Chapter IX: Section 14: of the Lever Bill, which became the Food Control (1)

Law, the President is authorized from time to time to determine
and fix a reasonable guaranteed price for wheat and this
section itself fixed the price for the crop of 1918 at not less
than $2 per bushel at the principal interior primary markets.
Pursuant to this section the President has, by two separate
decrees, set the price of 1917 wheat and of the 1918 crop at
$2.20 per bushel. Section 11 of the law authorizes the
President to purchase and store and sell wheat and flour,
meal, beans, and potatoes. Manifestly any purchase so made by
the government would in effect fix the price. Aside from these
delegations of power no authority is given by the Food Control
Law to fix prices. And yet a study of the operations of these
provisions as well as a regard for the implications of other
functions of the Food Administration carry the conviction that
price fixing is a necessary and inescapable corollary of the
effective prosecution of the Food Administration program."

PRICE LEVEL, NOVEMBER, 1918

With the close of military operations there was noted a slight decline in commodity prices; how far the downward tendency would reach was considered a moot point. The apparent zenith point in prices was attained in July, 1918, but _Bradstreet's_ prudently thought it unwise to indulge in any prophecies regarding low prices. The increased demand for food products among the stricken peoples of Europe would, it was believed, prevent any considerable fall in prices. There was not much to encourage consumers in the study of the index numbers of food commodities. The writer in _Bradstreet's_ shows a wide range of price movements in the following table, in which are given the index numbers based on the prices per pound of ninety-six articles:

1912
January $8.9493
February 8.9578
March 8.9019
April 9.0978
May 9.2696
June 9.1017
July 9.1119
August 9.1595
September 9.2157
October 9.4515
November 9.4781
December 9.5462

1913
January 9.4935
February 9.4592
March 9.4052
April 9.2976
May 9.1394
June 9.0721
July 8.9522
August 9.0115
September 9.1006
October 9.1526
November 9.2252
December 9.2290

1914
January 8.8857
February 8.8619
March 8.8320
April 8.7562
May 8.6224
June 8.6220
July 8.6566
August 8.7087
August 15 9.8495
September 9.7572
October 9.2416
November 8.8620
December 9.0354

1915
January $9.1431
February 9.6621
March 9.6197
April 9.7753
May 9.7978
June 9.7428
July 9.8698
August 9.8213
September 9.8034
October 9.9774
November 10.3768
December 10.6473

1916
January 10.9163
February 11.1415
March 11.3760
April 11.7598
May 11.7485
June 11.6887
July 11.5294
August 11.4414
September 11.7803
October 12.0699
November 12.7992
December 13.6628

1917
January 13.7277
February 13.9427
March 14.1360
April 14.5769
May 15.1208
June 15.4680
July 16.0680
August 16.3985
September 16.6441
October 16.9135
November 17.0701
December 17.5966
1918
January $17.9636
February 18.0776
March 18.0732
April 18.4656
May 18.9133
June 19.0091
July 19.1849
August 19.1162
September 19.0485
October 19.0167
November 18.9110

The groups that make up the index number are as follows:

Nov. 1, Sept. 1, Oct. 1, Nov. 1,
1917 1918 1918 1918
Breadstuffs $0.2105 $0.2077 $0.2026 $0.1999
Live stock .6785 .7400 .7100 .6960
Provisions 4.0285 4.3264 4.5359 4.5889
Fruits .4288 .3725 .3725 .3725
Hides and leather 2.3900 2.2150 2.2150 2.2050
Textiles 5.1179 5.8742 5.7554 5.7029
Metals 1.1477 1.4233 1.3662 1.3062
Coal and coke .0101 .0119 .0120 .0120
Oils .9084 1.3185 1.3121 1.2734
Naval stores .0956 .1295 .1255 .1348
Building materials .1448 .2047 .2047 .2046
Chemicals and drugs 1.4261 1.5153 1.5253 1.5278
Miscellaneous .4832 .7095 .6795 .6870
-------- -------- -------- -------
Total $17.0701 $19.0485 $19.0167 $18.9110

A Municipal Canning Station

In city establishments like the one shown above, food that would otherwise go to waste in the markets was saved, and women were instructed in the best methods of putting up fruits and vegetables for winter use.]

FOOD CONDITIONS AND PRICE LEVEL, 1919

A clear summary of the food situation and price conditions in the half-year succeeding the armistice is to be found in the Federal Commission's Memorandum on food stocks and wholesale prices, June, 1919:

"The comparative amounts of food stocks on hand June 1, 1919,
as against June 1, 1918, in the case of many important foods,
show that the stocks are considerably larger.

"On June 1, 1918, the United States stocks were in demand for
feeding the armies of the Allies as well as the civilian
population. The fact that stocks of many important foods were
much larger on June 1, 1919, while prices were as high or
higher, apparently, means that they are being withheld
speculatively for a world demand which is not now here but
which is expected when hunger-impelled strikes secure higher
wages with which higher food prices can be paid.

"The statistics of stocks are from the latest and last issue of
the Bureau of Markets 'Food Surveys,' June 27, 1919. We use the
quantities reported by identical firms for 1918 and 1919.
(Stocks held June 1, 1919, by other firms not reporting for
June 1, 1918, increase the actual stocks from 5 or 10 per cent.
up to 20 or 25 per cent. over the comparable stocks). The
stocks are those in warehouses and cold storage houses and in
hands of wholesale dealers. Retail stocks are not reported. The
prices are wholesale prices, furnished by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, for the first Tuesday in June.

COMMODITIES INCREASING IN STOCKS AND IN PRICE (WHOLESALE PRICES) ========================================================================= | | Quantity | | Price |------+----------+----------+--------| |-----------+----- | | | | | | | Commodity Unit |June, 1919|June, 1918|Per cent| Unit of| June | June | of | | | in- | Price | 1919 | 1918 |quan- | | | crease | | | | tity | | | 1919 | | | | | | | over | | | | | | | 1918 | | | --------+------+----------+----------+--------+--------+-----------+----- Wheat |Bushel|41,955,167|15,286,331| 174.5| Dollars| 2.51| 2.20 | | | | | per bu.| 2.46| 2.17 --------+------+----------+----------+--------+--------+-----------+----- Wheat |Barrel| 3,942,205| 3,236,671| 21.8| Dollars| 12-12.20| 9.80 flour | | | | |per bbl.|11.50-11.80| 9.95 --------+------+----------+----------+--------+--------+-----------+----- Canned |Pound |99,203,544|82,616,582| 20.1| Dollars| 2.70-2.75| 2.70 salmon | | | | |per doz.| | | | | | | No. 2 | | | | | | | cans | | --------+------+----------+----------+--------+--------+-----------+----- Canned |Pound |81,233,023|42,352,994| 91.8| Dollars| | 1.70 corn | | | | |per doz.| 1.75-(Mch)| 1.75 | | | | | No. 2 | | | | | | | cans | | --------+------+----------+----------+--------+--------+-----------+----- Fresh | Case | 5,975,817| 5,441,560| 9.8| Cents| .40-40½| .29 eggs | | | | |per doz.| | .30¾ --------+------+----------+----------+--------+--------+-----------+----- Butter |Pound |29,190,222|12,749,055| 129.0| Cents| .53 .41 (creamery) | | | | per lb.| | --------+------+----------+----------+--------+--------+-----------+----- Salt |Pound |25,701,138|24,962,881| 3.0| Dollars| 35.00|32.00 Beef | | | | |per bbl.| 36.00|34.00 --------+------+----------+----------+--------+--------+-----------+----- Frozen |Pound |10,962,670| 2,749,077| 298.8| Cents | .37½| .34½ fowls | | | | | per lb.| | =========================================================================

COMMODITIES INCREASING IN STOCKS AND DECREASING IN PRICE.
(Wholesale Prices.)

========================================================================= | Quantity | | | Price ---------+--------+-----------+----------+--------+-------+--------+----- |Unit of | | | |Unit of| | |quantity| | |Per cent| Price | June | June Commodity| | June, 1919|June, 1918|increase| | 1919 | 1918 ---------+--------+-----------+----------+--------+-------+--------+----- | | | | |Dollars| 1.19 - | 1.21 Barley | Bushel | 16,399,396| 7,916,073| 107.2|per bu.| 1.27 | 1.26 ---------+--------+-----------+----------+--------+-------+--------+----- Rye | Bushel | 11,613,127| 3,355,349| 246.1|Dollars| 1.53½ | 1.73 | | | | |per bu.| | ---------+--------+-----------+----------+--------+-------+--------+----- Buckwheat| Pound | 18,053,230| 5,523,850| 226.8|Dollars| 5.00 | 5.75 Flour | | | | |per cwt| (Apr) | 6.25 | | | | | | |(Apr) ---------+--------+-----------+----------+--------+-------+--------+----- Canned | Pound |179,101,286|88,531,024| 102.3|Dollars| 2.05 | 2.30 Tomatoes | | | | | per |(Dec'18)| | | | | | doz. | | | | | | | No. 3 | | | | | | | cans | | ---------+--------+-----------+----------+--------+-------+--------+-----

COMMODITIES DECREASING IN STOCKS AND IN PRICE. (Wholesale Prices)

======================================================================= | | Quantity | | Price | |----------+-----------+--------+ |------+----- Commodity|Unit of |June, 1919| June, 1918|Per cent|Unit of| June | June |quantity| | |decrease| Price | 1919 | 1918 | | | | 1919- | | | | | | | 1918 | | | ---------+--------+----------+-----------+--------+-------+------+----- Oats | Bushel |37,827,343| 41,763,555| 9.4| Cents | 69|73½ | | | | |per bu.| | ---------+--------+----------+-----------+--------+-------+------+----- Corn Meal| Pound |34,231,066|117,674,918| 70.9|Dollars| 3.90| 4.25 | | | | |per cwt| | ---------+--------+----------+-----------+--------+-------+------+----- Beans | Bushel | 4,252,451| 4,408,686| 3.5|Dollars| 7.75-|12.25 | | | | |per cwt| 8.00|12.50 ---------+--------+----------+-----------+--------+-------+------+----- Rice | Pound |75,134,920| 80,727,516| 6.9| Cents | 6 | 8.5 (Blue | | | | |per lb.| 7-7/8| 8.9 Rose- | | | | | | | Honduras)| | | | | | 9-1/8| 8½ | | | | | [10][11] 9-5/8 =======================================================================

[10] First week JUNE.

[11] Increase in price.

COMMODITIES DECREASING IN STOCKS AND INCREASING IN PRICE.
(Wholesale Prices)

========================================================================= | | Quantity | | Price | | | | | |-----------+-----------+--------+ +-----+------ | | | | | | | Commodity |Unit of |June, 1919 |June, 1918 |Percent |Unit of|June | June |quantity| | |decrease| Price |1919 | 1918 | | | | 1919- | | | | | | | 1918 | | | ----------+--------+-----------+-----------+--------+-------+-----+------ Corn | Bushel | 13,260,910| 27,883,361| 52.4|Dollars| 1.76| 1.50 | | | | |per bu.| 1.77| 1.55 ----------+--------+-----------+-----------+--------+-------+-----+------ Sugar | Pound |207,622,237|217,632,365| 4.6| Cents | 8.82| 7.30 | | | | |per lb.| | ----------+--------+-----------+-----------+--------+-------+-----+------ Cheese | Pound | 10,174,502| 15,875,236| 35.9| Cents | 31|21½ (American)| | | | |per lb.| | ----------+--------+-----------+-----------+--------+-------+-----+------ Dry Salt | Pound |395,940,437|488,344,838| 18.9|Dollars|58.00| 48-50 Pork | | | | | per |58.50| | | | | | bbl. | | ----------+--------+-----------+-----------+--------+-------+-----+------ Lard | Pound | 81,275,392|106,649,588| 23.8| Cents |33.80|24.15 | | | | |per lb.|34.30|24.25 =========================================================================

The following data, taken from the _Monthly Labor Review_ of July 1919, give a survey of the retail prices of food in the United States:

AVERAGE RETAIL PRICES AND PER CENT OF INCREASE OR DECREASE IN THE UNITED STATES MAY 15 OF EACH SPECIFIED YEAR COMPARED WITH MAY 15, 1913 ========================================================================+ | | | | | | | | | | | Average retail prices, May 15-- | | +---------------------------------------+ Article | Unit | | | | 1913|1914|1915|1916|1917|1918|1919| -----------------------+--------+---------+----+----+----+----+----+----| | | _Cts.|Cts.|Cts.|Cts.|Cts.|Cts.|Cts._ Sirloin steak | Pound | 25.7|25.9|25.7|27.8|32.2|40.0|44.4| Round steak | do | 22.3|23.3|23.0|25.0|29.6|38.0|41.6| Rib roast | do | 19.9|20.1|19.9|21.6|25.7|31.8|35.2| Chuck roast | do | 16.1|17.0|16.3|17.5|21.8|27.8|29.7| Plate beef | do | 12.1|12.5|12.3|13.1|16.6|21.9|22.5| | | | | | | | | | Pork chops | do | 20.9|22.2|20.9|22.9|30.6|36.7|43.0| Bacon | do | 27.0|26.7|26.4|28.4|41.6|50.5|56.7| Ham | do | 26.8|26.8|25.6|31.8|38.8|45.6|54.6| Lamb | do | 19.4|19.8|21.7|23.2|29.7|36.8|39.6| Hens | do | 22.2|22.7|21.5|24.1|29.3|37.9|43.5| | | | | | | | | | Salmon, canned | do | | |19.8|20.0|25.7|29.6|31.9| Milk, fresh | | | | | | | | | Milk, evaporated | | | | | | | | | (unsweetened) | [12] | | | | | |15.1| | Butter | Pound | 35.9|32.7|34.7|37.0|46.5|51.0|67.9| Oleomargarine | do | | | | | | |40.4| | | | | | | | | | Nut margarine | do | | | | | | |35.3| Cheese | do | | |23.5|24.8|33.8|33.4|42.2| Lard | do | 15.8|15.6|15.1|20.1|27.8|32.9|38.8| Crisco | do | | | | | | |33.9| Eggs, strictly fresh | Dozen | 26.3|26.6|26.3|28.1|39.8|42.4|53.1| | | | | | | | | | Bread |Pound[13] 5.6| 6.2| 7.2| 7.0| 9.6| 9.8| 9.8| Flour | Pound | 3.3| 3.3| 4.5| 3.9| 8.7| 6.6| 7.5| Corn meal | do | 3.0| 3.1| 3.3| 3.3| 5.4| 7.0| 6.2| Rolled oats | Pound | | | | | | | 8.4| Corn flakes | [14] | | | | | | |14.1| | | | | | | | | | Cream of wheat | [15] | | | | | | |25.1| Rice | Pound | | | 9.1| 9.1|10.5|12.3|13.4| Macaroni | do | | | | | | |19.0| Beans, navy | do | | | 7.6| 9.4|19.1|17.8|12.0| Potatoes | do | 1.6| 1.9| 1.6| 2.5| 6.1| 2.2| 3.3| | | | | | | | | | Onions | do | | | 4.3| 5.1| 8.6| 5.6|10.7| Cabbage | do | | | | | | | 9.6| Beans, baked | |No. 2 can. | | | | |17.5| Corn, canned | do | | | | | | |19.1| Peas, canned | do | | | | | | |19.0| | | | | | | | | | Tomatoes, canned | do | | | | | | |15.8| Sugar, granulated | Pound | 5.4|5.0 | 6.8| 8.5|10.0| 9.1|10.6| | | | | | | | | | Tea | do | | |54.6|54.6|55.7|63.8|69.8| Coffee | do | | |27.9|29.9|30.2|30.1|40.5| | | | | | | | | | Prunes | do | | |13.7|13.3|15.3|16.5|23.2| Raisins | do | | |12.5|12.6|14.4|15.1|16.3| Bananas | Dozen | | | | | | |38.8| Oranges | do | | | | | | |54.1| | | | | | | | | | All articles combined | | | | | | | | | -----------------------+--------+---------+----+----+----+----+----+----+ ========================================================================= | | |Per cent of increase (+) or | | | |decrease (-) May 15 of each | | | |specified year compared with | | | |May 15, 1913. | | |---------------------------------------+ Article | Unit | | | | |1914|1915|1916|1917|1918|1919| -----------------------+--------+---------+----+----+----+----+----+----| | | | | | | | | | Sirloin steak | Pound | | +1|[16]| +8| +25| +56| +73| Round steak | do | | +4| +3| +12| +33| +70| +87| Rib roast | do | | +1|[16]| +9| +29| +60| +77| Chuck roast | do | | +6| +1| +9| +35| +73| +84| Plate beef | do | | +3| +2| +8| +37| +81| +86| | | | | | | | | | Pork chops | do | | +6|[16]| +10| +46|+ 76|+106| Bacon | do | | -1| -2| +5| +54|+ 87|+110| Ham | do | |[16]| -5| +19| +45|+ 70|+104| Lamb | do | | +2| +12| +20| +53|+ 90|+104| Hens | do | | +2| -3| +9| +32|+ 71|+ 96| | | | | | | | | | Salmon, canned | do | | | | | | | | Milk, fresh | | | | | | | | | Milk, evaporated | | | | | | | | | (unsweetened) | [12] | | | | | | | | Butter | Pound | | 9 | 3| +3| +30| +42| +89| Oleomargarine | do | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Nut margarine | do | | | | | | | | Cheese | do | | | | | | | | Lard | do | | -1| 4| +27| +76|+108|+146| Crisco | do | | | | | | | | Eggs, strictly fresh | Dozen | | +1|| +7| +51| +61|+102| | | | | | | | | | Bread |Pound[13] | +11| +29| +25| +71| +75|+ 75| Flour | Pound | |[16]| +36| +18|+164|+100|+127| Corn meal | do | | +3| +10| +10|+ 80|+133|+107| Rolled oats | Pound | | | | | | | | Corn flakes | [14] | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Cream of wheat | [15] | | | | | | | | Rice | Pound | | | | | | | | Macaroni | do | | | | | | | | Beans, navy | do | | | | | | | | Potatoes | do | |+ 19|[16]|+ 56|+281|+ 38|+106| | | | | | | | | | Onions | do | | | | | | | | Cabbage | do | | | | | | | | Beans, baked | |No. 2 can. | | | | | | Corn, canned | do | | | | | | | | Peas, canned | do | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Tomatoes, canned | do | | | | | | | | Sugar, granulated | Pound | |- 7|+ 26|+ 57|+ 85|+ 69|+ 96| | | | | | | | | | Tea | do | | | | | | | | Coffee | do | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Prunes | do | | | | | | | | Raisins | do | | | | | | | | Bananas | Dozen | | | | | | | | Oranges | do | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | All articles combined | | |+ 1|+ 3|+ 13|+ 56|+ 64|+ 91| -----------------------+--------+---------+----+----+----+----+----+----|

[12] 15-16 ounce can.

[13] Baked weight.

[14] 8-ounce package.

[15] 28-ounce package.

[16] No change in price.

"The total of dry storage stocks, including those that
increased and those that decreased is as follows, all items
being reduced to pounds:

June 1, 1919 7,875,280,040
June 1, 1918 6,336,763,505

"That is the total dry storage stocks reported on June 1, 1919,
were 124 per cent. of those on June 1, 1918.

"The total of cold storage items reported in pounds in June,
1919, and June, 1918 (omitting apples in barrels but covering
eggs; frozen eggs; butter; cheese, frozen and cured beef;
frozen lamb and mutton; frozen, dry salt and pickled pork;
lard; and frozen poultry), was as follows:

June 1, 1919 1,671,777,990
June 1, 1918 1,669,826,166

"That is, cold storage stocks this June are 100.1 per cent. of
those last June.

"None of the above figures include army stores nor the army
excess supply which is to be distributed by the War Department
under resolution of the House of Representatives.

"The sum of dry storage and cold storage (except apples) for
the two periods (combining the figures already given) was as
follows:

June 1, 1919 9,547,058,030 pounds
June 1, 1918 8,006,589,671 pounds

"That is the total stocks reported on June 1, 1919, were 119
per cent. of those on June 1, 1918.

"This as noted does not include Army supplies.

"Grouping the commodities in four classes:

"(1) Those increasing in stocks and increasing in price.

"(2) Those increasing in stocks and decreasing in price.

"(3) Those decreasing in stocks and increasing in price.

"(4) Those decreasing in stocks and decreasing in price; we
have the accompanying significant tables, which indicate that
the 'law of supply and demand' is not working.

III--INDUSTRY AND LABOR IN WARTIME

Unprecedented Conditions and Developments Due to the World War and How They Were Met

The issue of the great world conflict between autocracy and democracy rested largely in the hands of the laboring classes behind the lines. Mr. William B. Wilson, Secretary of Labor, placed vividly before the public in one of his official statements the views of American labor at the outbreak of the war:

"During the past decade the sentiment of American labor has
crystallized against resort to arms as a means of settlement of
disputes between nations. War had come to be considered
wasteful economically, socially, and morally. Labor felt that
no national advantage gained through force of arms could offset
the human life sacrificed, the burden of taxation levied upon
successive generations to pay the cost of war, the standards of
life set back or destroyed, which had to be rebuilt slowly and
with infinite sacrifice. In short, war had come to be looked
upon as morally wrong, entirely unnecessary, a calamity that
could be avoided and must be avoided if the race was to
progress. This feeling was shared to a greater or lesser extent
by the workers of all civilized nations, and there was a
universal feeling in world labor ranks prior to the outbreak of
the European war that this sentiment, shared by many thoughtful
people outside the ranks of the wage workers in all civilized
nations, was strong enough to prevent any armed conflict which
would involve any number of peoples. This sentiment was
undoubtedly responsible for the lack of military preparedness,
in the sense that Germany prepared, among the other major
powers now engaged in the world conflict.

"When the war clouds broke in Europe, American labor was
stunned. All its preconceived notions as to the inability of
any great nation to wage war upon another nation because the
working people would refuse either to fight or produce
munitions and supplies of war were shattered when nation after
nation quickly mobilized its armies and the organized labor
movements of each country, without exception, quickly pledged
their men and their resources to the support of their
respective governments. But the fact that America itself might
be drawn into the world conflict was still foreign to the mind
of the American workman. While American labor grieved over the
fate which had befallen its kind in Europe no sense of danger
to this country was apparent. From the beginning of this
Republic it had been our national policy to hold aloof from the
quarrels of the Old World. The splendid isolation of thousands
of miles of ocean protected us. We had no quarrel with Europe
and we asked but to be let alone. We stood upon our rights to
protect the people of continental America from invasion or
aggression as enunciated by the Monroe Doctrine, and further
than that we could not see that the European conflict embroiled
us as a nation. Let Europe settle her own family quarrel. We
were to remain the one great neutral nation of the earth. When
the time came America, untrammeled by participation in the
conflict, with no desire for American aggrandizement or
territorial expansion, would be the natural messenger of peace
to war-worried Europe."

SAFEGUARDS FOR WORKINGMEN

From the moment of the declaration of war the general loyalty of the laboring classes throughout the United States was apparent. This attitude of loyalty found a ready response in the immediately declared intention of the Government to safeguard the interests of the workingmen. Congress announced its attitude toward standards of legal protection for workers. It was printed verbatim in _Labor Laws in War Time_, 201, p. 1, as follows:

"WHEREAS, The entrance of the United States into the World War
appears imminent; and

"WHEREAS, Other countries upon engaging in the conflict
permitted a serious breakdown of protective labor regulations
with the result, as shown by recent official investigations, of
early and unmistakable loss of health, output, and national
effectiveness; and

"WHEREAS, Our own experience has already demonstrated that
accidents increase with speeding up and the employment of new
workers unaccustomed to their tasks, that over fatigue defeats
the object aimed at in lengthening working hours, and that new
occupational poisoning has accompanied the recent development
of munition manufacture; and

"WHEREAS, The full strength of our nation is needed as never
before and we cannot afford to suffer loss of labor power
through accidents, disease, industrial poisoning, and
overfatigue; now, therefore, be it.

"_Resolved_, That the American Association for Labor
Legislation, at this critical time, in order to promote the
success of our country in war as well as in peace, would sound
a warning against the shortsightedness and laxness at first
exemplified abroad in these matters, and would urge all
public-spirited citizens to coöperate in maintaining, for the
protection of those who serve in this time of stress the
industries of the nation (who as experience abroad has shown
are quite as important to military success as the fighting
forces), the following essential minimum requirements:

I. SAFETY

"1. Maintenance of all existing standards of safeguarding
machinery and industrial processes for the prevention of
accidents.

II. SANITATION

"1. Maintenance of all existing measures for the prevention of
occupational diseases.

"2. Immediate agreement upon practicable methods for the
prevention of special occupational poisonings incident to
making and handling explosives.

III. HOURS

"1. Three-shift system in continuous industries.

"2. In non-continuous industries, maintenance of existing
standard working day as basic.

"3. One day's rest in seven for all workers.

IV. WAGES

"1. Equal pay for equal work, without discrimination as to sex.

"2. Maintenance of existing wage rates for basic working day.

"3. Time and one-half for all hours beyond basic working day.

"4. Wage rates to be periodically revised to correspond with
variations in the cost of living.

V. CHILD LABOR

"1. Maintenance of all existing special regulations regarding
child labor, including minimum wages, maximum hours,
prohibition of night work, prohibited employment, and
employment certificates.

"2. Determination of specially hazardous employments to be
forbidden to children under sixteen.

VI. WOMAN'S WORK

"1. Maintenance of existing special regulations regarding
woman's work, including maximum hours, prohibition of night
work, prohibited hazardous employments, and prohibited
employment immediately before and after childbirth.

VII. SOCIAL INSURANCE

"1. Maintenance of existing standards of workmen's compensation
for industrial accidents and diseases.

"2. Extension of workmen's compensation laws to embrace
occupational diseases, especially those particularly incident
to the manufacture and handling of explosives.

"3. Immediate investigation of the sickness problem among the
workers to ascertain the advisability of establishing universal
workmen's health insurance.

VIII. LABOR MARKET

"1. Extension of existing systems of public employment bureaus
to aid in the intelligent distribution of labor throughout the
country.

IX. ADMINISTRATION OF LABOR LAWS

"1. Increased appropriations for enlarged staffs of inspectors
to enforce labor legislation.

"2. Representation of employees, employers, and the public on
joint councils for coöperating elsewhere with the labor
departments in drafting and enforcing necessary regulations to
put the foregoing principles into full effect."

ORGANIZING LABOR FOR WAR WORK

Supplying the man power for industrial action during the war was a really more complicated task than drafting men for military service. In the earlier period of American participation labor was distributed more or less according to the law of supply and demand. The unequal distribution of workers became a grave problem. To meet this the United States Employment Service of the Department of Labor took over the supply of war industries with common labor, and all independent recruiting of labor by manufacturers having a pay roll of more than a hundred men was discontinued.

H. E. Coffin, Chairman on Industrial Preparedness of the Council of National Defence, described the conflict as a war of munitions, of factories, of producing powers, of sweating men and women workers. In the plant sketched above, 26,000 men toiled and sweated during the war to make munitions for our troops overseas.]

"On this Board were representatives of the War, Navy, and
Agriculture Departments, the Shipping Board and the Emergency
Fleet Corporation, the War Industries Board, and the Food,
Fuel, and Railroad Administrations. Assistant Director Nathan
A. Smyth, of the United States Employment Service, was quoted
in the New York _Globe_ as saying in part:

"'Today the war industries of the country are short about
500,000 unskilled workers, and the coming requirements of war
production necessitate finding between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000
more.

"'Similarly the demand for skilled workers in war industries is
greater than the immediately available supply. Before long we
will have to take every tool maker and die-sinker in non-war
work and put him in war production.'

"The country was divided into thirteen Federal districts, by
the regulation of labor for war industries, and each was in
charge of a superintendent of the United States Employment
Service, while the States within the several districts were in
charge of a State director. The labor problem this measure was
designed to remedy and control was pictured by Secretary of
Labor Wilson, who was quoted in the New York _Sun_ as saying in
part:

"'The Government found itself in need of men, and on going out
to get them found itself in competition with private industry,
which was equally hard pressed. Men who had never drawn more
than a common laborer's wages found themselves at a premium in
the market, and began to ask and receive extortionate prices,
and to rove from place to place seeking still higher prices.

"'Everywhere industry was hampered by what is known as the
turnover, or the constant shifting of itinerant labor, in some
cases the loss in efficiency running as high as 100 per cent.
This is what is perhaps best described as the evil of the
individualistic strike--the strike by the man, thousands of
him, in different yards and factories all over the country, who
is forever throwing down his tools and wandering away on the
slightest rumor of higher wages elsewhere, who by his habit of
roving never masters the details of any trade, and who in the
mass accounts for a greater loss than all the organized strikes
and walkouts in the land.'"

INFLUENCE OF WAR CONDITIONS

In the United States under war conditions labor unrest did not reach the intense form manifested in England. Nevertheless a great many strikes were reported. Surprise was expressed that the labor adjustment machinery of the War Department and of the Navy Department was not appealed to. Besides there was the National War Labor Board to take up mediation. Investigations in Bridgeport, Connecticut, showed an increase of earnings of 81 per cent. against an increase of living prices of 61 per cent. Yet at one time the Press reported strikes in over 350 machine shops in New Jersey--nearly all engaged in necessary war work--as well as trouble in many shipyards. Of course there was the explanation of foreign propaganda or a tendency toward industrial Bolshevism. Such explanations failed to account for the fact that American workmen as a whole were patriotic.

Attention was called, on the other hand, to the warm tribute given by the Federal Fuel Administrator to the bituminous coal miners who had brought production past the 13 million ton mark in the second week in July, 1917, and the exceptional efforts of diligent and patriotic workers in the shipyard. A portion of the press emphasized the unreasonableness of striking while the laboring people enjoyed, during war time, immunity from service and immunity from the pressure of competition for wages. The Springfield _Republican_ protested against applying to the workingmen exaggerated standards of economic rectitude.

"It is easy to be harsh in one's judgment even in the case of
the strikes that occur. Why do they strike at all while the war
continues? Have they no capacity for self-sacrifice for the
country? These questions will be asked by many people whenever
war work anywhere is checked in the least degree by workmen
dropping their tools.

"On the other hand, let us not be unjust to labor, for in the
American Army in France labor is represented by multitudes of
youth upon whose gallantry and steadiness all our hopes of
victory depend. No class here at home gives 100 per cent.
efficiency or commits itself to 100 per cent. of sacrifice in
the winning of the war. Why demand it of the wage earners or
the labor unions?

"Simply because of its organization and its machinery of
leadership, however, labor enjoys an exceptional opportunity to
contribute to the winning of the war. This is the first great
war in history in which labor has been organized into an
economic unit, and that is the reason for some special war
problems today which were never encountered by governments in
previous wars. But there can be gains even more than losses to
the national strength by reason of this organization, if the
opportunity be accepted to promote labor's contribution. This
is a task especially for the leadership of organized labor. It
is certainly no exaggeration to say that in no way can labor be
advantaged after the war so much as by the wholehearted
acceptance of its opportunity for loyal service to the nation
during the war. Let labor splendidly do its part in bringing
victory and its future influence will expand beyond the dreams
of its prophets....

"Labor and victory are inseparable; nay more, the one may
command the other, and thus it may control the fate of the
world."

INDUSTRIAL MEANING OF WAR

Mr. H. E. Coffin, Chairman of the Committee on Industrial Preparedness, described the European War in its last analysis as a war of munitions, a war of factories, of producing powers, of sweating men and women workers. When the United States entered the war there were four main things required of its government and its people, viz., ships, munitions and materials of war, food and soldiers. It can be seen that three out of these four factors are matters that belong to the economic history of the war. Fortunately for our Government, it had the experience of foreign countries to learn from, and learning was an essential part of war preparation in spite of the resources in hand in the United States; as Mr. Coffin said:

"A close observation of the experience in foreign countries has
shown us the vital necessity for a peace time prearrangement
for conversion in all industries. Wars, as now waged, involve
every human and material resource of a belligerent nation.
Every factory and every man, woman, and child are affected.
Every sinew of industry, of transportation, and of finance must
be harnessed in the country's service. In England two years and
a half ago there were three government arsenals. Today
thousands of England's industrial plants are being operated as
government factories for the production of war materials, and
many other thousands of plants, still under private control,
are centering their energies in this same direction.

"We have here in the United States vast resources in
manufacturing and producing equipment, but they are unorganized
and uneducated for the national service. Our observations of
the European War have taught us that it is upon organized
industry that we must base every plan of military defense. In
the event of trouble with any one of the several first-class
powers, between 80 and 90 per cent. of our industrial activity
would of necessity be centered upon the making of supplies for
the government. We have learned also that from one to two years
of time and of conscientious effort are needed to permit any
large manufacturing establishment to change over from its usual
peace-time commercial line to the quantity production of war
materials for which it has had no previous training."

In certain respects the position of the United States was unique, not only because of its resources but because it was to a certain extent self-dependent as a belligerent. England was able for some time to import large quantities of munitions and supplies from other countries. In the case of the United States when it entered the war, munition and food supplies had to come from its own resources. Practically all of the war materials had to be ultimately produced in the United States. Many observers were optimistic because they had a sanguine opinion of the efficiency presented by American industrial democracy. But efficiency alone could not win the war. There were certain limitations to the sphere of efficiency. This was pointed out by Mr. H. G. Moulton in an address on "Industrial Conscription," delivered before the Western Economic Society, at Chicago, in 1917:

"At this point it should be emphasized that the position of the
United States is unique, so far as the allied nations are
concerned. England, for instance, at the outbreak of the
conflict could import vast quantities of munitions and supplies
from other countries. England, therefore, had a fourth
alternative, one denied to us because the struggle is now
world-wide. All of the materials of war that we furnish must
come from the current energy of our own people. We must
ourselves produce these ships, munitions, food supplies, and
stocks in the coming months. There is no one else to do it for
us. In this connection I should like to emphasize with all the
power at my command the argument that we cannot by bond issues
shift the burdens of this war to future generations. The mere
fact that all of us--as represented by the government--borrow
from some of us--as represented by bond purchasers--does not
change the other essential fact that we, the people within this
country, must actually produce practically all the war
materials we are to have for use in the war.

"There is also much current discussion of the wonderful gains
that may be made through increasing efficiency. It is argued
that we should make our patriotic impulses the occasion for the
universal introduction of scientific management. It of course
goes without saying that we should do all that we possibly can
to further the improvement of industrial methods; and doubtless
something may be accomplished."

"Every man, in the draft age at least, must work or fight," said General Crowder. And the workers were just as important a factor in winning the war as the fighters. In the gigantic machine sketched above, ingots of sixty and seventy tons were pressed into plates of any size and thickness for use on our super dreadnoughts.]

LABOR DISLOCATION

It is estimated that about 35,000,000 men, women and children in the United States do the country's work: dig its coal, raise its crops, run its trains, build its roads, make its powder, turn out its munitions. There was an increase each year of a million man-power through immigration. The result of the war was that this source of supply was cut off. What was the economic significance of this cutting off of immigration? The immigrant was almost the only source of what we call day labor--the men who do the building and repairing of railroads, the mending of streets and roads, mining, and the rough work of steel mills and other factories. Along with the cessation of immigration came the withdrawal from labor power of two million men who were drawn into the Army. These men, incidentally, became large consumers of goods rather than normal producers of wealth. Some estimates were made that the United States Government was using for war purposes about one-half of the entire productive capacity of the country. These figures enable one to gauge the industrial dislocation caused by the war. In matters affecting the members of what might be called the labor army, which still kept up the work of production, the Government laid great emphasis on the need of securing industrial peace.

A Mediation Commission was appointed by the President to deal with conditions of labor unrest. This Commission made a report early in 1918, in which it spoke of the lack of knowledge on the part of Capital as to Labor's feelings and needs and on the part of Labor as to problems of management. The program outlined by the Commission was as follows:

"1. Modern large scale industry has effectually destroyed the
personal relation between employer and employee--the knowledge
and coöperation that come from personal contact. It is
therefore no longer possible to conduct industry by dealing
with employees as individuals. Some form of collective
relationship between management and men is indispensable. The
recognition of this principle by the government should form an
accepted part of the labor policy of the nation.

"2. Law, in business as elsewhere, depends for its vitality
upon steady employment. Instead of waiting for adjustment
after grievances come to the surface there is needed the
establishment of continuous administrative machinery for the
orderly disposition of industrial issues and the avoidance of
an atmosphere of contention and the waste of disturbances.

"3. The eight-hour day is an established policy of the country;
experience has proved justification of the principle also in
war times. Provision must of course be made for longer hours in
case of emergencies. Labor will readily meet this requirement
if its misuse is guarded against by appropriate overtime
payments.

"4. Unified direction of the labor administration of the United
States for the period of the war should be established. At
present there is an unrelated number of separate committees,
boards, agencies, and departments having fragmentary and
conflicting jurisdiction over the labor problems raised by the
war. A single-headed administration is needed, with full power
to determine and establish the necessary administrative
structure.

"5. When assured of sound labor conditions and effective means
for the just redress of grievances that may arise, Labor in its
turn should surrender all practices which tend to restrict
maximum efficiency.

"6. Uncorrected evils are the great provocative to extremist
propaganda, and their correction would be in itself the best
counter-propaganda. But there is need for more affirmative
education. There has been too little publicity of an educative
sort in regard to Labor's relation to the war. The purposes of
the government and the methods by which it is pursuing them
should be brought home to the fuller understanding of Labor.
Labor has most at stake in this war, and it will eagerly devote
its all if only it be treated with confidence and
understanding, subject neither to indulgence nor neglect, but
dealt with as a part of the citizenship of the state."

ADVISORY LABOR COUNCIL

In order to prevent lack of coördination in the government's handling of the labor situation an advisory council was created to help the Secretary of Labor to organize the new war work. The field of this advisory council is indicated in a series of memoranda presented to him in January, 1917.

"1. An Adjustment Service which will have to do with the
adjustment of industrial disputes according to policies and
principles arrived at through the deliberations of the War
Labor Conference Board.

"2. A Condition of Labor Service which will have charge of the
administration of conditions of labor within business plants.

"3. An Information and Education Service which will devote
itself to the establishment of sound sentiment among both
employers and employees and to the establishment in individual
plants of the local machinery (_e. g._, employment management)
and policies necessary for the successful operation of a
National Labor Program.

"4. A Woman in Industry Service which will meet the problems
connected with the more rapid introduction of women into
industry as a result of war conditions.

"5. A Training and Dilution Service which will administer such
training and dilution policies as may be agreed upon.

"6. A Housing and Transportation of Workers Service whose duty
it will be to provide the housing facilities to meet the
nation's needs.

"7. A Personnel Service whose duties it shall be to assemble
and classify information concerning appropriate candidates for
positions in the war-labor administration and make
recommendations for appointment.

"8. A Division for the Investigation of Special Problems which
would be a part of the Secretary's office force and would
conduct investigations in the placing of contracts, in priority
of labor demand, in powers of the Department, in problems of
reconstruction, and would assist in formulating the national
labor policy.

"9. An Investigation and Inspection Service to provide the
field force of examiners and inspectors required by the other
services."

After various stages of experience the War Industries Board secured something more than an advisory position. This was done only after a year of warfare. The final situation was explained by Mr. C. M. Hitchcock in the _Journal of Political Economy_, June, 1918:

"When on March 4th of the present year the President appointed
Bernard M. Baruch Chairman of the War Industries Board and
defined his duties he did not, as certain press reports have
implied, create an industrial dictator. His action did clear
the way for Mr. Baruch's assumption of the duties of a director
of industrial war strategy, of an industrial Chief of
Staff--for the present position of the War Industries Board in
the American Government is comparable in its relation to
national industrial policy to nothing so much as the functions
of the General Staff of the Army in its jurisdiction over
military strategy. After a year of war the direction of
industrial policy is placed in single hands, and a central
planning board is established for dealing not only with the
problems of production and purchase but with the whole attitude
of the government toward the mobilization of business resources
for the prosecution of the war. Leadership has been focused and
an administrative channel opened for the inauguration of a
studied and inferentially constructive industrial policy.

"From the present trend of events the War Industries Board
promises to become the sole directing agency between the
government and industry. Backed by the power of the President
to commandeer, to withhold fuel, and in other ways to force the
halting into line, it can mold the country's industrial system
almost as it will--whether in organizing the nation for war or
in directing the lines along which it shall return to normal
conditions when peace comes. In a system of government such as
ours, where the responsibility for directing the war rests
almost exclusively in the hands of the President, and where his
power ultimately becomes almost absolute, the Board has been
shaped into a very potent instrument.

"Yet powerful as it may become, subject only to the
jurisdiction of the President, it is well to remember that in a
comprehensive national war plan it cannot stand alone. Its
policies must be subject to the administration's general
strategy in the war--for instance, to the amount of munitions
in comparison with the number of men or the amount of food that
it wishes to send abroad at any given time. The munitions
program and the conversion of industry to war purposes must be
governed by the ultimate end in view. In addition, one of the
great factors in production--the labor factor--is being
administered by another government agency, and it is obvious
that priority in the labor supply must go hand in hand with
priority in materials."

WORK OR FIGHT

Military men were as keen as business men in realizing the industrial factor as a powerful contributory cause in winning the war. General Crowder's famous "work or fight" alternative was a sufficient witness of this fact. He said:

"Every man, in the draft age at least, must work or fight.

"This is not alone a war of military maneuvers. It is a deadly
contest of industries and mechanics. Germany must not be
thought of as merely possessing an army; we must think of her
as _being_ an army--an army in which every factory and loom in
the Empire is a recognized part in a complete machine running
night and day at terrific speed. We must make ourselves the
same sort of effective machine.

"We must make vast withdrawals for the Army and immediately
close up the ranks of industry behind the gap with an
accelerating production of every useful thing in necessary
measure. How is this to be done? The answer is plain. The first
step toward the solution of the difficulty is to prohibit
engagement by able-bodied men in the field of hurtful
employment, idleness, or ineffectual employment, and thus
induce and persuade the vast wasted excess into useful fields.

"One of the unanswerable criticisms of the draft has been that
it takes men from the farms and from all useful employments and
marches them past crowds of idlers and loafers away to the
Army. The remedy is simple--to couple the industrial basis with
other grounds for exemption and to require that any man
pleading exemption on any ground shall show that he is
contributing effectively to the industrial welfare of the
nation."

A nine-mile howitzer nearly ready for transportation. Beyond are seen heavy armorplate turrets in the making. The small and large manufacturers were given equal opportunity to obtain war business.]

Industrial preparation for war was guided by the principle of priority. This is an old principle, but it began to be applied in unheard-of ways. When an army is to be moved all means of transport in sight are commandeered. When an army is to be fed, civilians protest in vain against the seizure of stores. These practices were always features in the history of warfare.

A novel factor in priority as applied during the present war was the breadth of its scope.

"When the whole industry of a nation is mobilized behind the
fighting line, it is not merely finished munitions that must be
given priority in transportation, but also the materials and
fuel for further munitions production. The food supply of the
industrial population, as well as that of the army, has a claim
to priority. So also have clothing supplies, lumber for
housing, and whatever else is essential to working efficiency.
In production it would be impossible to fix definite limits
upon the application of the priority principle. We can not much
longer permit the free flotation of the securities of foreign
enterprises, nor even of the less essential domestic
enterprises, so long as national loans or issues designed to
finance railways or industrial enterprises of prime necessity
are to be floated. Modern warfare, in involving the whole
national life, has made inevitable a control of business
practically coextensive with the economic system.

"The application of the priority principle to transportation
and production is quite in accord with plain common sense. It
is none the less revolutionary in its social economic
implications. What it means is that necessities shall have
right of way. If we have excess productive capacity, the
unessentials and luxuries may be provided, but not otherwise.
And necessities are definable in terms that take account only
of physical requirements. There is no room in the definition
for class distinction. A new country house may seem a matter of
necessity to the man of fortune, but he will persuade no
priority board to permit shipment of building materials while
cars are needed for coal or wheat. Nor will he persuade them to
let him have lumber that could be used for ships or
workingmen's camps, or labor that could be employed to
advantage in production for more clearly national and
democratic needs."

WAR SUPPLIES

The United States, following the experience of other belligerents, adopted the policy of decentralization in the production of war supplies. A plan was worked out under which the small and large manufacturer were given equal opportunity to obtain war business:

"Under the plan that has been worked out for bringing the
manufacturing resources of the country into more effective
coöperation with the government, the country is to be divided
into twenty industrial regions, with the following cities as
centers: Boston, Bridgeport, New York, Philadelphia,
Pittsburgh, Rochester, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, Cincinnati,
Baltimore, Atlanta, Birmingham, Kansas City, St. Louis, Dallas,
Milwaukee, St. Paul, Seattle, San Francisco. The following plan
for effecting the organization is suggested by the officials in
charge:

"1. Organize through Chambers of Commerce and other business
associations Industrial Committees with the principal
industrial center as headquarters and such subdivisions as are
recommended by the business association of each district.

"2. Develop such organization in various classes of industry as
well as in area for greatest convenience, to get information of
all classes of products in and between regions.

"3. Having established such region and sub-region, through the
coöperation of the best business men in each district have a
survey of the industries recorded in the hands of the section
in Washington of the War Industries Board for information to
the various procurement sections of the government.

"4. Each region may have in Washington a representative who
through the Resources and Conversion Section of the War
Industries Board may keep in direct contact with his region and
be available to the governmental procurement divisions or the
War Industries Board for prompt action in giving data from his
region.

"The detailed form of organization suggested for each region
(subject, of course, to modifications as desired to meet the
needs of any region) is known as the Cleveland Plan, which has
been for some time in operation. Under this plan each region is
divided into eight sub-regions, an important industrial city in
each sub-region being designated as a center. Each sub-region
has a local War Industries Commission which coördinates all
industry within its territory. Within each sub-region
manufacturing is divided into the following classes: castings,
forgings and stampings; machinery and machine products; rubber
products; clay products, chemicals, oils, and paints; textiles
and clothing, wood and leather; engineering; automotive. Other
classifications may of course be added in important lines of
industry."

Such regional divisions were but one factor in industrial administration. Government needs and labor shortage made imperative the regulation of manufactures by the priority system.

Interior of one of the Bethlehem Steel Company's mills--among the largest plants in the world for the production of munitions during the War.]

THE PRIORITY SYSTEM

The actual working of the priority system is shown in the following general classification of industry for the purpose of priority treatment:

Ships--Including destroyers and submarine chasers.

Aircraft.

Munitions, Military and Naval Supplies and
Operations--Including building construction for government
needs and equipment for same.

Fuel--For domestic consumption, and for manufacturing
necessities named herein.

Food and Collateral Industries--(_a_) Foodstuffs for human
consumption, and plants handling same.

(_b_) Feeding stuffs for domestic fowls and animals, and plants
handling same.

(_c_) All tools, utensils, implements, machinery, and equipment
required for production, harvesting and distribution, milling,
preparing, canning and refining foods and feeds such as seeds
of foods, and feeds, binder twine, etc.

(_d_) Products of collateral industries, such as fertilizer,
fertilizer ingredients, insecticides and fungicides, containers
for foods and feeds, collateral products.

(_e_) Materials and equipment for preservation of foods, and
feeds, such as ammonia and other refrigeration supplies,
including ice.

Clothing--For civilian population.

Railroad--Or other necessary transportation equipment,
including water transportation.

Public Utilities--Serving war industries, Army, Navy, and
civilian population."

But the perplexity of applying this system to such a question as fuel administration is shown in the following list taken from one of the trade publications of the Administration for April, 1918:

"The Fuel Administration has therefore arranged the following
list of preferred industries:

Aircraft--Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing aircraft
or supplies and equipment therefor.

Ammunition--Plants engaged in the manufacture of ammunition for
the United States Government and the Allies.