Chapter VIII: The Franco-German War (1)

(1870)

Whilst the barren disarmament negotiations were proceeding, the internal political situation in France had not improved. Though calm on the surface, a section of the people was becoming more socialistic, and socialism produced stagnation in business, a desire on the part of the lower classes for revolution and a corresponding desire on the part of the middle classes for a strong government again. Ministers were uneasy, for although the new Constitution had been well received by the country at large, its weak point lay in the right reserved by the Emperor of appealing to the people, a right which nothing could induce him to abandon, and which he was about to exercise by submitting the recent Constitutional changes to a plébiscite. Theoretically, this should have afforded gratification to the Republicans, as being in conformity with their view that the public should decide everything directly itself, but they were in reality well aware that the French people were not yet Republican in sentiment.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._

Paris, April 5, 1870.

There is a good deal of uneasiness in the French political world.
The great thing for the moment is that the Ministers should get a
good majority in the Chamber at the end of the debate on the new
Constitution which is now going on. They are afraid that some of
their usual supporters will abstain from voting. The 'Appeal to the
People' is so thoroughly Napoleonic an idea, and so completely in
accordance with the peculiar character and modes of thinking of
Napoleon III., that it would be very hard to make him give it up.
One cannot wonder at people's being distrustful of the use he may
make of it. The submitting the present changes in the Constitution
to a plébiscite is certainly legally necessary and admitted to be so
by all parties. What people are afraid of is that the Emperor will
insist upon calling for it in a Proclamation so worded as to make
the acceptance by the people a vote in favour of his person, as
against the Chambers and Ministers.

You will see from Claremont's report that the Government has agreed
to reduce the military contingent by another 10,000 men, making it
80,000 instead of 90,000 as the present Government proposed, and
instead of 100,000, as it was fixed by the late Government.

It was not surprising that the French Ministers, as well as many other people, should feel suspicious about the plébiscite, and that frequent councils should have taken place at the Tuileries with the object of inducing the Emperor to consent that in future no plébiscite should be submitted to the people unless it had first been voted by the two Chambers. For one thing, it was feared that few people would care enough about it to take much trouble to vote, and it really did not seem very probable that a peasant would take a long walk to express his opinion on the question of whether the Senate should have the power of originating certain laws. Therefore the Ministerial crisis which arose, and the Emperor's determination not to yield about the Appeal to the People, were attributed to a Machiavellian plot on his part, and it was believed that the return to personal government was to be brought about by getting rid of the independent Ministers, Ollivier included. The belief was possibly unfounded, but the Emperor's previous history had not inspired his people with implicit confidence in him, and they were always convinced that he had an incurable taste for conspiracy.

* * * * *

_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, April 13, 1870.

It is impossible not to feel very uneasy about the present state of
things in France and the sort of _locus standi_ that the enemies of
the Empire have obtained for suspecting the Emperor, who will be a
long time in recovering, if he ever does, the public confidence he
now seems to have lost. Revolutions are not made with half measures,
any more than with the proverbial rose water, and among the ships
that the Emperor was supposed to have burnt behind him when he
landed on the Constitutional shore, the plébiscite ought surely to
have been included. No doubt he would have divested himself of a
favourite weapon, but he should have foreseen the very serious
objections to it that would arise in the mind of the most moderate
friend of Constitutional Government, and he would have done far
better for himself to have given it up and taken his chance, for
with or without plébiscite, that is what he is now reduced to, and
his chances will be improved by endeavouring with sincerity to guide
the stream rather than oppose himself to it.

As the result of the crisis, both Daru and Buffet left the Ministry, thus weakening the Cabinet and diminishing materially the chance of a quiet and satisfactory establishment of Parliamentary Government. Thiers was generally supposed to have been the principal mischief-maker. Lord Russell was at this time in Paris, and in conversation with Ollivier the latter expressed himself most confidently about the plébiscite, and thought that if six million people voted it might be looked upon as a decided success. Another opinion on the plébiscite was volunteered by Mr. Gladstone. 'If the Emperor is really stickling for the right to refer when he pleases to the people for an Aye or No upon a proposition which he is to frame, that, in my opinion, reduces Constitutional Government to an absolute mockery, just as it would reduce to a shadow the power of a Legislative Assembly.'

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._

Paris, April 21, 1870.

The prospects of the quiet establishment of Constitutional
Government are in some respects better and in some worse. They are
better inasmuch as men of property, bankers, and others, are giving
money and exerting themselves to obtain a decided success for the
Plébiscite. They are worse, inasmuch as the suspicion of the
Emperor's intentions appears to increase, and people become more and
more afraid that if he gets a really large majority on the
Plébiscite, he will revert to personal government. The imprudent
language of the Right and their undisguised avowal of their hopes
produce this feeling. The Emperor himself has neither said nor done
anything to warrant it.

Ollivier asked me what progress had been made in the disarmament
question. I made him understand, without going into details, that it
must be let sleep for the present, and he agreed immediately.

There is a hitch about the English evidence before the Parliamentary
Committee on the Régime Parlementaire. The Committee have proposed
that only one English witness shall be heard. Emile Ollivier will do
his best to put things straight. I told him that if a proper and
courteous answer was made to our tender of evidence, I would
undertake that we would not abuse their civility by asking for too
much of their time.

Emile Ollivier dines with me to-day, and will, I hope, learn and
profit by Lord Russell's instruction in Constitutional Government.

English manufacturers were naturally desirous of putting their case before the Parliamentary Committee on the Commercial Treaty, but the members of the Committee did not appear equally desirous of hearing them. According to Lord Lyons, who, like all his official contemporaries, was in principle a Free Trader, and felt compassion for the misguided economics of continental nations, the majority of the Committee were infected by a politico-economical heresy which took the form of demanding that any advantages which foreign manufacturers might enjoy, should be balanced by import duties, which they persisted in calling 'compensation.' His advice was that any English witnesses who might be called, should confine themselves very closely to facts and not allow themselves to be led into discussions on trade principles, 'as it is not easy to reply in French to a Committee, of which the anti-Free Trade members are much hotter than the Free Traders.'

As the date of the plébiscite drew near, Ollivier's confidence and satisfaction continued to increase, but some discomposure was caused by the hostile action of Thiers and his friends. No one had ever expected that Thiers would long endure that any Government of which he was not a member should go on smoothly, and in the present instance, he was able to establish a plausible case by protesting that the Emperor, in reserving the right to appeal to the people, was nullifying liberal institutions. At an opportune moment, however, a plot against the Emperor's life was discovered, in which a man named Beaury was concerned, and although of small importance, it was considered likely to produce a considerable effect upon public opinion.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._

Paris, May 6, 1870.

I thought Emile Ollivier rather out of spirits yesterday, or at all
events not so confident as he is usually. He seemed to hope the
publication of the details of the plot would produce a great effect
and increase the 'Ayes' for the Plébiscite. That there really was a
plot is certain, but it may be doubted whether the conspirators were
numerous enough, or were men of sufficient note, to make the danger
so great as to frighten the voters. I am not surprised at La
Valette's being out of spirits, for the situation is really very
critical, and it is difficult to conceive any ending which will
place him and Rouher where they were again.

With reference to Loftus's despatch, I sincerely hope that his most
confidential correspondent is not so well informed as he represents
himself to be, and that no change is really contemplated in the
_status quo_ of Hesse and Baden. It would be quite a mistake to
suppose that this is a moment at which it would be safe to defy
France. On the contrary, a war unmistakably provoked by Prussia,
would be hailed by many as a welcome diversion from internal
difficulties. So far as I can judge, _Ollivier is not the man to
shrink from one_. There is more security against a sudden surprise
than there was under the personal government, but there is also less
probability that the Emperor's health and personal views will
prevent war.

The plébiscite took place on May 8, and an ecstatic note from Ollivier announced success.

* * * * *

_M. E. Ollivier to Lord Lyons._

Paris le 9 mai, 1870.

La Victoire est complète!

A Paris nous avons gagné cent mille voix, et jusqu'à présent voici
les resultats.

Oui 6.189.506
Non 1.305.881

manquent 37 arrondissements, l'armée, la marine, l'Algérie.

The complete returns showed that about 7,250,000 voted 'Yes,' and 1,500,000 'No.' The Minister was thus justified in his satisfaction. Nearly all the big towns, including Paris, had voted against the Government, as had been expected, but on the other hand the agricultural population had showed itself to be practically unanimous in favour of the Empire. One of the disquieting surprises was provided by the Army, no less than 50,000 votes being recorded against the Emperor. Riots, as usual, broke out in Paris after the voting was over, but were suppressed without difficulty. In connection with these riots an ingenious but discreditable device, was resorted to for the purpose of seducing the soldiers in the Prince Eugène Barracks, these having been supplied by the Republicans with _bons_ (orders for free admission) on the neighbouring houses of ill-fame, on the presumption that the holders of these orders would feel peculiarly aggrieved at being confined to barracks.

The general impression created was that a large majority was safer than a moderate one would have been, and much safer than a very small one. This was the view entertained by Lord Clarendon, who had always considered the plébiscite to be a great mistake, but was now anxious to make the best of it, and instructed the Ambassador to congratulate Ollivier and to express the hope that he would be able to surround himself with Liberal Ministers determined to keep order. An Empire based upon soldiers and peasants could not be said to be placed on a solid foundation, and no effort should be spared to enlarge the basis.

The Imperial success at the plébiscite produced a sycophantic outburst amongst the diplomatists at Paris, and a movement was promoted by the Nuncio and Prince Metternich, the Austrian Ambassador, with the object of asking for an audience, and offering the collective congratulations of the Diplomatic Corps to the Emperor. The ineptitude of the proposal was evident.

* * * * *

_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, May 12, 1870.

I wish the flunkeyism of the Nuncio and Metternich was displayed in
some other way than congratulating the Emperor on the success of his
foolish Plébiscite. It is an improper interference in the internal
affairs of France, which, if allowed, would justify a remonstrance
of the Diplomatic Corps against some measure they disapproved; but,
of course, we can neither oppose nor abstain, and it will be well
for you to join cordially. But I hope there will be no expression of
opinion in favour of the Plébiscite, or recognition of it as a
component part of Constitutional Government. We should be justly
condemned if we joined however indirectly in any such opinion. I
asked La Valette this morning whether such congratulations would be
agreeable to the Emperor, and he answered, with a shrug of the
shoulders: 'Il a le gout des compliments.'

Upon further consideration Lord Clarendon decided that it would be unwise if the British representative took any part in the proposed joint congratulation, as it was foreseen that it might provoke awkward discussions in the House of Commons. Lord Lyons was therefore directed to inform Ollivier at once, that, much as the British Government sympathized with the Emperor and his dynasty, no worse service could be done to him than by offering compliments upon his success. He would at once be attacked for having invited or rather tolerated intervention in the internal affairs of France, and the Queen of England, in an analogous case, could not possibly accept such an address from foreigners as that would imply a sort of right to interfere which might prove extremely inconvenient. The Emperor would gain much more with the nation by courteously declining to receive foreign opinions upon his own acts and the domestic affairs of France, than by any assurance that Foreign Governments were united in approving a measure about which there existed a considerable difference of opinion in France. These views were to be communicated to Ollivier in a friendly manner with the assurance that they should be brought to the Emperor's notice.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._

Paris, May 19, 1870.

I think we are well out of the scrape of the collective
congratulations. The notion was Metternich's and the Nuncio only
came into it to a certain degree, lest his refusing to do so should
give offence. So far as I know, the Nuncio has behaved very well,
and has not brought _us_ forward, but has simply told Metternich
that he found the Diplomatic Corps generally cold on the subject,
and therefore thought it better not to go on with it. Metternich
appears to have acquiesced. I have not seen him; he was out when I
called, which was, I think, lucky; and we have not met.

There is a Ball at the Tuileries on Monday, at which I shall
probably have a chance of saying something pleasant to Cæsar. I
shall be careful to keep within the terms sanctioned by Mr.
Gladstone. We may at any rate rejoice at the establishment of
Parliamentary Government in France, and hope, till we have evidence
to the contrary, that the means provided for upsetting it will not
be resorted to. The present Plébiscite was undoubtedly technically
necessary to the legality of the new Constitution, and as such was
insisted upon by Daru and other Liberals. Let us hope it will be the
last.

I have received the usual invitation in the name of the Emperor to
the function on Saturday evening. I must not leave the Embassy in
darkness if everybody else illuminates, but I think the idea a
foolish one, as being likely to give rise to street riots.

Two of the new Ministers are unknown to fame, but their appointment
is a relief to those who apprehended appointments from the Right.
There is no remarkable speaker in the Ministry except Ollivier
himself.

Gramont called upon me yesterday and was profuse in expressions of
friendship to England, to you, and to me.

The appointment, however, of the Duc de Gramont[17] could hardly have been in the nature of a relief, for, as far back as the beginning of 1868, when Ambassador at Vienna, he had announced that he considered a Franco-Prussian war unavoidable.

The formal announcement of the result of the plébiscite was made to the Emperor on May 21, in the Salle des États of the Louvre, and must have been one of the last, if not the very last, of the brilliant ceremonies which marked the reign of Napoleon III. It was attended by all the dignitaries of the realm, the Senators, the deputies, the civic functionaries, the Diplomatic Corps; an imposing array of troops filled the Place du Carrousel; and Cæsar himself, elevated upon a dais, replied to the congratulations offered to him by the Chambers in a speech full of those resounding and occasionally meaningless phrases which invariably meet with a responsive echo in an assembly of Frenchmen. It was, in fact, the final coruscation of the Imperial fireworks, and, in the prosaic words of Lord Lyons, 'the ceremony went off extremely well.'

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._

May 24, 1870.

I made a little speech to the Emperor about the Plébiscite at the
ball last night. I did not in fact go as far as Mr. Gladstone
allowed, but what I did say appeared to be to His Majesty's taste.
At all events he was extremely gracious and cordial. I don't know
that any one except the Prussian Ambassador has asked for a special
audience to deliver congratulations, but I have not made inquiries,
because I neither wished to put it into my colleagues' heads to do
so, nor to appear as if it seemed to me the natural thing to do. All
seems to be quite right with the Emperor and Empress, so far as H.M.
Government, and you in particular, and I am concerned. He has been a
good deal annoyed and disappointed by the tone of the English press.
After all, he has established a Constitutional form of Government,
more democratic than that which exists in England, and the worst way
to encourage him to persevere is to assume at once that he does not
mean to do so. Selfishly, we ought to remember that his influence in
the Government is the principal security we can have for _Free Trade
and cordiality between the two countries_.

What the Emperor will really do depends on the course of events. I
believe nothing of the stories of his having deep-laid schemes. It
is a pity that he has not stronger men in the Cabinet--men strong
enough to resist him in case of need--and to direct the Chamber. A
dissolution is hardly to be thought of at present. The people at
large would not stand being disturbed to vote again soon, and
consequently the votes would be few, and principally Republican.
There is danger in the influence of the Emperor's old political
friends, who want to regain their old position, and in some of the
influential military men who want a war for promotion and glory. And
there is danger in the position in which the Plébiscite has placed
him--owing mainly to the Republicans, who, much more than he is, are
to blame for making it a question between him personally and them.
The function of the 21st went off very well; indeed, wonderfully
well, considering how great a part of the audience was composed of
Senators and Councillors of State who have lost in importance by the
Constitutional change.

The excitement attending the plébiscite gave way before long to a feeling of political lassitude, and to those surmises concerning the probabilities of weathering the session which habitually preoccupy Constitutional Governments. It is of more interest to turn for a moment to a matter which is now fortunately viewed in a very different light.

Having been asked his advice on some question concerning Canada, Lord Lyons wrote to Lord Clarendon the following as his deliberate opinion, and it must be borne in mind that he had had exceptional opportunities of studying the Canadian situation:--

I never feel comfortable about Canada and our North American
possessions. I do not believe we have the means of defending them
against the United States in case of war, and I am by no means
confident that the colonists would be unanimous and enthusiastic in
helping us to do so. I am afraid too that the colonists are
beginning to see that in matters short of war, we feel that we must
let the United States do very much as they please: in short that we
doubt our having the strength to resist them, and, unless under a
very strong provocation, have not the spirit to try. I was struck
by an observation made some time ago by the Governor of Newfoundland
respecting the French claims and the coast fisheries, viz. that the
Colonists felt that if the United States were their masters, the
questions would soon be settled in their favour. In fact it seems to
be in the nature of things that the United States' prestige should
grow and ours should wane in North America, and I wish we were well
and creditably out of the scrape.

In the course of the previous year he had already expressed the opinion that the great problem for us in American politics was to find some fair and honourable way of dissolving all connection between England and our North American colonies.

Lord Clarendon on his side was equally emphatic. 'I agree,' he wrote on June 1, 'in every word you say about our possessions in North America, and wish that they would propose to be independent, and to annex themselves. We can't throw them off, and it is very desirable that we should part as friends.'

The views of Lord Stanley on this subject have already been quoted, and, if search were made, no doubt it would be discovered that similar sentiments were entertained by nearly all the mid-Victorian statesmen. I have a clear recollection of hearing, less than thirty years ago, a Cabinet Minister, who had been Colonial Secretary, express the opinion that 'colonies were expensive luxuries which only a rich country like England could afford to indulge in.'

One of the last letters written by Lord Clarendon refers to suspicions created by the visit to Ems of the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, and Bismarck.

* * * * *

_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, June 8, 1870.

I have nothing of importance to write about.

Loftus says that the Berlin public is much _intrigué_ by the sudden
departure of the King and Bismarck for Ems, as the Czar was at
Berlin ten days before, when Bismarck pretended to be too ill to
come and meet him.

Bernstorff professes entire ignorance on the subject, and supposes
that, as Ems is now Prussian, the King thinks it necessary to give a
personal welcome to his Imperial relative.

This is possible, but not probable, and I suspect, though I can give
no good reason for so doing, that the more complete unification of
Germany occupies the Prussian mind, beginning of course by the
incorporation of Baden, and that it is thought desirable to get a
Russian sanction of the project, in the event of its leading to war
with France. One fails, however, to discover any reason why Russia
should make an enemy of France and endanger the peace of Europe in
order to justify the ambition of Prussia and enable the King to
unduly tax his subjects for an unnecessary army.

Lord Clarendon's suspicions in this case were as correct as his prophecy with regard to the establishment of a Republic in France, although the words 'unnecessary army' might be taken exception to in the light of subsequent events. Benedetti[18] happened to be in Paris at the time when Lord Clarendon's letter arrived, and he informed Lord Lyons that he had 'entire confidence in the assurances of the King of Prussia and Bismarck, and that he did not apprehend any danger to peace, unless circumstances were too strong for His Majesty and his Minister, and this he thought improbable.' The idea of circumstances being too strong for Bismarck might fairly be classed with the danger to Prussia threatened by the appointment of Monsignor Klazko.

Lord Clarendon died on June 27, and was succeeded at the Foreign Office on July 6 by Lord Granville. The celebrated announcement that there had never been so great a lull in foreign affairs was made upon the authority of Mr. Hammond,[19] whose singularly faulty judgment and unhappy prophecies have been already commented upon. At the same time, it must in justice be admitted that appearances in the early summer of 1870 were unusually deceptive owing to the general calm which prevailed in the diplomatic world.

When the Hohenzollern candidature thunderbolt fell in the early days of July, the Duc de Gramont lost no time in intimating to the British Ambassador that France would go to war with both Spain and Prussia rather than allow a Hohenzollern to reign at Madrid. But although Gramont seemed bent upon committing the French Government to this course, he allowed it to be seen that he would be very grateful for any exertion England might make to induce the King of Prussia to forbid his kinsman to go on with his candidature. The election of Montpensier, he said, might be looked upon as a _mauvais procédé_ towards the Emperor and the dynasty, but the putting forward a Prussian was an insult and an injury to all France. Similar language was held by the French Ambassador in London.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, July 6, 1870.

Your telegram of yesterday arrived while we were debating the Land
Bill. It took Mr. Gladstone and me by surprise. I received your
despatch and private letter this morning, and on my return from
Windsor, M. de La Valette called on me. He held the same language to
me as that reported by you to have been held by Gramont. France
disclaimed all interference with Spain, but stated the arguments
which made the possession of the Crown of Spain by a Prussian Prince
dangerous to France. I am writing to catch the post, and I cannot
repeat to you all the reasons which he gave, concluding by assuring
me that the circumstances were of the gravest character, and that in
his opinion, the Government of the Emperor could not, under the
pressure of public opinion, admit a project of such a nature. He
added however that there was no reason why any preliminary means
should not be tried to avert so great an evil, and he addressed
himself to the Government of the Queen, on the strength of our
friendly relations, and our desire to maintain the peace of Europe,
to exercise all our influence upon Prussia and upon Spain to stop
the project.

I told M. de La Valette of the surprise which the matter had been to
H.M. Government, that I perfectly understood the unfavourable effect
which such an announcement was contemplated to produce in France,
although I did not agree with all the arguments which he had used
with respect to the importance to so great a nation as France of a
German prince on the throne of Spain.

I said it was a matter of some regret to me that such strong
language as that reported by you to have been addressed to the
Prussian Ambassador should have been used. But I added that it was
not so much a moment for the general discussion, as to see what
could be done.

I readily assented to his request to use what influence we might
possess both with Prussia and Spain, but without any pretension
to dictate to either Power, to induce them to take into the most
serious consideration all the bearings of this question, such as its
gravity required, and I promised to communicate with you, Lord A.
Loftus, and Mr. Layard at once.

It is very sad that I should be writing to you in the place of one
who would have had so much personal power in such a matter as this.

In the meanwhile, however, the explosion of Chauvinism in France and the attitude of the French Ministers rendered the situation more alarming from day to day. Undoubtedly the French Government desired and hoped to carry their point without actual war, but Ministers had burnt their ships and left themselves no means of escape if they failed in their attempt to win a moral victory over Prussia. As Gramont remarked, '_l'Avènement du Prince de Hohenzollern, c'est la guerre_!' It was almost impossible to see what injury to French interests could be caused by the presence of a Hohenzollern at Madrid, but the question had been taken up as a point of honour, and was therefore more dangerous than if treated from a material point of view. The Emperor, according to Lord Lyons, remained at this stage of the crisis, very calm and extremely confident that he would get his way without war. There was no doubt that he was strongly averse from war, partly on account of his own views, and partly on the ground of his ill-health, which would be a serious drawback if he were forced to take the command of the army; but he also felt that it would not be safe for him to submit to another rebuff from Prussia, and his Constitutional Ministers were inconveniently anxious to show their spirit.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, July 10, 1870.

The state of things to-day may be told in half a dozen words. If the
Prince of Hohenzollern's renunciation is announced in 24 or 48
hours, there will be peace _for the moment_. If not, there will be
an immediate declaration of war against Prussia. I cannot however
answer for even this situation lasting for the 48 hours. The French
are getting more and more excited. They think they have got the
start of Prussia this time in forwardness of preparation; that they
have a better cause of war, as being one less likely to rouse the
Germans, than they are likely to get again; and in fact that they
must have it out with Prussia sooner or later; and that they had
better not throw away this chance. When I say that I cannot answer
for things remaining in as favourable a situation as they are now,
for 48 hours, I mean that if the excitement goes on, the French may
choose to pick a quarrel on the form of the renunciation, or some
other pretext, even if the Prince retires.

End how it will, the whole affair is a terrible misfortune, for the
French and the Prussians will hate each other more than ever, and I
hardly expect to see their animosity come back to the quiescent
state in which it was a month ago.

Gramont says that, so far from the energetic language and
preparations of France thwarting your endeavours to preserve peace,
they afford the only chance of your succeeding.

I told him I did not at all agree with him.

This letter reveals two colossal errors on the part of the French. They honestly thought that they were better prepared for war than the Prussians, and they believed that the latter could be successfully intimidated.

As late as July 12 Lord Granville still believed that Prussia did not really want war, and hoped that the pressure applied to the Hohenzollern Prince by Queen Victoria and other important personages would avert the calamity. Writing on the same day, Lord Lyons said that he did not despair of peace, but that the war feeling was very strong, both in and out of the Ministry.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, July 13, 1870.

Nothing can be better than your work at Paris, and I only wish it
may prove successful. My colleagues and the House of Commons are
getting very angry, and Gladstone wishes me to use stronger language
to the French Government than would, in my opinion, be useful for
the object, although it is true that no nation is powerful enough in
these times to stand up against the public opinion of Europe.

Your telegram of this evening leaves some hope, but I very much
doubt whether, even if we are asked by France, we can exert any more
pressure on Prussia, who in substance has done all that we were told
to ask and all that Gramont said was necessary to put an end to the
dispute.

La Valette is very angry. He gets a communication from his Foreign
Office once in three days, and then there is hardly anything in it.
His argument to-day is probably not the one his Government uses. 'I
do not, like everybody else, suspect the French of having had a
project of going to war. But having got into the wrangle, having
found their warlike preparations so popular, and having roused
effectually the feelings of France and Prussia, they do not like to
abstain from a fight, which they think will come, and in which
during the next six weeks their enemies would be unprepared.

I have some thoughts of asking the Cabinet, if war is declared,
whether it would be wise to ask both Governments whether they are
prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium. It is always safer,
or at least, generally so, to do nothing; but both, in doubt, would
be more likely to give a favourable answer, than either flushed with
victory. Let me know what you think, and please make any other
suggestions which may occur to you if the emergency arises.

As far as I can judge, all the Neutral Powers are sincerely anxious
for peace. Italy, certainly so. The only thing which we have done,
of which I doubt, is having asked Italy a leading question about an
Italian Prince. They seem to wish to entangle us further in the
matter. It was of great importance before Spain and France were
reconciled, but now I presume it will be discreet to let this matter
remain in the hands of the parties concerned.

The phrase 'in which during the next six weeks their enemies would be unprepared,' seems to imply that H.M. Government were singularly ill-informed as to the true state of Prussian military efficiency.

Upon July 14, Lord Lyons reported that an article in the _North German Gazette_ seemed to make war absolutely inevitable, and that Benedetti, who was expected in Paris the following day, confirmed the accuracy of the newspaper. Werther, too, the Prussian Ambassador, had announced to Gramont that 'he had been granted leave of absence and was about to take advantage of it immediately.' Even the guileless Hammond was alarmed. 'Why Bismarck went to Berlin instead of Ems, and finally retired to Varzin without personal communications with his master, is not easy to explain, and with a person of his character the proceeding is somewhat suspicious.' The last hope of peace practically vanished when Bismarck intimated that he could not recommend to the King for acceptance the proposal made by H.M. Government.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, July 16, 1870.

It will be a miracle if we are as good friends with France six
months after the beginning of this wretched war, as we are now, and
it will require the utmost tact, prudence and consideration for
French susceptibilities to prevent all the improvement in feeling
between the two nations, which has grown up in the last twenty
years, being entirely destroyed.

We have already a question with Gramont about his assertion that we
recognized the justice of his complaint. I hope it may be possible
to let this drop, but if not it is to be noted that, my memorandum
correcting the assertion on your authority was in his hands the
night before he repeated the assertion in his declaration of
yesterday.

In referring to his declaration that if the Hohenzollern
renunciation were obtained, France would be satisfied, it may be
well to bear in mind that the exact words he used to me were: '_If
the Prince of Hohenzollern should now, on the advice of the King of
Prussia_, withdraw his acceptance of the Crown the whole affair
would be at an end.'

This point becomes of less importance as France now seems to set the
Hohenzollern affair aside altogether, and to rest her _casus belli_
wholly on the boast of the affront to Benedetti.

Above all things we must try and keep as much as possible out of
Blue Books. If it is absolutely necessary to have one now, pray let
me have the opportunity of looking over anything of mine which it is
proposed to publish, and suggesting omissions. It would also be a
great relief to me to be allowed to consult Gramont himself, as I
did La Valette on the Cretan Blue Book. The cases are not the same,
and I might not use the power, but I should like to have it. I am
the more alarmed with regard to Gramont, as his reputation for
inaccuracy is so universal, that there must be some foundation for it.

Newspaper correspondents, amateur travellers, and so forth, are
already tormenting me to get them leave to accompany the French
Army. I believe none are to be allowed; but if it be otherwise, I
think the danger of being held responsible for their indiscretions
would be so great and so damaging to our relations with France, that
I do not think I should be justified in applying for leave on any
private recommendation, however strong: in fact, I should not be
willing to apply on anything short of a distinct official order, in
each case from you; and such an order I should be sorry to receive.

I tremble at the thought of the Blockades. Those during the American
Civil War kept us in perpetual hot water and within an inch of war
with the United States, and the labours of working out the cases
without coming to a rupture was very nearly the death of me. Heaven
defend us from anything like an _Alabama_ case with the French!

It is important that I should know as soon as possible whether our
Embassy at Berlin might take charge of French subjects in Prussia.
I am pretty sure to be sounded very soon, and might perhaps be able
to soften the very bad impression a refusal would make, by
preventing the request being made. I should wish us to accept, and I
don't see why, as impartial neutrals, we might not take charge also
of the Prussians in Paris, if we were asked, though I would rather
avoid this if possible.

Just at this moment the _Liberté_ caused some embarrassment by publishing more or less correct details respecting the secret negotiations which had taken place earlier in the year between Lord Clarendon and Bismarck on the question of disarmament. Lord Granville had not been in the confidence of Lord Clarendon, and it now was necessary to explain to him what had passed. How the _Liberté_ obtained its information does not appear. Daru always stoutly maintained that he had not mentioned the matter to any one except the Emperor and Ollivier, and the disclosures involved not only a gross breach of confidence on the part of some one--presumably a French Foreign Office official--but also a danger that Bismarck might demand explanations. The tremendous events, however, of the next few weeks, diverted attention from the _Liberté's_ revelations. War was formally declared on July 19.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, July 19, 1870.

The war has been forced upon the Emperor principally by his
own party in the Chamber, the Right, and by his Ministers.
Constitutional Government has so far established itself that a
Ministry in a minority in the Corps Législatif is as much bound to
go out as a Ministry in the House of Commons. The Emperor was in a
bad position to resist, because after the line taken at the time of
Sadowa, it would have been too dangerous for him to be put forward
as the cause of France's truckling to Prussia. The whole affair is a
series of blunders which has culminated in an awful catastrophe.

Gramont told me this afternoon that La Valette wrote him a very
_bizarre_ story. La Valette said that it had been considered by the
British Cabinet whether they should not send an English force to
occupy Belgium during the war, which would be a strange way of
showing respect for Belgian neutrality.

I should myself be very sorry to see a British soldier landed on the
Continent, and seriously alarmed if any force that was landed was
under a hundred thousand strong.

Gramont told me also that Bray[20] had hit upon a combination to
which France would have no objection if it were possible. Bray
declared that Bavaria would be neutral if the neutrality of Baden
were secured. Gramont said however that of course to carry out such
an arrangement, the Prussian troops must retire from Rastadt.

He said he had just been informed that Italy had called out two
classes of her military contingent. He did not know what this might
mean. Italy has not yet made to France any declaration of policy.

Gramont concluded by saying that he supposed all the Minor States
would wait for a battle and then declare for the victor.

The neutrality of Belgium was, of course, one of the main preoccupations of H.M. Government, but there is no reason to suppose that a British occupation was ever seriously contemplated, and La Valette's report on the subject was probably caused by the vanity of appearing to possess special pieces of information which often leads diplomatists astray. Belgium was not, however, the only country which had reason to feel alarmed. The position of Denmark before hostilities actually began between France and Prussia was both painful and critical. The Danish Minister at Paris appeared at the British Embassy in great distress, saying that he knew nothing of what his Government intended, and asking for information; as it seemed quite likely that the Danish capital would be occupied by whichever of the two opposing armies could get there first. It was common knowledge that a great expedition was fitting out for Copenhagen at Cherbourg, and that General Trochu, who passed for about the best French general, was to command it. And if French forces appeared off Copenhagen it would be impossible to restrain the people from marching against the Prussians, although there was, as yet apparently, no understanding between the French and Danish Governments.

On July 25 the _Times_ surprised the world by publishing the text of a draft treaty concerning the annexation of Belgium which it was alleged had been submitted by the French Government to Bismarck in 1866.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, July 26, 1870.

I have had some conversation with Gramont about the nefarious Projet
de Traité which the _Times_ has given to the world, but as he has
written to La Valette about it, I had better leave you to receive
from him the French version. The only curious, and to me quite new
statement which he made, was that Bismarck had at one time offered,
if France was afraid of the odium of occupying Belgium, to occupy it
first himself, and then to retire in apparent deference to
remonstrances from France, and so give France a pretext for
entering.

It has long been a common belief among diplomatists that France and
Prussia have at different times discussed the propriety of seizing,
the one upon Belgium, the other upon Holland. No such scandalous
iniquity has been contemplated since the partition of Poland, and it
is much worse than the partition of Poland, for there might be some
colourable assertions that Poland was turbulent, ill-governed, that
most of the population were serfs, and that she was an inconvenient
neighbour. But Belgium and Holland are free, extremely well
governed, and, to say the least, perfectly inoffensive neighbours.
One must leave it to the parties concerned to defend themselves from
the reproach of such odious projects, and I hope they will.

The insinuation in the leading article in the _Times_ that the
subject has been revived by France since the Hohenzollern crisis
seems to me to be extremely improbable.

Bernstorff's attempts to make you vouch for the authenticity of the
_Projet_, without committing himself, is as poor a little trick as I
ever heard of.

I send you in a despatch the official account of the cause of the
tardiness in producing Benedetti's despatch, that is to say,
delicacy on the part of Gramont. The version accepted by the public
is that the whole affair had been forgotten at the Ministère until
at last Benedetti himself remembered it and had it looked up.

With the object of prejudicing European opinion against Prussia, the Emperor wrote the well-known letter to Gramont from Metz, on July 28, accusing Bismarck of having proposed to France the annexation of Belgium, but the sole result was that both parties were shown to have played an equally sordid part in the transaction, and they were consequently both induced to agree to the English proposal that they should give a new and formal pledge not to violate Belgian integrity.

In a letter dated July 31, is a dispassionate analysis of the inadequate causes which had brought about a rupture at that particular moment.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, July 31, 1870.

I see the public, with their usual tendency to attribute everything
to deep-laid plots and schemes, generally suppose that war was a
foregone conclusion on the part of France and of Prussia. I don't
believe it in the case of Prussia, and I know it not to be the fact
as regards France. Prussia threw the first stone, by bringing on the
Hohenzollern question. France made a peaceful settlement difficult
by Gramont's irritating declaration on the 6th. The cause of the
change from a mild to an irritating declaration was the arrival of
the report from the Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, that Thile[21]
pooh-poohed the French remonstrance, and said that the question
_n'existait pas pour le Gouvernement Prussien_. Then came the
great fault of France in not accepting the renunciation of the
Hohenzollern as a final settlement; but, even at the last moment the
declaration of the 16th would have concluded with a phrase leaving
the door open to the mediation of a Congress, if the article in the
_North German Gazette_ had not arrived, and convinced the French
that Bismarck had decided upon war. However, it is no use crying
over spilt milk.

I understand that the Emperor writes to the Empress that no great
action is to be expected for three or four days. At the French Head
Quarters there was an apprehension that the Prussians might attempt
to turn the right flank of the French Army.

Subsequent revelations have shown how profoundly the course of events was influenced by the action of Bismarck in connection with the tone of the German press, and by his distortion of the celebrated Ems interview between the King of Prussia and Benedetti, but this was of course unknown at the time.

One humorous incident in connection with the outbreak of hostilities is worth recording. Animated by what Lord Clarendon would have called the spirit of flunkeyism, the Paris diplomatists grew greatly excited over the question of illuminations in the event of French victories. As was only to be expected, the accommodating Austrian Ambassador was foremost in advocating rejoicings, and he and his Italian colleague were bent upon illuminating their Embassies, while the representatives of the smaller Powers, such as Switzerland, who lived in less conspicuous abodes, opposed the proposal, and were supported by the British Ambassador. The question was referred home, and the Foreign Office took the common-sense view that the Ambassador should not illuminate without necessity, but should do so rather than cause trouble or give offence.

The early reverses of the campaign were concealed from the public with some success, MacMahon's defeat being known at the Embassy twelve hours before the official announcement; but as soon as the truth came out, the population of the capital seems to have believed that the Germans would at once appear before Paris.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Aug. 8, 1870.

If the panic in the army is as great as it is in the capital, it is
all over with France. One would think that the Prussians were
already in Montmartre. There must, it is supposed, be a great battle
fought before they can get there, and the French may win it.

I have been beset with Representatives of small Powers, all except
the Belgian, in consternation, and with Rothschilds and other
bankers in despair. They hope England will interfere to stop the
Prussian army on its road to Paris: not an easy task if the road is
open.

All Gramont could or would tell me was that the Emperor was
concentrating forces between Metz and Chalons, and that a great
battle was expected.

I was really ashamed to speak to him about our Treaty, but I thrust
your despatch on him, knowing you were anxious to avoid delay. He
said: _n'ayez pas peur, nous n'avons pas grande envie d'entrer en
Belgique dans ce moment_.

In the Chamber, no one, even on the Right, had the generosity to say a single word in defence of the unfortunate Emperor when a declaration was made from the Tribune that all the disasters were due to the inefficiency of the Commander-in-Chief. Ollivier and his colleagues resigned, and General Trochu, who had been given an unimportant command in the South, was hailed as the possible saviour of the country, and offered, in vain, the War Office in the new administration of Count Palikao. It is instructive to note that Gramont (upon whom Bismarck subsequently heaped the most savage contempt) denied to Lord Lyons that he had ever been in favour of war. According to him, the strongest phrase in the declaration of July 6 was inserted at the Council on that morning, and was not in his draft, and he threw the blame of the imprudent haste in going to war on Leboeuf's confident declaration that neither France nor any other country had ever been so well prepared for war before. Leboeuf's celebrated declaration about gaiter buttons has always been cited as almost unequalled for fatuity, but it is an undoubted fact that Gramont himself was convinced that a Franco-Prussian war was inevitable, and he is not known to have discouraged the idea.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Aug. 16, 1870.

So far as we can conjecture, the military situation is very bad, and
the political is certainly as bad as can be. There are ups and downs
in the spirits of the French about the war, but the Emperor and the
dynasty seem simply to sink lower and lower. La Tour d'Auvergne[22]
speaks still as a loyal subject, but I know of no one else who does.
The Empress shows pluck, but not hope. She has sent her nieces away,
and she summoned the Bonapartes in Paris to the Tuileries yesterday,
and told them plainly that the time was come for them to look after
themselves.

No party wishes to come into office, with the risk of having to sign
a disadvantageous peace. It is this which has hitherto kept the Left
within bounds. They wish the peace to be made by the Emperor before
they upset him. No one can tell what the effect of a victory might
be; few people expect one, and fewer still believe that the effect
would be to set the Emperor on his legs again. The Paris population
so far seems to have behaved well.

The one thing, in fact, upon which there seemed to be general agreement was that the Empire was doomed.

By the middle of August the feeling in Paris against England, produced largely by articles in the London press, had reached a very disagreeable point, and the Ambassador was obliged to ask that he might be spared from having to make too many obnoxious communications to the French Government; these communications consisting of complaints put forward by the Prussian Government through the channel of the British Embassy at Paris, which it was really the duty of the United States Legation to deal with.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond._

Paris, Aug. 23, 1870.