Chapter III: Outbreak of CIVIL War--The 'trent' Case (1)

(1860-1861)

Before the close of 1860 the relations between North and South had reached the critical stage: the mutterings of the coming storm grew louder, and when it became clear, in November, that Abraham Lincoln was to be the new President, secession advanced with rapid strides, while conviction became general that a collision was inevitable.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Duke of Newcastle._

Dec. 10, 1860.

It is difficult to believe that I am in the same country which
appeared so prosperous, so contented, and one may say, so calm when
we travelled through it. The change is very great even since I wrote
to you on the 29th October. Our friends are apparently going ahead
on the road to ruin with their characteristic speed and energy.

The President (Buchanan) is harassed beyond measure. It is a very
unfortunate moment for our negotiations, but the present state of
things makes me more than ever anxious to get the San Juan question
safely landed beyond the reach of the incoming administration.

The approaching rule of Lincoln entailed the disquieting probability of the appointment of Mr. Seward as Secretary of State.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._

Washington, Jan. 7, 1861.

It is considered almost certain that Mr. Seward is to be Mr.
Lincoln's Secretary of State. This will be regarded as a defiance
of the South, unless (as is expected) Mr. Seward comes out with a
conciliatory speech in the Senate. With regard to Great Britain, I
cannot help fearing that he will be a dangerous Foreign Minister.
His view of the relations between the United States and Great
Britain has always been that they are a good material to make
political capital of. He thinks at all events that they may be
safely played with without any risk of bringing on a war. He has
even to me avowed his belief that England will never go to war with
the United States. He has generally taken up any cry against us, but
this he says he has done from friendship, to prevent the other
Party's appropriating it and doing more harm with it than he has
done. The temptation will be great for Lincoln's party, if they be
not actually engaged in a civil war, to endeavour to divert the
public excitement to a foreign quarrel. I do not think Mr. Seward
would contemplate actually going to war with us, but he would be
well disposed to play the old game of seeking popularity here by
displaying violence towards us. I don't think it will be so good a
game for him as it used to be, even supposing we give him an
apparent triumph, but I think he is likely to play it.

This makes me more than ever anxious to settle the San Juan
question.

The forebodings came true. Mr. Seward, a lawyer, who had aimed at the Presidency himself, became Secretary of State, and caused the British Government and the diplomatists at Washington many uncomfortable moments.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._

Washington, March 26, 1861.

Mr. Seward came to me on the evening of the 20th ultimo, and asked
me to let him speak to me very confidentially....

Mr. Seward observed that he considered it all important to ward off
a crisis during the next three months; that he had good hopes that
if this could be effected a counter revolution would take place in
the South; that he hoped and believed it would begin in the most
distant State, Texas, where indeed he saw symptoms of it already. It
might be necessary towards producing this effect to make the
Southern States feel uncomfortable in their present condition by
interrupting their commerce. It was however most important that the
new Confederacy should not in the mean time be recognized by any
Foreign Power.

I said that certainly the feelings as well as the interests of Great
Britain would render H.M.'s Government most desirous to avoid any
step which could prolong the quarrel between North and South, or be
an obstacle to a cordial and speedy reunion between them if that
were possible. Still I said, if the U.S. determined to stop by force
so important a commerce as that of Great Britain with the
cotton-growing States, I could not answer for what might happen.

Mr. Seward asked whether England would not be content to get cotton
through the Northern Ports, to which it could be sent by land.

I answered that cotton although by far the most important article of
the Trade was not the only point to be considered. It was however a
matter of the greatest consequence to England to procure cheap
cotton. If a considerable rise were to take place in the price of
cotton, and British ships were to be at the same time excluded from
the Southern Ports, an immense pressure would be put upon H.M.'s
Government to use all the means in their power to open those Ports.
If H.M.'s Government felt it to be their duty to do so, they would
naturally endeavour to effect their object in a manner as consistent
as possible first with, their friendly feelings towards both
Sections of this Country, and secondly with the recognized
principles of International Law. As regards the latter point in
particular, it certainly appeared that the most simple, if not the
only way, would be to recognize the Southern Confederacy. I said a
good deal about my hopes that Mr. Seward would never let things come
to this, with which it is unnecessary to trouble you.

I thought that Mr. Seward, although he did not give up the point,
listened with complacency to my arguments against interference with
Foreign Commerce. He said more than once that he should like to take
me to the President to discuss the subject with him. The conclusion
I came to was that the questions of a forcible collection of the
duties in the Southern Ports, and of a blockade of those Ports were
under discussion in the Cabinet, but that Mr. Seward was himself
opposed to those measures, and had good hopes that his opinion would
prevail.

It would appear however that a change took place in the interval
between this conversation and yesterday. Mr. Seward, the principal
Members of the Cabinet, the Russian Minister, M. de Stoeckl, and the
French Minister, Mons. Mercier, with some other people dined with
me. After dinner, Mr. Seward entered into an animated conversation
with my French and Russian Colleagues, and signed to me to join
them. When I came up I found him asking M. Mercier to give him a
copy of his Instructions to the French Consuls in the Southern
States. M. Mercier made some excuse for refusing, but said that what
the instructions amounted to was that the Consuls were to do their
best to protect French Commerce 'sans sortir de la plus stricte
neutralité.' Mr. Seward then asked me to give him a copy of my
instructions to H.M.'s Consuls. I, of course, declined to do so, but
I told him that the purport of them was that the Consuls were to
regard questions from a commercial not a political point of view,
that they were to do all they could to favour the continuance of
peaceful commerce short of performing an act of recognition without
the orders of Her Majesty's Government.

London: Edward Arnold]

Mr. Seward then alluded to the Peruvian Papers, and speaking as he
had done all along very loud, said to my French and Russian
Colleagues and me, 'I have formed my opinion on that matter, and I
may as well tell it to you now as at any other time. I differ with
my Predecessor as to _de facto_ Authorities. If one of your Ships
comes out of a Southern Port without the Papers required by the laws
of the U.S., and is seized by one of our Cruisers and carried into
New York and confiscated, we shall not make any compensation.' My
Russian Colleague, M. de Stoeckl, argued the question with Mr.
Seward very good humouredly and very ably. Upon his saying that a
Blockade to be respected must be effective, Mr. Seward replied that
it was not a blockade that would be established; that the U.S.
Cruisers would be stationed off the Southern Coast to collect
duties, and enforce penalties for the infraction of the U.S. Customs
Laws. Mr. Seward then appealed to me. I said that it was really a
matter so very serious that I was unwilling to discuss it; that his
plan seemed to me to amount in fact to a paper blockade of the
enormous extent of coast comprised in the Seceding States; that the
calling it an enforcement of the Revenue Laws appeared to me to
increase the gravity of the measure, for it placed Foreign Powers in
the Dilemma of recognizing the Southern Confederation, or of
submitting to the interruption of their Commerce.

Mr. Seward then went off into a defiance of Foreign Nations, in a
style of braggadocio which was formerly not uncommon with him, but
which I had not heard before from him since he had been in office.
Finding he was getting more and more violent and noisy, and saying
things which it would be more convenient for me not to have heard, I
took a natural opportunity of turning, as host, to speak to some of
the ladies in the room.

M. de Stoeckl and M. Mercier inferred, as I do, that within the last
two days the opinion of the more violent party in the Cabinet had
prevailed, at all events for the moment, and that there is a danger
that an interference with Foreign Trade may take place at any
moment. I hope that it may still be prevented by the fear of its
producing a recognition of the Southern Confederacy. But I am afraid
we must be prepared for it.

It may perhaps be well, with a view to the effect on this
Government, that the Commissioners who are on their way to Europe
from the Southern States should not meet with too strong a rebuff in
England or in France. Such a rebuff would be a great encouragement
to violent measures. In fact, notwithstanding my contradictions, the
Senate, and indeed, I fear, the President is not uninfluenced by the
bold assertions made by some Members of the violent Party that they
have positive assurances from Y.L. and other Members of H.M.'s
Government that _under no circumstances whatever_ will Great
Britain recognize the independence of the South.

M. Mercier thinks it advisable that he and I should have a
discretionary Power to recognize the South. This seems to me to be
going too fast. I should feel a good deal embarrassed by having such
a power in my pocket, unless the contingency in which it was to be
used should be most clearly stated. What does appear to be of
extreme importance is that England and France should act in concert.

Lincoln had been inaugurated as President in March, and in the following month the long-awaited collision occurred at Charleston, when the Confederates opened fire upon and captured Fort Sumter. The forts in Charleston harbour had by common consent become the test case, and the capture of Fort Sumter signalized the fact that a population of little over 5 millions of white men had had the audacity to challenge over 22 millions of their fellow-countrymen.

Charleston, by the way, besides its importance in American history, seems to have been a place where slavery was a very thorough-going institution, judging from the following advertisement in the _Mercury_, of March 25th, 1861.

* * * * *

NOTICE. TEN DOLLARS REWARD.

Runaway on Friday night, March 23rd, my woman 'Silvey,' about forty
years of age, of a light brown complexion, and has spots on her
face as if done with powder, and limps a little, and speaks very low
when spoken to. She formerly belonged to the Rev. Mr. Keith, and of
late to Johnson the tailor, in King Street, near George Street. When
she left she had a chain around her ankles to keep her from going
off, but she went anyhow. Apply to P. Buckheit, north-west corner of
Line and Meeting Streets.

Mr. W. H. Russell, the well-known correspondent, was in Charleston a few days after the fall of Fort Sumter, and wrote as follows:----

* * * * *

Charleston, April 19, 1861.

I arrived here the night before last _viâ_ Baltimore, Norfolk and
Wilmington. North Carolina was in revolt--that is, there was no
particular form of authority to rebel against, but the shadowy
abstractions in lieu of it were treated with deserved contempt by
the 'citizens,' who with flint muskets and quaint uniforms were
ready at the various stations to seize on anything, particularly
whisky, which it occurred to them to fancy. At Wilmington I sent a
message to the electric telegraph office for transmission to New
York, but the 'citizens' of the Vigilance Committee refused to
permit the message to be transmitted and were preparing to wait upon
me with a view of asking me what were my general views on the state
of the world, when I informed them peremptorily that I must decline
to hold any intercourse with them which I the more objected to do in
that they were highly elated and excited by the news from Sumter. I
went over the works with General Beauregard: the military injury
done to Sumter is very trifling, but Anderson's defence, negative as
it was, must be regarded as exceedingly creditable to him.

* * * * *

In a week's time the place will be a hard nut to crack. One thing
is certain: nothing on earth will induce the people to return to the
Union. I believe firmly their present intention is to march upon
Washington, if it were merely as a diversion to carry the war away
from their interior.

War having now actually broken out, the question of the blockade of the Southern ports became all important for England.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._

Washington, April 15, 1861.

I am getting very uneasy about the intention of the Government with
regard to stopping intercourse with Southern Ports. Now that war has
begun it seems difficult to suppose that they will abstain from
taking advantage of their one great superiority, which is their
navy. I suppose that a regular blockade would be less objectionable
than any such measures as closing the Southern Ports as Ports of
entry, or attempting to collect duties for the U.S. by ships
stationed off them. The rules of a blockade are to a great extent
determined and known, and our ships could at all events resort to
any Ports before which the U.S. did not establish a regular
effective blockade. But if the U.S. are to be permitted to seize any
ship of ours wherever they can find her within their jurisdiction on
the plea that by going to a Southern port she has violated the U.S.
custom laws, our commerce will be exposed to vexations beyond
bearing, and all kinds of new and doubtful questions will be raised.
In fact, this, it seems to me, would be a paper blockade of the
worst kind. It would certainly justify Great Britain and France in
recognizing the Southern Confederacy and sending their fleets to
force the U.S. to treat British and French vessels as neutrals in
conformity with the law of nations.

Just as Mr. Seward was confident that he had prevailed in the
Cabinet, the President and the violent party suddenly threw over his
policy. Having determined not to resign, he pretends to be pleased,
and one of his colleagues says of him that in order to make up for
previous lukewarmness he is now the fiercest of the lot. It is a
great inconvenience to have him as the organ of communication from
the U.S. Government. Repeated failures have not convinced him that
he is not sure to carry his point with the President and the
Cabinet. He is therefore apt to announce as the fixed intentions
of his Government what is in reality no more than a measure which he
himself supports.

I am in constant apprehension of some foolish and violent proceeding
of the Government with regard to Foreign Powers. Neither the
President nor any man in the Cabinet has a knowledge of Foreign
Affairs; they have consequently all the overweening confidence in
their own strength which popular oratory has made common in this
country. I believe the best chance of keeping them within bounds
will be to be very firm with them, particularly at first, and to act
in concert with France, if that be possible.

As I have mentioned in my despatches, information coming from the
Southern Commissioners sent to negotiate with the Government here,
it may be as well to mention that they did not seek any intercourse
with me, and that I never had any communication with them, direct or
otherwise. I do not know that I should have thought it necessary to
refuse to communicate with them, if it had been proposed to me, but
the fact is as I have just said.

The policy of acting in conjunction with France was adopted with considerable success, as will appear later, but hitherto the British Government had not given any very clear lead, Lord John Russell contenting himself with the view that he relied upon 'the wisdom, patience, and prudence of the British Minister to steer safely through the danger of the crisis.' It was absolutely necessary, however, to deal with the Blockade Question, and the Cabinet consulted the Law Officers of the Crown, with the result that the Southern States were recognized as belligerents.

* * * * *

_Lord John Russell to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, May 6, 1861.

I cannot give you any official instructions by this mail, but the
Law Officers are of opinion that we must consider the Civil War
in America as regular war--_justum bellum_--and apply to it all
the rules respecting blockade, letters of Marque which belong to
neutrals during a war. They think moreover it would be very
desirable if both parties would agree to accept the Declaration of
Paris regarding the flag covering the goods and the prohibition of
privateers.

You will of course inform our naval officers that they must conform
to the rules respecting Blockade, of which they are I believe in
possession. The matter is very serious and very unfortunate.

An important conversation took place on May 17, between Lord J. Russell and Mr. Adams, the new American Minister in London, in which the latter went so far as to state that Lord John Russell's language to his predecessor, Mr. Dallas, had been construed in an unfavourable light in the United States, and that he was afraid that his own mission might come to an end unless the unfavourable impression was corrected. He further complained of the recognition of the South as a belligerent. Lord John Russell in reply declined to give an undertaking that, apart from belligerent rights, England would never recognize the Southern States, but he endeavoured to make it clear that, if anything, popular sympathy in England was with the North, and that H.M. Government were only desirous of maintaining a strict neutrality. Any one reading the correspondence of the period cannot fail to realize that Lord John Russell was perfectly sincere in his expressed wish to preserve perfect impartiality, in spite of the querulous and acrimonious tone which occasionally characterized his communications.

Lord Lyons, on his side, was only too anxious to avoid the slightest semblance of anything which might cause offence to the United States Government. He was constantly impressing upon the various Consuls that, strict neutrality being the policy of H.M. Government, they must not be led away by their sympathies, but confine themselves to obeying orders. He vetoed the requests for warships, which they occasionally clamoured for, in the traditional consular spirit, and urged caution upon the British naval Commanders and the Canadian authorities. Fortunately, both Admiral Milne and Sir Edmund Head, the Governor-General of Canada, were prudent and tactful men, who ably co-operated with him. With both of these he corresponded confidentially, and made no secret of the apprehensions which he entertained.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Sir E. Head._

Washington, May 22, 1861.

You will perhaps consider the notion that the U.S. should at this
moment provoke a war with a great Power as preposterous, and _à
priori_ it must seem incredible to any one. Nevertheless I am
so seriously alarmed by what I see passing around me here and
especially by the conduct of the Cabinet that I have thought it my
duty to call the attention of our Government to the danger which I
conceive to exist. To avert it is the main object of all I do here.
I am afraid however that things are coming to a point at which my
diplomacy will be completely at fault.

* * * * *

I could write a great deal to explain my reasons for fearing that if
a war be not imminent the risk is at any rate so great that it ought
at once to be guarded against. My mind is almost unremittingly
employed in devising means to maintain the peace. In this, even more
than in ordinary cases, I think the best safeguard will be found in
being evidently prepared for war. Nothing is so likely to prevent an
attack as manifest readiness to prevent one. I have thought it right
to state to H.M. Government my opinion that it is not even now too
soon to put Canada into a complete state of defence and to provide
both in the West Indies and on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts the
means of resisting attack in case of war or of making our neutrality
respected if peace can be maintained.

Canada is, as you know, looked upon here as our weak point. There
are in the Cabinet men who are no doubt as ignorant of the state of
feeling in Canada as they were of that in the Southern States and
who believe that there is a strong American feeling in Canada. You
will not have forgotten that Mr. Seward, during the Presidential
canvass, publicly advocated the annexation of Canada as a
compensation for any loss which might be occasioned by the
disaffection of the South. The people calculate here (I am afraid
not without reason) upon being effectively aided in an inroad upon
Canada by the Irish Secret Societies which have been formed
especially in the State of New York nominally for the purpose of
invading Ireland.

I can hardly hope that you will not think the antecedent
improbability of this country's rushing to its ruin by adding
Foreign to Civil war so great as to prove that I must be led away by
visionary apprehensions. However this may be, it may be convenient
to you to know what my knowledge of men and things here has brought
me to believe and what I have in consequence written home.

Our Government has taken the only position sanctioned by
International law and by precedent. It observes absolute neutrality
and impartiality between the contending parties, recognizing, as it
is bound to do, both as invested with belligerent rights. No other
course was open to it, except that of an offensive alliance with one
side against the other. The North have certainly not asked for such
an alliance and would doubtless reject an offer of it with disdain.
And yet they choose to be in a fury because we do not try to occupy
some untenable position as their partisans.

No one defines our position more clearly than their own great
authority Wheaton.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._

Washington, May 21, 1861.

One of the great difficulties I have to contend with in my endeavour
to keep this Government within such bounds as may render the
maintenance of peace possible is the persuasion which prevails even
with sensible men that _no_ outrage will compel England to make
war with the North. Such men, although seeing the inexpediency and
impropriety of Mr. Seward's treatment of the European Powers, still
do not think it worth while to risk their own mob popularity by
declaring against it. If they thought there was really any danger
they would no doubt do a great deal to avert it.

Of these men the most distinguished is Mr. Sumner. He has
considerable influence in Foreign Questions and holds the important
office of Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He
is in correspondence with many people in England, and I believe with
the Duke and Duchess of Argyll. I think no greater service could be
rendered to the cause of peace than to make Mr. Sumner aware of the
real perils to which Mr. Seward and the Cabinet are exposing the
country. If some means cannot be devised of checking them, they will
carry not only arrogance but practical vexations to a pitch which
will render the maintenance of peace impossible. If Mr. Sumner's
correspondence from England convinced him that there was real danger
in Mr. Seward's proceedings, he might do a good deal to put a stop
to them. I think I have done something to shake his confidence, but
I believe he still relies to a great degree upon assurances he
received from England under circumstances wholly different from
those which now so unhappily exist.

Only a few years earlier, a British Minister, Sir John Crampton (like Lord Sackville, in 1888), had been offered as a sacrifice to the Irish vote, and received his passport, and it began to look as if this spirited action might be repeated.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._

Washington, June 4, 1861.

The present game of the violent party appears to be to discover or
invent some shade of difference in the conduct of England and France
in order to use violent language, or even to take violent measures
against England without necessarily involving themselves in a
quarrel with France also. The plan most in vogue at this moment
seems to be to send me my passport. After their experience in the
case of Sir J. Crampton they look upon this as a measure which would
gain them most applause by its appearance of vigour without exposing
them to any real danger. They have not yet hit upon any fault to
find with me personally, except that I _must_ have written
unfriendly despatches to my government, because my government has
taken a course which they do not like. The whole is no doubt an
attempt to carry a point by bluster which will perhaps fail if it be
encountered with mild language and very firm conduct. For my own
part I conceive my best line will be to avoid giving any possible
reason for complaint against myself personally and to keep things as
smooth as I can. If H.M. Government concede nothing to violent
language it will _probably_ subside, but there is such a dementia
in some of the people here that we must not be surprised at any act of
violence they may commit.

Mr. Seward will be furious when he finds that his adherence to the
Declaration of Paris will not stop the Southern privateering. This
is one of the difficulties of making the proposals respecting
maritime law. But the great trouble will be the fuss which the
Southern government will make about receiving a communication from
England and France. It will be a great advantage to have a discreet
and able man like Mr. Bunch to employ in the South. I trust it may
be possible to grant him some compensation for the risk and loss to
which he is exposed by remaining there.

Another long letter of June 10 illustrates the tension of the situation, and again urges the necessity of attending to the defence of Canada.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._

Washington, June 10, 1861.

I owe you more than common thanks for your private letter of the
25th.

Mr. Adams' Report of his first conversation with you appears to have
produced a good impression on the Cabinet. This I learn from Mr.
Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, who dined with me the day
before yesterday. I have not seen Mr. Seward since they arrived. It
is too dangerous to talk to him on such subjects for me to bring
them up unnecessarily.

I hope we may see some moderation in the tone of the Newspapers.
The people in the North are beginning to be aware of the immense
encouragement which their predictions of a war with England have
given to their Southern Foe. I understand that the effect at
Richmond of the repeated assertions in the Northern Papers of the
hostility of England to the North has been prodigious.

I have written so much officially on the risk of a sudden
Declaration of War against England by the U.S. that I have nothing
to add on that subject. That such an act of madness is so far from
impossible, that we ought to be prepared for it at any moment, I
am thoroughly convinced. I am doing all I can to avoid awkward
questions--for to give way upon any such question would be still
more dangerous to peace than to make a firm stand. The safe course
therefore is to prevent questions arising, if possible. But the
first thing to be done towards obtaining anything like permanent
security is to remove the temptation to attack Canada.

I am a little nervous about our Company of Marines on San Juan. I
don't know that I can suggest any precautions to Governor Douglas
which would not be more likely to do harm than good. I have besides
no means of sending him a letter, which would not be liable to
be read on the way. I can communicate with the Admiral in the
Pacific in cypher, but I do not know where he may be. Under any
circumstances the Government here would of course be able to send
intelligence of war having broken out to the Pacific sooner than I
could.

M. Mercier, the French Minister here, appears to be very frank and
cordial with me. The instructions which he read to me insist very
strongly upon his acting in entire concert with me. I think he may
perhaps have received a confidential Despatch desiring him to
proceed cautiously, for he is going at a much slower pace than his
language a short time ago would have led one to expect. His giving
Mr. Seward a copy of the Exposition of the French Jurists on the
question of Belligerent Rights, as he did before of M. Thouvenel's
account of his conversation with Mr. Sanford, seems to show a
straightforward desire to make this Government acquainted with
the real sentiments and intentions of the Emperor. The language
M. Mercier uses to me and to his other Colleagues, as well as
that which he uses to Americans in my presence, is in direct
contradiction to the reports that France will assist the North,
which are so assiduously repeated and commented upon in the American
Newspapers. I am very willing to let him take the lead in our
communications about the Declaration of Paris. It would be playing
the game of the enemies to peace with England for me to go faster in
these matters than the French Minister.

Among other difficulties in the way of making your communication to
the Southern Consuls, is that of getting it safely to them. All
regular communication with the South is cut off. I suppose the
Government here would give either M. Mercier or me a Pass for a
special Messenger if we asked for one--but it may be desirable to
afford as little evidence as possible of our being connected with
the communication. The Southern Government will no doubt do all in
their power to give importance and publicity to the communication.
This Government will very probably withdraw the Exequaturs of the
Consuls who make it. The withdrawal would not be altogether free
from inconvenience to us, as it would interfere with the Consuls'
holding intercourse with the Blockading Squadrons, which it is
sometimes of importance that they should be able to do.

I think the English and French Governments will find it necessary to
make the Cabinet of Washington clearly understand that they _must_
and _will_ hold unofficial communication with the Southern
Government on matters concerning the interests of their subjects.
The announcement should if possible be made _collectively_, and in
such a form as to preclude the Cabinet's pretending to find a
difference between the conduct of France and England. The Government
of the U.S. can perform none of the duties of a Government towards
Foreigners in the Seceded States; and it is a preposterous
pretension to insist upon excluding Foreign Governments from
intercourse with the authorities however illegitimate, to whom their
Subjects must in fact look for protection.

The inactivity of the Troops on both sides would be satisfactory, if
one could hope that there was still any chance of the question's
being solved without any serious fighting. As it is, one would be
glad that something should be done as soon as possible to enable an
opinion to be formed on the relative strength and spirit of the
Armies. I believe that the real secret is that from want of training
in the men, and total lack of waggons, horses and other means of
transport, neither Government can move troops in any considerable
numbers except by railroad. I can see as yet no signs of the spirit
of conquest in the North flagging, or of the South losing courage.
The Financial Difficulty will be the great one on both sides. The
Southern men are said to serve without pay--but this Government has
fixed the pay of the volunteers and militiamen at the same rate as
that of the regular army, eleven dollars (about 45 shillings) a
month, for a private, in addition to clothes and rations.

I must do the little I can to influence the Senators and
Representatives when they come up next month; but there is only too
much reason to fear that fierceness against England will be popular,
and that the Legislators will vie with each other in manifesting it.
What I think they are most likely to do is to give the President
authority to declare war with us, without waiting for the sanction
of Congress.

* * * * *

Since I wrote what precedes I have been informed privately that in
Mr. Dayton's Report of his audience of the Emperor, there is a
rather ambiguous phrase put into the Emperor's mouth, respecting His
Majesty's desire to contribute to put an end to the dispute between
North and South. My informant says that the President and Mr. Seward
_really_ interpret the phrase as signifying that the Emperor would
be willing to assist the North to subdue the South--and that it is
from this supposition that Mr. Seward does not send M. Mercier back
the 'Exposition' and enter into the discussion about neutral Rights.
Mr. Seward is naturally puzzled by the apparent discrepancy between
the Emperor's language and that of His Majesty's Minister here. The
men in the State Department who are accustomed to business look, it
seems, upon the Emperor's words, even as reported by Mr. Dayton, as
no more than a vague assurance of goodwill, pointing to mediation
rather than to anything else. I will endeavour to get M. Mercier to
set the President and Mr. Seward right as soon as possible, for the
delusion is a very dangerous one for England, and a much more
dangerous one for the U.S.

The ill-feeling towards England continued to grow worse as time went on, and apparently was due largely to sentiment. The success of the South in founding a practically independent government was so galling to the North that anything which implied the admission of a self-evident fact, such as the recognition of the Southern States as belligerents, was inexpressibly galling. Fortunately, England and France were acting in unison, and even Mr. Seward's ingenuity was unable to show that there was any difference between the attitude of the two countries. Writing on June 24, Lord Lyons reported that he had discovered that Mr. Seward had prepared a despatch which was all but a direct announcement of war, and that it was only the intervention of the President and of the more reasonable members of the Cabinet which prevented its being sent to the American Minister in London. The great qualities of President Lincoln, by the way, do not appear to have been recognized at this early period, for competent judges pronounced that although well-meaning and conscientious, he gave no proof of possessing any natural talents to compensate for his ignorance of everything but Illinois village politics.

Towards the end of July the military inactivity, due to causes mentioned earlier, came to an end, and the historic fight of Bull's Run took place on the 21st.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, July 22, 1861.

It is too soon to form any speculations on the result of the defeat
of yesterday. Neither General Scott nor the Government had
calculated on the possibility of anything like it, and as for the
people of the North, they talked at all events as if the victory was
already theirs. If the North have anything like the spirit to which
they lay claim, they will rise with more resolution than ever to
avenge the defeat. The test will be the conduct of the Militia
Regiments. The three months' term of service of most of them has
just expired: some had gone home and the rest were on the point of
following--leaving the war to be carried on by the Volunteers and
the Regular Army. If the Militia regiments remain and others come
up, we may conclude that the warlike spirit of the North is
unbroken. If they do not, there may be a chance of peace. For this
battle will not facilitate recruiting for the army and the
Volunteers--and unless the Capitalists are urged by patriotism or
squeezed by mob pressure, the loans will fail and the money to pay
the Volunteers will not be forthcoming.

I am myself inclined to hope that Congress may show some dignity
and good sense. The general opinion is that it will be violent and
childish--vote men and money on paper by millions--slay its Southern
enemies by treason bills--and ruin them by confiscation acts--decree
the immediate and unconditional abolition of slavery in the Southern
States--the closing of the Ports, and what not.

Amongst other results of Bull's Run was the production of the following minute by Lord Palmerston. If his judgment on the temper of the North was completely wrong, his other observations might be profitably studied by the numerous persons in this country who hold the view that efficient military forces can be improvised whenever an emergency arises.

* * * * *

MINUTE OF LORD PALMERSTON.

Aug. 15, 1861.

The defeat at Bull's Run or rather at Yankee's Run proves two
things. First, that to bring together many thousand men and put
uniforms upon their backs and muskets in their hands is not to make
an army: discipline, experienced officers and confidence in the
steadiness of their comrades are necessary to make an army fight and
stand: secondly, that the Unionist cause is not in the hearts of the
mass of the population of the North. The Americans are not cowards:
individually they are as reckless of their own lives as of the lives
of others: ..., and it is not easy to believe that if they had felt
they were fighting for a great national interest they would have run
away as they did from the battle, or that whole regiments would have
quietly marched away home just before the fight was to begin. The
Truth is, the North are fighting for an Idea chiefly entertained by
professional politicians, while the South are fighting for what they
consider rightly or wrongly vital interests.

The defects and weaknesses disclosed by this defeat produced much contemptuous criticism upon the military inefficiency of the United States. In reality there was no cause for surprise. In April, 1861, the entire regular army of the United States only amounted to 16,000 officers and men. Many of the officers had taken sides with the South. Not one of them had ever had the opportunity of commanding any considerable number of troops, and public opinion was so entirely uninstructed concerning military questions that every local politician considered himself competent to become a colonel, or even a general. But what Bull's Run showed more conclusively than anything else, was that the task of subjugating the South was infinitely greater than had been anticipated, and that the confident boastings of enthusiastic Northerners were as foolish as they were unjustified. We, however, as a nation, had not then, and have now, little cause to jeer at the Americans for their failure: we had embarked, only a few years earlier, upon the Crimean Campaign almost equally unprepared for a serious struggle, and less than forty years later, in 1899, one of our most eminent military authorities undertook to finish off the Boers before the date of the Lord Mayor's Banquet.

About this time Anglo-American relations showed a slight improvement, although Mr. Seward, in a characteristic outburst, took occasion to point out that 'the policy of Foreign Governments was founded upon considerations of interest and of commerce, while that of the United States was based on high and eternal considerations of principle and the good of the human race; that the policy of foreign nations was regulated by the government which ruled them, while that of the United States was directed by the unanimous and unchangeable will of the people.' Yet he had clearly become more peaceable, and this welcome tendency was perhaps due to the British Government having increased the Canadian garrisons in response to the urgent pressure of Lord Lyons and the Canadian authorities.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Sir E. Head._

Washington, Aug. 2, 1861.

The intentions of the Government are at this moment more peaceful
than they have been. But I do not yet see any reason to modify the
views I expressed in my previous confidential letters. The present
change has been mainly produced by our preparations for defence and
by the quiet firmness with which we have maintained the position we
took up with regard to Belligerent Rights. I think it as necessary
as ever to complete our preparations for defence, and I find that
the knowledge that we are making such preparations calms instead of
irritating this people.

There is nothing very surprising in raw levies being seized with
such a panic as that which led to the flight from Bull's Run. The
want of spirit before and since shown by the Militia regiments is a
worse sign. Two went away, on their term expiring, one may say from
the battlefield itself. The defeat, and even the danger of
Washington being taken, have been unable to induce any whose time is
up to remain. The Government considers that we are now safe again
from an attack here, but for some days our reliance was only upon
its not entering into the enemy's plan to come here.

As day after day passes without an onward movement of the Southern
troops, the war spirit seems to revive in the North. But it will
require a decided Northern victory to bring back the enthusiasm and
the unanimity which appeared on the fall of Fort Sumter. A peace
party is beginning to show itself timidly and weakly, but much more
openly than it would have dared to do two months ago.

We have nearly got through another Tariff Bill without a serious
attack upon the Reciprocity Treaty, thanks more to the haste, I am
afraid, than the good will of the Legislators. It will be a
wonderful tariff, whichever of the plans now before Congress is
adopted.

Mr. Seward some weeks ago took credit to himself for having recalled
Mr. Ashman on finding that his mission was ill looked on. This gave
me a good opportunity of telling him that H.M. Government
considered that they had a good right to complain of his having been
sent at all without proper communication being previously made to
them and to me.

I have applied for the discharge of the two minors about whom you
wrote to me officially. I am not sure of getting it. My applications
for discharge from the Army and Navy have become necessarily so
numerous that they are not viewed with favour.

Such elaborate pains had been taken to prevent anything in the least likely to irritate the Government of the United States, that it was all the more annoying when an incident occurred which gave excuse for complaint.

The Consuls in the Southern States were permitted to send their despatches in Foreign Office bags through the lines on the reasonable condition that no advantage was to be taken of the privilege in order to provide information which might be of use to the enemies of the United States Government. The rule was rigidly observed at the Legation, and the Consuls had been repeatedly warned not to infringe it in any way; but in an evil hour, Mr. Bunch, the British Consul at Charleston, a capable and industrious official, committed his bag to a friend, who, unknown to the Consul, also took charge of about two hundred private letters. The messenger was arrested by the United States authorities, and imprisoned. The letters, of course, were seized, but so also was the Foreign Office bag, addressed to Lord Russell, and a Foreign Office bag has always been considered as one of the most sacred objects upon earth. The United States Government, professing that a most serious offence had been committed, and taking advantage of an error in the passport of the messenger, sent the bag over to London by special messenger, and demanded the recall of the unfortunate Consul Bunch. The opportunity, in short, was too good to be lost. When the bag was eventually opened, in Downing Street, it was found to contain nothing but despatches and a few letters from British governesses and servants who had been permitted to make use of it in consequence of the discontinuance of the post. In fact, it was an essentially trivial matter, but the tension between the two countries was so great that Lord Russell thought that it might possibly lead to a rupture of official relations, and sent the following instructions:--

* * * * *

_Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._

Abergeldie Castle, Sept. 13, 1861.

It is not very probable, but it is possible that the complaint
against Bunch may be a preliminary to the breaking off of official
intercourse between the two countries.

Your name has been kept out of the correspondence on both sides,
but if the Envoys are to be withdrawn, you will be sent away from
Washington.

In that case I wish you to express in the most dignified and guarded
terms that the course taken by the Washington Government must be the
result of a misconception on their part, and that you shall retire
to Canada in the persuasion that the misunderstanding will soon
cease, and the former friendly relations be restored.

It is very desirable to obtain an explanation from Consul Bunch, and
you may authorize Admiral Milne, after due notice, to Mr. Seward, to
send a gunboat to Charleston for the purpose.

Consul Bunch, in spite of his troubles, remained for over a year in Charleston after this incident. Eventually the American Government revoked his exequatur, and he made a semi-state return to England in a man-of-war.

In the late autumn, Mr. Seward began to show signs of returning to his earlier manner, and it was plain enough that he had only been seeking to gain time by his moderation. He now maintained that any communication between a Foreign Government and the Confederate Government was an offence against the United States, and it became more and more necessary for England and France to come to some distinct agreement as to what the nature and extent of those communications should be. Mr. Seward's contention was obviously absurd. South Carolina had seceded nearly a year previously. State after State had followed its example; the United States Government had not made the slightest progress in restoring its authority, and exercised no power or influence in any portion of the new Confederation. On the other hand, there was a _de facto_ government in that Confederation which was obeyed without question and exercised the functions of government with perfect regularity. It was clear that a government which was without the means of protecting British subjects had no right to prevent us from holding necessary and informal communications with the only power to which British subjects could look for protection and redress of grievances. Cases of British subjects being compulsorily enlisted, of British goods being seized on board vessels captured by Southern privateers, and instances of a similar nature were of constant occurrence. It was preposterous that under these conditions British Consuls should be expected to refrain from communication with the Confederate authorities. Fortunately, although the British interests involved were infinitely the more important, French interests were affected too, and upon this, as upon most other difficult questions, Lord Lyons received the hearty and loyal support of his French colleague, M. Mercier.

On November 8, an incident of the gravest nature occurred, which seemed likely to render futile all the laborious efforts which had been made to keep the peace between England and the United States.

The English mail steamer _Trent_, one day out from Havannah, was met by the American warship _San Jacinto_ and stopped by a shell fired across her bows. She was then boarded by a party of marines, and the officer in command of the party demanded a list of the passengers. The production of the list having been refused, the officer stated that he knew the Confederate delegates to Europe, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, to be on board, and insisted upon their surrender. Whilst the discussion was in progress, Mr. Slidell made his appearance and disclosed his identity. Thereupon, in defiance of the protests of the captain of the _Trent_ and of the Government mail agent, Mr. Slidell and Mr. Mason, together with their secretaries, were seized and carried off by force to the _San Jacinto_, and taken as prisoners to New York.

The news arrived in England on November 27, and, naturally, caused the greatest excitement and indignation. It was felt that the limits of concession had been reached, that a stand must now be made if we ever intended to maintain our national rights, and, as a proof that they were in earnest, the Government decided upon the immediate despatch of 8000 men to Canada.

The first private letter from Lord Lyons was written on November 19.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, Nov. 19, 1861.

I have written so much officially on this unfortunate affair of
Mason and Slidell that I have hardly left myself time to thank you
for your kind private letter of the 2nd.

I am told confidently that orders were given at Washington which led
to the capture on board the _Trent_, and that they were signed by
Mr. Seward without the knowledge of the President. I do not vouch
for the truth of this. I am afraid he is not sorry to have a
question with us like this, in which it is difficult for France to
take a part.

Lord Lyons had made up his mind from the first that, as it was impossible for him to form a correct opinion as to what had actually occurred, the only thing to do was to maintain an attitude of complete reserve. In the absence of authentic information, he felt that on the one hand it would be unsafe to ask for a reparation which might be inadequate; on the other hand he was reluctant to make a demand which might be unnecessarily great. Consequently, he resolved to take no steps until he received instructions from home, refused to say a word on the subject either officially or unofficially, and instructed the Consuls to maintain silence.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, Nov. 22, 1861.

I have all along been expecting some such blow as the capture on
board the _Trent_. Turn out how it may, it must I fear produce an
effect on public opinion in both countries which will go far to
disconcert all my peaceful plans and hopes. I am so worn out with
the never-ending labour of keeping things smooth, under the
discouragement of the doubt whether by so doing I am not after all
only leading these people to believe that they may go all lengths
with us with impunity that I am sometimes half tempted to wish that
the worst may have come already. However I do not allow this feeling
to influence my conduct, and I have done nothing which can in the
least interfere with any course which you may take concerning the
affair of the _Trent_.