Chapter II: Washington

(1859-1860)

In February, 1859, Lord Lyons, accompanied by some members of his staff (a novelty to one who hitherto had been obliged to work unaided) was despatched to Washington in H.M.S. _Curaçoa_, and owing to the limited coal capacity of that vessel, the voyage occupied no less than forty-two days, a period which must have been singularly disagreeable to a man who in spite of some years' naval service always suffered from sea sickness. The new Minister was received with marked courtesy by the U.S. authorities, and presented his letter of credence on April 12, Mr. Buchanan being President at the time, and General Cass occupying the position of Secretary of State.

Although the Presidential message of the previous December had contained some rather ominous passages with regard to the relations between England and the United States, the sentiments now expressed were friendly in character and showed a disposition to settle pending difficulties in an amicable spirit.

The first letter of importance addressed by Lord Lyons to Lord Malmesbury deals with the effect produced in the United States by the outbreak of war between France and Austria.

* * * * *

Washington, May 24, 1859.

I had intended to write a despatch respecting the effect produced
in the U.S. by the War in Europe, but we are so short of hands in
the Chancery, that it is as much as we have been able to do to get
through the regular matters of business which must be treated
officially. I can however give you in a very few words an account of
the state of feeling here, which is probably just what you would
have expected it to be.

The sympathies are all with France and against Austria, but they do
not seem very strong; one sentiment however does appear to be both
strong and universal--the desire to take advantage of the state of
things in Europe to carry out American Views on this side of the
Atlantic; in short to get hold of Mexico and Cuba. The present wish
of the President is, I think, both to be and to appear to be on the
best terms with us. He is careful to vindicate us, in the newspaper
which is his organ, against all imputation of insincerity in Central
American Affairs. The Departments are particularly attentive to all
the smaller matters I have to bring before them, and apparently
anxious to do what I ask. But here I am afraid the practical effect
of their goodwill is likely to end. The Government is so weak that I
do not think it would venture, even in a small matter, to do
anything for us which would expose it to the least unpopularity. I
feel my way cautiously, endeavouring to be very plain and firm upon
clear British Questions, and to avoid doubtful topics as much as
possible.

The immediate object of the President with regard to Mexico appears
to be to avoid the ridicule which would be heaped upon him if the
Government of Juarez were to fall immediately after the American
Cabinet had at last made up their mind to recognize it. Instructions
are, I am told, on the point of being sent to Mr. McLane to
negotiate a treaty with Mexico, partly, it is said, with the object
of giving Juarez a little moral support, partly perhaps to get so
advantageous a Treaty from him, as to engage public opinion here to
declare itself more strongly in favour of his being upheld by the
U.S. Whether Mr. McLane will be instructed (as Mr. Forsyth was) to
propose to purchase part of the Mexican territory, I am unable to
say.

I am very much obliged by your sending out Mr. Warre, and am
impatiently expecting him. It is absolutely necessary to have a good
man here to direct the Chancery; I think too this mission would be a
very good school for a young man who really wished to learn his
business, and I should welcome any one who was industrious, and
wrote a thoroughly good legible hand.

It is particularly desirable that the Staff should be complete,
because if the Minister is to have any knowledge of the Country and
people, it is indispensable that he should visit, from time to time,
the principal cities. This is not like a European State, in which
politics and business are centred in the Capital, and can be studied
more advantageously there than elsewhere. No political men make
Washington their principal residence, in fact they cannot do so, as
it sends no members to Congress, either to the Senate or the House
of Representatives. Commerce it has none. It is in fact little more
than a large village--and when Congress is not sitting it is a
deserted village.

Another letter dated May 30, shows that he was under no illusion as to the feelings entertained by a large section of the American public, while fully conscious of the difficulties with which the United States Government, however well intentioned, was forced to contend.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Malmesbury._

Washington, May 30, 1859.

You will anticipate from my private letter of the 24th my answer to
your inquiry as to what would be the animus of this Government if
England became involved in the present war.

The first notion both of Government and People would be to take
advantage of the circumstance to take their full swing upon this
side of the Atlantic, and especially so far as the people are
concerned to get hold of Cuba and Mexico. The wiser heads see
very distinctly the imprudence of fresh acquisitions of territory,
and the great danger to the Union of introducing large Bodies of
Citizens of Spanish and mixed Races. I believe this to be the
feeling of the present Administration, but no administration
disregards the popular cry.

So far as I can learn, the American acquisitiveness is directed
rather South than North, and is disposed to be content for the
present, with what is most easy to lay hold of. Except on the part
of the most rancorous of the Irish here there does not appear to
be much desire of exciting disturbances in Canada or any of our
Colonies.

I think that if we were engaged in war the Americans would be
(particularly with reference to neutral rights at sea) punctilious,
exacting and quarrelsome to a degree. There is hardly any amount of
violence to which a captain of an American man of war, if he were
clearly in superior force, might not be expected to resort, in order
to prevent American merchantmen being interfered with. And however
outrageous in itself and opposed to International Law the conduct of
the American officers might be, it would meet with enthusiastic
applause from the multitude, and consequently the Government would
not dare to disavow it. This admiration of bullying and violent
proceedings on their own side, which appears to be universal among
the populace here, and the want of firmness on the part of the
Government in withstanding it, seem to me to constitute some of the
greatest difficulties we should have to contend with in keeping at
peace with America when we were at war with other Powers.

I do not think the general sympathies of the Americans need be taken
much into the account. The violent feelings aroused at particular
conjunctures by the events of the war, or by special matters of
dispute, are what will sway the mob, and therefore control the
Government. The upper classes here have certainly in general a
strong sympathy with England; they are proud of her position in the
world, they are anxious for her good opinion, they admire her
political institutions, and are extremely discontented with those of
their own country. But the upper classes keep aloof from political
life, and have little influence in public affairs. The mass of the
Irish Emigrants appear to regard England with bitter hatred, their
numbers give them weight in elections, but their moral power is
small. I should hardly say that the Bulk of the American people are
hostile to the old country but I think they would rather enjoy
seeing us in difficulties. Those even who are most friendly like to
gratify their pride by the idea of our being reduced to straits and
of their coming to our rescue.

I conceive that the wish both of Government and people would certainly
at first be to remain neutral, and reap all the advantages to their
commerce which could not fail to result from that situation, and
their interest in remaining at peace with us is so apparent and so
immense, that it could not fail to tell for some time. But the
People are irritable, excitable, and have a great longing to play
the part of a first-rate power.

The Government would no doubt endeavour to maintain neutrality, but
it would follow public feeling, and probably become exacting,
captious, and (to use a term more expressive than classical)
'bumptious' to a very irritating extent. A great deal would depend
upon firmness on our side. If they thought they could attain their
ends by threats and bluster, there would be no limit to their
pretensions. Perhaps the best way to deal with them would be to
gratify their vanity by treating them in matters of form as great
people, being careful to communicate with them respecting our views
and intentions in something the same manner as if they were really a
considerable military power: to avoid interfering in matters in
which we are not sufficiently interested to make it worth while to
raise serious questions, and above all in matters directly affecting
British interests and British Rights to be clear and distinct in our
language, and firm and decided in our conduct, to convince them that
when we are in the right and in earnest, we are more unyielding, not
less so than formerly--in short to avoid as much as possible raising
questions with them, but not to give way upon those we raise.

I need not remind you that these are the crude ideas of a man who
has been only seven weeks in the country, and who has necessarily
passed them in a small, and at this season, almost deserted town,
which is merely the nominal Capital.

I am anxiously looking out for Mr. Warre, whose arrival you announce
that I may soon expect. It would add much to the efficiency of the
Mission, and be a great comfort to me to have an additional unpaid
attaché, provided he were industrious, desirous to improve, and
capable of writing a good hand.

The change of Government which took place in England during the summer substituted Lord John Russell for Lord Malmesbury at the Foreign Office, and following the example of his predecessor, Lord John desired to be supplied with confidential information by private letters.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._

Washington, July 11, 1859.

At present the President and his Cabinet appear to desire both to
be, and to be thought by the Public to be on the best terms with us.
They are however so weak in Congress, that I doubt whether they
would venture to do anything for us which would be the least
unpopular. It is not therefore to be hoped that they will make any
effort to open to us the Coasting Trade, to extend the provisions of
the Reciprocity Treaty with Canada, to make a Copyright Convention,
or, in short, take any liberal course in commercial matters. Nor
indeed is it likely to be in their power to carry any measures
tending to put us on equal terms with themselves in these respects.
The Democratic spirit in this country appears to be all in favour
of Protection and Exclusive Privileges. Happily the interest of
the South is against a high Customs Tariff; and this checks the
Protectionist Tendencies of the Manufacturing North.

Mr. Dallas will have communicated to you the Statement which has
been for months preparing here, of the views of this Government
respecting neutral rights. The Cabinet, I understand, hope that they
shall obtain great credit with the people for their efforts to
establish American views on this point. They are very anxious to
obtain our co-operation, and imagine, I think, that they may induce
us to claim now concessions to Neutrals which would result in being
a considerable restraint to our assertion for ourselves of
Belligerent rights if we should become involved in war.

I think that our Relations with the U.S. require more than ever--at
this moment--caution and firmness. Caution--to avoid raising
questions with them, without a positive necessity; firmness--to make
them feel that they cannot take advantage of the State of affairs in
Europe to obtain undue advantages in matters directly affecting
British Interests or British Rights. For my own part I endeavour to
speak firmly and distinctly upon all matters which fall within the
proper province of the British Minister in this country and to avoid
all doubtful topics.

* * * * *

The Americans, both Government and People, are I think very much
pleased by attentions and civilities, and very prone to fancy
themselves slighted. This quality may be sometimes turned to good
account, and should certainly be borne in mind when it is necessary
to keep them in good humour.

One of the many questions which had for some time engaged the attention of the two Governments was the disputed ownership of the island of San Juan on the Pacific coast, and this case afforded an instance in which the Government of the United States was hampered by an agent whom it was not inclined to disavow. The culprit was a certain General Harney who in a high-handed manner occupied the island without authorization, and conducted himself in a generally offensive manner, but although President Buchanan was considerably embarrassed by his action, he was too much afraid of the press and the mob to order the withdrawal of the troops. For some time there appeared to be a chance of an actual collision, and Lord John Russell showed considerable irritation.

* * * * *

_Lord John Russell to Lord Lyons._

Abergeldie, Sept. 21, 1859.

The affair of San Juan is very annoying. It is of the nature of the
U.S. citizens to push themselves where they have no right to go, and
it is of the nature of the U.S. Government not to venture to disavow
acts they cannot have the face to approve.

The best way perhaps would be that we should seize some other island
to which we have as little right as the Americans to San Juan. But
until we know the answer of the American Government to your note and
the proceedings of Governor Douglas, we can hardly give you
instructions.

If you could contrive a convention with the U.S. by which each Power
should occupy San Juan for three or six months, each to protect
person and property till the boundary question is settled, it will
be the best arrangement that can be made for the present.

As a matter of fact the U.S. Government showed itself more reasonable than had been expected: a superior officer, General Scott, was sent to settle matters, Harney, to use Lord John Russell's expression, was 'left in the mud,' and after a joint occupation and protracted negotiations the question of the ownership of San Juan was referred to the arbitration of the King of Prussia, who gave his award in favour of the United States some years later.

San Juan, however, was but one amongst a multitude of questions requiring solution, and the great difficulty which Lord Lyons had to contend with was--to use his own words, 'The idea that, happen what may, England will never really declare war with this country has become so deeply rooted that I am afraid nothing short of actual hostilities would eradicate it.' One of these questions concerned the Slave Trade.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._

Dec 6, 1859.

You will see by my despatches of this date, that there is very
little prospect of any satisfactory result from our remonstrance
concerning the Slave Trade. Lamentable as it is, I am afraid the
President goes beyond public opinion already in the measures he
takes against it. In the South the rendering it legal has many
avowed advocates, and it is to be feared that some of the professed
Abolitionists of the North derive too much profit from dabbling
themselves in the trade to desire any efficient measures for its
suppression. The greater part of the vessels engaged in it seem to
be fitted out at New York. The state of feeling at this moment in
the South upon the whole question of slavery is shocking. The
Harper's Ferry affair seems to have excited Southern passions to an
indescribable degree. The dissolution of the Confederation is but
one of the measures which are loudly advocated. There are plans for
the re-enslavement of all the emancipated negroes and for the
purging the South of all whites suspected of Abolitionist
tendencies. The difficulty which we shall have in obtaining decent
treatment for coloured British subjects will be almost insuperable.

* * * * *

Another source of trouble between us and the Southern States may
arise from the measures which they are taking to drive out all
persons suspected of unorthodox notions on slavery, and the orthodox
notion seems to be that slavery is a divine institution. In many
parts of the South, Vigilance Committees are formed who turn people
out at a moment's notice, without any pretext even of law. If any
attempt is made to treat British subjects in this manner, I trust
you will approve of my encouraging the Consuls to insist upon the
law being observed in their case, and to resist any endeavour to
inflict banishment or any other penalty upon an Englishman, except
in due form of law. But it will require a great deal of prudence
and discretion to act in each case, for a fair trial is a thing
impossible in this country of election judges and partisan juries
when party feeling is excited, and any redress we may exact for the
wrong to England, will be too late for the individual in the hands
of Lynch Law Assassins.

The great hope is that the excitement is too violent to last, but
before it subsides, it may do incalculable harm to these states and
raise very painful and awkward questions for us.

If the hope expressed in the last paragraph was fallacious, the forebodings as to the possible tribulations of British subjects proved before long to be only too well founded.

Asked by Lord John Russell for his opinion on the position of affairs in Mexico, he points out _inter alia_, that--

The actual annexation of Mexico to this Confederation raises
immediately one of those questions between the Northern and Southern
States which have already gone a great way to dissolve the Union
altogether. The Southern States desire the addition of territory
_south_, with a view to extending slavery and adding to the
Pro-Slavery votes in the U.S. Senate. To this the North is
conscientiously opposed on religious grounds, to say nothing of the
indignation it feels at the notion of its own vast superiority in
wealth and population being swamped in the Senate. Even now, since
every State sends equally two senators, whatever may be its
population, the North has not the influence it ought to have in the
Senate which is the more important branch of the Legislature. As
the religious sentiment in the North approaches very nearly to
fanaticism, and as the Southern feeling on the point has become
furious passion, there is little chance of their coming to an
agreement upon a matter which calls these feelings into play. In
this particular question the South have on their side the national
vanity which seems always childishly gratified by any addition to
the already enormous extent of the territory. In the meantime the
course of events seems to be bringing about the gradual annexation
of Mexico. The Mexicans in the northern part of their country have
fallen to that point, that they can neither maintain order on the
frontier nor hold their own against the savage Indians within it.
They will (to use an American expression) be 'squatted out' of their
country whenever and wherever any considerable number of the more
energetic race choose to settle. But this is a very different thing
from the sudden incorporation of a vast territory and of a large
population totally different in race, language, religion and
feeling, and (so far as the experiment has been tried) utterly
incapable of maintaining order among themselves under the U.S.
system of government. All the wiser and more conservative
politicians in this country deprecate as an unmitigated evil the
sudden annexation of Mexico; nor are such men willing to undertake
a protectorate of Mexico. This they say would be an enormous
innovation upon their whole political system which has never
admitted of any other connexion than that of perfectly equal
sovereign states, bound by a Federal tie on terms the same for all.

The Presidential Message of December, 1859, was noticeable for an earnest appeal to the North and South to cultivate feelings of mutual forbearance.

The message also made clear the policy of the President towards Mexico; in accordance with the principles of the Monroe doctrine, European intervention in that country was repudiated, and American intervention recommended.

A passage referring to San Juan while obviously intended to exculpate General Harney, paid a handsome tribute to the moderation and discretion shown by the British Admiral (Baynes) commanding on the Pacific station; and the President in conversation expressed the hope that the approaching close of his administration would leave 'a clear score' with England. No doubt President Buchanan was sincere in his expressions, but unfortunately, early in 1860, signs were not wanting, that in the distracted state of the country owing to the rising passions between North and South, many people believed that a foreign war would be the best means of promoting unity, nor was there much doubt as to which foreign country would be selected for the experiment.

Washington has already been disrespectfully alluded to as little better than a large village, and as bearing little resemblance to an ordinary capital, but it is evident that Lord Lyons found plenty of enjoyment there. He was on excellent terms personally with the State officials and his diplomatic colleagues; liked the members of his staff, and above all rejoiced in the fact that there was plenty of work to be done--a good deal more, indeed, than the ordinary person would have approved of. One of his few complaints is that he is much beset by the inventors of implements of war. 'I have not the slightest knowledge practical or theoretical respecting implements of war, and should consequently never be justified in recommending one more than another to the authorities at home. I absolutely decline to see, touch, or have brought into my house any explosive material, I should not feel easy at having even in a garret such a box as you (the Consul at New York) have received for Her Majesty. I should be inclined to ask for authority from England to sink it in the Atlantic Ocean.'

'I am getting on tolerably well here, I hope, on the whole, and have no complaints to make of the Americans,' he admits in letters to other correspondents, and adds: 'I am afraid marriage is better never than late. The American women are undoubtedly very pretty, but my heart is too old and too callous to be wounded by their charms. I am not going to be married either to the fascinating accomplished niece of the President, or to the widow of a late Foreign Minister, or to any other maiden or relict to whom I am given by the newspapers.'

These sentiments sound rather rash even at the age of forty-two, but they remained unchanged. It would be incorrect to describe him as a misogynist, but he successfully withstood all attempts to marry him. In after years, an exalted personage (neither Queen Victoria nor the Empress Eugenie) was so insistent upon the advisability of his espousing one of her ladies-in-waiting, that she eventually couched her proposal in the form of an ultimatum. Lord Lyons asked for and obtained a delay of twenty-four hours, and decided upon consideration to refuse. In view of an event which occurred not long afterwards the decision proved to be a prudent one, and probably confirmed him in the suspicions which he appeared to entertain of the opposite sex.

It had been decided that the Prince of Wales should make a tour in Canada in the summer of 1860, and the Duke of Newcastle, at that time Colonial Secretary, consulted Lord Lyons as to the advisability of H.R.H. paying a visit to America. The latter, upon consideration, pronounced in favour of it. He did not arrive at this decision without some hesitation. It was feared by persons of experience that the disaffected Irish in New York and elsewhere might make themselves disagreeable; the Prince's time was limited, and he would obviously be unable to make an extended tour, and so might involuntarily cause offence, whilst it was highly probable that the necessity for preserving a strictly non-official character might also give rise to difficulties.

On the other hand, President Buchanan extended an invitation in such cordial terms that it would have been ungracious to decline.

Lord Lyons joined the Prince of Wales in Canada in August, and the tour must have been an agreeable change even to a person of his sedentary inclinations. Since his arrival at Washington, fifteen months before, he had never slept or been six miles outside the town. 'Whenever,' he explains to a friend, 'I have planned a journey, I have been stopped by invasions of islands in the Pacific or some other "difficulty" as a dispute is called here.' It may be surmised, however, that such obstacles were much less objectionable to him than they would have been to any one else; he hated travel, openly avowed that he loathed sight-seeing, and welcomed the opportunity of 'getting Niagara and the Lakes done this way; it will be a good thing over.'

It was eventually decided that the Prince's visit to the States should take place in September, and the announcement was not only received with unbounded satisfaction, but caused prodigious excitement. 'The President was moved from the usual staid solemnity of his demeanour by his gratification at receiving an answer from Her Majesty written with her own hand. At the close of our interview he hurried off with it in great delight (no doubt to show it to his niece) saying: "It is indeed something to have an autograph letter from Queen Victoria!"[2] Nor was the President's gratification confined to the family circle, for he asked and obtained permission to publish the royal letter which had afforded so much satisfaction. As soon as the news became known invitations of every kind at once began to pour in from all quarters, and offerings of the most varied description made their appearance at the Legation, which included such objects as equestrian sugar statues of H.R.H., pots of ointment for the Queen, books of sermons for "Baron Renfrew," and a set of plates for the "Prince of Whales." Innumerable requests arrived too for interviews, autographs, and mementos, amongst which may be cited an application for a photograph from a citizen of Lowell "for his virgin wife."'

It was, of course, unfortunately necessary to decline the invitations, for the itinerary had been settled beforehand, and it had been wisely decided that the Prince should never stay with any private individual, but always be lodged at an hotel at his own expense, that he should refuse to receive addresses and deputations, and should neither hear nor make public speeches. It was also considered desirable that receptions of British subjects should not be encouraged, and that he should not attend any demonstration of his fellow-countrymen so as not to excite any feeling of jealousy.

As for the gifts which were proffered in great profusion, they were regretfully declined in accordance with the usual practice of the Royal Family.

In spite of the nominally private character of the Prince of Wales's tour in the United States, most careful arrangements were found to be necessary wherever he made a stay. At New York, in particular, which city appears to be, beyond all others, interested in Royal personages, the programme could hardly have been of a more elaborate nature had an Emperor been visiting an Imperial Sire and Brother; even the ladies with whom H.R.H. was expected to dance, having been selected long in advance. The chief difficulty in New York and elsewhere seems to have been the prohibition of speeches at banquets. The Americans, overflowing with hospitable enthusiasm, were only too anxious to display their friendship in public utterances, but the British Government had wisely decided that nineteen was too early an age at which to begin making speeches in a foreign country, and the rule of silence was rigidly adhered to.

The Prince of Wales's tour, although necessarily brief, included, besides Washington, some of the principal cities in the States, and judging from the contemporary correspondence, was attended by singularly few untoward incidents, proving, in fact, successful beyond expectation.

The happy effect produced by this visit was described in an official despatch, and private letters corroborate the favourable impression created.

'I have more completely realized, as the Americans say, the wonderful success of the Prince of Wales's tour than I did when it was in progress. I have now had time to talk quietly about it with men whose opinion is worth having, and also to compare newspapers of various shades of politics. I am glad to see that the incognito and other restrictions maintained are represented as a peculiar compliment to the Americans as showing a desire to associate with them on more equal terms than would be possible with subjects.'[3]

'The Prince of Wales's tour in the U.S. went off completely to the satisfaction of all parties from the beginning to the end. It was rather hard work for me, as he never went out without me, nor I without him, and I had quantities of letters to write and people to see and keep in good humour. Nevertheless H.R.H. himself and all the people with him were so agreeable, that on the whole I enjoyed the tour very much while it was going on. I look back to it with unmixed satisfaction.'[4]

Much of the success, although he was too modest to allude to it, was probably due to his own carefulness and forethought.

FOOTNOTES:

[2] Lord Lyons to Lord J. Russell, July 9.

[3] Lord Lyons to the Duke of Newcastle, Oct. 29.

[4] Lord Lyons to Mr. Griffith, Nov. 10.