Chapter IV: Course of the CIVIL War (2)

Instructions upon this question were requested from Her Majesty's Government before the war broke out, and in reply it was stated that there was nothing in International Law which prohibited a Government from requiring resident aliens to serve in the police or militia; if, however, the militia were to be embodied for active service, and substitutes were prohibited, then 'the position of British subjects would appear to deserve very favourable consideration, and to call for every exertion being made in their favour.' A similar opinion was expressed in July, 1861.

The difficulty really arose out of the defective military organization of the United States, which was based upon the voluntary system. The so-called voluntary system, which is in reality only a high-sounding device to impose upon an impecunious minority what ought to be a general obligation, may be an admirable institution in time of peace, but it invariably breaks down in a really serious emergency, and it was the totally inadequate nature of that system which forced both combatants in the American Civil War to have recourse to all sorts of discreditable expedients.

It has already been stated that at the beginning of the war the American regular army consisted of only 16,000 officers and men all told. Immediately after the seizure of Fort Sumter, in April, 1861, President Lincoln called out 75,000 militia, and in May he called for 42,000 volunteers for three years, half of whom were to serve in the regular army, and half in the navy. At first these appeals were responded to with the greatest enthusiasm, but it was not long-lived, for, as has been related, even as early as the battle of Bull's Run in July, militia regiments insisted upon leaving at the completion of their period of service, and from that date the difficulty in finding recruits continued to increase.

The pay of the privates was in May, 1861, raised to thirteen dollars a month, which, however, may be considered low when compared with the five shillings a day we paid to untrained men during the Boer War, and it became clear that not only was it difficult to attract volunteers, but also to keep them when obtained. In view of the methods employed in recruiting them it was not surprising that the results were frequently unsatisfactory.

The usual method employed was to inform the Governor of a State of the number of men required. The Governor having made the necessary announcement, private persons came forward offering to raise regiments. Each set forth his claims, his influence in the State or among a certain portion of the population, and his devotion to the party in power.

From the persons thus presenting themselves the Governor made his choice. Generally the person upon whom the choice fell laid it down as a condition that he should have the command of the regiment. The next thing was to find soldiers. Friends seized with the same martial ardour promised to bring so many recruits if they were made--the one a Captain--another a Lieutenant--another a Sergeant, and so forth. The framework was thus formed and partially filled up, and the regiment being thus organized, the lists were carried to the Governor for his approval.

The inconveniences of such a system were obvious, and experience showed that it was much less adapted, than had been supposed, for the purpose of raising an efficient army. It was considered, however, to possess certain political advantages, one of which was that there was little fear of the officers ultimately forming anything like a separate military or aristocratic caste.

The real inconvenience of the system, however, was that sufficient men were not forthcoming in spite of the inducements offered by means of high pay, and the Government was forced to have recourse to all sorts of iniquitous devices in order to get hold of so-called volunteers, many of whom were foreigners. The most objectionable practice was that of giving bounties to agents for bringing in recruits. The effect of this at the beginning of the war was that great numbers of men deserted from the British navy, and the Admiral at Halifax reported that at one time there were a hundred deserters from one ship alone, the _St. Vincent_, but as the contest progressed the bounty system was responsible for innumerable cases of kidnapping in which British subjects were the sufferers. Kidnapping especially flourished in New York where the emigrants were an easy prey, and to such a point had corruption been carried that the Governor admitted to the British Consul that out of every million of dollars expended in bounties, fully four-fifths of the amount were secured by bounty and substitute brokers and crimps.

* * * * *

'The fraud and violence combined,' wrote Consul Archibald from New
York, 'which are now used in procuring recruits for both army and
navy are disgraceful, and it is idle for the authorities to think of
putting down the malpractices of the villains who carry on the
business of kidnapping recruits, or of making the world believe they
are sincere, while they hold out such inducements to these vagabonds
for carrying on their White Slave Trade and Black Slave Trade too. I
have numerous complaints, but, as in a great majority of cases the
victims, at last, succumb and take a portion of the bounty, for they
rarely get more than a portion, it would be unavailing to ask for
their release.'

In the autumn of 1862, Fire Island was filled with unfortunates
cheated and deluded, or forced thither by the police who received
ten dollars a head for each man. Now in addition to the enormous
bounties offered, there is placarded in conspicuous places on the
walls of the New Park barracks at the City Hall the following very
suggestive notice: 'Fifteen dollars Hand Money given to any man
bringing a volunteer.'

The following report from a Federal General shows that the strictures of Consul Archibald were thoroughly justified.

* * * * *

_Important Letter from General Wistar._

VICTIMS OF THE BOUNTY SWINDLERS DESERTING IN LARGE NUMBERS,--EVILS
OF THE PLUNDERING SYSTEM ON OUR ARMIES IN THE FIELD, ETC.

* * * * *

Headquarters United States Forces,
Yorktown, Va., April 15, 1854.

General--An extended spirit of desertion prevailing among the
recruits recently received from the North, in some of the regiments
of my command, has led me to make some inquiries resulting in
apparently well-authenticated information, which I beg respectfully
to communicate to you in this unofficial manner, deeming it required
by humanity, no less than by our common desire to benefit the
service.

There seems to be little doubt that many, in fact I think I am
justified in saying the most, of these unfortunate men were either
deceived or kidnapped, or both, in the most scandalous and inhuman
manner, in New York city, where they were drugged and carried off to
New Hampshire and Connecticut, mustered in and uniformed before
their consciousness was fully restored.

Even their bounty was obtained by the parties who were instrumental
in these nefarious transactions, and the poor wretches find
themselves on returning to their senses, mustered soldiers, without
any pecuniary benefit. Nearly all are foreigners, mostly sailors,
both ignorant of and indifferent to the objects of the war in which
they thus suddenly find themselves involved.

Two men were shot here this morning for desertion, and over thirty
more are now awaiting trial or execution.

These examples are essential, as we all understand; but it occurred
to me, General, that you would pardon me for thus calling your
attention to the greater crime committed in New York, in kidnapping
these men into positions where, to their ignorance, desertion must
seem like a vindication of their own rights and liberty.

Believe me to be, General, with the highest esteem, your obedient
servant,

* * * * *

J. J. WISTAR.

To Major-General John A. Dix, New York City.

These outrages committed in the name of the Voluntary System, and many of the victims of which were Englishmen, constantly took place even after the Act of July, 1862, which provided for the enrolment in the militia of all able-bodied citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, and it may be presumed therefore either that the United States Government was afraid to enforce its laws or that the so-called 'volunteers' were chiefly foreign subjects. In any case, amongst these unhappy victims were numerous British youths under twenty-one years of age, and the efforts made to obtain their discharge on the ground of their being minors were rarely successful and eventually abandoned altogether.

In the South, apparently, the state of things was equally bad, if not worse; British subjects were imprisoned on all sorts of pretexts in spite of Consular protection papers, and enlistment was frequently the price of liberty. The Southern press was particularly scathing on the subject of aliens, especially Irishmen who endeavoured to evade military service.

* * * * *

We can conceive nothing more disgraceful than the conduct of
Irishmen, for example--but we trust they are few--who have been
cursing the British Government ever since they could talk, who have
emigrated to this country to escape the British Yoke, but who now
run to an English Consul and profess themselves subjects of Queen
Victoria in order to evade their duties in the land of their
adoption. We say that we fervently trust there are but few Irishmen
of whom this can be said, for such are a disgrace to their old
island, and bring the blush of shame to the cheek of their
compatriots who fight in our foremost ranks upon every field. Nobody
will be more pleased than our good Irish citizens if these fellows
are sent under guard to the camp.

The attention of conscript officers is therefore called to the
foreign Consul's offices, to the railroad cars and the roads.

The question of the liability to conscription of British subjects naturally produced a voluminous correspondence.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, July 24, 1863.

Military events, or at all events military news, have been scarce
during the last few days. The really important question seems to be
the enforcement of the Conscription Act. On the one hand we hear of
wide-spread plans of resistance to it, organized among the Germans,
as well as the Irish population in all parts of the Country; on the
other hand it is represented that the Government is determined to
enforce it at the point of the bayonet, and to begin at New York, as
soon as it can get things ready. We have as yet had no proof that
any serious resistance to the Government will be provoked by any
measures it may take. The Democrats at New York are, as might be
expected, frightened by the mob--they dare not encourage resistance
to the Conscription, lest they should let loose an uncontrollable
gang of plunderers. On the other hand, if the Government succeeds in
getting military command of New York there is very little chance of
any but the Government candidate's coming in as President when Mr.
Lincoln's term expires.

British subjects are not the least violent in language about the
Draft, and are far from being pleased either with H.M. Government or
with H.M. Minister here. I have given myself a world of trouble to
make the burthen of proving their claim to exemption as light as
possible. If I have not succeeded as well as I ought, I have done
more than most people, who knew anything about the difficulties,
expected. I have written you a very long despatch about it--much
longer than I intended, but I thought it well to put something on
record to show that the matter had been properly attended to. I have
taken more pains myself about it, and given Mr. Seward more trouble
about it, than about any matter which I have had to treat with him.

M. Mercier's absence has made it difficult to concert measures
speedily about the Cotton question, but his Secretary of Legation
and I intend to speak to Mr. Seward about it to-morrow. We do not
mean to go to Mr. Seward together. I have so little hope of
effecting anything practical, that I should hardly feel in earnest
about it, if it were a matter of less importance. As it is, I shall
of course do my best. As soon as this affair is in train, I hope to
set out for Canada. My present notion is to wait here for the
despatches from London of the 18th--which ought to arrive the middle
of next week--and to wait at New York for the despatches from London
of the 25th, and then, if they bring nothing to hinder it, to go on
to Quebec. I shall present Mr. Stuart as _Chargé d'affaires_ before
I leave Washington. It would be impossible to carry on the immense
amount of protection to British subjects' business here, without
some one on the spot who could write officially to the Government.
Mr. Stuart is both perfectly capable of managing difficult questions
himself, and perfectly willing to refer them to men higher in office
when it is proper to do so--a rare combination of merits.

The question was finally decided to the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government by a Proclamation of the President which allowed aliens a period of sixty-five days, during which their departure was permitted, and interference on behalf of persons who had failed to take advantage of the opportunity was subsequently refused. As for the difficulties experienced by the United States Government, they seem to have been met by enforcing conscription where it was possible, and delaying it where serious opposition was feared.

In August, 1863, a somewhat surprising proposal came from Mr. Seward. In a confidential conversation with Lord Lyons he expatiated upon the necessity of reviving a better feeling between Great Britain and the United States, and of making some demonstration calculated to produce the desired effect. England, he said, had made such a demonstration before the war by the visit of the Prince of Wales, which had been productive of the happiest results. Now it was the turn of the United States to make a corresponding display of goodwill, but it was difficult to devise the means of doing so, as the President could not travel, and America possessed no Princes. Would Lord Lyons think the matter over?

The latter, having duly reflected, expressed the opinion that there was no real hostility to the United States in England, although there was undoubtedly a certain amount of sympathy with the South, and that consequently there was no necessity to take any extraordinary step. Mr. Seward, however, having returned to his suggestion of making some counter demonstration in the nature of the visit of the Prince of Wales.

* * * * *

'The only conjecture I can make,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'is that he
thinks of going to England himself. He may possibly want to be
absent for some reasons connected with the Presidential contest. If
he thinks that he has himself any chance of being taken as a
candidate by either party he is the only man who thinks so at this
moment. It is however generally considered to be an advantage to a
candidate to be out of the country during the canvass. I cannot see
any good which his going to England could effect with regard to
public opinion. If he considered himself as returning the Prince of
Wales's visit, the absurdity of the notion would alone prevent its
being offensive. The majority of the Americans would probably be by
no means pleased if he met with a brilliant reception. He has,
besides, so much more vanity, personal and national, than tact, that
he seldom makes a favourable impression at first. When one comes
really to know him, one is surprised to find much to esteem and even
to like in him. It is however hardly worth while to say more on the
subject, for it is a mere conjecture of mine that he was thinking
of going to England when he spoke to me. It might however be of
advantage for me to know whether you would wish to encourage the
idea of some public demonstration or other, if he should return to
the subject when I get back to Washington. I told him that so far as
public opinion in England was concerned, the one thing to do was
to let us really have a supply of cotton; that without this
demonstrations and professions would be unsuccessful: that with it
they would not be required.'

Whether Lord Lyons's conjecture was well founded or not, the prospect of a visit from Mr. Seward possessed no charms for Lord Russell, whose antipathy to the American Secretary of State has been already noted. The following letter appears to be full of good sense and instructive as regards the real value of those visits of exalted personages which produce such illimitable enthusiasm in the press.

* * * * *

_Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._

Oct. 2, 1863.

Upon considering Mr. Seward's hints to you of doing something here
as an equivalent or a return for the Prince of Wales's visit to the
United States, I do not see my way to anything satisfactory. These
visits of Great Personages seldom have more than a transient effect;
they form no real and solid relation of friendship between nations,
though if undertaken at a fortunate moment, they serve to bring out
and demonstrate a friendship already existing.

The visit of the Prince of Wales was thus fortunately well timed;
but if Mr. Seward or any conspicuous statesman of the United States
were to visit this country now he would find us all divided. The
Government would show him every attention and civility: the
Anti-Slavery party would probably make great show of sympathy by
addresses and public receptions. But the party who press for
recognition of the South would hold aloof, and in some unmistakable
manner, prove that there is a great deal of sympathy with the South
in this country.

In these circumstances I do not think that any such mark of
friendship as Mr. Seward suggests would be likely to produce the
good effect of which he is desirous. Mr. Sumner's conduct is very
bad; he has taken infinite pains to misrepresent me in every
particular. I have done my best to counteract his efforts by my
speech at Blairgowrie. I don't know how far I may be successful, but
I rely on your constant watchfulness to prevent any rupture between
the two countries, which of all things I should most lament.

The question of the ironclads is still under investigation. The
Cabinet must consider it very soon, and I have no doubt we shall do
all that is right to preserve our neutrality free from just
reproach--unjust reproach we shall not yield to.

I hope you are now quite well, and as the heats must be over I trust
you will not suffer for the next six months from the climate of
Washington.

Owing to continual ill-health, Lord Lyons was compelled to pay a visit to Canada in the autumn, and upon his return to Washington in October, accompanied by Admiral Milne, he found Mr. Seward in a more conciliatory frame of mind than ever, chiefly owing to the detention of Confederate ironclads in England. Mr. Welles and the lawyers at the Navy Department, however, still 'appeared to be thoroughly wrongheaded and unable to see that municipal law is one thing and International Law and the relations between Governments another.' The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Chase, engaged on an electioneering tour, distinguished himself by spirited speeches, talking of 'taking Old Mother England by the hair and giving her a good shaking,' and was himself outdone in rancour against England by another distinguished politician, Mr. Sumner. There was in fact no sign of change in the feeling of the people at large towards us, and the visit of a Russian squadron to New York was made the occasion of an anti-British and anti-French demonstration.

Considering that the war had now lasted for several years, it seems rather remarkable that the British Government had not thought it worth while to send military or naval officers to watch the operations, but judging from the following letter, the idea never seems to have occurred that there was anything to learn.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, Nov. 3, 1863.

I have no news of importance--political or military to write to-day.
The crisis at Chattanooga has not yet taken place, so far as we
know.

I doubt whether people in Europe are aware of the extent of the
progress of this Country in military strength or of the preparations
which have been made for the contingency of a War with an European
Power. It is impossible for me to undertake to give anything like
detailed information on the subject; but it may be worth while for
Her Majesty's Government to consider whether it is important for
them to know what is really being done, and if so, what measures
will be best with a view to their obtaining regularly information
practically useful. I have no fancy for having a military or Naval
Attaché--and I am not certain how the appointment of one might be
taken here. It _might_ create suspicion--on the other hand it
_might_ be taken as a compliment. I am inclined to think that
Officers unconnected with the Legation sent quietly, but by no means
secretly, would learn most. But if the Legation is to be depended
upon for the information, it is absolutely necessary that there
should be in it some one having a professional knowledge both of
naval and military matters. I myself know as little of such matters
as any man--and were it otherwise, I have as much proper Diplomatic
business to do as I can manage. The correspondence with Mr. Seward,
which requires minute care in many cases, grows more and more
burdensome. New cases arise daily, and the old ones never seem to
come to an end. I have had considerably more than nine hundred notes
from Mr. Seward already this year.

I don't think the Government here at all desires to pick a quarrel
with us or with any European power, but the better prepared it is,
the less manageable it will be.

This suggestion was eventually acted upon as appears later.

About this time, the mission to Europe of Messrs. Mason and Slidell having failed in its object, the Confederate Government resolved upon the expulsion of the British Consuls resident in the South, who were informed that they could no longer be permitted to exercise their functions, or even to reside within the limits of the Confederacy. Doubtless the active part the Consuls had taken in endeavouring to prevent the compulsory enlistment of British subjects contributed towards this action, but the ostensible reasons were, firstly, that they received their instructions from the British Minister residing in Washington, and secondly, that Mr. McGee, the Consul at Mobile, had been dismissed from his post because he had allowed specie intended for the payment of interest on a State debt to be shipped from that blockaded port to London on board of a British warship. In Lord Lyons's opinion the action of Mr. Jefferson Davis's Government appeared reasonable.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, Nov. 17, 1863.

Mr. Walker has sent me a copy of his despatch to you enclosing Mr.
Benjamin's letter to Mr. Slidell explaining the reasons to be given
for the expulsion. The objection to the Consuls being under the
orders of the Minister at Washington appears reasonable enough. As
you know, I have all along been of opinion that the connexion
between the Southern Consulates and the Legation was full of
inconvenience. The objection to Mr. Cridland's appointment, that it
was made by me, has, in fact, no other foundation than that your
orders to Mr. Moore on the subject were sent through me; in
transmitting them I took the precaution expressly to desire Mr.
Moore to word the appointment as one coming from H.M. Government
and not to mention me.

Mr. Benjamin's lecture on the duty of Belligerents to pay their
debts is totally beside the purpose. Of course no one could have
wished more than I did that the British creditors should receive
their money. I wished that all British subjects should be able to
remove their property from the Confederate States, and most of all I
wished that an unlimited amount of cotton should be exported. What I
objected to was that a British Consul should engage himself in
committing a breach of blockade, and that a British man of war,
which had been admitted on the faith that she should carry away
nothing but despatches, should carry through the Blockade the very
article to the exportation of which the United States most objected.
It is rather cool of Mr. Benjamin to say that the United States
could not but have been glad that specie should be exported, when he
knew that at the time the great anxiety of the Confederates was to
get specie through the blockade to pay for their purchasers of
warlike stores in Europe, and that the great anxiety of the United
States was to prevent this.

At the close of 1863 it became evident that the cause of the South was failing, but the reverses of the Confederates seemed only to stimulate them to fresh exertions, while President Davis's eloquent message in December proclaimed that the patriotism of the people was equal to every sacrifice demanded by their country's needs.

In the preceding autumn, Mr. Seward, in pursuance of his laudable policy of conciliation, had suggested that the Reciprocity Treaty with Canada, which would expire shortly, might afford an opportunity of making a friendly demonstration. His suggestion was that the British Government should make inquiries from him on the subject of its renewal, but Lord Russell, who was prone to regard him with suspicion, had not responded to this advance with any favour. In the early part of 1864 it became evident that the treaty was in considerable danger, and the Canadian Government began to show signs of natural anxiety, especially in view of the fact that a hostile motion was pending in Congress. The following letters disclose the objections of the professional diplomatist to being saddled with amateur assistants.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Viscount Monck._

Washington, Jan. 28, 1864.

The Canadians appear to me to be acting unwisely about the
Reciprocity Treaty at this moment. Their true policy is to keep as
quiet about it as possible. The more they agitate, the more they
convince people here that the Treaty is a good bargain for Canada
and a bad bargain for the United States. The utmost we can ever
dream of doing now is to stave off a successful motion in Congress
calling upon the President to give the notice for abrogating the
Treaty. I doubt whether we shall be able to do this, but our only
chance lies in keeping quiet and endeavouring to induce the Executive
Government to exert its influence unostentatiously against the
motion. If the Executive Government can be induced to do so, it will
be by considerations connected with its relations with the Imperial
Government. The moment the question is treated as one between the
United States and the Provinces, all hope of maintaining the Treaty
vanishes.

I cannot have a Canadian here supposed to be peculiarly in
my confidence on the subject. This would impose upon me a
responsibility which I cannot undertake. Directly there was the
least appearance of a Canadian being here in any such position, I
should feel bound to take decisive steps to show that the appearance
was false. My own opinion is that the Canadians will only do
themselves harm by coming lobbying here; but if they choose to do
so, they must do it entirely independently of me, and I would
suggest that any who came for this purpose should not be furnished
with letters of introduction to me, and should be advised not to
call upon me.

At the same time, I think it right to say that I do not believe that
we shall find it possible to maintain the Treaty long after the U.S.
can abrogate it. The impression is very strong that it is a bad
bargain for them, and they will probably give the notice very soon
after the terms of the Treaty allow of their doing so, with a view
perhaps to negotiating another. If matters reach this point, it will
no doubt be very desirable that whoever negotiates the new Treaty
should be thoroughly informed on all the details of Canadian
commerce, and then will be the time for a Canadian Cobden to be sent
here. At present there are no questions of detail to be considered:
the only practical thing is to stave off the notice of the
abrogation as long as possible, and the only chance of doing this,
is, in my opinion, the exertion of the _Imperial_ influence.

I very well understand the difficulty of keeping quiet when one is
very anxious on a subject, and the immense relief it is to be doing
something. I can also well understand that if there were a
discussion on the details of the Treaty, the Canadians would wish to
have an advocate better informed on the details than the British
Minister at Washington is ever likely to be, but the object now is
to _avoid_ discussion.

It became necessary, however, to modify these views, for Mr. Seward changed his mind, and whereas he had at first discountenanced the presence of official and semi-official Canadian representatives he now expressed himself in favour of their coming over privately and lobbying Members of Congress, that being, in his opinion, an effective method of promoting good relations between the two countries.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, Feb. 9, 1864.

I am very sorry to say that the agitation against the Reciprocity
Treaty has gone on increasing, and that it now appears probable that
a Resolution calling upon the President to give as soon as possible
notice for abrogating it, will be passed by Congress. The Canadian
Ministers are very anxious to be doing something in the matter, in
order to cover their responsibility as regards their constituents
hereafter. They had a desire to send an agent here to advise with me
and to speak to the American Cabinet and to members of Congress.
This I have told Lord Monck privately, I will not hear of. I could
not undertake to keep the peace for a month if I had a man here by
my side, over whom I could have no practical control, and who would
be really guided only by Canadian party politics, but who would yet
be supposed to be more or less in my confidence, and therefore to be
entitled to speak for me and H.M. Government. My troubles are great
enough without adding Canadian electioneering views to the
difficulties I have to contend with.

Mr. Seward's opinion was that the quieter the Canadians kept the
better, and so was mine, and so it would be still, if Mr. Seward had
not changed his. He now thinks that discussion on the subject cannot
be avoided, and a good effect would be produced by visits to
Washington of influential Canadians coming 'on their own hook' and
talking in a friendly manner to Senators and Deputies. He does not
recommend that they should appear to have any special connexion with
me, nor any semblance of an official or quasi-official character of
any kind, nor does he consider it to be desirable that any one
individual should stay long.

I am corresponding privately with Lord Monck about this action of
Mr. Seward's, and I defer writing about the Treaty officially until
I come to some understanding with him about it. Mr. Seward's opinion
is so much more likely to be correct than mine, that I do not like
to discourage Canadians coming in the way he suggests. Beside which
I have very little hope of staving off the Resolution for the
abrogation of the Treaty in any way, and therefore do not feel
justified in preventing efforts being made by the Canadians
themselves, provided I am clear of all connexion with them, and
that they do not compromise me or the Imperial Government.

The attack on the Treaty is now caused much more by ill will to
England and her Colonies than by any commercial or financial
considerations. The same spirit has caused the introduction of a
Bill into Congress to repeal the Act allowing goods to pass through
the United States without paying duty in transit to and from Canada.
In fact the absence of any serious opposition in Congress renders
both Houses very unmanageable.

The views expressed in these two letters may appear unsympathetic as regards Canada, but apart from his rooted and well-founded distrust of amateur diplomatists, Lord Lyons's main task was to keep the peace if possible between England and the United States, and he was therefore justified in refusing to be associated with any persons who might conceivably add to the difficulty of a very critical situation. In addition to this he was always inclined to resent the tendency of Canadian Ministers to do a little diplomacy of their own, and held strongly that it would be time enough for them to think of diplomacy when they had provided themselves with an army and a navy.

The extreme caution which he constantly displayed in avoiding anything which might disturb American susceptibility in the smallest degree is well illustrated by a letter to Mr. Hammond respecting the appointment of a new secretary to the Washington Legation.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond._

Washington, April 5, 1864.

I have been terribly frightened by hearing that there has been a
notion of sending Mr. Horace Johnstone to this Legation. To have the
brother of a man married to the sister of Slidell's Secretary of
Legation in Paris would expose the whole of this mission to all
kinds of suspicion and ill will. It is impossible for any one not
here to conceive the captiousness of the Federals, in and out of
office, on these points. It is almost beyond my power to keep
matters straight with them, do what I can, and if I had a man in the
Legation who was personally suspicious to them I should have no hope
of keeping out of scrapes. If Mr. Johnstone were here, I think the
only way I could employ him for the advantage of H.M.'s service
would be in carrying the next despatches home.

So much alarmed was he at the prospect of Mr. Johnstone's appearance that he also communicated his objections to the Private Secretary at the Foreign Office, and even wrote to Lord Russell saying that if Mr. Johnstone arrived he should feel it his duty to order him to remain at the port of disembarkation until further instructions were received. Most men would probably have considered that the family connexions of a junior member of the Legation were of no importance, but Lord Lyons was one of those who never took any risks.

In accordance with the suggestion made in the previous autumn, some officers were at last despatched from England in order to follow the operations of the Federal Army.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, April 19, 1864.

The two military officers, Colonel Gallway and Captain Alderson,
sent by the War Office to report on military matters here, are about
to set out for the Army of the Potomac. Some great attempt will
probably be made by that army within a very short time. Everything
is supposed to depend on the success of the operations. The
Presidential Election and the Finances in particular hang in the
balance. Captain Goodenough, the officer sent here by the Admiralty,
confirms my impression that the Americans are very seriously
preparing for a Foreign War. I think we should never be for long
without naval and military officers here to watch and to report on
these matters. The men employed should be made to understand that
their principal duty is to keep H.M. Government so well informed of
the state of preparation and of the position of the naval and
military forces of the United States that if a war were to break out
at a moment's notice, our Admiralty and War Office would know
exactly what to do. It is quite impossible that a Diplomatic Mission
can do this without the assistance of professional men; and the more
completely the responsibility is thrown on the professional men, the
more effectually will the work be performed. With the present
feeling of the United States Government I think the officers had
better come with a decidedly official character, either as naval or
military attachés to the Legation, or under any other name: but I do
not think that the most effective mode of obtaining the requisite
information would be to let them subside into permanent attachés
residing here, and making mere routine reports by each mail.
It would, of course, be well before publishing any appointment of a
definite official character, to let me ascertain that it would be
acceptable to this Government to have officers here in that
particular character.

There can unhappily be no doubt that three-fourths of the American
people are eagerly longing for a safe opportunity of making war with
England, and to what extent this feeling may be played upon, and
with what results, during the Presidential Elections, no one can
say.

The ill will shows itself in many ways--principally in vexatious
proceedings in regard to the neighbouring Colonies. The last attempt
in Congress is to repeal an Act of 1831 in virtue of which there are
no higher duties levied on British rafts, boats, and Colonial
vessels in the American ports on the Lakes, than are levied on
similar American craft in the British ports. I have spoken to Mr.
Seward about it, and I hope, if it is a matter of importance to
Canada, that we shall be able to stop it.

The ill will alluded to above showed itself in an unpleasant and undignified manner in connection with the visit of the British officers. Application had been made on behalf of Major-General Lindsay, M.P., commanding the Brigade of Guards in Canada to be allowed to visit the Army of the Potomac, and, much to the surprise of the Legation, a pass was refused by the Secretary of War, although the point was pressed as far as was prudent; but worse was to follow, for the Secretary of War actually refused passes also to Colonel Gallway and Captain Alderson, the two officers specially sent out by the British Government. 'I do not trust myself,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'to say all I think about this discourtesy, but I have let the people here know that this is not the way to maintain friendly feelings, and have reminded them of the very different manner in which we treated the officers sent by the United States to the Crimea.'

Of more importance than this act of discourtesy was the apparent preparation for a foreign war on the part of the United States Government. There could, unfortunately, be little doubt as to the country against which these preparations were being made, and the danger was that, in the existing temper of the American people, advantage might be eagerly taken of any conjunction of circumstances which would enable a declaration of war against England to be made with tolerable safety. The letters of Lord Russell do not display a realization of the enormous increase of the military and naval power of the United States, and it does not appear that he appreciated the vast change which had taken place in the relative power of England and the United States. In the past, the latter had been restrained from provoking hostilities by fear of the advantages which the greatly superior military and naval forces, then habitually maintained by England, would confer on their enemy at the outset. Now, however, they considered the reverse to be the case. They believed, and probably they were right, that they could throw an overwhelming force into Canada, and that sudden attacks on some of the British colonies, such as Bermuda and the Bahamas, would in all probability be successful. They believed that they could inflict enormous injury to British commerce, and it was plain that an immense booty could be obtained by sending out their swift cruisers with as little notice as possible.

It was difficult to discover an adequate explanation of the bitter feeling which, at that time, actuated the majority of the American people against England; and it was still more difficult to combat it, because it was largely unreasonable and quite regardless of facts and arguments. In reality it resulted from the exasperation caused by the civil commotion which constituted the first check to a previously uninterrupted course of progress and prosperity, and the Americans, mortified and angry, found it a relief to vent their ill-humour upon England, against whom they had an old grudge. Under these adverse circumstances, it is easy to realize how difficult must have been the position of the British Minister at Washington, and it is not surprising that his letters and despatches of the period were couched in a more pessimistic tone than had been the case for some time. 'I am out of heart altogether,' he wrote to Lord Russell, in consequence of the manner in which his representations to the American Government, with regard to the grievances of British subjects, were treated. These grievances related chiefly, at this period, to the hardships inflicted upon the crews of blockade runners and to the iniquities of the United States recruiting agencies, iniquities which were fully admitted in an official report of General Dix, the Military Commandant at New York, and in neither case was it found possible to obtain adequate redress. The following note will serve as a sample of the communications which passed:--

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Mr. Seward._

Washington, July 3, 1864.

This day week you came to my door with the President to tell me that
I might write to England to say that Mr. James McHugh would be
released immediately. He was still in Fort Lafayette yesterday. What
to say in writing to England to-morrow I know not. Could not orders
be sent by telegraph to the military authorities at New York to
release McHugh at once and to report by telegraph that they have
actually done so?

I am very much pained by what has happened about Eneas and Rahming,
as well as about McHugh, and am utterly unable to devise any
satisfactory explanation to send home.

To add to his troubles the health of Lord Lyons again began to give way under the strain, and as the following letter shows, his staff was insufficient for the work.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond._

Washington, June 14, 1864.

We cannot get on without more hands in the Chancery here. I could
not refuse to let Heneage go, on the death of his father, but he was
ill to be spared.

One really first-rate second secretary and two ordinary working
second or third secretaries should come out at once if the work is
to be done. It has doubled since last year. We ordered an immense
register which we calculated would last through the year, having
made ample allowance as we thought for the usual progressive
increase of correspondence. We are already obliged to order another
of the same size.

For my own part I am worn out altogether.

Although never prone to spare himself or to exaggerate, such phrases as: 'I am worked to death here,' and 'I am worn out by the heat and the work,' occur in letters to other correspondents, and in order to prevent a complete breakdown he was directed by Lord Russell to proceed to Canada to confer with Lord Monck as to the defence of the Dominion.

* * * * *

_Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._

July 23, 1864.

I think it will be useful that you should go to Canada soon. If, as
you think, the Americans may take a sudden resolution to attack us,
it will be important to consider how and when we can best defend
ourselves. I should be very glad that with this view you should
consult Lord Monck, and also that you should, if possible, see Sir
James Hope, who might come up the St. Lawrence to meet you at
Quebec. The defence of Quebec both by land and sea is one of the
most important points for the consideration of the Cabinet. It is
also of great importance to ascertain what the Canadian Government
are prepared to do for themselves.

If, as is probable, Grant will not succeed in reaching Richmond and
is obliged to retire, the American Government may not be willing to
add to the number of their enemies, especially as the Emperor of
Mexico may have the assistance of French troops, and may hold an
unfriendly position to the Northern, and a friendly attitude to the
Southern States. I shall be glad to send a civil or military agent
or commissioner to the Confederate States, and think of sending him
by Mexico and Texas. It would be by no means a recognition, but
would be useful as regards our interests in the Southern States.

Lord Russell never seems to have thoroughly believed in the ultimate success of the North, and frequently expressed the opinion that, as the re-establishment of the Union was impossible, it would be well to come to terms with the South, but he could scarcely have been expected to foresee that the day would come when the United States Government would order the Emperor Napoleon out of Mexico.

As regards the mission to Canada, Lord Lyons pointed out that whereas it was very desirable that he should confer with the Governor-General on many questions, amongst others, the 'wholesale system of seducing, entrapping and kidnapping recruits for the United States Army from Canada,' yet that his own opinion on the naval and military questions concerning the defence of that country was worth nothing at all. His general impression, however, was that the Dominion was altogether indefensible, unless the Canadians were prepared to make such a stand and such sacrifices as the Southerners had done. Whether he ever made any recommendations, as the result of his visit, or whether, if they were ever made, any attention was paid to them does not appear, but there is reason to believe that the British Government eventually nerved itself to spend the stupendous sum of £50,000 on Canadian defence.

The Canadian visit was undertaken very reluctantly, in spite of weariness and ill health, partly on account of the press of work, and partly because it would be necessary to leave as Chargé d'Affaires a Secretary of Legation (Mr. Burnley), who had only just arrived in the country, and of whose abilities and judgment he was completely ignorant. Consequently he took the precaution of asking the Foreign Office to intimate clearly that, whether outside American territory or not, he should still be considered the superior authority in the Legation, and that if he deemed it necessary to give an instruction, it must be obeyed. This stipulation was not intended as a reflection upon Mr. Burnley, who indeed showed himself perfectly competent, but was merely an instance of that extreme caution which never left anything to chance.

At the end of August he was suffering so much from the excessive heat of Washington and from nervous prostration that he no longer felt able to discharge his duties satisfactorily, and set out for Canada much against his will, remaining there until October. The change of air, however, effected little improvement, and letters to friends announcing his return complain of ill health and low spirits. While on the journey back, he met at dinner, at New York, by a singular coincidence, General Dix, on the night when the news of the St. Albans raid arrived. During the dinner the latter received a telegram stating that a band of Confederate desperadoes had made a raid from Canada upon a place called St. Albans, raided some banks and committed some murders. General Dix said that he had sent orders to the military officers in the neighbourhood to take measures for apprehending the raiders, and that he had directed these officers to use their best endeavours to seize them on American territory, but that rather than allow them to escape, they were to be pursued beyond the frontier, such action being, in his opinion, justifiable under International Law. Upon being asked whether he had given this order on his own authority or under instructions from Washington, the General admitted that he had acted on his own responsibility. This was clearly one of the most alarming incidents that had yet occurred, and had General Dix's orders been carried out, there must inevitably have been war between England and the United States. Fortunately, however, the American Government disavowed General Dix's ill-advised orders, and the prompt action of the Canadian authorities contributed towards a peaceful solution. The raiders were seized and made to give up their booty; police were stationed along the frontier, the volunteers were called out, and effective steps taken to prevent similar occurrences in the future.

The settlement of this affair must have been one of Lord Lyons's last transactions with the American Government, for upon his return to Washington his health rapidly grew worse, and as scarcely any letters from him are to be found between the end of October and the middle of December it is to be presumed that he was so incapacitated that the work devolved upon Mr. Burnley. Early in November he was forced to apply for leave, which was granted in December.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, Dec. 5, 1864.

I am truly obliged to you for so promptly sending me leave to come
home. When I wrote to you on the 1st of last month to ask for it, I
hardly expected to have such urgent need of it as I have now, but a
few days afterwards I became so ill as to be utterly unable to do
any work. I have not made any satisfactory progress towards a
recovery, and am scarcely in a state to travel. There seems however
to be no prospect of my getting any better while I stay here, and I
shall therefore, if possible, set out for New York to-morrow, in the
hope of being able to embark there for England on the 14th.

I am told that the American papers have stated that I have been
dangerously ill with typhoid fever. I have had no fever at all. My
principal malady is a nervous headache.

In letters to other correspondents he explained that being quite unable to work he considered himself simply an impediment to the transaction of public business, and was going away simply on leave of absence. During the last few days of his stay in America he was too unwell to write, or even, as he explained to Mr. Seward, equal to a conversation, and it was doubtful whether he would be well enough to travel. Accompanied, however, by Mr. Sheffield, he embarked at New York and arrived in London during the closing days of December.

The fact was that he had completely broken down under the continuous strain of the last four years, and in view of the circumstances it was not surprising. Some idea of the work at Washington may be gathered from the following official figures.

* * * * *

_Despatches and Letters sent to and from Her Majesty's Legation at
Washington during the year 1864._

Foreign Office to Lord Lyons 966 From Lord Lyons 653
United States Government " " 1816 " " 2782
Consuls " " 1155 " " 1390
Naval and Colonial
Departments " " 311 " " 360
Miscellaneous " " 2242 " " 3141
---- ----
6490 8326

To these figures must be added a number of lithographs and other answers for which forms had been devised and which therefore were not registered, nor does it seem probable that Lord Lyons's numerous private letters to the Secretary of State and other correspondents are included; whilst there is no mention of telegrams.