Chapter VI: The Second Empire (1)

(1867-1869)

Lord Lyons, accompanied by Malet and Sheffield, whom he had again been permitted to retain on his staff, entered upon his duties at Paris in October, 1867, and there he remained until within a few months of his death, some twenty years later. He arrived at a time when, although the outward splendour of the Empire still dazzled the popular imagination, the prestige, influence, and popularity of the Imperial Government, and more especially of the Emperor himself, had suffered a series of disastrous shocks. If Napoleon III.'s career had ended in 1862 he would presumably have left a great name in history and a record of brilliant successes; after that period, however, everything seemed to go wrong for him. Poland, the Danish War, and the Austro-Prussian War had shown that his pretension to control the policy of Europe had practically vanished; the incomprehensible Mexican enterprise had ended in disaster and disgrace, and to add to these glaring failures in foreign policy there was deep-seated discontent at home. In the autumn of 1867 a fresh embarrassment to France was created by the action of Garibaldi, who succeeded in embroiling two Governments which had latterly been on most friendly terms. The alliance between Italy and Prussia in 1866 had been a temporary expedient only; the sympathies of Victor Emmanuel had always been on the side of France, and when at the close of that year, the Emperor decided upon the withdrawal of his troops from Rome, it seemed not improbable that a permanent alliance between Italy and France might be effected. This combination was defeated by the action of Garibaldi in invading the Papal States, and the Emperor, dominated by the clerical party, found himself compelled not only to use threatening language towards the Italian Government, but to send a French expedition to re-occupy Rome and defend the Pope against his enemies. Mentana was the result, and it soon became plain that the policy of the French Government was to prevent Italy from obtaining possession of Rome, M. Rouher, the French Prime Minister, at a subsequent period going so far as to declare that France would never tolerate such an outrage on its honour. In spite of all this, signs were not wanting that there was no desire on the part of either France or Italy to go to war. Mentana had cleared the air, and the chief danger seemed to consist in the renewed French occupation of Rome. As Lord Stanley pointed out, it was comparatively easy for the Emperor to go to Rome, but the difficulty lay in getting out again, for who was to keep order after the evacuation? Napoleon III. had, in fact, released himself from momentary embarrassments at the cost of heavy trouble in the future. In accordance with his favourite practice, he now made the proposal that the so-called Roman Question should be submitted to a Conference of the Powers at Paris--a proposal which did not commend itself to England, and was opposed by Prussia at the instigation of Bismarck, whose object it was to accentuate the differences between France and Italy. To what extent the Empress Eugénie participated in the direction of French foreign policy has often been the subject of discussion, but there can be no doubt that she held decided views with regard to the Roman Question and the proposed Conference.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._

Paris, Nov. 11, 1867.

After I had presented the Queen's letter this morning, the Empress
kept me in conversation for an hour. She began by expressing in warm
terms respect and affection for the Queen and in particular
gratitude for Her Majesty's kind reception of her at the last visit.

The Empress proceeded to speak of the Roman question and insisted
strongly on the necessity for a Conference and on the importance and
propriety of non-Catholic as well as Catholic powers taking part in
it. She expressed a very strong desire that England should not stand
aloof.

Without taking upon myself to anticipate your decision on the
matter, I endeavoured to make the Empress aware of the very great
difficulty and delicacy of a Conference to us. It appeared to result
from that. Her Majesty said that, in her own opinion, the proper
basis for the deliberations would be the maintenance of the _status
quo_. This, she seemed to think, would be a fair compromise between
the demand of the Pope that all the provinces he had lost should be
restored to him and the pretensions of Italy to Rome itself.

The conversation having been brought round to the measures to be
taken immediately, I endeavoured to impress upon the Empress the
advantage of withdrawing the troops without a day's unnecessary
delay, if not from the Roman territory altogether, at least from
Rome itself. Her Majesty said that there was nothing in principle
against withdrawing to Civita Vecchia at once, and that certainly
the Emperor and she herself were anxious to bring all the troops
back to France as soon as it was safe to do so.

The Empress spoke discouragingly of the state of Italy--of the
little progress that had been made towards uniting and assimilating
the various sections of the population--of the financial
difficulties and other unfavourable points. She said however that
the unity of Italy had been the work of the Emperor, and that it
would be absurd and disadvantageous to allow it to be destroyed. She
believed that the French expedition had in reality been of as much
or more service to King Victor Emmanuel than to the Pope. His
Majesty's throne was threatened, she thought, by the revolutionary
party quite as much as was the Temporal power of the Pope.

Among a great variety of topics which came up, the Empress spoke, by
way of an illustration, of the Kingdom of Greece. She said it had
been a mistake, if that Kingdom was to be created at all, not to
give it territory enough to enable it to exist. She did not however
seem to think it would be advisable at this moment to make over
Crete or any other Ottoman province to Greece. She appeared to be
aware of the extreme peril to the whole Ottoman Empire of detaching
any portion of it in this way.

The Empress spoke with much grace both of manner and of expression,
and I think with very great ability.

For my own part I endeavoured principally to make an impression on
her mind respecting the immediate withdrawal of the troops to Civita
Vecchia at least, and I am inclined to think that I succeeded so far
as to ensure the repeating to the Emperor what I said on this point.

I hear from all quarters that the Emperor's own position in France
becomes more and more critical. Every one seems to admit that he
could not do otherwise than send the expedition to Rome, but the
success which attended it does not seem to have made much
impression. All parties except the ultra-clerical appear to desire
to get out of the intervention as soon as possible. So far as I can
make out, the weakness of the Emperor's position lies simply in
loss of prestige arising partly from his want of success on many
recent occasions, and mainly, I imagine, from the inconstancy of men
and Frenchmen in particular. In fact he has reigned eighteen years,
and they are getting tired of so much of the same thing and want
novelty.

Lord Stanley's comment upon this letter was that the Empress's 'frank and sensible conversation' furnished the best reason he had received yet for keeping out of the affair altogether, and he observed with some justice that what Her Majesty's proposed compromise amounted to, was that the Pope should keep all that he had already, and merely renounce his claim to what, under no circumstances, he could ever hope to recover. The more he considered the proposed Conference the more hopeless it appeared to him. There was no plan, nothing settled, no assurance that there was even a wish for agreement amongst the Powers interested. They were being asked to discuss a question on which they were certain to differ, and the sole reason given for summoning a Conference was that the Emperor disliked bearing the responsibility which he had assumed. Why should we be asked to bear it for him? It must have been a congenial task for a man of Lord Stanley's temperament to throw cold water upon the vague and slipshod proposals of the unlucky Emperor, and he was probably fortified in his conclusions by the attitude of Prussia and by the reluctance of Russia, in spite of a Conference being 'always a temptation to Gortschakoff.'[11]

Another personage of some importance, Prince Napoleon, also held decided views upon the Roman question, which he imparted to the Ambassador in the hope that they would thus be brought before the Emperor.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._

Paris, Nov. 15, 1867.

I have had a long interview with Prince Napoleon this afternoon. He
does not desire that England should agree to the Conference. He
thinks that the best service England could render to the Emperor
would be to advise him to give up the idea of a Conference and
settle the matter with Italy, by satisfying, at least in a certain
measure, Italian aspirations. He declares that Italy will never be
quiet, and that the unity of Italy will never be assured until she
gets Rome for her capital. He believes that the Emperor's support of
the Pope is very unpopular with the great majority of the French
people, and that it will, if persevered in, be a serious danger to
the dynasty. He takes a gloomy view altogether of the state of
feeling in France, and thinks that the Emperor will not be able to
hold his own, unless he abandons the system of personal government
and gives a large increase of liberty. He wishes England to give
this advice to the Emperor.

He volunteered to say all this to me and entered into a great many
details. He spoke with great animation and remarkably well.

My share of the conversation was but small. I think the advice which
the Prince wishes us to give to the Emperor would be sound in
itself, but that it would produce no good effect, unless His Majesty
felt that he was in a strait, and asked our opinion. I am myself
very little inclined to thrust advice upon him out of season.

Prince Napoleon on this and, as will be seen, on subsequent occasions, showed that his judgment was remarkably correct, but it is not probable that his Imperial cousin benefited by his sage advice, for Lord Stanley agreed that it was undesirable that the British Government should become the channel of his opinions. Both he and the Ambassador, however, thoroughly realized that the Emperor had no fixed plan, and was merely following his usual hand-to-mouth policy of staving off present at the cost of future embarrassments.

Napoleon's vague and unpractical views were exposed in a conversation with Lord Lyons, which apparently took place in a crowded ball-room. Asked what was to be the basis of the Conference, he made the cryptic reply: '_Mon Dieu! la base est d'assimiler le pouvoir du Pape à l'Italie_,' which sounds like unadulterated nonsense; and when pressed to explain how an unpalatable decision was to be enforced upon a recalcitrant Pope, His Majesty was only able feebly to suggest 'moral influence.' Nevertheless, he showed no ill-feeling, and, with habitual good nature, addressed no reproaches to the Ambassador with regard to the unsympathetic attitude of Her Majesty's Government. In spite of many rebuffs and discouragements, the Emperor and his ministers continued to labour on behalf of their ill-starred project with an energy worthy of a better cause; but circumstances were eventually too strong for them. The real opponent all along had been Prussia, and the aim of the Prussian Government was to throw the blame on to England. The French were well aware of the fact, and did not consequently display ill-will towards us, and it seems to have been the speech of M. Rouher, already referred to, which made it clear that a Conference would be little better than a waste of time; for when the Italians asked for an explanation they were informed that M. Rouher's speech only asserted more emphatically what had been said before. Meanwhile the French troops continued to remain at Rome, although King Victor Emmanuel complained bitterly to Lord Clarendon of their presence and declared that, should they be withdrawn, he would undertake that there should be no aggressive action against the Pope. The erroneous impression which influenced French policy with regard to the Papacy was explained in a letter to Lord Lyons from that acute observer, Mr. Odo Russell,[12] who was the British representative at Rome at the time.

* * * * *

Rome, Dec. 10, 1867.

Cardinal Antonelli constantly talks of you with affection and
respect and often expresses his desire to see you again.

Many thanks for your letter of the 4th about a preliminary
conference. Rouher's speech, I take it, has put an end to all
that--at least so Cardinal Antonelli tells me--and the joy caused at
the Vatican that France will never allow Italy to hold Rome is
immense.

You are perfectly right in not thinking that the Court of Rome has
changed since you were here.

French diplomatists and statesmen are but too apt to interpret the
clear and precise language of the Court of Rome according to their
own wishes and to think and proclaim that the Pope will adopt and
follow the wise counsels of France, etc. etc.

Now I say, give the Pope his due, and at least give him credit for
being consistent, whether you agree with him or not.

In the long run, an Italian priest will always outwit a French
statesman, and no Frenchman can resist the influence of Rome. A
year's residence suffices to make him more Papal than the Pope, whom
he fondly believes to be a French institution under the immediate
control of the French clergy.

I have often marvelled at French notions of the Papacy, and now it
has grown the fashion to mistake the cause of the Pope for that of
France, even among men who might know better.

A permanent French occupation is the only possible machinery by
which the Temporal Power can be imposed on Italy. The national
feeling against the Temporal Power is certainly much stronger than I
myself thought in Italy, and the bitter hostility of the Romans has
been proved by the hideous means employed by them to destroy life
and property in the October conspiracy.

The accuracy of these views was sufficiently demonstrated in 1870.

Before the end of the year Prince Napoleon made another of his frequent appearances at the Embassy, and announced that he looked upon a war with Germany in the spring as certain. He considered that there were only two courses which could have been taken with prudence--the one to resist the aggrandizement of Prussia immediately after Sadowa--the other to accept it with favour; what had been done had merely caused so much irritation that France would eventually be forced into war. He denounced Thiers, who, while pretending to advocate peace, was always crying out that France was being wronged and humiliated, and thought that even a successful war would be full of danger to the Empire. Apparently his own policy was to unite with Italy against the Pope and establish liberal institutions in France, a course which the Emperor had now rendered it impossible to adopt, as he had committed himself to the Pope, and was not likely to play the part of a Constitutional monarch after eighteen years of absolute power. 'He speaks very well, and with a good deal of animation,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'and his opinions sound much better as he delivers them than they read as I write them.' But, making every allowance for exuberant verbosity, this Prince seems to have held much sounder and more definite opinions than his Imperial relative.

Not long after Prince Napoleon came the Foreign Minister, M. de Moustier, with his story.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._

Paris, Jan. 16, 1868.

M. de Moustier says that the reports he receives from Berlin and
other quarters confirm his impression that Prussia is averse to a
war with France; that the relations between Austria and Prussia are
improving, and that such being the case Prussia is awakening to a
sense of the danger of Russian designs in Eastern Europe. On the
other hand he says that Baron Brunnow gives the most positive
assurances that Russia will do nothing against Turkey. He trusts
that these assurances may be depended upon, but he thinks that the
Russian Government uses its ambassadors as screens, behind which to
carry on its own manoeuvres.

Nigra, the Italian Minister here, tells me that his last news from
Florence gives him strong hopes that the Menabrea Ministry will
maintain itself. I presume that the object of Italy should be to
convince the Emperor that Rome will be safe without the French
troops--I mean to make the Emperor himself really confident of it.
This done, I suppose diplomacy is capable of devising some formal
guarantees to satisfy the French public. I do not believe that
France has as yet done more than hinted at some security that Italy
will take her side, if she quarrels with Prussia. I do not know that
she has even hinted at anything of the kind. A demand for an
engagement of this sort would be unreasonable and probably futile.
If France is ever hard pressed by Prussia, the Italians will go to
Rome unless some other Powers step forward to bar the way. At all
events, it will not be by promises extracted beforehand that they
will be stopped.

The real danger to Europe appears however to be in the difficulties
of the Emperor Napoleon at home. The discontent is great and the
distress amongst the working classes severe. The great measure of
the session, the new Conscription Act, is very unpopular. There is
no glitter at home or abroad to divert public attention, and the
French have been a good many years without the excitement of a
change. I think that Europe, and England in particular, are more
interested in maintaining the Emperor, than in almost anything else.

The accuracy of this forecast, like that of Mr. Odo Russell, was also demonstrated in 1870, when, upon the retirement of the French garrison, the Italian troops marched into Rome, and the temporal power of the Pope came to an end. It is not, however, altogether fair to place the whole responsibility for the collapse of French policy in Italy upon Napoleon III., for whereas he was no doubt personally in favour of an united Italy; there was a strong party in France which was strongly opposed to it, and convinced that French interests lay in a divided country. The mention of Russia in the above letter makes the following remarkable communication not inappropriate.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._

Paris, Jan. 22, 1868.

The Emperor told me last night that his Ambassador at St. Petersburg
had had a curious conversation with the Emperor Alexander.

The Emperor Alexander had, he said, asked the Ambassador whether the
French Government were fully aware of the extent of the plot which
was actively carried on for the destruction of all the monarchical
governments in Europe, and the assassination of sovereigns and Royal
families. After giving some details His Majesty had suggested to
the Ambassador that the several Governments should communicate
information to each other and unite their efforts to defend
themselves.

The Emperor Napoleon proceeded to tell me that it was asserted that
the first and principal attempt was to be made in England; that the
palaces and public buildings were to be blown up, and the Queen and
Royal Family seized and put on board a steamer in the Thames and
'disposed of.' The Emperor Napoleon went on to say that the supposed
details of the scheme to overthrow the Government of England were of
course absurd, but he seemed to intend to suggest that we should be
vigilant, and that he himself would be glad to co-operate with us.
He said that Mazzini, who had let him alone for some time, had now
again taken up the idea of assassinating him, and was busily
employed in making plans for effecting their purpose. He told me
that Mazzini was very ill and he did not express any wish for his
recovery.

The Emperor talked to me a long time and related to me interesting
anecdotes, some very amusing, of the conduct of various persons
towards him in past times.

Cheap sensational magazines were not in existence in 1868, or one would be disposed to infer that the Emperor Alexander had been indulging in this species of literature, since it seems difficult otherwise to account for such credulity in high places. As for the Emperor Napoleon's anecdotes of his youth, they are unfortunately denied to the world, for the most distressing feature in Lord Lyons's correspondence is the almost complete absence of anything in the nature of indiscretions. The conversation, however, serves to show on what intimate terms he already stood with Napoleon III.

In the spring, letters received from Lord Stanley show that the British Government was feeling some uneasiness with regard to America, more especially in connection with the _Alabama_ question, and, as now was frequently the case, Lord Lyons's advice was requested on various points. As to the general policy which should be pursued, he reiterated his former opinion that the chief danger consisted in the belief of the ordinary American politician that England would submit to anything rather than fight. Neither party would wish to have the responsibility of actually making war with England, but each party would very much like to be able to boast of having made her yield without fighting, and would vie with each other in calling for unreasonable concessions if they thought there was any chance of obtaining them. The best chance, therefore, of keeping the peace was to be very firm and uncompromising in questions of arrests and other measures necessary for putting down Fenianism, as these were manifestly well grounded, and the rights of the same kind so frequently claimed and exercised by the Americans during the war had never been contested. In anything doubtful, we should be mild and conciliatory--not that mildness and conciliation would make much impression in America--but in order to satisfy a section of the British public. The present danger, he considered, lay in the over-conciliatory, over-yielding tone of a great number of English writers and public men, which might lead the Americans to fancy they would be quite safe in pushing us into a corner, and so bring about a state of things which would render a fight unavoidable. As for the _Alabama_ question, he urged that the more quietly the claims were discussed, the more satisfactory the result was likely to be, and he strongly advised that the discussion should take place in Europe rather than in the United States: it would be a mistake to send a _mission d'éclat_ to Washington, as such a mission would be taken as a surrender at discretion. Whether the mission of Lord Ripon and his colleagues to Washington three years later could be correctly described as a _mission d'éclat_ or not is of little importance, but it certainty ended in surrender.

The letters from Paris about this period abound in misgivings as to the political situation in France. The conviction was becoming general that the Bonaparte dynasty was too weak to stand any shock. The Emperor, it was true, began to show indications of proceeding gradually towards Parliamentary government, in the hope of founding a state of things which might render the position tenable on his death for his son, but it seemed more probable that the progress might be too slow for the object. Towards the end of February some apprehension was created by a circumstantial rumour that the Emperor had announced positively to Russia that France would not allow the annexation of the Grand Duchy of Baden to the North German Confederation, and a month later a vague fear was felt of the imminence of a _coup de théâtre_.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._

Paris, March 27, 1868.

I ought to say that there are, among not unreasonable or
inexperienced people, vague apprehensions that the Emperor may,
_more suo_, resort to a _coup de théâtre_ and declare war when it is
least expected. The only act which can be cited in support of these
apprehensions is the formation of two more camps of instruction this
year than usual. It is said that the effect of this will be to have
two additional army corps ready to take the field at short notice.
But the real ground of the apprehension appears to be a resemblance
real or fancied between the declaration and proceedings of the
Emperor now, and those which preceded the war with Italy. I believe
it to be true that Prince Napoleon has told the Emperor that war
with Germany must be made this year or never, but I do not think the
Prince advises the war being made at all. The general impression
indeed here appears to be that there is at this moment an amount of
discontent in the annexed provinces which might be turned to account
now by France, but which will subside in a year's time, if the
Prussian Government is left to carry into effect its plans. Southern
Germany, it is thought, would go with France _after_ a French
victory, but not without one. For my own part I am more inclined to
believe that the Emperor is sincerely anxious to preserve peace. In
case of war he must take the field in person, and it is much doubted
whether he is willing or able to endure the mental and bodily
fatigue of a campaign. Defeat would be fatal and anything short of
great success and additions of territory far from advantageous. It
is of course impossible to say what a man so reserved and really so
little in the habit of making up his mind long beforehand, may or
may not do, and therefore the possibility of a _coup de théâtre_
must I suppose always be kept in one's mind. Still I must say that
all I can make out leads me to believe that his present wishes and
intentions are peaceful.

A good deal of interest had been aroused by a visit of Prince Napoleon to Germany in the spring, which gave rise to much speculation in the political world. His friends gave out that it was merely an ordinary tour. Others, who were supposed to be well informed, declared (probably much to the satisfaction of the Prince) that he had been sent on a private mission from the Emperor, of which none of His Majesty's Ministers had any cognizance. Two different objects were assigned to the mission; one that he was commissioned to assure Bismarck of the Emperor's determination to remain at peace if possible, but to represent that Bismarck should act so as to make it easy, and should not use the presumed hostility of France so frequently as a lever to move public opinion in Germany. The other and less probable object with which he was credited, was that he was to summon Prussia to join France against Russia in Turkey, a fantastic absurdity which was directly contrary to Moustier's policy in the East. The probability is that Prince Napoleon had no mission at all, but the long letter which follows is interesting as showing what correct conclusions an intelligent person can occasionally draw from a well-timed visit to a foreign country.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._

Paris, March 31, 1868.

Although I have not seen Prince Napoleon myself since his return
from Germany, I think I can give you a tolerably accurate notion of
the language he holds.

He speaks with satisfaction of the manner in which he was himself
received at Berlin. He thinks that Count Bismarck will not provoke
France to war by increasing at present the area of the North German
Confederation, or any other overt act. He believes him to be
sincerely desirous of avoiding a war, but not to be willing to allow
any interference on the part of France in the affairs of Northern
Germany, or to make any patent concession whatever to France. He
conceived it to be vain to talk to Prussia of disarmament, as she
would answer that she was already disarmed, having only 200,000 men
under arms. Her system, which would enable her to put from 4 to
600,000 men in a condition to take the field in eight or ten days,
she could not be persuaded to change.

The Prince has seen nothing, except in the United States, like
the contempt in which foreign nations are held in Prussia. Austria
is not considered to be worth taking into account at all. Great
indifference is professed as to Italy and Turkey. The Prince does
not believe that there is any formal treaty between Russia and
Prussia, but is convinced that there is an understanding that, in
return for a friendly neutrality in the West, Prussia is, in case of
being at war with France, to give Russia free scope in the East.

The Prince gives no weight to the assertions that the recently
annexed provinces would see with pleasure an attack by France upon
Prussia and use it to recover their independence. He is not blind to
the discontent which prevails among a great part of the populations
in those provinces, but he is convinced that an attack from abroad
would rouse an almost universal spirit of resistance in Germany
which would extend even to the German possession of Austria. The
allegations to the contrary come from adherents of the dispossessed
dynasties, who fancy that their own peculiar feelings are the
feelings of the mass of their countrymen. The Saxon army might
possibly be a danger to the Prussians, if the Prussians should be
defeated, and in that event, Bavaria and Wurtemberg might also
support France. But they would none of them do anything for France
until she had gained so decided a victory as to have no need of
them. In Saxony the Prince found the army to be ill-disposed to
Prussia, but not the commercial classes.

The Prince has not come back with the idea that France could easily
attempt to annex Rhenish Prussia. He believes that the inhabitants
are now prosperous and contented and better off than they would be
under France with her present institutions. Cologne might turn out
to be another Saragossa to France. The case might in his opinion be
different in the Palatinate, and France would, he supposes, have
little difficulty in 'assimilating' Belgium if she obtained
possession of that country.

So far the impressions brought back by the Prince are calculated to
show that the policy of France should be to remain at peace, and his
language to the Emperor may have had a good effect. But he has also
said to the Emperor and others that a war with Prussia should be
made this year or never; that the consolidation of Germany is
proceeding surely and rapidly; that the adhesion of Southern Germany
will soon follow, and that hereafter war would have to be waged with
a Germany thoroughly united and perfectly organized.

Prince Napoleon is himself opposed to war. He considers that an
unsuccessful war would overthrow the Emperor and his dynasty and
send the whole Bonaparte family to the right about. A war only
partially successful would, he thinks, rather weaken than strengthen
the Emperor at home, while a thoroughly successful war would simply
give His Majesty a fresh lease of 'Cæsarism' and adjourn
indefinitely the liberal institutions which he considers essential
to the durability of the dynasty. At the same time the Prince is not
without apprehension as to war being made this season. He fears weak
men, and he looks upon the Emperor as a weak man. He fears the
people who surround His Majesty, the Generals, the Chamberlains, the
ladies of the Palace. It has been particularly observed that while
the Prince has been very communicative as to the opinions expressed
by him to the Emperor, he has been, contrary to his wont, wholly
silent as to what the Emperor said to him.

This account of Prince Napoleon's views was derived from Colonel Claremont, the British Military Attaché, who was on intimate terms with him. Prince Napoleon, one of the best abused and most unpopular of Frenchmen, had, with all his talents, little fixity of purpose, no real perseverance, and was too much wanting in courage to become the head of a party; but the insight which he displayed with regard to the real situation between France and Prussia is really remarkable. There is hardly a single opinion, in the letter quoted above, which was not shown subsequently to be absolutely accurate and well founded, and one cannot help suspecting that he afterwards must have derived some melancholy consolation from the realization of his prophecies of evil.

LONDON EDWARD ARNOLD]

The general uneasiness which was felt in France, and to which constant allusion is made in private letters and in despatches, was in no way allayed by the pacific declarations of the Emperor, which seem, indeed, to have made an effect exactly contrary to what was intended. It was in vain that ministers made reassuring statements; bankers and capitalists had lost confidence in the maintenance of peace, and, although the diplomatic world was quiet, the public was convinced that war was imminent. The one thing that was certain was that France was preparing for a war of some kind, and the suspicions of Lord Stanley were aroused by a request from Moustier that Her Majesty's Government should 'give advice' to the Prussian Government.

* * * * *

_Lord Stanley to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, April 14, 1868.

You will receive from me to-day a despatch which seems to confirm in
some degree the apprehensions so generally felt at Paris. It may
mean less than it appears to imply, but a warning given at Berlin
that any attempt or any measure tending towards the annexation of
the South German states will be regarded unfavourably at Paris,
is so like a threat that one cannot help feeling anxious as to the
result, and how it can be conveyed in language which will not be
considered offensive, passes my comprehension. If nothing else had
occurred, one might think that it was only a piece of unnecessary
fuss on the part of Moustier, whose alternations of activity and
indolence are not always easy to follow; but looked at together with
the military preparations which have so much alarmed Colonel
Claremont and which you do not seem to contemplate without some
uneasiness, the state of things indicated is certainly not pleasant.
Perhaps I make too much of this: up to the present time I have
always contended against the alarmist view of the situation, and
Bernstorff,[13] whose information is generally good, shows no
anxiety. It is the business of war departments in all countries to
look at foreign policy from their special point of view, and I class
the utterances of General Moltke with those of Marshal Niel, as
professorial rather than political.

In any case I am not disposed to volunteer advice which would
certainly be uncalled for, probably useless, and perhaps altogether
out of place. Nor can I fail to detect in Moustier's language a
wish, hardly concealed, to enlist England on the side of the French
claim that Prussia shall not be enlarged--though it is disguised
under the form of asking us to give advice in the interests of
peace.

* * * * *

There can be no doubt that Lord Stanley was right, and that Moustier's intention was to commit England to the French side under the guise of a friendly communication to the Prussian Government. The refusal to be drawn into Franco-Prussian entanglement was sound, but, as will be seen, the British Government did attempt to intervene shortly afterwards.

In spite of highly coloured orations by Marshal Niel, and of an important speech by General Moltke on the position which Germany should hold as a predominant power in Europe, and of the use to be made of the army and navy in consolidating German unity, which caused much irritation in France, the fear of the outbreak of war passed temporarily away, and calm again reigned in the diplomatic world. In August, Lord Cowley, former ambassador at Paris, paid a visit to the Emperor Napoleon at Fontainebleau, and found him in a very depressed mood.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._

Paris, Aug. 11, 1868.

Lord Cowley wrote me a short note after his return from
Fontainebleau and sent me an account of what had been said there.

He appears to have thought the Emperor aged, and to have found him
much depressed. His Majesty said little of Foreign Politics, but
spoke gloomily of his own position in France. He said that the
country districts were still for him, but that all the towns were
against him: a vast number of persons had congregated at Troyes to
see him, but he had been assured by the Prefect that most of them
were in reality red Republicans. The Emperor does not seem to have
said anything about the Queen. The Empress held the same language
that she and her entourage did to us, but from an expression she let
fall, it would seem that she is sore at heart about the visit. The
public appear to be rather accepting the version that it was in
compliance with a request from the Empress, that Her Majesty, being
ill and fatigued, abstained from returning the visit.

It is not certain whether the Emperor and Empress will be at
Biarritz or at St. Cloud at the time of Her Majesty's return. If
they are at Biarritz there can be no question of any visit, and this
might give an opportunity for a letter, which might smooth the
difficulties of the point of etiquette. If the Emperor and Empress
are at St. Cloud, it must be considered the same thing as if they
were at Paris.

I hear from other persons besides Lord Cowley that the Emperor is
very much out of spirits. It is even asserted that he is weary of
the whole thing, disappointed at the contrast between the brilliancy
at the beginning of his reign and the present gloom--and inclined,
if it were possible, to retire into private life. This is no doubt a
great exaggeration, but if he is really feeling unequal to governing
with energy, the dynasty and the country are in great danger.
Probably the wisest thing he could do, would be to allow real
parliamentary government to be established, so as to give the
opposition a hope of coming into office by less violent means than
a revolution.

The 'soreness of heart' referred to a visit of Queen Victoria, who had passed through Paris in July on her way to Switzerland. It had been arranged, after prodigious correspondence, that the Empress should come up to the Elysée Palace and call upon the Queen at the Embassy (the Elysée having been selected on account of its proximity), but apparently nothing was settled about a return visit on the part of the Queen. At all events, no return visit was paid to the Elysée, and the consequence was that a section of the French press seized upon the occasion maliciously to represent that the Emperor and Empress were no longer treated with consideration by the ancient Royal Houses, and that England was all in favour of the pretensions of the House of Orleans.

These attacks naturally caused much annoyance to the Emperor, who was always very sensitive where the Orleans family was concerned, and he was placed in a somewhat embarrassing position with regard to the return journey of Queen Victoria through Paris, since, owing to the visit of the Empress not having been returned, he was unable to pay his respects as he had been anxious to do. The difficulty was eventually solved by the Emperor and Empress arranging to go to Biarritz at the time when the Queen was expected to pass through Paris on the return journey, and an explanatory letter from the latter was considered to have closed the matter satisfactorily. If any trace of soreness remained it was doubtless removed by the highly successful visit of the Prince and Princess of Wales later in the year.

The Imperial spirits, which were much in need of a tonic, were temporarily revived by the demonstrations of loyalty shown by the National Guards at a review held in August, and this evidence of personal popularity appears to have surprised most people. It may be presumed, however, that the unfortunate Emperor was frequently misled on these occasions. Astonishment and admiration had frequently been evoked at the spectacle of the autocrat shaking hands freely with blouse-clad working men and exchanging fraternal greetings with them on the occasion of public festivities, but, according to the Prefect of Police, these favoured individuals were in every case his own detectives masquerading as horny-handed sons of toil.

Two questions of secondary importance about this period were brought to the attention of the British Government, the one concerning Tunis, and the other the Throne of Spain. In Tunis the French showed an unmistakable intention to establish themselves as the paramount power, and it was not clear whether England would remain indifferent or not. Lord Stanley, upon being asked for instructions, gave it as his personal opinion that there was no occasion to show any jealousy of French influence there, and that the position of the French as near neighbours gave them a strong interest. He declined to believe in annexation, as Algeria had not been such a success that any government would be likely to desire to extend the French dominions in North Africa. The French Government therefore obtained, as far as we were concerned, a free hand, and although Bismarck intimated that the claims of Prussia in Tunis would have to be considered, it is probable that had it not been for the Franco-German War, that country would have become a French possession in 1870 instead of in 1880.

With regard to Spain, it is worthy of note that the Spanish Government was in 1868 desirous of offering the throne to the Duke of Edinburgh. Both Queen Victoria and her ministers, however, were strongly opposed to the project, and their opposition was founded on good sense. The throne, they considered, was insecure. New dynasties took root with difficulty, more especially in Spain, where respect for foreigners was not a national characteristic, and it would be disagreeable for England to have an English prince, however detached from England, involved in a civil war, and possibly ejected. Again, even if the experiment were successful, it would confer no real advantage on England, while it would probably excite extreme jealousy in France. Further, we should probably be asked to give up Gibraltar in return, and if this were refused, which of course would be the case, there would be a complaint, if not of absolute unfairness, yet at least of ingratitude on our part. If any form of monarchy was to be retained, the opinion was expressed that the cause of religious freedom would be better served by a moderate Catholic on the throne than by a Protestant.

Such were the matter-of-fact views of Her Majesty's Government as expressed by Lord Stanley, and nothing more was heard of the proposed candidature of the Duke of Edinburgh. The straightforward action of the British Government on this occasion contrasts favourably with that of other Powers when the question of the choice of a King of Spain recurred two years later.

In October, Lord Clarendon, who had been Lord Stanley's predecessor at the Foreign Office, arrived in Paris. Lord Clarendon, in addition to a thorough acquaintance with foreign political questions, enjoyed apparently the great advantage of being a _persona grata_ to all the principal personages in Europe, and was honoured with the confidence of Napoleon III., the King of Prussia, King Victor Emmanuel, the Pope, and a host of other persons occupying high and responsible positions. As the Liberal party was at that time in opposition, he bore no responsibility, and it was therefore possible for him to use language and arguments which might not have been appropriate to any one speaking officially on behalf of a government. The valuable and interesting information which Lord Clarendon thus obtained was, in accordance with the high principles upon which he acted, placed unreservedly at the disposition of his political opponents.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._

Paris, Oct. 13, 1868.

Lord Clarendon arrived here on Saturday. He has given me accounts of
interesting conversations he has had with the King and Queen of
Prussia and with General Moltke. The details he will no doubt repeat
to you when you see him. The sum of what was said by all three is
that Prussia earnestly desires to keep at peace with France; that
she will be very careful not to give offence and very slow to take
offence: that if a war is brought on she will act so as to make it
manifest to Germany and to Europe that France is the unprovoked
aggressor: that a war brought on evidently by France would infallibly
unite all Germany. Moltke seemed to believe that the Emperor
Napoleon must know too well how thoroughly prepared Prussia is to
provoke a war lightly. He was, on his side, well aware of the
complete state of preparation in which the French were: he thought
Prussia had lost an opportunity after Sadowa, and that if she had
then known that France could not bring more than 150,000 men into
the field, she might have settled the whole affair of German unity
out of hand. This opportunity had been lost, according to him, by
the incorrectness of the information from the Embassy at Paris, and
now Prussia must have peace if possible in order to organize her
system of government civil and military.

In short, Lord Clarendon is sure that the Emperor Napoleon may be
confident that he has nothing to fear from Prussia, if he does not
give her just provocation: but, on the other hand, that Prussia does
not fear a war, if she can show Germany and the world that she is
really forced into it.

I think I might very well mention to Moustier the impression Lord
Clarendon has brought back, and indeed to the Emperor, if I have an
opportunity.

Lord Clarendon gathered from Moltke and others that there is a very
strong feeling in the Prussian army against Russia and a very great
repugnance to accepting Russian assistance. In case however of a war
with France, Prussia must of course (Moltke observed) get help
wherever she could find it, and must at all events use Russia to
paralyze Austria. Austria he thought hostile, and very naturally so,
to Prussia, and ready to do all the harm she can. She is not
however, in his opinion, in a condition to be otherwise than neutral
at the beginning of a war.

Lord Clarendon tells me he most forcibly pointed out to the King of
Prussia and Moltke the extreme danger of giving France any
provocation; anything like a challenge could not be passed over by
the Emperor: if the glove were thrown down, public feeling would
oblige His Majesty to take it up. Lord Clarendon urged them to
settle the Danish question, and even suggested that some way should
be sought of giving a satisfaction to French _amour propre_.

It will be seen that the information obtained by Lord Clarendon
coincided more or less with the impressions derived by Prince
Napoleon. Upon Lord Stanley it produced a reassuring effect, and
confirmed him in his opinion that the Prussians were in a state of
alarm which they were endeavouring unsuccessfully to conceal, under
an ostentation of being ready for whatever might happen. In any
case, he thought, they would have a respite until the spring.

Lord Clarendon was fortunate enough to be able to give the Emperor
Napoleon the benefit of his Prussian experiences.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._

Paris, Oct. 20, 1868.

Lord Clarendon dined at St. Cloud yesterday, and had a long
conversation with the Emperor after dinner. He repeated to His
Majesty the pacific language which he had heard from the King of
Prussia, the Queen of Prussia, and General Moltke. The Emperor heard
the pacific assurances with evident satisfaction, and spoke very
strongly himself in the same sense. Lord Clarendon was thoroughly
convinced that the Emperor was exceedingly anxious to avoid war and
thoroughly convinced that peace was desirable for the interests of
the dynasty. At the same time, His Majesty declared that if anything
like a challenge came from Prussia it would be impossible for him to
oppose the feeling of the army and the nation, and that he must, in
such a case, for the sake of his own safety, make war. He was most
anxious that England should step in to enable France and Prussia to
withdraw with honour from their present antagonistic attitude. This
is an idea which, as you know, has been vaguely suggested to me more
than once by men more or less in the Emperor's confidence. It has
never been hinted by Moustier in speaking to me. The Emperor
appears, however, to have dwelt a good deal upon it with Lord
Clarendon yesterday, and even to have entered a little upon details.
He seems to have relished the idea of other great powers being
united with England in a sort of mediation, but I did not gather
that he had any matured plan, or any distinct notion of the way in
which practical effect could be given to his wishes. His object was
to calm public opinion in France, and the means of doing this were
to be a sort of collective confirmation by Europe of the Treaty of
Prague, and a sort of pressure to be exercised by Europe on France
and Prussia which would compel them, or rather enable them, to
diminish their military preparations and take effectual steps to
restore public confidence. Whatever may be the feasibility of the
Emperor's project, it is important to know what is in his mind, and
convenient to learn it with so much certainty, and at the same time
in a way which prevents its being presented to H.M. Government as a
proposal or a suggestion to them. There is nothing as the matter
stands which necessitates even an expression of opinion from us.

The Emperor told Clarendon in strict confidence of a proposal which
he had not, he said, mentioned even to his Ministers. Men of weight
(_des hommes sérieux_) had proposed a Confederation between the
South German States and Switzerland. Lord Clarendon pointed out
objections to the notion, such as the want of any real bond of
sympathy or interest between Switzerland and the proposed
confederates, and the offence which would be taken by Prussia, and
the Emperor appeared (for the moment, at least) to have given up the
idea.

The King of Prussia told Lord Clarendon, and Lord Clarendon repeated
it to the Emperor, that the speech at Kiel was intended to be
thoroughly pacific, and that its object was to make the Prussian
army and the public take quietly the anti-Prussian cries stated to
have been uttered by the French troops at the camp at Chalons. The
Emperor positively declared that no anti-Prussian cries and no
political cries of any kind beyond the usual loyal cheers had been
uttered at the camp.

Of Spanish affairs little seems to have been said in the
conversation with the Emperor. At dinner the Empress talked of
little else. She did not appear to favour any particular solution of
the question or any particular candidate for the Crown. She appeared
to expect both political troubles and extreme misery from the famine
which she says is undoubtedly impending. As to her own estates and
those of her relations in Spain she says they return absolutely
nothing, and that the peasants have not even put by grain enough to
sow the land. No one dares to store up grain or to bring it from
abroad lest he should be torn to pieces by the ignorant people as an
_accapareur_.