Chapter IV: Course of the CIVIL War (1)

(1862-1865)

Although the immediate danger of war between England and America had at all events temporarily vanished, and the United States Government had put a good face upon the matter, it was only natural that a soreness should remain; nor did the slowness of military operations tend to restore that government to a more equable frame of mind. Much of the enthusiasm which marked the outbreak of hostilities had already evaporated, but the hatred of the South had continued to grow in intensity, and although the latter was undoubtedly suffering great hardships and privations, there was no sign of failing courage, and every prospect of a long and bitter contest. The difficulty of finding men for the Northern army continued to increase; the prospect of having to raise twenty or thirty millions sterling in taxes from a people unaccustomed to pay any apparent taxes at all for Federal purposes was particularly unpleasant, more especially as there appeared to be no immediate probability of a striking military success; and it was not surprising that the country showed signs of great depression. Under these circumstances, a marked division of parties in the North began to show itself. One, which may be termed the Revolutionary Party, was in favour of prosecuting the war at all hazards and by all means; of proclaiming the immediate abolition of slavery in the South; promoting a servile insurrection there; turning out the Cabinet, and even deposing the President if he proved to be an obstacle; keeping Congress permanently in session to spur on the Government, and the Generals, maintaining a paper currency by inflicting heavy penalties for depreciating it, and so on. The Foreign Policy of this party consisted in a return to reckless conduct and language towards Europe in general, and an attempt to obtain the support of France against England.

On the other side, however, were now ranged the President, Mr. Seward, and the more moderate men. Mr. Seward had now, strange to say, become a kind of guarantee for peace, for after the concessions he had made, a foreign war would have been fatal to his reputation, and it was only fair to assume that his conversion to a more moderate course was genuine. Still there was danger to England from both sides. If the party of violence should show itself reckless enough to risk anything, the moderate party might conceivably provoke a foreign war either as an excuse for giving up the contest with the South, or to divert popular irritation after having abandoned the contest as hopeless.

Meanwhile, Mr. Seward's demeanour towards England had changed so much that, early in 1862, his friendliness had become actually embarrassing. Quite a considerable force, according to British standards, amounting to something like 12,000 men, had been already despatched, or were under orders to proceed to Canada, and Mr. Seward now made the surprising offer that these troops and stores should be landed at Portland, a port in the United States, and sent overland to Canada. However well meant the invitation, it would manifestly have been most imprudent to accept it. It must have been plain to the densest understanding that these troops and stores were only being sent to Canada in order that we might be prepared, if unhappily a rupture should take place between England and the United States. Therefore, if troops and stores so conveyed were eventually used against the United States, there would have been a violent outcry of treachery against us throughout the country. The danger, too, of some unpleasant incident occurring during the landing or during the passage of the trains with which it would be impossible to deal, was so obvious, that the invitation was declined with thanks. Too much love is sometimes almost more inconvenient in diplomacy than hatred.

Mr. Seward's anxiety, at this time, however, to show himself a friend to England continued, and he took particular care to point out, in proof of his new attitude, that up till the last moment (December 26) he had been the only person in the Government who was in favour of the surrender of Slidell and Mason, and that President Lincoln had been opposed to surrender and was in favour of arbitration only. In fact, Mr. Seward appeared to be seized with the desire of overwhelming not only England, but France as well, with demonstrations of friendship and confidence, and it is perhaps not uncharitable to assume that two reasons were contributory causes to this agreeable change of tactics. One of these was that the appearance of a good understanding with these two Powers would exercise a beneficial influence upon the money market; the other was the fear of one or both of them recognizing the South and breaking up the blockade. Probably Mr. Seward's fears of French interference were increased by a visit paid by M. Mercier, in the spring, to Richmond, the Confederate Headquarters. M. Mercier, whether instructed from home or not, was bent upon this visit, which the United States Government could not prevent, but which they could hardly be expected to view with favour, and after the manner of French diplomatists of the period, he was probably unable to resist the temptation of trying to effect a striking _coup_, although there was not the slightest reason to suspect him of any disloyalty to his English colleague. Lord Lyons wisely declined to accompany him, and prophesied that he would end by getting into trouble, which proved to be the case, for the journey naturally gave rise to all sorts of comments. As will be seen from the following letter, both M. Mercier and Mr. Seward drew incorrect conclusions from the information derived during this visit; the former being convinced that the subjugation of the South was an impossibility, and the latter confidently believing that the end of the war was close at hand.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, April 23, 1862.

M. Mercier came back from Richmond yesterday. He went soon after his
arrival to see Mr. Seward and came afterwards to me. He is persuaded
that the confidence and the resolution of the Confederates are
increased rather than diminished by recent events. If they are
worsted anywhere they will still not surrender. They will destroy
their stores of cotton and tobacco, and all other property which
they cannot remove. They will retire into the interior of their
country and defy the North to follow them. They will endure any
privations and sufferings rather than be again united to the North.
Their unanimity and devotion to the cause are wonderful. They are
not carrying on a war in the usual manner for dominion as the North
is: they consider themselves to be fighting for their homes and
their liberty, and are making and are ready to make any sacrifices.

Such is the impression which M. Mercier says was made upon him by
what he saw and heard.

I asked him whether he had obtained any specific information as to
the extent of the naval and military resources of the Confederates.
He said that they admitted that they were in want of arms and
ammunition, and said that but for this they could keep a very much
larger army in the field. They had no difficulty about men. On the
contrary, they had more than they could arm. They had another
'Merrimac' nearly ready at Norfolk: they had an iron-plated vessel
on the James River: they had iron-plated vessels nearly ready at New
Orleans. If they lost New Orleans and all the seaboard, they would
be as far from being subdued as ever.

I inquired of M. Mercier whether he had entered upon any particular
matter of business with the members of the Confederate Government.
He said he had avoided the appearance of having come to transact
business: that the French tobacco would be spared if the rest was
burnt, provided it could be distinguished and separated from that
belonging to private persons.

I asked M. Mercier if anything had passed on the subject of the
position of the Consuls. He said that if the idea of calling upon
them to take out exequaturs from the Confederate Government had ever
been entertained, it was now abandoned; there appeared to be a very
good disposition towards foreigners in general; less good perhaps
towards the English as a nation than others, perhaps because more
had been expected from that country than from any other, and the
disappointment had consequently been greater. On the other hand, the
Confederate leaders professed to have abandoned all expectation of
succour from Europe: indeed, they declared that all they desired was
such an interruption of the blockade as would enable them to get
arms.

M. Mercier said that he was more than ever convinced that the
restoration of the old Union was impossible; that he believed the
war would, if the Powers of Europe exercised no influence upon it,
last for years; that he thought that in the end the independence of
the South must be recognized, and that the governments of Europe
should be on the watch for a favourable opportunity of doing this in
such a manner as to end the war. The present opportunity would,
however, he thought, be peculiarly unfavourable.

I did not express any opinion as to the policy to be eventually
pursued by France or England, but I entirely agreed with M. Mercier
that there was nothing to do at the present moment but watch events.

This morning Mr. Seward spoke to me about M. Mercier's journey. He
said that M. Mercier had, probably without being altogether aware of
it himself, obtained very valuable information for the U.S.
Government. He himself was quite convinced from M. Mercier's account
of what had passed, that the Confederates were about to make a last
effort: that they had their last armies in the field; and that their
last resources were brought into action. Their talking of retiring
into the interior was idle. If the U.S. were undisputed masters of
the border states, including Tennessee, and of the sea coast, there
would be no occasion for any further fighting. Anybody who liked to
retire into the interior was welcome to do so and stay there till he
was tired. Mr. Seward went on to say that he had had some difficulty
in preventing M. Mercier's journey making an unfavourable impression
upon the public. With this view he had caused it to be mentioned in
the papers that M. Mercier had had a long interview with him on his
return from Richmond; he had in the evening taken M. Mercier to the
President, which also he should put in the newspapers: to-night he
was to dine with M. Mercier to meet the captain of the French ship
of war which had brought M. Mercier back: to-morrow the President
would pay a visit to that ship.

I suppose the truth lies somewhere between M. Mercier's views of the
prospects of the South and Mr. Seward's. Mr. Seward was of course
anxious to weaken any impression M. Mercier's language may have made
upon me.

The Slave Trade Treaty has met with much more general approval than
I expected. It has excited quite an enthusiasm among the
Anti-Slavery party. I have never seen Mr. Seward apparently so much
pleased. Mr. Sumner, who has had the management of it in the Senate,
was moved to tears when he came to tell me that it had passed
unanimously.

As had been foreseen and pointed out to M. Mercier, the most unsatisfactory result of his visit was the impression it produced that France was disposed to act independently of England, but there is no evidence to show that such were the intentions of the French Government at the time, and M. Mercier himself always showed himself to be a most frank and honest colleague.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, May 16, 1862.

The Government here is very much disquieted by the rumoured
intentions of England and France with regard to intervention. This
is not altogether without advantage, as they are more disposed to be
considerate, or, at all events, civil, when they have doubts about
us, than when they feel sure of us. They are more civil to France
than to England partly because they are more doubtful about her, and
partly because they never will have, do what she will, the same
bitterness against her as they have against England. Mr. Seward is
encouraged by some of his English correspondents to believe that the
Mexican affair will produce a serious disagreement between England
and France.

M. Mercier thinks it quite within the range of possibility that the
South may be victorious both in the battles in Virginia and in
Tennessee. He is at all events quite confident that whether
victorious or defeated they will not give in, and he is certainly
disposed to advise his Government to endeavour to put an end to the
war by intervening on the first opportunity. He is however very much
puzzled to devise any mode of intervention which would have the
effect of reviving French trade and obtaining cotton. I shall
suppose he would think it desirable to go to great lengths to stop
the war, because he believes that the South will not give in until
the whole country is made desolate, and that the North will very
soon be led to proclaim immediate emancipation, which would stop the
cultivation of cotton for an indefinite time.

I listen and say little when he talks of intervention. It appears to
me to be a dangerous subject of conversation. There is a good deal
of truth in M. Mercier's anticipations of evil, but I do not see my
way to doing any good.

* * * * *

The credit of the Government has been wonderfully kept up, but it
would not stand a considerable reverse in the field. It is possible
under such circumstances that a peace party might arise, and perhaps
just _possible_ that England and France might give weight to such a
party. However, all this is a mere speculation. We are (as usual) on
the eve of a crisis which is to clear up everything.

A threatened breakdown in health, due chiefly to overwork, forced Lord Lyons reluctantly to apply for leave to return to England before the severe heat of a Washington summer had set in, and in making the application he pointed out that during the three years which had elapsed since his arrival in the United States he had only been absent for four nights from Washington, with the exception of the two months during which he was officially in attendance on the Prince of Wales. The work in fact was incessant, the staff of the Legation scanty, and things were not made easier by the autocratic Hammond, who suddenly recalled one of the attachés to London, that enlightened bureaucrat being apparently quite incapable of realizing that a young man's time might be more profitably employed at Washington during the Civil War than in preparing for some perfunctory and trumpery examination which could perfectly well have been undertaken at any subsequent period. The appeals to the autocrat of the Foreign Office for assistance are as pathetic as they are moderate. 'I conjure you to send me out two or at least one good working attaché as soon as possible. Brodie is completely out of health; Warre is always prostrated by the abominable heat of this place; Monson can do a great deal, but his constitution is not of iron; and as for myself I cannot do much Chancery work in addition to my proper duties. Indeed, I shall soon break down. What you see of our work gives a very small idea of the amount of it. It seems to me that everybody North and South who gets into trouble discovers that he or she is a non-naturalized British subject.'

Nor were any high qualifications demanded. Geniuses were not in request. 'What we want is a good steady industrious copier, _well conducted in private life_. I have no objection to quite a young one; such a man as Jenner would suit me perfectly. Anderson, Monson, and I are all sufficiently well up in ordinary Chancery management to make it unnecessary to have more genius or more experience than is required for copying.'

Writing to his old chief Lord Normanby, the confession is made that Washington 'is a terrible place for young men; nothing whatever in the shape of amusement for them, little or no society of any kind now; no theatre, no club. I have no time to think whether I am amused or not.'

Being constitutionally incapable of exaggeration, this last statement may be accepted as literally accurate.

Leave for three months having been granted, the sanguine Mr. Seward did not fail to draw hopeful conclusions from the circumstance, and there appeared to be no sign of immediate trouble in the near future.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, June 9, 1862.

I was so unwell yesterday that I was unable to do anything, which
has prevented my sending you by this mail some general information
on the prospects of the war and some other matters.

I did not think that Mr. Seward would object to my going. He has, in
fact, taken up the idea with so much enthusiasm that I have been
obliged to endeavour to check his anticipation of the wonders I am
to effect, or rather to make him understand that my own views, not
his, are those which I must express to you.

I take his willingness that I should go as a sign that he does not
expect serious trouble, for I think that he would rather be in my
hands than those of a man new to him if he did.

I am afraid that there are three things to which we must not blind
ourselves:

1. That we have a very small chance of getting cotton from this
country for a long time to come.

2. That there is no Union feeling in the South.

3. That the war has become one of separation or subjugation.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, June 13, 1862.

I had quite an affectionate parting with the President this morning.
He told, as is his wont, a number of stories more or less decorous,
but all he said having any bearing on political matters was: 'I
suppose my position makes people in England think a great deal more
of me than I deserve, pray tell 'em that I mean 'em no harm.' He
does not pay much attention to foreign affairs, and I suppose did
not like to talk about them without Mr. Seward. I am to hear Mr.
Seward's last words at New York on Tuesday evening. I embark the
following morning, and hope to pay my respects to you in person a
few days after this letter reaches you.

It is quite time for me to get away from this place. The heat to-day
is overpowering.

Lord Lyons arrived in London about the end of June, and a letter to Mr. Stuart who had been left in charge of the Legation at Washington shows that he was considerably alarmed at the hostile feeling prevailing throughout the country against the North, largely due to the inability to obtain cotton, but also embittered by the tone of the American press. As an instance of this feeling, alluding to the rumour that McClellan had suffered a serious defeat, he adds: 'I am afraid no one but me is sorry for it.' McClellan's misfortunes certainly provoked demonstrations of pleasure in the House of Commons during an ill-timed debate which took place in July, and a celebrated speech by Gladstone in which he asserted that 'Jefferson Davies and the leaders of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made, what is more than either--they have made a nation,' certainly tended to show that however impartial the Cabinet intended to be, the sympathies of England were to a great extent with the South.

During his stay in England he was in constant communication with the Cabinet, and the general belief of ministers was that whilst extremely reluctant to interfere in any way in the American contest, interference might be forced upon them. Mediation was again in the air, and M. Mercier and the French Government thought that an opportunity had arrived for proposing it.

Lord Lyons, after having been detained by Lord Russell for the purpose of additional consultations, set out again for Washington in October accompanied by the late Sir Edward Malet, who remained for a considerable period on his staff, and became one of his closest friends. In fact, with the exception of the late Mr. George Sheffield, who was already acting as his private secretary, and of the late Sir Michael Hubert, who subsequently acted in the same capacity, it is doubtful whether any other person of his acquaintance ever reached the same degree of intimacy or shared his confidence to an equal extent.

The visit to England had in no sense changed the policy of the British Government towards the United States, and there were no fresh instructions with regard to mediation, intervention, recognition of the South, and the numerous other matters which occupied attention. Nor had any essential change taken place in the situation in America, and Lord Lyons, immediately after his return expressed the opinion that foreign intervention, short of the use of force, would only make matters worse. The indefatigable M. Mercier, however, in whose thoughts intervention was always uppermost, was full of a new plan, although, with the violent party predominant in the Cabinet, the moment did not appear propitious. M. Mercier's idea was that France, with the consent and support of England, should offer mediation alone. He thought that the difficulty which the irritation against England threw in the way of mediation might thus be avoided, while the fact of England supporting France would give to France the weight of both Powers. According to his information, Russia, probably from a desire to separate France and England, was disposed to join France in offering good offices, but, independently of other considerations, the presence of Russia might be an obstacle to the success of his plan. It would take away from the offer of mediation the element of intimidation, which, though kept in the background, must be felt by the United States to exist. The mediation of all the European Powers (France, England, Russia, and perhaps Prussia) would be a different matter. It might have the effect of reconciling the pride of the United States to negotiation with the South, and might, in certain conjunctions, be usefully employed. But it would be more easy for the Government of the United States to reject an offer from the four Powers than from England and France, or from France only. England and France had an obvious and pressing interest in putting an end to hostilities and the means of supporting their counsels by their navies.

Such was M. Mercier's plan, but he received little encouragement from his British colleague, who had anticipated something of the kind, and with habitual caution declined to pronounce any opinion until he had received instructions from home. As a matter of fact, he had foreseen this proposal when in England, and had obtained an assurance from Lord Russell that it should be discussed by the Cabinet.

The two following letters from Lord Russell to Lord Lyons show that M. Mercier was really in accordance with his own Government.

* * * * *

Woburn Abbey, Nov. 1, 1862.

The Emperor of the French wishes to offer peace to both parties, and
he says both parties will agree to peace, the one on the ground of
Union and the other on the ground of Separation! I fear we are no
nearer to peace, if so near, as we were a year ago.

Seward's avowal to Mr. Stuart that he looks to mutual extermination
and the superior numbers of the North, in order to restore the
Union!!! is the most horrible thing I ever heard.

Cobden, I fear, is right when he says that to preach peace to them
is like speaking to mad dogs. I am much less sanguine than I was,
but I shall be glad to hear your views on your return. Russia must
be a party to any thing done by us and France--if we do anything.

* * * * *

Woburn Abbey, Nov. 8, 1862.

Flahault has been instructed to propose to us in conjunction with
Russia to ask North and South to suspend their war for six months. I
have not seen the despatch.

We shall consider our answer on Tuesday next.

The Emperor's proposal was declined by the British Government, and at first peremptorily declined also by the Russian Government, but as soon as the latter perceived, by a speech made by Lord Palmerston at the Guildhall, that there was no chance of an acceptance of the proposal by England a circular was issued, stating that if France persisted in her intention, the Russian Minister at Washington would be instructed to give it moral if not official support. Thus, as on many other occasions, did Louis Napoleon's elaborate scheme vanish into space.

One fresh difficulty which had arisen in the meantime was the diminished influence of Mr. Seward with the President and his ministers. He had become much more conciliatory in his dealings with foreign representatives, but was apparently unable to carry his points with other departments, and had fallen in public estimation by signing the Abolition Proclamation which had been imposed upon him, in opposition to all his views by the Radical party in the Cabinet. Towards the end of the year it seemed quite probable that he would have to resign, and the contingency was viewed with consternation, for although Mr. Seward had very pronounced faults, he now represented the Moderate party, and his departure would signify the surrender of President Lincoln to the Ultra Radical party, prepared to risk everything, even to a foreign war, in order to maintain itself in power.

Upon the whole, there was every excuse for dissatisfaction with their Government on the part of the Northern public. After about two years' fighting the two main armies of the North and South remained in much the same position, but, if anything, the balance of gain appeared to rest with the South. New Orleans, it is true, had been captured, but the invasion of Virginia had failed, and Richmond was as unapproachable as ever. The North were the attacking party, and if they failed to advance it was equivalent to a defeat. Disappointment and discouragement had succeeded to confidence and enthusiasm, and if the contest imposed much severer hardships upon the Confederates than upon their opponents, there was no sign of faltering, and their spirit remained as high as ever.

Before the end of 1862 the prices of ordinary articles in the Confederate States had already greatly increased. As early as October, according to the consular reports, the price of tea at Savannah was sixteen dollars a pound; brown sugar sixty cents; loaf sugar unobtainable, and the commonest brown soap seventy-five cents. At Charleston, coal was unprocurable; black cloth fetched fifty-three dollars a yard; shoes cost thirty-four dollars a pair; beer thirty dollars a dozen; sugar a dollar a pound; butter a dollar and a half, and the pound sterling was worth fourteen dollars. In view of these figures it would be interesting to learn the cost of a banquet given by General Ripley in December 1862, to some French officers at Charleston, at which Consul Bunch, of revoked exequatur fame, was present, and which must surely have been the most sumptuous meal ever partaken of in a besieged town since the days of Belshazzar.

* * * * *

BILL OF FARE.

Oysters on Shell.

FISH.
Salmon, Anchovy sauce.

SOUP.
Green Turtle. Oyster.

RELEVÉES.
Fillet of Beef, braisé with Mushrooms,
Capon, with Truffes à la Regence.

BOILED.
Leg of Mutton, Caper sauce,
Turkey, Celery sauce.

COLD.
Boned Turkey, garnished with Jelly,
Chicken Salad, à la Française,
Game Pattie, with truffles, decorated with Jelly.

ENTRÉES.
Sweet Breads, larded en croustade, sauce petits pois,
Fillets of Teal Duck, bigare, sauce Italienne,
Quails, braisés, sauce Champignons,
Snipe, broiled on Toast,
Fillets of Venison, sautés, sauce Poivrade,
Fried Oysters.

RELISHES.
Sardines, Olives, Celery, Assorted Pickles,
Horseradish, Pickled Onions, Cranberry Jelly,
Worcestershire sauce.

VEGETABLES.
Baked Sweet Potatoes, New Irish Potatoes, Mashed Potatoes,
Spinach, Cauliflowers, Turnips, Rice.

ROAST.
Turkey, stuffed with truffles, Saddle of Mutton,
Baked Ham, Madeira sauce.

GAME.
Wild Duck, Wild Turkey, Venison, with Jelly.

PASTRY.
Plum Pudding, Brandy sauce.
Apple and Mince pies, Omelette Soufflée, Lady Fingers,
Vanilla Kisses, Sponge Cake, Cup Custard, Madeira Jelly.

DESSERT.
Apples, Nuts, Coffee, etc.

If, however, the South was feeling the effects of privation, the North had no cause to rejoice. In September, 1862, Lincoln had issued the preliminary proclamation of Emancipation, but the hope that it would consolidate the North had not been realized. The second proclamation appeared on January 1, 1863, and had no greater success, serving only to exasperate the South still further and increasing the divisions in the North. The Democratic party was afraid to declare openly for peace, but disguised efforts in favour of it were now made, and it was sought to induce some of the State Legislatures to pass resolutions in favour of an armistice and a convention. Men of all shades of politics had lost heart, but the most probable cause of peace seemed to be the impossibility of raising or keeping together a great army unless the national spirit could be raised by some striking military successes, meanwhile the division of feeling in the North had reached such a pitch that the patriots who had formerly clamoured for a foreign war to reunite North and South were now calling for a foreign war to reunite the North itself.

The general demoralization induced M. Mercier to make yet another attempt at mediation. Upon this occasion he was approached by the well-known journalist, Mr. Horace Greeley, whose object it was to ascertain whether the Emperor Napoleon could be relied upon as a real friend to the United States in case of his being accepted as a mediator, a 'real friend,' meaning, of course, one who would insist upon the restoration of the Union. M. Mercier's fresh attempt met with no greater success than before, nor was it surprising, for his action was based upon an entire misconception.

Being firmly convinced that the restoration of the Union was impossible, he failed to realize that this must be the basis of all negotiations, and although most people were heartily sick of the war and were not prepared to refuse to the South all terms short of unconditional surrender, they had not been brought to the point of acquiescing in a cession of territory.

The French proposal, with which we had been careful not to associate ourselves, was, of course, declined by the American Government. Mr. Seward re-established some of his popularity by the character of his answer; distrust of the Emperor Napoleon increased, and the only party which benefited in any way was England, for the increase in ill-feeling towards France had the result of diminishing to some extent the animosity against us, and M. Mercier himself was now almost as much attacked in the press as the British Minister had been in the past.

Early in the year, an incident occurred which might have had unpleasant consequences had it not been promptly dealt with. In spite of the endless embarrassments created by the blockade, the British Government was sincerely anxious not to give the United States Government any ground for complaint, and the Consuls had been continually enjoined by Lord Lyons to adhere closely to the recognized rules of International Law where a state of blockade existed. To his consternation he now learnt that the Consul at Mobile proposed to send away from that port a quantity of specie in a British man-of-war. 'I should be very much alarmed,' he wrote, 'if I thought it likely that he would find a captain of man-of-war as foolish as himself. I really could not answer for peace if, in addition to the irritation about the _Alabama_, should come the fury which would be excited, if it were shown that our men-of-war had carried Confederate gold through the blockade. No proof that the money was intended for, or even that it had been actually paid to, British bondholders would ever convince people here that it had not been used to purchase munitions of war.' Unfortunately a simple-minded captain had been discovered by the Consul, and before it was possible to communicate with him the specie had been shipped. This action, which was due solely to stupidity, was impossible to defend, and would have provided the American Government with a first-class grievance; clearly the best thing to do was to anticipate any complaints, and consequently the Consul was wisely dismissed before the matter became really public. The promptitude with which this regrettable incident was dealt with contrasts favourably with the difficulty which was experienced in persuading the American Government to deal adequately with grievances arising out of the proceedings of their own officials.

At this period of the war innumerable complaints were received from British Governors, Naval officers and Consuls with regard to the arbitrary proceedings of United States cruisers, and it was plain that these proceedings were largely due to the exasperation caused by the exploits of the _Alabama_, and by the rumours that similar vessels were being built in England for the Confederates. This exasperation was perfectly natural, but not altogether reasonable, for it never seems to have occurred to the Americans that the fault lay partly with their own Navy. Great pressure was put upon President Lincoln to issue letters of marque, and had privateers made their appearance and exercised belligerent rights against neutral merchantmen, the difficulty of preserving peace would have been increased tenfold. Mr. Seward was known to be strongly in favour of the policy of issuing letters of marque, and the matter was brought to the attention of Mr. Adams by Lord Russell, who always appeared somewhat unnecessarily disposed to suspect Mr. Seward of hostile intentions.

* * * * *

_Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._

Chesham Place, March 14, 1863.

I don't think Mr. Seward means to quarrel with us, but perhaps he
will bluster rather more when he has lost the support of Congress.

Adams told me that the privateers, if sanctioned at all, were not
intended to interfere with nice questions of International Law, but
only to encounter the _Alabama_ and other vessels of that sort.
If this be so I doubt if they will be fitted out at all, but if
they are fitted out I think they will not keep their hands off
English merchant ships.

We have no thoughts of recognizing at present. If you are asked our
intentions by Seward, say that our opinion is that the Republican
Party ought not to leave the glorious work of peace to the
Democrats, but as a Neutral Power, our intention and wish is to let
the war work itself out, as it is sure to do by the moral exhaustion
of the war spirit.

Our procession and wedding went off splendidly. The Princess of
Wales is charming and would make New York stand on tiptoe to behold
her.

In a further conversation with Mr. Adams he made the significant remarks that if the contemplated privateers sought for Confederate merchant ships they would not find any, and that if they interfered with neutral vessels and the law of blockade they would probably involve their own and the British Government in 'very awkward questions.'

Lord Russell, in spite of his sincere and often proclaimed desire to remain absolutely impartial, hardly seems at this time to have realized the disastrous consequences of not having prevented the departure of the _Alabama_ and similar vessels.

* * * * *

_Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, March 28, 1863.

The outcry in America about the _Oreto_ and the _Alabama_ is much
exaggerated, but I must feel that her roaming the ocean with English
guns and English sailors to burn, sink and destroy the ships of a
friendly nation, is a scandal and a reproach. I don't know very well
what we can do, but I should like myself to refer the question of
indemnity to an impartial arbiter.

When things are more advanced towards a termination, I think this
might be done. It would be dangerous to do it at present, or even
to hold out hopes of it. I will think further of it, and if I remain
in the same mind, will submit the question to the Cabinet.

The _Peterhoff_ and the _Magicienne_ are now before the Law
Officers. I will send you instructions about them next week. The
seizures by Admiral Wilkes seem like a plan to embroil our two
countries. He always protests that such is not his object, but his
acts do not agree with his words.

I should like anything better than being obliged to take the part of
the Confederates. But then President Lincoln must not be getting up
war cries to help his declining popularity.

The two vessels alluded to had been captured on their way to Matamoros, in Mexican territory, and the British Government contended that the traffic to that place was legitimate, while the United States Government maintained, probably with justice, that the goods were intended for Texas. Matamoros, which was situated on the Rio Grande, separating Mexico from the United States, sprang into prominence in 1862 in consequence of the war, became the seat of a brisk trade, and provided one of the numerous difficulties arising out of the blockade, which had now been greatly extended owing to the rapid development of the Federal Navy.

As for Admiral Wilkes, the hero of the _Trent_, his arbitrary conduct was the subject of continual complaints; he showed marked discourtesy in connection with H.M.S. _Barracouta_, and upon one occasion a cruiser under his command went so far as to fire a shot across the bows of H.M.S. _Cygnet_, and as the long-suffering British Admiral Sir A. Milne observed, to fire a shot across the bows of a neutral ship of war when hove to, was going a step further in the already uncourteous proceedings of the American cruisers. Admiral Wilkes always disclaimed any intention of unfriendliness, but his proceedings were a fruitful source of irritation, and Lord Russell certainly conceived the impression that he and his official chief, Mr. Welles, were bent upon picking a quarrel with us.

Feeling between the two countries was not improved by the inopportune publication of a Blue Book. The Democrats, who had been faring badly, by some mysterious process of reasoning, came to the conclusion that the object was to destroy them and denounced Lord Russell for having lost them an election in Connecticut by his Machiavellian proceedings. They vented their indignation upon the Legation at Washington, and the position of the minister became more and more unpleasant, added to which his health again showed signs of giving way.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, April 13, 1863.

I have written as much as I have time and strength for officially. I
have been unwell all the last week, but not seriously so. I think
the state of things here, as far as peace with us is concerned, more
alarming than it has been since the Trent affair. They are not a
people who can be soothed by concessions, and they are a people who
after any amount of bluster will give in if they think that their
opponents are in earnest and are stronger than they. I would rather
the quarrel came, if come it must, upon some better ground for us
than the question of the ships fitted out for the Confederates. The
great point to be gained, in my opinion, would be to prevent the
ships sailing, without leading the people here to think that they
had gained their point by threats. I am in trouble altogether, for
the good will to me personally, which had miraculously survived so
long, seems at last to have sunk altogether under the stroke of the
last Blue Book.

It must have been peculiarly irritating, after all the efforts he had made, to find them neutralized by the clumsy action of the Home Government, but in his private correspondence there occur no expressions of resentment against those who had thus weakened his position, probably because his sense of discipline and loyalty to his official chiefs was so strong as to preclude anything in the nature of criticism. It is customary, before publishing Blue Books on Foreign Affairs, to consult both the Foreign Government concerned and the British representative accredited to it, but presumably in this case the usual practice was not observed.

In one direction, however, there was an improvement. The British Government tardily realizing the danger arising from the building of Confederate cruisers in England took steps to prevent it, and the situation was eased for the time being.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, April 24, 1863.

So far as I can judge in this short time the Americans have eagerly
grasped at the intelligence of the endeavours to stop the
Confederate vessels building in England, as a relief from their
dread that they were really drifting into a war with us. I cannot
yet say whether the exasperation is subsiding. I have not much fear
that they will ever put a _casus belli_ to us, but I do fear that
they may force us to make demands upon them to which, however
plainly just, party considerations may render it difficult for the
administration to yield. I seem to be getting on pretty well again
with Mr. Seward, but not with others since the Blue Book, and Mr.
Seward cannot control the feelings or the actions of the other
members of the administration either as regards England or her
Representative here personally. However, for the moment, things
certainly look more peaceful than they did a week ago. I mean
peaceful towards us, for there are no symptoms of an approaching end
of the civil war.

One danger at any rate was removed, at all events temporarily, for the American Government determined not to proceed with the issuing of the letters of marque. The chief danger, however, lay not so much in the exasperation caused by the Confederate ships as in the proceedings of the United States cruisers, and it was feared that a repetition of such seizures as those of the _Peterhoff_ and _Magicienne_ might rouse such a feeling of indignation in England that it might become necessary to put forward demands for redress which the Americans would be too angry to comply with. For some reason, too, the relations between the British Legation and the Navy Department (perhaps owing to Mr. Welles's anti-English proclivities), were much less satisfactory than was the case with the other Government offices, and whenever an American naval officer had been admittedly in the wrong, explanation, regret, or redress were generally postponed so long (as in the case of the _Trent_) that the United States Government found itself in the position of having either to make a marked concession to England, or to run the risk of refusing just demands. Lord Lyons's usual practice was to leave the door open for spontaneous action on their part up to the last moment, and to abstain from making anything like a demand or even an embarrassing observation for as long as possible; but his difficulties in dealing with such questions were increased by a quarrel between Mr. Seward and Mr. Welles. Mr. Seward, to do him justice, generally seems to have exercised a pacific influence, but party spirit ran so high, and the Democrats detested him so cordially, that even those who were known to be friendly towards England could not resist the temptation of denouncing his 'humiliating concessions to British arrogance' when they got the opportunity.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Admiral Sir A. Milne._

Washington, May 11, 1863.

I have given Mr. Seward verbally a warning from H.M. Government that
the impression which prevails in England that the United States are
systematically endeavouring by fair means and by foul to stop our
trade with Matamoros is producing very dangerous effects. Mr. Seward
said that he should be able to give very satisfactory assurances on
this head. I observed to him that I thought some decided practical
steps were necessary to do away with this impression. I reminded him
of his previous assurances and of his instructions to the Navy
Department, and pointed out those instructions were apparently set
at nought by the U.S. officers. I said that the great point was to
make the subordinate officers feel the effects of the displeasure of
the Government, when they violated neutral rights; that it was not
likely the naval officers would pay much attention to the assurances
given by the Government to Foreign Powers, and that it was not to be
expected that they would pay much attention to formal instructions
to themselves, if they found that they could practically violate
them with impunity. The Government ought, I said, to remove its
subordinates from situations in which they were peculiarly exposed
to temptations to make an unlawful use of belligerent powers. I told
Mr. Seward that I should regard another questionable seizure of a
British merchant vessel in the neighbourhood of St. Thomas, or
another questionable seizure anywhere of a British vessel bound to
Matamoros, as little less than a calamity.

I trust that I made so much impression as to render it probable that
these matters will be arranged for the present, as far as _words_
go, and that something will be done to check the vexatious
proceedings of the cruisers. What this Government ought to do is to
remove their ships from St. Thomas altogether and recall Admiral
Wilkes. I have not however much confidence in their doing anything
really effectual. Many of the naval officers would like a war with
England. They know well enough that it would not be a naval war, but
they are envious of Captain Semmes and the _Alabama_, and would
rather roam about picking up prizes, than go on with the dull and
harassing work of blockading. Then the universal exasperation in the
country against England makes the Government unwilling and afraid to
do anything which looks like a concession to us. Thus things are in
a dangerous state, and it will be a great comfort to me to be within
reach of you by telegraph.

If any more privateers get out of our ports, the Government here may
be forced by public clamour to issue letters of marque somewhat
suddenly. Mr. Seward has verbally promised to give us notice, but
this is a very vague assurance: of course it will not do for me to
discuss beforehand any particular arrangements about them, because
this would imply acquiescence in their being issued, which we are
far from wishing to signify beforehand.

I have been unwell for more than a month, and am beset by a quantity
of small vexatious business concerning the wrongs of British
subjects who have suddenly proclaimed their unswerving loyalty to
the British Crown and demanded my protection.

Many thanks for your private letter. You will think that I am trying
to make up for the quality of my information by quantity of writing.
The fact is I am too much knocked up to be able to write shortly.

The representations made with regard to Admiral Wilkes, partly owing to the good offices of Mr. Seward, at length produced a satisfactory result, and that enterprising officer was promoted to a command in the Pacific, much doubtless to the relief of all concerned. Lord Lyons was extremely careful to conceal the fact that he had been in any way instrumental in obtaining this transfer, and congratulated himself upon the advent of a temporary lull in the storm against England: a lull, however, which the escape of another _Alabama_ from Liverpool, of a considerable Federal success or even a mere accident, might convert into an even more furious tempest.

Two years previously Mr. Seward had announced that the policy of the United States, unlike that of other countries, was 'based on high and eternal consideration of principle and the good of the human race,' but aliens resident in America, and more especially Englishmen, might have been excused for complaining that this lofty and inspiring ideal was accompanied by a vast amount of inconvenience and hardship.

Foreigners who have taken up their abode in a country where a state of war prevails are naturally subjected to much that is objectionable to them, in the natural course of things, and as a general rule find it extremely difficult to obtain redress, for whilst they remain in a country which is not their own they must submit to any exceptional legislation which the force of circumstances may require. Foreign Governments are not in a position to decide whether this exceptional legislation is justifiable or not, and the utmost that the alien can expect is, either that he should be allowed time to depart, or that his Government should protect him by remonstrance or otherwise when he is dealt with illegally; and the general principle which is usually adopted is that foreign interference should be as sparing as possible and that the foreigner should take his chance with the native citizen.

It was not long before foreigners in the United States were made to realize the disadvantages of living in a country where civil war prevailed. When hostilities began, the Government, reasonably enough, took steps to suspend when necessary the ordinary law, that being a practice almost invariably adopted by civilized countries under similar circumstances. Persons suspected of disaffection or treason were arbitrarily arrested, kept in prison under the authority of the military, and detained there without trial; and amongst these were occasionally _bonâ fide_ British subjects and others who claimed to be such. Where martial law exists, it is only natural that occasional cases of injustice or harshness should arise, and it is clear that a certain number of British subjects suffered without due cause, but upon the whole it does not appear the United States Government exercised its powers with undue severity, or that it acted in a more arbitrary manner than would have been the case with a European Power in a similar position.

In February, 1862, nearly all political prisoners, other than spies, were ordered to be released on parole, and in April Lord Lyons was able to report that although the Executive Government retained the power to make political arrests it was rarely exercised. He stated that he was not aware of any British subject being detained arbitrarily as a political prisoner, and that although arrests without form of law were still being made by the military authorities in places occupied by the forces of the United States, they appeared to be confined in general to persons accused of offences affecting, more or less, the discipline or safety of the army.

As was only to be expected, there were an enormous number of applications made to the Legation by persons who were aggrieved by the operation of martial law, but what gave far more trouble was the attempt of the United States Government to exact military service from resident British subjects.

The established principle is that resident aliens, in return for the enjoyment of ordinary civil rights, should be liable to discharge certain duties in connection with the administration of justice and the maintenance of order, and that in certain cases they may reasonably be called upon to take part in the defence of the country against invasion. On the other hand, the incorporation of aliens in the regular army or navy is manifestly unjust, for it prevents departure from the country and might conceivably incur the obligation of having to fight against their own countrymen. This, it is true, is not applicable to a civil war, but an alien might well argue that a civil war, waged between citizens for an object in which he, as an alien, had no concern, was a totally insufficient reason for dragging him into the contest. It is difficult to believe, for instance, that the United States Government would tolerate the compulsory service of American citizens in the army of a South American Republic in the event of an attempt being made to impress them during a civil war. Consequently, when hostilities began, the Washington Legation was besieged by persons who desired to be exempted from service by getting registered as British subjects, many of whom had announced their intention of becoming American citizens at the earliest opportunity. _Prima facie_ it seems only reasonable that persons who deliberately exchange one nationality for another, more especially if like many of the Irish emigrants they have professed undying hostility to England, and everything English, should accept any liability imposed upon them, but the question was complicated by the fact that they had not acquired full rights of citizenship, the naturalization of a foreigner in America, necessitating a residence of five years in the United States, and a declaration of intention three years in advance.