
beginning of the war were exhausted, New England mills shut
down because of inability to get supplies. In 1864 raw cotton
ruled at 72 cents per pound, while at one time it touched
$1.90. Cotton goods of all kinds were therefore extraordinarily
high.'

The number of men drawn from Great Britain into the army and navy during the war was about 5,000,000. This meant extraordinary efforts of production were necessary on the part of those who were left behind. By means of a motor tractor and an acetylene gas generator, the owner of the farm shown above was able to run day and night shifts.

Copyright Underwood & Underwood]

"The public spirit manifested at present is much more admirable
than that displayed in the '60s, as shown by the following
first-hand description of life in those days, as compared with
what we see on every hand today. Said the New York
_Independent_ of June 25, 1864:

"'Who at the North would ever think of war if he had not a
friend in the army or did not read the newspapers? Go into
Broadway and we will show you what is meant by the word
"extravagance." Ask Stewart about the demand for camel's-hair
shawls and he will say "monstrous." Ask Tiffany what kind of
diamonds and pearls are called for. He will answer "the
prodigious, as near hen's-egg size as possible, price no
object." What kind of carpetings are now wanted? None but
"extra." Brussels and velvets are now used from basement to
garret. Ingrains and three-plys won't do at all.

"'Call a moment at a carriage repository. In reply to your
first question you will be told, "Never such a demand before,
sir." And as for horses, the medium-priced $500 kind are all
out of the market. A good pair of fast ones, "all right," will
go for $1,000 sooner than a basket of strawberries will sell
for four cents. Those a "little extra" will bring $1,500 to
$2,000, while the "superb" 2.40 sort will bring any price among
the high numbers.'"

GREAT BRITAIN'S PRODUCTIVE POWER

To appreciate what industrial mobilization meant in England the best method is to start with the figures on national production taken from the British census of 1907, the last accessible for the peace period:

In 1907 the British people are
estimated to have produced
goods to the total amount of,
roughly $10,000,000,000

The nation consumed during that
year in personal consumption 7,050,000,000

It spent on capital purposes at
home:

(_a_) On betterment of its national
plant 950,000,000

(_b_) On maintenance of its national
plant 900,000,000

It used up goods to the value of
(in keeping up and probably increasing
its stocks of material
on hand) 325,000,000

It exported goods in the form of
loans to foreign countries of
about 500,000,000

By 1914 the British Empire had probably advanced its income to at least $12,500,000,000; and the surplus of goods which it had to export as loans to foreign countries seems to have increased from about $500,000,000 to $1,000,000,000. What happened in war-time? First of all there was an unprecedented manufacture of munitions and war supplies. This production was needed not only for Great Britain, but also for her Allies. Seven-tenths of what was produced in Great Britain in the year 1907 was immediately used up in the form of personal consumption by its population; accordingly war industrial activities meant either that British production must be increased or British consumption reduced, or that more goods must be bought from foreign countries through the sale of British liquid capital assets.

First of all, consumption was cut down; in detail, this was accomplished in the following ways: 1. By cutting down all normal additions to England's national plant, _i. e._, by building no more houses, factories, railways, roads, etc., except for purely war purposes. This expenditure in 1907 amounted to about $950,000,000. 2. By cutting down and ceasing as far as possible to spend money on the maintenance of this national plant, except the minimum required to keep it running. This expenditure in 1907 amounted to $900,000,000. 3. Most important of all, by cutting down civil personal expenditure. This was so far the largest item of consumption that it was here that the most important savings were made.

A WHOLE POPULATION AT WORK

In England the total number of "occupied males" between the ages of 18 and 44, _i. e._, roughly, the conscription age was, in 1911, 7,200,000. The number of men from the United Kingdom in the Army and Navy amounted to over 5,000,000; therefore, out of every seven of these men, on the average five were soldiers or sailors. These men were lost from the productive capacity of the nation. It is obvious that if English production remained the same, or increased, it must have been the result of extraordinary efforts on the part of the small percentage of occupied males of fighting age left, on the part of all the other males occupied or formerly occupied, and on the part of all females.

Mr. R. H. Brand, in discussing the situation in 1918, said:

"Notwithstanding the great difficulties, I think it is probable
that our production is quite as great as before. Measured in
money, and owing to the rise of prices, it would probably be
much greater. This is due to the fact that the whole
population, practically speaking, has been working, and working
intensely. Millions of women who have not worked before are
working now. No one is idle. Every acre of land or garden that
can be used is being used. Methods of production have been
speeded up, labor-saving machinery in industry and agriculture
multiplied. In every direction the wheels have been turning
faster.

"But, perhaps more important still, the _character_ of our
production has entirely changed--almost our entire industry is
producing for war purposes. Ordinary civil needs are no longer
considered. We have of course to produce what is essential for
life, but beyond that all our energies are directed to war
production. The government has of necessity compelled the whole
of British industry to produce for war and to produce what it
is told to produce, because in no other way could our own
armies and our Allies have been supplied. No man is free to do
what he likes with his labor and capital, with his ships, or
with his steel. He has to do what he is told to do. By this
means production for war purposes has enormously increased, and
civil consumption has enormously decreased, because the goods
for the civil population were no longer produced and one cannot
buy what isn't there. Instead of gramophones, the gramophone
company makes fuses; instead of cloth for ordinary clothes, the
woolen factory makes khaki; instead of motor cars, the
motor-car maker makes shells.

BRITISH INDUSTRY ON WAR BASIS.

"Apart from selling our liquid capital assets in return for
foreign goods, and apart from borrowing from foreign countries
for the same purpose, our power to provide our own army and
navy with all they want and have any surplus over for our
Allies has indeed depended entirely on our extraordinary
efforts in production--not in normal production, but in war
production--and also on the extent to which we have been able
to reduce our civil consumption of all kinds. I put production
first because, while economy in consumption is exceedingly
important, increased productive capacity devoted to war
material, in my opinion, is still more important. Our increased
productivity has, as I say, been devoted entirely to war
requirements. We have had to turn over our whole industry from
a peace to a war basis. We have both voluntarily and
compulsorily cut off the production of goods which are
unnecessary for war purposes. Many trades have been actually
shut down and the labor taken from them and handed over to war
industries. Labor itself has been subjected to restrictions
which would have been wholly impossible before the war. Labor
may not leave its employment without government leave; salaries
and wages may not be increased without government approval.
Measures for the control of industry which were unheard of and,
in fact, absolutely impossible before the war have been imposed
upon all industry.

"Fixed prices had been placed on the most important materials;
the government now has the absolute control of the use of
steel, copper, lead, wool, leather, and other materials for
which the war demand is insatiable, and also of all materials
manufactured therefrom. No use may be made of most of these
materials for any purpose whatever without a certificate being
first obtained, no buildings of any kind may be erected without
leave of the Ministry of Munitions. The whole of industry may
now be said to be directed according to the requirements of the
government, its regulation is an enormous task. In the head
office of the Ministry of Munitions alone there are more than
10,000 people.

Mr. R. H. Brand, who is responsible for these statements and used them in an address to the American Bankers' Association, showed how these regulations had resulted in a decline of British imports from peace conditions of 55,000,000 tons annually to war conditions of 20,000,000 tons. The imports were nearly all foodstuffs. England exported large amounts of munitions and supplies to her Allies. In the year 1916 alone we supplied them with 9,000,000 pairs of boots, 100,000,000 sand bags, 40,000,000 yards of jute, millions of socks and blankets, and in addition several thousand tons of leather; also cloth, foodstuffs of every kind, portable houses, tools, hospital equipment and so on.

LABOR POWER IN ENGLAND

Mr. Lloyd George became the man naturally selected to be Prime Minister because of his success in directing one of the chief war industries--the work of munitions. In May, 1915, when he was made head of the newly created Department of Munitions, the problem before him was no easy one. The Central Empires were able to turn out 250,000 shells a day, while the British rate of production was 2,500 high-explosive shells a day, and 13,000 shrapnel shells. Lloyd George selected a large technical staff; the work was decentralized as much as possible, and special committees were formed for the purpose of organizing the work in each district. The question of raw materials had to be handled and this was not always easy because there were unscrupulous suppliers trying to make a corner in their goods. New machinery had to be made for the manufacture of large shells; all the big machine works were taken under direct control by the Government. Old factories had to be equipped and altered and twenty-six large plants had to be created. To provide the labor power, workmen were recruited by voluntary methods. A hundred thousand were in this way got together by July, 1915, most of whom were experts in machinery and ship-building. The result is pictured in the following extract by a French expert, Jules Destrée:

"On the 20th of December, 1915, Mr. Lloyd George, in a speech
delivered in the House of Commons, summarized the results of
the first six months of his tenure of office. We will take a
few points.

"Orders placed before the formation of the department were
delivered with an increase of 16 per cent. on previous
deliveries. The number of new orders placed increased by 80 per
cent.

"The state regulation of the metal market resulted in a saving
of from 15 to 20 million pounds sterling.

"The present output of shells for a single week is three times
as great as the entire output for May, 1915, which means that
the rate of production is twelve times as great.

"The enormous quantity of shells consumed during the offensive
of September, 1915, was made good in a month. The time will
soon come when a week will suffice.

"The output of machine guns is five times as great; that of
hand grenades is increased forty fold.

"The production of heavy artillery has been accelerated, and
the heaviest guns of the early days of the war are now among
the lightest.

"An explosive factory in the south of England, which on October
15, 1915, started to fill bombs at the rate of 500 a week with
a staff of 60, was in March, 1916, turning out 15,000 a week
with a staff of 250.

"An entirely new factory which started work at the end of
October, 1915, with one filling shed and six girl fillers and
an output of 270 a week, was in March, 1916, employing 175
girls and handling 15,000 bombs a week.

"The Ministry of Munitions has built, or is building, housing
accommodation for 60,000 workers, and canteens and mess rooms
in munition works now give accommodation for 500,000 workers a
day.

"All the workmen were assigned either to the works already in
existence--which in many cases were short of hands and unable
for this reason to fulfill their contracts--or else they were
allotted to the new factories.

"But in view of influence wielded by the labor unions, various
provisions were inserted in the Munitions Act. They related to
the settlement of labor disputes and to the prohibition of
strikes and lockouts the grounds for which had not been
submitted to the Board of Trade.

"To obviate such disputes, which were generally called forth by
the excessive profits accruing to the employers and the demands
of the wage-earners, the system of 'controlled establishments'
was instituted. Every establishment engaged on munition work
was placed, so far as the regulation of profits and salaries
was concerned, under direct government control. Any
modification in the rate of wages had to be submitted to the
Ministry of Munitions, which had power to refer the question to
an arbitration board specially set up by the act.

"To complete this rapid survey it must be added that a
department was created by the Ministry of Munitions, under the
control of an undersecretary, whose special business it was to
examine war inventions."

INDUSTRIAL DISLOCATION IN FRANCE

When war was declared in 1914, the result in France was a complete disorganization. It must be remembered that workingmen from the age of 19 to 45 were called to the colors. This meant that the labor supply was reduced by about three-fourths. The revival of trade was very slow until the beginning of 1915. When it began to be realized that the war would be a long one, and when the consumption of ammunition and war materials was beyond all previous records, the Government was forced to prepare a program for industrial warfare. It was a hard task because much of industrial France was under enemy occupation. Munition work had to be undertaken in neighborhoods largely agricultural. Everything was lacking: labor, coal, raw material and transportation. As it became evident that the stoppage of industrial work was a serious mistake, an attempt was made to revive industries not connected with munitions, such as paper manufacture, glove and silk making. The operations undertaken by the Government are described in the following passage from M. R. Blanchard's article in the _North American Review_ (1917):

"The first was to take men out of the army and send them to
industrial work. This was done with great caution during the
winter of 1914--15. The proportion of the men thus taken
increased more and more during the year 1915 and reached its
fullest extent in 1916. The specialists in steel work were the
first to be taken out of the trenches; these were far from
being sufficient, and common workmen were added to them. Then
chemists and workmen trained in the manufacture of explosives
were recalled; electric engineers were sent back to the
hydro-electric plants; miners above thirty-five years of age
who belonged to the territorial regiments were sent to the
mines; paper-makers and cardboard-makers who could be employed
in the preparation of explosives were put to work;
cabinet-makers were put to manufacturing rifle stocks;
wood-cutters were brought back from the front in order to see
that there was no waste in providing the enormous amount of
wood needed in the army. All this recalling of mobilized men
was effected at first according to the need, and without
method. By degrees it became clear that the output would be
greater if these soldier-workmen were assigned to the plants or
factories where they were working before the war. As it would
have been unwise to take too large a number of men out of the
fighting units, hundreds of thousands were taken from the
auxiliary troops of the interior, men who through lack of
physical ability to fight were employed in sedentary tasks.
Thus in 1915 and 1916 auxiliaries were swept away to become
workmen, foremen, secretaries, bookkeepers, accountants, etc.
Finally the administration decided to draw from the oldest
classes of men still under the military law. These were called
in 1915 and sent to the factories--men born in 1868, either
bachelors or married men without children.

"Another draft was made on the civil population. To make up for
the absence of male help, women were called upon for a great
number of occupations. Along with the women the refugees were
to do their part. After a rather long period of unsettled life
these refugees took again to regular occupations, some working
in the fields as agricultural hands, others in factories. Today
it is difficult to find unemployed people among them.

"The alien population for France is also large, considerable
numbers of Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese being employed
in the southeastern region. A newer element was provided by
natives from French colonies, namely, Morocco and Algeria.
Since the war started large numbers of Greeks and Armenians had
been imported into France; and during the last two years
something like 200,000 Chinamen had been brought to France for
unskilled work. The last resource was the enemy itself. There
were in France more than 250,000 German prisoners engaged in
various work and receiving a salary for it."

Germany's industrial mobilization was picturesquely described by the head of the General Electric Co., Dr. Walter Rathenau, who was appointed at the beginning of the war to superintend the supplying of the German War Office with raw materials. He told the officials at the War Office that Germany was provided with more war materials only for a limited number of months. Accurate statistics were prepared in a short time on the power of production in various German industries. Then all the raw material was put where it could be commandeered. The flow of products was restricted, so that the raw material and also half manufactured products could be automatically diverted to articles needed by the Army. New methods were discovered and developed. Where former technical means were insufficient substitutes had to be found. Where it was prescribed that this or that article was to be made out of copper or aluminum, it was permitted to make it out of something else. All the laboring power of the country, including men from 16 to 60, were enrolled and controlled from the central organization called the War Office, described by General Gröner as follows:

"The new War Office represents Germany as a colossal firm which
includes all production of every kind and is indifferent to the
kind of coat, civil or military, which its employes wear. The
new measures are intended to mobilize all effective labor,
whereas up to the present we have only mobilized the army and
industry. The whole war is becoming more and more a question of
labor, and in order to give the army a firm basis for its
operations the domestic army must also be mobilized. All the
labor, women's as well as men's, must be extracted from the
population, so far as possible voluntarily. But if voluntary
enlistment does not suffice we shall not be able to avoid the
introduction of compulsion."

THE GERMAN NATION IN ARMS

Sixteen months after this war organization was effected, General Ludendorff said that when the great spring offensive of 1918 opened the Germans were superior to the Allies in every form of war supplies. There was a speeding up all round; the output of shells and cannon was double. This meant the doubling of the coal and iron production, and could be done only by increasing the workers necessary to double the output of basic war materials. Adequate food had to be supplied to the workers; there was what is known as the Hindenburg "Fat Fund" to which contributions were sent in from German peasantry and agriculturists. General Gröner, the head of the German War Office, outlined optimistically the future of German war industrial production as quoted in the New York _Times_ of December 14, 1916:

A War Time Warning

Dairy production among the Allies decreased 30 per cent. during the war. The lard supply was also decreased. Kitchen economy in fats was never more important. Fats were so scarce in Germany during the latter part of 1917 that a "Hindenburg Fat Fund" was organized to which contributions were sent in from German peasantry and agriculturists.]

"German locomotives are running to the Taurus in Asia Minor; we
are operating practically all the Serbian railways with German
rolling stock; we have thousands of cars in Transylvania and
Rumania, to say nothing of other occupied territories. After
the transportation problem, we are taking measures to double
the production of the auxiliary raw materials and semi-finished
products. As one example, we are doubling our efforts for the
manufacture of nitres from the nitrogen of the air. Not only of
the basic raw materials, coal and iron, but of auxiliary raw
materials we have no lack.

"The brains of our chemists and technicians are supplying the
missing imports, and will continue to do so. Only when we have
accomplished all this will we proceed to the last step of
doubling the production of shells and cannon. Such a war is not
to be won by looking ahead from month to month, but only by
thinking of the distant future. After we have doubled the
pyramid, we shall proceed to treble it.

"By spring we shall be going full steam ahead. After that our
production will increase from month to month; and we have the
labor and raw materials for keeping up the pace indefinitely.

"The male working forces available between the ages of
seventeen and sixty, as provided by the Auxiliary Service Law,
will cover our requirements into the distant future, but
ultimately, aside from the children, aged and sick, every man
and woman will be enlisted for home defense, if necessary. The
home army will be the whole nation.

"What we are engaging on is not alone the progressive
mobilization of all the nation's physical strength and material
resources, but the mobilization of the nation's brains. An army
corps of professors, scientists, chemists, engineers,
technicians, and other specialists is already working with the
Kriegstaat. Our idea is to be eminently scientific and
practical--no theorizing. We are working to show results.

"We are coöperating closely with the war industries of Turkey,
Bulgaria, and Austria. It means doubling and trebling their
ammunition supply, too.

"The military successes achieved in Rumania, which synchronize
with the birth of patriotic auxiliary service, are an advantage
that cannot be overestimated. The Danube means everything to
us. Last year we had to beg Rumania for her oil and grain and
pay our good money for it too. Now we don't need to beg costly
favors of Rumania.

"Lloyd George does not scare us. We have, however, not time for
busying ourselves with politics; we have more important things
to do--supplying Hindenburg with the means of victory."

RUSSIA'S INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION

In Russia industrial mobilization was badly managed. Cattle were taken to the front in herds. Often driven on foot, they were slaughtered on the spot where the meat was needed for the soldiers. The hides were thrown aside to rot. As a result of this wasting of hides, the supply of leather for military uses and for shoes for both the Army and the civilian population was soon utterly inadequate. Horses were requisitioned in the most unintelligent way, the result being that agricultural production decreased and with the lack of transportation facilities the Army horses could not be supplied with food. They died by the tens of thousands.

Gross mismanagement marked the war handling of the Russian railway system. The rolling stock was allowed to deteriorate. Locomotives and cars were put aside permanently when they needed slight repairs. They could not be repaired because the railway machine shops had been converted into munition factories. There was an appalling shortage of manufactured goods for the civilian population, because the entire output of many manufacturing concerns was taken over for the Army. It was almost impossible to get clothing, boots and articles of wearing apparel. So great was the dearth of cloth at the end of the third year of the war that one was struck by the contrast between the lines in front of the bakeries formed in the early morning hours and the groups of women gathered at eight in the evening before the shops which sold cloth to stand all through the night in line for the opening of the shop in the morning.

A bright spot in Russian war administration was the work of the Municipal and Provincial Councils. The members of these bodies did valiant service in preventing the growing disorganization of the economic life of their country. Their activities are described by Prof. Harper of Chicago University, an actual eye witness of Russian conditions during the war, in the following passage:

"So these organizations entered upon a campaign of 'saving' and
'production.' They saved the hides that were being thrown away,
collected the discarded boots at the front and repaired them,
and took over the task of supplying the underwear for the whole
army--mobilizing the village coöperative societies to fill the
large orders. And they did much to organize the refugees from
the invaded districts for productive work. In a word, these men
saw that the war was going to extend into years, and they
realized that only foresight and organization of productive
resources would make it possible for Russia to withstand
economically the burdens of a protracted struggle.

"The attitude of the governmental authorities (the bureaucratic
departments) toward the work of these non-bureaucratic, but
public, institutions (the Unions of the Municipal and
Provincial Councils) was one of suspicion and antagonism, and
difficulties were put in their way with the deliberate intent
to block their activities. The institutions were suspected of
pursuing political aims. Only when it became clear that the
ruling group in the bureaucracy was consciously allowing the
country to drift into a state of anarchy in order to bring
Russia out of the war did these leaders venture to risk
revolutionary methods of action.

"The president of the All-Russian Union of Provincial Councils,
the Zemstvo, was Prince Lvoff, the first Prime Minister of the
new Russia after the revolution of March, 1917. In the monthly
reports of the work of the All-Russian Union of Zemstva, Prince
Lvoff, repeatedly issued warnings of the impending economic
collapse of the country. But neither he nor Kerensky was able
to liquidate the heritage received from the old régime in time
to stave off the series of economic and financial crises of
which the Bolsheviki availed themselves."

FOREBODINGS OF RUSSIA'S COLLAPSE

But it was not only foreign observers who were able to detect the prevailing rottenness in Russia's economic status. The following passage from an address made by A. I. Konovalov, a member of the Moscow Stock Exchange, shows that Russian business men were keenly alive to the dangers of the situation as early as April, 1917:

"The old régime has seemingly done everything deliberately to
destroy and demoralize the trade-industrial apparatus it took
years to build up. As a result the usual course of the
country's economic life was stopped, and at the same time,
through the peculiarly enforced system of regulations, a wide
field for all sorts of abuses and speculations was opened. We
must frankly acknowledge that from these abuses and
speculations a system of oppression grew up which has called
forth fully merited reproach, distrust, and hostile feelings
towards the representatives of the trade-industrial class.

"At the same time there can be no doubt but that under present
circumstances, lacking most of the necessaries of existence,
with the factories and mills forced to cut down their
production due to lack of raw material and fuel, with the
demoralization of the transportation system, and being
compelled, despite all these obstacles, to meet the numerous
requirements at the front--there is no other way out but
government control of private industrial and mercantile
enterprises, and the coöperation of the democratic masses of
the population in the matter of regulating the trade-industrial
life of the country. In addition to fair distribution it should
be the task of all the committees, which are to become parts of
the Ministry, also to regulate the prices.

"Closely connected with this question there is another one
which I personally consider of tremendous importance. I have in
mind the question of limiting the profits of all mercantile and
industrial establishments. Undoubtedly a properly worked-out
solution of this question would have the tendency to check the
unwarranted growth of prices that would appease the masses. The
normal effect of a decree limiting profits is of tremendous
importance, not only in that it would soften the feeling of
ill-will towards the trade-industrial class, but also because
it would afford the government a new, convincing proof that the
commercial and industrial class is ready to make all possible
sacrifices for the common good, a proof which would paralyze
the voicing of any new demands on the part of the masses.

"Now, these are the main ideas, the fundamental points of view
which the trade-industrial class should consider as a starting
point in its efforts to win the confidence of the population
and to safeguard that important position which it ought to
occupy in the life of the country.

"The situation is becoming all the more difficult because of
the ever-increasing famine due to the shortage of means of
production as well as of all the necessaries of life; this
famine will be felt very acutely, not only on account of the
lack of these goods, but also because of the overabundance of
paper money."

LABOR TRADITIONS UPSET

All kinds of economic theories and all varieties of economic experiences have been overturned by the abnormal industrialism of the war. The world really passed into a _terra incognita_. Even the firmest foundations of trade unionism have been shaken. There was no more firmly established fact before the war than the inability of women to secure a level of wages equal to that of the male wage earner. Such theories have passed to the limbo of forgotten things. Prejudice and tradition have given away before the actual test of facts. Women have taken the place of men called away to war service in practically all the fields of industrial activity. Apart from theory, biological and otherwise, it is now seen that the old exclusion of women from skilled industry was largely the result of trade union regulation. But the woman war-worker was found in fields untouched by trade unionism. There was the woman bank clerk as well as the woman engineer.

There was much discussion, mostly pessimistic, as to what would happen if the woman labor supply should permanently take the place of man labor after the war was over. The best solution was thought to be the placing of the woman worker under a régime of trade unionism. How far such prognostications went is illustrated in the following quotation from Miss Mary Stocks in the London _Athenaeum_.

"It has been presupposed that the war will end decisively
before the armies engaged are reduced to inappreciable numbers
of able-bodied men. It has been presupposed that the return of
peace will find British industry based upon the old system of
private ownership of capital and haphazard production in
response to the effective demand of individuals. It presupposes
no change of heart on the part of employers, government or
trade unions. But, in view of possible, if not probable
dangers, the most urgent stress should be laid upon what is an
undoubted palliative, if not a fundamental cure for such
prospective economic ills; that is, the strenuous promotion and
public encouragement of trade unionism among women. What women,
by reason of underlying social and economic causes, are not
able to do for themselves, the moral and financial support of
the public must do for them, and such support should be
regarded not merely as an interference in the old struggle
between capital and labor, but as an attempt to ward off a
national danger.

"The root of the evil is the old incompatibility between male
and female labor in the skilled and semi-skilled grades of
industry. That incompatibility has arisen partly from
fallacious theorizing of the 'wages-fund' type, but largely
from the fact that the industrial woman, in spite of the uphill
and often successful trade union work which has been
accomplished, mainly from above, during the past forty years,
is regarded by her male colleague as nature's blackleg. And in
spite of the short-sighted policy of hostility to women members
displayed by a few trade unions, it is fairly clear that it is
not the woman trade unionist that the man is afraid of, but the
woman blackleg; not the well-paid woman, but the sweated woman.
Now there are three ways of dealing with a blackleg: he may be
elbowed out of the industrial world altogether; he may be
penned up, as women have been penned up, in the lowest and most
undesirable grades; or he may be turned into a trade unionist.
As far as women are concerned, the first two are closed by
national expediency, humanity and justice. The third lies open;
and in view of the peculiar economic rocks which loom vaguely
ahead of us, it may be said without exaggeration that one woman
trade-union leader is worth a hundred welfare workers."

Women Workers in America

A field of winter lettuce, with the cloches, or glass bells, which made it possible during the war to raise plants in cold weather.]

WOMEN WORKERS IN AMERICA

As a result of the labor dislocation due to the operation of the American Draft Law, a large number of women were employed in railway work. The experience of the United States Railroad Administration in the matter of women employes was summarized in a paper read by Miss Pauline Goldmark, manager of the women's service section of the Railroad Administration, at a conference at the Academy of Political Science, in 1918:

"The number of women employed on the railroads of the United
States had been 60,000 at the beginning of the year, and
reached approximately 100,000 by October 1st. The greatest
number are in the clerical and semi-clerical occupations. Of
the 81,000 employed July 1st, 61,000 were working as clerks of
all kinds, stenographers, accountants, comptometer operators,
etc. In this class appear women ticket sellers and bureau of
information clerks, who served the public for the first time;
they were found well fitted for this type of work, and special
instruction agencies were opened by the government in various
states to train them in the intricacies of tariffs and routes.

"The next largest group of 4,000, it is not surprising to
learn, appears in women's time-honored occupation of cleaning.
Women have long been cleaning stations, offices, etc., but now
they are employed in the yards to clean coaches and Pullmans,
both inside and outside; and in the roundhouses, doing the
heavier work of wiping locomotives; 800 were so employed. In
personal service, including work in dining rooms and kitchens,
as matrons and janitresses, 2,000 were found. In the railroad
shops, women entered the greatest variety of new occupations.
Three thousand were employed, ranging at one end of the scale
from common laborers, at the other end of the scale of skilled
mechanics earning the machinists' or carmen's rate of pay.

"Many women were employed a year and a half ago, before the
railroads were put under Federal control, because they could be
obtained for less pay than men. They were, for instance,
engaged as common laborers at 20¢ to 22¢ an hour, at a time
when men were receiving 28¢ to 30¢ for the same class of
labor. With rare exceptions where adjustments are still
necessary, the wage orders have absolutely stopped this
undercutting of men's wages by women.

WORK UNSUITABLE FOR WOMEN

"Soon after women began to be largely employed it became
apparent that some of their work was neither profitable nor
appropriate. The use of women as section laborers, for
instance, in a gang of men working along the tracks at a
distance from any house or station was judged to be unsuitable.
This was also found to be the case where women were employed as
truckers in depots and warehouses on account of the
extraordinary physical exertion required of them. In view of
the wages now paid it was believed possible to secure men and
to transfer the women to some class of work suitable to their
strength and with proper regard to their health. The railroads
were accordingly asked to discontinue their employment in both
these positions.

"Comparisons with other industries can probably best be made in
respect to the women employed in the shops. They are operating
a number of machines such as bolt-threaders, nut-tappers, drill
presses, for which no great skill or experience is needed, and
which is classed as 'helpers' work,' and rated at the specified
pay of 45¢ an hour. They are also employed for highly skilled
work. A number have succeeded as electric welders and
oxy-acetylene-burners. They have been found well adapted for
work on the air-brake equipment and are cleaning, testing, and
making minor repairs on triple valves. In some places they are
now working in a separate group on the lighter-weight valves,
weighing not more than forty pounds. After a period of
training they are giving satisfaction without the help of any
man operator.

"A remarkably fine type of woman is now to be seen in many of
the shops, who enjoys the greater freedom of her work as
compared with factory routine, although in many cases the
discomfort, the dirt, and exposure are far greater. It remains
to be seen whether the women will remain in these jobs to any
great extent. The railroads will, of course, recognize the
seniority rights of all their employees returning from military
service, but as far as the new employees are concerned, women
will have the same privileges as other new employees in
retaining their positions or being assigned to other jobs.
There can be no doubt that in the clerical and semi-clerical
positions they have proved their worth, and will to a great
extent be retained."

ALIEN LABOR FOR WAR PURPOSES

The man in the fighting line was only one factor in the prosecution of warlike operations. The success of strategy and tactics was dependent upon the organization of the man in the labor line not only at home but also in the territory behind the miles of trenches in France. For this purpose Chinese labor was drafted by both the British and the French Government. Large numbers of British ships sailed with crews practically consisting of Chinese sailors. The sentiment in favor of Chinese exclusion had to give way before imperative needs for labor power. There were tens of thousands of Chinamen in the service of the Allies. In the _Sunset Magazine_, Mr. G. C. Hodges calls attention to the fact that the break between the Chinese Republic and Germany was precipitated largely by the Allied drafting of China's manpower. Even in its beginnings he says, the French and British mobilization of Chinese labor caused a diplomatic battle royal. The significance of Chinese labor behind the battle front is described in the following words:

"They are a war factor. His Britannic Majesty's Chinese Labor
Corps now behind the battle line in France is almost as large
as the total Chinese population in the United States. The
French Republic has recruited a force of similar dimensions,
bringing Chinese manpower overseas for non-combatant and
industrial work. Even teeming Russia, before its tragic
collapse, had drawn upon thousands of Chinese for work as far
west as the Ural mines. In 1914 there were but 7,000 in this
rich country, but a fourfold increase brought the total to
30,000. All told, 200,000 Chinese are 'carrying on' in the war
zone, laboring behind the lines, in munition works and
factories, manning ships.

"Though the pages of no White Book say it, the break between
the Chinese Republic and Germany was precipitated largely by
the Allied drafting of China's manpower. Even in its
beginnings, the French and British mobilization of Chinese
labor caused a diplomatic battle royal."

ECONOMIC VALUE OF AMERICAN ARMY TO FRENCH INDUSTRY

Permanent economic improvements were one result of the presence in France of the American Expeditionary Force. An industrial movement was created that will probably continue long after the war is over. In various French seaports, docks had to be constructed to handle the enormous tonnage of supplies needed for the American troops. A letter in the New York _Journal of Commerce_ gives a picture of the transformation in the transport system in France made in order to handle with speed and certainty the various supplies on which the American Army depended:

"Our project comprises nearly 1,000 miles of railroad
construction, but not continuous. France already controls on
her lines such facilities that she has been able to support her
great military burden and not break. Their local development in
the way of sidings and so forth is chiefly in the big towns,
and small engines and cars are used. To meet our larger needs,
it is necessary to establish terminals outside the towns for
the change of engines and for our great storage warehouses. Our
great railway construction in France, apart from a few cut-off
lines, is in the way of storage yards. We have practically the
use of two trunk-line tracks. The French run over them, too,
for there is a tremendous civil population to be supported. The
French are necessarily supreme, and we simply have the right to
run over their railroads subject to their rules.

"The French have an arrangement with their railroads by which a
piece of track that is put in for military purposes is paid for
by the French Government. If the civil requirements of the
railroad grow up to the use of that particular piece of track,
then the government is reimbursed by the railroad. We are in
the same position toward these railroads as the French
Government. At the end of the war the improvements which we
make will be surveyed. If they are useful to the railroads our
expenditures will be reimbursed. If not, we are at liberty to
take up the stuff and clear the ground. Two days ago a
semi-official statement was made to the Paris press, reading:

"'Americans, in full agreement with the French authorities,
are making every effort to carry out, by their own means, the
debarkation of their troops in ports, their provisioning as
well as their transportation over our railroads. Sidings, large
stations, and establishments of every kind are being
constructed by the most modern and expeditious processes. One
of the warehouses has an area of about 4,000 acres, and it has
a cold-storage plant capable of holding several thousand tons
of meat. Aviation training camps and repair shops, considerable
in size and with the most improved machinery, are being erected
on every side.'"

FRENCH INDUSTRIAL EXHAUSTION

A realistic picture of the industrial exhaustion of France at the close of the war was given by M. Tardieu, General Commissioner for Franco-American war affairs. The war expenses of 120,000,000,000 francs was only a fractional part of the whole loss. Another 50,000,000,000 would have to be raised to secure raw material destroyed during the war. M. Tardieu presented in detail the various items indicating to what extent France had suffered economic disability and paralysis:

"The territories which have been under German occupation for
four years were the wealthiest part of France. Their area did
not exceed six per cent. of the whole country. They paid,
however, 25 per cent. of the sum total of our taxes. These
territories are now in a state of ruin even worse than we had
anticipated. Of cities and villages nothing remains but ruins;
350,000 homes have been destroyed. To build them up again--I am
referring to the building proper, without the furnishings--600
million days of work will be necessary, involving, together
with building material, an outlay of 10,000,000,000 francs. As
regards personal property of every description either destroyed
by battle or stolen by the Germans, there stands an additional
loss of at least 4,000,000,000 francs. This valuation of lost
personal property does not include--as definite figures are
lacking as yet--the countless war contributions and fines by
the enemy, amounting also to billions. I need hardly say that,
in those wealthy lands, no agricultural resources are left. The
losses in horses and in cattle, bovine and ovine species, hogs,
goats, amount to 1,510,000 head--in agricultural equipment to
454,000 machines or carts--the two items worth together
6,000,000,000 francs.

"As regards industries, the disaster is even more complete. Those
districts occupied by the Germans, and whose machinery has been
methodically destroyed or taken away by the enemy, were,
industrially speaking, the very heart of France, the very backbone
of our production, as shown in the following startling figures: In
1913 the wool output of our invaded regions amounted to 94 per
cent. of the total. French production and corresponding figures
were: For flax from the spinning mills, 90 per cent.; iron ore, 90
per cent.; pig iron, 83 per cent.; steel, 70 per cent.; sugar, 70
per cent.; cotton, 60 per cent.; coal, 55 per cent.; electric
power, 45 per cent. Of all that--plants, machinery, mines--nothing
is left. Everything has been carried away or destroyed by the
enemy. So complete is the destruction that, in the case of our
great coal mines in the north, two years of work will be needed
before a single ton of coal can be extracted and ten years before
the output is brought back to the figures of 1913.

President of the American Federation of Labor.

Copyright Underwood & Underwood]

THE WORK OF REBUILDING

"All that must be rebuilt, and to carry out that kind of
reconstruction only, there will be a need of over 2,000,000
tons of pig iron, nearly 4,000,000 tons of steel--not to
mention the replenishing of stocks and of raw materials which
must of necessity be supplied to the plants during the first
year of resumed activity. If we take into account these
different items, we reach as regards industrial needs a total
of 25,000,000,000 francs. To resurrect these regions, to
reconstruct these factories, raw materials are not now
sufficient; we need means of transportation. The enemy has
destroyed our railroad tracks, our railroad equipment, and our
rolling stock, which, in the first month of the war, in 1914,
reduced by 50,000 cars, has undergone the wear and tear of
fifty months of war.

"Our merchant fleet, on the other hand, has lost more than a
million tons through submarine warfare. Our shipyards during
the last four years have not built any ships. For they have
produced for us and for our Allies cannon, ammunition, and
tanks. Here, again, for this item alone of means of
transportation we must figure on an expense of 2,500,000,000
francs. This makes, if I sum up these different items, a need
of raw material which represents in cost, at the present rate
of prices in France, not less than 50,000,000,000 francs."

IV--GOVERNMENT CONTROL

Wartime Nationalization of Railways and Shipping--Ship-building at High Speed--Trade Licensing, Etc.

On April 5, 1917, the day before war was declared, Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior, introduced and had passed by the Council of National Defense the following resolution:

_Resolved_, That Commissioner Willard be requested to call upon
the railroads to organize their business so as to lead to the
greatest expedition in the movement of freight.

Acting in accordance with this resolution, the principal railroad executives of the country met in Washington on April 11, 1917, and resolved that during the war they would coördinate their operations in a continental railway system, merging during such period all their merely individual and competitive activities in the effort to produce a maximum of national transportation efficiency. The direction of the continental railway system thus organized was placed by the railroads in the hands of the executive committee of the Special Committee on National Defense of the American Railway Association. This executive committee was also known as the Railroads' War Board.

Under this resolution the railroads of the United States continued to be operated under private ownership and private management until December 28, 1917.

On that date President Wilson, exercising his war-time prerogative, took control of the railways of the country and appointed W. G. McAdoo Director General.

2. Congress in January passed a railroad-control bill.

3. On April 11, 1918, President Wilson issued a proclamation taking over for the Government the property of coastwise shipping lines.