Chapter IX: The Government of National Defence (1)

(1870-1871)

The investment of Paris being now imminent, the Diplomatists had to make up their minds as to whether they should remain or leave, and the latter course was adopted.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Tours, Sept. 19, 1870.

I was a good deal put out at having to leave Paris. The interest is
still there: there was no danger in staying, and of course the
Diplomatists could have got the Prussians to let them through the
lines. But as soon as Jules Favre himself advised that I should go,
I had nothing to say to my colleagues of the Great Powers, whom I
had withstood, not without difficulty, for some time. At all events
I could not have stayed if they went, without exposing myself to all
kinds of misrepresentation, and presenting myself to the public and
Foreign Powers as the special partisan and adviser of the present
French Government. The Representatives of the small Powers, or most
of them, want to be able to go home when they leave Paris, and are
very much afraid of the expense and difficulty of finding lodgings
here. Well they may be: I myself spent eight hours yesterday walking
about or sitting on a trunk in the porte cochère of the hotel, and
have at last, in order not to pass the night _à la belle étoile_,
had to come to a house out of the town.

I don't expect much from Jules Favre's interview with Bismarck, but
I am very impatient to know whether he was received, and if so, what
passed. I should be glad that Bismarck should distinctly announce
his terms, though I can hardly hope they will be such as France will
accept now. But it would be well, whatever they are, that the French
should know them, and thus get their minds accustomed to them, and
so know also what amount of resistance is better than yielding to
them. I myself think that the loss of territory and the humiliation
of France and the great diminution of her power and influence would
be great evils and great sources of danger: but, if we can have no
means of preventing them, I am certainly anxious that we should not
aggravate them by holding out hopes that our mediation could effect
a change, or rather by allowing the hopes to be formed, which the
mere fact of our mediating could not but give rise to. I have read
with great interest the accounts of your conversations with Thiers,
and have been still more interested by your correspondence with
Bernstorff on 'benevolent neutrality.' On his part it is just the
old story I used to hear in America from the Northerners: 'The
ordinary rules of neutrality are very well in ordinary wars, such
as those in which we were neutrals, but our present cause is so
pre-eminently just, noble and advantageous to humanity and the rest
of the world, that the very least other nations can do is to strain
the laws of neutrality, so as to make them operate in our favour and
against our opponents.'

Thiers himself was expected here yesterday. Jules Favre did not
say positively that he was coming here himself, but he gave me to
understand that it was not improbable he should do so. He must make
haste, for we hear that the railway we came by is already broken up,
and all the others were impassable before.

As Lord Lyons's departure from Paris to Tours was practically the only action in the course of his career which was subjected to anything like unfavourable criticism, it is desirable to point out that as far back as August 31, Lord Granville had written to him in these words: 'I presume that your post will be with the Government as long as it is acknowledged; and that if the Empress and her Foreign Minister go to Lyons or elsewhere, you would go too.' It is almost inconceivable that any one should have advocated the retention of the Ambassador in Paris after that city had been cut off from the outside world; some of the members of the Government, it is true, including Jules Favre remained there, but the _de facto_ Government of the country was temporarily established at Tours, and when Tours seemed likely to share the fate of Paris, the Government was transferred to Bordeaux. It was so obviously the duty of diplomatists to remain in touch with the French Government that the wonder is that any objection should ever have been raised, and, as has already been narrated, Lord Lyons had been urged to move long before he would consent to do so. The action of the Ambassador was the subject of an attack upon him subsequently in Parliament by the late Sir Robert Peel, which proved singularly ineffective.

Few people had anticipated much result from Jules Favre's visit to Bismarck, and when the latter insisted upon a surrender of territory being accepted in principle, the French envoy burst into tears. According to Bismarck this display of emotion was entirely artificial, and he even accused Jules Favre of having painted his face grey and green in order to excite sympathy, but in any case it became perfectly plain that no agreement was in sight and that the war would have to continue. In justice to the French it must be said that Bismarck seemed to have made his terms as harsh in form as they were stringent in substance, and it was difficult to conceive any Government subscribing to his conditions; as for poor Jules Favre he had to console himself by issuing a stirring address to his fellow-countrymen.

Although the French public naturally began to display some impatience and irritation at the slowness with which 'Victory' was being organized, and to talk of Carnot, the old Republic, and the necessity of a Red Republic if heroes were to be produced, the Tours Government continued to hold its own fairly well; there was little trouble about the finances; disorders were suppressed, and the arrival of Gambetta infused a good deal of energy into the administration. After the manner of French statesmen, Gambetta, upon his arrival at Tours, issued a spirited proclamation, announcing _inter alia_ that Paris was impregnable, and explaining that as the form of Government had changed from a shameful and corrupt autocracy to a pure and unsullied Republic, success was a moral certainty. Gambetta, who had assumed the office of Minister of War, summoned to his assistance the veteran Garibaldi, and the arrival of the former obviously embarrassed the peace-loving diplomatists, who expressed regret that his balloon had not capsized on the way from Paris.

By the middle of October, however, the French Government began to show signs of wiser dispositions.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Tours. Oct. 16, 1870.

As you will see by my long despatch of to-day, I went yesterday with
the Comte de Chaudordy[23] into the questions of the '_pouce de notre
territoire_' and the '_pierres de nos forteresses_.' The fortresses
have in point of fact been tacitly abandoned for a long time,
provided the dismantling them only, not the cession of them to
Prussia is demanded.

M. de Chaudordy said that he would tell me what was in the bottom of
his heart about the cession of territory, if I would promise to
report it to your Lordship only in such a form as would ensure it
never being published now or hereafter, or even being quoted or
referred to.

Having received my promise and taken all these precautions, he said
that he did not regard some cession of territory as altogether out
of the question. The men at present in office certainly could not
retreat from their positive declaration that they would never yield
an inch of territory; but if the interests of France appeared to
require positively that the sacrifice should be made, they would
retire from office, and give place to men who were unshackled, and
not only would they abstain from opposing such men, but would give
them full support in signing a peace, which, however painful,
appeared to be necessary. M. de Chaudordy was convinced and indeed
had reason to know that the men now in office had patriotism enough
to act in this way in case of need, but he could not authorize me to
tell you this as a communication from the individuals themselves,
much less as a communication from the French Government. It would be
ruin to the men themselves and to the cause, if it should transpire
that such an idea had ever been contemplated at a moment like this.
For it to be carried into effect with any success, it must appear to
rise at the critical time out of the necessities of the hour.

He concluded by reminding me of my promise that what he had said
should never be published or even referred to.

I thanked him for the confidence he had placed in me, and assured
him that he need not have the least fear that it would be abused. I
said however at the same time that he must feel, as I did, that
however useful it might be to be aware of the disposition he had
mentioned, as entertained by the men in power, it would be very
difficult for a Government to make information, given with so much
reserve, the foundation of any positive measures.

This criticism was sufficiently obvious. If the information was never to go beyond Lord Lyons and Lord Granville, of what practical use could it be? It can only be supposed that those who sent Chaudordy, intended that his confidential communication should somehow or other reach the Prussian Government.

Hard upon Chaudordy, followed a man destined before long to achieve a melancholy celebrity, General Bourbaki. General Bourbaki had been the victim of a strange mystification, which resulted in his being permitted to leave Metz upon a secret mission to the Empress at Chislehurst, and when it was discovered that the whole thing was an ingenious fraud perpetrated by one Regnier (probably with the connivance of Bismarck), and that the Empress had never sent for him at all, he returned to France, but was not permitted to re-enter Metz. Consequently, he repaired to Tours and gave the Ambassador the benefit of his views.

General Bourbaki, as a professional soldier, took a most gloomy view of the military situation. He did not think that an army capable of coping with the Prussians in the field in anything like equal numbers could be formed in less than five or six months, even with first-rate military organizers at the head of affairs, instead of the present inexperienced civilians. According to him, the Army of Metz was in admirable condition and might perhaps break out, but even so, where was it to go? Its provisions and ammunition would be exhausted long before it could get to any place where they could be replenished. As the surrender of Paris was really only a question of time, the most prudent thing to do would be to make peace whilst those two fortresses were still holding out, and it would be to the interest of Prussia to do so, because if Metz fell, Bazaine's army would disappear, and there would be no Government left in France with whom it would be possible to treat, and the Prussians would, therefore, be forced to administer the country as well as occupy it. The Provisional Government, who must have had a high opinion of Bourbaki, offered him the title of Commander-in-Chief and the command of the Army of the Loire, but he declined the honour on the ground that he would not be given unlimited military powers, and that nothing could be effected under the orders of civilians absolutely devoid of military capacity.

Another visitor was M. Daniel Wilson, who achieved a sinister notoriety during the Presidency of M. Grévy in connection with the alleged sale of honours, etc. Wilson's object was to urge the desirability of summoning a Constituent Assembly without delay, as he and his moderate friends were convinced that such a body would be in favour of peace. He himself considered the prosecution of the war under existing circumstances to be a crime, and he was not disposed to allow the six or seven men who had seized upon the Government, to achieve the ruin of France. Their only excuse for postponing the elections was the difficulty of holding them in the districts occupied by the Prussians, but if an armistice could be obtained, that difficulty would disappear, and an armistice of only fifteen days would make the resumption of hostilities impossible. The interest attaching to this visit lay in the fact that a peace party was now actually in existence, whereas the Provisional Government at Tours, the Ministers left in Paris, and the advanced Republicans seemed to be still fully bent upon war _à outrance_, and as little willing as ever to hear of a cession of territory.

Bazaine capitulated on October 27, and shortly afterwards Thiers who had returned to Paris from his circular tour round the Courts of Europe proceeded to the Prussian Headquarters to discuss with Bismarck the question of an armistice, a course of action which the Provisional Government had agreed to, provided it were initiated by a third party. The attitude, however, of Gambetta and his friends did not encourage much hope of success.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Tours, Oct. 31, 1870.

Gambetta's Proclamation and the language Chaudordy has again been
directed to hold about cession of territory, will show you how vain
it is to try to induce these people to give a negotiation a fair
chance by abstaining during the course of it from violent and
imprudent language.

Nothing can look worse for France than things do at this moment. A
reign of terror, perseverance in hostilities until the country is
utterly ruined, a dissolution of all order and discipline in the
army, and a total disorganization of society might seem to be
threatened. I take comfort from the thought that much allowance must
be made for the first ebullition of grief and rage at the surrender
of Bazaine, and that some of Gambetta's fire and fury may be
intended to divert blame from himself for a catastrophe which he did
nothing to prevent. Anyhow things are gloomy enough, and I am
nervous and uneasy about Thiers and his mission, and should be glad
to hear that he was at least safe out of Paris again.

The news of the capitulation of Metz was at once followed by an unsuccessful outbreak against the Government in Paris, headed by the well-known revolutionary, Gustave Flourens, who seized the Ministers and proclaimed the Commune at the Hotel de Ville. The Ministers, however, were shortly liberated by the Garde Mobile and National Guards and order was restored without much difficulty in the course of a few hours. Flourens, who was subsequently shot by the Versailles troops during the suppression of the Commune in 1871, was generally regarded as the most formidable 'man of action,' and had lately been residing in London. It is interesting to record the impression which the wasted potentialities of England made upon this impartial visitor. _Me voici, avec mes amis Félix Pyat et Louis Blanc à Londres, dans ce pays d'Angleterre qui pourrait être si grand à condition de n'avoir point ni les Lords ni la Bible!_ One almost wishes that he had been spared to witness the operation of the Parliament Act.

The Paris Government, adroitly profiting by the overthrow of Flourens and his friends, at once organized a plébiscite in the city, and emerged triumphantly with over 500,000 votes recorded in their favour as against 60,000 dissentients. This was all to the good, as it showed that moderate opinions were still in the ascendency, and whereas the fall of Metz was at first received with frantic cries of rage and war to the knife, people began to look a little more calmly on its effect on the military situation, and hopes were entertained that the mission of Thiers to Bismarck, which had been promoted by Her Majesty's Government, would result in the conclusion of an armistice. These hopes were doomed to disappointment, for after several interviews at Versailles, during the course of which an agreement for some time appeared probable, negotiations were finally broken off on the question of revictualling the various fortresses, more especially Paris.

Thiers, who had repaired to Tours after the failure of his efforts, gave Lord Lyons in strict confidence a full and interesting account of his negotiations with Bismarck.

At the first important interview, which took place at Versailles on November 1, no serious objection was raised to the proposals of the French Government, and after a conversation which lasted two or three hours, Thiers took his leave with good hopes for the success of the negotiation.

The second conference, on the following day, passed equally satisfactorily. On Thursday, the 3rd, Bismarck kept Thiers waiting a short time, and said that he had been detained at a military meeting held by the King. He seemed annoyed and irritable, and indeed on one occasion, quite lost his temper. Nevertheless, Thiers resenting this, he apologized and assumed a civil and indeed caressing demeanour. He asserted that _les militaires_, as he always called them, made objections to the proposed revictualling of Paris and that they also had some reservations to make with respect to the suggested elections. _Les militaires_ also urged that if, as proposed, Paris were to be provisioned during twenty-five days' armistice, those days would be absolutely lost to the German arms, and the surrender of the town deferred for at least that time. On being sounded as to what might be considered an equivalent, it appeared that two or more of the detached forts, or some other concession equally inadmissible, would be demanded. On finding, therefore, that Bismarck was unshaken in declaring that positively _les militaires_ would not allow Paris to be revictualled, Thiers had no alternative but to withdraw from the negotiation and to request facilities for communicating the result to the Government in Paris. _Les militaires_, it will be observed, played much the same convenient part in this affair as the King of Prussia in the arguments used against Lord Clarendon's secret disarmament proposals.

Upon the Paris Government becoming acquainted with these terms, Jules Favre directed Thiers to break off the negotiations and leave Versailles immediately; a decision which Bismarck stated caused him great regret and induced him to suggest that elections should be held even while hostilities were going on. He made no offer, however, of any concession with regard to the revictualling of Paris.

The conclusion which Thiers arrived at was that there was both a political and a military party at the Prussian Headquarters. The political party, with which Bismarck himself to a great extent agreed, was desirous of bringing the war to an end by concluding peace on comparatively moderate terms. The military party held that the glory of the Prussian arms and the future security of Germany demanded that the rights of war should be pushed to the utmost, and that France should be laid waste, ruined, and humiliated to such a degree as to render it impossible for her to wage war again with Germany for very many years. He could not, however, discover even among the most moderate of the so-called political party any one who seemed to ask less than the cession of Alsace and of that part of Lorraine in which German is spoken. It seems clear that Bismarck impressed Thiers with his sincerity at the commencement of the negotiations, and with the belief that he was subsequently overruled by _les militaires_, but whenever it was suggested that the armistice had been proposed to both parties by the neutral Powers, Bismarck showed much 'impatience and annoyance.' He showed Thiers the letters which the Emperor Alexander had written to the King of Prussia. They were 'warm, earnest letters,' but written as from a friend to a friend, without in the least assuming the tone of a sovereign addressing a brother sovereign on a matter concerning the relations of their respective Governments. Of Great Britain, it is sad to learn, he spoke with 'special ill-humour.' One subject upon which he touched is not without interest at the present day. He complained bitterly of the treatment to which the crews of captured German merchant vessels were subjected, and said that he should give orders to have an equal number of French non-combatants arrested and treated in the same way. When it was mildly suggested that this would hardly be in accordance with international maritime law, he exclaimed with some violence: 'Who made the code of maritime law? You and the English, because you are powerful at sea, it is no code at all, it is simply the law of the strongest!' To this Thiers appears to have retorted that he, Bismarck, did not on all occasions seem disposed to repudiate the law of the strongest.

So far as the convocation of a National Assembly was concerned Bismarck alleged complete indifference, explaining that he had now two Governments with which to treat, one at Paris, and the other at Wilhelmshöhe, and although he expressed unmitigated contempt for the Emperor Napoleon, he was nevertheless quite ready to make use of him to attain his ends.

During the fruitless negotiations which had taken place, first when conducted by Jules Favre, and secondly when conducted by Thiers, the British Government found itself in a somewhat embarrassing position. It was perfectly sincere in desiring to bring about peace between France and Prussia, but it was unwilling to identify itself with the one proposal which would have had that effect, viz. the cession of territory, and the perplexity in which the English Ministers found themselves is illustrated by a letter from Mr. Gladstone to Lord Lyons.

* * * * *

11, Carlton House Terrace, Nov. 7, 1870.

I have seen your letter to Lord Granville in which you notice that
in a note to him I had expressed a hope you would not allow the
French to suppose we adopted their view as to integrity of
territory.

I do not recollect the exact words to which you may refer, but I
write a line lest I should by chance have conveyed a false
impression.

At an earlier stage of this tremendous controversy, the French took
their stand upon inviolability of soil. That ground always seemed to
me quite untenable in the case of a country which had made recent
annexations.

The French also declared that they would surrender neither an inch
of their territory nor a stone of their fortresses. This appeared to
me an extravagant proposition, and, what is more important, I
venture to say it was thought unreasonable by my colleagues and by
the country generally. It is possible that my note may have referred
to either of these views on the part of France.

But I am very sorry if I have conveyed to you on my own part, or by
implication on the part of any one else, the belief that we approved
of, or were in our own minds indifferent to the transfer of
Alsatians and Lorrainers from France to Germany against their will.

On this subject, I for one, entirely concur with the opinions you
have so admirably expressed in your letter, and I should be to the
last degree reluctant to be a party not only to stimulating a German
demand of this kind, but even to advising or promoting a compliance
with it on the part of France.

All this you will see is quite distinct from and consistent with the
desire which you and which we all entertain that the Defence
Government of France should not needlessly deal in abstract
declarations, and with a full approval of your reticence as to the
conditions of peace.

On the failure of the armistice I think the Cabinet will disperse,
as having nothing more to consider in the present circumstances. I
cannot help feeling doubtful whether the Prussians do not lose more
than the French by the unhappy failure of the negotiations.

We are all more grieved at the failure than surprised.

It is difficult to read much meaning into the above involved epistle. How, for instance, could any fortresses be surrendered without Alsatians and Lorrainers being handed over to Prussia? Put into plain language, the letter presumably meant that H.M. Government was anxious to remain friends with both sides, but was afraid to make the one recommendation to the French which would have been of any use, and hoped that the proposal of a cession of territory would eventually be made on the latter's initiative.

Thiers, who in the course of his tour round the capitals of Europe had vigorously denounced (especially to the Italians) the apathy and selfishness of England, now intimated to the Ambassador that he was willing to go back to London if he could contribute, by so doing, to bring about an armistice and a peace, but received no encouragement; partly because it was thought that the less the British Government did, which appeared to be prompted by France, the more Bismarck might be inclined to yield, and partly because it would cause irritation in France, if Thiers made another formal expedition to England without producing any marked result.

A momentary elation was just about this time produced at Tours by the victory of General d'Aurelle des Paladines and the recapture of Orleans, but Gambetta does not appear to have lost his head in consequence of this temporary success or to have attached undue importance to it. Gambetta's opinion was that France could hold out for four months, and that the Germans would not be able to stay so long in the country. He told Lord Lyons that he approved of the armistice on the terms proposed by the Government of Paris, and implied that he did, rather than not, approve of the readiness of that Government to conclude one still, if through the representations of the neutrals Prussia should yet be brought to consent to reasonable terms for one. He manifested great indignation at Bismarck's contention that there was no Government in France, maintained that the Government of National Defence was a properly constituted Government entitled to exercise all the powers of the nation, and said that there was no need whatever of a Constitutional Assembly. As for General d'Aurelle des Paladines, his hour of triumph was soon terminated; the Prussians drove him out of Orleans, and his failure was ascribed by the Republicans to his action in proceeding to venerate some relics in the Orleans cathedral.

In the meanwhile Mr. Gladstone's Government found themselves confronted with a difficulty which had to some extent been foreseen, but which was entirely unexpected at that particular moment. In the beginning of November, Prince Gortschakoff issued a circular denouncing the clauses of the Treaty of Paris which related to the Black Sea. Lord Granville communicated the intelligence in a letter to Lord Lyons dated November 11.

* * * * *

Foreign Office, Nov. 11, 1870.

The shell has fallen suddenly. I expected it, but not in so abrupt a
form. If it was to come, I am not sure that I regret the way it has
done. Do not communicate officially my answer till the Russian
Government has received theirs: the messenger leaves London
to-night.

I am curious to hear what the Provisional Government will say. I
presume they will try to make a bargain on the subject. You will of
course explain to them that it is, at the very least, a more serious
subject for them than for us.

The handling of the matter is delicate and difficult. We are
unanimous about the first step, more in doubt about the next.

If Bernstorff gets permission to give a safe conduct to Odo Russell,
we mean to send him to-morrow to Versailles with our answer and a
private letter from me to Bismarck. I presume there is a private
understanding between Russia and Prussia, but it is not certain;
Bernstorff as usual was dumb, but intimated his surprise at the
form.

He tells me that my question will be met with a negative as to
provisioning Paris: the Generals will not hear of it. If so, I shall
ask whether he will still give facilities for an election without an
armistice, and then I shall request you to press the expediency of
summoning a Chamber on the Provisional Government--always declaring
that you do not wish to interfere with the self-government of
France.

Why it should have been assumed that the action of the Russian Government was more serious as regards the French than ourselves, is not particularly clear. Whatever the French Government may have said in public on the subject, there can be little doubt that in secret they hailed it as a welcome diversion which might be turned to advantage. If it brought about a congress or conference, it might cause a stir amongst neutrals resulting in a check to Prussia as well as to Russia. The ingenious Thiers at once grasped at the possibility of forming an European Alliance against these two Powers.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Tours, Nov. 14, 1870.

Thiers has just paid me so long a visit that he has left me very
little time to write. His notion is that England, Austria, Italy,
Turkey and Spain should now unite with France to check the
aggression of Prussia and Russia, and he thinks that without war
this would lead to a Congress in which all Europe would settle the
terms of peace. If England lets the occasion go by, it will, in his
opinion, be she, not France, who will have sunk to the rank of a
second-rate Power. I thought my prudent course was to listen and say
nothing, which, as you know, is easy with him; for he talks too well
for one to be bored with him, and is quite content to talk without
interruption.

He had a violent argument with Chaudordy in the presence of
Metternich and me on the subject of the elections. Chaudordy
maintains the Government view that they are impossible without an
armistice. Thiers took the other side, and at last cried out: 'They
will at least be much more free under the Prussians than under
Gambetta's Prefects!'

In 'Bismarck, his Reflections and Reminiscences,' there occurs the suggestive passage:--

'It was consequently a fortunate thing that the situation offered a
possibility of doing Russia a service in respect to the Black Sea.
Just as the sensibilities of the Russian Court, which owing to
the Russian relationship of Queen Mary were enlisted by the loss of
the Hanoverian Crown, found their counterpoise in the concessions
which were made to the Oldenburg connexions of the Russian dynasty
in territorial and financial directions in 1866; so did the
possibility occur in 1870 of doing a service not only to the
dynasty, but also to the Russian Empire.... We had in this an
opportunity of improving our relations with Russia.'

There can hardly be a shadow of a doubt that the denunciation of the Black Sea clauses was what is vulgarly called a 'put up job' between Bismarck and the Russian Government, probably arranged at Ems in the spring; but when Mr. Odo Russell made his appearance at Versailles in order to discuss the question, Bismarck assured him that the Russian action had not met with his sanction and added that the circular was ill-timed and ill-advised. (In private, he subsequently expressed the opinion that the Russians had been much too modest in their demands and ought to have asked for more.) As, however, the face of the British Government had to be saved somehow, a Conference in London was suggested, and the efforts of Lord Granville were concentrated upon an attempt to persuade the Provisional Government of France to take part in it. This proved difficult, for the French made it clear that they were not anxious to do so unless they could get some advantage out of it, and intimated that they meant to accept aid from any quarter where it might be obtained--even from the 'Satanic Alliance,' as Thiers called it, of Russia. One of the difficulties encountered in dealing with the French Government arose from the discrepancy between language used in London by the French Ambassador and that used by Chaudordy at Tours. The latter was not a Minister and the Government consequently did not feel bound to support him. Chaudordy himself took advantage of his anomalous position to talk freely and to treat what he had said, according to circumstances, as pledging or not pledging the Government, and, besides this, the Government at Tours was liable to be disavowed by the Government at Paris.

How serious the situation was considered to be in London may be judged by the following two letters from Lord Granville to Lord Lyons.

* * * * *

Foreign Office, Nov. 28, 1870.

Pray exert all your influence to obtain the assent of France to the
Conference. It will of course be an annoyance to her that peace
instead of war prevails, and there is no doubt that a general
conflagration might be of advantage to her. But you may point out
that the very nature of the question almost precludes instant and
offensive war, and that hostilities distant in point of time would
be nothing but an embarrassment to her.

With regard to the Diplomatic position, it is a great step for the
Provisional Government that Prussia has asked us to obtain her
consent to a Conference. On the other hand, it would be a severe
blow to the Provisional Government if they were left out in the
cold, while the other Powers were settling a question of so much
interest to France.

If such an unfortunate state of things were to occur, we should do
our best to protect the dignity of France, but it would be
difficult. Do not encourage France to suggest delay.

* * * * *

Foreign Office, Nov. 30, 1870.

The French are unwisely playing the same game as they did under
Gramont about the Belgian Treaty. In each case, Bismarck had the
sense to do at once what was to be done.

It is an enormous step for the Provisional Government to be
recognized by Prussia, Austria, Turkey, Italy, and England as
capable of attending a Conference, and it will be very foolish of
them to lose the opportunity and remain out in the cold.

As London is the place, it would be my duty to issue the formal
invitations; at least I suppose so. Do your best to persuade them.

The Government here wish to hold their own, but are most desirous of
a prompt and peaceable solution of this 'Circular' question.

We shall adhere to anything we say, but you will observe that we are
not rash.

Turkey, Austria and Italy are not pleasant reeds to rest on.

If we go to war, we shall be very like the man with a pistol before
a crowd, _after_ he has fired it off. Do not let a pacific word,
however, escape your lips.

These two letters are a sufficiently clear indication of the highly uncomfortable position in which H.M. Government found itself involved, and of the urgent necessity of discovering some face-saving formula. France being incapacitated, it could hardly be supposed that Austria and Italy would go to war with Russia on account of a question whether Russia should or should not maintain a fleet in the Black Sea, and England with her ludicrous military establishments would therefore have been left to undertake the contest single-handed, or, at most, with the assistance of Turkey.

Ultimately, of course, a Black Sea Conference met in London, and a French representative, the Duc de Broglie, put in an appearance just as it was terminating, after ineffectual efforts had been made to secure the presence of M. Jules Favre. Lord Fitzmaurice, in his 'Life of Lord Granville,' has elaborately endeavoured to show that the Conference resulted in a triumph for British diplomacy. If the acceptance of a particular form of words (of which, by the way, no notice was taken by Count Aehrenthal when he annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in defiance of the Treaty of Berlin), constitutes a success, then Mr. Gladstone's Government were entitled to congratulate themselves; but as the Russians got their way and established their right to maintain a fleet in the Black Sea, they could legitimately claim that for all practical purposes the triumph was theirs.

In the course of his interviews with Thiers, Bismarck had denounced England, and before the end of 1870 the feeling between England and Prussia was anything but friendly. At the outbreak of hostilities British sympathy had been almost universally on the side of Prussia, but as the war progressed, public opinion began to veer round. The change in opinion was due partly to sympathy with a losing cause, partly to an impression that the Prussians were inclined to put forward unjust and exaggerated demands, partly to the violent abuse which appeared in the press of both countries, as well as to a variety of other causes. A letter from Mr. Henry Wodehouse, one of the secretaries at the Paris Embassy, shows that the Crown Prince of Prussia, whose Anglophil sympathies were well known, deplored the tone of the German papers, and alludes at the same time to a domestic squabble in high German circles, thus showing that the Prussian Government as well as the French was not entirely exempt from internal dissensions.

* * * * *

_Mr. Wodehouse to Lord Lyons._

Rouen, Nov. 16, 1870.

On Monday morning, before leaving Versailles, I had an interview
with the Crown Prince of Prussia at H.R.H.'s desire.

H.R.H. informed me that, at the last moment, when it was thought
that all was arranged for the Union of South Germany with the North
German Confederation, the Würtemberg Minister, instigated, it was
believed, by the Bavarian Government, had asked for a delay in order
to consult the other members of the Würtemberg Government, and had
started for Stuttgardt with this object. This sudden decision had
caused the King of Prussia and his Government very great annoyance.

H.R.H. spoke of the hostile tone lately adopted towards England by
the German press, which he assured me, was quite contrary to the
wishes of the Prussian Government, and that he himself much
regretted it, as he feared it would give rise to a spirit of
animosity between Prussia and England.

H.R.H. desired me to report this conversation to Lord Granville on
my arrival in England.

As was shown in the case of the American Civil War, it is extremely difficult for a neutral to keep on good terms with both parties, however much it may be desired to preserve an absolutely impartial attitude. The French blamed us because they considered that we had not rendered them the kind of assistance which they thought was due to them. The Prussians, on the other hand, were always discovering grievances which betrayed our partiality. Upon the whole it is not surprising that our attitude provoked excessive irritation on their part, for we were continually harping on and deploring the iniquities of war, while perfectly ready to make a handsome profit out of it by selling anything to the belligerents. The late Sir Robert Morier admirably described the British attitude as it appeared to German eyes. "We sit by like a bloated Quaker, too holy to fight, but rubbing our hands at the roaring trade we are driving in cartridges and ammunition. We are heaping up to ourselves the undying hatred of this German race, that will henceforth rule the world, because we cannot muster up courage to prevent a few Brummagem manufacturers from driving their unholy trade."[24] It is only fair to add, however, that German censure was confined to England; the Americans, who exported arms in just the same way, were never denounced, but possibly this was due to the fact that they assumed a less self-righteous attitude.

Whatever may have been Bismarck's private sentiments with regard to England, he was not unconciliatory in public, and the various difficulties which arose were settled satisfactorily. One of the last unpleasant episodes was the sinking of several British merchant vessels in the Seine by the Prussian artillery towards the close of the year, for which compensation was demanded, and a passage in Busch's 'Bismarck' shows his method of dealing with such matters. 'When the Germans, a short time before the conclusion of the Preliminary Peace at Versailles, sank some English coal ships on the Lower Seine and the English made a row on the subject, the chief asked me (Lothar Bucher), What can we say in reply? Well, I had brought with me some old fogies on the Law of Nations and such matters. I hunted up what the old writers called the Jus Angariæ, that is to say, the right to destroy the property of neutrals on payment of full compensation, and showed it to the chief. He sent me with it to Russell, who showed himself to be convinced by this "good authority." Shortly afterwards the whole affair with the Jus Angariæ appeared in the _Times_. We wrote in the same sense to London, and the matter was settled.'

Mr. Odo Russell, whose presence at Versailles had been utilized to ascertain what terms of peace were likely to be granted, wrote before the middle of December that he was convinced that Bismarck would refuse to treat except upon the basis of unconditional surrender, and the failure of the sorties from Paris and of the operations near Orleans caused Thiers to lose heart, although Gambetta was as determined as ever to continue the struggle and to postpone the convocation of a National Assembly for as long as possible. Thiers indeed went so far as to declare in private to the Ambassador that further resistance was useless, and that it was a crime as well as a folly to continue it. The last disasters of the French, which were partly due to two shocking pieces of bad luck--the balloon which should have brought Trochu's plan for combined action with the Army of the Loire having been blown off to Christiania, and a sudden rise of the Marne having rendered co-operation with General Vinoy impossible--forced the Tours Government and the Diplomatists to migrate to Bordeaux. An offer on the part of the Foreign Office to send a warship to that port for the benefit of the Ambassador and his staff was declined with thanks: 'Under ordinary circumstances, I think I am better without one, and indeed personally I should be much less afraid of the Prussians than of the Bay of Biscay.'

It used to be a tradition in after years that the sole perceptible effect of the Franco-German War upon the British Embassy was that Lord Lyons's footmen ceased temporarily to powder their hair, but to judge by a letter to Hammond, Ambassadors suffered inconveniences as well as humbler people.

It is probable too that the social disorganization produced by the war provided distinguished diplomatists, who are necessarily amongst the most ceremonious of mankind, with some novel sensations. Upon one occasion, when Lord Lyons had occasion to call upon Gambetta, the Dictator was too busy to see him for some minutes, and deputed a subordinate to make his excuses. The latter began his conversation with the remark: 'Allons boire un bock!' a hospitable invitation hardly in accordance with the traditions of conventional diplomacy.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond._

Bordeaux, Dec. 12, 1870.

Many thanks for the _Bradshaw_ and the _Times_, and very many more
for your letter of the 7th, which has just arrived by messenger.

Not having the archives here, I cannot look up the regulations about
the expenses of an Embassy on its travels, as this is now. What I am
anxious about is that some compensation should be made to the junior
members who are with me, for the additional expense they are put to
by their migration. I am willing to do anything I can for them, but
there are of course limits to what I can afford, and it would be
utterly repugnant to all my feelings and principles, for me to have
an allowance for entertaining them. In old times, when manners and
feelings were different, this might do; but in the present day the
position of an hotel keeper for his subordinates is destructive of
discipline and comfortable relations between a chief and the members
of his Embassy.

The difficulty of finding lodgings and the prices are much greater
than they were at Paris. I have nothing but one room for study,
drawing-room, bedroom and all; and have just been asked six hundred
pounds a month for one floor of a moderate sized house.

The junior members alluded to included Malet and Sheffield. It had, of course, been necessary to leave some of the staff at Paris.

In spite of Thiers's failure to obtain an armistice, the French Government still made strenuous efforts in the same direction and even succeeded in pressing the Pope into their service. The latter broached the subject to Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Rome, proposing that the revictualling of Paris should be accepted as a basis, and received a severe snub for his pains. He was informed, 'in very harsh terms,' that the proposal could not be considered, and further, that it was impossible to negotiate with a nation whose bad faith was scandalously exhibited by the daily appearance in arms of French officers who had given their word of honour not to serve again during the war. After much haggling, the French proposals resolved themselves into three alternatives, each of which was categorically rejected by Bismarck.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Mr. Layard._[25]

Bordeaux, Dec. 20, 1870.

The difficulty of communication is between this place and England,
and arises from the utter irregularity of all trains, caused by the
movements of the troops. St. Malo has become the usual port of
embarkation and disembarkation for our messengers.

Things are at present at a deadlock. The French want: either a peace
without cession of territory; or an armistice with the revictualling
of Paris for the number of days it lasts; or a European Congress to
settle the terms of peace between France and Germany. Bismarck
peremptorily rejects all three proposals, and does not say precisely
what his conditions of peace are. I suppose the King of Prussia
holds to taking Paris as a satisfaction to military vanity, and that
if the military situation continues favourable to Germany, he will
accept nothing much short of unconditional surrender, while Paris
resists. Of course, unless, by a miracle, Paris is relieved, its
surrender is a question of time--but of how much time? They declare
here that it can hold out without any very material suffering until
the middle of January, and for many weeks longer, if the population
will be content to live on bread and wine. But, supposing Paris to
fall, will peace be made? Here it is declared that the South will
still continue the war, and at any rate there seems to be every
probability that the violent party will not surrender its power
without a struggle. Then the financial question must soon become a
difficulty. I am told that since the investment of Paris began three
months ago, not less than thirty-two millions sterling have been
spent. It is however idle to speculate when events march so fast. I
can tell you little of the present state of the armies. Bourbaki is,
I believe, at Bourges, and Chanzy at Le Mans. I have a military
attaché,[26] Fielding, who has been with Chanzy's army during all the
affairs near Orleans and since, and who has the highest opinion of
his military talents.

The acceptance, pure and simple, of the Conference on the Russian
question arrived from Paris the day before yesterday.

Towards the close of December the remarkable elasticity of the French character was manifested in a recovery from the depression which had been produced by the failure of the sorties from Paris and the recapture of Orleans by the Germans. The overpowering energy of Gambetta was chiefly responsible for the creation of new armies, and the moment again appeared unfavourable for peaceful counsels. Thiers and his party considered that the Government was only pushing the country on to more complete ruin, and were urgent in their call for a National Assembly. The majority of the great towns of the South, Bordeaux included, were against an Assembly or any interference with the existing Government, and Gambetta and his adherents were determined to go on with the war and keep themselves in power by all means available. Gambetta was the only member of the Government outside Paris who counted for anything, and the moderates were placed at a considerable disadvantage owing to Jules Favre being detained there.

Thiers, who had never joined the Government, prognosticated that it would immediately come to an end upon the fall of Paris, and that a moderate (_honnête_) republic would be established in the greater part of the country, while Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon and other places in the south would set up a socialistic form of government, and do an enormous amount of harm before suppression. In the opinion of competent judges, if the country could have been fairly polled at this particular period, the majority (consisting of course mainly of the peasants) would have been found to be Bonapartist, in spite of all that had taken place. The bourgeoisie and inhabitants of the smaller towns would have shown themselves to be in favour of quiet and security of property, and would therefore have probably voted for the Orleanists, as the best representatives of those principles; and the masses in the large towns would have turned out to be republican and socialist. A genuinely free expression of opinion would, however, have been difficult to secure, for Gambetta's prefects were, if anything, more unscrupulous than the Emperor's and, under existing circumstances, had greater means of downright intimidation.

In the closing days of 1870 fresh efforts were made by H.M. Government to start the Black Sea Conference as soon as possible, and to persuade the French to send a representative without delay. Under the circumstances, it might have been supposed that they would have named their Ambassador in London, but for some obscure reason, it was decided that Jules Favre was the only possible man, and as he was shut up in Paris it was necessary to obtain a safe conduct for him from the Germans. The following letter is of interest as an impartial appreciation of Jules Favre, and as containing some sage opinions upon the question of the Black Sea and the Dardanelles.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Bordeaux, Dec. 26, 1870.

I did all I could in favour of Tissot. He would have been a much
more convenient plenipotentiary than Jules Favre and have
facilitated the business of the Conference and the speedy
termination of it. Jules Favre is, I believe an honest and really
patriotic man--by which I mean a man who will sacrifice his own
position and interests to what he believes to be the real good of
his country. But he has not hitherto shown himself to be a good
diplomatist or a skilful negotiator, and is too much led away by his
feelings to be a good practical man of business. He will at all
events go to London with a real knowledge of the state of things in
Paris, and if he thinks the convocation of a National Assembly
feasible and advisable, will have more means than any one else of
bringing it about in spite of Gambetta. It will be good too that he
should see for himself what the real feelings and intentions of the
English Government are. He is a man, who would, I should think, be
touched by real kindness and consideration for his country and
himself in these times, and sensitive in case anything like a slight
was put upon him or them--and particularly if the situation of
France were not taken very seriously by all who approach him. He was
a fierce and even truculent orator in the Chamber, but in private
life is mild and agreeable. His power of speaking may be an
inconvenience in the Diplomatic Conference, and I fancy he is led
away by his 'verve' when he does get into a speech, and says
sometimes things more forcible than judicious. I should think he
would never himself sign a peace by which territory was yielded, but
I conceive him to be a man who would make room for others to do so,
and help them, if he was really convinced that it was necessary for
France.

I suppose the Germans will make no difficulty about the safe
conduct: it is for their interest to have some influential member of
the Government who might enable peace to be made in an emergency, in
which Gambetta might, if unchecked, have recourse to desperate
measures.