Chapter C: Section 4: That the joint resolution of Congress, approved (1)

December 7, 1917, declaring that a state of war exists between
the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government and the
Government and people of the United States, and making
provisions to prosecute the same, be and the same is hereby
repealed, and said state of war is hereby declared at an end,
and the President is hereby requested immediately to open
negotiations with the successor or successors of said
Government for the purpose of establishing fully friendly
relations and commercial intercourse between the United States
and the Governments and peoples of Austria and Hungary.

A DEMOCRAT PAYS HIS RESPECTS TO REPUBLICANS

The attitude of leaders of the Democratic party on Republican maneuvers to force peace by Congressional action was indicated by a statement issued by Homer S. Cummings, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, in which the Knox resolution was characterized as "renewed evidence of the moral leprosy which is eating out the heart of the Republican party," and which, according to Mr. Cummings, proposed dishonor in the name of peace. As reported in the press, the statement said:

"The so-called Knox peace resolution, which has just been
reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, is
renewed evidence of the moral leprosy which is eating out the
heart of the Republican party. In the name of peace it proposes
dishonor.

"An analysis of the resolution discloses that:

"First, it recognizes the defect in the recent House
resolution, which attempted to make a separate treaty with
Germany by act of Congress.

A former United States Attorney-General and Secretary of State, and one of the "irreconcilable" opponents of the League of Nations and Treaty of Versailles. He was the author of the peace resolution declaring war with Germany ended which was passed by Congress but vetoed by President Wilson.]

"Second, as an alternative proposition, it requests the
President to commence negotiations for a separate peace with
Germany.

"Third, it seeks to terminate, by a paper resolution, a state
of war without protecting American rights.

"Fourth, it attempts to take advantage of the provisions of the
Treaty of Versailles without becoming a party to that treaty
and,

"Fifth, it requests the President to negotiate a separate peace
with Austria.

"These are the outstanding features of the resolution. If any
group of leaders a year ago had dared to suggest that we should
abandon our allies and negotiate a separate treaty of peace,
they would have found themselves isolated and discredited.
Republican leaders have lost their moral sense in their mad
lust for power.

"There has not been one moment since November, 1918, during
which America has not suffered in honor, prestige, and power,
as the result of the elections of that year. Since that time
everything has been in confusion, and the frantic attempt of
Republican leaders to find a legal method in which to do the
dishonorable thing merely adds to the confusion. There is but
one clear path of duty. It is likewise the path of honor and of
peace and of permanent security.

"The path lies straight before us, and consists simply in
ratifying the treaty of peace which our companions in arms have
already ratified. The more the matter is debated the more it
will become apparent that there are no substitutes for the
requirements of plain duty and American honor."

KNOX URGES SEPARATE PEACE WITH GERMANY

On May 5th the debate on the resolution was opened in the Senate with a carefully prepared speech by Senator Knox, which outlined in detail arguments not only for the propriety and validity of the resolution, but for the absolute necessity of its adoption. Senator Knox contended that the war had ended, in fact and in law; that the objects for which the United States had entered the struggle had been achieved; that a "power-maddened administration" was continuing the technical state of war solely for the purpose of coercing the Senate into ratifying the Versailles Treaty, which had been universally discredited in all its parts; and that, since there was no hope of co-operation from the President, Congress must find means of ending the technical state of war independently of him. Said Senator Knox:

"The welfare and safety of the nation imperatively demands that
we know we have peace. The whole world seethes with revolution.
Our own nation is in ferment and turmoil. Force and strife are
rampant and threaten the destruction not only of our property,
but of our free institutions and even of our very lives. And
yet we stand, and have stood for months, as a rudderless ship
foundering in the trough of tremendous seas. We must not dare
longer to delay a return to the ordered government of peace. As
a preliminary step, the Executive must be returned to his
peace-time powers and prerogatives. Need, propriety, wisdom,
cannot question this. The resolution before us is designed to
bring us to this.

WILSON TO BLAME

"The course of the President ever since he cruised to Europe to
participate in the Peace Conference leaves no chance for doubt
that he will continue hereafter as heretofore to thwart, so far
as he is able, every attempt on the part of the Senate, the
Congress, or the people, to take any action immediately or
remotely affecting, in however slight a degree, through change
or modification, the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles as
it came to us fresh from his signature. He preferred to keep
the country in an alleged state of war for now almost a year
rather than abate one jot or tittle of the full measure his
isolated will had set for the nation. Constitutional order,
lawful functions, rights and duties of position, oaths of
office as affecting the members of this body, he has noticed
only to bring into contempt. He has conjured up every power
within the whole vast executive domain in his efforts to compel
this Senate to surrender its will and judgment to him, to
become mere automatons to register his mandate--to approve this
treaty in its last minutiæ of detail as he sent it to us.

"Now, in the face of this situation, it will be idle for us to
pass any resolution looking to the immediate establishment of
peace that does not contemplate the unqualified acceptance of
the treaty, if that resolution requires from the President the
performance of any act or duty in order to secure peace,
because if we do, he will, if the statements of his
representatives are accepted, so delay or ignore that act or
duty as to defeat the end and purpose of our action, for in his
opinion wisdom lies only in following the behests of his will.
Therefore, if the resolution is to be effective, it must be
self-operative. Nothing necessary to the bringing of peace must
be left for his accomplishment.

WHY UNITED STATES WENT TO WAR

"Our purposes, as stated by the President, were three-fold:

"First, the defeat and elimination of the Imperial German Government and Prussian autocracy;

"Next, the liberation from their yoke of despotism of the Germans themselves--for whom we had nothing but sympathy and friendship--to the end that they might be masters of their own fates and fortunes; and

"Lastly, the establishment, as sincere friends of the German people, of intimate relations of mutual advantage between them and us.

"In so far as my information goes, the German Government never declared war against the United States. They merely accepted the status which this declaration recognized and probably created; for it must be remembered that while we interpreted, and rightly so, that German submarine warfare, as directed against the United States, was illegal, constituting acts of war, the German Government never acquiesced in that view and, on the contrary, maintained the legality of all general measures taken.

"The Imperial German Government, against whom we declared war, did cease to exist at the time of the signing of the armistice, leaving us from thence on without any titular enemy against which to wage a war unless we were warring with the German people, and we have clearly estopped ourselves to make such a contention.

"Thus from this point of view also the armistice brought us not alone the end of hostilities, but the actual peace. There remained only the making of arrangements covering the ordinary peace-time intercourse.

WAR AT END, IN FACT AND IN LAW

"As a matter of law and of fact we are at peace with Germany; first, because of the terms of the armistice of November 11, 1918, its amendments and renewals; second, because of the 'silent ceasing' of hostilities; third, because of the disappearance, the extinction of the Government against which we declared war, and fourth, because of the negotiation by us and our allies or associates in the war with the people who were lately our enemies, and the ratification by our allies or associates and our enemies, of a treaty of peace which specifically provides both for the termination of hostilities to be followed by a resumption of diplomatic relations, and also for the status that should exist during our future peace-time intercourse; which treaty is now in force and observed everywhere except in the United States, and has in fact and in international law brought peace to the whole world, including ourselves.

"Having thus in law and in fact international peace, having
nothing left but a domestic status of war created by a
legislative declaration of war, with no hostilities heretofore
or now existent or possible in the territory over which this
paper-war status exists, it is not only legally sound, but
economically, morally, and patriotically necessary and
indispensable that we at once repeal the declaration of war and
so immediately end the despotic war powers with which a
power-maddened administration continues to misrule this great
people.

VERSAILLES TREATY IMPOSSIBLE

"To what end has all this juggling with obvious facts and universally recognized principles been maintained? The answer is easy and known to all. The purpose has been to coerce the Senate to approve the Treaty of Versailles--a treaty that is almost universally discredited in all its parts. The majority of its negotiators concede this. Its economic terms are impossible; its League of Nations is an aggravated imitation of the worst features of the ill-fated and foolish Holy Alliance of a century ago. It promises little but mischief unless recast on such radical lines as will entirely obliterate its identity.

"Wisdom requires the negotiation of a separate treaty between the United States and Germany, which should provide reciprocal rights and obligations between us and that country alone."

KNOX RESOLUTION PASSES BOTH HOUSES

In the course of its consideration in the Senate, the provision of the resolution requesting the President to negotiate a separate treaty with Germany was eliminated, but the request for a treaty with the successors of the Austro-Hungarian government was retained. In its amended form the resolution was brought to a decision in the Senate on May 15th, and adopted by a vote of 43 to 38, three Democrats voting with its supporters and one Republican with the opposition.

As the text of the Knox resolution adopted by the Senate differed from the measure which had been passed by the House of Representatives on April 9th, the House, to expedite matters, dropped its own resolution, and passed, on May 21st, the Senate draft by a vote of 228 to 139, seventeen short of the two-thirds majority necessary to override the expected Presidential veto.

TEXT OF AMENDED RESOLUTION

The text of the peace resolution as passed by the Senate and later concurred in by the House of Representatives, read as follows:

The joint resolution of Congress, passed April 6, 1917,
declaring a state of war to exist between the Imperial German
Government and the Government and people of the United States,
and making provisions to prosecute the same, be, and the same
is hereby repealed and said state of war is hereby declared at
an end.

Provided, however, that all property of the Imperial German
Government, or its successor or successors, and of all German
nationals which was on April 6, 1917, is or has since that date
come into the possession or under control of the Government of
the United States or any of its officers, agents or employees
from any source or by any agency whatsoever, shall be retained
by the United States and no disposition thereof made, except as
shall specifically be hereafter provided by Congress, until
such time as the German Government has, by treaty with the
United States, ratification whereof is to be made by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, made suitable provisions
for the satisfaction of all claims against the German
Government of all persons, wheresoever domiciled, who owe
permanent allegiance to the United States, whether such persons
have suffered through the acts of the German Government or its
agents since July 31, 1914, loss, damage, or injury to their
persons or property, directly or indirectly, through the
ownership of shares of stock in German, American, or other
corporations, or have suffered damage directly in consequence
of hostilities or any operations of war, or otherwise, or until
the German Government has given further undertakings and made
provisions by treaty, to be ratified by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, for granting to persons owing permanent
allegiance to the United States, most favored nation treatment,
whether the same be national or otherwise, in all matters
affecting residence, business, profession, trade, navigation,
commerce and industrial property rights, and confirming to the
United States all fines, forfeitures, penalties, and seizures
imposed or made by the United States during the war, whether in
respect to the property of the German Government or German
nationals, and waiving any pecuniary claim based on events
which occurred at any time before the coming into force of such
treaty, any existing treaty between the United States and
Germany to the contrary notwithstanding.

That in the interpretation of any provision relating to the date of
the termination of the war or of the present or existing emergency
in any acts of Congress, joint resolutions or proclamations of the
President containing provisions contingent upon the date of the
termination of the war or of the present or existing emergency, the
date when this resolution becomes effective shall be construed and
treated as the date of the termination of the war or of the present
or existing emergency, notwithstanding any provision in any act of
Congress or joint resolution, providing any other mode of
determining the date of the termination of the war or of the
present or existing emergency.

That until by treaty or act or joint resolution of Congress it
shall be determined otherwise, the United States, although it
has not ratified the Treaty of Versailles, does not waive any
of the rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or
advantages to which it and its nationals have become entitled
under the terms of the armistice signed November 11, 1918, or
any extensions or modifications thereof or which under the
Treaty of Versailles have been stipulated for its benefit as
one of the principal allied and associated powers and to which
it is entitled.

That the joint resolution of Congress approved December 7,
1917, declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial
and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government and the Government and
the people of the United States and making provisions to
prosecute the same, be, and the same is hereby repealed, and
said state of war is hereby declared at an end, and the
President is hereby requested immediately to open negotiations
with the successor or successors of said Government for the
purpose of establishing fully friendly relations and commercial
intercourse between the United States and the Governments and
peoples of Austria and Hungary.

PRESIDENT'S VETO

The resolution now came before the President for his signature. On May 27th he returned it to the House without his approval, and in an accompanying message explained the reasons for his veto. The President did not touch upon the question of constitutionality which had been raised frequently during the debates, but gave as his chief reason refusal to become party to an action which, he felt, would place "ineffaceable stain upon the gallantry and honor of the United States."

Following is the text of President Wilson's message vetoing the peace resolution:

"_To the House of Representatives:_

"I return herewith, without my signature, House Joint
Resolution 327, intended to repeal the Joint Resolution of
April 6, 1917, declaring a state of war to exist between the
United States and Germany, and the Joint Resolution of December
7, 1917, declaring a state of war to exist between the United
States and the Austro-Hungarian Government, and to declare a
state of peace. I have not felt at liberty to sign this
resolution because I cannot bring myself to become party to an
action which would place ineffaceable stain upon the gallantry
and honor of the United States.

"The resolution seeks to establish peace with the German Empire
without exacting from the German Government any action by way
of setting right the infinite wrongs which it did to the
peoples whom it attacked and whom we professed it our purpose
to assist when we entered the war. Have we sacrificed the lives
of more than one hundred thousand Americans and ruined the
lives of thousands of others and brought upon thousands of
American families an unhappiness that can never end for
purposes which we do not now care to state or take further
steps to attain?

"The attainment of these purposes is provided for in the Treaty
of Versailles by terms deemed adequate by the leading statesmen
and experts of all the great peoples who were associated in the
war against Germany. Do we now not care to join in the effort
to secure them?

"We entered the war most reluctantly. Our people were
profoundly disinclined to take part in a European war, and at
last did so, only because they became convinced that it could
not in truth be regarded as only a European war, but must be
regarded as a war in which civilization itself was involved and
human rights of every kind as against a belligerent Government.
Moreover, when we entered the war we set forth very definitely
the purposes for which we entered, partly because we did not
wish to be considered as merely taking part in a European
contest. This Joint Resolution which I return does not seek to
accomplish any of these objects, but in effect makes a complete
surrender of the rights of the United States so far as the
German Government is concerned.

"A treaty of peace was signed at Versailles on the
twenty-eighth of June last which did seek to accomplish the
objects which we had declared to be in our minds, because all
the great Governments and peoples which united against Germany
had adopted our declarations of purpose as their own and had in
solemn form embodied them in communications to the German
Government preliminary to the armistice of November 11, 1918.
But the treaty, as signed at Versailles, has been rejected by
the Senate of the United States, though it has been ratified by
Germany. By that rejection and by its methods we had in effect
declared that we wish to draw apart and pursue objects and
interests of our own, unhampered by any connections of interest
or of purpose with other Governments and peoples.

"Notwithstanding the fact that upon our entrance into the war
we professed to be seeking to assist in the maintenance of
common interests, nothing is said in this resolution about the
freedom of navigation upon the seas, or the reduction of
armaments, or the vindication of the rights of Belgium, or the
rectification of wrongs done to France, or the release of the
Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire from the
intolerable subjugation which they have had for so many
generations to endure, or the establishment of an independent
Polish State, or the continued maintenance of any kind of
understanding among the great powers of the world which would
be calculated to prevent in the future such outrages as Germany
attempted and in part consummated.

"We have now, in effect, declared that we do not care to take
any further risks or to assume any further responsibilities
with regard to the freedom of nations or the sacredness of
international obligations or the safety of independent peoples.
Such a peace with Germany--a peace in which none of the
essential interests which we had at heart when we entered the
war is safeguarded--_is_, or ought to be, inconceivable, as
inconsistent with the dignity of the United States, with the
rights and liberties of her citizens, and with the very
fundamental conditions of civilization.

"I hope that in these statements I have sufficiently set forth
the reasons why I have felt it incumbent upon me to withhold my
signature.

WOODROW WILSON.
THE WHITE HOUSE, _May 27, 1920._"

Next day, May 28th, the resolution was brought before the House in an attempt to repass it over the veto, but the vote, 219 to 152, lacked twenty-nine of the necessary two-thirds majority. On the original House resolution, passed April 9th, the vote had been 242 to 150, and on the Knox resolution, passed by the House on May 21st, 228 to 139. A few days later Congress adjourned until the winter session in December.

THE MAP OF EUROPE REMADE

Proposed Form of Government, Countries from Which Formed and Ethnic or Racial Stock of Newly Established Political Units Resulting from the World War.

(From a paper prepared in January, 1920, by O. P. Austin, Statistical Department, National City Bank.)

========================================================================= |[33]Area | [33] | Date |Form of |Countries |Ethnic or | |Population|estab-|Govern- |from which | Racial | | |lished|ment |formed | Stock ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Poland | 141,854|36,000,000|Nov., |Republic |Russia, | Slavic, | | | 1916 | |Germany, | Semitic | | | | |Austria- | | | | | |Hungary | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Czecho- | 60,000|13,000,000|Oct., |Republic |Austria- | Slavic Slovakia | | | 1918 | |Hungary | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Jugo-Slavia | 85,000|10,500,000|Oct., |Kingdom |Hung, | Slavic, | | | 1918 | |Serbia, | Serbs, | | | | |Bosnia, | Croats | | | | |Herzegovina, | | | | |Mont. | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Ukrainia | 215,000|30,000,000|Nov., |Republic |Russia, | Slavic | | | 1917 | |Austria- | | | | | |Hungary | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Esthonia | 7,300| 1,750,000|Apr., |Republic |Russia | Slavic | | | 1918 | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Livonia | 17,000| 1,650,000|Apr., |Republic |Russia | Slavic | | | 1918 | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Courland | 10,000| 600,000|Apr., |Republic |Russia | Slavic | | | 1918 | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Letvia | 9,000| 1,500,000|Apr., |Republic |Russia | Letts | | | 1918 | | | (Balto- | | | | | | Slavs) ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Lithuania | 90,000|10,000,000|Apr., |Republic |Russia | Slavic, | | | 1918 | | |Germania ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- White Russia| 140,000| 5,000,000| May, |Republic |Russia | Slavic | | | 1918 | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- North Russia| 275,000| 400,000|Nov., |Military |Russia | Slavic, | | | 1918 |Gov | | Finns ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Rus. Fed. | Undet'd | Undet'd |Nov., |Soviet Rep|Russia | Slavic Soviet Rep | | | 1917 | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Don Rep | 63,000| 4,000,000|Jan., |Military |Russia | Slavic, | | | 1918 |Gov | | Cossack ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Kuban Rep | 36,000| 3,000,000|Nov., |Republic |Russia | Slavic | | | 1918 | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Tauride Rep | 23,000| 1,800,000|Mar., |Republic |Russia | Slavic, | | | 1918 | | | Tartar ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Terek Rep | 28,000| 1,300,000|Sept.,|Republic |Russia | Turko- | | | 1918 | | | Tartar ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Tatar- | 175,000| 9,000,000|Oct., |Military |Russia | Turko- Bashkir Rep | | | 1918 | | | Tartar ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Yakutsk Rep |1,000,000| 400,000| May, |Military |Siberian | Yakuts, | | | 1918 | |Russia | Cossack ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Rep. of | Undet'd | Undet'd |Dec., |Military |Siberian | Slav, Siberia | | 1917 | |Russia | Mongol, | | | | | | Tartar ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Rep. of | 40,000| 2,500,000|Jan., |Republic |Russia, |Georgian, Georgia | | | 1918 | |Turkey | Armenian ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Rep. of | 400,000| 6,500,000|Jan., |Military |Russia | Turko- Turkestan | | | 1918 | | | Tartar ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Eastern | 68,000| 250,000| May, |Military |Russia | Balto- Karelia | | | 1919 | | | Slavic ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Finland | 125,000| 3,500,000|Dec., |Republic |Russia | Finns | | | 1917 | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Murman | 35,000| 100,000|July, |Military |Russian | Finns Region | | | 1918 | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- German Rep | 175,000|60,000,000|Nov., |Republic |Germany | Germanic | | | 1918 | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Rep of | 28,000|10,000,000|Oct., |Republic |Austria | Germanic German | | | 1918 | | | Austria | | | | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Hungarian | 32,000| 9,000,000|Nov., |Soviet |Hungary | Magyar Rep | | | 1918 |Rep. | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- [34]Rumania | 110,000|12,500,000| |Kingdom |Rumania, |Rumanian, | | | 1919 | |Hungary, | Magyar | | | | |Bessarabia | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Turkey in | 10,000| 1,900,000| |Undet'd |Turkey | Turkish Europe | | | | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Anatolia, | 145,000| 5,000,000| |Undet'd |Turkey | Turkish Asia Minor | | | | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Armenia, | 75,000| 2,500,000|Aug., |Undet'd |Turkey |Armenians Asia Minor | | | 1918 | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Mesopotamia,| 143,000| 2,000,000| 1917 |British |Turkey | Turks, Asia Minor | | | |Admin. | | Arabs, | | | | | | Persian ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Syria, Asia | 37,000| 1,000,000| 1919 |Undet'd |Turkey | Syrian, Minor | | | | | | Turkish ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Palestine, | 16,000| 500,000| 1917 |British |Turkey | Turks, Asia Minor | | | |Admin. | | Arabs, | | | | | | Jews ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Kingdom of | 96,500| 300,000|June, |Kingdom |Turkey | Arabs, Hejaz | | | 1916 | | | Turks ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Nejd & Hasa,| No data | No data | 1913 |Emirate |Turkey | Arabs Arabia | | | | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Jebel | No data | No data | 1918 |Emirate |Turkey | Bedouin Shammar, | | | | | | Arabia | | | | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Asir, Arabia| No data | No data | 1918 |Principate|Turkey | Arabs ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Yemen, | No data | No data | 1918 |Imamate |Turkey | Arabs Arabia | | | | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Koweit, | No data | No data | 1918 |Sultanate |Turkey | Arabs Arabia | | | | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Oman, Arabia| 82,000| 500,000| 1913 |G. Brit & |Turkey | Arabs | | | |France | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Egypt | 350,000|12,000,000| 1914 |Great |Turkey | Egyptian | | | |Britain | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- German East | 384,000| 8,000,000| 1918 |Great |German | Bantu Africa | | | |Britain |Colony | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- German S. W.| 322,000| 200,000| 1915 |British S.|German Hottentots Africa | | | |Africa |Colony | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Kamerun | 191,000| 2,500,000| 1916 |British & |German | Sudanese | | | |French |Colony | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Togo | 33,000| 1,000,000| 1914 |Allied Mil|German | Hamitic | | | | |Colony | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Kaiser | 70,000| 250,000| 1918 |Australia |German | Malay Wilhelm Land| | | | |Colony | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Ger. Samoan | 1,200| 40,000| 1918 |Australia |German | Samoan Islands | | | | |Colony | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Nauru | [35] | | 1918 |Mandate-- |German | Samoan Islands | | | |British |Colony | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Ger. S. | 15,000| 350,000| 1918 |Australia |German | Malay Pacific | | | |Japan |Colony | Islands | | | | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Ger. N. | 5,000| 600,000| 1918 |Mandate-- |German | Malay Pacific | | | |Japan |Colony | Islands | | | | | | ------------+---------+----------+------+----------+-----------+--------- Kiau Chau | 200| 200,000| 1918 |Mandate-- |German | Chinese | | | |Japan |Colony | =========================================================================

[33] Latest available estimate.

[34] Enlarged by absorption of Hungarian territory.

[35] A small island in the Marshall Group occupied as a wireless station; also known as Pleasant Island.

OUR PART IN WINNING THE WAR

Official Figures That Reveal the Enormous Contribution of This Country in Men, Money and Supplies

FIGURES OF AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR[36]
Revised to August 1, 1919

Total armed forces, including
Army, Navy, Marine Corps, etc. 4,800,000
Total men in the Army 4,000,000
Men who went overseas 2,086,000
Men who fought in France 1,390,000
Greatest number sent in one month 306,000
Greatest number returning in one month 333,000
Tons of supplies shipped from America to France 7,500,000
Total registered in draft 24,234,021
Total draft inductions 2,810,296
Greatest number inducted in one month 400,000
Graduates of Line Officers' Training Schools 80,568
Cost of war to April 30, 1919 $21,850,000,000

Cost of Army to April 30, 1919 $13,930,000,000
Battles fought by American troops 13
Months of American participation in the war 19
Days of battle 200
Days of duration of Meuse-Argonne battle 47
Americans in Meuse-Argonne battle 1,200,000
American casualties in Meuse-Argonne battle 120,000
American battle deaths in war 50,300
American wounded in war 205,690
American deaths from disease 57,500
Total deaths in the Army 115,500

[36] From the _War with Germany_--A STATISTICAL SUMMARY, by Leonard P.
Ayres, Colonel, General Staff, U. S. A. (For statistics of American
casualties revised to the end of 1919, see Vol. III, pp. 403-6.)

The part played by the United States in the war is statistically and graphically summarized in a compact little book prepared by Colonel Leonard P. Ayres of the Statistical Staff of the War Department. Attentively as the public may have followed the published reports of the many progressive steps and stages of our preparation for and participation in the war, much of the matter in _The War With Germany--A Statistical Summary_ will have surprising interest. It is the first time a comprehensive view of the character and magnitude of our war activities has been made possible through anything so concrete and authoritative. The data were obtained from official reports, during the war, to the President, Secretary of War and Chief-of-Staff from the American Peace Commission in Paris, from the files of the Supreme War Council in Versailles, and other sources; and though, as Colonel Ayres states, it was still impossible to get final figures on some points or wholly reliable ones on others, care was taken to insure the degree of reliability reasonably practicable. The diagrams, figures and other information presented here and elsewhere in this volume are reproduced from Colonel Ayres' _Summary_, second edition, revised to August 1, 1919.

Male Population Registered and Not Registered]

THE SELECTIVE SERVICE

"The willingness," Colonel Ayres says, "with which the American people accepted the universal draft was the most remarkable feature in the history of our preparation for war. It is a noteworthy evidence of the enthusiastic support given the war program that, despite the previous hostility to the principle of universal liability for military service, a few months after the selective service law was passed, the standing of the drafted soldier was fully as honorable in the estimation of his companions and of the country in general as was that of the man who enlisted voluntarily. Moreover, the record of desertions from the Army shows that the total was smaller than in previous wars and a smaller percentage occurred among drafted men than among those who volunteered. The Selective Service Law was passed on May 19, 1917, and as subsequently amended, it mobilized all the man power of the nation from the ages of 18 to 45 inclusive. Under this act, 24,234,021 men were registered and slightly more than 2,800,000 were inducted into the military service on the first draft. But during the war, from April 6, 1917, to November 11, 1918, about 4,000,000 served in the Army of the United States." The total number serving the armed forces of the country, including Army, Navy, Marine Corps and other services, amounted to 4,800,000. Approximately five men out of every 100 citizens were in arms. Of these, 2,086,000, constituting the American Expeditionary Force, were in service on the Western front. Those who saw actual fighting were 1,390,000.

It is interesting in this connection to record the fact that in our greatest previous war, the Civil War, 2,400,000 men served in the Northern Armies and in the Navy. In that struggle 10 men in each 100 inhabitants of the Northern States served as soldiers or sailors.

The fact is pointed out by Colonel Ayres that though the British sent to France more men in their first year than we did in our first year, it took England three years to reach a strength of 2,000,000 men in France whereas the United States reached that strength in France in a year and a half. But as an offset, it must be borne in mind that the British had to use men from the beginning to fill terrible casualty gaps, which was not the case with the American steadily building forces, and that the British also were sending men to several other battle fronts than those of France.

HOW THE DRAFT WAS MADE UP

Under the draft, registrants were subjected to a preliminary examination by the local boards to determine who were not of sufficient soundness and vigor for military life. Those accepted as qualified for service were sent to training camps where they underwent a second examination and rejections were made of those in any serious way defective. The not surprising result of the examinations was the demonstration that men representing the highest order of physical condition came from agricultural districts, the country bred boys far excelling those reared in the city. Taken by States it is noteworthy that men from the Middle West and those from Kentucky and Arkansas of the Southern States had the highest record, their physical condition enabling 70 to 80 percent. to pass the two examinations. The lowest percentage was in the New England States, in New York, in Michigan and in Western States that have for years been health resorts, where subnormal persons from all over the country resort. The percentage of men from those states who passed the two examinations was but 50 to 59. The intermediate ranges were 60 to 69. Under the two examinations not only did country boys make a better showing than city boys (100,000 country boys would furnish for military service 4,700 more soldiers than would an equal number of city boys), but the white registrants were better than the colored, the native-born better than the alien-born. Under the analysis 100,000 whites would furnish 1,240 more soldiers than would an equal number of colored; and 100,000 native-born would yield 3,500 more soldiers than would the like number of foreign-born. As 3,500 men are equivalent to an infantry regiment at full war strength, the value of these differences can be appreciated.

Comparative Losses of Merchant Shipping During the War]

About 200,000 commissioned officers were required for the Army. Less than 9,000 were in the Federal Service at the beginning of the war,--5,791 were Regulars and 3,199 were officers of the National Guard in Federal Service. Thus out of every six officers one had had previous training in the army, Guard or ranks; three trained for their commissions in officers' training camps; two went from civil life into the army with little or no military training--the latter being in the majority physicians, ministers or technical men.

CAMPS AND TRAINING

Shelter was constructed in a few months for the accommodation of 1,800,000 men under training. For the National Guard and National Army divisions there were 16 camps and 16 cantonments, chiefly in the North. For National Guard Units organized during the summer of 1917 there were canvas camps in the South. One division, the Rainbow, required no training field, as it was assembled directly at Camp Mills for early transportation to France. The average American soldier who went to France received six months' training before he sailed and two months more in a quiet sector after reaching France, before entering the battle line.

The infantry soldier was trained in the division, the American typical unit, composed of about 1,000 officers and 27,000 men. Before the signing of the armistice there had been trained and sent overseas 42 divisions, the training of 12 more was well advanced and 4 others were being organized. Had the war continued this country would have had 80 divisions overseas before July, 1919, and 100 by the end of that year.

This country had the benefit in its training camps of 547 of the ablest French and English officers who had seen service on the Western front and were sent over to bring to the training of our men the approved methods developed in the experiences of the war. There were besides 226 non-commissioned British officers detailed as instructors. Colonel Ayres says they rendered services out of all proportion to their number, being a significant contribution to our training program.

GETTING THE TROOPS OVER

Especially impressive are the figures dealing with troop movements:

"During our nineteen months of war more than 2,000,000 American
soldiers were carried to France. Half a million of these went
over in the first thirteen months, the others in the last six
months.

"The highest troop-carrying records are those of July, 1918,
when 306,000 soldiers were carried to Europe, and June, 1919,
when 364,000 were brought home to America.

"Most of the troops who sailed for France left from New York.
Half of them landed in England and the other half landed in
France.

"Among every 100 Americans who went over forty-nine went in
British ships, forty-five in American ships, three in Italian,
two in French, and one in Russian shipping under English
control.

"Our cargo ships averaged one complete trip every seventy days
and our troopships one complete trip every thirty-five days.

"The cargo fleet was almost exclusively American. It reached
the size of 2,700,000 dead-weight tons and carried to Europe
about 7,500,000 tons of cargo.

"The greatest troopship among all the ships has been the
_Leviathan_, which landed 12,000 men (the equivalent of a
German division) in France every month.

"The fastest transports have been the _Great Northern_ and the
_Northern Pacific_, which have made complete turn-arounds,
taken on new troops and started back again in nineteen days."

TRANSPORTATION EXTRAORDINARY

_Apropos_ of the rapid transportation Colonel Ayres says:

"In June (1918) with the German drives in full swing, the
Allies called on us to continue the extraordinary
transportation of troops begun in April. The early movement had
been met by filling up the divisions that sailed with the best
trained men wherever they could be found. Divisions embarked
after July 1 had to meet shortages with men called to the
colors in the spring. By November the average period of
training in the United States had been shortened to close to
four months, and the average for the period July 1 to Nov. 11
was probably five months.

"In the last months of the war, the induction of men was
carried forward at top speed and every device was used for
hastening training. The result fully justified the effort. Into
the great Meuse-Argonne offensive we were able to throw a force
of 1,200,000 men, while we had many thousands of troops engaged
in other parts of the line. Our training camp officers stood up
to the test; our men with their intensive drilling in
open-order fighting, which has characterized American
training, routed the best of the German divisions from the
Argonne Forest and the Valley of the Meuse."

FEEDING AND CLOTHING PROBLEMS

When an army is 3,000 or 4,000 miles from its sources of supply the amounts of supplies in reserve and in transit are enormous as compared with the quantities actually consumed each month. As an example the army purchases of blankets in 1918 were two and one-quarter times as great as the entire American production in 1914. Put differently, the blankets bought in one year for the use of 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 soldiers would have been sufficient to make good the normal consumption of blankets by 100,000,000 American civilians for two and a quarter years. So proportionately with other things, the rule for clothing was that for every man at the front there must be a three months' reserve in France, another two or three months' reserve in the United States and a third three months' supply continuously in transit.

The same thing was true of other supplies and munitions. The need for reserves and the time required for transportation called for the supply of enormous quantities and called for it at once.

An indication of the quartermaster problem may be obtained from
the fact that between April 6, 1917, and May 31, 1918, there
was delivered to the army 131,800,000 pairs of wool stockings,
85,000,000 undershirts, 83,600,000 drawers, 30,700,000 pairs of
shoes, 26,500,000 flannel shirts, 21,700,000 blankets,
21,700,000 wool breeches, 13,900,000 wool coats, and 8,300,000
overcoats. When the troop movement was speeded up in 1918
Colonel Ayres states that the margin of woolen clothing was
dangerously narrow, and to secure these and other articles in
sufficient quantity it was found necessary to take control of
all states of the manufacturing process, from assembling the
raw material to inspecting the finished product.

At no time was there a shortage of food in the expeditionary
forces. Soldiers sometimes went hungry in this as in all other
wars, but the condition was local and temporary. It occurred
because of transportation difficulties during periods of active
fighting or rapid movement when the units outran their rolling
kitchens.

In France American engineers built seventeen new ship berths
and 1,000 miles of standard and 125 miles of narrow gauge
railroads. The Signal Corps strung 100,000 miles of telephone
wires, and 40,000 American made motor trucks were shipped
overseas. In this country army construction projects cost
twice as much as the Panama Canal and were on nearly as large a
scale overseas.

The storage space constructed in France was more than nine-tenths as large as that built at home. The amount of food on hand from the time the American troops entered active fighting never fell below a 45 days' supply, and at the time of the submarine scare, was kept at 59 to 72 days' supply.

Likewise the supply of clothing arose to the emergency of combat.

"The records of the quartermaster show that during the six
months of hard fighting, from June to November, the enlisted
man in the A. E. F. received on the average:

"Slicker and overcoat, every 5 months; blanket, flannel shirt,
and breeches, every 2 months; coat, every 79 days; shoes and
puttees, every 51 days; drawers and undershirt, every 34 days;
woolen socks, every 23 days."

GUNS AND MUNITIONS

When war was declared we had on hand nearly 600,000 Springfield rifles. The American Enfield rifle was designed and manufactured. The total production of the two up to the signing of the armistice was over 2,500,000. The production of rifle ammunition amounted to 3,500,000,000, of which half was shipped overseas, in addition to the 200,000,000 rounds secured from the French and British.

During the war the Browning automatic rifle and the Browning
machine gun were developed, put into quantity production and
used in large numbers in the final battles in France. Before
the war the allowance of machine guns in the American Army was
four guns to a regiment; the allowance now is 336 to a
regiment, testimony to the demonstrated importance in war of
that effective weapon. The Browning machine guns are believed
to be more effective than the corresponding weapons used in any
other army.

The total number of machine guns produced in America up to the
end of 1918 was 226,557, of these 69,960 being of the light
Browning and 56,612 of the heavy Browning type. The Vickers
field machine guns produced totaled 12,125, the other field
guns 6,366, the Lewis aircraft guns, 39,200, the Browning
aircraft 580, the Marlin aircraft 38,000, and the Vickers
aircraft 3,714. Before Nov. 1, 1918, 29,000 light Brownings,
27,000 heavy Brownings, and 1,500,000,000 rounds of rifle and
machine-gun ammunition were shipped.

When war was declared the United States had sufficient light
artillery to equip an army of 500,000 men, and shortly found
itself confronted with the problem of preparing to equip
5,000,000 men. To meet the situation, it was decided in June,
1917, to allot our guns to training purposes and to equip our
forces in France with artillery conforming to the French and
British standard calibers. It was arranged that we should
purchase from the French and British the artillery needed for
our first divisions and ship them in return equivalent amounts
of steel, copper and other raw materials so that they could
either manufacture guns for us in their own factories or give
us guns out of their stocks and replace them by new ones made
from our materials.

Up to the end of April, 1919, the number of complete artillery
units produced in American plants was more than 3,000, or equal
to all those purchased from the French and British during the
war. The number of rounds of complete artillery ammunition
produced in American plants was in excess of 20,000,000, as
compared with 10,000,000 rounds secured from the French and
British. In the first twenty months after the declaration of
war by each country, the British did better than we did in the
production of light artillery, and we excelled them in
producing heavy artillery and both light and heavy shells.

THE ARTILLERY SUPPLY

Colonel Ayres says:

"The most important single fact about our artillery in France
is that we always had a sufficient supply of light artillery
for the combat divisions that were ready for front-line
service. This does not mean that when the divisions went into
the battle line they always had their artillery with them, for
in a number of cases they did not.

"The result of the compilation is to show that in every 100
days that our combat divisions were in line they were supported
by their own artillery for seventy-five days, by British
artillery for five days, by French for one and one-half days,
and were without artillery for eighteen and one-half days out
of the 100. Of these eighteen and one-half days, however,
eighteen days were in quiet sectors and only one-half of one
day in each hundred was in active sectors. There are only three
records of American divisions being in an active sector without
artillery support. The total of these three cases amounts to
one-half of 1 per cent., or about fourteen hours out of the
typical 100 days just analyzed.

"The facts can be summarized in round numbers with approximate
accuracy by saying that we had in France 3,500 pieces of
artillery of which nearly 500 were made in America, and we used
on the firing line 2,250, of which over 100 were made in
America."

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1919

At the conclusion of his chapter on rifles and machine guns Colonel Ayres has an interesting bit of semi-critical comment on the question of foresight, of which some desk-experts have been inclined to doubt the United States authorities were possessed. He says:

"At this point it is appropriate to comment on the fact that
there are many articles of munitions in which American
production reached great amounts by the fall of 1918 but which
were not used in large quantities at the front because the
armistice was signed before big supplies of them reached
France. In the main, these munitions are articles of ordnance
and aviation equipment, involving such technical difficulties
of manufacture that their production could not be improvised or
even greatly abbreviated in time.

"As the production figures are scrutinized in retrospect, and
it is realized that many millions of dollars were spent on army
equipment that was never used at the front, it seems fair to
question whether prudent foresight could not have avoided some
of this expense.

"Perhaps the best answer to the question is to be found in the
record of a conference that took place in the little French
town of Trois Fontaines on October 4, 1918, between Marshal
Foch and the American Secretary of War.

"In that conference the Allied Commander-in-Chief made final
arrangements with the American Secretary as to the shipment of
American troops and munitions in great numbers during the fall
and winter preparatory for the campaign of 1919.

"This was one day before the first German peace note and 38
days before the end of the war, but Marshal Foch was then
calling upon America to make her great shipments of munitions
and her supreme contribution of man-power for the campaign of
the following year."

GAS AND EXPLOSIVES

One of the striking contributions to the cause of the Allies was the enormous quantity of smokeless powder and high explosives produced. From April 1, 1917, to November 11, 1918, the production of smokeless powder in the United States was 632,000,000 pounds, which was almost equal to the combined production of France and Great Britain. But by the time the war ended the production of smokeless powder in this country was 45 per cent. greater than that of France and Great Britain combined.

The output of high explosives, T.N.T. and others, increased rapidly from its pre-war status to a quantity 40 percent. greater than that of Great Britain, and nearly double the French production at the close of the war.

"The result of the high rate of production of both smokeless
powder and high explosives was that the artillery ammunition
program was never held up for lack of either the powder which
hurls the bullet or the shell from the gun, or the high
explosive which makes the shell effective when it reaches its
destination."

Colonel Ayres says of toxic gases:

"When the clouds of chlorine suddenly enveloped the British and
French lines in the Ypres salient, early in 1915, a new weapon
was introduced into the war. That it was a powerful weapon is
evidenced by the fact that during the year 1918 from 20 to 30
percent. of all our battle casualties were due to gas.

"At the time we entered the war we had practically no
experience in manufacturing toxic gases, and no existing
facilities which could be readily converted to such use. At the
signing of the armistice we were equipped to produce gas at a
more rapid rate than France, England, or Germany."

THE AIR SERVICE

"On the declaration of war the United States had fifty-five
training airplanes, of which fifty-one were classified as
obsolete and the other four as obsolescent. When we entered the
war the Allies made the designs of their planes available to us
and before the end of hostilities furnished us from their own
manufacture 3,800 service planes.

"Aviation training schools in the United States graduated 8,602
men from elementary courses and 4,028 from advanced courses.
More than 5,000 pilots and observers were sent overseas. The
total personnel of the Air Service, officers, students, and
enlisted men, increased from 1,200 at the outbreak of the war
to nearly 200,000 at its close.

"There were produced in the United States to Nov. 30, 1918,
more than 8,000 training planes and more than 16,000 training
engines.

"The De Haviland-4 observation and day bombing plane was the
only plane the United States put into quantity production.
Before the signing of the armistice 3,227 had been completed
and 1,885 shipped overseas. The plane was successfully used at
the front for three months.

"The production of the 12-cylinder Liberty engine was America's
chief contribution to aviation. Before the armistice 13,574 had
been completed, 4,435 shipped to the expeditionary forces, and
1,025 delivered to the Allies.

"The first fliers in action wearing the American uniforms were
members of the Lafayette Escadrille, who were transferred to
the American service in December, 1917.

"The American air force at the front grew from 3 squadrons in
April to 45 in November, 1918. On Nov. 11 the 45 squadrons had
an equipment of 740 planes.

"Of 2,698 planes sent to the zone of the advance for American
aviators 667, or nearly one-fourth, were of American
manufacture.

"American air squadrons played important rôles in the battles of
Château-Thierry, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne. They brought
down in combat 755 enemy planes, while their own losses of planes
numbered only 357."

"The squadrons were of four types: Observation squadrons, whose
business it is to make observations, take photographs, and
direct artillery fire; pursuit squadrons, using light fighting
planes to protect the observation planes at their work, to
drive the enemy from the air, or to _strafe_ marching columns
by machine-gun fire; the day bombers, whose work was the
dropping of bombs on railways or roads; and the night bombers,
carrying heavier bomb loads for the destruction of strategic
enemy works."

Production of Training Planes and Engines to the End of Each Month]

At the armistice there were on the front 20 pursuit squadrons, 18 observation squadrons and 7 bomber squadrons with 1,238 flying officers and 740 service planes, in addition to which there were 23 balloon companies.

CARGO SHIPMENTS

Altogether, from our entrance into the war through April, 1919, the Army shipped from this side of the Atlantic nearly seven and a half million tons (7,500,000) of cargo.

Included in the cargo shipment were 1,791 consolidation locomotives of the 100-ton type. Of these, 650 were shipped, set up on their own wheels so that they could be unloaded in France and run off in a few hours under their own steam.

The Army also shipped 26,994 standard-gauge freight cars; motor car trucks to the number of 47,018, and rails and fittings for the reinforcing of French railways and for the construction of our own lines of communications to the aggregate of 423,000 tons. The Army also shipped 68,694 horses and mules.

SIGNAL CORPS STATISTICS