Chapter XIII: Section 14: of the Lever Bill, which became the Food Control (5)

The only federal agency in existence on April 7, 1917, capable of the elasticity to mobilize industry, labor, and science for the national defense was the United States Council of National Defense. This body, composed of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, had providentially been created by Congress eight months before. It was charged by Congress with "the coördination of industries and resources for the national security and welfare" and "the creation of relations which will render possible in time of need the immediate concentration and utilization of the resources of the nation." With it was to act an advisory commission of seven men, each to have expert knowledge of some special industry, public utility, or the development of some natural resource.

The Council was further charged with the following particular duties:

1. To supervise and direct investigations and make
recommendations to the President and the heads of Executive
Departments as to:

(_a_) The location of railroads with reference to the frontier
of the United States, so as to render possible expeditious
concentration of troops and supplies to points of defense.

(_b_) The coördination of military, industrial, and commercial
purposes in the location of extensive highways and branch lines
of railroads.

(_c_) The utilization of waterways.

(_d_) The mobilization of military and naval resources for
defense.

(_e_) The increase of domestic production of articles and
materials essential to the support of the armies and of the
people during the interruption of foreign commerce.

(_f_) The development of sea-going transportation.

(_g_) Data as to amounts, location, methods and means of
production and availability of military supplies.

(_h_) The giving of information to producers and manufacturers
as to the class of supplies needed by the military and other
services of the Government, the requirements relating thereto,
and the creation of relations which will render possible in
time of need the immediate concentration and utilization of the
resources of the nation.

2. To report to the President or to the heads of Executive
Departments upon special inquiries or subjects appropriate
thereto.

3. To submit an annual report to Congress, through the
President, giving as full a statement of the activities of the
Council and the agencies subordinate to it as is consistent
with the public interest, including an itemized account of the
expenditures made by the Council or authorized by it, in as
full detail as the public interest will permit, providing,
however, that when deemed proper the President may authorize,
in amounts stipulated by him, unvouchered expenditures and
report the gross so authorized not itemized.

PERSONNEL OF THE COUNCIL

Save for preliminary meetings late in the winter of 1916, the Council and Advisory Commission did not get under way to any appreciable degree until February, 1917, when both bodies began to meet separately and jointly with the primary purpose of taking the national balance, chiefly with regard to industrial resources. The permanent organization of both bodies was made on March 3, 1917.

The Council of National Defense was composed as follows:

Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, Chairman.
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels.
Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane.
Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston.
Secretary of Commerce William C. Redfield.
Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson.

The members of the Advisory Commission were:

_Transportation and Communication_:
Daniel Willard, Chairman, President of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad.

_Munitions and Manufacturing, including Standardization and
Industrial Relations_:
Howard E. Coffin, Vice-President of the Hudson Motor Car
Company.

_Supplies, including Food and Clothing_:
Julius Rosenwald, President of Sears, Roebuck & Company.

_Raw Materials, Minerals and Metals_:
Bernard M. Baruch, financier.

_Engineering and Education_:
Doctor Hollis Godfrey, President of the Drexel Institute.

_Labor, including Conservation of Health and Welfare of
Workers_:
Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor.

_Medicine and Surgery, including General Sanitation_:
Doctor Franklin Martin, Secretary-General of the American
College of Surgeons.

The Director of the Council and the Advisory Commission during the greater part of the war was Walter S. Gifford, now Vice-President of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, a most capable organizer, who with the writer had been closely associated with Howard Coffin in a pioneer industrial preparedness movement inaugurated in the spring of 1916 to examine into the capacity of industrial plants for military purposes. This was an entirely volunteer movement of business men and industrial engineers under the Naval Consulting Board of the United States, acting with the full approval of the President and the War and Navy Departments. Mr. Coffin's Committee on Industrial Preparedness did a remarkable job in a very short space of time, and the creation of the Council of National Defense was the logical sequence of the Committee's work, its records being turned over to the Council. The writer was the Secretary of the Council and the Advisory Commission throughout until the early summer of 1918, when he became Acting Director, succeeding Mr. Gifford shortly after the signing of the armistice.

=United States Council of National Defense and Its Advisory Commission=

Seated, left to right: David F. Houston, Secretary of Agriculture; Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy; Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War; Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior; William B. Wilson, Secretary of Labor. Standing, left to right: Grosvenor B. Clarkson, Secretary, later Director, of both Council and Advisory Commission; Julius Rosenwald, Bernard M. Baruch, Daniel Willard, Chairman of the Advisory Commission; Dr. Franklin Martin, Dr. Hollis Godfrey, Howard E. Coffin and Walter S. Gifford, Director of the Council and Advisory Commission.]

PROPOSALS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Although the Council and Advisory Commission did not, as has been stated, make permanent organization until March 3, 1917, the Advisory Commission on December 7, 1916, determined on the following proposals of action:

To begin immediately a study to determine the most effective
flexible organization and mechanism for the securing of all
necessary information and for the clarifying, recording, and
classifying of such information when secured.

To begin immediately a study as to what media now exist which
can aid in the carrying out of the purposes of the council.
This study to be made in three divisions--governmental media
in the departments, governmental media outside the departments,
and civil media. As this study progresses it is believed that
the council can aid materially in the development of such
media, and can from time to time define (_i. e._, delimit and
delineate) spheres of activity in which existing organizations
may operate intensively without duplication.

To assist in the advance of the physical well being of the
people of the nation.

To begin immediately a study of the possibility of the
coördination of transportation, communication and surveys.

To continue the work done on the inventory of manufactures, of
medical equipment and officers, of supplies, and of resources.

To assist in the development of the "Personal Index" already
begun.

To set a fixed date (a date three months after the beginning of
action is suggested) on which an inspection may be made of the
work accomplished to that date. This inspection to be made
through the submitting to the commission of an actual problem
by the Departments of War and Navy, with the intent to
determine at that time what needed information is or is not
available.

To form a temporary organization to put the above proposals or
any part of them or additional proposals into effect at the
earliest possible date, with the intention of changing from a
temporary organization to a permanent organization as the
progress of the work makes this possible.

To begin a study of the best methods of expression of the work
of the council to the people of the nation.

To scrutinize all legislative action touching national defense.

To do any other thing or take any other action necessary to
give effect to the law under which the council and commission
are organized.

PRE-WAR ACTIVITIES

At this time there was consideration of plans to enroll labor in an industrial reserve, and the question of mobilization of American railroads for military purposes was seriously discussed against future need. At the same time Commissioner Baruch stated that he had been making a study of the steel and metal industries in connection with the national defense, and wished for authority to consult further with the leaders in those trades. The Director was asked to establish relations in the interest of the national defense with civic organizations, patriotic associations, and chambers of commerce.

At a meeting on February 12, 1917, plans were discussed to call a series of conferences with the leading men in each industry fundamental to the defense of the country in the event of war, and at the same meeting a plan was laid down and afterwards agreed upon to split the Advisory Commission up into seven separate committees as detailed above, the Chairman of each committee to be given power to select the members of his committee from either governmental or civil life, or both.

At a meeting on February 14, 1917, E. S. Stettinius, who, acting for J. P. Morgan and Company, was the purchasing agent of the Allies at that time, was called before the Council to confer with it on the manufacture of munitions. In the same way during this early period men of the authority and standing of Herbert Hoover, Admiral Peary, and General Kuhn, who had closely studied the German armies, were called into consultation by the Council, Mr. Hoover of course, discussing the mobilization, distribution, and conservation of food supplies, and Admiral Peary the development of the aeroplane and seaplane for modern war.

On February 15th the Advisory Commission, further to progress its work then already under way, requested detailed lists of materials, with specifications and detailed dimensioned blueprints covering all equipment needed for a force of 1,000,000 men and for the assumed force of the Navy and Marine Corps with its numbers increased to emergency strength. It also called for estimates of reasonable accuracy covering the maintenance of a force of the size mentioned in the field during each ninety days of active service. The information was desired in order that approximations might be made as to the amounts of both manufactured and raw material for which it would be necessary to draw upon the resources of the country. The Advisory Commission later furnished estimates of its own.

On March 3rd Chairman Willard of the Advisory Commission read to the Council a list of men nominated by the Commission to compose a munitions standards board. It is highly significant to detail the names of these men with their occupations, for they were typical of the cream of American industry which from that time on was enlisted in the Government's interest:

W. H. Vandervoort, builders of special machine tools, and
President of the Moline Automobile Co.

E. A. Deeds, formerly General Manager for the National Cash
Register Co., President of the Dayton Engineering Laboratories
Co., and interested in many industrial activities.

Frank A. Scott, Warner & Swasey Co., Cleveland, manufacturers
of automatic machinery and optical instruments.

Frank Pratt, General Electric Co., Schenectady.

Samuel Vauclain, Baldwin Locomotive Works, Remington and
Westinghouse Cos.

John E. Otterson, Vice-President, Winchester Arms Co.

The Council duly approved these nominations.

Bernard M. Baruch

Known as the "Eye of Industry," because his task was to see that the raw materials were brought to the factories and the finished products shipped overseas.]

MEN OF VISION

It is impossible here to give more than a few instances such as the foregoing of the way in which the Council and Commission, with remarkable vision and perhaps even more remarkable disregard of precedent when precedent got in the way of the national welfare, made history in these pre-war days. Fully to tell the story of this period would pack a large volume. I quote from a recent partisan criticism directed by an American Congressman, as chairman of a congressional committee to investigate war expenditures, against the Advisory Commission particularly, which he characterized as the "secret government of the United States" during this vital space of time:

It appears from the minutes of the advisory commission and the
council, which were kept separately, that practically all of
the measures which were afterwards considered as war measures,
were initiated by this advisory commission, adopted by the
council, and afterwards acted upon by Congress. In many cases,
a considerable period before the actual declaration of war with
Germany this advisory commission was discussing matters which
were thought to be new legislation, conceived by reason of the
necessities of war. For instance, on March 3rd, over a month
before the War declaration, the advisory commission indorsed to
the Council of National Defense a daylight-saving scheme, and
recommended a Federal censorship of the press. The question of
Federal censorship of the press was further discussed on March
24th, two weeks before the declaration of war.

On February 15th, about two months before the declaration of
war, Commissioners Coffin and Gompers made a report as to the
exclusion of labor from military service, and the draft was
discussed; the draft was also discussed on other occasions
before anyone in this country, except this advisory commission
and those who were closely affiliated with the administration,
knew that a declaration of war was to be made later. At a
meeting, on February 15th, this same commission of seven men
(none of whom had any official authority except as advisors),
recommended that Herbert Hoover be employed by the Government
in connection with food control. It was generally understood,
as appears from the minutes, that Mr. Hoover was to be in
control of this matter, although war was two months in the
future.

The advisory commission first met on December 6, 1916. Almost
the first thing the commission did was to take up the matter of
arranging an easy method of communication between the
manufacturers and the Government. On February 12th, for
example, Secretary Lane offered a resolution to the advisory
commission suggesting to them to call a series of conferences
of the leading men in various industries, so the industries
might organize and be able to do business with the council
through one man. In several meetings, long before the war was
declared, this advisory commission of seven men met with the
representatives of the manufacturing industries and formed an
organization of them for selling supplies to the Government,
which organization was well perfected before the war was
declared. This method consisted of having the representatives
of the various businesses, producing goods which the Government
would have to buy, form themselves into committees so that they
might be able to sell to the Government the goods direct, which
their industries produced. In almost every meeting that this
advisory commission had before the declaration of war, they
discussed and recommended to the council (which consisted of
six Cabinet members) these plans for fixing prices and selling
to the Government. When war was declared on April 6th, this
machinery began to move, headed by the advisory commission of
these minutes, the active Government of the seven men, who
were, in effect, as shown by United States, so far as the
purchase of supplies was concerned. So far as I can observe,
there was not an act of the so-called war legislation afterward
enacted that had not before the actual declaration of war been
discussed and settled upon by this advisory commission.

It should be said, of course, that no member of this Council organization ever sold commodities to himself. But that is another story.

MEN OF EXPERIENCE

I could not complete even a skeleton outline of the period in question without certain other references.

Further to emphasize the quality of the business men being called to Washington by the Council and Advisory Commission, I quote part of a letter to Chairman Willard of the Commission from Commissioner Baruch of March 23, 1917:

Mr. Daniel Willard,
Chairman, Advisory Commission, Council of
National Defense, Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

In pursuance of the authority given me and in order to be
prepared to meet the requests made of the advisory commission,
I have appointed the following committees. As the necessity
arises and the advisability becomes apparent, I shall add from
time to time other members to these committees, always bearing
in mind keeping them down to such a size that they will be
workable. It has been my endeavor to appoint on these
committees men of proved ability and undoubted integrity.

LEATHER.--Walter C. Garritt, U. S. Leather Co., Boston, Mass.;
George F. Johnson, Endicott, N. Y.; Theodore P. Haight,
American Hide & Leather Co., New York City.

RUBBER.--A. Marks, Diamond Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio; Fred Hood,
Hood Rubber Co., Watertown, Mass.; Stuart Hotchkiss, General
Rubber Co., New York City.

STEEL.--E. H. Gary, President, American Iron & Steel Institute,
New York.

WOOL.--J. F. Brown, Boston, Mass.; Sigmund Silberson, Chicago,
Ill.; Joseph R. Grundy, Bristol, Pa.; F. J. Hagenbarth,
President, National Association of Wool Growers, Salt Lake
City, Utah.

NICKEL.--Ambrose Monell, President, International Nickel Co.,
New York.

OIL.--I have asked Mr. A. C. Bedford, president of the Standard
Oil Co., to serve on the committee, but I shall probably add
another from the Middle West, whose name I have not yet
determined upon, and Mr. Ed. L. Doheny, of Los Angeles, Calif.

ZINC.--I have in the process of formation a committee
representing the zinc trade. There are certain difficulties in
the way of trade jealousies which we have to smooth away. The
same thing is occurring in other lines, but it will be
adjusted, and I shall report on them from time to time.

COAL.--I have been in consultation with the producers of coal,
both bituminous and anthracite, and am now studying that
situation as to the best method of covering coal.

SPRUCE WOOD.--I have also under consideration, but have come to
no conclusion, the employment through a committee of those best
fitted for obtaining the manufacture of aeroplanes for the
Government the proper amount of spruce wood which seems to be
needed.

LABOR PLEDGES SUPPORT

It will be long before the writer forgets the dramatic meeting of the Advisory Commission as early as March 3, 1917, when Commissioner Gompers reported that he had called an executive council meeting of the American Federation of Labor for March 9, 1917, for the purpose of considering the attitude of labor toward the preparedness plans of the government. The labor leader spoke with great emotion. He referred to England's difficulty in the first year of the war in enlisting the services of the working people. He went on to say that in England unity was then lacking between government and labor and that the same situation, if not properly handled before hand, could arise in this country in even more acute form, largely because of the racial diversity of our working classes. He concluded by stating that he was now bending his efforts to mobilizing good will in this direction, saying: [24] "I want the workingmen to do their part if war comes to America." He forecasted the meeting in Washington on March 12, 1917, of the officers of the National and International Trade Unions of America, and said: "I am expecting a definite response of support from every trade union in America." There is no doubt in the writer's mind that Samuel Gompers kept the faith throughout.

[24] I took Mr. Gompers' words verbatim.

On April 6, 1917, the Council and Advisory Commission approved a declaration of the attitude of American labor toward the war presented by Mr. Gompers' Committee on Labor of the Advisory Commission. This action was directed toward the maintenance of existing standards of employment, and provided, among other things, that the Council should issue a statement to employers and employees in industrial plants and transportation systems advising that neither employers nor employees should endeavor to take advantage of the country's necessities to change existing standards; and providing further that when economic or other emergencies might arise requiring changes of standards, the same should be made only after such proposed changes were investigated and approved by the Council. It likewise provided that the Council urge upon the legislatures of the States, as well as upon all administrative agencies charged with the enforcement of labor and health laws, the great duty of rigorously maintaining the existing safeguards as to the health and welfare of workers, and that no departure from such standards in State laws and State rulings affecting labor should be taken without a declaration of the Council that such departure was essential for the effective pursuit of the national defense.

MERGING THE RAILROADS

On April 7, 1917, the Council directed Chairman Willard of the Advisory Commission to call upon the railroads so to organize their business as to lead to the greatest expedition in the movement of freight and troops. The response of the railroads was literally splendid. Their executives came to Washington, conferred with Mr. Willard, and passed the following resolution:

RESOLVED, That the railroads of the United States, acting
through their chief executive officers here and now assembled
and stirred by a high sense of their opportunity to be of the
greatest service to their country in the present national
crisis, do hereby pledge themselves, with the Government of the
United States, with the governments of the several States, and
one with another, that during the present war they will
coördinate their operations in a continental railway system,
merging during such period all their merely individual and
competitive activities in the effort to produce a maximum of
national transportation efficiency. To this end they hereby
agree to create an organization which shall have general
authority to formulate in detail and from time to time a policy
of operation of all or any of the railways, which policy, when
and as announced by such temporary organization, shall be
accepted and earnestly made effective by the several
managements of the individual railroad companies here
represented.

COÖPERATING COMMITTEES

The first of July, 1917, found the Council and Advisory Commission directing the operation of the following boards and committees:

Aircraft Production Board.

Committee on Coal Production.

Commercial Economy Board.

Woman's Committee.

General Munitions Board with its sub-committees on Army
Vehicles, Armored Cars, Emergency Construction and Contracts,
Optical Glass, Storage Facilities, Machine Guns, Priority, and
Accounting.

Munitions Standards Board with its sub-committees on Gauges and
Dies, Army and Navy Artillery, Fuses and Detonators, Small Arms
and Munitions, Optical Instruments, and Army and Navy
Projectiles.

Section on Coöperation with States.

Committee on Inland Waterways.

Committee on Telegraphs and Telephones.

Committee on Railroad Transportation, with which acted an
executive committee made up of leading railroad presidents and
six departmental committees composed likewise of railroad
executives and paralleling the military departments over the
country, and sub-committees on Express, Car Service, Military
Equipment Standards, Military Transportation Accounting,
Military Passenger Tariffs, Military Freight Tariffs, and
Materials and Supplies.

Committees on Cars and Locomotives, with their personnel made
up of the high executives of such concerns as the Baldwin
Locomotive Works, the Pullman Company, and the American
Locomotive Company.

Committee on Electric Railroad Transportation, composed of
electric railway presidents.

Committee on Gas and Electric Service.

Committee on Automotive Transport.

Committee on Supplies, with its sub-committees on Cotton Goods,
Woolen Manufacturers, Shoe and Leather Industries, Knit Goods,
Leather Equipment, Mattresses and Pillows, and Canned Goods.

Committee on Raw Materials, with its sub-committees, popularly
known at the time as the "A to Z" committees, on Alcohol,
Aluminum, Asbestos, Magnesia and Roofing, Brass, Cement,
Chemicals, Acids, Alkalis, Electrochemicals, Fertilizers,
Miscellaneous Chemicals, Coal-Tar Products, Pyrites, Sulphur.

Sub-Committees on Copper, Lead, Lumber, Mica, Nickel, Steel
Products, with sub-committees on Alloys, Sheet Steel, Pig Tin,
Steel Distribution, Scrap Iron, Pig Iron, Iron Ore, and Lake
Transportation, Tubular Products, Tin Plate, Wire Rope, Wire
Products, and Cold Rolled and Cold Drawn Steel.

Sub-Committee on Oil, Rubber, Wool, and Zinc.

Committee on Engineering and Education, with its sub-committees
on General Engineering, Production Engineering, Universities
and Colleges, Secondary and Normal Schools, and Construction
Engineering.

Committee on Labor, with its sub-committees on Mediation and
Conciliation, Wages and Hours, Women in Industry, Welfare Work,
Sanitation with twelve subdivisions, Vocational Education with
nine subdivisions, Information and Statistics, Cost of Living
and Domestic Economy.

General Medical Board, with a long and active list of
sub-committees.

Daniel Willard

President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

He was chairman of transportation and communication in the Council of National Defense.]

SERVICE OF EXPERTS

On these boards and committees sat, almost without exception, the American leaders of industry, science, and labor. Scattered through the list one finds such names as:

Rear Admiral David W. Taylor, one of the world's leading naval
constructors.

F. S. Peabody, the great coal operator.

James J. Storrow, of Lee, Higginson & Co., of Boston.

A. W. Shaw, publisher of the _System_ magazine, who, as
Chairman of the Commercial Economy Board, preached with
remarkable success the gospel of conservation in business.

Dr. Anna Howard Shaw, who for her labors as Chairman of the
Woman's Committee received the Distinguished Service Medal.

Frank A. Scott, on whom was bestowed the same distinction for
his leadership of the General Munitions Board.

W. A. Starrett, constructing architect of New York, to whom in
great measure is due the credit for the building of the
cantonments in an incredibly short space of time.

Samuel Vauclain, President of the Baldwin Locomotive Works,
whose contribution in the matter of Army and Navy artillery was
monumental.

Theodore Vail, President of the American Telephone & Telegraph
Company, who brought the wire communication men of the country
to a common center in the national interest.

Charles Clifton, President of the National Automobile Chamber
of Commerce.

Gen. George H. Harries, the famous electric railway operator.

Samuel Insull, President of the Commonwealth Edison Co., of
Chicago.

Charles Eisenman, who, as active head of the Council's
Committee on Supplies, procured for the Government $800,000,000
of supplies in 200 days at an overhead cost of but $20,000,
involving the handling of 45,000 contracts, and who justly
received the Distinguished Service Medal.

A. F. Bemis, President of the National Association of Cotton
Manufacturers.

John P. Woods, the eminent woolen manufacturer.

J. F. McElwain, of the McElwain Shoe Company.

Lincoln Cromwell, of Wm. Iselin & Co., New York.

Arthur V. Davis, President of the Aluminum Co. of America.

Thomas F. Manville, President of H. W. Johns-Manville Co.

Charles F. Brooker, President of the American Brass Company.

John E. Morron, President of the Atlas Portland Cement Company.

John D. Ryan, President of the Anaconda Copper Company.

R. L. Agassiz, President of the Calumet & Hecla Mining
Company.

W. A. Clark, President of the United Verde Copper Company.

Murry M. Guggenheim.

R. H. Downman, President of the National Lumber Manufacturers'
Association.

Ambrose Monell, President of the International Nickel Company.

Gary, Farrell, Burden, Dinkey, King, Grace, Schwab, Topping,
Dalton, and Clarke, the great steel executives.

Bedford, Davison, Doheney, Lufkin, Markham, Sinclair, Van Dyke,
Muir, James, and Guffy, in whose hands lay almost the entire
oil output of America.

Stuart Hotchkiss, President of the General Rubber Company.

F. J. Hagenbarth, President of the National Association of Wool
Growers.

The Presidents of the leading zinc companies.

Then when we come to Engineering and Education:

Dr. Henry E. Crampton, of Columbia University.

Charles A. Stone, of Stone and Webster.

The heads of the great engineering societies.

The presidents of Harvard, Johns Hopkins, and other famous
universities and colleges.

Among labor leaders such persons as:

Warren S. Stone, Grand Chief of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers.

James W. Sullivan, Matthew Woll and Frank Morrison, all high in
the American Federation of Labor.

Such well-known men as:

V. Everit Macy, Benjamin Ide Wheeler, John H. Finley, August
Belmont, E. T. Stotesbury and Charles G. Dawes, afterwards a
brilliant figure as a General in France.

Such nationally and internationally known physicians as:

General Gorgas; Dr. William H. Welch, of Johns Hopkins; the
Mayos; Dr., afterwards Brigadier-General, Finney; Dr. George E.
Brewer; Dr. George W. Crile; Dr. Simon Flexner; and Dr.
Theodore Janeway.

Dr. George E. Hale, Chairman of the National Research Council,
which was and is the Council's Department of Science and
Research.

Thomas A. Edison, President of the Naval Consulting Board,
which was and is the Council's Board of Inventions.

The activities of these men and their hundreds of colleagues, nearly all dollar-a-year workers and men whose time could not be bought, as a rule, in days of peace, reached out and touched almost every town and village in almost every part of the United States. They were moved and stimulated by the philosophy of voluntary coöperation, which was first and in a very daring way thrust into the consciousness of the nation by the Council of National Defense. It was the policy that won the war. One distinct benefit which the Government received from calling the industrial intelligence of the country to its aid was the breadth of view which industrial leaders possess. Their habit of mind to survey the field as a whole, to take a bird's-eye view of the problem to be solved, enabled the Government agencies to obtain a proper comprehension of the task of building the war machine. The country will probably never know the debt that it owes to these men and their like who came to Washington and bent their backs throughout the hot Southern summer during a series of endeavors in which absolutely no paths were charted.

NON-PARTISAN REPRESENTATION

It has been asked why a coalition government was not formed to wage the war. That very thing was in effect done by the Council, though we were all too busy to point it out at the time. A majority of the Advisory Commission was made up of Republicans. Certainly Republicans were in the huge preponderance in the Committee and Boards of the Council and Advisory Commission. Speaking as one who was not affiliated with the politics of the Administration of Woodrow Wilson, the writer never perceived a trace of political flavor in the organization and operation of the Council from first to last. Never did the six Democratic cabinet officers forming the Council itself so much as inquire into the politics of the hundreds of business men and experts nominated to them for appointment. It was an amazing demonstration of non-partisanship in a national crisis. The Council was an organization of specialists from beginning to end, and the work was everywhere carried forward on the most impersonal basis. The writer attributes this state of affairs to the breadth of view, and the very genuine passion for national service, of Secretary of War Baker, Chairman of the Council.

It should be plainly stated that, utilizing in the main dollar-a-year experts, the Council made the preliminary mobilization of industry to July 1, 1917, at the grotesquely small sum of $127,000. To May 1, 1919, its total expenditures, including the operation of the war industries for nearly a year, amounted to but $1,500,000, and this comprehended the expenditure of $225,000 for the erection of a building. I doubt if there is anything in governmental or commercial history to match those figures, squared with results. The savings of the Council and Advisory Commission to the Government and the people mounted literally into the billions, as careful analysis of pre-war and war-time prices on certain commodities will demonstrate. It was made possible by the Council's course in commandeering to its side the business men of the United States.

SOME RESULTS OF COÖPERATION

One of the practical results of voluntary coöperation was the agreement made by Mr. Baruch and Mr. Ryan with the largest copper producers of the country to furnish the Navy 20,000,000 pounds of copper and the Army 25,510,000 pounds at 16-2/3¢ a pound when the market price was 35¢ a pound. This meant saving to the Government close to $10,000,000. The copper men made this offer notwithstanding their increased cost for labor, materials, etc., because, as they said: "We believe it to be our duty to furnish the requirements of the Government in preparing the nation for war with no more profit than we receive from our regular production in normal times."

In the same way the steel makers of the country, represented in the Steel Institute, agreed to furnish steel to the Government at the basic price of 2.9¢ per pound as compared with the then market price of from 5¢ to 7¢ a pound. This represented an approximate saving to the Government of $18,000,000.

THE FIELD DIVISION

The tremendous effort of the Council to mobilize and coalesce into a fluid and powerful whole the industrial, economic and scientific forces, was supplemented and to a great extent made possible by the Council's Section on Coöperation with States, later known as the Field Division. Through this subordinate body was created, guided and coördinated the 185,000 units of the state, county, community and municipal councils of defense, which literally unified the citizenship of America for war. If production was to win the war, it was elementary that the civilian morale must be brought to the highest pitch of coöperation and efficiency--and it was accomplished. In this vital task a noble part was played by the Woman's Committee of the Council, which in the most thorough-going and swift manner brought the services of the women of the country to the Government. The director of this committee, Miss Hannah J. Patterson, received the Distinguished Service Medal.

WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD

On August 1, 1917, the Council, with its fortunate power to create subordinate bodies, brought into being the War Industries Board, of which the first Chairman was Frank A. Scott, and of which some of the other members up to the end of the war were:

Robert S. Brookings.

Brigadier-General Hugh S. Johnson.

Rear Admiral F. F. Fletcher.

Hugh Frayne, of the American Federation of Labor.

George N. Peek, a prominent Middle Western manufacturer.

J. L. Replogle, who became the very efficient Director of Steel
Supply.

L. L. Summers, an expert on explosives.

Alexander Legge, General Manager of the International Harvester
Company.

And Judge Edwin B. Parker.

Mr. Brookings was later placed in charge of price fixing and Judge Parker in charge of priorities. The War Industries Board undoubtedly accomplished a much better centralization of effort than was possible in the hurried organization of the early days, when the imperative need was to increase the sources of supply and get production going until the executive departments of the Government could get into their full stride. Mr. Scott was succeeded as Chairman of the War Industries by Daniel Willard, who in turn was succeeded by B. M. Baruch, who, in his leadership of this vital and powerful agency, duplicated the success that Mr. Willard had made as Chairman of the pioneer Advisory Commission.

CANTONMENT CONSTRUCTION

In indicating even an outline statement of the American industrial and economic effort in the war, the writer feels helpless to paint the picture within the space of a few thousand words. It simply cannot be done. But to visualize what the measure of the task was, let one thing be cited:

=John D. Ryan=

President of the Anaconda Copper Company. He was made chairman of the Aircraft Production Board after we entered the war.]

At our entrance into the war there were one colonel and four men to build the cantonments. The job involved the expenditure of $150,000,000 in about three months. The largest year's work on the Panama Canal amounted to but some $50,000,000. The situation was heart-breaking. On hearing of it Frank Scott, then Chairman of the General Munitions Board, called up the Secretary of War and said that something had to be done, with which the Secretary instantly agreed. The result was that the Colonel, afterwards Brigadier-General Littell, had a civilian organization built around him by the Council of National Defense, notably by W. A. Starrett, later himself a colonel in the Army, which functioned until the Army was in shape to carry on the job alone. The building of the cantonments was the greatest job of the ages. Incidentally it should be stated that the average profit to the contractors was less than three per cent.

MEN LITTLE KNOWN

The writer likewise feels great reluctance in mentioning, as he has mentioned, only a few of the men who waged the industrial side of the war. Many business men little known to the country gave up their businesses and came to Washington and did superhuman things--did them in an impersonal, selfless way that was nothing less than stirring. Many of them remain unknown to this day, and their chief reward must lie in the satisfaction that they drew to their own souls by what they did, which is, of course, the greatest satisfaction of all in such situations as war-time Washington exemplified.

It has not even been possible to touch on the work of business men in such great war agencies as the Food and Fuel Administration, the War Trade Board, the Shipping Board, the Aircraft Production Board, the Office of the Alien Property Custodian, the War Finance Corporation, and those divisions of the War Department which called highly qualified civilians to their aid. It would seem better to emphasize the initial effort, when the Council, through force of circumstances, became the great administrative laboratory for the examination, organization, and, at the proper time, allocation of totally new and untried phases of Federal action related to the prosecution of the war. It was in effect a fecund mother, which, it is not the slightest exaggeration to say, gave birth to and propelled the war machine which in the closing days of the conflict overseas was reaching to the peak of its load, and which in fact dealt the death blow to the Imperial German Government. It made, in truth, its fair share of mistakes, but some day its part in sending out the trumpet call to the business and labor and scientific leaders of America to join in the national defense will be fully told. Then there will be perceived in clear and true light the extent to which peace-loving American civilians offered all they had and all they were to the Government of the United States so that decency might again be paramount upon the face of the earth.

VII--THE LIBERTY LOAN ARMY

Mobilizing Americans at Home to Pay for the War--A National Effort Which Yielded $24,065,810,350

By GUY EMERSON

Vice-President of the National Bank of Commerce, formerly Director of Publicity, Government Loan Organization

Our Army was our first line in the war against Germany. Our second line of offense and defense was the Navy, and behind both stood another line without which neither the Army nor the Navy could have "carried on." This third force was the greatest unit ever marshalled in the history of this or any other country--the Liberty Loan Army. Before a man in the United States uniform entered a trench, before the first depth bomb had been dropped on a U-boat, this Army, which finally carried a roster of 22,777,680 names, had entered the war.

Think of it! One person in every five in the immense population was in the war!

True, their contribution to the eventual triumph of our arms was measured in dollars while that of the men at the front or on the seas was in lives or limbs. Yet it is a fact that dollars were as powerful relatively as men in bringing the Boche to bay.

Various causes have been given to account for the startlingly sudden collapse of the Kaiser's army. Some say that the Allies' superior military strategy brought it to its knees. Others contend that success against the U-boats broke it down. Both are partly right, for each helped to undermine the German morale. But however great the contribution of both was, it is safe to say that the front presented by the Liberty Loan Army was a vital factor. The belated German consciousness that the United States as a whole was in the war, as tangibly represented in the strength of the Liberty Loan Army, helped to shatter the Germans' will to victory. As much as the men in khaki or in blue, this gigantic unit bore in upon his mind as an unyielding opponent. He understood the futility of trying to defeat a people that enlisted against him to the number of 22,777,680 at home, 4,000,000 in the field and 300,000 on the water.

THE SPIRIT BEHIND THE DOLLAR

There is another angle to this important element of morale. In inverse ratio to the weakening of the spirit of the Germans against this resistless body there came a daily strengthening of the morale of our own men and those of the Allies through this manifestation at home. Where there are two opposing wills to victory in the field, the one that has the greater backing at home is certain to overwhelm the other.

It was not the dollar that won the war, it was the spirit behind the dollar. Before Prince Max asked for the armistice he had learned that $9,978,835,800 had been subscribed in this country toward his defeat. It is natural to assume that this fact did not impress him so much as the related fact that millions of persons had participated in the subscription.

Up to the end of the Fourth Loan, which coincided with the negotiations for the Armistice, $16,971,909,050 had been paid in and this helped to save life to an extent that we can only imagine. It was the confident expectation when the Americans halted the German onslaught at Château-Thierry that the end of the war would come in the following spring. None dared to hope that it would come before Christmas. When the crash came in November, even the Allied commanders were bewildered by its suddenness. Had the war been prolonged to the spring of 1919, it is certain that we would have paid a large toll in lives. Some have estimated that 100,000 more of our young men would have been sacrificed. That the war did not drag along for six months more may be ascribed in part to the effect that the demonstrated loyalty of the Liberty Loan Army had upon German morale. We know that the Germans fed lies to their own troops and dropped pamphlets with these same falsehoods into our own trenches. They tried to convince their own and our men that the Loans had no support.

MOBILIZING THE LIBERTY LOAN ARMY

When at 11 o'clock on November 11, 1918, peace dawned upon a war-sick world we had 2,000,000 men in Europe, and as many more on this side putting themselves in readiness to go across. On the seas we had close to 300,000 men. This tremendous force was welded into form in the nineteen months we were in the war. Yet within a few months after our entrance into the war there were more than this total in the Liberty Loan Army. The list of subscribers to the First Liberty Loan which closed two months after our entry had 4,500,000 names.

And this number remained for the duration of the war, giving every penny they could spare, mortgaging their property, committing themselves to personal privations. When the Second Loan books were totalled in November the number had increased to 9,500,000, and it leaped to 17,000,000 in the Third. In the Fourth--the last loan of war-time--it had grown to 22,777,680 and in the Fifth which closed six months after the armistice, it finished with 12,000,000 names.

As in the Army, where organization is half the battle, it was through organization of the enthusiasm and the deep fervor of the American people that success came in this big venture. We had to create a state of mind, we had to educate the American public in finance--which in itself appeared an insuperable task--we had to marshal resources on a scale such as never before had been attempted, and we had to map out a sales campaign that would comprehend millions of persons. There were no precedents to go by; the example set in Europe could not have application in the United States because of temperamental and financial differences; the flotation of the loans in the Civil War afforded no practicable working basis. It was pioneering, and this fact was made clear in the first conference held in Washington when Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo called together the financial leaders of the country.

Only three weeks were allowed to prepare for the First Loan Drive. As soon as we had decided to get into the war, this decision carried with it the determination to go in to the limit of our resources. The Secretary of the Treasury informed the bankers that the first issue would be for $2,000,000,000 and this would be merely the forerunner of a succession of loans in larger amounts. The bonds were to be put on the market at three and a half percent. and the campaigns were to be conducted according to the territories of the Federal Reserve districts, twelve in all.

"It is quite likely," said the Secretary of the Treasury, "that
we could induce a group of men to take up this loan but that
would compromise the country before the world. We must sell to
the public in such numbers that there shall exist no doubt
among our enemies that our people are back of the Government as
a unit in this war."

The men whom he addressed were all recognized as organizers, all had been identified with big business. However, few of them had had the general contact with the public so essential to popularizing the loan. They knew how to sell, but not in small denominations or to millions of purchasers. In an abstract sense they realized the value of advertising and newspaper publicity, but not one of them had the remotest idea of how the ideal of Secretary McAdoo could be realized.

ORGANIZING THE FIRST DRIVE

It was at this point that their resourcefulness came into play. Their first move was the right one; they engaged specialists to undertake the tasks of which they knew little. They addressed themselves to the public through men skilled in establishing such contacts as are given through advertising, publicity, and canvassing. In the brief time allotted to them, they barely had time to surround themselves with this trained talent.

Verily, it was shooting in the dark, a process of hit and miss. Some one said that the campaign in the First Loan was planned as we went along, and that is literally true. The patriotism was there--that was an unquestionable fact; the problem was to make it manifest itself in sacrifice of savings and earnings. The work of the whole three weeks was experimental and the country was the laboratory. Let it be said that the alchemy of patriotism transmuted the hearts and minds of the public into pure gold. Once the people were informed of their duty toward the United States they rallied instantly.

Newspapers turned over their columns, advertisers offered their precious space--and it was precious in those days of paper shortage; stores and banks opened booths for sales, public speakers cancelled every other engagement that they might participate, factories strove to enlist every person in their employment as purchasers, clubs responded in whole memberships, women's committees were formed for the acceleration of interest, churches consecrated themselves to the project, trade unions abandoned all differences with employers and allied themselves unselfishly, writers pleaded for a chance to exercise their influence, foreign language groups demanded opportunity to prove their Americanism, actors, singers, and lecturers begged for a place in the campaign.

Wholeheartedly and with utter disregard of personal sacrifice this vast aggregation committed itself to the task. The initial momentum gave the drive the force of an avalanche that swept everything else aside. There came times during this first drive when the issue seemed in doubt, but this was due more to an excess of enthusiasm than to a lack of support. When the totals were in, it was realized that these misgivings were due to the physical inability of the tabulators to keep abreast of the tide of subscriptions. The subscriptions went to $3,035,226,850.

It had been said that the first campaign in its directive agencies was largely hit and miss. When it was over the strikes were recorded and the misses eliminated for the preliminary work of the Second Loan which was to follow in October. Out of the mass was evolved a system of methods that served as the groundwork of the real organization. The results afforded a working basis that would have carried a dozen loans through, granting that the people remained faithful to their patriotism.

THE APPEAL

Let it be admitted that in the first loan there was no defined appeal. We were in the war and in to win, that was sufficient. It was foreseen that the psychology of the public must have a central theme for the next loan to which it must respond. The Second campaign began on October 1, 1917, after the embarkation of the nucleus of the vast army that eventually was to overwhelm the foe. None of them yet had been called into action. The keynote of this drive was the education of the people on the meaning of a German victory. We had before us the ghastly stories of what the Germans had done in Belgium and in France; we had to throw ourselves into the conflict to keep our own homes safe.

The eyes of all Europe, our Allies and our enemies, were upon us. It was clear that by the results at home we would be judged, as we had not yet had the opportunity to show ourselves in the field. For four weeks and a day the campaign went on, this time for $3,000,000,000. The appeal which touched the heartstrings of all persons served a double purpose. Not only did it carry the message of the Loan, but it knit closer the sentiment of the whole American people to the purposes of the war. Through its constant reiteration it had the effect of a prayer and like a prayer gained added meaning with deeper thought.

Thought was compelled through its manifold repetitions. All the functions of life were linked with it, all the recreations, all the relaxations embodied it in part. It formed the backbone of conversation, it became a part of every daily activity. It assailed the eye at every turn, it smote the ear constantly, it crashed into consciousnesses in every conceivable form. Through a strange paradox it linked a fear and a hope. It embraced the whole gamut of emotions.

GROWING RESPONSE

Again there was a resounding response. In the First Loan the subscriptions were limited to the actual amount of the issue, but in the Second all subscriptions were accepted. The number of those who took bonds was increased more than 100 percent.--it reached 9,500,000, to be exact, and the $3,000,000,000 issue went to $3,808,766,150.

So it was in the Third, which was put before the public on the anniversary of our entrance into the war. At this time our men had gone into the trenches which in itself made the war our own in its most serious meaning. This was intensified throughout the land by the operation of the Selective Service Act. The draft had entered almost every home; many of those who had qualified in the first call were at that time in France. Casualty lists were beginning to appear in the newspapers.

It needed only this fact--the fact in itself was its own appeal--to bring out the finest in our people. All previous sentiment faded into insignificance compared with the solemnity of the actual participation. The resources that we had been led to believe had been plumbed to their depths were now revealed to us as inexhaustible. Giving seemed to be the poorest means of showing how the country was touched; the people gave as if in despair because this was all they might do.

The campaign had been for $3,000,000,000 and it brought in returns of $4,170,069,650 from 17,000,000 men, women and children in the United States; men, who regretted that this was all they might give to their country's need; women, who offered with each dollar a passionate prayer that it might help the men now matching themselves against the foe, and children, who realized with joy that they were becoming part of the world's greatest war.

FOURTH LIBERTY LOAN

Before the Fourth Loan the Rolls of Honor in the daily newspapers were carrying a lengthening list of those who had paid the supreme sacrifice. In the training camps more and more hundreds of thousands of drafted men were preparing themselves to take their places on the line; the sea lanes were crowded with troopships, each bearing the best of our country away. There had been a depressing period when Ludendorff's men seemed to carry everything before them, when the coast ports of France seemed menaced, but before the bugle called the non-combatants at home to attention again our boys had turned the tide at Château-Thierry and now were in full cry after the fugitive enemy.

On September 27, 1918, the call for the Fourth Loan came and it seemed at the time as if it had been postponed too long because the foe was crumbling. President Wilson sounded the tocsin in the Metropolitan Opera House in New York City. This time the appeal was to drive home the finishing blows, to demonstrate to the crumbling empire of the Hohenzollerns that here was a people undivided and unafraid.